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American Strategy in the Soviet-Afghan War Schearer 2
ABSTRACT
After the American disaster in Vietnam, U.S. foreign policy
gave way to significant Soviet gains in the 1970s. With the
fall of Saigon in 1975 and the Soviet expansionism in Southeast
Asia and Africa, the Soviets capitalized on the lack of
leadership in American foreign policy to expand their influence
around the globe.
This paper explores one particular strain of the Cold War,
in particular the Soviet-Afghan war and the role that the United
States strategy played in affecting the outcome of that war.
The Americans first sought to increase costs for the Soviet
Union by supplying funds and Soviet-style arms to the Afghan
resistance (mujahadeen). Second, President Reagan escalated the
conflict as part of a larger strategy, the "Reagan Doctrine."
Third, the American strategy was integral in the Soviet
withdrawal in 1988-1989 and served as an important component to
ending the Cold War.
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SUMMARY
This paper explores the Soviet-Afghan war and the role that
the United States strategy played in affecting the outcome of
that war. This paper first establishes the historical context
by briefly exploring the events that precipitated the Soviet
invasion. Second, the initial American response, dictated
largely by President Carter and his National Security Advisor
Zbigniew Brzezinski, is discussed in the context of the Soviet
invasion. Third, I review the continuation of this policy under
President Reagan. Fourth, I explore the escalation between
1983-1986 and the role of the Chinese and the impact that it had
on the eventual Soviet withdrawal. Finally, I attempt to
determine the reasons for the Soviet withdrawal as well as the
strategic implications of the end of the Soviet-Afghan war.
I reach three conclusions: First, Presidents Carter and
Reagan, as part of a "bleeder" strategy, supplied funds and
Soviet-style arms to the mujahadeen. Second, The escalation by
the United States in 1985-1986 sought to push the Soviets out of
Afghanistan. Third, the covert campaign against the Soviets in
Afghanistan was part and parcel of larger strategy, the "Reagan
Doctrine," which sought to roll-back Soviet gains in the Third
World. Ultimately, this helped to end the Cold War.
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AMERICAN STRATEGY IN THE SOVIET-AFGHAN WAR
PROLOGUE
On July 3, 1979, President Jimmy Carter's National Security
Advisor, Zbigniew Brzezinski, wrote a note to the President in
which he explained how he believed American aid to the
mujahadeen in Afghanistan would increase the likelihood of a
Soviet invasion. That same day, President Carter signed a
secret directive that began the CIA's decade-long program of
assistance to the Afghan resistance. According to Brzezinski,
"[t]hat secret operation was an excellent idea...The effect was
to draw the Russians into...[Afghanistan]."1 Brzezinski, "[a]
virulent anti-Communist of Polish origin...saw his chance in
Moscow's Afghanistan intervention to rival Henry Kissinger as a
heavyweight strategic thinker."2 The trap had been set.
INTRODUCTION
After the American disaster in Vietnam, U.S. foreign policy
gave way to significant Soviet gains in the 1970s. With the
fall of Saigon in 1975 and the Soviet expansionism in Southeast
Asia and Africa, the Soviets capitalized on the lack of
1 "CIA Helped Mujahideen Before Soviet Intervention," NouvelObservateur, 15 January 1998, accessed online athttp://www.geocities.com/CollegePark/Library/9803/world_affairs/cia_afgan.html; 20 April 1999.
2 Dilip Hiro, "Islamic Militants, Once Encouraged by the United States,Now Threaten It," The Nation, 15 February 1999, accessed online athttp://www.afghanradio.com/jan29g1999.htm; 20 April 1999.
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leadership in American foreign policy to expand their influence
around the globe. Soviet repression of Czech human rights and
the perceived deficiencies of SALT II were seen vis--vis the
weakness of President Carters foreign policy. Further, the
economic recession, together with the Islamic fundamentalist
revolution in Iran, further entrenched Americans in pessimism.
Finally, in December 1979, the Soviets invaded Afghanistan.
This event, more than any other, marked the failure of SALT II,
the end of dtente, and the beginning of a new phase in the Cold
War.
The goal of this paper is to explore one particular strain
of that new phase, in particular the Soviet-Afghan war and the
role that the United States (especially the Central Intelligence
Agency) played in affecting the outcome of that war. The thesis
of this paper is threefold. First, the goal of the initial
American response was to increase costs for the Soviet Union by
supplying funds and Soviet-style arms to the Afghan resistance
(mujahadeen). Second, President Reagan sought to escalate the
conflict as part of a larger strategy, the "Reagan Doctrine,"
which sought to move beyond containment and roll back Soviet
gains made in the Third World as a result of its 1970s
expansionist policy. Finally, American assistance to the
mujahadeen, especially the escalation by President Reagan,
together with assistance from China (and others), was integral
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in the Soviet withdrawal in 1988-1989 and served as an important
component to ending the Cold War.
