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Appeal No. 14-56140
IN THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
CALIFORNIA COALITION FOR FAMILIES AND CHILDREN, PBC
a Delaware public benefit corporation, COLBERN C. STUART, III,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
SAN DIEGO COUNTY BAR ASSOCIATION, et. al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Courtfor the Southern District of California
Case No. 13-CV-1944-CAB-BLM
The Honorable Cathy Ann Bencivengo
JOINT ANSWERING BRIEF OF JUDICIAL DEFENDANTS-
APPELLEES
James B. Gilpin, Bar No. 151466Matthew L. Green, Bar No. 227904
BEST BEST & KRIEGER LLP655 West Broadway, 15th Floor
San Diego, California 92101Telephone: (619) 525-1300
Facsimile: (619) 233-6118
Attorneys for Judicial Defendants-
Appellees SUPERIOR COURT OF
CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF SANDIEGO, et. al.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
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I. INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................1
II. STATEMENT OF ISSUES..........................................................................4
III. STATEMENT OF FACTS ..........................................................................5
A. The Stuart Dissolution .......................................................................5
B. Stuarts Criminal Proceeding People v. Stuart................................6
C. The April 15, 2010 Bar Association Event.........................................8
D. The Filing Of This Action And The Inclusion Of JudicialOfficers Home Addresses In the Complaint......................................9
IV. PROCEDURAL HISTORY.......................................................................11
A. The Motions to Dismiss the Complaint ............................................11
B. The First Amended Complaint And Omnibus Motion To
Dismiss............................................................................................14
C. The Dismissal of the Action.............................................................16
V. STANDARD OF REVIEW .......................................................................16VI. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT .................................................................17
VII. ARGUMENT ............................................................................................20
A. THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY EXERCISED ITS
DISCRETION IN DISMISSING THE ACTION FORFAILURE TO COMPLY WITH FEDERAL RULE OF CIVILPROCEDURE 8 ..............................................................................20
1. Appellants Failure To Comply With Rule 8 Was One Of
Several Enumerated Grounds In Support Of TheOmnibus Motion To Dismiss .................................................22
2. The District Court Correctly Concluded That The FAC
Failed To Satisfy Rule 8.........................................................22
3. The District Court Did Consider And Properly ApplyThe Relevant Factors For Dismissal Under Rule 41(b) ..........25
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4. The Involuntary Dismissal Was Supported With Or
Without The District Courts Prior Order On The
Original Complaint ................................................................28
B. JUDICIAL IMMUNITY BARS ALL CLAIMS ARISING OUT
OF STUARTS DISSOLUTION AND CRIMINAL
PROCEEDINGS..............................................................................29
1. Ashelmanand SparkmanAre Binding Precedent In This
Circuit....................................................................................312. The District Court Correctly Applied Circuit Precedent.........34
3. The Recycled Claims In The FAC Concerning StuartsDissolution Proceeding, As Well As The New Claims
Relating ToPeople v. Stuart, Are Also Barred By
Judicial Immunity ..................................................................35
4. No Historical Analysis Of Judicial Immunity WasNecessary...............................................................................36
5. Family Law Judges Are Also Afforded JudicialImmunity ...............................................................................37
C. THE DISTRICT COURTS JUDGMENT MAY BEAFFIRMED ON NUMEROUS OTHER GROUNDS......................38
1. The Claims Against The Judicial Defendants In Counts 1
And 2, Which Arise From The So-Called Stuart
Assault, Are Time-Barred ....................................................39
2. Counts 1 And 2 Also Fail To State Facts Sufficient To
State A Claim Against Any Judicial Defendants....................40
3. The Claims Against Judicial Defendants In Count 3,Which Relate ToPeople v. Stuart, Also Fail To State
Sufficient Facts......................................................................41
4. The Claims In Count 3 Against Judge Groch Are Also
Barred By The Rooker-Feldman Doctrine..............................41
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5. Count 4, Which Arises From Appellants Inclusion Of
Judicial Officers Home Addresses In Their Original
Complaint, Fails To State Sufficient Facts.............................42
6. The Claims For Supervisory Liability In Count 6 Are
Devoid Of Sufficient Facts.....................................................44
7. The Claims Against The Superior Court, Judicial
Council, and AOC In Count 7 Are Barred By Eleventh
Amendment Immunity...........................................................468. Counts 9 And 10 Fail To State Facts Sufficient To State
A Claim For Violation Of Sections 1985 and 1986 ................47
9. The Claims Against Judicial Defendants In Count 11 Are
Barred By The Rooker-Feldman Doctrine..............................50
10. Counts 12 and 13 Fail To State Facts Sufficient To State
A Claim Against Any Judicial Defendant ..............................51
11. Count 15 Does Not And Cannot State Facts Sufficient To
State A Claim Against The Judicial Defendants For FalseAdvertising Under The Lanham Act ......................................51
12. The FAC Does Not Allege Facts Sufficient To State ACivil RICO Claim Against The Judicial Defendants..............53
13. The Claims For Prospective Relief Are Barred For Lack
Of Standing And Under Principles Of Abstention..................56
D. NONE OF THE DISTRICT COURTS COMMENTSSUPPORT APPELLANTS PARTIALITY CHALLENGE.............57
E. THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY APPLIED ITSDISCRETION IN DENYING STUARTS MOTION FORCOUNTER-SANCTIONS............................................................58
VIII. CONCLUSION .........................................................................................61
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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page(s)
Federal Cases
Alan Neuman Prods., Inc. v. Albright,
862 F.2d 1388 (9th Cir. 1988)............................................................. 55
Arnold v. Bostick,
339 F.2d 879 (9th Cir. 1964)............................................................... 37
Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662 (2009).............................................................................25
Ashelman v. Pope,
793 F.2d 1072 (9th Cir. 1986) .................................................... passim
Awabdy v. City of Adelanto,
368 F.3d 1062 (9th Cir. 2004)............................................................. 41
B.C. v. Plumas Unified Sch. Dist.,
192 F.3d 1260 (9th Cir. 1999)............................................................. 56
Barrus v. Sylvania,
55 F.3d 468 (9th Cir. 1995).................................................................52
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544 (2007).............................................................................25
Bianchi v. Rylaarsdam,
334 F.3d 895 (9th Cir. 2003)............................................................... 42
Blake v. Dierdorff,856 F.2d 1365 (9th Cir. 1988)............................................................. 55
Bradley v. Fisher,
80 U.S. (13 Wall) 335 (1872).......................................................passim
Bretz v. Kelman,
773 F.2d 1026 (9th Cir. 1985)............................................................. 48
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Estate of Brooks v. U.S.,
197 F.3d 1245 (9th Cir. 1999)............................................................. 40
Ipcon Collections LLC v. Costco Wholesale Corp.,
698 F.3d 58 (2nd Cir. 2012) ................................................................ 59
Cafasso v. Gen. Dynamics C4 Sys.,
637 F.3d 1047 (9th Cir. 2011)................................................. 17, 23, 25
Cal. Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited,
404 U.S. 508 (1972).............................................................................43
Canlis v. San Joaquin Sheriffs Posse Comitatus,641 F.2d 711 (9th Cir. 1981)......................................................... 48, 49
In re Century 21-Re/Max,
882 F. Supp. 915 (C.D. Cal. 1994) ......................................................53
Cerrato v. San Francisco Cmty. Coll. Dist.,
26 F.3d 968 (9th Cir. 1994).................................................................48
City of Los Angeles v. Lyons,
461 U.S. 95 (1983)...............................................................................56
Delew v. Wagner,
143 F.3d 1219 (9th Cir. 1998)............................................................. 43
Dist. of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman,
460 U.S. 462 (1983).............................................................................41
Doe & Assocs. Law Offices v. Napolitano,
252 F.3d 1026 (9th Cir. 2001)............................................................. 42
Duvall v. County of Kitsap,
260 F.3d 1124 (9th Cir. 2001)............................................................. 37
E.T. v. Cantil-Sakauye,
682 F.3d 1121 (9th Cir. 2012) ...................................................... 46, 57
Eastway Constr. Corp. v. City of New York,
762 F.2d 243 (2nd Cir. 1985) .............................................................. 59
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Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp.,
544 U.S. 280 (2005).............................................................................41
