Does Globalization Cause Separatism? A Critical Examination of the Globalization-Separatism Relationship

By Dean E. McHenry, Jr.

Claremont Graduate University Claremont, California, USA

A paper prepared for presentation at the 21st World Congress of the International Political Science Association, Santiago, Chile, July, 2009.

Does Globalization Cause Separatism? A Critical Examination of the Globalization-Separatism Relationship

By

Dean E. McHenry, Jr. Claremont Graduate University

Claremont, California, USA I. Introduction Few concepts have elicited as much study and commentary in recent years as that of “globalization.” The phenomenon manifests itself in the huge increases the interconnections among states and peoples throughout the world. Trade among them has increased substantially over the years; the current economic downturn affects virtually all countries; the proportion of the world’s population linked by communications continues to increase; the carbon dioxide emissions in one country affect the climate in other countries; and, so on. One impact of globalization, widely reported, is that it has given rise to an increasing number of separatist movements. The purpose of this study is to provide an assessment of the truth of this claim, i.e., to seek to answer the question: “Is there a causal relationship between globalization and separatism?” The question is important for at least two reasons: First, there are disagreements among scholars on whether the answer is “yes” or “no.” Second, the question seeks an answer which greatly simplifies reality, exemplifying the desire of “scientifically-oriented” political scientists to discover a set of simple generalizations about the world that may constitute part of a theory. This has been a goal of the field at least since the time of the behavioral revolution. And, both the goal and the methods used to achieve this goal have been questioned by growing numbers of political scientists. An answer to the specific question will not only clarify the appropriateness of the globalization—separatism relationship, but also provide a basis for assessing the appropriateness of the simplifications of reality that have become the goal of many political scientists. We will seek to answer the question in four steps: First, we will examine the definitions given to the two concepts, “globalization” and “separatism” to gain some understanding of the phenomena under review. We will find, as others have found, that there is an array of conceptualizations that contributes to the difficulty of assessing the relationship between the concepts. Nevertheless, we will seek aspects of the conceptualizations that will allow us to answer to the research question. Second, we will review the claims scholars make about the relationship between the two concepts. We will find, once again, that there is no agreement—some assert there is a positive relationship between the two and some assert there is no such relationship. Thirdly, we will examine briefly the causes, identified by scholars, of five cases of separatism in an attempt to determine

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whether globalization has been central to their initiation and development. We will find that most scholars in each case have identified an array of causes that do not include the major indicators of globalization—or, they relegate such indicators to secondary importance. Fourth, we will use those findings to reflect upon the appropriateness of the effort in the discipline of political science to develop generalizations that simplify reality and can be grouped with other generalizations related to the dependent, or independent, variable to become parts of theories which “store” knowledge. We will find that such efforts lead to conclusions that are of little help in practical tasks of leaders wishing to ameliorate the human costs that may be associated with separatist undertakings. II. Concepts: The Meanings of “Globalization” and “Separatism” Concepts are general words, i.e., they are meant to apply to more than a single instance or case of something. That is an essential characteristic if generalizations are to be made about them. Both “globalization” and “separatism” are concepts. The phenomena to which they refer are manifested in many instances or cases. Clearly, the building of knowledge about both concepts is hindered by the fact that scholars do not agree on their meaning. Why is this lack of agreement a problem? When scholars amalgamate findings about “globalization” or “separatism,” they may be combining information about quite different phenomena. The result is likely to be a set of assertions that mistakenly equate findings about these different phenomena and, so, provide inaccurate information. This is a perennial problem in the social sciences. And, it is a problem which afflicts findings about both “globalization” and “separatism.” Nevertheless, a review of meanings given to these terms will facilitate an understanding of why there is disagreement about the relationship between the two phenomena. A. “Globalization” The conceptualizations of “globalization” range widely. They include phenomena such as “sharing power,” “interconnectedness,” “spatial connections and functional interdependence,” “mobility of factors of production,” “a set of interrelated changes,” “greater dependence on international trade,” and so on. They are used to refer to one phenomenon or to a multitude of phenomena. Examples of definitions of “globalization” given by different scholars are illustrative of the diversity of meanings of the concept. Here are a few:

• Globalization is “a term that describes the intensification of social and cultural interconnectedness across the globe.”1

• Globalization refers to nation-states “having to share their power with three

groups of global actors: transnational corporations; international, or more accurately intergovernmental, organizations such as the United Nations; and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs).”2

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• “Globalization is the transformative growth of connections among people across the planet.” 3

• Globalization is “the process by which the social relations between human beings

have tended to extend ‘globally’, to cover the territorial and demographic space of the entire planet.”4 He continues, “In this more specific sense, the term ‘globalisation’ is used to indicate the social process, highly influenced by technological development, increasingly rapid means of transport and the ‘information revolution’, which has created a truly world-wide web of spatial connections and functional interdependence.”5

• “...globalization is the growing mobility of factors of production—capital, labor,

information, and goods—between countries.”6

• “Globalization...denotes movements in both the intensity and the extent of international interactions.”7 But, he suggests, also, that “no simple and straightforward definition can be offered of....” globalization.8

• “Globalization is an uneven transition process from an international economy

comprised of discrete national units to a global economy of integrated national economies.”9

• Globalization is “a set of more or less interrelated changes....Among these

changes are a deepening of international economic integration (itself a multifaceted phenomenon), developments in communication technologies and infrastructure, the rise of multiculturalism, global environmental problems, proliferation of international institutions, agreements and regimes, the rise of transnational non-state actors, the end of the Cold War, and others.”10

• Globalization is “interconnectedness of social fates.”11

• Globalization refers to the growth of economic and technological connectedness,

the weakening and dissolution of economic barriers and the joining of nation states to form larger regional unions. 12

• Globalization is typically defined as “the greater exposure of national economies

to the world market through a greater dependence on international trade.”13 Or, globalization is “increased trade as a percentage of GDP...”14

• “Globalization refers to the increasing pace and scope of economic and cultural

activities across space.”15

• Globalization entails “all the sociocultural processes that contribute to making distance irrelevant.”16

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Clearly, there is no single “thing” to which all refer. At a very general level, globalization refers to the growth of linkages among people around the world. The forms of such linkages are many, including communications, trade, investment, travel, migration, identification with people in other countries, and so on. To determine the degree to which it is present, one might look for an increase in value of trade as a proportion of GDP, or increased availability of information about other parts of the world, or more people travelling, or increased foreign investment—or, similar aspects of the many phenomena to which globalization refers. We will seek to locate the presence of these phenomena among the causes of separatism in the five cases we will examine. B. “Separatism” The Wikipedia provides a general definition: Separatism refers to “a state of cultural, ethnic, tribal, religious, racial or gender separation from the larger group, often with demands for greater political autonomy and even for full political secession and the formation of a new state.”17 A sense of the breadth of meanings given to the term “separatism” necessitates a review of concepts that usually fall within its scope, including “autonomy,” “self-determination,” “secession,” and, “fragmentation.” 1. Autonomy “Autonomy” refers to the independence of an individual or group from other individuals or groups. As was the case with the concept of “globalization,” scholars differ somewhat in their definitions:

• “A territorial political autonomy is an arrangement aimed at granting to a group that differs from the majority of the population in the state, but that constitutes the majority in a specific region, a means by which it can express its distinct identity.”18

• “Autonomy” refers to both individual independence and that of collective bodies

such as “nation-states, minority groups within states, indigenous peoples, and religious movements....”19 It is related to sovereignty for the greater the collective autonomy, the greater the sovereignty.20

• Autonomy is “the capacity for self-determination and the conditions enabling

it....”21

• Autonomy requires “both self-awareness and a capacity to act by the autonomous person or community. These two dimensions of autonomy correspond to a basic distinction found in the social movement literature – between interest- based explanations such as resource mobilization theory and identity-based approaches such as new social movement theory, which focuses on struggles over symbolic resources and rights to difference....Self-awareness links to identity, while capacity to act relates to the resource or interest dimension. Autonomous action therefore cannot be understood without considering both kinds of factors....22

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2. Self-determination The concept of “self-determination” often is used to refer to the right of individuals or groups to separate and form their own political entity, though some view the “right” as subordinate to the maintenance of state sovereignty. Here are some scholar’s views:

• “National self-determination can be understood in a strong or weak sense. In the strong sense it insists that a nation be given statehood, whereas in the weak sense it requires only that a nation be given some form of self-government. Weak national self-determination is thus compatible with a multinational state in which nations are given some political autonomy.”23

• “The principle of self-determination is best viewed as entitling a people to choose

its political allegiance, to influence the political order under which it lives, and to preserve its cultural, ethnic, historical, or territorial identity. Often, although not always, these objectives can be achieved with less than full independence.”24