To these ends, this paper will first establish the
historical context by briefly exploring the events that
precipitated the Soviet invasion. Second, the initial American
response, dictated largely by President Carter and his National
Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski, will be discussed in the
context of the Soviet invasion. Third, we will review the
continuation of this policy under President Reagan. Fourth, and
perhaps most importantly, the escalation between 1983-1986 and
the role of the Chinese and the impact that it had on the
eventual Soviet withdrawal will be explored. Finally, we will
attempt to determine the reasons for the Soviet withdrawal as
well as the strategic implications of the end of the Soviet-
Afghan war.
BACKGROUND
While this paper does not intend to be a historical piece
on either Afghanistan or the Soviet-Afghan war, it would be
impossible to discuss the role of the United States in this
conflict without first establishing some sort of historical
context.
Soviet Imperialism and the Breakdown of Dtente
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Soviet imperialism in the Third World characterized the
later half of the 1970s. As part and parcel of the Brezhnev
Doctrine, the Soviet Union supported socialist and communist
movements in their national liberation wars.3 Between 1975 and
1979, eight dictatorships were established as Soviet client-
states: South Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, Mozambique, Angola,
Ethiopia, Grenada, and Nicaragua. A ninth, Afghanistan,
suffered its communist coup in April 1978. In addition, despite
signing the Helsinki Accord in 1975, Moscow intimidated,
persecuted, and imprisoned the Czechoslovak Charter 77
dissidents, among them the playwright Vclav Havel. The
American Right, led by then-candidate Ronald Reagan, condemned
SALT II and suggested Carter was soft on the Soviet Union.4
Jeane J. Kirkpatrick summed up the prevailing opinion that
emerged:
There was a strong view that dtente was not workingand that the United States was becoming progressivelyweaker and the Soviet Union not only progressivelystronger in relationship to the United States and theWest, but also more aggressive.5
The fall of the Shah in Iran (worsened by the resulting oil
shortages and the failed Desert One disaster) together
3 Jeane J. Kirkpatrick and Allan Gerson, The Reagan Doctrine, HumanRights, and International Law, in Right v. Might: International Law and theUse of Force. 2nd ed. (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1991),23.
4 Ronald Reagan, Interview, CNN's Cold War, Cable News Network, Episode19, accessed online athttp://cnn.com/SPECIALS/cold.war/episodes/19/script.html; 20 April 1999.
5 Jeane Kirkpatrick, Interview, Ibid.
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with the deepening economic crisis entrenched the United
States in a deep pessimism. In short, dtente had broken
down, its future in serious jeopardy.
Afghanistan, 1978-1979
If ever a country needed a revolution it was Afghanistan. By themid-1970s all other forms of government had been tried and hadproved themselves bankrupt. Successive governments had failed tomake Afghanistans people literate, failed to improve the lot ofminority ethnic groups, failed to gain respect or status forwomen, and failed to give the country any substantialgovernmental or industrial infrastructure. In short, they hadfailed to create a 20th-century state. In April 1978, Afghanistan
got its revolution.6
The revolution in Afghanistan had its roots in the April
15, 1978 murder of Mir Akber Khyber, a leader in the Peoples
Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA). When Khybers funeral
developed into a demonstration, the secret police of President
Mohammed Daoud subsequently arrested a number of significant
PDPA leaders, yet failed to arrest their military counterparts.7
On April 27, the 4th and 15th Armored Brigades (those forces loyal
to the PDPA) moved on Kabul, securing the Defense Ministry and
the airport.8 MiG-21s of the 322nd Air Regiment strafed the
Central Corps and 8th Division headquarters of the Army,
primarily to deter wavering units from intervening.9 Finally,
the combination of a deadly air strike and armor and mechanized
6 Mark Urban, War in Afghanistan, 2nd ed. (New York: St. Martin's Press,1990), 5.
7 Ibid., 7.8 Ibid., 7-8.9 Ibid., 8.
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infantry attacks on the Presidential Palace resulted in the
defeat of the Daoud regime.10 On April 30, 1978, Nur Mohammed
Taraki became President and Prime Minister of the Democratic
Republic of Afghanistan.
The establishment of the new regime met with immediate
resistance within both the Army and among the peasantry.
Despite two purges, military units lacked any significant party
organization.11 The allegiances of the Afghan soldier,
journalist Mark Urban writes, were...torn between state and
tribe or village.12 Furthermore, the new governments socialist
reforms provoked opposition among rural rebels. Combined with
mass executions and the brutal suppression of Islam, the
governments socialist agenda mobilized peasants against the
government. In September 1978, the rebel groups declared a
jihad (holy war) against the Taraki government.13 In this
declaration lies the birth of the Afghan resistance movement
known as the mujahadeen (holy warriors or fighters of God).14
Throughout 1979, the mujahadeen continued to gain strength,
primarily in rural areas. This was bolstered in mid-1979 when
the CIA began to intervene.15 A power struggle ensued between
10 Ibid.11 Ibid., 22.12 Ibid.13 Ibid.; Kurt Lohbeck, Holy War, Unholy Victory: Eyewitness to the
CIAs Secret War in Afghanistan (Washington, D.C.: Regnery Gateway, 1993), 36.14 Lohbeck, 36; Urban, xi.15 While most literature focuses on post-invasion operations by the
Central Intelligence Agency, it appears likely that covert assistance beganin mid-1979, primarily from three sources: first, the admission by then-
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President and Prime Minister Taraki and deputy prime minister
and foreign minister Hafizullah Amin. Amin capitalized on
continued revolt by the resistance and further demoralization of
the Army.16 By July 1979, he had taken over as both Prime
Minister and Defense Minister. When a confrontation between
Taraki and Amin erupted into gunfire, Major Taroun (an aide of
Taraki) was killed.17 Within days, Tarakis death was announced;
Amin had now seized control of the government.18
The Soviets opposed Amin. Claiming they despised the KGB,
[Soviet military officers] assured [Amin] of their protection.