Farm Credit Servs. v. Am. State Bank,
339 F.3d 764 (8th Cir. 2003)............................................................... 25
Forrett v. Richardson,
112 F.3d 416 (9th Cir. 1997)............................................................... 45
Forsyth v. Humana, Inc.,
114 F.3d 1467 (9th Cir. 1997)............................................................. 42
Franceschi v. Schwartz,57 F.3d 828 (9th Cir. 1995).................................................................46
Greater Los Angeles Council of Deafness, Inc. v. Zolin,
812 F.2d 1103 (9th Cir. 1987)....................................................... 46, 47
Griffin v. Breckenridge,
403 U.S. 88 (1971)......................................................................... 49, 50
Hacienda Valley Mobile Estates v. City of Morgan Hill,
353 F.3d 651 (9th Cir. 2003)............................................................... 39
Hansen v. Black,
885 F.2d 642 (9th Cir. 1989)............................................................... 44
Hart v. Massanari,
266 F.3d 1155 (9th Cir. 2001)............................................................. 32
Hearns v. San Bernardino Police Dept.,
530 F.3d 1124 (9th Cir. 2008)....................................................... 21, 28
Heck v. Humphrey,
512 U.S. 477 (1994).............................................................................41
Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles Police Dept.,
839 F.2d 621 (9th Cir. 1988)............................................................... 48
Kush v. Rutledge,
460 U.S. 719 (1983).............................................................................48
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Lacey v. Maricopa County,
693 F.3d 896 (9th Cir. 2012) ........................................................ 28, 42
Lancaster Community Hosp. v. Antelope Valley Hosp. Dist.,
940 F.2d 397 (9th Cir. 1991)............................................................... 55
Leon v. IDX Sys. Corp.,
464 F.3d 951 (9th Cir. 2006)......................................................... 26, 28
Liteky v. United States,
510 U.S. 540 (1994)....................................................................... 57, 58
Long v. County of Los Angeles,442 F.3d 1178 (9th Cir. 2006)............................................................. 40
Margolis v. Ryan,
140 F.3d 850 (9th Cir. 1998)............................................................... 40
McHenry v. Renne,
84 F.3d 1172 (9th Cir. 2003)......................................................... 16, 22
Meek v. County of Riverside,
183 F.3d 962 (9th Cir. 1999)............................................................... 17
Metzler Inv. GMBH v. Corinthian Colleges, Inc.,
540 F.3d 1049 (9th Cir. 2008)....................................................... 16, 17
Mireles v. Waco,
502 U.S. 9 (1991) .................................................................... 29, 30, 36
Moore v. Brewster,
96 F.3d 1240 (9th Cir. 1996)............................................................... 29
Moore v. Kayport Package Exp., Inc.,
885 F.2d 531 (9th Cir. 1989)............................................................... 55
Nevijel v. North Coast Life Ins. Co.,
651 F.2d 671 (9th Cir. 1981)................................................... 21, 22, 28
Nissan Motor Co. v. Nissan Computer Corp.,
378 F.3d 1002 (9th Cir. 2004)............................................................. 52
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OShea v. Littleton,
414 U.S. 488 (1974)............................................................. 4, 19, 39, 57
Occupational-Urgent Health Sys., Inc. v. Sutro & Co.,
711 F. Supp. 1016 (E.D. Cal. 1989) ....................................................54
Odom v. Microsoft Corp.,
486 F.3d 541 (9th Cir. 2007)............................................................... 54
Orin v. Barclay,
272 F.3d 1207 (9th Cir. 2001)............................................................. 50
Parke v. Raley,506 U.S. 20 (1992)...............................................................................16
Parker v. Google, Inc.,
422 F. Supp. 2d 492 (E.D. Pa. 2006)...................................................53
Pesnell v. Arsenault,
543 F.3d 1038 (9th Cir. 2008)............................................................. 58
Pierson v. Ray,
386 U.S. 547 (1967)....................................................................... 33, 36
PlayMakers LLC v. ESPN, Inc.,
376 F.3d 894 (9th Cir. 2004)............................................................... 34
Portman v. County of Santa Clara,
995 F.2d 898 (9th Cir. 1993)............................................................... 49
Reves v. Ernst & Young,
507 U.S. 170 (1993).............................................................................54
RK Ventures, Inc. v. City of Seattle,
307 F.3d 1045 (9th Cir. 2002)............................................................. 49
Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co.,
263 U.S. 413 (1923).............................................................................41
San Remo Hotel v. City and County of San Francisco,
145 F.3d 1095 (9th Cir. 1998)............................................................. 57
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Schmidt v. Herrmann,
614 F.2d 1221 (9th Cir. 1980)....................................................... 22, 26
Simmons v. Sacramento County Superior Court,
318 F.3d 1156 (9th Cir. 2003)....................................................... 46, 47
Skydive Arizona, Inc. v. Quattrocchi,
673 F.3d 1105 (9th Cir. 2012)............................................................. 52
Stump v. Sparkman,
435 U.S. 349 (1978).....................................................................passim
Tan v. Univ. of S. Cal.,252 F.3d 1059 (9th Cir. 2001)............................................................. 38
U.S. v. Bosch,
951 F.2d 1546 (9th Cir. 1991)....................................................... 17, 58
U.S. v. Lockheed-Martin Corp.,
328 F.3d 374 (7th Cir. 2003)......................................................... 21, 25
U.S. v. Odachyan,
749 F.3d 798 (9th Cir. 2014)............................................................... 58
Usher v. City of Los Angeles,
828 F.2d 556 (9th Cir. 1987)............................................................... 39
Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police,
491 U.S. 58 (1989)...............................................................................47
Winterrowd v. Am. Gen. Annuity Ins. Co.,
556 F.3d 815 (9th Cir. 1999)............................................................... 17
Wolfe v. Strankman,
392 F.3d 358 (9th Cir. 2004)............................................................... 47
Woodrum v. Woodward County,
866 F.2d 1121 (9th Cir. 1989)............................................................. 40
Younger v. Harris,
401 U.S. 37 (1971).......................................................................passim
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Yourish v. California Amplifier,
191 F.3d 983 (9th Cir. 1999)............................................................... 26
State Cases
Olsen v. Harbison,
119 Cal. Rptr. 3d 460 (Ct. App. 2010) ................................................ 43
Sacramento & San Joaquin Drainage Dist. v. Superior Court,
238 P. 687 (Cal. 1925) .........................................................................46
Federal Statutes
15 U.S.C. 1125 ..................................................................................... 52
18 U.S.C. 1961 ...................................................................................... 54
18 U.S.C. 1962 ................................................................................ 53, 54
28 U.S.C. 1391 ...................................................................................... 44
42 U.S.C. 1983 ..............................................................................passim
42 U.S.C. 1985 ...................................................................... 9, 14, 47, 50
42 U.S.C. 1986 ...................................................................... 9, 14, 47, 50
State Statutes
Cal. Civ. Code 47 ..................................................................................43
Cal. Code Civ. Proc. 335.1 ....................................................................39
Cal. Fam. Code 200...............................................................................38
Cal. Gov. Code 6254.21................................................................... 10, 43
Cal. Gov. Code 70301-70404...............................................................47
Cal. Gov. Code 77003............................................................................46
Cal. Gov. Code 77200.............................................................................46
Cal. Penal Code 646.9.............................................................................6
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Cal. Penal Code 653m......................................................................... 6, 7
Rules
Cal. Rules of Ct., rule 10.81 ....................................................................46
Cal. Rules of Ct., rule 10.810 ..................................................................47
Fed. R. App. P. 28.................................................................................... 25
Fed. R. Civ. P. 8...............................................................................passim
Fed. R. Civ. P. 9 ....................................................................................... 55
Fed. R. Civ. P. 11.............................................................................passim
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12 ............................................................................... 24, 28
Fed. R. Civ. P. 41.............................................................................passim
Constitutional Provisions
Eleventh Amendment .....................................................................passim
Cal. Const. Article VI, 1.................................................................. 46, 53
Cal. Const. Article VI, 5........................................................................46
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I.
