Report of

The National Task Force on theCriminal Backgrounding of America

SEARCHThe National Consortium for Justice Information and Statistics

Report of the National Task Force on the Criminal Backgrounding of America �

Th�sreportwaspreparedbySEARCH,TheNat�onalConsort�umforJust�ceInformat�onandStat�st�cs,Franc�sX.AumandIII,Cha�rman,andRonaldP.Hawley,Execut�veD�rector.

Th�sreportwasproducedasaproductofaprojectfundedbythe Bureau of Justice Statistics, Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Department of Justice, under Cooperative Agreement No. 2005-RU-BX-K014, awarded to SEARCH Group, Incorporated, 7311 Greenhaven Drive, Suite 145, Sacramento, California 95831.

Contents of this document do not necessarily reflect the views or policies of the Bureau of Justice Statistics or the U.S. Depart-ment of Justice. Copyright © SEARCH Group, Incorporated, dba SEARCH,TheNat�onalConsort�umforJust�ceInformat�onandStatistics, 2005.

Report of the National Task Force on the Criminal Backgrounding of America ��

Contents

Introduction..................................................................................... 1

National Task Force Created to Guide Effort.......................................... 2

Scopeofth�sReport.......................................................................... 2

Definition of Terms........................................................................... 3

Current Landscape............................................................................ 4

Demand for Criminal Record Backgrounding and Resulting Tensions........ 5

LawandPol�cy................................................................................. 5

Task Force Recommendations.......................................................... 8

Appropriate Levels of Access: Recommendations 1.1 to 1.9.................... 9

Privacy and Social Safeguards: Recommendations 2.1 to 2.4.................16

Complete and Accurate Records: Recommendations 3.1 to 3.3..............18

Miscellaneous: Recommendations 4.1 to 4.3.......................................20

National Task Force on the Criminal Backgrounding of America.......22

Report of the National Task Force on the Criminal Backgrounding of America 1

Report of the National Task Force on theCriminal Backgrounding of America

IntroductionThe criminal record background check has becomeaub�qu�touspartofAmer�cancul-ture.Assomeobservershavenoted,1“To-day, background checking—for employment purposes, for eligibility to serve as a volun-teer, for tenant screening, and for so many other purposes—has become a necessary, even�fnotalwaysawelcome,r�teofpas-sage for almost every adult American.”

A Society for Human Resource Manage-mentsurveyofemployers,theresultsofwhich were published in January 2004, found that more than 80 percent conduct criminal background checks of prospective employees. Fifty-one percent of employers conducted such checks in 1996.2

The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, resulted in millions more criminal re-cord checks being conducted routinely. Just weeksaftertheattacks,FederalAv�at�onAdministration administrator Jane Garvey ordered criminal checks of up to 1 million workersw�thaccesstosecureareas�nthenat�on’sa�rports.ThePatr�otAct,3enactedby Congress in October 2001, directed the criminal backgrounding of hazardous mate-r�alstransporters.Theprocesswasexpect-ed to result in approximately 3.5 million checkseachyear.S�m�larcheckswerecon-templated for those working in U.S. ports and�nthecountry’schem�cal�ndustry.

1Report of the National Task Force on the Commercial Sale of Criminal Justice Record Information(SEARCH:Sacramento, CA, December 2005), available at http://www.search.org/files/pdf/RNTFCSCJRI.pdf.2Wired News, “When Old Convictions Won’t Die,” May 10, 2004, http://www.wired.com/news/business/0,1367,63364,00.html?tw=wn_story_related.3 Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropr�ateToolsRequ�redtoInterceptandObstructTerrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001, Public Law 107-56.

Child protection legislation such as the Pro-tectAct4onthenat�onallevelandFlor�da’sJess�caLunsfordAct5onthestatelevelbroadenedeverfurtherthescopeofbothstatutorily authorized and required screen-ing. Estimates as to the number of youth-serving volunteers who could potentially be backgrounded as a result of the Protect Act range in the tens of millions. Florida schools are struggling with the impact of theLunsfordAct,wh�chrequ�restheback-grounding of virtually anyone who enters school grounds when children are present, including meter readers, package delivery serv�cerepresentat�ves,dr�verswhodel�vergroceries to school cafeterias, and individu-als who fill vending machines.Somelawenforcementcr�m�nalrecordsrepos�tor�esnowconductalmostasmanycr�m�nalrecordchecksforc�v�lornon-cr�m�naljust�cepurposesasforcr�m�nalpurposes.TheFBI,forexample,processed9,777,762 fingerprint submissions for civil checks in Fiscal Year 2005 compared to 10,323,126 fingerprint submissions for criminal checks during that same period.6It would be difficult to accurately tally the tensofm�ll�onsofnoncr�m�naljust�cecr�m�-nal record checks, both name- and fin-gerprint-based, conducted throughout the country each year by government-adminis-teredrepos�tor�esandbypr�vatecommer-cial background check service providers.

4TheProsecutor�alRemed�esandOtherToolstoEndtheExploitation of Children Today (PROTECT) Act of 2003, Public Law 108-21.5 Florida Statutes 1012.465.6 Information provided Jan. 10, 2006, by Barbara S. Wiles, Management Analyst, Criminal Justice Information Services D�v�s�on,FBI.

Report of the National Task Force on the Criminal Backgrounding of America 2

America’s growing dependence on criminal record background checks to strengthen public safety by reducing opportunities for certa�ncr�m�naloffenderstorepeatthe�rpasth�stor�esrequ�resnewandadd�t�onalresources to help law- and policymakers craft backgrounding laws, policies, and procedures to effectively govern this ex-pans�on.

To assist on the national level, Congress included a directive in the Intelligence Re-form and Terrorism Prevention Act of 20047for the U.S. Attorney General to prepare a report making “recommendations … for improving, standardizing, and consolidat-ing the existing statutory authorization, programs, and procedures for the conduct of criminal history record checks for non-criminal justice purposes.” The Attorney General was directed to look at a num-beroffactorsassoc�atedw�thnoncr�m�naljustice background checks, including the roleofpr�vate�nformat�onprov�ders,se-cur�tyconcerns,feestructures,d�ssem�na-t�onpol�c�esandrestr�ct�ons,�nformat�ontechnology infrastructure issues, and other factors.

To provide further guidance and assistance, SEARCH,TheNat�onalConsort�umforJus-tice Information and Statistics (SEARCH), and the Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS), U.S. Department of Justice, launched a comprehens�veandanalyt�clookatnon-criminal justice background checks, seek-ing clarity on many of the pervasive ques-t�onsassoc�atedw�ththeprocess.8

7 Public Law 108-458.8 SEARCH is a nonprofit consortium of the states dedicated to improving the quality of justice and public safety through the use, management, and exchange of information; application of new technologies; and responsible law and policy, while safeguarding security and privacy (http://www.search.org/). The Bureau of Justice Statistics, a component of the Office of Justice Programs in the U.S. Department of Justice, collects, analyzes, publishes, and d�ssem�nates�nformat�ononcr�me,cr�m�naloffenders,cr�mev�ct�ms,andtheoperat�onofjust�cesystemstoalllevels of government, providing critical data to federal, state,andlocalpol�cymakers(http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/).

Howcanthechecksbeconductedmostef-fect�vely?Whatcr�m�nalrecord�nformat�on�smostrelevanttoasu�tab�l�tydeterm�na-t�on?Howdowebalancepubl�csafetycon-cerns against the rights of individuals? Can states find ways to accommodate the in-creasingly burdensome noncriminal justice background check cost and still respond effect�velytodemands?

National Task Force Created to Guide EffortTo guide this effort, SEARCH and BJS con-vened nationally recognized experts in August 2004 to be the National Task Force on the Criminal Backgrounding of America.9TheTaskForcewascompr�sedofrepresen-tatives from federal agencies, including the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Department of Justice (DOJ), the Depart-ment of Defense (DOD), and the Office of Personnel Management (OPM); volunteer organizations which screen volunteers’ backgrounds; state criminal history record repositories and identification bureaus; pr�vatecompan�esthatassemblecr�m�naljust�ce�nformat�onandsell�tforback-ground checks; employers; state legisla-tures; criminal record background check clearinghouses; and scholars and academic experts.

TheTaskForcemetfourt�mesbetweenAugust 2004 and August 2005. Its findings andrecommendat�onshere�ndonotneces-sar�lyrepresentthev�ewsofalloranyonemember or the organizations with which they are affiliated.

Scope of this ReportThis report is intended to provide law- and pol�cymakersw�threcommendat�onsanddiscussion on criminal backgrounding for noncr�m�naljust�cepurposes,and�tde-scr�bestheTaskForce’sv�s�onforsuchbackgrounding based on values identified

9Hereafter,theTaskForce.Al�stofTaskForcemembersappears on page 22.

Report of the National Task Force on the Criminal Backgrounding of America 3

during its meetings. Recommendations, which begin on page 8, are organized into the following subsections: Appropriate Levels of Access; Privacy and Social Safe-guards; Complete and Accurate Records; andM�scellaneous.It�shopedthatth�sre-portw�llbeapos�t�veand�mportantcontr�-bution to the continuing debate surround-ing criminal backgrounding for noncriminal just�cepurposes.