• “In general terms, self-determination is the right of a national group to be

sovereign within a given territory.”25

• “In international law the concept of pursuing a collective interest is known as ‘self-determination.’”26 “Self-determination does not in any manner imply a right to independence.... it is a concept that international law acknowledges must be secondary to the integrity of democratic states.”27

3. Secession The concept of “secession” is generally, but not always, viewed as a form of separatism, but not necessarily identical to it. Politically, secession may be an extreme form of separatism leading to a sovereign political unit. Some scholarly views of the meaning of “secession” are:

• “A separatist movement differs from a secessionist movement insofar as the demands of the former consist of increased autonomy in one or many areas, whereas in the latter, full independence is part of the definition of success.”28

• Secession does not simply mean separation. “In many, perhaps most cases, the

secessionists desire not only independence from the existing state but also sovereignty for the new political unit they seek to create.”29

• Secession is “the formal withdrawal from an established, internationally

recognized state by a constituent unit to create a new sovereign state.”30

• Secession is “a movement to obtain sovereignty and split a territory or group of people from another....”31

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• Secession is “the voluntary withdrawal from a state and its central government of

part of its people with their territory, with the remainder of the existing state maintaining this state’s legal identity.”32 Furthermore, “A group’s right of political self-determination is the right to determine its political status.”33

• Secession is “the unilateral withdrawal of territory and people from a state.”34

• “Secession...involves the creation of a new state with sovereign jurisdiction over

its citizens.”35

• Secession involves “a group of people within an existing nation-state” seeking “to form their [own] nation-state....”36

4. Fragmentation, etc. A variety of other terms are used and related to separatism. Milica Bookman writes that “The distinction between separatist, irredentist, ethnoterritorial, and secessionist movements is often blurred, both in fact and in the usage of the terms.”37 She contends that “Ethnoterritorial movements differ from secessionist movements insofar as the former is broader, and encompass both secession and irredentism.”38 Ian Clark uses the term “fragmentation” and suggests it is the opposite of globalization, “on the one hand, it suggests disintegration, autarchy, unilateralism, closure, and isolation; on the other, the trend is towards nationalism or regionalism, spatial distension, separatism, and heterogeneity.”39 He says, “Fragmentation expresses itself in many ways: autarchy, unilateralism, disintegration, heterogeneity, and separation.”40 Clearly, both terms, i.e., “globalization” and “separatism,” are imprecise and refer to multiple phenomena. Broadly speaking, globalization refers to greater interconnections among people, groups and states throughout the world, while separatism refers to efforts to increase the autonomy of groups from the states with which they are associated. III. Scholars’ Findings about the Relationship between Globalization and Separatism The relationship between globalization and separatism has been the focus of numerous scholarly studies, yet consensus on whether the link is a causal one or not is lacking. A review of some of the arguments and evidence used by each “side” confirms the claim that disagreement exists. Those who argue for a causal relationship often insert an intermediary variable that they claim is the product of globalization and an immediate cause of separatism. In other words, globalization is identified as the indirect cause of separatism. Those who argue against a causal relationship cite a variety of mitigating circumstances that may account for the absence of such a relationship between “globalization” and “separatism.”

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1. Claim #1: Globalization causes separatism Annalisa Zinn has summarized an argument common among those who see a causal relationship between “globalization” and “separatism.” She notes: “In 1960 trade was 24 percent of world gross domestic product (GDP). By 1980 trade accounted for 39 percent of world GDP and in 1999 trade’s share of global GDP was 45 percent....”41 And, she notes, “Observation of these simultaneous processes...has led to the popular claim that economic globalization, especially in the form of increasing trade liberalization, and self-determination movements are casually linked in that globalization increases the frequency and intensity of the demand for self-determination....And there are indeed multiple examples that seem to substantiate this claim.”42 A brief review of the most common forms of the arguments for a causal relationship is indicative of the extent, and apparent reasonableness, of the causal claim. a. Globalization brings economic inequality which produces separatist movements. Supporting the argument that globalization produces economic inequality which produces separatism is the work of Guljit Arora. Writing on globalization and the creation of new states in India, he found “that globalisation induced changes produce economic frustrations among people. And these are easily exploitable into demands for smaller states by the political class....”43 In other words, “globalisation may influence the entire socio-economic and political structure of the country further inducing pressures for new states....”44

b. Globalization weakens states which fosters separatist movements. A frequently made argument by scholars of globalization is that this phenomenon weakens states and weak states “encourage” separatist movements. Several illustrations can be given. William Coleman, Louis Pauly, and Diana Brydon, writing on the impact of aspects of globalization, say that “These globalizing processes encouraged questioning and ultimately the broadening of claims to collective autonomy, and this questioning challenged the state’s monopoly.”45 They say, “the dominance of a given nation-state society or community in the lives of many diminishes relative to membership in other communities....”46 The result is the rise of separatist sentiments. Natalia Loukacheva, examining peoples in the Danish territory of Greenland and the Canadian federal territory of Nunavut, suggests that the global involvement of these communities has given them powers to enhance their autonomy in the countries in which they are found. Yet, she asserts, this doesn’t “necessarily threaten the sovereignty of their respective states. Changes taking place within the Arctic raise the standing of Greenland and Nunavut within their home states....”47 In other words, although the status of Denmark and Canada in the world may not have been challenged by the global

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involvement of these territories, their autonomy from the two countries has been enhanced. Paul Hirst and Grahame Thompson accept the argument that as a result of globalization “States are less autonomous, they have less exclusive control over the economic and social processes within their territories, and they are less able to maintain national distinctiveness and cultural homogeneity.”48 They say the state’s “capacities to control its people and domestic social processes have declined as a consequence.”49 And, they agree that “the decline in the centrality of national-level politics” means “Sub-nationalities and regions can assert their autonomy with less fear....”50 c. Globalization challenges local cultures which “encourage” individuals to respond through separatist movements. Danilo Zolo argues that though globalization may produce uniformity, it also may produce rebellion. He accepts the argument that “...the pressure to conform can actually generate resistance, disorder and violence. In some cases it triggers rejection, secession and isolationism on the part of subjects – states, peoples, ethnic or religious communities – driven to defend their identity and assert the autonomy of their ‘local’ reality in the face of ‘global’ contamination and standardisation.”51

Ian Clark contends that we are now in a period of globalization “...that is certain to intensify heterogeneity and separatism, even if the forces of globalization are not uniformly resisted or reversed. Globalization evokes an equal but opposite reaction in the direction of fragmentation precisely because it forces cultures into mutual awareness and thereby accentuates the identity of difference....”52

Gerard Delanty says “Citizenship involves four components: rights, responsibilities, participation and identity.”53 He argues, “What has come about today, largely as a result of globalization, is the separation of these components from each other: they are no longer united into a coherent national framework.”54 The result, he says, “is the spectre of a new nationalism, ranging from violent separatist movements, religious nationalism to neo-fascism and the more subtle cultural nationalisms which have become an integral part of late political culture.”55 He believes that globalization has fostered a “growing discord between citizenship and nationality....”56 He contends that there is a way out: the adoption of a cosmopolitan identity. To him a cosmopolitan “is a universal citizen, mobile, autonomous and choosing to be transnational.”57 Yet, we remain in a “pre-cosmopolitan” world where separatism is a response to globalization. d. Globalization challenges the human desire for autonomy thereby stimulating separatist efforts. Louis Pauly suggests that by challenging a basic human desire, globalization stirs the desire for autonomy or separatism. He says, not only do “human beings want to shape and live in a world that is prosperous, secure, and sustainable, but also that they insist on

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one that preserves in principle a high degree of autonomy for themselves and for the collectivities with which they identify.”58

William Coleman, Louis Pauly, and Diana Brydon write similarly. They contend that the effects of globalization challenge human nature. They argue:

Individuals and communities around the world are becoming ever more deeply connected to one another. For better or for worse, what happens abroad now affects us deeply at home. Nevertheless, whether as individuals or as members of discrete communities, human beings continue to place a high value on their autonomy. They insist on shaping the conditions of their existence to the fullest extent possible.59

A consequence of that desire for autonomy may take the form of separatism. Nanda Shrestha and Dennis Conway make a similar argument about reactions to globalization, i.e., that the human desire for autonomy is being channeled into separatism as a result of an aspect of globalization:

The contemporary trend does not seem to bode well for globalization’s relentless advance.... Despite ongoing cultural homogenization and cultural hybridization as related to everyday commodities or in the material arena, heightened senses of cultural identity and resultant cultural conflicts seem to be on the rise, especially in Asia. Again, this rise is mostly attributed to the public reaction and response to the cultural relations of dominance and dependence, not so much to the government policy and cultural behavior of the co-opted ruling classes (vis-a-vis the West).60