INTRODUCTION
Before the Court is an appeal from the dismissal of a lawsuit brought by a
disgruntled family court litigant, Colbern C. Stuart (Stuart), against nearly 60
defendants identified as San Diegos family law community. Stuart generally
claims that anyone involved with his divorce proceeding, which includes the
family court judges that presided over the matter and their supervisors, state
judicial branch entities, family law attorneys and firms, and forensic psychologists,
conspired together to deprive Stuart of his federal family rights.1
Stuart also alleges San Diegos family law community retaliated against
him as a result of complaints regarding the family law system that he lodged
with various governmental agencies, elected officials, and media outlets. Namely,
1 The judicial defendants named in this action consist of the (1) SuperiorCourt of California, County of San Diego (Superior Court), (2) Hon. Robert J.
Trentacosta, Judge of the Superior Court, (3) Michael M. Roddy, Executive Officer
of the Superior Court, (4) Judicial Council of California (Judicial Council), (5)Hon. Steven Jahr, Administrative Director of the Courts, (6) Administrative Office
of the Courts (AOC), (7) Hon. Tani G. Cantil-Sakauye, Chief Justice of
California, (8) Hon. Lisa Schall, Judge of the Superior Court, (9) Hon. Lorna A.Alksne, Judge of the Superior Court, (10) Hon. Christine K. Goldsmith, Judge ofthe Superior Court (Ret.), (11) Hon. Jeannie Lowe, Commissioner of the SuperiorCourt (Ret.), (12) Hon. William H. McAdam, Jr., Judge of the Superior Court
(Ret.), (13) Hon. Edlene C. McKenzie, Commissioner of the Superior Court, (14)Hon. Joel R. Wohlfeil, Judge of the Superior Court, (15) Hon. Michael S. Groch,
Judge of the Superior Court, and (16) Kristine P. Nesthus, the Director of Legal
Services and General Counsel for the Superior Court (collectively, JudicialDefendants).
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Stuart asserts that the family law community conspired together to bring about
the filing of criminal harassment and stalking charges against him by the San
Diego City Attorneys Office for conduct directed at his ex-spouse, for which he
was convicted, and Stuarts purported assault in April 2010 at a San Diego
County Bar Association (Bar Association) family law seminar.
As implausible as Stuarts conspiracy theory is, Stuart filed the instant action
pro se in August 2013. The original complaint purported to assert approximately
36 claims in a complaint roughly 175 pages in length, and more than 1,300 pages
with exhibits. Aside from the sparse factual averments buried in pages of
generalized grievances about the family courts, as the district court found, the
complaint was confusing, redundant, [and] conclusory, fail[ed] to clearly
identify each separate claim for relief, and fail[ed] to connect [the] factual
allegations to the numerous causes of action identified, among other deficiencies.
(ER 46-47.)
The district court dismissed the complaint with leave to amend for failure to
comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8, which requires pleadings to
contain a short and plain statement of the claim and that each allegation be
simple, concise, and direct[.] Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), (d)(1). The district court
also dismissed with prejudice Stuarts damages claims against the defendant judges
under the doctrine of judicial immunity, which bars claims arising out of judicial
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acts within the jurisdiction of their courts. Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356
(1978);Ashelman v. Pope, 793 F.2d 1072, 1075 (9th Cir. 1986) (en banc).
Rather than attempt to correct the pleading deficiencies identified by the
district court, Stuart filed a First Amended Complaint (FAC), which asserted
more than 100 claims and grew in size to 251 pages, and nearly 1,550 pages with
exhibits. Given the amended pleading was even longer than the original and
remain[ed] unmanageable, argumentative, confusing, and frequently
incomprehensible, (ER 10), the district court again found that Stuart failed to
comply with Rule 8 and the district courts prior order.
Based on the substantial harm to the defendants, the district court, and
litigants in other matters pending before the district court, coupled with Stuarts
inability, or unwillingness, to file a Rule 8-compliant pleading, the district court
properly dismissed the action with prejudice under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
41(b), which permits dismissals for failure to comply with Rule 8 or a court order.
For the reasons explained in this brief, the Court should affirm the district courts
dismissal of the action for failure to comply with Rule 8. While Rule 8 alone is
sufficient to affirm the dismissal of the action, ample other grounds also support
the district courts judgment.
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II.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
The issues presented in this appeal are:
(1) whether the district court abused its discretion in dismissing the action
for failure to comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8;
(2) whether the district court properly dismissed the claims against the
judicial officers who presided over Stuarts dissolution and criminal proceedings
under the doctrine of judicial immunity;
(3) whether the district courts dismissal is supported by other grounds
beyond Rule 8 and judicial immunity, including the statute of limitations, failure to
state facts sufficient to state a claim, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, Eleventh
Amendment immunity, lack of standing, and abstention underYounger v. Harris,
401 U.S. 37 (1971) andOShea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488 (1974);
(4) whether any remarks of the district judge, which merely reflected her
general frustration with Stuart, amounted to deprivation of an impartial tribunal;
and
(5) whether the district court abused its discretion in denying Stuart
counter-sanctions against certain Judicial Defendants based on their successful
motion to dismiss the original complaint.
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III.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
As outlined by the district court, the allegations in this action generally relate
to four incidents: (1) Stuarts dissolution proceeding; (2) Stuarts criminal
prosecution and conviction; (3) Stuarts so-called assault at the Bar Association
event; and (4) Stuarts inclusion of judicial officers home addresses in the original
complaint. (ER 7:13-16.)
A. The Stuart Dissolution
The genesis of this action, particularly Stuarts grievances with the family
law system, appears to begin with Stuarts dissolution proceeding with his former
spouse, Lynn Stuart (Stuart Dissolution). According to Stuart, who was an
attorney admitted to practice in California, Arizona, and Nevada at the time, the
Honorable Joel R. Wohlfeil, Judge of the Superior Court, recommended that Dr.
Stephen Doyne mediate custody issues in the Stuart Dissolution in April 2008.
(ER 111, 3; ER 265, 809.) Stuart thereafter hired Dr. Doyne in September
2008, and Judge Wohlfeil is alleged to have had oversight responsibilities in
connection with the mediation. (ER 265, 812; ER 270-71, 833, 835, 836-37.)
In December 2008, the Stuart Dissolution was reassigned to another Superior
Court judge, the Honorable Lisa Schall, who allegedly maintained the same
oversight responsibilities until November 2009. (ER 271, 837; ER 276, 876.)
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Stuart avers that Dr. Doyne caused Stuart to lose shared custody of his son
and for sole custody to be awarded to Ms. Stuart. (ER 265, 817(F).) Stuart
makes numerous other accusations against Dr. Doyne and alleges that Judges
Wohlfeil and Schall did not properly discharge their oversight responsibilities.
(ER 266-71, 816-17, 821, 822-30, 838.) Based on the same purported conduct,
Stuart also alleges supervisory failures by the Honorable Lorna A. Alksne, the
Supervising Family Court judge at the time, the Honorable Robert J. Trentacosta,
the former Presiding Judge of the Superior Court, Michael Roddy, the Executive
Officer of the Superior Court, and the Superior Court itself. (ER 111-12, 9-10;
ER 113, 19; ER 276, 873.)
B. Stuarts Criminal Proceeding People v. Stuar t
This action also stems from the criminal prosecution of Stuart in the matter
ofPeople of the State of California v. Stuart, Superior Court of California, County
of San Diego, Case No. M104094DV (People v. Stuart). In March 2010, Stuart
was charged with multiple violations of California Penal Code section 653m(a) and
(b),2 as well as one count of stalking under California Penal Code section 646.9(a),
based on conduct directed at Ms. Stuart. (ER 181, 373.) Citing to Stuarts
2 Subdivision (a) generally prohibits the harassment of others by telephone or
e-mail with obscene language or threats to inflict injury, while subdivision (b)
generally prohibits a person from harassing others with repeated telephone calls ore-mails.
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ongoing obscene and threatening messages, an arrest warrant was requested by
the San Diego City Attorneys Office, which was granted on April 14, 2010. (SER
68, 70.)
According to Stuart, the Assistant City Attorney prosecuting the case, Emily
Garson, conspired with her boss, San Diego City Attorney Jan Goldsmith, and
his spouse, the Honorable Christine K. Goldsmith, Judge of the Superior Court
(Ret.), in initiating criminal proceedings and obtaining the arrest warrant against
Stuart. (ER 181, 373; ER 183, 381; ER 204, 486-89.) Stuart also claims
that Judge Goldsmiths purported involvement with People v. Stuart, by virtue of
her marriage to Jan Goldsmith, was with the knowledge and support of Judges
Schall and Wohlfeil. (ER 183, 382.)