In order to protect Amin, the number of Soviet advisors
increased dramatically....19 The initial Soviet objective of
the operation was to replace Amin with Babrak Karmal, another
PDPA leader who was thought to be able to secure broader
support from the people and the party.20 As Soviet paratroops
remarked to Kabul Radio operators on the night of December 27,
we've come "to save the revolution."21
National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski, "CIA Helped Mujahideen BeforeSoviet Intervention," Nouvel Observateur, 15 January 1998, accessed online athttp://www.geocities.com/CollegePark/Library/9803/world_affairs/cia_afgan.html; 20 April 1999; second, a Soviet source who claimed that a freighter
called the Al-Kasum, laden with arms, arrived at the Pakistani port ofKarachi in June 1979, Vladimir Efros, Afghanistan: US Terrorism in Action,in Urban, 29; and third, the report that documents from the American embassyin Tehran suggest CIA involvement at this time, Urban, 29.
16 Urban, 31-36.17 Ibid., 38.18 Lohbeck, 40-41; Urban, 38.19 Lohbeck, 41.20 Urban, 42.21 Ibid., 46.
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The Invasion
By the last week of December, all was quiet as far as theAfghan military was concerned uneasy, perhaps, but quiet. The
Westerners in the Afghan capital were preparing for a subduedcelebration of the Christian feastday. Although Christmas Eve isnot celebrated in Kabul, and it is certainly not an Islamicholiday, December 24, 1979, will not be soon forgotten in Islamic
Afghanistan.22
Beginning on December 24, 1979, the Soviet Union invaded
Afghanistan with four motor rifle divisions (66th, 201st, 357th,
and 360th) and one and a half air assault divisions (105th
Guards, reinforced with regiments from the 103rd Guards and
104th Guards).23 The reinforced air assault division was flown
in to seize key targets, while the 40th Army made a two-pronged
thrust toward the Salang pass in the east and to Herat in the
west.24
At the same time, the Communist party paper Pravda was
calling Western reports of the invasion "pure inventions" and
repeated charges that the CIA and the Chinese were aiding Afghan
rebels.25 By the time the invasion could no longer be denied,
Karmal, newly-installed by the Soviet-back coup, made a fait
accompli plea for Soviet assistance.26 Brezhnev abetted Karmal's
plea by responding to President Carter with the reply that the
22 Lohbeck, 41.23 Urban, 42. See Appendix II, 314-319, for the Soviet order of battle.24 Ibid., 46-47.25 Paper Denies Troop Reports, The Washington Post, 25 December 1979,
A39.26 Urban, 47. In fact, 15,000 to 20,000 Soviet troops were already in
Afghanistan by this time.
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Soviet action was a response to an invitation.27 Karmal
continued the absurd rhetoric by suggesting that "with the
fraternal assistance and undiminishing cooperation [of the
Soviets,] we shall win and overcome...."28 The war had begun.
THE AMERICAN RESPONSE
After the April 1978 communist coup, the Carter
administration remained silent:
No official statements were issued decrying the lossof thousands of lives of Afghans during the coup, nopresidential voice rang out against the murderouspurges that instantly swept the country...Washingtonhad conceded the legitimacy of a Soviet puppet regime.29
Given this response (or lack thereof to be more precise), it is
not difficult to wonder why the Soviets expected the American
response to the invasion to be "equally spineless."30 Yet in
this respect, the Soviets miscalculated. According to
journalist Kurt Lohbeck, "Carter reacted explosively."31 In
remarks on December 28, Carter called the invasion "a grave
threat to peace."32 In a January 4, 1980, address to the nation,
Carter called for the suspension of Senate consideration of SALT
II, halted the exportation of certain high technology items,
27 Lohbeck, 43.28 Kevin Klose, Soviets Say CIA Trained Afghan Rebels in Pakistan, The
Washington Post, 2 January 1980, A3.29 Lohbeck, 37.30 Ibid., 43.31 Ibid.32 White House, "American Hostages in Iran and Soviet Intervention in
Afghanistan," 28 December 1979, Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents15:52 (1979): 2287.
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restricted Soviet fishing rights, and blocked further grain
sales.33 Speaking to Members of Congress at the White House,
Carter said that he believed "the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan
is the greatest threat to peace since the Second World War.