To Shrestha and Conway, the stimulus activating the human desire for autonomy lies in unequal power relations embedded in globalization. e. Globalization imposes the will of the most powerful on others who may react through separatist movements. Ian Clark has written of the view, “common in the literature,” that “the more globalization intensifies, the fiercer will be the pockets of resistance to its intrusive sway.”61 He says: “There are certainly many arguments that explicitly link fragmentation to globalization: fragmentation is a dialectical response to globalization.”62 Clark argues that “Globalization has been shaped and carried forward by the most powerful states and for their own ends. It is therefore a tangible expression of the inequalities of the international system.”63 Who will lead the opposition to globalization? Clark predicts that those seeking fragmentation will be those who have the most to lose by continuing globalization. And, he suggests, “precisely how the balance between globalization and fragmentation will be adjusted depends on the new role that states are able to forge for themselves, and how successfully they manage to

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mediate between increasingly potent international pressures and the heightened levels of domestic discontent that will inevitably be brought in their wake.”64

f. Globalization has fostered international criminal activities which have supported separatist movements. Christian Allen has emphasized the intermediary role of criminal activity between globalization and separatism. He notes that “Globalization processes have increased the scale and scope of transnational exchange for legitimate and criminal enterprises alike.”65 He contends: “Current and recent insurgencies supported primarily through criminal activities include Sendero Luminoso (Peru); FARC/ELN (Columbia); and separatist movements in Myanmar, Chechnya and ‘Kurdistan’.....”66 And, he argues, “Exploitable natural resource wealth not only funds civil conflict, but also motivates it. As the economic and political opportunities of marginalized populations decline, they take to arms seeking direct control over scarce but exploitable resources like mines, forests or fields of drug crops.”67 g. Globalization has led to popular insecurity which has fostered separatist movements. More generally, the argument has been made that globalization has produced insecurity among portions of the population and that insecurity has been a motive for separatism. For example, Ronaldo Munck suggests that

The rise of the new nationalism needs to be seen as both response to, and product of, globalization. The insecurities generated by globalism, and the perceived failure of alternative development paths, have generated new nationalisms. But their reaction to cultural loss and disorientation has taken full advantage of the benefits of globalization in terms of increasingly accessible international travel and the communications revolutions.68

He continues,

Against the social and existential insecurity created by the ‘one big market’ that is globalization, nationalism reaffirms the importance of culture, identity and roots. Nationalism can thus be seen not as some unfortunate hangover from an era before the ‘end of history’ was proclaimed but, rather, as an integral element of the ongoing march of globalization.69

The contention that globalization causes separatism is widespread and scholars see it operating through a variety of intermediary factors, including economic inequality, weakened states, challenges to local cultures, the psychological desire for autonomy, reactions to the will of the powerful, enhanced criminal activity, and general insecurity. The “bottom line” is that globalization directly, or indirectly, causes separatism.

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2. Claim #2: Globalization does not cause separatism Nevertheless, many scholars argue the opposite, i.e., that globalization does not produce separatism. Indeed, they contend that it functions to limit separatist movements. Just as the arguments and evidence supporting the view that globalization causes separatism takes a variety of forms, so the argument and evidence that globalization does not cause separatism takes a variety of forms. a. Globalization is providing states with new tools to thwart potential separatism. According to Ian Clark, A.D. Smith “...challenges yet another of the central premises of globalization theory. The technical accoutrements of communication—the very nervous system of all accounts of globalization—may in fact be more even handed in their impact on the two processes. ...fragmentation is as likely as is globalization to thrive in the communications revolution of the late twentieth century.”70 In other words, communications networks may be used to fight separatism and foster unity in a country. b. State action will mitigate possible fragmenting impacts of globalization. Richard Rosecrance concludes that globalization is unlikely to produce secessionist movements for three reasons:

First, metropolitan governments have themselves embraced globalization, extending its benefits to potentially dissident provinces.”71 “Second and perhaps more important, dissident elements can no longer legitimately use the threat of terrorism to gain independence from a reluctant metropolitan government. If they do so, they lose the support of other nations and the international community as a whole, undermining their position. Third, existing governments have rewarded dissident provinces which have remained within the central administrative fold....The rewards of remaining within tend to exceed the benefits of going outside.72

A similar argument is made by Meredith Weiss in her study of the Basque, Catalan, Punjabi and Kashmiri movements. She concludes that “while international context matters, how states respond to ethnonationalist movements remains more salient....movements supported significantly by a diasporic population or that invoke transnational identities may benefit more from globalization than others.”73 She states these findings in greater detail as follows:

Globalization matters when a diasporic or otherwise-aligned population has resources and motivation to contribute, when international norms promote a particular trajectory, when other states are directly affected by the movement, or when geostrategic alliances require the settlement of distracting domestic disputes. These conditions and moments, though, are impermanent and have effect only as they concatenate with state- and local-level forces. 74

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These cases suggest that states and sovereignty may increasingly find themselves counterbalanced by supranational institutions and global forces, but retain critical relevance. How the state responds to ethnonationalist unrest, and especially, what sorts of institutional outlets are available for protest, nay significantly determine the timbre and course of the movement – how radical the demands expressed are, what sort of alliances form within or across regions and even with sympathizers abroad, and how palatable moderation seems to the contenders....Ultimately, though, despite the rhetoric and reality of economic globalization and expectations of shifts in the distribution of political power toward a supranational level, the basic processes of ethnonationalist contention remain much the same as ever, and both regional and state-level identities and processes retain core relevance.75

Thus, some scholars argue that under most circumstances, states will be able to mitigate frustrations brought by globalization and significant separatist movements will not develop. Clearly, their arguments are directed primarily against the notion that separatist movements will develop significantly and/or succeed, rather than against the notion that they may be fostered or initiated as a result of globalization. c. Economic development derived from globalization may undermine the potential economic causes of separatism. Nicholas Sambanis argues “that globalization understood as increased trade as a percentage of GDP can both fuel and quell self-determination movements under different conditions....”76 He notes: “According to most theories of secessionism, self-determination is typically demanded when the economic benefits of membership to the predecessor state are low relative to the economic and political gains of independence.” 77 Yet, he argues, “More democratic states might be better able to resolve conflicts, increasing the benefits of continued membership (i.e. no secession).”78 And, he concludes “that globalization will have generally positive effects if it increases levels of income and leads governments to provide social insurance programs to cushion any external shocks to vulnerable populations.” 79 Still, he notes, “in some regions with prior levels of conflict, globalization is likely to exacerbate those conflicts.”80

Like Nicholas Sambanis, Richard Rosecrance and Arthur Stein say “although globalization initially stimulated ethnic discontent by creating inequality, it also provides the means for quieting discontents down the road within the fold of the state political system. Distributed economic growth is a palliative for political discontent.”81

Again, globalization does not necessarily lead to separatism. d. Identity with existing states can not be easily shifted to global identity thereby weakening identity with the state, so globalization’s impact on identity is unlikely to foster the rise of separatism.

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A.D. Smith suggests that arguments related to the impact of globalization on identity necessarily fostering globalization are fallacious. He says, “‘If memory is central to identity, we can discern no global identity in-the-making’...”82 Furthermore, he says, “any globalization of culture, induced by international politics, is skin deep and destined to pass away with the next shift in international power. It does not have the resilience of ‘true’ cultures, based on memory and history.”83 If globalization does not challenge identity, then it can not be the cause of shifts of identity related to the rise of separatist movements. e. Most states are not weakening significantly, so the impetus for separatism is unlikely to seriously increase. The argument that globalization weakens states and that weak states invite separatism is contested by some scholars. Nick Bisley contends that “Globalization is said to discipline states and force them to adhere to a singular model of economic behaviour. Yet if one looks at the fiscal policy of the richest states—those most heavily influenced by globalization—there is little evidence to support the claims that globalization has tied their policy hands.”84 That is, globalization’s impact on the authority of developed states is exaggerated by those who see globalization causing separatism. He concludes that “there is little empirical evidence to support the position....” that the state is in decline.85

f. Empirical studies do not support the globalization-separatism hypothesis. There are studies which directly refute the globalization-separatism hypothesis. The work of Annalisa Zinn is among the most thorough. The starting point for her study is the observation that:

A common notion is that globalization, specifically in the form of trade liberalization, increases the frequency and intensity of movements for regional autonomy. That is, it stimulates the formation of new movements and fuels existing movements, perhaps by increasing voter support for these movements..., inducing changes in their strategies, or encouraging them to be more active in their pursuit of greater autonomy.86