The Honorable Michael S. Groch, also a Superior Court judge, was assigned
as the trial judge in People v. Stuart. (ER 187, 402.) Stuart was ultimately
convicted of multiple violations of California Penal Code section 653m and
sentenced by Judge Groch in March 2011. (ER 190, 416-17.) After serving
approximately 90 days in jail, Stuart was conditionally released from custody in
May 2011. (ER 191, 421-22.) As a result of violating the terms of his
suspended sentence, however, Stuart was arrested in April 2012, and returned to
jail until May 2013. (ER 194-95, 433, 439.) Stuart also alleges that Judge
Groch issued multiple domestic violence restraining orders prohibiting any contact
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with Ms. Stuart. (SeeER 191, 422-23; ER 196, 444; ER 199, 462.) Stuarts
conviction inPeople v. Stuartalso led to his disbarment in California, Arizona, and
Nevada. (ER 192-93, 426-32; SER 74-75, 77-82, 84, 86, 88-91.)
C. The April 15, 2010 Bar Association Event
This matter also arises out of a family law seminar hosted by the San Diego
County Bar Association on April 15, 2010, which Stuart identifies as the central
subject of this litigation. (Compl. 114-15; ER 135-36, 109.) Stuart alleges
that Judges Goldsmith, Wohlfeil and William H. McAdam, Jr. (Ret.), and
Commissioners Jeannie Lowe (Ret.) and Edlene C. McKenzie were organizers
and panel members in connection with the seminar. (ER 113-14, 21-25.)
Stuart also avers that Judge Alksne served as a panel member at the seminar. (ER
136, 110; ER 139, 125.)
Stuart attended the seminar for the purpose of gaining knowledge in order
to advance [his] PUBLIC BENEFIT ACTIVITY. (ER 138, 121.) According to
Stuart, during her introductory remarks, Judge Alksne announced an abrupt break,
apologizing that she needed a break so we can straighten something out. (ER
139, 125.) Judge Alksne is alleged to have conferred with Sheriffs deputies,
security guards, and other individuals regarding Stuart. (ER 139, 126-27.)
Sheriffs deputies and private security officers thereafter asked Stuart multiple
times to accompany them in leaving the seminar. (ER 139, 128.) Stuart refused
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to leave and was ultimately handcuffed and removed from the seminar. (ER 140,
132.) Stuart was released once outside of the seminar and told not to return. (ER
140, 133.)
D. The Filing Of This Action And The Inclusion Of Judicial Officers
Home Addresses In the Complaint
On August 20, 2013, Stuart and the California Coalition for Families and
Children, PBC (California Coalition) (collectively, Appellants), a Delaware
corporation formed by Stuart the day before he filed this action, and whose
membership allegedly consists of other aggrieved family court participants, filed
this action against dozens of defendants generally referred to as the Family Law
Community.3 (Compl.; ER 111, 3-4; ER 121, 63; SER 72.) Appellants
complaint totaled roughly 175 pages, plus 1,156 pages of exhibits, and contained
numerous acronyms of [Appellants] invention. (Compl.; ER 42:14-15.) The
complaint purported to assert approximately 36 claims arising under 42 U.S.C.
1983, 1985, and 1986, the Lanham Act, the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act (RICO), the Declaratory Judgment Act, and California state
law. (Compl.)
3 Stuarts former law corporation, Lexevia, P.C., was also a plaintiff in the
original complaint, but was omitted from the First Amended Complaint and is nota party to this appeal. (SeeCompl. 3, 107-08; ER 1:22-35; ER 7 n.1.)
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For no ostensible purpose other than intimidation, the complaint also
included the residential addresses of Judges Trentacosta, Schall, Alksne, and
Wohlfeil, and the Chief Justice of California, the Honorable Tani G. Cantil-
Sakauye.4 (Compl. 11, 17, 22, 23, 29.) After viewing the complaint on the
Internet, Kristine Nesthus, the Superior Courts Director of Legal Services and
General Counsel, delivered a letter to Appellants on August 25, 2013, demanding
that the residential addresses be removed from the Internet and that steps be taken
to remove the information from PACER under California Government Code
section 6254.21.5 (SeeER 208-10, 510-26.) Ms. Nesthus, who allegedly acted
in collaboration with and under the direction of Mr. Roddy and Judge
Trentacosta, also attempted to contact Stuart directly by e-mail and through his
attorney service by telephone to demand that the home addresses be removed from
the Internet. (ER 209, 518; ER 210, 524; ER 214, 538.)
Rather than comply with Ms. Nesthuss requests, Appellants applied ex
parte to the district court on August 26, 2013, for an order excusing their
4 The home address of Lawrence J. Simi, Chairperson for the Commission onJudicial Performance, was also included in the complaint. (Compl. 19.)
5 California Government Code section 6254.21 prohibits any person fromdisplaying on the Internet the home address of any elected or appointed official,
which includes judges and court commissioners, if that official has demanded in
writing that the person remove his or her home address. Cal. Gov. Code 6254.21(c)(1), (f)(3).
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compliance with the requests. (SER 5:24-6:1; SER 15:9-26.) Plaintiffs ex parte
application acknowledged that as of the prior day, the VERIFIED COMPLAINT
containing the residential addresses of several Defendants ha[d] been viewed over
119,296 times [on an Internet blog], and this number is progressing at a rate of
about 20,000 views per day. (SER 6:18-7:5.)
Recognizing that the complaint contains confidential information,
particularly the home addresses of judicial officers, the district court issued a
minute order on August 26, 2013, directing that the complaint be sealed. (SER 25,
26.) Appellants nevertheless allege that Ms. Nesthus, along with Mr. Roddy,
Judges Trentacosta, Alksne, Wohlfeil, Schall, Goldsmith, McAdam, and Groch,
and Commissioners Lowe and McKenzie, obstructed justice. (ER 208, 509;
ER 214-16, 540, 542, 544, 546, 548.)
IV.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
A. The Motions to Dismiss the Complaint
On September 30, 2013, the Judicial Defendants who had been served at the
time, which were collectively identified as the Superior Court Defendants,6
moved to dismiss the complaint on numerous grounds, including, but not limited
6 The Superior Court Defendants consisted of the Superior Court, Judges
Trentacosta, Schall, Alksne, Goldsmith, McAdam, and Wohlfeil, CommissionersLowe and McKenzie, and Mr. Roddy. (SER 28:5-15.)
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to, the California Coalitions failure to obtain counsel, non-compliance with
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8, judicial immunity, and the statute of limitations.
(SER 28:1-19; SER 2:20; SER 41:5-42:4.) Several other defendants also filed
motions to dismiss the complaint on similar or related grounds, which included the
Commission on Judicial Performance (CJP) and its officials, Brad Battson and
Lawrence J. Simi. (SER 95.)
The Superior Court also moved for sanctions under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 11 based on the frivolous nature of the claims and the inclusion of
judicial officers home addresses in the complaint. (SER 97.) In response, Stuart
filed his own motion for Rule 11 sanctions on the ground that the Superior Court
Defendants motion to dismiss the complaint was frivolous. (SER 104; ER 37:11-
15.)
The district court heard the Superior Court Defendants and the CJP parties
motions to dismiss on December 19, 2013, and thereafter issued its order on
December 23, 2013. (ER 41:17-21.) The district court dismissed the California
Coalitions claims without prejudice due to its failure to obtain counsel. (ER 45:8-
27.)
As to Stuarts claims, the district court dismissed them without prejudice for
failure to comply with Rule 8(a)(2). (ER 46:2-4.) The district court found that
Stuarts individual claims could not be distinguished from those of the California
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Coalition, that each claim for relief was not clearly and separately identified, and
that the complaint was confusing, redundant, conclusory, and buries its factual
allegations in pages of generalized grievances about the family courts. (ER 46:6-
47:25.) The district court also dismissed with prejudice Stuarts claims against
the defendant judges for damages arising out of judicial acts within the jurisdiction
of their courts. (ER 48:2-4.)
Although Stuart requested that the dismissal of the complaint on Rule 8
grounds be with prejudice in order to expedite his filing of an appeal, (ER 63:20-
23), the district courts dismissal was nevertheless without prejudice, (ER 48:24-
26). In amending the complaint, the district court cautioned Stuart to be wary of
the immunity and statute-of-limitation issues . (ER 48:28.)