It's a sharp escalation in the aggressive history of the Soviet
Union."34 Perhaps most significant, though, was Carter's call
that "[t]he response of the international community to the
Soviet attempt to crush Afghanistan must match the gravity of
the Soviet action."35 This statement, more than any other,
marked the beginning of a new phase in the Cold War.
Brzezinski had persuaded Carter in July 1979 to aid the
mujahadeen based on the strategic calculation that it would
increase the likelihood of Soviet invasion. The goal was the
potential ability, as Brzezinski put it, "to finally sow shit in
their backyard."36 Brzezinski saw the opportunity to make
Afghanistan the Soviet Union's Vietnam. Just days after the
invasion, Carter increased covert aid to the mujahadeen,
funneling weapons through Pakistan.37
33 White House, "Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan," 4 January 1980, WeeklyCompilation of Presidential Documents 16:2 (1980): 26-27.
34White House, "Situation in Iran and Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan," 8
January 1970, Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents 16:2 (1980): 40.
35 "Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan," 27.36 Lohbeck, 43.37 James M. Scott, Deciding to Intervene: The Reagan Doctrine and
American Foreign Policy(Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1996), 45.According to Scott, the weapons were mainly .303 Enfield rifles. Furtherresearch by this author suggests that these weapons, British in manufacture,mayhave been fabricated and refurbished at the Pakistan Ordnance Factory inWah, Pakistan. See "A Brief History of Lee-Enfield Rifles," accessed online
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The covert weapons program begun under President Carter and
continued under President Reagan was an international effort
with the financial efforts of the United States (mainly the
CIA), the Saudis, and the British, and weapons from China,
Egypt, Pakistan, and eventually Israel.38 To maintain plausible
deniability, "it was a firm policy that only communist block
weapons could be bought."39 To secure these commitments, the
Carter administration sent Secretary of Defense Harold Brown to
China and Brzezinski to Pakistan.40 Brown "found the Chinese
ready to commit to active opposition...they began to funnel
weapons...through Pakistan, with whom they had a long-standing
relationship."41 Brzezinski visited Pakistan to meet with
General Zia. According to journalist Kurt Lohbeck:
Brzezinski was the perfect envoy to send to Zia.The two men were among the few in the world's
political hierarchy who believed that merely haltingSoviet expansion would be insufficient; it must besharply curtailed. Furthermore, they agreed thatAfghanistan was the place to begin.42
These meetings, together with a new-found sense of urgency in
the Carter administration, resulted in the development of an
internationally-supported arms network operating against the
at http://www.uidaho.edu/~stratton/history.htm; 29 April 1999.38 Lohbeck, 45; Mohmammad Yousaf and Mark Adkin, The Bear Trap:
Afghanistan's Untold Story(London: Leo Cooper, 1992) 83-84. General Yousafnotes that the Israeli weapons were Soviet-style "that had been captured inlarge quantities during Israel's invasion of the [sic] Lebanon."
39 Yousaf and Adkin, 83.40 Lohbeck, 44-45.41 Ibid., 44.42 Ibid., 45.
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Soviets (see Figure 1).
While the program was covert, reports of assistance began
to surface immediately. Soviet reports of CIA training of the
mujahadeen appeared as early as December 25, 1979.43 On February
15, 1980, The Washington Post reported on the weapons supply,
which an unidentified source called "neither big nor dramatic,"
yet "is a significant step beyond the aid the United States was
providing...prior to the Soviet invasion."44 But whether covert
or overt, the objective was clear: the goal of the initial
American response was to increase costs for the Soviet Union.
The trap set by Brzezinski in July 1979 had begun to close.
Figure 1. The Money Flow
MONEY
USA ARABSSAUDI ARABIA
CIA
Arms Purchases
ChinaEgypt
Israel
America
Britain
ISI ISIRawakpindi & Quetta IsIamabad
43Paper Denies Troop Reports, The Washington Post, 25 December 1979,
A39; see also Kevin Klose, Soviets Say CIA Trained Afghan Rebels inPakistan, The Washington Post, 2 January 1980, A3.
44 Michael Getler, "U.S. Reportedly Is Supplying Weapons to AfghanInsurgents, Afghan Rebel Forces Reportedly Getting U.S. Arms Assistance," TheWashington Post, 15 February 1980, A1.
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M U J A H A D E E N
Money
Arms and Software
Figure 1. The Money Flow. Reprinted from Mohammad Yousaf and Mark Adkin,The Bear Trap: Afghanistan's Untold Story(London: Leo Cooper, 1992), 82.
THE REAGAN ESCALATION
Of the four wars in my lifetime, none came about because the U.S.was too strong.
--Ronald Reagan
The foreign policy situation at the outset of the Reagan
administration was not at all positive. It became clear that
dtente had failed. American restraint in weapons development
and deployment combined with the "unprecedented" Soviet military
build-up and Third-World expansion had demoralized the United
States.45 According to Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, "[t]he problem
confronting Ronald Reagan: to redress the correlation of forces,
stop Soviet expansion, clarify the nature of the contest and its
stakes, and to do this simultaneously."46
Yet early on, the Reagan administration sought to continue
to continue the "bleeder" strategy, "designed to hurt Moscow and
raise the costs of its occupation."47
Funding was still low.