Definition of TermsThe Task Force identified the following key terms that describe the background check layersava�labletoday.Thesetermsanddefinitions were crafted in a building-block manner that emphasizes record source, which is a critical aspect of backgrounding d�scuss�onsandconcepts.Consequently,many of these definitions are based on re-cordsource.Theyrelyontheconceptthatgovernment records are generally consid-ered “official” records, and that private-sector records are not “official” records unless designated as such by government. The following terms were defined for use in th�sreport:

Backgrounding – Theoverallcollect�on,ma�ntenance,retr�eval,anduseofdataabout a person’s background, from any source.

Criminal Backgrounding – Theoverallcollect�on,ma�ntenance,retr�eval,anduseofdataaboutaperson’scr�m�nalrecord,through official government records, as set forth in the next two definitions.

Criminal History Record Check–Acheck that returns records from official cr�m�nalh�storyrepos�tor�es.10Cr�m�nalh�storyrepos�tor�esstore“cr�m�nalh�storyrecord information,”11wh�chfederallawde-

10Forthepurposeofth�sreport,“cr�m�nalh�storyrepository” means state repositories and the FBI-administered Interstate Identification Index (III), which includes the National Fingerprint File (NFF).11Hereafter,CHRI.

fines as “information collected by criminal justice agencies on individuals consisting of identifiable descriptions and notations of arrests,detent�ons,�nd�ctments,�nforma-tion, or other formal criminal charges, and any disposition arising therefrom, including acquittal, sentencing, correctional supervi-sion, and release.”12Twotypesofcr�m�nalhistory record checks exist: fingerprint-based and name-based. These two types will be referred to throughout this report to clar�fy�ssuesassoc�atedw�theach.(Wh�lenot part of this definition, some reposito-r�esreturn�nformat�onfromsexoffenderregistries and wants-and-warrants files with criminal history record checks.)

Criminal Case Record Check – Acheckthat returns results from official criminal caserecordsma�nta�nedbystateorfed-eral criminal justice agencies, other than recordsreturnedbycr�m�nalh�storyrecordchecks, as defined above. Examples include information from wants and warrants files, sex offender registries, courts, law enforce-ment,correct�ons,andothersourcesofrecordson�nd�v�dualsandoffenseskeptin criminal justice agency case manage-mentsystems.Someoftheserecordsareoriginal source records for criminal history repos�tor�es.Cr�m�nalcaserecordchecksare generally not fingerprint-based.

Investigatory Record Check–Acheckthat returns results from investigatory re-cords maintained by government or quasi-government entities, other than records returnedbycr�m�nalh�storyrecordchecksand criminal case record checks as defined above. Examples are gang registries, intel-ligence or investigative files, and Interpol and other international records. Investiga-tory record checks are not usually finger-print-based.

Civil Record Check – Acheckthatre-turns results from official government-

12 28 C.F.R. § 20.3(d).

Report of the National Task Force on the Criminal Backgrounding of America 4

ma�nta�nedc�v�lrecords.Examples�ncluderecords of birth and death, marriage, land, publ�ceducat�on,m�l�taryserv�ce,andc�v�lcourt records and judgments. Civil record checks are not fingerprint-based.

Commercial Check–Acheckthatreturnsresults from non-governmental private prov�ders,wh�chcollect,comp�leandstoredata from many different sources, including civil and criminal government databases andotherpr�vatedatabases.Examplesinclude personal identifiers such as Social Secur�tyNumbers,pastaddresses,re-cordsfromcr�m�nalh�storydatabases,c�v�lcourts, credit and consumer agencies, as-sessors’ offices, county clerks, the military, andeducat�onal�nst�tut�ons.Commerc�alchecksoftendrawuponamult�tudeofd�f-ferentsourcedatabasesandcomb�netheresults into a consolidated profile. They are almost always name-based.

Current LandscapeThe backgrounding landscape is very com-plex.Thelandscape�scompr�sedoftwodistinct components: 1) laws and policies governing access to, and the use of, back-ground information; and 2) the collection and management of data that provide background information. Complexities mul-t�plywhenthecomponentsarecomb�ned.Further,asweface�ncreaseddemandforbackgrounding, and criminal background-ing in particular, important national public policy issues surface regarding privacy, au-thorized use of official records, and others.In its broadest sense, backgrounding is “theoverallcollect�on,ma�ntenance,re-tr�evalanduseofdataaboutaperson’sbackground, from any source.”13Afullbackground check can include many types andsourcesofpersonal�nformat�on,suchas:

13 See “Definition of Terms” section on page 3 of this report.

• Informat�ontover�fythe�dent�tyoftheapplicant or record subject, including birth certificates and other vital records

• Cr�m�nalh�storyandcr�m�nalcasere-cord�nformat�on

• Employmenth�story

• Cred�th�storyandscore

• Educat�onh�story

• Res�denceandrentalh�story

• C�v�lcourtact�ons

• L�cense�ssuance

• DepartmentofMotorVeh�clerecords

• M�l�taryandDepartmentofDefenseh�s-tor�es

• No-fly, selectee, and other terrorist watchl�sts

• Characterreferences

• Federal agency records

• Drug and alcohol test results

• Immigration records

• Office of Foreign Assets Control data

• “Deadbeat dad” registries

• Various insurance databases, including the Comprehensive Loss Underwriting Exchange (CLUE)

• Non-adjudicated shoplifting reports from reta�lsources

• Foreign association databases

• Various abuse registries

• Voting records

• Travel�nformat�ondatabases

• Others.

Although the Task Force recognized and discussed backgrounding in its broadest sense,�tfocusedthebulkof�tsd�scuss�onsandrecommendat�onsoncr�m�nalrecordbackgrounding. The Task Force viewed

Report of the National Task Force on the Criminal Backgrounding of America 5

criminal record backgrounding as at the heart of the most significant background-ing issues, and an area for which it could offer the most significant recommendations and insight. Therefore, criminal record backgrounding is the primary focus of this report’sd�scuss�onsandrecommendat�ons.

Demand for Criminal Record Backgrounding and Resulting TensionsAccording to a February 2005 survey of hu-manresourceprofess�onalsbytheSoc�etyfor Human Resource Management, criminal background checks were the second-most frequently conducted employee background checks by employers after U.S. employ-ment eligibility checks.14Anumberofreasons,notnecessar�lymutuallyexclus�veofeachother,mot�vateemployers,volun-teer organizations, and others to conduct criminal record background checks. They �nclude:

• Publ�csafety

• Compliance with legal requirements

• L�m�tat�onofl�ab�l�ty

• Conditions of doing business

• Protect�onofvulnerablepopulat�ons

• Customerassurance

• Avo�danceoflossofbus�ness

• Fearofbus�nessloss,orpubl�cormed�abacklashoveran�nc�dentcausedbyan�nd�v�dualw�thapastrecord

• To regain public or customer trust.

New and advancing technologies also play arole�nthedemandforcr�m�nalback-ground checks, as they ease the collection, ma�ntenance,andd�ssem�nat�onofback-ground information.

14BureauofNat�onalAffa�rs,“SHRMSurveyF�ndsEmployers Spending more Time on Worker Background Checks,” Privacy Law Watch, Feb. 25, 2005.

With the high demand for criminal back-grounding, tensions surface between dif-fering views on the value and appropriate use of criminal background information. Someconcludethatw�despreadaccesstocriminal background information is pre-dominantly beneficial to society for public safetyandotherreasons,andshouldbeprevalent.Othersconcludethatw�despreadaccess to criminal background information maybepredom�nantlydetr�mentaltosoc�-ety and invites negative unintended conse-quences, especially if privacy rights are not carefullyprotected.St�llothersfallatvar�-ouspo�ntsonthespectrumbetweenthesetwo opposing views, recognizing a need to balancethese�nterests.

The Task Force recognized that tensions ex�stbetweenaccessandpr�vacy.Thesetensions were discussed at length and were of great concern. The Task Force strived tostr�keanappropr�atebalancebetweenthesetwoperspect�vesand�ssued�tsrec-ommendations with this goal in mind.

Law and PolicyLayers of law and policy governing crimi-nal record backgrounding activities exist at thestateandfederallevels.Forexample,28 U.S.C. § 534, an important provision atthefederallevel,states,“TheAttorneyGeneral shall (1) acquire, collect, classify, and preserve identification, criminal identi-fication, crime, and other records; and (2) exchange these records with, and for the official use of, authorized officials of the Federal Government, the States, cities, and penal and other institutions.”15

The Code of Federal Regulations (C.F.R.) further governs the use of records collected under the authority of 28 U.S.C. 534, which shall be referenced in this report as “FBI-

15 28 U.S.C. § 534. See also U.S. v. Rosen, 343 F.Supp. 804, 806 (D.C.N.Y 1972) (noting that the word “shall” in 28 U.S.C. § 534 “is not merely an authorization but an imperative direction.”).

Report of the National Task Force on the Criminal Backgrounding of America 6

maintained CHRI” (criminal history record information).16 Specifically, 28 C.F.R. 20.33 l�m�tstheuseofsuchrecordsto“cr�m�naljustice agencies for criminal justice pur-poses,17wh�chpurposes�ncludethescreen-ing of employees or applicants for employ-ment hired by criminal justice agencies.” Th�sprov�s�onhasleadtothecommonuseoftwophrasesforthepurposeofd�st�n-guishing the use of CHRI: “use for criminal justice purposes” and “use for non-criminal justice purposes.”18Suchphrasesshallbeused throughout this report.