The district court denied the Superior Courts sanctions motion, but warned
that sanctions against Appellants would be considered if the amended complaint
does not provide justifiable reasons as to why each defendant is named in the
action, does not take judicial immunity into account, and names judicial defendants
just to harass them. (ER 59:21-60:1.) The district court also advised Stuart that
[he was] lucky [he wasnt] sanctioned for filing a complaint representing a
corporation where [he] knew, as a disbarred lawyer, [he] had no right to do that.
(ER 38:4-7.) Given the Superior Court Defendants motion to dismiss was
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granted, the district court found that the motion was not frivolous and denied
Stuarts sanctions motion. (ER 16:16-17:9.)
B. The First Amended Complaint And Omnibus Motion To Dismiss
On January 9, 2014, the California Coalition, after retaining counsel, and
Stuart filed a First Amended Complaint (FAC). (ER 109.) Rather than set forth
a short plain statement as directed by the district court, the FAC increased the
length of the original complaint to 251 pages, plus 1,297 pages of exhibits, added
roughly eleven new defendants to the case,7 and continued to utilize countless,
lengthy, concocted acronyms. (ER 7:12-13; ER 8:6-9:7.)
The FAC included over 1,200 numbered paragraphs and was divided into 28
counts. (ER 143-356, 149-1203.) The first 15 counts were subdivided into 75
claims generally arising under 42 U.S.C. 1983, 1985, and 1986, the Lanham
Act, and California state law. (ER 143-292, 149-914; ER 25-27.) The FAC
also contained an additional eleven RICO counts and two counts for prospective
relief. (ER 316-49, 1001-1180; ER 351-54, 1192-1203.)
In order to promote efficiency, the district court scheduled a case
management conference for February 26, 2014. (SER 155.) At the case
management conference, the district court expressed its preference to have the
7 The new defendants named in the FAC included the Honorable Steven Jahr,
Administrative Director of the Courts, Judge Groch, and Ms. Nesthus. (ER 112, 12; ER 115-16, 26, 31.)
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defendants file one joint motion, rather than receive separate motions from the
multitude of defendants. (ER 25:3-15.) The district court added that it would like
to see one motion that addresses the issues the Court previously raised regarding
Rule 8, regarding the statute of limitations, and regarding the immunity issues on
the broad perspective that most of the defendants may have immunity . (ER
27:13-17.) Following the case management conference, the district court set a
briefing schedule, which was to commence with the filing of an omnibus motion
to dismiss by the Bar Association and be followed by the filing of joinders and
supplemental motions to dismiss by other defendants. (SER 157.)
Pursuant to the district courts briefing schedule, the Bar Association filed
the omnibus motion to dismiss the FAC on March 28, 2014. (SER 159.) Among
other grounds, the omnibus motion sought dismissal based on Appellants failure
to comply with Rules 8 and 9 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (SER 159.)
On April 10, 2014, the Judicial Defendants filed their notice of joinder in the
omnibus motion to dismiss, as well as their supplemental memorandum of points
and authorities, the stated purpose of which was to advance those additional
grounds supporting dismissal of the action as against the Judicial Defendants.
(SER 222:8-10, SER 232-34.) On May 13, 2014, the Superior Court and the AOC
also filed a motion for Rule 11 sanctions based on the continuing frivolous nature
of Appellants lawsuit and failure to comply with the district courts directives.
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(SER 236-39.) After all briefing concluded, the district court took the matter under
submission. (SER 265.)
C. The Dismissal of the Action
On July 8, 2014, the district court issued an order dismissing the case with
prejudice for failure to comply with Rule 8. (ER 6-12.) The district court
appropriately reasoned that that the FAC remains unmanageable, argumentative,
confusing, and frequently incomprehensible. (ER 10:22-26.) The district court
further observed that Appellants non-compliance with Rule 8 prejudiced the
defendants and harmed litigants in other pending matters. (ER 10:27-11:10.)
Although recognizing that the amended submission is even more unmanageable
than the original , the district court nevertheless declined to impose sanctions.
(ER 11:21-12:3.) Judgment in favor of the defendants was entered on July 9, 2014,
and the instant appeal ensued. (ER 1-5.)
V.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The decision of a district court is generally presumed to be correct. Parke v.
Raley, 506 U.S. 20, 29 (1992). A dismissal for failure to satisfy the pleading
standard of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 is reviewed for abuse of discretion.
McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1177 (9th Cir. 2003). The denial of leave to
amend a complaint is also reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Metzler Inv.
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GMBH v. Corinthian Colleges, Inc., 540 F.3d 1049, 1072 (9th Cir. 2008). [T]he
district courts discretion to deny leave to amend is particularly broad where
plaintiff has previously amended the complaint. Id.; see also Cafasso v. Gen.
Dynamics C4 Sys., 637 F.3d 1047, 1058 (9th Cir. 2011).
The district courts dismissal based on judicial immunity is a question of law
reviewed de novo. Meek v. County of Riverside, 183 F.3d 962, 965 (9th Cir.
1999). The district courts denial of Rule 11 sanctions is also reviewed for abuse
of discretion. Winterrowd v. Am. Gen. Annuity Ins. Co., 556 F.3d 815, 819 (9th
Cir. 1999). Finally, any claim for reversal based on judicial bias is reviewed for
plain error when raised for the first time on appeal. U.S. v. Bosch, 951 F.2d 1546,
1548 (9th Cir. 1991).
VI.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
As properly determined by the district court, the pleading at issue in this
action is argumentative, prolix, confusing, redundant, almost entirely conclusory,
nearly impossible to determine what claims are being asserted and against whom,
and contains incomprehensible rambling, all of which are grounds on which this
Court has consistently affirmed dismissals for failure to comply with Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 8. There was therefore no abuse of discretion by the district
court in its dismissal of the action with prejudice for failure to comply with Rule 8.
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Although Rule 8 alone supports affirmance of the district courts dismissal
of the action, the judgment against Appellants is warranted on numerous other
grounds. With regard to those claims against the judicial officers that presided
over Stuarts Dissolution Proceeding and People v. Stuart, the district court
correctly recognized that judicial officers enjoy absolute immunity from claims for
damages arising out of judicial acts within the jurisdiction of their courts. The
claims relating to the dissolution and criminal proceedings are also barred by the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine, which precludes federal courts from hearing de facto
appeals of state court judgments. Stuarts criminal conviction also bars any
malicious prosecution claim in connection withPeople v. Stuart.
As to those claims relating to the Bar Association incident, which occurred
more than three years before this action was filed, they are barred by the two-year
statute of limitations for civil rights claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983, and they do
not otherwise state facts sufficient to state a claim.
Appellants nonsensical obstruction of justice claim based on the demands
that the judges home addresses be removed from the original complaint also fails
as a matter of law, as the inclusion of such information violates a general order of
the district court and California state law and is entirely immaterial to the outcome
of this action.
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Eleventh Amendment immunity also bars the claims against the Superior
Court, Judicial Council, and AOC, as it is well-established that such State agencies
are immune from suit. The state court judicial officers and employees named as
defendants in this action are also protected by Eleventh Amendment immunity as
to those claims against them in their official capacities.
The dismissal of Appellants conspiracy claims under 42 U.S.C. 1985
and 1986 was also proper due to the absence of any factual allegations establishing
a conspiracy, that Stuart is a federal officer, or that any Judicial Defendant acted
with a discriminatory animus. Appellants false advertising claim under the
Lanham Act also does not and cannot state facts sufficient to state a claim, as the
Judicial Defendants do not advertise or sell services, or compete commercially
with anyone.
The FAC also does not and cannot satisfy the elements needed to assert a
viable civil RICO claim. There are no factual allegations regarding any Judicial
Defendants participation in a purported enterprise, or conduct that constitutes a
criminal act, let alone a pattern of crime. Appellants also lack standing to obtain
prospective relief because there are no allegations establishing a real or immediate
threat of being harmed again in the future. The granting of such relief would also
run afoul of principles of abstention underYoungerand OShea, which generally
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preclude federal courts from interfering with ongoing state proceedings, as well as
the administration of Californias judicial system.