This was primarily due to maintaining plausible deniability.
45 Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, The Reagan Doctrine and U.S. Foreign Policy(Washington, D.C.: The Heritage Foundation, 1985), 5-6, 9.
46 Ibid., 9.47 Scott, 46.
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However, the seeds had been sown for a major escalation.
The roots of the escalation are found primarily in two
individuals: William Casey and Charles Wilson. Casey, Reagan's
1980 campaign manager, was appointed Director of Central
Intelligence. According to journalist Kurt Lohbeck:
Casey envisioned his job as having a twofoldpurpose: first, to restructure the agency and lift itout of the despondency caused by the unendinginvestigations and purges of the 1970s; and second, toconfront what he saw as the caldron of evil in theworld - the expansionist Soviet Union. It thatregard, he became the foremost adherent of the sloganof the first Reagan administration: "Peace ThroughStrength."48
Wilson, a Texas Congressman on the Appropriations
Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee and the House
Intelligence Committee, became the major congressional supporter
of the covert assistance program. In an interview with CBS News
in 1987, Wilson gave his rationale for supporting the
mujahadeen: "I wanted to hurt [the Soviets]. I wanted them to
count bodybags going back to Moscow."49 Wilson saw Afghanistan
as Brzezinski did: payback for Vietnam.
The Reagan Doctrine
The escalation by the Reagan administration began in 1983
and continued through 1987 (see Figure 2).
48 Lohbeck, 49.49 Quoted in Lohbeck, 52.
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Figure 2. American Assistance to the Mujahadeen
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
Year
Billions
Assistance ( in Billions of Dollars)
Figure 2. American Assistance to the Mujahadeen. Compiled fromvarious sources in James M. Scott, Deciding to Intervene: The ReaganDoctrine and American Foreign Policy (Durham, N.C.: Duke UniversityPress, 1996), 43-74.
With Congressman Wilson marshaling congressional support and
Director Casey directing the CIA's covert program, the
administration sought to expand this program through the
application of a "broad U.S. strategy vis--vis the Soviet
Union."50 This strategy was codified in National Security
Decision Directive 75 (written primarily by then-National
Security Council staffer Richard Pipes in 1982) and signed on
January 17, 1983.51 In terms of Afghanistan, NSDD-75 proposed to
"keep maximum pressure on Moscow for withdrawal" and "ensure
that the Soviets'...costs remain high."52
Publicly, the rhetoric began to intensify. A November 1984
report by the influential Heritage Foundation singled out
50 Scott, 51.51 Ibid, 21.52 Quoted in Scott, 51.
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Afghanistan as one of nine countries that ought to be targeted
for "anti-Communist insurgency."53 Secretary of State George
Shultz visited the Nasebagh Refugee Camp in Peshawar, Pakistan,
and declared: "Fellow fighters for freedom, not only in
Afghanistan but through the world. My message to you from the
United States is very simple. We are with you."54 However, the
two clearest statements of what eventually became known as the
Reagan Doctrine were made by President Reagan himself. In his
1985 State of the Union address, Reagan proclaimed that
we must not break faith with those who are riskingtheir lives--on every continent, from Afghanistan toNicaragua--to defy Soviet-supported aggression andsecure rights which have been ours frombirth...Support for freedom fighters is self-defense....55
At the Bitburg Air Base in the Federal Republic of Germany,
Reagan sounded the clarion call for anti-Communist insurgency:
Twenty-two years ago President John F. Kennedywent to the Berlin Wall and proclaimed that he, too,was a Berliner. Well, today freedom-loving peoplearound the world must say: I am a Berliner, I am a Jewin a world still threatened by anti-Semitism, I am anAfghan, and I am a prisoner of the Gulag, I am arefugee in a crowded boat foundering off the coast ofVietnam, I am a Loatian, a Cambodian, a Cuban, and aMiskito Indian in Nicaragua. I, too, am a potentialvictim of totalitarianism...[F]reedom must always be
stronger than totalitarianism and good must always be
53 Bill Keller, "U.S. Aid to Rebels in 9 Countries Suggested ByConservative Group," The New York Times, 20 November 1984, A20.
54 Department of State, Press Release 269, 8 July 1983, American ForeignPolicy Current Documents 1983 (Washington, D.C.: 1985).
55 White House, 1985 State of the Union, accessed online athttp://odur.let.rug.nl/~usa/P/rr40/speeches/su85rwr.htm; 29 April 1999.