Given the generally restrictive use of FBI-maintained CHRI, specific legislation is required to authorize its use for noncrimi-naljust�cepurposes,suchasemploymentand licensing background checks. Further, the authorization must specifically autho-rize access to FBI-maintained CHRI or FBI systems, rather than a mere obligation, proh�b�t�on,oradm�n�strat�verespons�b�l�tyto perform certain employment or licensing screening.19

Public Law 92-544 was enacted by Con-gress in 1972 to permit states to enact leg-islation that designates specific licensing or employmentpurposesforwh�chstateandlocal government agencies may submit fin-gerprints to the FBI and receive FBI-main-ta�nedCHRI.It�s�mportanttonotethatFBI-maintained CHRI includes state records

16 See “Definition of Terms” section on page 3 of this report, especially “Criminal History Record Check,” for the definition ofCHRI.17 “Criminal justice purpose” is further defined to be for an “administration of criminal justice,” as outlined in 28 C.F.R. 20.3(b). Qualifying activities include: detection, apprehension, detention, pretrial release, post-trial release,prosecut�on,adjud�cat�on,correct�onalsuperv�s�on,rehabilitation, and the criminal identification activities and the collection, storage, and dissemination of criminal h�storyrecord�nformat�on.18 “Use for non-criminal justice purposes” has also been commonly called referred to as “use for civil purposes.” However,th�ssecondreferencetoc�v�lpurposes�snotasw�despread,and�tstermsdonotrelateasd�rectlytotheunderlying legal authority.19 CJIS Information Letter, U.S. Department of Justice, April 6, 2001.

totheextentthattheyarecollectedbytheFBI and indexed through the FBI’s Inter-state Identification Index (III).20

Public Law 92-544 statutes may include disqualifying offenses that prevent an ap-plicant from obtaining a position of employ-mentoral�cense�ftheappl�canthasthestated offense in his or her background. Cr�mesofv�olenceorofasexualnaturearealmost a universal disqualifying offense in Public Law 92-544 statutes. Other disquali-fying offenses relate more specifically to the license or position being sought; for ex-ample, a conviction for a financially related cr�mewouldl�kelyd�squal�fyan�nd�v�dualfrom a position that involves handling money.

20The Interstate Identification Index (III), known informally as “Triple I,” is an interstate/federal-state computer network for conducting national criminal history record searches. III uses an index-pointer approach to tie together thecr�m�nalh�storyrecorddatabasesofstatecentralrepos�tor�esandtheFBI.

Under this approach, the FBI maintains an automated mastername�ndex,wh�ch�ncludesthenamesandidentifying information on all individuals whose CHRI is available through the III system. (As of December 1, 2005, the system held more than 56 million records.) If a search ofthe�ndex�nd�catesthatan�nd�v�dual�sthesubjectofaIII-indexed record, the index will point the inquiring agency to the FBI and/or to the state or states from which the �nd�v�dual’scr�m�nalh�storyrecordscanbeobta�ned.Theinquiring agency may then obtain the records directly from thestateorFBIcr�m�nalrecorddatabasethatholdstherecords.

III searches for criminal justice purposes, including criminal investigations and prosecutions, are conducted pursuant to federal regulation 28 CFR Part 20, Subpart C. III searches for noncriminal justice purposes must be fingerprint-basedandareconductedpursuanttotheNat�onalCr�mePrevent�onandPr�vacyCompact,asestabl�shedbytheCrime Identification and Technology Act of 1998, Public Law 105-251.

Twenty-five states have ratified the Privacy Compact: Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, Maine, Maryland, Minnesota, M�ssour�,Montana,Nevada,NewHampsh�re,NewJersey,North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Carolina, Tennessee, and Wyoming. Eleven states and territories have signed a Memorandum of Understanding effectively subscribing to the Compact: American Samoa, Guam, Hawaii, Illinois, Kentucky, Mississippi, North Dakota, Nebraska,NewMex�co,SouthDakota,andVermont.

Report of the National Task Force on the Criminal Backgrounding of America 7

The following criteria must be met before access is allowed under a Public Law 92-544 statute: (1) the statute must exist as a result of a legislative enactment; (2) it must require that applicants be fingerprint-ed; (3) it must, expressly or by implication, authorize the use of FBI records for the screening of applicants; (4) it must identify the specific category(ies) of licensees/em-ployees falling within its purview, thereby avoiding overbreadth; (5) it must not be against public policy; and (6) it must not �dent�fyapr�vateent�tyastherec�p�entoftheresultsoftherecordcheck.21

The problem with the overall Public Law 92-544 approach is that the specific state pro-visions that authorize access to FBI-main-ta�nedCHRIcreateacomplex,�ncons�stent,and noncomprehensive authorization scheme.S�m�larpos�t�onsofemployment�nd�fferentstatesmaybetreatedd�fferently,even though the underlying public safety �ssuesmaybethesame.Stateshaveen-acted more than 1,100 statutes under the Public Law 92-544 umbrella.

StatestatutesseparatefromPubl�cLaw92-544 statutes allow public access to state-held CHRI. Each state legislature controls access to its own state-maintained CHRI,andeachstatemaytakead�ffer-ent approach to making such records pub-licly available for employment, licensing, andothernoncr�m�naljust�cepurposes.(A listing of many of the State laws gov-erning the security and dissemination of State-maintained criminal history record �nformat�oncanbev�ewedontheonl�neCompendium of State Privacy and Security Legislationathttp://www.search.org/pro-grams/policy/compendium/.) State-level cr�m�nalh�storyrecordchecksvarycon-siderably, from name-based searches that do not require data subject authorization to fingerprint-based searches that require

21CJISInformat�onLetter,supra note 19 at p. 19.

both statutory and data subject authoriza-tion. State-maintained CHRI databases are bel�evedtobemorecompletethanthosema�nta�nedbytheFBI�nthattheyoftenhavemored�spos�t�ons,m�sdemeanor�nformat�onthatwasnotcollectedbytheFBI,andoffender�nformat�onthatthestatemaintained even though it was rejected by the FBI because of poor fingerprint images orotherqual�tycontrol�ssues.

TheTaskForcerecommendat�onsfollow.

Report of the National Task Force on the Criminal Backgrounding of America 8

Task Force Recommendations

Appropriate Levels of Access: Recommendations 1.1 to 1.9

Recommendation 1.1 National investment should be directed toward enabling and maximizing the use of fingerprints for criminal history record checks for noncriminal just�cepurposes.

Recommendation 1.2 Expand access to fingerprint-based criminal history record checks under Public Law 92-544 for noncriminal justice purposes that involve pos�t�onsoftrust.

Recommendation 1.3 Consider alternate means to support cost of producing checks.

Recommendation 1.4 Cons�deropt�onstoreducefeespa�dbyrequestorsandappl�cants.

Recommendation 1.5 Offerautomat�cupdatesofd�ssem�nated�nformat�on.

Recommendation 1.6 Setaresponset�medeadl�ne.

Recommendation 1.7 Establish access controls to prevent unauthorized access.

Recommendation 1.8 Allow private agents and value-added services from the private marketplace.

Recommendation 1.9 Consider electronic consumer interfaces and data exchange services.

Privacy and Social Safeguards: Recommendations 2.1 to 2.4

Recommendation 2.1 Obta�nthesubject’sconsentforcr�m�nalh�storyrecordchecksfornoncr�m�naljust�cepurposes.

Recommendation 2.2 Developappropr�aterelevancycr�ter�a.

Recommendation 2.3 Provide notice of disqualifying offenses.

Recommendation 2.4 Allowaccessandcorrect�onbydatasubject.

Complete and Accurate Records: Recommendations 3.1 to 3.3

Recommendation 3.1 Worktowardcompleteandaccuraterecords.

Recommendation 3.2 Continue funding for the National Criminal History Improvement Program (NCHIP).

Recommendation 3.3 Prov�declearandcons�stentresults.

Miscellaneous: Recommendations 4.1 to 4.3

Recommendation 4.1 Create a federal act to address backgrounding for noncriminal justice (or “civil”) purposes.

Recommendation 4.2 Imposec�v�landcr�m�nalpenalt�es.

Recommendation 4.3 Develop a national education campaign.

Report of the National Task Force on the Criminal Backgrounding of America 9

Appropriate Levels of Access:Recommendations 1.1 to 1.9

RECoMMENDATIoN 1.1:National investment should be directed toward enabling and maximizing the use of fingerprints for criminal history record checks for noncriminal justice purposes.