Appellants remaining grounds for appeal relate to the alleged partiality of
the district court and the denial of counter-sanctions in connection with the
Superior Court Defendants motion to dismiss the original complaint. As to the
former, the comments made by the district judge about which Appellants complain
reflect nothing more than the district judges frustration with Appellants, which is
insufficient to establish judicial bias as a matter of law, let alone that the district
court was incapable of making a fair judgment. With regard to the latter, the
district court clearly did not abuse its discretion in denying a motion for counter-
sanctions relating to a motion to dismiss that was granted. For these reasons, and
as set forth more fully below, the Court should affirm the district courts judgment.
VII.
ARGUMENT
A. THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY EXERCISED ITS
DISCRETION IN DISMISSING THE ACTION FOR FAILURE
TO COMPLY WITH FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE 8
In order to satisfy Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8, a complaint must
contain a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is
entitled to relief. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Each allegation in a complaint also
must be simple, concise, and direct. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(d)(1). Rule 8 requires
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parties to make their pleadings straightforward, so that judges and adverse parties
need not try to fish a gold coin from a bucket of mud. U.S. v. Lockheed-Martin
Corp., 328 F.3d 374, 378 (7th Cir. 2003).
A complaint which fails to comply with Rule 8 may be dismissed with
prejudice under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b). Hearns v. San Bernardino
Police Dept., 530 F.3d 1124, 1129 (9th Cir. 2008); Nevijel v. North Coast Life Ins.
Co., 651 F.2d 671, 673 (9th Cir. 1981). Under Rule 41(b), a defendant may move
for dismissal of an action where the plaintiff fails to comply with the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure or a court order.
On appeal, Appellants argue the district courts dismissal of the FAC for
failure to comply with Rule 8 was error on the grounds that (1) the district court
sua sponteconsidered Rule 8 without notice and an opportunity for Appellants to
be heard on the issue; (2) the district court misapplied Rule 8; (3) the district court
did not consider the pertinent factors for an involuntary dismissal under Rule
41(b), and (4) the district courts order dismissing the original complaint with leave
to amend was improvident and thus the violation thereof cannot support a Rule
41(b) dismissal. (AOB 21-30.) Each argument is without merit.
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1. Appellants Failure To Comply With Rule 8 Was One Of Several
Enumerated Grounds In Support Of The Omnibus Motion To
Dismiss.
Appellants first assert that the district court sua sponte dismissed the action
under Rule 8 without providing Appellants notice and opportunity to be heard.
(AOB 21-22.) Contrary to Appellants assertion, the district courts consideration
of Rule 8 was not sua sponte. Not only did the Bar Associations notice expressly
state that the motion was being made under Rule 41(b) for failure to comply with
Rule 8, but its memorandum of points and authorities devoted six pages to
Appellants non-compliance with Rule 8. (SER 160:2-4; SER 168-74.) The
allegedlysua spontenature of the district courts Rule 8 dismissal, and Appellants
purported lack of notice and opportunity be heard, is also belied by Appellants
joint opposition to the omnibus motion to dismiss, which devoted approximately
18 pages to discussing Rule 8. (SER 244-62.)
2. The District Court Correctly Concluded That The FAC Failed To
Satisfy Rule 8.
As noted by the district court, [this Court] has affirmed dismissal on Rule 8
grounds where the complaint is argumentative, prolix, replete with redundancy,
and largely irrelevant, McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1177-80 (9th Cir. 1996),
verbose, confusing and [almost entirely] conclusory, Nevijel v. North Coast Life
Ins. Co., 651 F.2d 671, 674 (9th Cir. 1981), or where it is impossible to designate
the cause or causes of action attempted to be alleged in the complaint, Schmidt v.
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Herrmann, 614 F.2d 1221, 1223 (9th Cir. 1980). (ER 5:8-14); see also Cafasso,
637 F.3d at 1059 (Rule 8(a) has been held to be violated by a pleading that was
needlessly long, or a complaint that was highly repetitious, or confused, or
consisted of incomprehensible rambling.).
The rationale for such dismissals has been explained by this Court as
follows:
Prolix, confusing complaints impose unfair burdenson litigants and judges. As a practical matter, the judgeand opposing counsel, in order to perform their
responsibilities, cannot use [the] complaint and must
prepare outlines to determine who is being sued for what.
Defendants are then put at risk that their outline differs
from the judges, that plaintiffs will surprise them withsomething new at trial which they reasonably did not
understand to be in the case at all, and that res judicata
effects of settlement or judgment will be different fromwhat they reasonably expected.
The judge wastes half a day in chambers preparing the
short and plain statement which Rule 8 obligated
plaintiffs to submit. He then must manage the litigation
without knowing what claims are made against whom.This leads to discovery disputes and lengthy trials,
prejudicing litigants in other case who follow the rules,
as well as defendants in the case in which the prolix
pleading is filed. McHenry, 84 F.3d at 1179-80.
Moreover, [t]he propriety of dismissal for failure to comply with Rule 8
does not depend on whether the complaint is wholly without merit. Rule
8[(d)(1)], requiring each averment of a pleading to be simple, concise, and direct,
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applies to good claims as well as bad, and is a basis for dismissal independent of
Rule 12(b)(6). [Citations]. Id.at 1179.
The operative pleading in this action contains anything but a short and plain
statement of each claim, or simple, concise, and direct allegations. See Fed. R.
Civ. P. 8(a)(2), (d)(1). The FAC totals 251 pages in length, and roughly1,550
pages with all of its voluminous exhibits, and sets forth in excess of 1,200
numbered allegations. While verbosity alone is ordinarily not a basis for
dismissing an action under Rule 8, like the pleadings at issue in the authorities
referenced above, the FAC is unquestionably argumentative, confusing, and almost
entirely conclusory.
The general charge in the FAC is that nearly 60 defendants, consisting of
judicial officers and state judicial branch entities, the Bar Association, the San
Diego County Sheriff, the County, the City, the District Attorney, health care
professionals, and family law attorneys and firms, all conspired against Stuart to
deprive him of his fundamental rights. Yet, it is impossible to determine from the
FAC what each defendants role was in this alleged conspiracy, the manner in
which each defendant participated in the conspiracy, and what claims Appellants
assert arise from each defendants conduct.
Because the FAC requires the defendants and the district court to penetrate
a tome approaching the magnitude ofWar and Peace to discern [the] plaintiffs
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claims and allegations[,] Cafasso, 637 F.3d at 1058, and to try to fish a gold
coin from a bucket of mud[,] Lockheed-Martin, 328 F.3d at 378, the district court
properly exercised its discretion in dismissing the action on Rule 8 grounds.8
3. The District Court Did Consider And Properly Apply The RelevantFactors For Dismissal Under Rule 41(b).
Appellants also argue that the district court erred by failing to consider the
requisite factors for an involuntary dismissal under Rule 41(b). (AOB 20-21.)
Appellants reason that because the district court did not specifically reference Rule
41(b), the district court therefore did not analyze the relevant factors for its
application. (AOB 20.) Not only did the district court address such factors, but the
findings relating thereto are correct.
A district courts dismissal under Rule 41(b) should not be disturbed unless
there is a definite and firm conviction that the court below committed a clear error
of judgment in the conclusion it reached upon a weighing of the relevant factors.
8 Appellants also assert that Rule 8 was satisfied because the FAC contains
sufficient factual matter to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.
(AOB 21-30); Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Simplyput, a conspiracy by and between the entire Family Law Community to depriveStuart of his fundamental rights is implausible. Indeed, the district court foundcertain of Appellants allegations to be so implausible as to be offensive. (ER
8:1.) Moreover, the assertion of legal conclusions cast in the form of factualallegations, as is the case here, is insufficient to establish a plausible claim.
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); Farm Credit Servs. v. Am. State Bank,
339 F.3d 764, 767 (8th Cir. 2003); (see also Doc. 45 at 14-17, adopted byreference under Fed. R. App. P. 28(i).)
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Schmidt, 614 F.2d at 1224 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Leon v. IDX
Sys. Corp., 464 F.3d 951, 961 (9th Cir. 2006). Such factors consist of (1) the
publics interest in expeditious resolution of litigation; (2) the courts need to
manage its docket; (3) the risk of prejudice to the defendants; (4) the public policy
favoring disposition of cases on their merits; and (5) the availability of less drastic
alternatives. (Yourish v. California Amplifier, 191 F.3d 983, 990 (9th Cir. 1999).
A dismissal should be affirmed where at least four factors support
dismissal, or where at least three factors strongly support dismissal. Id.