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stronger than evil.56
The nadir of escalation came in March 1985, when President
Reagan signed National Security Decision Directive 166. NSSD-
166 marked the codified change in policy from a "bleeder"
strategy to a "victory" strategy. Reagan emphasized this in his
1986 State of the Union Address: "You are not alone, freedom
fighters. America will support you with moral and materiel
assistance, your right not just to fight and die for freedom,
but to fight and to win freedom in Afghanistan...."57
With more and better weapons, intelligence, and international
pressure, the United States believed that it could succeed in
forcing the Soviet Union from Afghanistan.58 Two of these
factors deserve special attention: the role of the Chinese and
the introduction of the Stinger missiles.
The Chinese Role
According to the scholar Michael Yahuda, in 1979 "China's
new policies of economic reform began to take shape and...the
United States and China commenced a new period of normalized
56 White House, "Bitburg Air Base, Federal Republic of Germany," 5 May1985, Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents 21 (1980): 589.
57 White House, 1986 State of the Union, accessed online athttp://odur.let.rug.nl/~usa/P/rr40/speeches/su86rwr.htm; 3 May 1999.
58 Scott, 59.
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relations."59 As a result of the deteriorating situation with
Moscow, the United States saw in Afghanistan a chance to exploit
the growing Sino-Soviet rift. Deng Xiaoping's insistence that
the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan was an obstacle to
normalizing Sino-Soviet relations made the Chinese strategic
allies of the United States.60
Chinese support for the mujahadeen had already begun prior
to the invasion.61 It seems no surprise, then, that when
Secretary of Defense Brown visited Beijing soon after the
invasion, he "found the Chinese ready to commit to active
opposition...they began to funnel weapons...through Pakistan,
with whom they had a long-standing relationship."62 Beijing
solidified their support when Chinese Foreign Minister Huang Hua
visited Pakistan's President Zia. According to journalist Mark
Urban, Chinese weapons
included 12.7mm Type-54 machine guns (copies of theSoviet Dshk), 14.5mm Type-58 single and twin anti-aircraft machine guns (called Zigouaks by themujahadeen), and some 23mm twin anti-aircraft guns.The equipment was robust, could be broken down intoman-pack loads, and was identical to that used to sucheffect by the Viet Cong. Other Chinese deliveriesincluded 82mm mortars, 82mm recoilless rifles andinnumerable different types of mine.63
59 Michael Yahuda, The International Politics of the Asia-Pacific, 1945-1995 (London: Routledge, 1996), 79.
60 Yahuda, 93-94. Deng Xiaoping's two other famous "obstacles" were theend of Soviet support for Vietnam in Cambodia and the reduction of Sovietforces on the Sino-Soviet frontier.
61 Urban, 32.62 Ibid., 44.63 Urban, 123.
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Moreover, many of these weapons were financed through the CIA.64
According to General Yousaf, China was the major supplier of
guns and ammunition until 1984, and "proved to be an excellent
supplier, completely reliable, [and] discreet...."65
The Reagan escalation was also accompanied by increased
assistance from China. In early 1986, Senator Orrin Hatch of
Utah, along with representatives of the NSC, Department of
Defense, and the CIA, traveled to Beijing to enlist Chinese
support for both the escalation and the introduction of the
Stinger missiles.66
The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan thus provided a "growing
Sino-American agreement on security issues."67 Capitalizing on a
growing Sino-Soviet rift, the United States worked with China to
provide large amounts of weapons (generally through Pakistan) to
the mujahadeen.
The Stinger Missiles
Perhaps the most significant debate concerning the Reagan
escalation that occurred concerned the decision to supply the
mujahadeen with the portable "Stinger" anti-aircraft missile.
According to Walter B. Wriston:
64 Lohbeck, 44.65 Yousaf, 85.66 Scott, 63.67 Ibid.
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its basic ground-to-air version uses an IR (infrared)homing sensor, can be carried by one man, and is firedfrom the shoulder. The Stinger is effective againstlow-flying helicopter gunships as well as fixed-wingaircraft. It is a so-called fire-and-forget missile
and carries on board a sophisticated informationsystem to identify friend from foe....Weighing 34.5pounds, including the launcher, the missile uses asolid-fuel rocket motor [and has]...an estimated rangeof two to three kilometers and a very high targetinterception rate....68
The decision to send Stinger missiles to the mujahadeen was a
result of increasing pressure from an alliance consisting of
activists within the CIA and the Department of Defense and
mostly conservative legislators in the Congress. On February
25, 1986, an inter-agency review recommended introducing the
Stinger missiles.69 Journalist Kurt Lohbeck (who spent a
significant time with the mujahadeen) believes his
conversation with Director Casey "tipped the scales in his
mind in favor of providing the Stinger missiles."70
Conservatives in the Congress brought pressure on Secretary
of State Shultz to support the introduction of the Stingers.71
Reagan himself had apparently first made the suggestion as
early as September 1983 that Stingers should be sent, but the
68 Walter B. Wriston, The Twilight of Sovereignty: How the Information
Revolution is Transforming Our World(New York: Charles Scribner's Sons,1992), 161. Some reports suggest the Stinger has a range of up to fivemiles, David B. Ottaway and Patrick E. Tyler, "U.S. Sends New Arms To Rebels;Afghans, Angolans Get Stinger Missiles in Change of Policy," The WashingtonPost, 30 March 1986, A1.