Two primary identifiers are used for crimi-nal history record checks: fingerprints and names, with names often being coupled with other identifiers such as gender, date ofb�rth,andSoc�alSecur�tyNumber.Cr�m�-nalh�storyrecordchecksconductedfornoncr�m�naljust�cepurposesunderPubl�cLaw 92-544 are fingerprint-based. Crimi-nalh�storyrecordchecksperformedfornoncr�m�naljust�cepurposesouts�detheauthorization of Public Law 92-544 are predominantly name-based. The majority ofstatecr�m�nalh�storyrepos�tor�esoffername-based checks for noncriminal justice purposes to the general public.22It�seas�erandcheaperforbothconsumersandre-pos�tor�esthatofferth�sserv�cetoperformname-based checks rather than fingerprint-basedchecks.Checksofprospect�vehand-gun purchasers performed under the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act23arealsoname-based, as are most criminal case re-cordchecks.However,there�ssomemove-ment throughout the states to increase fingerprint capture, storage, and search ca-pab�l�t�esforcr�m�nalh�storyrecordchecks.Theuseofotherb�ometr�cdata,suchasdigital photos, is also emerging in some ar-eas. Overwhelmingly, however, civil record and commercial checks are name-based.

22Survey of State Criminal History Information Systems, 2003,Cr�m�nalJust�ceInformat�onPol�cySer�es,NCJ210297 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, February 2006), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/abstract/sschis03.htm.23 Public Law 103-159.

The Task Force concluded that fingerprint-basedcr�m�nalh�storyrecordchecksaremore accurate than name-based checks. Name-based checks may return results that are “false positive” (incorrectly associ-ates an individual with a criminal record) and “false negative” (fails to associate an individual with his/her criminal re-cord). Names tend to be unreliable identi-fiers for many reasons: people lie about the�rnamesandobta�nnamesfromfalsedocuments; people change their names; people have the same name; people mis-spell names; people use different versions of their names—with middle name, with-out middle name, and with middle initial; people use nicknames and aliases; and names have different formats depending on culture and/or country of origin. Although manydatabasesusenamesasapr�maryrecord identifier, the result can be unlinked or unfound records unless other identifiers arealsousedtofurther�ncreasethel�kel�-hoodofanaccuratematch.

Although the Task Force agreed that finger-print-based criminal history record checks are more accurate than name-based checks,cr�m�nalh�storyrepos�toryrecordsare not always complete for a given re-quest.

Fingerprint-based criminal history record checks often cost more and take longer to provide a response. Ideally, only finger-print-based checks would be performed. However, name-based checks are often less expens�ve,areeas�erfortheconsumertoconduct,andprov�deaqu�ckerresponse.Consequently, name-based checks are of-tenthecho�ceofent�t�esthatwouldoth-erwise prefer fingerprint-based checks, if ava�lable.

TheTaskForcerecommendsthatnat�onalinvestment be directed toward enabling and maximizing the use of fingerprints for cr�m�nalh�storyrecordchecksfornoncr�m�-naljust�cepurposes.

Report of the National Task Force on the Criminal Backgrounding of America 10

RECoMMENDATIoN 1.2:Expand access to fingerprint-based criminal history record checks under Public Law 92-544 for noncriminal justice purposes that involve positions of trust.

Remove the Public Law 92-544 limitation that requires a public agency to receive record check results, and instead allow au-thorized private entities to receive results directly. Expand access to fingerprint-based criminal history record checks under Public Law 92-544 for noncriminal justice pur-poses that involve positions of trust. Spe-cifically, expand such access to “end us-ers who appoint individuals to positions or responsibilities entailing/involving access to vulnerable populations, client residences, businesses’ significant organizational as-sets; sensitive information; or as otherwise deemed necessary by state legislatures or the U.S. Attorney General for public safety or national security.”

The Task Force discussed the growing nat�onaldemandforaccesstostateandfederal fingerprint-based criminal history record checks under Public Law 92-544. Al-though existing state statutes approved by the Attorney General under 92-544 cover a mult�tudeofnoncr�m�naljust�cepurposes,the Task Force recognized that Public Law 92-544 is limiting in that it only permits the FBI to disseminate identification records to state and local governments identified in statestatutesapprovedunderthePubl�cLaw 92-544 scheme. It forbids dissemina-tion to private entities. State legislatures are unable to authorize criminal history re-cordchecksfornoncr�m�naljust�cepurpos-es pursuant to Public Law 92-544 without a governmental hiring or public regulatory bodytorece�veandscreentheresults.

TheTaskForcerecommendsremovalofthePublic Law 92-544 limitation that prohib-�tsd�ssem�nat�onofrecordcheckresults

topr�vateent�t�es,andrecommendsthatauthorized private entities be allowed to rece�verecordcheckresultsd�rectly.Th�swill allow expansion of Public Law 92-544 accessforbroaderpurposes.TheTaskForce emphasized that positions of trust andlevelsofr�skshouldbethepr�maryqualifiers under approved Public Law 92-544 statutes, not the existence of a gov-ernmental regulatory body to accept and screenresults.

In addition, the Task Force defined the de-gree to which Public Law 92-544 should be broadened, recommending that the law be expandedtoallowstateandfederalcr�m�-nalh�storyrecordcheckstoberequestedby“enduserswhoappo�nt�nd�v�dualstopositions or responsibilities entailing/in-volving access to vulnerable populations, client residences, businesses’ significant organizational assets; sensitive informa-tion; or as otherwise deemed necessary by state legislatures or the U.S. Attorney General for public safety or national secu-rity.” Under this scheme, state legislatures wouldhavetheopportun�tytoenactau-thorizing legislation under the Public Law 92-544 umbrella for private entities within this definition; those entities would, in turn, be able to request fingerprint-based criminal history record checks through statecr�m�nalh�storyrepos�tor�es.Statelegislatures deciding not to enact such authorizing legislation would, in effect, be “opting out.” Entities within the definition affected by state opt-outs would then need authorization by the U.S. Attorney General torequestcr�m�nalh�storyrecordchecksdirectly through the FBI.

The Task Force emphasized that such ex-pans�onshouldbeach�eved�namannerthat sends authorized entities to statecr�m�nalh�storyrepos�tor�esforaccess,notd�rectlytotheFBI,unlessstatesoptoutby choosing to not create enabling legisla-tion. Allowing entities within the definition

Report of the National Task Force on the Criminal Backgrounding of America 11

tobypassstatecr�m�nalh�storyrepos�tor�esand to go directly to the FBI would result in alossofstatefees,apotent�albreakdownofthestatecr�m�nalh�story�nfrastructure,andotherun�ntendedconsequencesduetod�vers�onofrevenue.

The Task Force specifically noted that its recommendat�on�sacomprom�seofvar�-ousTaskForcemembers’v�ews.ItnotedthattheTaskForcewasd�v�dedonthedegree to which authorization under Pub-lic Law 92-544 should be expanded; some memberswantedexpans�ontocoverallemployersandlandlords,andotherswantedamuchmorel�m�tedexpans�on.Asacomprom�se,theTaskForceadoptedthestatedrecommendat�onw�ththe�ntentof authorizing a large pool of positions of trust,butnottheent�reun�verseofpos-sible legitimate purposes. The Task Force referred to its final recommendation of expansion under Public Law 92-544 as “not thebestposs�blerecommendat�on,butthebestposs�blerecommendat�ononwh�chthe Task Force could reach consensus.”

RECoMMENDATIoN 1.3:Consider alternate means to support the cost of producing checks.

The concept of adequate and continued funding for criminal history repositories and infrastructure must be a guiding principle for all decisions surrounding the reform of criminal backgrounding. Alternative means to supplement traditional funding for crimi-nal history repositories and infrastructure should be studied. New business processes and technologies should be considered to help streamline criminal history reposito-ries and infrastructure, including capture, processing, and screening, with the goal of reducing costs in the long run.

The Task Force recognized that the cost to criminal history repositories of capturing, processing and screening CHRI for both

criminal justice and criminal backgrounding purposes�sacr�t�calelement�nthenat�on-ald�scuss�onofreforms.Thecostoftech-nology and staffing to operate and support criminal history repositories is significant. Tobeeffect�ve,cr�m�nalh�storyrepos�tor�esrequire a sufficient funding commitment to ensurethatrepos�toryrecordcompletenessand accuracy remain the highest priority, that current technology is used, and that requestsforcr�m�nalh�storyrecordchecksareproperlyscreenedandprocessed�nat�melymanner.

Statecr�m�nalh�storyrepos�tor�esobta�nfunding and resources in a variety of ways. Somestatessupportcr�m�nalh�storyre-positories solely through the collection of userfees,wh�chareappropr�atedbacktothe repositories. Twenty-two states that responded to a 2004 survey by the Nation-alCr�mePrevent�onandPr�vacyCompactCounc�l24reportedthatallorpartofthecollecteduserfeeswereput�nthestate’sgeneral fund; criminal history repositories then receive general fund appropriations. The problem with varied funding mecha-n�sms�sthatsomecr�m�nalh�storyrepos�-tor�esareadequatelyfundedandconse-quentlyaremorel�kelytoemployadvancedtechnology, while others receive inadequate funding and manually perform certain func-tions that can be handled more efficiently through automated means. Fingerprint capturebylawenforcementandotherent�t�es�sanothercr�t�calandrelatedcom-ponent that also lacks proper funding and technological capabilities in many jurisdic-tions. These funding factors directly affect CHRIqual�tyandcompleteness.

Instatesthatred�rectfeescollectedbycr�m�nalh�storyrepos�tor�esbacktotherepos�tor�es,thefeescollectedfornoncr�m-�naljust�cerecordchecksareoftenusedtooffset staff costs and the increasing expen-

24Seehttp://www.search.org/files/pdf/CCouncilUserFeeSurvey_Summarytables_final.pdf.