(internal quotation marks omitted). Although it is preferred, it is not required that
the district court make explicit findings in order to show that it has considered
these factors and [this Court] may review the record independently to determine if
the district court abused its discretion. Id.(internal quotation marks omitted).
The district court correctly found that at least four of the foregoing factors
favors dismissal of the action with prejudice. (ER 10-11.) The district courts
order first addressed the risk of prejudice to the defendants, noting that the
defendants face the onerous task of combing through [plaintiffs lengthy
complaint] just to prepare an answer that admits or denies such allegations and to
determine what claims and allegations must be defended or otherwise litigated.
(ER 10:27-11:3 (quoting Cafasso, 637 F.3d at 1059).)
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The district court next found that plaintiffs noncompliance [with Rule 8]
harms litigants in other matters pending before the court[,] which corresponds to
the public interest and docket management factors. (ER 11:3-4.) The district court
aptly noted that [f]ederal judges have better things to do [than try to fish a gold
coin from a bucket of mud], and the substantial subsidy of litigation (court costs do
not begin to cover the expense of the judiciary) should be targeted on those
litigants who take the preliminary steps to assemble a comprehensible claim.
(ER 11:4-10 (quoting Lockheed-Martin Corp., 328 F.3d at 378).) The district
court also appropriately observed that [d]istrict judges are busy, and therefore
have a right to dismiss a complaint that is so long that it imposes an undue burden
on the judge to the prejudice of other litigants seeking the judges attention. (ER
11 n.6 (quotingKadamovas v. Stevens, 706 F.3d 843, 844 (7th Cir. 2013)).)
Lastly, the district court addressed the issue of whether further leave to
amend should be granted, which relates to the availability of less drastic
alternatives. (ER 11:12-20.) Because Appellants were previously granted leave to
amend, and their amended submission [was] even more unmanageable than the
original, the district court found that Appellants demonstrated an inability or
unwillingness to file a Rule 8-compliant pleading and thus denied leave to amend.
(ER 11.) Based on the foregoing, four of the five factors weigh in favor of
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dismissal of the action with prejudice.9 The Court therefore should affirm the
district courts dismissal of the action with prejudice under Rule 41(b).
4. The Involuntary Dismissal Was Supported With Or Without The
District Courts Prior Order On The Original Complaint.
Appellants also take aim at the district courts order dismissing the original
complaint and contend the violation thereof cannot support an involuntary
dismissal under Rule 41(b). (AOB 19-20.) According to Appellants, instead of
moving to dismiss the original complaint, the Superior Court Defendants should
have moved for a more definite statement under Rule 12(e). (AOB 29.) While
such a motion may have been available, a motion to dismiss for failure to comply
with Rule 8 was also appropriate. Hearns, 530 F.3d a 1129; Nevijel, 651 F.2d at
673.
Although Appellants may disagree with the district courts conclusion that
the original complaint did not comply with Rule 8, the district court specifically
identified the pleadings deficiencies and provided Appellants leave to amend.
(ER 41-49.) Given Appellants elected to amend their complaint and included
every claim from their original complaint in the FAC, Appellants cannot now be
heard to complain about the district courts order on the original complaint. Lacey
9 The lone factor arguably weighing against dismissal is the general policy
favoring disposition of cases on their merits. This factor, by itself, however, is
not sufficient to outweigh the other four factors. Leon, 464 F.3d at 961-62(internal quotation marks omitted).
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v. Maricopa County, 693 F.3d 896, 927 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc) (recognizing the
general rule that an amended complaint supercedes the original complaint and
renders it without legal effect).
Appellants argument concerning the propriety of an involuntary dismissal
based on the district courts December 23, 2013 order also ignores the express
language of Rule 41(b). Under Rule 41(b), dismissal is warranted for failure to
comply with a court order or the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Thus,
notwithstanding their failure to adhere to the district courts original dismissal
order, Appellants non-compliance with Rule 8 alone warranted the involuntary
dismissal of the action under Rule 41(b).
B. JUDICIAL IMMUNITY BARS ALL CLAIMS ARISING OUT
OF STUARTS DISSOLUTION AND CRIMINALPROCEEDINGS
A long line of [the Supreme Courts] precedents acknowledge that,
generally, a judge is immune from a suit for money damages.10 Mireles v. Waco,
502 U.S. 9, 11 (1991) (per curiam). Judicial immunity applies even where a judge
is accused of acting in bad faith, maliciously, corruptly, or erroneously. Mireles,
502 U.S. at 11; Stump, 435 U.S. at 356. As early as 1872, the [Supreme] Court
recognized that it was a general principle of the highest importance to the proper
10 Ninth Circuit jurisprudence has also recognized that judicial immunity
extends to actions for declaratory, injunctive and other equitable relief. Moore v.Brewster,96 F.3d 1240, 1243 (9th Cir. 1996).
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administration of justice that a judicial officer, in exercising the authority vested in
him, [should] be free to act upon his own convictions, without apprehension of
personal consequences to himself.11 Stump, 435 U.S. at 356 (quoting Bradley v.
Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall) 335, 351 (1872)).
The only two instances in which immunity is overcome is where the judge
acts in the clear absence of all jurisdiction, [citation], or performs an act that is not
judicial in nature. Ashelman, 793 F.2d at 1075 (internal quotation marks and
citations omitted); see also Mireles, 502 U.S. at 11-12. The factors relevant in
determining whether an act is judicial relate to the nature of the act itself, i.e.,
whether it is a function normally performed by a judge, and to the expectations of
the parties, i.e., whether they dealt with the judge in his judicial capacity.
Ashelman, 793 F.2d at 1075 (quoting Stump, 435 U.S. at 362); see also Mireles,
502 U.S. at 11.
In connection with the original complaint, the district court dismissed with
prejudice Stuarts claims against the defendant judges for damages arising out of
judicial acts within the jurisdiction of their courts. (ER 48:2-4 (citingAshelman,
11 The Supreme Court further recognized: Liability to answer to every one
who might feel himself aggrieved by the action of the judge, would be inconsistentwith the possession of this freedom, and would destroy that independence without
which no judiciary can be either respectable or useful. As observed by a
distinguished English judge, it would establish the weakness of judicial authorityin a degrading responsibility. Bradley, 80 U.S. at 347.
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793 F.2d at 1075).) Although Appellants effectively ignored the district courts
ruling and asserted the same claims in their FAC, as well as additional claims
against judicial officers arising out of allegedly non-immune acts, (see ER 177-
78, 350; ER 270-71, 831-838), Appellants criticize the district courts
dismissal of claims based on judicial immunity. (AOB 34-48.)
Appellants argue that (1) Ashelman, which was cited by the district court,
and Sparkman were both wrongly decided, (AOB 46-51, 53-58, 62-63); (2) the
district court improperly expanded the immunity recognized in Ashelman, (AOB
52-53); (3) the district court failed to perform a historical analysis to determine
whether there is any federal common law immunity for judges, (AOB 43-46); and
(4) that family law judges, in particular, have no common law immunity, (AOB
58-62). Each of Appellants assertions is without merit.
1. Ashelmanand SparkmanAre Binding Precedent In This Circuit.
In Ashelman, the issue before an en banc panel of the Ninth Circuit was
whether a judge and prosecutor are immune from damages in a civil rights action
charging them with conspiracy to predetermine the outcome of the judicial
proceedings. 793 F.2d at 1074. In light of policy considerations favor[ing] a
liberal application of immunity[,] the en banc panel held that [a]s long as the
judges ultimate acts are judicial actions taken within the courts subject matter
jurisdiction, immunity applies. Id.at 1078. While clearly improper, the Court
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concluded that a conspiracy between a judge and prosecutor to predetermine the
outcome of a judicial proceeding does not pierce the immunity extended to
judges and prosecutors. Id.
Appellants accuse the en banc panel in Ashelman of misapplying and
expanding Sparkman, (AOB 36-40, 41-45), and go so far as to claim that the
Supreme Court overstepped the limits of Article III jurisdiction in Sparkman by
finding the doctrine of judicial immunity applicable to section 1983 actions, (AOB
39-40). In other words, Appellants ask that this Court reconsider the wisdom of
the en banc panels decision in Ashelman and the Supreme Courts ruling in
Sparkman.