To test the causal relationship, she undertook a “multivariate statistical analysis of 116 countries from 1980-1999.” She reported that her finding “challenges the popular view that globalization amplifies the intensity of subnational threats to state sovereignty and suggests that the increasing level of trade between countries is actually curbing parallel increases in the number of active self-determination movements.”87 She concluded: “The key finding seems to be that recent increases in economic integration and political separatism are parallel processes and that without the increasing level of trade between countries, the number of active self-determination movements worldwide most likely would be higher.88 In other words, “economic globalization decreases, rather than increases, the frequency and intensity of the demand for self-determination.”89

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In addition, there are scholars whose findings are mixed, i.e., they partly contradict and partly support the globalization-separatism hypothesis. Shahadad Naghshpour and Joseph St. Marie, using multiple regression tools, found, on the one hand, that “globalization does, in fact, increase the incidence of ethnic protest in the sample countries.”90 Yet, on the other hand, they conclude: “Robust findings demonstrate that economic factors such as trade and GDP growth decrease protest while the balance of payments and the value added in industry actually increase protest for various reasons....While some sorts of contact with other countries decrease protest, others especially membership in Western NGOs increases protest.”91

3. Summary: The globalization-separatism relationship The simplest conclusion to this review of studies of the globalization-separatism relationship is that the relationship is ambiguous. Scholars have noted parallel trends in the two variables. More than a decade ago, Metta Spencer observed, as others have observed,

The late 1980s and 1990s have been marked by two mutually contradictory trends. The first is an increasing cultural, economic, environmental, and political integration transnationally through “globalization” and the formation of international political structures, such as the European Union. The second is the upsurge in separatist movements that aspire, sometimes with success, to partition states.92

Yet, she does not claim a causal relationship. The appearance of a relationship because of this correlation does not mean the reality of globalization causing separatism. Indeed, several scholars use a coin analogy to identify their relationship. Ronaldo Munck suggests that “Globalism and nationalism are, perhaps, best seen as two sides of the same coin and inextricably linked.”93 And, Thomas Eriksen suggests “that the centripetal or unifying forces of globalization and the centrifugal or fragmenting forces of identity politics are two sides of the same coin....”94 Thus, at a minimum, scholars suggest that they often appear to be linked, but how they are linked is disputed. A general conclusion from our review of the arguments that globalization causes separatism and that globalization does not cause separatism is that no consistent bivariate relationship exists. Globalization may be causally related to separatism sometimes, but not at other times. Indeed, that is the implicit or explicit argument of many scholars. Four examples are illustrative: In a paper by Ryan Griffiths and Ivan Savic, the conclusion is reached that “the process of globalization may lead to two worlds: one in which separatism leads to the devolution of power and, ironically, greater regional integration...; the other in which separatism leads to true fragmentation.”95

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Richard Rosecrance, Etel Solingen and Arthur Stein argue that globalization may lead to dissatisfaction. Yet, “The dissatisfaction of a province...can lead in two directions: toward greater dependence on the metropolitan government and an acceptance of lesser status, or toward independence in hopes that the international economy will treat the fledgling state kindly.”96 Thus, they conclude, that globalization will not necessarily produce a separatist reaction in different regions. Why? “Much depends on what national and international authorities (national governments, the IMF, WTO, NATO, ASEAN, and G-8) do to contain the response.”97 Russell Hardin has suggested that “the globalization that finally makes it feasible for subnational groups to opt out of their ‘home’ nations without loss of economic opportunity also makes it less worthwhile to be autonomous.”98 Ian Clark says “sometimes globalization has shifted the burden to domestic sectors; at others, domestic interests have been given priority and international fragmentation has resulted. None of this is automatic, nor mechanical, but it is explicable in terms of the working out of political preferences.”99

In order to better sort out the ambiguities and contradictions regarding the globalization-separatism relationship, we will examine briefly five separatist cases to determine the importance of globalization as a causal factor. The separatist struggles to be examined include Bangladesh from Pakistan (1971), Eritrea from Ethiopia (1993), East Timor from Indonesia (2002), Kosovo from Serbia/Yugoslavia (2008), and the Kurds from Turkey (on-going). III. The Role of Globalization in Five Separatist Cases In the following review of the five cases, we will seek to identify what scholars consider the key causal variable or variables in each of the five cases. We will look for possible causes that fall into six categories: geographical, cultural, political, economic, leadership and external factors. Then we will determine the degree to which the causal factors in the cases studied are related to the concept of globalization. On the basis of that assessment we will seek an answer to the research question: “Is there a causal relationship between globalization and separatism?” A. East Pakistani Efforts to Separate from Pakistan (1971) The two territories that became Pakistan were parts of British-ruled India until they were given independence on August 14, 1947. Grievances developed in what was initially known as East Bengal but was renamed East Pakistan. They reached a crisis point on March 26, 1971 when Bengali leaders declared East Pakistan independent from Pakistan. Military suppression of the separatist movement led to an estimated ten million refugees fleeing East Pakistan to India, the rise of an India-supported resistance called the Mukti Bahini, and Indian military intervention in December which resulted in the surrender of Pakistani troops and Pakistani acceptance of the independence of what became Bangladesh on December 16, 1971.

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Scholars who have studied the separatist movement have identified an array of causes giving rise to, sustaining, and leading to the successful fruition of the effort. Geographical factors: Pakistan consisted of two parts with the East separated from the West by 1000 miles of the state of India. Cultural factors: Although the people in the two parts of Pakistan were linked by the dominant religion, Islam, they were divided by ethnicity. The dominant group in the East was the Bengali, while that in the West it was the Punjabi. As we have noted, at independence, the East was called East Bengal in recognition of the fact that the Bengali constituted about 98% of the population there. Indeed, the Bengali population is greater than that of the Punjabi and any other ethnic group in Pakistan. The 1955 change of name to East Pakistan was a symbolic action which reaffirmed to many Bengali their inferior status in the country. The Bengali felt disadvantaged in Pakistan, too, because of language. Urdu became the country’s official language, though most people in the East spoke Bengali. Indeed, in 1952 there were protests in the East by the Bengali Language Movement on this issue. These protests were suppressed violently. Political factors: Although the population of the East was greater than that of the West, elites of the West controlled the Pakistani government. R.K. Dasgupta suggests that in post-independent East Pakistan there was a generational change. Among the younger leaders many came to denounce “the Muslim League as an instrument of non-Bengali tyranny over the Bengalis and hated its Bengali members as loyalist collaborators.”100 Among those leaders was Sheikh Mujibur Rahman who, in his Six Point Program of February 12, 1966, called for greater autonomy for the East. Dasgupta suggests that Programme “began to turn political unrest into violent uprising.”101

In the December 7, 1970 national elections, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman called for greater decentralization and complained about the government’s failure to help when a cyclone hit the East the previous month. His Awami League won virtually all the parliamentary seats in the East and a majority of parliamentary seats in the country as a whole. 102 Yet, the President, General Yahya Khan, would not allow the party to assume control of the government of Pakistan. As anger grew in the East, more Pakistani troops were sent there. On March 25, 1971 the military launched its attack, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman called for an independent Bangladesh early the next morning, and he was captured and imprisoned. Although the West quickly seized control of the major urban centers and captured opponents, the action spurred popular resistance and an exodus of millions of people to India. External factors: The key external “player” in the East Pakistani effort to separate from Pakistan was India, a country with which Pakistan had fought two wars. India had not been a critical player in the growing estrangement between East and West Pakistan, but following the military crackdown in March of 1971 it became the refuge of many Bengali Pakistanis and became more and more involved. And, India was concerned that refugees in the northeast might spur destabilizing conflict there. As a consequence, India began

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aiding the resistance forces, i.e., the Mukti Bahini. Yet, it was not until 9 months after the initial crackdown by Pakistani troops that India became directly involved. Indian armed forces began occupying territory in East Pakistan on November 21st; Pakistan attacked Indian air installations in northwestern India on December 3rd; in response, India declared war on Pakistan that day; the Dhaka offensive was launched by India on December 5th; and, Dhaka fell December 16th. Although Pakistan had expected international intervention to restrain India, India was able to keep that from happening. It made a strong case legitimizing its actions. 103