Report of the National Task Force on the Criminal Backgrounding of America 12

ditures on technology maintenance and up-grades. In some states, noncriminal justice fees subsidize and, in some cases, even fullyfundtherepos�tor�es’pr�marycr�m�naljust�cefunct�ons.Cr�m�nalh�storyrepos�-tories, and their fingerprint identification systems,werecreatedpr�mar�lytoprov�deCHRI to support decision-making at vari-ous stages of the criminal justice process, including investigation, bail determinations, sentencing, probation, and parole. In the past 20 years, criminal history reposito-ries have experienced a rapidly escalating nat�onaldemandforcr�m�nalh�storyrecordchecksfornoncr�m�naljust�cepurposes.Instateswhererepos�tor�esarefundedd�rect-lybynoncr�m�naljust�cecheckrevenue,thesecondarynoncr�m�naljust�cepurposepartially subsidizes the primary criminal just�cepurpose,becausecr�m�naljust�cechecksareconductedw�thoutfees.

Also,astatecr�m�nalh�storyrepos�toryonlycollectsfeeswhenacr�m�nalh�storyrecord check originates with that reposi-tory.Ifastate’scr�m�nalh�storyrecordsare obtained through another repository or channel, such as through the FBI, there is no mechanism through which that state can charge for the use, access, or delivery of�tsrecords.Asnotedprev�ously,newcostrecoveryapproachesshouldbecons�d-ered, including recovery for results pro-vided regardless of where a record check originates, and regardless of whether the results�nd�cateareturnedrecordortheabsencethereof.

After lengthy discussion and review, the TaskForceconcludedthatadequatere-sourcesmustbeprov�dedtocr�m�nalh�s-toryrepos�tor�esand�nfrastructure,espe-c�allystatecr�m�nalh�storyrepos�tor�es,toma�nta�n,atam�n�mum,thecurrentqual�tyofcr�m�nalh�storyrecordchecks.Ifserv�cedemandsare�ncreased,adequateresourcesmustbemadeava�lablesocr�m�nalh�storyrepos�tor�escanrespondto

�ncreaseddemands.Absenttheava�lab�l�tyofadequateresources,thecr�m�nalh�storyrepos�tory�nfrastructurew�llbreakdownwith resulting unintended consequences impacting both the criminal justice system and criminal backgrounding.

As�m�larconsequencecouldoccur�fex-isting service demands are legislatively d�vertedfromstatecr�m�nalh�storyrepos�-tories to an alternate, centralized source. Eachstaterepos�torywouldplayan�m-portant role in providing state CHRI to this centralized record source, which would only be as strong as its weakest contribut-ing state repository. Any weak links in this chain would degrade local and national checks for backgrounding, for criminal jus-t�ce,andforpubl�csafetypurposes.

TheTaskForcerecommendsthatthecon-cept of adequate funding for criminal his-toryrepos�tor�esand�nfrastructurebeaguiding principle in all decisions surround-ing the reform of criminal backgrounding. Further,�trecommendsthatalternat�vemeanstosupplementtrad�t�onalmethodsof funding for criminal history repositories and infrastructure, including the develop-ment of a national funding model, should bestud�ed.F�nally,�trecommendsthatnew business processes and technologies becons�deredtohelpstreaml�necapture,processing and screening, with the goal of reducing costs.

RECoMMENDATIoN 1.4:Consider options to reduce fees paid by requestors and applicants.

Congress and state legislatures should consider the impact of fees on individuals and organizations using fingerprint-based criminal history record checks. Varying fee structures, fee reduction strategies, government subsidies, and other inno-vative approaches are needed to relieve the financial burden of fingerprint-based

Report of the National Task Force on the Criminal Backgrounding of America 13

criminal history record checks, especially with respect to circumstances under which multiple or volume checks are performed. Schemes to expand noncriminal justice ac-cess to fingerprint-based criminal history record checks should be considered in con-nection with solutions to address existing fee problems.

TheTaskForced�scussedandexpressedgreat concern about fees charged for fin-gerprint-based criminal history record checksfornoncr�m�naljust�cepurposes,andtheoverall�nd�rect�mpactthatfeeshaveonpubl�csafety.Th�sconcernstemsfromfeedbackrece�vedfrom�ndustr�esandindividuals who often view fees as too high, andevenunaffordable,tomany.

Fees for fingerprint-based criminal history recordchecksvaryfromstatetostateandat the federal level. State fees range from $0 to $75. FBI fees range from $18 to $24. Feesaresomet�mesreducedorwa�vedforcerta�nclassesofconsumers,suchasvolunteers. Fees for name-based criminal h�storyrecordchecksandcr�m�nalrecordchecks are usually less than fingerprint-based checks, but all Public Law 92-544 checks are fingerprint-based. Fees for com-merc�alchecksalsovary,andcanbehelddownbymarketpressures.Suchcheckscanalsobemoreexpens�vethanstateorfederalchecksbasedonthenatureandextentofthecheckandthe�nformat�onprov�ded.

TheTaskForceexpressedconcernthatfeesforcr�m�nalh�storyrecordcheckscanbea financial burden, especially when mul-t�plechecksarerequ�red.Employeesandlicensees earning higher incomes are less affected than those seeking positions in the lowereconom�cstrata.Morechecksmaybeneeded for the latter, who may be working multiple jobs or who change jobs often. A delivery person serving multiple hospitals orschoolsmayneedacr�m�nalh�storyre-

cordcheckforeachent�tyor�neachjur�s-diction he or she serves. Volunteers serving more than one organization may also need mult�plechecks.Thecostofsuchcheckscouldbead�s�ncent�ve.

Some state and local governments and industries minimize the need for multiple checks through licensing boards and as-soc�at�ons.Theneedformult�plechecksis reduced when a licensing board or in-dustryassoc�at�onactsasan�ntermed�arybetweenl�censeesandthecr�m�nalh�storyrepository, receiving and screening record checkresults.The�ntermed�ary�ssuesl�censesorclearancecards,orotherw�seconveystothepubl�cthat�tsl�censeesorconst�tuentshavepassedstatutoryrequ�re-ments.

The Task Force recognized that various opt�onscanaddressfeeproblemsandthehigh cost of multiple criminal history re-cordchecks.Theseopt�onsrequ�restudyandevaluat�on.Thefee�ssueshouldberesolved before Public Law 92-544 criminal h�storyrecordchecksarebroadlyexpand-ed.

TheTaskForcerecommendsthatCon-gress and state legislatures consider the impact of fees on individuals and organiza-tions authorized for criminal history record checks under Public Law 92-544. Varying fee structures, fee reduction strategies, government subsidies, and other innova-t�veapproachesareneededtorel�evethefinancial burden of fingerprint-based crimi-nalh�storyrecordchecks,espec�allyw�threspecttothosewhoneedmult�pleorahigh volume of checks. Schemes to expand private sector access to fingerprint-based cr�m�nalh�storyrecordchecksshouldbecons�dered�nconnect�onw�thsolut�onstothe existing fee issues.

Report of the National Task Force on the Criminal Backgrounding of America 14

RECoMMENDATIoN 1.5:offer automatic updates of disseminated information.

All criminal history repositories should of-fer automatic updating of disseminated information as part of their criminal history record check offerings.

TheTaskForced�scussedtheneedforautomat�cmechan�smstoupdated�ssem�-natedcr�m�nalh�storyrecordcheckresultsas changes to a subject’s record occur. Employees,l�censees,andvolunteersoftenneedtoberecheckedonafrequentbas�s.CHRI can change almost immediately after asetofcomp�led�nformat�on�sreleased.Specifically, new arrest information may arr�veattherepos�tory.W�thoutamecha-n�smtoautomat�callyupdateresultswhenchanges occur (sometimes described as a “rap-back” approach), a criminal history re-cordcheckwould,�ntheory,havetoberunfrequently to remain current—an obvious financial and logistical burden on consum-ersaswellascr�m�nalh�storyrepos�tor�es.Instead, providing automatic update servic-es for previously run checks—e.g., notifica-tion of subsequent arrest or conviction—is a more sound and efficient approach. The TaskForcerecommendsthatcr�m�nalh�s-tory repositories offer automatic updating ofd�ssem�nated�nformat�onaspartofthe�rcriminal history record check offerings.

RECoMMENDATIoN 1.6:Set a response time deadline.

The Attorney General should set a deadline for criminal history repositories to have end-to-end electronic processing for sub-mission of fingerprints to the FBI. All crimi-nal history repositories should work toward receiving electronic fingerprints from all consumers at the point when fingerprint-based criminal history record checks are submitted, and set a deadline for this to occur. State criminal history repositories,

together with the FBI, should work toward setting a goal of a maximum amount of time to process the vast majority of finger-print-based criminal history record checks, from the time a request is submitted to the time results are returned to the consumer.

TheTaskForced�scussedtheamountofelapsed time from the initiation of a finger-print-based criminal history record check to thepo�ntwhentheconsumerrece�vesthecheckresults.Consumersrece�ved�m�n-�shedvalue�fchecksarenotprocessedquickly. Applicants do not get hired. Vol-unteers do not get placed. Many factors can introduce time lags attributable to the consumer,thecr�m�nalh�storyrepos�tory,or the FBI. The Task Force acknowledged that electronic submission of fingerprints generally results in better response time thanmanualsubm�ss�on.