69 Ottaway and Tyler, "U.S. Sends New Arms To Rebels; Afghans, AngolansGet Stinger Missiles in Change of Policy."
70 Lohbeck, 151.71 Ottaway and Tyler, "U.S. Sends New Arms To Rebels; Afghans, Angolans
Get Stinger Missiles in Change of Policy."
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CIA voiced cautions over concerns of escalation, technology
transfer, and plausible deniability for both the United
States and Pakistan.72 By 1986 however, "Soviet-backed forces
[among them spetznaz troops] were employing more lethal
weaponry and more aggressive tactics...where they have
inflicted heavy casualties."73 Together with support from
within the CIA and the Department of Defense, as well as
pressure from Congress, Reagan approved the first shipment of
Stingers in March 1986.74
Following several months of training from the CIA, U.S.
Special Forces, and the British SAS,75 the first use of Stingers
came on September 25, 1986. The mujahadeen ambushed a group of
Mi-24 Hind helicopters, shooting down three and damaging several
others.76 Soon thereafter, the Soviets publicly acknowledged the
Stinger threat.77 While the success rate of the Stingers remains
subject to debate, best estimates put the rate between 50-79 per
cent.78 Regardless the exact rate, it appears now the Stinger
72 David B. Ottaway, et al., "The CIA in Transition; Casey StrengthensRole Under 'Reagan Doctrine,'" The Washington Post, 31 March 1986, A1.
73 Ottaway and Tyler, "U.S. Sends New Arms To Rebels; Afghans, AngolansGet Stinger Missiles in Change of Policy."
74 Ibid.75 Scott, 62; Michael Evans, "Ex-soldier Says SAS Helped in Afghan War,"
The (London) Times, 4 November 1998.76 Yousaf, 174-176; Urban, 206.77 "Soviets Confirm Afghan Rebel Use of Stinger Missiles," The Los
Angeles Times, 20 December 1986, 1-14.78 Based on statistics compiled by Pakistan and the U.S. Army and
interviews with the mujahadeen. See Diego Cordovez and Selig S. Harrison, Outof Afghanistan: The Inside Story of the Soviet Withdrawal (New York: OxfordUniversity Press, 1995), 199; Scott R. McMichael, Stumbling Bear: SovietMilitary Performance in Afghanistan (London: Brassey's, 1991), 90; Yousaf,183.
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was taking its toll. As we will see next, privately the Soviets
were already considering withdrawal.
THE IMPACT OF THE STINGER AND THE SOVIET WITHDRAWAL
Despite some debate, it is generally acknowledged that the
introduction of the Stinger missile marked a turning point in
the Soviet-Afghan war.79 According to Deputy Director of
Central Intelligence Robert M. Gates:
There is little question that providing theStingers was a major turning point in the Afghan war.It greatly increased Soviet and Afghan aircraft (andpilot) losses and thus the cost of the war to Moscow;it forced changes in Soviet tactics that helped the[mujahadeen] on the ground; and it was a bigpsychological boost for the resistance. The hugeincreases in funding, which vastly improved the flowof all kinds of assistance to the [mujahadeen], moresophisticated targeting of Soviet and Afghaninstallations based on U.S. satellite information, andthe flow of Stingers by the end of 1986, had begun to
turn the tide. The Soviets had to either reinforce orlose. Because they clearly were not winning.80
General Yousaf of the Pakistani ISI writes that the Stingers
marked "the turning-point of the campaign...."81 While he
questions the military effectiveness of the Stinger, journalist
Mark Urban suggests that "undoubtedly the arrival of the weapons
bolstered guerrilla morale."82 Scott R. McMichael, writing in
79 Cordovez and Harrison dispute this "widespread assumption," 199.80 Robert M. Gates, From the Shadows: The Ultimate Insider's Story of
Five Presidents and How They Won the Cold War(New York: Simon & Schuster,1996), 350.
81 Yousaf, 177.82 Urban, 214, 296-297.
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Stumbling Bear: Soviet Military Performance in Afghanistan,
argues that "[t]he real breakthrough in rebel air defence [sic]
came with the arrival of the US-made Stinger missiles."83
According to Walter B. Wriston, "[i]t is probably not an
exaggeration to say that not since the musket destroyed the
once-overwhelming firepower of massed men has new technology
performed such an equalizing role."84
More importantly, though, was the effect the Stinger had on
the Soviets. According to the Politburo minutes of November 13,
1986, Andrei Gromyko complained that "[t]he situation is worse
today than it was six months ago. We must be more active in
searching for a political solution."85 Marshal Sergei Akhromeyev
intoned, "[w]e have lost the struggle for the Afghan people."86
According to the scholar Richard Crockatt, "[the minutes] also
show that the American supply of 'Stinger' missiles to the
[mujahadeen] guerrillas in 1986 was decisive in making up
Gorbachev's mind [to leave Afghanistan]."87
Journalist Mark Urban identifies six factors which led the
Soviets to withdraw:
(a) the arrival of Mikhail Gorbachev and his 'new thinking' in
83 McMichael, 90.84 Wriston, 161.85 Quoted in Michael Dobbs, "Dramatic Politburo Meeting Led to End of
War; Gorbachev Pressed to Pull Out of Quagmire for Soviets During Secret 1986Debate," The Washington Post, 16 November 1992, A1.