Economic factors: A continuing grievance used by leaders in the East was that of economic neglect. Observers suggested the relationship was a colonial one with the West the colonizer and the East the colonized. 104 Government resources seemed to go inordinately to the West. And, as noted above, when the disastrous cyclone following Monsoon flooding hit the East in late 1970, financial assistance from the government was minimal. Leadership factors: Commenting on the leadership in Pakistan and India during the brief Bangladesh war, Richard Sisson and Leo Rose said “there was strong and consistent control in democratic India during the Bangladesh crisis, but relatively weak and inconsistent control in authoritarian Pakistan.”105 They noted, “While Pakistani decision making before the military crackdown of 25 March was unsystematic in design and insensitive to consequences, it subsequently became more ad hoc in structure, minimalist in terms of political reform, and dependent upon external events with respect to timing.”106 Dasgupta was more colorful in his description of post-election government formation talks among leaders in early 1971: “Constitutionally the talks between the General Yahya Khan and Sheikh Mujibur Rahman were not talks between the Government and a party leader of the same country. They were talks between the representative of a colonial power and the leader of a rebel province which had virtually shaken off its colonial bondage.”107 Although the bias is obvious in Dasgupta’s remarks, Sisson and Rose have commented critically regarding Pakistan’s leadership at the time.108

Concluding comments: As appears to be true for the other separatist efforts to be examined, the causes in the Bangladesh case were both multiple and complex. B. Eritrean Efforts to Separate from Ethiopia (1993) Italy formally declared Eritrea a colony on January 1, 1890 and ruled it until the British seized it early in World War II. The British ruled Eritrea from 1941 until 1951. On September 15, 1948 the British took the issue of the status of Eritrea to the UN for a decision on its future status. There was disagreement among members, so a year later the General Assembly appointed a commission to advise it. The commission provided two alternatives in its June 1950 report. Commission members from Burma, Norway, and South Africa suggested that Eritrea be a self-governing unit within an Ethiopian federation, while the members from Guatemala and Pakistan suggested Trusteeship under

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the UN for ten years and then independence. In December of 1950, the General Assembly decided to proceed with the former recommendation. A UN Commissioner arrived to oversee the transfer in early 1951; a year later elections were held in Eritrea for a Representative Assembly and a constitution was adopted; on September 11, 1952, with the approval of the Ethiopian Emperor, the federation was established. Yet, in 1961 Ethiopia shut down the Eritrean Representative Assembly and on November 14, 1962 Ethiopia formally annexed Eritrea. A 30 year separatist struggle followed. The struggle culminated on May 24, 1993 when Eritrea became an independent state. Geographic factors: Like Pakistan, the territory of Eritrea constituted the Eastern part of Ethiopia prior to its separation, but, unlike Pakistan, it was contiguous with the rest of the country. Its position along the Red Sea gave Eritrea strategic importance for it provided Ethiopia with its surface link to the sea. The boundary in the north divides Tigrinya-speaking peoples between Ethiopia and Eritrea, a feature which affected the success of the separatist movement. Cultural factors: Ethiopia is a country of many ethnicities dominated by a core of Amharic-speaking peoples. In Eritrea, there are nine major ethnic groups, though the Tigray and Tigrinya-speakers constitute about 80 % of the population. The population is said to be equally divided between Christians and Muslims. During the period of the federation, specifically, in 1956, the two official languages specified by the Eritrean constitution, Arabic and Tigrinya, were replaced by Amharic. This was followed by the banning of a separate Eritrean flag. Both actions were viewed as efforts to diminish cultural symbols of importance to people living in Eritrea. Political factors: In another attempt to diminish possible separatist activity, Ethiopian law was imposed on Eritrea in 1959. According to a UN report,

The gradual erosion of Eritrea’s federal status in the late 1950s had led independence-minded Eritreans to launch a campaign of resistance to Ethiopian rule. With the abrogation of the Federal Act in 1962 and the incorporation of Eritrea into Ethiopia as one of that country’s provinces, the movement for secession and self-determination was taken up in earnest.109

Eritrea was not the only part of Ethiopia where grievances against the Addis Ababa-based government led to both opposition and separatist movements. On September 12, 1974, a military coup overthrew Emperor Haile Selassie and on February 3, 1977 Mengistu Haile Mariam became president of the Dergue, the military body that ruled Ethiopia. In the late 1970s, the Tigre People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) was formed seeking autonomy for Tigre region and became the most formidable opponent of the central government. It was helped by the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF) that was seeking Eritrean autonomy. Mengistu fled the country on May 21, 1991. In rapid succession the EPLF entered Asmara, the capital of Eritrea, and a broadened opposition took Addis Ababa, the capital of Ethiopia. As a result of the EPLF’s cooperation in bringing down the Mengistu government, the new government in Ethiopia accepted the separation of Eritrea.

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Economic factors: Ethiopia’s imports and exports depended on trade through Eritrea, yet Eritreans felt aggrieved by the fact that the government focused investment in other parts of the country. Leadership factors: In the post-World War II years, Emperor Haile Selassie led an authoritarian government that sought to affirm central control throughout Ethiopia. The demise of the federation angered sections of the Eritrean population. The significance of the military grew as resistance to central control arose. Haile Selassie’s overthrow by the military and the assumption of power by one of its leaders did not change the dominant position of the Amhara or the resistance of non-Amharic peoples to centralization. The fractious nature of the country led to leadership that tended to emphasize the use of the military and the centralization of power. External factors: Clearly, forces outside Eritrea have had a major affect on the territory’s status. The UN’s initial involvement was to foster the establishment of the federal link between Eritrea and Ethiopia, as we have noted. The US backed the Haile Selassie regime; the USSR backed the Mengistu regime, so the USSR’s collapse was a factor in weakening that regime. What became the major Eritrean opposition force, the Eritrean People’s Libesration Front (EPLF), received support from the Eritrean diaspora and, at times, from governments in Somalia and the Sudan when hostilities grew toward Ethiopia. Arab states supported the Eritreans at times, too. African states, according to Ruth Iyob, resisted Eritrean efforts for three reasons: because of fear of balkanization, “Ethiopia’s role as a champion of African liberation,” and Ethiopia’s successful portrayal of Eritrean independence as “Arabization.”110 The UN’s second involvement was at the invitation of the Ethiopian government to facilitate the separation of Eritrea. The General Assembly created the United Nations Observer Mission to Verify the Referendum in Eritrea (UNOVER) which was sent to Eritrea in January of 1993; the vote was held in April; it was overwhelmingly in favor of independence. Concluding comments: The causes of the separatist movement in Eritrea are many, including the historical separation and the sense of grievance felt as a consequence of several of Ethiopia’s policies. Ruth Iyob suggests that the causes lie “in the particular convergence of socio-historical, economic, and political factors that shaped events in post-colonial Africa.”111 Contributing factors working for and against include religion, geostrategic importance, end of cold war, success at internationalization, UN role, division within, access to arms, skill in diplomacy, and many others. These are different for the development of a movement for separation and the success of such a movement. The “causes” of the movement are more the former than the latter, though considerations about the possibility of the latter may affect the former. What is apparent is that those who seek a simple cause disagree with each other for the causes are complex and the result of unique features that change over time and are interpreted differently by different people. That “says” a great deal about the problem of simplification.

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C. East Timorese Efforts to Separate from Indonesia (2002) The Portuguese took direct control of East Timor in 1701, though it gained effective control only in 1913. Japan invaded in 1942 and left in 1945. Portugal then reasserted its control. On April 25, 1974 a coup occurred in Portugal which resulted in the overthrow of the Marcelo Caetano government. The new Portuguese regime was concerned primarily with extricating itself from its African wars and so, essentially, left the East Timor situation to be worked out by East Timorese. In 1975 there was fighting among factions in the country, but the most significant one, the Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor (FRETILIN), declared independence on November 28, 1975. On December 7, 1975, Indonesia invaded the territory and took over, formally making East Timor a province in July 1976. For the next 24 years, the armed military wing of FRETILIN continued the struggle for the separation of East Timor from Indonesia. Following the 1997-1998 financial crisis, President Suharto resigned on May 21, 1998 and the Vice President B.J. Habibi took over as head of a caretaker government. He accepted a UN request that a referendum in East Timor be held which would ask citizens whether they would like autonomy or independence. The United Nations Assistance Mission in East Timor (UNAMET) was established in 1999 for that purpose. The UN-sponsored referendum was held on August 30, 1999 with a vote favoring independence. On May 20, 2002, East Timor, also known as Timor Leste, became independent. Geographical factors: East Timor constitutes the eastern half of the island of Timor plus an enclave in the western half. It is located about 400 miles north of the Australian city of Darwin. Cultural factors: As a consequence of Portuguese rule, most of the people in East Timor are Roman Catholic, a fact which distinguishes them from Indonesians who are dominantly Muslim. Their cultural distinctiveness from other peoples on Timor and from others in Indonesia is primarily a consequence of their Portuguese colonial history. Political factors: The political history of what is now formally known as the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste had been described in outline above. An important feature of this period was the existence of a variety of opposition groups and efforts to unify them. During the period of Indonesian rule, the military wing of FRETILIN, the Armed Forces for the National Liberation of East Timor (FALINTIL), frequently sought to bring together various factions to oppose Indonesia’s “colonial” rule. The diversity of political tendencies and parties has continued to be reflected in post-independence East Timor, though FRETILIN remains a significant “player.” That diversity was viewed as an obstacle to be overcome during the separatist struggle. Economic factors: A critical factor in the success of the separatist forces was the impact of the Asian financial collapse on the Indonesian government. That led to a government more amenable to working with the United Nations to bring about the possible independence of East Timor. East Timor itself is poor. The greatest economic potential