TheTaskForcerecommendsthattheAt-torney General set a firm date, at which t�meallstatecr�m�nalh�storyrepos�tor�esmust be capable of electronic processing and electronic submission of fingerprints to the FBI to support end-to-end electronic processing. In addition, repositories should work toward receiving electronic finger-pr�ntsfromallconsumerswhenchecksare�n�t�ated,andsetadeadl�neforth�stooccur. Finally, a national goal should be set along the following lines: “The maximum t�meforacr�m�nalh�storyrepos�torytoprocess the vast majority of fingerprint-basedcr�m�nalh�storyrecordchecks,fromthet�mearequest�sproperlysubm�ttedtothet�meresultsaresentbacktothecon-sumer, is ____.” Although the Task Force wasunabletodeterm�netheexactnumberofdays,�texpressedthatdelaysofmorethanaweekareproblemat�c.

TheTaskForcealsod�scussedthet�methatelapsesfromthepo�ntwhenaconsumerdecides a fingerprint-based criminal history recordcheck�sneededtothet�methatthe

Report of the National Task Force on the Criminal Backgrounding of America 15

consumerproperly�n�t�atestherequest.However,�twasnotedthatdelaysoccur-ring prior to the submission of the request areoutofthe�mmed�atecontrolofcr�m�nalh�storyrepos�tor�es.Norecommendat�onsweremadew�threspecttoth�spartoftheprocess.

RECoMMENDATIoN 1.7:Establish access controls to prevent unauthorized access.

Proper access controls and security should be established, maintained, and funded to prevent unauthorized access to criminal history repository infrastructure and data.

TheTaskForced�scussedtheneedforpropersecur�tyandaccesscontrolstoensurethatCHRIaccess�sl�m�tedtoauthorized entities, and also to protect against unauthorized access to infrastruc-tureanddata.R�sksofsecur�tybreachesincrease as laws are modified to expand accesstocr�m�nalh�storyrecordchecks,and to authorize private entities to receive checkresultsd�rectly.TheTaskForcerec-ommendsthatappropr�atetechn�calandnontechn�calaccesscontrolsandsecur�ty,including identification verification at the time the applicant presents himself/herself for fingerprinting, must be implemented andma�nta�ned.

RECoMMENDATIoN 1.8:Allow private agents and value-added services from the private marketplace.

Private agents should be allowed to offer value-added services to, and to represent consumers in connection with, criminal history record checks, but with appropriate security and controls.

TheTaskForced�scussedtheuseofpr�vatecompanies as “consumer agents” to pro-vide value-added services to private enti-ties authorized under Public Law 92-544

statutes,andto�nd�v�dualswhoarethesubjectofcr�m�nalh�storyrecordchecks.The range of value-added services that private consumer agents can offer is great. Suchserv�cesmayholdtheanswerstosome of the technical and logistical issues thatex�staroundcr�m�nalrecordback-ground checks today. Consequently, the private marketplace should be encouraged to develop value-added services for con-sumers,andtooffercreat�vesolut�onstoallev�ateproblems.Forexample,pr�vateagents could serve consumers by capturing electronic fingerprints, ensuring that proper consent is obtained, making requests for criminal history record background checks to repositories, managing accounts for large-volume consumers, and holding re-cordcheckresults�ntrustfor�nd�v�duals,suchasvolunteers,whowanttoprov�dethe�rresultstomult�pleent�t�es.AlloftheTask Force recommendations work together tofac�l�tatetheuseofthepr�vatemarket-place while retaining certain privacy and social safeguards. The Task Force recom-mends that private agents be allowed to offer value-added services for criminal h�storyrecordchecksandrepresentcon-sumers�nconnect�onw�thsuchchecks,butw�thappropr�atesecur�tyandcontrols.

RECoMMENDATIoN 1.9:Consider electronic consumer interfaces and data exchange services.

Electronic consumer interfaces and data exchanges should be considered by crimi-nal history repositories to facilitate the provision of fingerprint-based criminal his-tory record checks for noncriminal justice purposes, with appropriate security and controls.

TheTaskForced�scussedtheneedforcr�m�nalh�storyrepos�tor�estobu�ldcon-sumerInternetportalsandelectron�cdatainterchange services to facilitate the provi-sion of fingerprint-based criminal history

Report of the National Task Force on the Criminal Backgrounding of America 16

recordchecksfornoncr�m�naljust�cepur-poses. Although this would involve sig-nificant technical and security challenges, consumerInternetportalsandelectron�cdata interchange services would provide ef-ficiencies for consumers and criminal histo-ryrepos�tor�es.Thesewouldrequ�repropersecurity, credentialing and authentication, andtrustworthymechan�smstosubm�tfingerprints and other necessary documen-tation. Through electronic data interchange services, value-added systems could be bu�lt�nthepr�vatemarketplacetoservevarious industries by offering sophisticated and intelligent solutions to manage large volume accounts with multiple pending requests; by providing automated screen-ing guidance that meets industry relevancy standards; and by processing electronic paymenttransact�ons.TheTaskForcerec-ommendsthatconsumerInternetportalsand electronic data interchange services be cons�deredbycr�m�nalh�storyrepos�tor�esto facilitate the provision of fingerprint-basedcr�m�nalh�storyrecordchecksfornoncr�m�naljust�cepurposes,w�thappro-pr�atesecur�tyandcontrols.

Privacy and Social Safeguards: Recommendations 2.1 to 2.4

RECoMMENDATIoN 2.1:obtain the subject’s consent for criminal history record checks for noncriminal justice purposes.

Consent of the subject should be required for any entity to conduct criminal history record checks for noncriminal justice pur-poses, to the extent it does not conflict with other law. Consent should be obtained in a uniform way, and should define im-portant consent-related issues surround-ing criminal history record checks, such as the type of criminal history record check authorized; the scope of consent granted; the duration of the consent; whether the consent covers automatic updates to check

results; whether re-disclosure is allowed and, if so, under what circumstances; the extent to which the consent allows storage and re-use of the information obtained to conduct the check (such as fingerprint and Social Security Number); and any other pertinent factors.

TheTaskForced�scussedthe�ssueofcon-sent as it pertains to conducting criminal h�storyrecordchecksfornoncr�m�naljus-tice purposes. It recognized that consent is generally inherent when a subject provides fingerprints for the purpose of a criminal history record check; however, consent may not be present in the context of name-based checks. The Task Force also recog-nized that state law varies with respect to the degree to which criminal history record checksmaybeperformedw�th�nthestate,w�thandw�thoutconsent.

At the same time, the Task Force recog-nized that consent is an important concept and in accordance with general privacy principles. The Task Force agreed that a nat�onalpol�cyshouldbedevelopedrequ�r-ing consent, which is to be applied to the extent that it does not conflict with other stateorfederallaws.Astandardapproachfor obtaining consent should be defined. Theconsentshouldspec�fythetypeofcriminal history record check authorized; the scope of consent granted; the dura-tion of the consent; whether the consent covers automatic updates to check results; whether re-disclosure is allowed and, if so, under what circumstances; the extent to which the consent allows storage and re-useofthe�nformat�onobta�nedtoconductthe check (such as fingerprints and Social Security Numbers); and any other perti-nentfactors.Ifotherlawex�ststhatcon-flicts with this consent policy, notice should beprov�dedtothesubjectofthecheck,explaining that information may be re-dis-closed or otherwise used according to such law.

Report of the National Task Force on the Criminal Backgrounding of America 17

RECoMMENDATIoN 2.2:Develop appropriate relevancy criteria.

Study is needed to develop appropriate rel-evancy guidelines for end-users, especially as access to criminal history record checks is expanded.

TheTaskForced�scussedthe�ssueofrelevancy and the need for guidelines for end-users of backgrounding results to determ�newhethertheex�stenceofvar�-ousoffenses�srelevanttothepos�t�onofemployment,l�censure,orotherserv�ceat�ssue.TheTaskForcerecommendsthatguidelines be developed to address re-demption, forgiveness, and opportunities for�nd�v�dualsafterrehab�l�tat�on.Whetherinformation from backgrounding results is relevanttoacerta�npos�t�onorserv�ce�sdependentonmanyfactors,suchasthetypeof�nformat�on(arrest,d�spos�t�on,orother); the circumstances surrounding an offense; the age of information; the num-ber and severity of offenses; evidence of rehabilitation; and the age of individuals, including the age at which the offense was comm�tted.Thecoredec�s�on�nconnec-tion with relevancy is one of risk manage-ment.Isthearrestorconv�ct�onofatypethatwouldcreateunacceptabler�sk�ntheworkplaceorserv�ceenv�ronmentat�s-sue?Isthearrestorconv�ct�on�nformat�onunrelated to such a degree that one could properlyconcludethatthesubjectdoesnotpose a significant risk?

The Task Force agreed that a risk manage-mentanalys�s�stheappropr�aterelevancyapproach,asopposedtoautomat�crejec-t�ononthebas�sofacr�m�nalrecord.Morestudy�sneededtodeterm�newh�chfactorsshouldbeappl�ed,andhowtheyshouldbeappl�edtod�fferentc�rcumstances,tomakeappropr�aterelevancydec�s�onsforvar�ouspos�t�onsofemployment,l�censure,andother services. Little guidance is currently available to end-users on fair and prudent

useofrecordcheckresults�nappl�cantselect�ondec�s�ons.TheTaskForcerecom-mendsthatstudy�sneededtodeveloprelevancy guidelines for end-users.