86 Ibid.87 Richard Crockatt, The Fifty Years War: The United States and the
Soviet Union in World Politics, 1941-1991 (London: Routledge, 1995), 362.
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foreign policy;
(b) Afghan resistance;
(c) diplomatic pressure on the Soviet Union;
(d) the internal cost to the USSR;
(e) a belief that the PDPA regime would survive;
(f) external military support for the mujahadeen.88
In terms of this paper, the most important factors to consider
are the Afghan resistance, the internal cost to the USSR, and
external military support for the mujahadeen. What Urban fails
to recognize is that, in reality, these three factors are
interrelated. The mujahadeen provided the foundation for
opposition against the Soviets. External military support from
the United States (and other nations such as China) was provided
for the explicit purpose of increasing the costs for the Soviet
Union. This was the stated purpose of the Reagan Doctrine. I
believe this strategy was an integral component in the Soviet
withdrawal.
STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
The thesis of this paper has been threefold. First,
Presidents Carter and Reagan sought to increase costs for the
Soviet Union by supplying funds and Soviet-style arms to the
mujahadeen. Second, President Reagan sought to escalate the
88 Urban, 299.
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conflict as part of a larger strategy, the "Reagan Doctrine,"
which sought to move beyond containment and roll back Soviet
gains made in the Third World as a result of its 1970s
expansionist policy. Finally, the escalation by President
Reagan, together with assistance primarily from China, was
integral in the Soviet withdrawal in 1988-1989 and served as
an important component to ending the Cold War.
To these ends, I have attempted to demonstrate that the
American strategy was, in large part, a coordinated effort of
the first the Carter administration (especially Brzezinski),
then the Reagan administration (including Casey, Shultz, and
Reagan himself) together with strong support from the Congress
(especially Wilson and conservatives like Hatch). Early on,
efforts to support the resistance were kept low-key, because of
concerns about escalation, technology transfer, and plausible
deniability for both the United States and Pakistan. However,
by the time of the Soviet escalation, momentum had finally
reached a culminating point within the administration. The
counter-escalation by the United States in 1985-1986 sought to
push the Soviets out of Afghanistan.
Two secondary factors stand out as integral parts of the
covert effort against the Soviet forces in Afghanistan. First,
the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan gave the Americans a chance
to exploit the Sino-Soviet rift, and they capitalized on it
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immediately. The provision of large amounts of Soviet-style
weapons by the Chinese to the mujahadeen helped the United
States to maintain plausible deniability. Furthermore, as
General Yousaf confirmed, the Chinese were "an excellent
supplier, completely reliable, discreet, and, at a later stage,
even providing weapons as aid as well as for sale."89 Finally,
the Chinese helped to facilitate the introduction of Stinger
missiles through Pakistan. Incidentally, the second factor
which proved to be an integral component of the covert campaign
were the Stinger missiles themselves. While ultimately the
Stinger's military success rate may be in doubt, the positive
psychological impact that Stingers had on the mujahadeen and the
negative psychological impact they had on the Soviets is
unquestioned. The American counter-escalation ordered by
Reagan, of which the Stinger was the most prominent feature, was
the decisive factor in persuading Gorbachev to first consider
Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan.
In a strategic sense, the covert campaign against the
Soviets in Afghanistan was part and parcel of larger strategy to
roll-back Soviet gains in the Third World. Covert programs were
attempted in other Third World states, such as Angola and
Nicaragua, with varied success. Yet military victoryper se by
the resistance movements was never really an objective of the
89 Yousaf, 85.
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Reagan Doctrine. Perhaps the best description of the relative
success of the efforts to support the mujahadeen is how the
Soviets saw their failure:
There is not a single piece of land [in Afghanistan]that the Soviet soldier has not conquered. Despitethis, a large chunk of territory is in the hands ofthe rebels. We control Kabul and the provincialcenters, but we have been unable to establishauthority over the seized territory. We have lost thestruggle for the Afghan people.90
It would be wrong to suggest that the mujahadeen ever defeated
the Soviet army in a military sense. But, the implications of
Marshal Akhromeyev's statement are clear: Soviet failure is
rebel victory. Even larger than that is the strategic
ramification: Soviet failure meant victory for the United
States. Without the loss of one American soldier, the United
States engaged the Soviet Union in their backyard and defeated
them. The Reagan Doctrine exploited the Soviet strategic
overstretch, set back the Soviets on a number of fronts, and
helped to bring an end to the Cold War.
90 Marshal Sergei Akhromeyev, quoted in Michael Dobbs, "DramaticPolitburo Meeting Led to End of War; Gorbachev Pressed to Pull Out ofQuagmire for Soviets During Secret 1986 Debate."
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