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comes from off shore oil and gas resources, partly shared with Australia, which have attracted foreign interest. Leadership factors: During the struggle against Indonesia, the Indonesian government’s arrest and/or killing of resistance leaders led to significant changes in militant leadership. Factional differences, too, contributed to several leadership changes. The 1996 Nobel Peace Prize awards to Bishop Belo and Jose Ramos-Horta gave fame to leaders who were not involved in the armed struggle. Perhaps, more important to the separation movement than any of these was the willingness of President Suharto’s successor, B.J. Habibie, to permit a referendum in 1999 on possible separation of East Timor from Indonesia. External factors: When one looks for causes of the separatist movement in East Timor and its success, external factors appear to have been critical—more critical in this case than in those of Bangladesh and Eritrea. It was the coup in Portugal in 1975 that prompted the initial declaration of independence which, in turn, led Indonesia to seize control of the territory. Indonesia’s action appears to have been encouraged by the U.S., fearful that its war in Vietnam might be compromised by an independent East Timor. Following the Indonesian invasion, on December 22, 1975, the UN Security Council unanimously voted that Indonesia should withdraw its troops from East Timor, but the U.S. blocked sanctions to enforce the resolution. Indeed, Indonesia’s claim that FRETILIN received support from China and was communist-oriented meant U.S. support for Indonesia’s control of East Timor continued. The Nobel Prizes attracted international attention to Indonesian “colonialism.” The Asian financial breakdown led to a change of leadership in Indonesia and a leader willing to allow the UN to step in and support elections. Australia’s proximity allowed it to provide the UN forces to carry out the mission. Thus, the separatist movement was affected greatly by the deliberate activities of outside countries and the UN. Concluding comments: The initiation and success of the efforts of those in East Timor seeking to separate from Indonesia were affected by a wide range of factors, especially those coming from abroad. They both thwarted and fostered the movement directly through influence on the “colonizer” and indirectly through the impact of a financial crisis on the “colonizer’s” leadership. D. Albanian Efforts in Kosovo to Separate from Serbia (2008) The area known now as Kosovo was taken from Ottoman control and given to Serbia after the first Balkan war of 1912. In a sense, that was the start of a separatist struggle which persisted until recently. In 1974 Kosovo was made an autonomous province of Serbia, a status very similar to that of a republic. In the 1980s, there were Albanian calls for its independence but they were met by repression from the Yugoslav government. In 1989, the Serbian constitution was changed and Kosovo’s autonomy was reduced. Kosovar Albanians reacted in two ways. One reaction was through non-violence: On July 2, 1990, an unofficial Kosovo “parliament” declared the territory independent; the following year they held an informal referendum on separation; and, in May 1992 they elected Ibrahim Rugova as President. The Serbian leader, Slobodan Milosevic, responded

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with repression. The other reaction was through violence: By 1996, the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) had become the dominant force in the separatist struggle. The Kosovo war continued until 1999 when Milosevic withdrew his forces following NATO bombing. The following year the UN Security Council placed Kosovo under UN administration (UNMIK) and authorized KFOR, a NATO peacekeeping force. In 2005, UN negotiations for a permanent settlement of the Kosovo “problem” failed. On February 17, 2008, the Kosovo Assembly declared its independence. To resolve disputes among major powers, on October 8, 2008 the UN General Assembly asked the International Court of Justice whether the independence was legal. Geographical factors: Kosovo is an area located between Albania and Yugoslavia. At the time of the separatist struggle with which we are concerned, it was a part of Yugoslavia but most of the people in Kosovo had cultural and religious links with Albania. Cultural factors: Kosovar Albanians make up 90% of the population of the Kosovo area, a proportion that has grown significantly over the last few decades. About 10% of the population is Serbian. Commenting on the significance of the ethnic make-up of the area, John Norris says:

While many of the disputes in the Balkans have been mislabeled as ‘ancient ethnic hatreds,’ Kosovo probably comes closest to living up to the title. Disputes between Serbs and Albanians over control of the territory stretch back centuries. The region has deep symbolic importance to both ethnic communities, and the twentieth century was marked by a disturbing series of violent ethnic expulsions and counterexpulsions by both Serbs and Albanians in an effort to demographically dominate the region. These tensions also often took on religious overtones, with the majority of Serbs being Orthodox Christian and the majority of Kosovar Albanians being Muslim.112

Political factors: As noted above, Milosevic for political reasons curtailed Kosovar Albanian rights culminating in the revocation of Kosovo’s autonomous status in July 1990.113 The struggle in the 1990s involved efforts by the Kosovar Albanians to declare their independence and set up an unofficial government under Ibrahim Rugova and efforts by what was called the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) to use force for the same purpose. Milosevic responded with even more repression leading to NATO’s intervention and Milosevic’s withdrawal in 1999, as we have noted. Subsequently, a dispute developed within the international community over recognition of Kosovo’s independence. Western countries generally recognized the separation, while Russia rejected it. Although there may be a dispute over whether the Kosovar Albanians have achieved de jure independence, they have achieved de facto separation. Economic factors: Kosovo was the poorest province in Yugoslavia and is one of the poorest countries in Europe today. The conflict over separation, the dispute over recognition, and the absence of significant resources have contributed to this poverty. And, the poverty may have fostered a desire for separation.

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Leadership factors: The behavior of leaders has contributed to the rise and fall of separatist sentiment, too. For example, in July 1966 at the 4th Plenum of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia ousted the Yugoslavian Interior Minister and Vice President Aleksandar Rankovic an event said to have ended a period of repression of Kosovar Albanians. And, the rise of Slobodan Milošević during the 1980s was due partly to his use of the issue of ethnic persecution. He claimed that Kosovo Albanians had ill-treated Kosovo Serbs. Indeed, it can be argued that the autonomous status of Kosovo was revoked in July 1990 justified by Milošević on the grounds that Serbia continued to be mistreated by Kosovar Albanians.”114 External factors: The splintering of Yugoslavia at the end of the Cold War, the horrors of Bosnia, and the suppression of Kosovo’s autonomy fostered the conviction that non-violence would not work, so groups like the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) sprung up in the mid-1990s. “The collapse of the government of neighboring Albania in 1997 then flooded Kosovo with cheap weapons and triggered harsh crackdowns by Serb police and paramilitary forces. Both sides continued to radicalize throughout 1998 with a steady stream of hit-and-run attacks by the KLA and Serb security forces.”115 Western powers were concerned with the instability Milošević’s actions might foster. In March of 1999, the Rambouillet Accords for the restoration of Kosovo’s autonomy were signed by the Kosovar Albanians, but Serbia refused to sign. According to Norris, “It was Yugoslavia’s resistance to the broader trends of political and economic reform—not the plight of Kosovar Albanians—that best explains NATO’s war. Milosevic had been a burr in the side of the transatlantic community for so long that the United States felt that he would only respond to military pressure.”116 As noted above, NATO forces were deployed, primarily in a bombing campaign from March to June 1999 which led to Milosevic’s agreement to withdraw his forces. The UN authorized a NATO peacekeeping force. Russia opposed the intervention because it feared “it might signal a future willingness by the Alliance to involve itself in Russia’s internal affairs without a UN mandate.”117 And, the legality of Kosovo’s proclamation of independence is being adjudicated before the International Court of Justice. Concluding comments: Richard Rosecrance and Arthur Stein argue that what happened in Kosovo is an anomaly. They contend “The recent formation of an ‘independent” Kosovo, which has not yet been recognized by various key countries, does not foretell the similar arrival of other new states....Rather, prospective secessionists, dissuaded by both central governments and the international community, are likely to hold back. Indeed, the most plausible future outcome is that both established states and their international supporters will generally act to prevent a proliferation of new states from entering the international system.”118 The international community’s use of force in Kosovo to facilitate its separation from Yugoslavia was a much more important cause than it was in any of the other cases under study. Yet, a multitude of other factors played a role in bringing about the separatist movement.