RECoMMENDATIoN 2.3:Provide notice of disqualifying offenses.

Individuals should have access to informa-tion that describes disqualifying offenses at the earliest point in time possible, prefer-ably prior to completing an application for employment, licensure, or other service.

TheTaskForced�scussedtheneedforindividuals to receive notification of dis-qualifying offenses as early as possible when applying for employment, licensure, and other services. It recognized that the earl�erappl�cantsrece�venot�ceofpasteventsthatmayd�squal�fythem,themorerespectfultheprocess�stoappl�cants,andthemorecontrolappl�cantshaveoverwhethertopart�c�pate�ntheprocessandd�sclosepersonal�nformat�on.Forexample,�fcerta�noffensesautomat�callyd�squal�fya person from obtaining a professional license, notice of such disqualifying of-fensesshouldbeprov�dedpr�ortoappl�ca-tion, examination, or even a pre-requisite courseofstudy.Asanotherexample,�fan employer has a policy of not hiring an �nd�v�dualw�thacerta�npastconv�ct�on,applicants should be notified prior to their filling out an application, or even as part of the position posting. Advance notice of disqualifying offenses provides clear benefit toappl�cants,butdoesnotpreventappl�-cants from moving forward with the appli-cat�onprocess�ftheybel�eveapropercasecan be made to overcome the disqualifica-t�oncr�ter�a.Inadd�t�on,advancenot�ceofdisqualifying offenses optimizes applicant, end-user, and repository resources. By al-lowing applicants to self-select out of crimi-nalh�storyrecordchecks,allaresparedt�meandresourcesthatwouldbeotherw�se

Report of the National Task Force on the Criminal Backgrounding of America 18

expendedtowardanunproduct�veresult.TheTaskForcerecommendsthat�nd�v�du-alshaveaccessto�nformat�onthatde-scribes disqualifying offenses at the earliest po�nt�nt�meposs�ble,preferablypr�ortocompleting an application for employment, l�censure,orotherserv�ce.

RECoMMENDATIoN 2.4:Allow access and correction by data subject.

Data subjects should have the right to obtain both name-based and fingerprint-based criminal history record check results about themselves, and should have the opportunity to review and correct such re-cords at minimal or no cost. To avoid abuse of this policy, information should be provid-ed to data subjects in a manner that pre-vents such information from being passed onto employers or others as official record check results. Data subjects should also have access to information about adverse actions against them based on the results of criminal record checks.

TheTaskForced�scussedthe�mportanceof data subjects having access to their own cr�m�nalh�storyrepos�toryrecordsatm�n�-malcostfor�nspect�onandcorrect�on.Itacknowledged that the FBI and state crimi-nalh�storyrepos�tor�eshaveproceduresfordatasubjectstorequestaccessto,andtocorrect, their own records. Providing data subjectsw�thaccesstothe�rownrecordsreducesoverallpubl�cconcernsaboutthecollect�onanduseof�nformat�on.However,the right to access records for review and correction should not be abused; therefore, the�nformat�onshouldnotbepassedontoothers as official record check results in an effort to circumvent fees charged by crimi-nalh�storyrepos�tor�es.

TheTaskForcerecommendsthatdatasub-jects have the right to obtain both name-based and fingerprint-based criminal histo-

ryrecordcheckresultsaboutthemselves,andalsohavetheopportun�tytorev�ewandcorrectthematm�n�malcost.TheTaskForcealsorecommendsthatcr�m�nalh�s-toryrepos�tor�es�mplementmechan�smstoprevent�nformat�onprov�dedtodatasubjects from being passed on to others as official record check results. Finally, the TaskForcerecommendsthatdatasubjectshaveaccessto�nformat�onaboutadverseactions against them based on the results ofcr�m�nalrecordchecks.

Complete and Accurate Records: Recommendations 3.1 to 3.3

RECoMMENDATIoN 3.1:Work toward complete and accurate records.

Criminal history repositories must continue to work toward complete and accurate re-cords.

TheTaskForced�scussedandstressedtheneedforcompleteandaccuraterecords�ncr�m�nalh�storyrepos�tor�es.Statecr�m�-nalh�storyrepos�tor�esdonotcoverstateoffenses�nacons�stentmanner.Somerepos�tor�esma�nta�n�nformat�onaboutm�noroffensesandothersdonot.TheTaskForcerecommendsthatcr�m�nalh�storyrepos�tor�esrev�ewandcomparethetypesofoffense�nformat�ontheyacceptandreta�nw�thapproachesfromotherstates,and that they strive for thoroughness and cons�stency.S�m�larly,theFBIonlyrecentlybroadened�tsacceptancepol�cytoacceptminor (i.e., formerly non-criterion ) of-fenses.

Regardless of the scope of offenses cov-ered,cr�m�nalh�storyrepos�tor�esmuststr�veforcompleterecords,espec�allyw�threspect to arrests, charges, and disposi-t�onsforoffensescovered.Doesthecr�m�-nalh�storyrepos�toryhavecomprehen-s�ve�nformat�onforalltheevents�nthe

Report of the National Task Force on the Criminal Backgrounding of America 19

cr�m�naljust�cecycleforthe�nc�dent?Forexample,doestherepos�toryrece�vecom-pleteandt�mely�nformat�ononprosecut�on(including prosecutor declinations), dis-position, sentencing (including alternative sentencing, fines incarceration, work pro-grams, community service), and comple-tion of sentencing terms?

The Task Force acknowledged that gaps ex�st�ncr�m�nalh�storyrepos�toryrecordsfor various reasons; for example, when thepol�ce�ssueanot�cetoappear�nsteadof formally arresting and fingerprinting an �nd�v�dual.However,�fstatelawrequ�resthat�nformat�ononcerta�noffenses�stobecollected,thenrepos�tor�esshouldworkto collect 100 percent of such information. TheTaskForcerecommendsthatcr�m�nalh�storyrepos�tor�esworktoensurethattheyhavecompleterecordsw�th�nthescopeofcoveredoffenses.

The Task Force acknowledged that vari-ousproblemsex�stw�threspecttocr�m�-nal history record checks providing results thatare�ncompletefromcerta�npol�t�caljur�sd�ct�ons.Somestatecr�m�nalh�storyrepos�tor�esdonothaverecordsfromalljur�sd�ct�onsw�th�nthestate.L�kew�se,with at least 48 state repositories serving as sole-source conduits for transmission ofarrest�nformat�ontotheFBI,�f�t�snotknownatthestate,�tcannotbeknownattheFBI.TheTaskForcerecommendsthatallstatesmovetowardadopt�onoftheNat�onalCr�mePrevent�onandPr�vacyCompact,25wh�chrepresentsacomm�t-ment by signatories to participate in the National Fingerprint File (NFF)26—the ulti-

25 Title 42, U.S.C., Chapter 140, Subchapter II, Section 14616.26 NFF states assume an obligation to provide interstate record services to all authorized III users for both criminal andnoncr�m�naljust�cepurposes.Thus,there�snoneedfor these states to continue submitting fingerprints and cr�m�nalh�storydatatotheFBIforarrestsofpersonswhoserecordsarethestates’respons�b�l�tyforIIIpurposes.NFF states submit fingerprint and offender identification information only for the first arrest of an individual for an

mate extension of the decentralized Inter-state Identification Index (i.e., the national criminal records exchange system). The TaskForcealsorecommendsthattheFBImaximize its response to queries that come fromstatecr�m�nalh�storyrepos�tor�estohelpstatesaccompl�shabetternat�onalsearch, by forwarding those queries to �ndexedstates.Moretechn�cally,theTaskForcerecommendsthatstatequer�espro-duceresultsthat�ncludeCHRIheldbytheFBI, the eight NFF27states,andthestatesthat have agreed to respond to the QR (Criminal Code Request) purpose Code “I” request.28

RECoMMENDATIoN 3.2:Continue funding for the National Criminal History Improvement Program (NCHIP).

Continued federal funding is needed to meet NCHIP objectives directed at accu-rate, timely, and complete criminal history records.

TheTaskForced�scussedtheneedforcontinued federal NCHIP funding. The more complete,accurate,andt�melytherecords�nstatecr�m�nalh�storyrepos�tor�es,thebetterthequal�tyofresultsfromcr�m�-nalh�storyrecordchecks.NCHIPprov�destechnical assistance and grant funding to statesto�mprovethequal�tyofthe�rcr�m�-nalh�storyrecords.Itsetsforthvar�ousobject�vestowardaccurate,t�mely,and

offensew�th�neachstate.Th�senablestheFBIto�ncludethe record subject in the III index (and set a “pointer” to the submitting state) and to include the subject’s fingerprints in NFF. (From Use and Management of Criminal History Record Information: A Comprehensive Report, 2001 Update,Cr�m�nalJust�ceInformat�onPol�cyser�es,NCJ187670 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, December 2001), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/abstract/umchri01.htm.)27 The eight NFF states are Colorado, Florida, Kansas, Montana,NewJersey,NorthCarol�na,Oklahoma,andOregon.28 A purpose Code “I” request is used for a III transaction that involves noncriminal justice and/or licensing.