While Appellants may disagree with the holdings in Ashelman and
Sparkman, it is well-settled that published Ninth Circuit and Supreme Court
decisions are binding precedent in this circuit. Hart v. Massanari, 266 F.3d 1155,
1171 (9th Cir. 2001). Once a panel resolves an issue in a precedential opinion,
the matter is deemed resolved, unless overruled by the court itself sitting en banc,
or by the Supreme Court. Id. Given Ashelman is the law in this circuit, and
Sparkman the law of the land, Appellants request that this Court ignore such
precedent, revive earlier case law expressly abrogated in Ashelman, and invoke
case law from other circuits, is misplaced.
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Notwithstanding the precedential value of Ashelman and Sparkman, the
grounds for Appellants attack on these decisions are equally devoid of merit.
According to Appellants, Ashelmans consideration of the precise act to
determine whether judicial immunity applies was rejected by Sparkman. (AOB
45-46.) Nothing in Sparkman rejected consideration of the precise act or
ultimate act for purposes of applying judicial immunity. To the contrary, the
first factor identified by the Supreme Court relate[s] to the nature ofthe actitself,
i.e., whether it is a function normally performed by a judge[.] Sparkman, 435
U.S. at 362 (emphasis added) (applying judicial immunity to judges ex parte
approval of a minors sterilization).
Appellants criticism ofSparkman and Ashelman on Article III grounds is
also unavailing. (SeeAOB 40, 49.) Appellants effectively assert that the scope of
judicial immunity recognized in Sparkman and Ashelman did not exist in federal
common law and was therefore abolished by Congress with the adoption of section
1983.
In Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967), the Supreme Court expressly held
that the doctrine of judicial immunity is applicable to section 1983 actions. 386
U.S. at 555, overruled on other grounds by Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800
(1982); Sparkman, 435 U.S. at 355-56; Ashelman, 793 F.2d at 1075. Indeed, in
1872, the Supreme Court held that judicial immunity applies however erroneous
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the act may have been, and however injurious in its consequences it may have
proved to the plaintiff. Bradley, 80 U.S. at 347. The only requirements for
judicial immunity reflected inBradley, and repeated in Sparkmanand Ashelman, is
that the character of the act be judicial, and that the act was within the jurisdiction
of the judicial officer. 80 U.S. at 347, 351. Appellants attack on well-settled
Supreme Court authorities is therefore not well taken and should be rejected.
2. The District Court Correctly Applied Circuit Precedent.
In its December 23, 2013 order, the district court dismissed with prejudice
those claims for damages against the defendant judges arising out of judicial acts
within the jurisdiction of their courts. (ER 48:2-4.) While Appellants may
disagree with the law, this is a correct recitation of the doctrine of judicial
immunity under Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit precedent.
Appellants seem to fault the district court for not identifying any particular
claims that are barred by judicial immunity.12 (AOB 34.) Although the district
courts order does not cite to the specific claims to which judicial immunity
12 Appellants also attack the scope of judicial immunity outlined by the districtcourt at the hearing on the Superior Court Defendants original motion to dismiss.
(AOB 34-35.) Where the record includes both oral and written rulings on thesame matter, [the Court] review[s] the written opinion and not the oral statements.
PlayMakers LLC v. ESPN, Inc., 376 F.3d 894, 896 (9th Cir. 2004). Appellants
apparent request for review of the district courts oral remarks is thereforemisplaced.
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applies,13 the district courts order identifies the two events on which the original
complaint was based the so-called assault at the Bar Association seminar and
Stuarts Dissolution Proceeding. (ER 42:18-44:25.) The Superior Court
Defendants motion papers also show that judicial immunity was being raised as to
any claims challenging allegedly unlawful rulings and decisions in the
Dissolution Proceeding. (SER 50:25-51:5; SER 144, n.4.) Because the defendant
judges are clearly immune from such claims, the Court should affirm the district
courts dismissal of such claims with prejudice.
3. The Recycled Claims In The FAC Concerning Stuarts Dissolution
Proceeding, As Well As The New Claims Relating To People v.
Stuart, Are Also Barred By Judicial Immunity.
Despite the district courts dismissal of the claims arising out of the judicial
decisions in Stuarts Dissolution Proceeding, Count 11 of the FAC continues to
assert claims against Judges Wohlfeil and Schall relating to their conduct in that
matter. (ER 270-71, 831-838.) Count 3 of the FAC also adds new claims
arising out of allegedly non-immune acts against Judge Groch, who presided
over the trial inPeople v. Stuart. (ER 177-78, 350; ER 205-06, 491-97.)
In both cases, the FAC fails to identify any acts outside the scope of judicial
immunity. The allegations that these judicial officers acted in bad faith,
13 Given Appellants utter failure to comply with Rule 8, particularly their
failure to connect their scant factual allegations to causes of action, it isunderstandable why the district court did not do so.
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maliciously, corruptly, or erroneously, or the legal conclusion that their acts were
not judicial, has no impact on the application of judicial immunity. Mireles, 502
U.S. at 11; Stump, 435 U.S. at 356. Given the acts about which Appellants
complain occurred during Stuarts encounter with Judges Wohlfeil, Schall, and
Groch solely in their judicial capacities, judicial immunity supports the dismissal
of the claims relating to Stuarts divorce and criminal proceedings.
4. No Historical Analysis Of Judicial Immunity Was Necessary.
Appellants next suggest that the district court erred because the Superior
Court Defendants proffered, and the district court undertook, no historical analysis
of whether judicial defendants asserting immunities were performing functions
immune at common law in 1871 both merely citing toAshelman. (AOB 35-36.)
Once again, Appellants ignore the precedential effect of prior decisions of this
circuit and the Supreme Court. After performing a historical analysis, the Supreme
Court, as recognized in Ashelman, has already held that judicial immunity existed
under federal common law and was not abolished in 1871 by 42 U.S.C. 1983.
Sparkman, 435 U.S. at 355-56; Pierson, 386 U.S. at 555; Bradley, 80 U.S. at 347;
Ashelman, 793 F.2d at 1075. Appellants historical analysis argument is therefore
without merit.
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5. Family Law Judges Are Also Afforded Judicial Immunity.
Finally, Appellants contend that family court judges are not entitled to
judicial immunity on the ground that courts did not have jurisdiction over divorces
and child custody matters in 1871. (AOB 46-48.) Appellants also assert any
immunity granted to such judgments does not apply to judicial acts performed
maliciously or corruptly because of the inferior status of family courts. (AOB
48.) Neither assertion has any merit.
It is well-established that judicial immunity applies to judges in divorce
proceedings. Duvall v. County of Kitsap, 260 F.3d 1124, (9th Cir. 2001) (finding
superior court judge absolutely immune in action under the American with
Disabilities Act arising out of judges failure to accommodate plaintiffs hearing
impairment during dissolution proceeding); Arnold v. Bostick, 339 F.2d 879, 880-
81 (9th Cir. 1964) (affirming dismissal of section 1983 action against superior
court judge based on court order excluding plaintiff from the family home); see
also Meyers v. Contra Costa County Dept. of Soc. Servs., 812 F.2d 1154, 1158-59
(9th Cir. 1986) (applying quasi-judicial immunity to family court employees that
mediate custody and visitation disputes).
In Bradley, the Supreme Court held that judges of courts of superior or
general jurisdiction are not liable to civil actions for their judicial acts, even when
such acts are in excess of their jurisdiction, and are alleged to have been done
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maliciously or corruptly. 80 U.S. at 351. Bradley did not recognize any
exception for malicious or corrupt acts of judges of limited and inferior
authority. (See AOB 48.) To the contrary, the Supreme Court held that any such
limitation was not a a correct statement of the law. 80 U.S. at 351. Indeed, [i]t
is essential in all courts that the judges who are appointed to administer the law
should be permitted to administer it under the protection of the law, independently
and freely, without favor and without fear. Id. at 349 n.16 (internal quotation
marks omitted). An exception to judicial immunity for malicious or corrupt
motives would subject judges to the same vexatious litigation that the doctrine
was designed to prevent. Id.at 354. Judges presiding over family law matters are
therefore entitled to the same protections granted under the doctrine of judicial
immunity.14
C. THE DISTRICT COURTS JUDGMENT MAY BE AFFIRMED
ON NUMEROUS OTHER GROUNDS
In addition to Rule 8 and judicial immunity, the Judicial Defendants moved
to dismiss the