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E. Kurdish Efforts to Separate from Turkey (On-going) When Mustafa Kemal Ataturk came to power in the early 1920s, he sought to build national unity by creating a Turkish identity. The Kurds were the most significant minority and resisted incorporation. A range of tools were used in an attempt to replace a Kurdish identity with a Turkish identity. Yet, Kurdish identity persisted. On November 27, 1978, the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) was founded linking Kurdish tribal areas and seeking a separate Kurdish state, that of Kurdistan. Since 1984 the PKK has used violence against the Turkish state as a means of promoting separation. The leader of the PKK, Abdullah Ocalan, was captured in Kenya and returned to Turkey in 1999. But, his capture did not end the separatist struggle. Under pressure from NATO and the European Union efforts have been made to relax some of the strictures against the expression of Kurdish ways, allowing the Kurdish language to be used, permitting some broadcasts in Kurdish, and so on. Although the PKK demand has shifted from independence to a desire for autonomy or federal status, the demand for a form of separation has not died.119 Geographical factors: The “Kurdish homeland” is eastern and southeastern Turkey, though many Kurds have moved to urban areas where they accept a “Turkish” lifestyle. Of particular importance is that Kurds live in the neighboring states of Syria, Iraq and Iran, so the separatist movement in Turkey is part of a broader irredentist movement. Cultural factors: At the heart of much of the justification for Kurdish separatism has been the anguish over the Turkish government’s effort to suppress the Kurdish language and culture. “Turkification” is a term used to refer to the efforts of the government to create a common identity among those living in Turkey. It is cited often as a cause of the Kurdish separatist demand. 120 Political factors: The historically loose structure of the Ottoman Empire gave local groups power to provide much of their own government. This was changed by Ataturk when he took power in the early 1920s. “Turkification” put Kurds at a considerable disadvantage, forcing them to alter their primary language and give up aspects of their culture if they wanted to participate as citizens of Turkey. Pelin Turgut has argued that Turks resist the Kurdish movement because they fear the Kurdish desire to secede “and take with them chunks of the territory so painstakingly saved by Ataturk from European dismemberment.”121 He believes that the Turkish government has two alternatives for dealing with Kurdish separatism: guns or policies which address grievances. He contends that an obstacle to the latter is the army “which sees itself as the custodian of Ataturk’s achievement and is used to calling the shots on the Kurdish issue.”122 Initially, the PKK used political means to achieve its goals. Sandrine Alexie says “after the coup of 1980 that set up a military power and started a hard political repression in Kurdistan, PKK chose to fight as a military organisation....”123 One factor affecting the form the separatist movement has taken is the recurring military intervention in the government of Turkey.

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Economic factors: The Kurdish parts of the country are poor. According to Dogu Ergil, “Economic backwardness has hampered eastern Turkey’s integration into the rest of the country....” 124 It has provided a grievance that has facilitated recruitment of Kurdish youth, much as the poverty has affected separatism in other countries. Leadership factors: On the Turkish side, repeated military seizures of power have meant that leadership frequently has been relatively authoritarian. Ergil contends that on the Kurdish side, leadership for a peaceful movement has not developed because of official repression of “anything associated with an ethnic identity other than Turkish.” And, Kurds “have not yet taken effective steps to put an end to violence and repression among themselves and against each other.”125

External factors: Neighboring countries have provided sanctuary and encouragement to Kurds from Turkey for policy purposes. Sandrine Alexie has written that “...Turkey put pressure on his neighbours with dams that will deprive Syria and Iraq of water. It is one of the reasons why Hafez el-Assad, the Syrian president, had sheltered for a long time the staff and the basis of Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), using their presence as reprisals.”126 More recently, the growth of more accommodationist Turkish policies toward the Kurds are often attributed, at least in part, to Turkey’s desire to join the European Union and the EU’s demand for the protection of human rights and the protection of minorities for admission. Concluding comments: For more than three quarters of a century, Turkey has been striving to create a homogenous nation. This meant that cultural and ethnic diversity had to be suppressed and “Turkishness” had to become the common identity of all citizens. Ergil suggests that “The state’s insistent lust for control of the nation stifled the growth and maturation of civil society and resulted in a lack of capacity to solve conflicts.” 127 Although the Kurdish separatist movement persists, the strength of the Turkish state has meant that it’s success has been limited. F. Globalization as cause summary This brief review of five cases leads to the conclusion that there is an extremely complex array of causal factors involved in the creation, development, and success of separatist movements. If Pakistan had different leadership, the separation of Bangladesh may not have happened. Without skillful Indian diplomacy, its intervention to support the separation of Bangladesh might have been thwarted by significant international resistance. If Tigrayans had not led both the Eritrean and Ethiopian resistance to Mengistu, Eritrea may not have been able to separate from Ethiopia. If the Asian financial crisis had not occurred, Habibi might not have become President of Indonesia, and the Indonesians may not have agreed to the UN referendum in East Timor that brought success for the separatists. Had Milosevic not been the Serbian leader, there may not have been as widely supported separatist movement in Kosovo. Had Turkey been more flexible in its “Turkification” efforts, Kurdish separatism may not have happened. This brief list of factors which might have significantly changed the separatist situations

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in the five countries suggests the extremely complex array of factors involved in separatist movement initiation and development and their complex interplay. In none of the cases was there evidence that a significant cause of separatism was an aspect of globalization. Trade, cross-national communications, declines in state power relative to that of international organizations, and so on, appear absent or of relatively minor importance compared with the complex of other factors in causing these separatist movements. Yes, external factors were often important, but their involvement does not appear to be something associated with what are widely considered to be aspects of the form of globalization said to be of increasing importance in the world. IV. Conclusions and Implications The question we set out to answer was: “Is there a causal relationship between globalization and separatism?” Our conclusion is that there is not a significant causal relationship between the two. The complexity of causation in each of the cases examined means that no causal factor appears to determine whether separatism occurs or succeeds. So many factors are involved in such complex ways that it is not meaningful to identify a universal cause such as globalization. What are the broader implications of this finding? Two implications of these findings deserve emphasis: One is related to the concepts we use and one is related to the effort to simplify reality. A. The problem of conceptual equivalence The long list of different conceptions of “globalization” and “separatism” itemized above are indicative of a fundamental problem in studies that seek general knowledge. The same words often are used to refer to different “things.” Any time we seek to accumulate knowledge in the form of a generalization, we are assuming conceptual equivalence. Conceptual equivalence is a gradational idea, i.e., there may be more or less empirical similarity in definitions. One of the advantages quantitative studies are said to have over qualitative studies is that a single definition of a concept is used when data sets are compiled. I would not dispute the claim that this diminishes the variability in the meaning of a concept. But, the numerous contingent factors that affect an operational definition in any particular setting are likely to produce meanings that are not equivalent across cases. If the meanings of concepts are not the same across cases, findings in one case may not apply to another case. B. The problem of causal simplification The disciplinary goal of seeking simple explanations for complex situations has been relatively unsuccessful. This situation has been particularly true for efforts to locate a cause of separatist movements. Robert Schaeffer writes in the conclusion to his book Severed States of the wide range of reasons ethnic movements demand states of their own: “Some movements have

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organized to protest the invasion and annexation of their country by neighboring states....In other countries, ethnic movements emerged in response to discrimination and assault by indigenous government....There are also ethnic groups with substantial political power, groups who may even be part of ruling majorities, such as the Czechs in Czechoslovakia, who see partition as a way to rid themselves of burdensome ethnic minorities....Although ethnic movements have different reasons for acquiring states, they all believe that state power will provide tangible benefits.”128

Metta Spencer has provided another summary of proximate causes of nationalist separatism: “emotional resentment,” “the justified resistance of victims,” “propaganda orchestrated for political gain,” “the power of a dominant ethnic group,” “economic motivations,” “preservation of a threatened culture,” and “commitment to modernization.”129 In addition, she cites several structural factors contributing to its rise: “Deep cleavages between segments of the population,” “centralization or decentralization of government,” “the size of the prospective new states,” “a history of political annexation or demographic manipulation,” “the newly democratic nature of the federal state,” and “ambiguities of international law.”130

The complexity is immense. A simple extraction of factors which appear to cause separation from a wide range of studies would show countless elements—and, factors dependent upon other factors.

Perhaps, the effort expended to determine whether a concept like “globalization” is the cause of a phenomenon like “separatism” would be better devoted to examining individual cases where the full complexity of causation can be seen and described. This may involve a shift in emphasis from quantitative to qualitative studies for the former are closely associated with the drive in the discipline for simplification which we contend does not provide an accurate depiction of the complex reality involved in phenomena like “separatism.” But, it is likely that the nuanced knowledge needed for practical understanding of such movements would be enhanced.