Report of the National Task Force on the Criminal Backgrounding of America 20

completerecords.Thecomplet�onoftheseobject�ves,espec�allythosefocusedon�m-proved records and increased reporting, is an�mportantcompan�ontocr�m�nalback-grounding reforms for noncriminal justice purposes.TheTaskForcerecommendsthatcontinued federal NCHIP funding be pro-v�dedforstatestohelpthemach�eveaccu-rate,t�mely,andcompleterecords�nstatecr�m�nalh�storyrepos�tor�es.

RECoMMENDATIoN 3.3:Provide clear and consistent results.

Criminal history repositories should provide the results of criminal history record checks in a clear and consistent format that is easy to read and understand. They should also provide publicly accessible resources to help readers interpret results.

TheTaskForced�scussedtheneedforcr�m�nalh�storyrecordcheckstoreturnclearandcons�stentresults.Thepubl�cof-ten has difficulty reading and understand-ing the results of criminal history record checks.Stateshaved�fferentoffensesandpresent�nformat�ond�fferently.TheTaskForcerecommendsthatallcr�m�nalh�s-toryrepos�tor�esworktopresentresults�naclearandcons�stentmanner,andtomakeresourcesava�labletoa�dthepub-lic in interpreting results. For example, a cr�m�nalh�storyrepos�torycouldadopttheInterstateCr�m�nalH�storyTransm�ss�onSpecification developed by the Joint Task Force on Rap Sheet Standardization (JTF).29

29TheJTFresultedfromtheworkofataskforceputtogether by the Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. Department of Justice, and SEARCH in 1993. The National Task Force on Increasing the Utility of the Criminal History Record in 1995 issued a list of recommendations, one being a call for consistency in the data elements included in exchanged criminal history records, and in the format in which the exchanged information was presented. The JTF was formed following publication of the task force’s report to pursue creation of a rap sheet specification that wouldpresentresponsestocr�m�nalrecordquer�es�napresentat�onformatandw�thdataelementsthatrequestorscouldunderstand.TheJTFhas�ssuedseveral�terat�onsof a “standardized rap sheet” since then, the most recent version in February 2005. That version, which is XML compat�ble,�sava�lableathttp://www.search.org/files/pdf/CH_transmission_spec.pdf.

Repos�tor�escanprov�depaperbrochuresand/or public portals with offense informa-t�onandexplanat�onsonhowtoreadand�nterpretcheckresults.TheTaskForcerecommendsthatcr�m�nalh�storyrecordcheckresultsshouldbeprov�ded�naclearandcons�stentformatthat�seasytoreadandunderstand,andthatmembersofthepubl�cshouldbeprov�dedw�thresourcestohelpthem�nterpretresults.

Miscellaneous:Recommendations 4.1 to 4.3

RECoMMENDATIoN 4.1:Create a federal act to address backgrounding for noncriminal justice (or “civil”) purposes.

Createanewfederalacttoun�quelyad-dress backgrounding for noncriminal justice (or “civil”) purposes, and to address priva-cy and social safeguards and other recom-mendat�onsundertheserecommendat�ons.TheTaskForced�scussedtheneedforanewfederalacttoaddressthevar�ousrec-ommendat�onssetforth�nth�sreport.Con-fusion exists surrounding laws that govern criminal backgrounding for noncriminal justice purposes and backgrounding in general. To reduce confusion, the public needsone,comprehens�vefederalactthataddresses backgrounding for civil purposes, along with the many considerations de-scr�bedw�th�ntheserecommendat�ons.TheTaskForcerecommendsanewfederalactto address backgrounding, including crimi-nal backgrounding, for noncriminal justice (or “civil”) purposes.

RECoMMENDATIoN 4.2:Impose civil and criminal penalties.

Civil and criminal penalties should be im-posed for violations of laws that govern backgrounding.

TheTaskForced�scussedtheneedforcontinued focus on, and strengthening of,

Report of the National Task Force on the Criminal Backgrounding of America 21

penalties for violations of laws pertaining to criminal backgrounding and backgrounding in general. With expanded access to state andfederalcr�m�nalh�storyrecordcheckson the horizon, coupled with the increased r�sktodatasubjectsthatcomesw�thsuchexpansion, existing civil and criminal pen-alties should be reviewed, strengthened, andadded,asneeded,topreventabuseofaccess.TheTaskForcerecommendsthe review, and strengthening if neces-sary, of existing civil and criminal penalties for violations of law that govern criminal backgrounding. The Task Force also recom-mendstheestabl�shmentofsuchlawsandpenalt�es�njur�sd�ct�onswheretheydonotalreadyex�st.

RECoMMENDATIoN 4.3:Develop a national education campaign.

Develop a comprehensive, national cam-paign to educate the public on the concept, strategies, processes, and goals of criminal record backgrounding.

TheTaskForced�scussedtheneedforanational educational campaign on back-grounding, especially criminal record back-grounding. Throughout its deliberations, the Task Force recognized the lack of un-derstanding by the general public of ter-minology, concepts, and laws surrounding criminal backgrounding. In fact, confusing terminology and lack of understanding on the part of the general public was a factor �ntheformat�onoftheTaskForce.

TheTaskForcerecommendsthatalex�confor criminal backgrounding be established and published to define a common set of terms, and to promote understanding of those terms. The terms defined in this reportshouldbe�ncluded.TheTaskForcealsorecommendsthatl�teraturebecreatedandw�delyd�str�butedtohelpconsumersunderstand criminal backgrounding today, and backgrounding in general.

Report of the National Task Force on the Criminal Backgrounding of America 22

Co-ChairsProf. Kent MarkusCapital University Law SchoolOh�o

Donna UzzellD�rectorCr�m�nalJust�ceInformat�onServ�cesFlor�daDepartmentofLawEnforcement

Task Force MembersLanaAdamsLawEnforcementL�a�sonFederal Investigations ServiceU.S. Office of Personnel Management

Robert ArmstrongDeputy Director (retired)Colorado Bureau of InvestigationColoradoDepartmentofPubl�cSafety

Franc�sX.AumandIIID�rectorD�v�s�onofCr�m�nalJust�ceServ�cesVermontDepartmentofPubl�cSafety

Dr.AlfredBlumste�nJ.Er�kJonssonProfessorUrban Systems and OperationsH. John Heinz III School of Public Policy and ManagementCarnegie-Mellon University

Dr. Kelly BuckAnalystDepartmentofDefensePersonnelSecur�tyResearchCenter

ToddCommodoreNat�onalCr�mePrevent�onandPr�vacyCompact OfficerPrograms Development SectionFederal Bureau of Investigation

National Task Force on the Criminal Backgrounding of America

Sally CunninghamExecut�veD�rectorNat�onalCounc�lofYouthSports

Walter GaylordD�rectorCaseAnalys�sandSupportD�v�s�onNational Center for Missing and Exploited Ch�ldren

JayHarr�sPres�dentFirst Advantage Government Services

BlakeHarr�sonPol�cySpec�al�stCriminal Justice ProgramNational Conference of State Legislatures

RobertW.HolloranChairman and Chief Executive OfficerNational Background Data LLC

Robert KamerschenV�cePres�dentLawandPubl�cPol�cyCho�cePo�ntInc.

Irv KatzPres�dentandCEONat�onalHumanServ�cesAssembly

BarryLaCro�xExecut�veD�rectorExecutive Office of Public SafetyMassachusettsCr�m�nalH�storySystemsBoard

M�keLeskoDeputyAdm�n�stratorCr�meRecordsServ�ceTexasDepartmentofPubl�cSafety

Cindy Libby-GreenPrem�erHomecare

Report of the National Task Force on the Criminal Backgrounding of America 23

L�aneMor�yamaAdm�n�stratorHawa��Cr�m�nalJust�ceDataCenterDepartment of the Hawaii Attorney General

AllenNashManagement AnalystPrograms Development Section Cr�m�nalJust�ceInformat�onServ�cesD�v�s�onFederal Bureau of Investigation

Georgene RammingCh�efofStaffCr�m�nalJust�ceSupportD�v�s�onArizona Department of Public Safety

JeffreySchuttD�rectorD�v�s�onofHumanResourcesColoradoDepartmentofPersonnelandAdm�n�strat�on

TheHonorableTomSm�thSenator (retired)Arizona State Senate

M�keT�mmermanManagerApplicant Processing GroupArizona Department of Public Safety

Craig WeideleD�rectorSecur�tyOperat�onsUniversal Orlando Resort

BarbaraS.W�lesManagement AnalystPrograms Development Section Cr�m�nalJust�ceInformat�onServ�cesD�v�s�onFederal Bureau of Investigation

U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice StatisticsDr. Gerard F. RamkerCh�efCriminal History Improvement Programs

SEARCH, The National Consortium for Justice Information and StatisticsRonaldP.HawleyExecut�veD�rector

Kelly J. HarrisDeputyExecut�veD�rector

Owen M. GreenspanD�rector,LawandPol�cy

Er�cC.JohnsonJust�ceInformat�onServ�cesSpec�al�st

SusanJ.LarsonAttorneyandContractor