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ENDNOTES 1 Timothy Scrase, “Globalization, India, and the Struggle for Justice,” in David Smith and Jozsef Borocz, eds, A New World Order? Global Transformations in the Late Twentieth Century (Westport, CN: Greenwood Press, 1995), p. 147. 2 Keith Suter, Global Order and Global Disorder, Globalization and the Nation-State (Westport, CN: Praeger, 2003), p. 67. 3 William Coleman, Louis Pauly, and Diana Brydon, “Globalization, Autonomy and Institutional Change,” in Louis Pauly and William Coleman, eds., Global Ordering, Institutions and Autonomy in a Changing World ( Vancouver: UBC Press, 2008), p. 4. 4 Danilo Zolo, Globalization: an Overview (Colchester, UK: ECPR Press, 2007), p. 1. 5 Danilo Zolo, Globalization: an Overview (Colchester, UK: ECPR Press, 2007), p. 1. 6 Richard Rosecrance, Etel Solingen, and Arthur Stein, “Globalization and Its Effects: Introduction and Overview,” in Richard Rosecrance and Arthur Stein, eds., No More States? Globalization, National Self-determination, and Terrorism ( Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2006), p. 8. 7 Ian Clark, Globalization and Fragmentation, International Relations in the Twentieth Century (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), p. 1. 8 Ian Clark, Globalization and Fragmentation, International Relations in the Twentieth Century (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), p. 1. 9 Christian Allen, “Unruly Spaces, Globalization and Transnational Criminal Economies,” in Dennis Conway and Nik Heynen, eds., Globalization’s Contradictions, Geographies of Discipline, Destrucction and Transformation (London: Routledge, 2006), p. 95. 10 Morten Ougaard, Political Globalization, State, Power and Social Forces (Hampshire, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), pp. 2-3. 11 Ronaldo Munch, Globalization and Contestation, The New Great Counter-Movement (London: Routledge, 2007), p. 5. 12 Fathali Moghaddam, How Globalization Spurs Terrorism, The Lopsided Benefits of ‘One World’ and Why That Fuels Violence (Westport, CN: Praeger Security International, 2008), p. ix. 13 Nicholas Sambanis, “Globalization, Decentralization and Secession, A Review of the Literature and Some Conjectures,” in David Cameron, Gustav Ranis and Annalisa Zinn, eds., Globalization and Self-Determination, Is the Nation-State under Siege? ( London: Routledge, 2006), p. 214. 14 Nicholas Sambanis, “Globalization, Decentralization and Secession, A Review of the Literature and Some Conjectures,” in David Cameron, Gustav Ranis and Annalisa Zinn, eds., Globalization and Self-Determination, Is the Nation-State under Siege? ( London: Routledge, 2006), p. 215. 15 John Agnew, Hegemony, The New Shape of Global Power (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2005), pp. 2-3. 16 Thomas Hylland Eriksen, “Globalization and the Politics of Identity,” UN Chronicle, Autumn 1999. URL: http://folk.uio.no/geirthe/UNChron.html Accessed September 19, 2008.

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17 Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia. URL: http://en.wikipedia.org/?title=Separatist Accessed September 19, 2008. 18 Ruth Lapidoth, Autonomy, Flexible Solutions to Ethnic Conflicts (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1996), p. 33. 19 William Coleman, Louis Pauly, and Diana Brydon, “Globalization, Autonomy and Institutional Change,” in Louis Pauly and William Coleman, eds., Global Ordering, Institutions and Autonomy in a Changing World ( Vancouver: UBC Press, 2008), p. 6. 20 William Coleman, Louis Pauly, and Diana Brydon, “Globalization, Autonomy and Institutional Change,” in Louis Pauly and William Coleman, eds., Global Ordering, Institutions and Autonomy in a Changing World ( Vancouver: UBC Press, 2008), p. 10. 21 Diana Brydon and William Coleman, “Globalization, Autonomy, and Community,” in Diana Brydon and William Coleman, eds., Renegotiating Community, Interdisciplinary Perspectives, Global Contexts (Vancouver, Canada: UBC Press, 2008), p. 5. 22 Michael Webb and Patricia Young, “Transnational Women’s Groups and Social Policy Activists around the UN and the EU,” in Diana Brydon and William Coleman, eds., Renegotiating Community, Interdisciplinary Perspectives, Global Contexts (Vancouver, B.C., Canada: UBC Press, 2008), p. 142. 23 Simon Caney, “National Self-determination and National Secession, Individualist and Communitarian Approaches,” in Percy Lehning, ed., Theories of Secession (London: Routledge, 1998), p. 152. 24 Morton Halperin and David Scheffer, Self-Determination in the New World Order (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1992), p. 47. 25 Julie Sunday, “Self-determination.” URL: http://anscombe.mcmaster.ca/global1/glossary_print.jsp?id=CO.0003 Accessed September 19, 2008. 26 C. Lloyd Brown-John, “Self-Determination and Separation,” Options Politiques/Policy Options, September, 1997, p. 40. 27 C. Lloyd Brown-John, “Self-Determination and Separation,” Options Politiques/Policy Options, September, 1997, p. 43. 28 Milica Zarkovic Bookman, The Economics of Secession (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1992), p. 4. 29 Alen Buchanan, Secession, The Morality of Political Divorce from Fort Sumter to Lithuania and Quebec (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1991), p. 18. 30 Viva Ona Bartkus, The Dynamic of Secession(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), p. 3. 31 “Separatism,” in Knowledgerush. URL: http://knowledgerush.com/kr/encyclopedia/Separatism/ Accessed May 11, 2009. 32 Harry Beran, “A democratic Theory of Political Self-determination for a New World Order,” in Percy Lehning, ed., Theories of Secession (London: Routledge, 1998), p. 34. 33 Harry Beran, “A democratic Theory of Political Self-determination for a New World Order,” in Percy Lehning, ed., Theories of Secession (London: Routledge, 1998), p. 34. 34 Linda Bishai, “Altered States, Secession and the Problems of Liberal Theory,” in Percy Lehning, ed., Theories of Secession (London: Routledge, 1998), p. 93.

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35 Simon Caney, “National Self-determination and National Secession, Individualist and Communitarian Approaches,” in Percy Lehning, ed., Theories of Secession (London: Routledge, 1998), pp. 152-153. 36 Keith Suter, Global Order and Global Disorder, Globalization and the Nation-State (Westport, CN: Praeger, 2003), p. 52. 37 Milica Zarkovic Bookman, The Economics of Secession (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1992), p. 3. 38 Milica Zarkovic Bookman, The Economics of Secession (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1992), p. 4. 39 Ian Clark, Globalization and Fragmentation, International Relations in the Twentieth Century (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), p. 2. 40 Ian Clark, Globalization and Fragmentation, International Relations in the Twentieth Century (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), p. 26. 41 Annalisa Zinn, “Economic Integration and Political Separatism, Parallel Trends or Causally Linked Processes?” in David Cameron, Gustav Ranis and Annalisa Zinn, eds., Globalization and Self-Determination, Is the Nation-State under Siege? ( London: Routledge, 2006), p. 233. 42 Annalisa Zinn, “Economic Integration and Political Separatism, Parallel Trends or Causally Linked Processes?” in David Cameron, Gustav Ranis and Annalisa Zinn, eds., Globalization and Self-Determination, Is the Nation-State under Siege? ( London: Routledge, 2006), p. 233. 43 Guljit Kumar Arora, Globalisation and Reorganising Indian States: Retrospect and Prospects (New Delhi: Bookwell, 2004), p. xiii. 44 Guljit Kumar Arora, Globalisation and Reorganising Indian States: Retrospect and Prospects (New Delhi: Bookwell, 2004), p. 173. 45 William Coleman, Louis Pauly, and Diana Brydon, “Globalization, Autonomy and Institutional Change,” in Louis Pauly and William Coleman, eds., Global Ordering, Institutions and Autonomy in a Changing World (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2008), p. 16. 46 William Coleman, Louis Pauly, and Diana Brydon, “Globalization, Autonomy and Institutional Change,” in Louis Pauly and William Coleman, eds., Global Ordering, Institutions and Autonomy in a Changing World ( Vancouver: UBC Press, 2008), p. 2. 47 Natalia Loukacheva, “Institutions of Arctic Ordering: The Cases of Greenland and Nunavut,” in Louis Pauly and William Coleman, eds., Global Ordering, Institutions and Autonomy in a Changing World (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2008), p. 271. 48 Paul Hirst and Grahame Thompson, Globalization in Question, The International Economy and the Possibilities of Governance (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 1996), p. 177. 49 Paul Hirst and Grahame Thompson, Globalization in Question, The International Economy and the Possibilities of Governance (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 1996), p. 178. 50 Paul Hirst and Grahame Thompson, Globalization in Question, The International Economy and the Possibilities of Governance (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 1996), p. 177. 51 Danilo Zolo, Globalisation: an Overview (Colchester, UK: ECPR Press, 2007), p. 11.

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