why did the world's youngest sovereign state- south sudan unravel so quickly?

WHY DID THE WORLD’S YOUNGEST SOVEREIGN

STATE –SOUTH SUDAN UNRAVEL SO QUICKLY?

By

Olufunke Olubusola Ogunyemi

ID no: 5447772

Supervised by

Professor Bruce Baker

MA International Relations

January 2015

Being a Dissertation submitted to the faculty of Business, Environment and

Society in Partial Fulfilment of the Requirement for the Award of Master

of Arts (M.A) Degree in International Relations.

WHY DID THE WORLD’S YOUNGEST SOVEREIGN STATE-SOUTH SUDAN UNRAVEL SO QUCKLY?

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The successful completion of this dissertation was made possible through the help of the

Almighty God.

I would like to express my gratitude to my supervisor, Professor Bruce Baker for his

unrelenting effort in making this work a success. Your dedication, criticisms, encouragements

and counsel brought my work this far and I would not have asked for a better supervisor.

Many thanks also go to my lecturers who dedicated their time in making this degree a

success.

I would also like to thank my friends Lynda Figyinaba, Efua Forson, Ceaser Payi, Cyril Ikem

Ede, Magai Danjuma, Ayo Akinwekomi, and Cynthia Abayomi. Your contributions made

this work worthwhile.

My gratitude also goes to my mother, Mrs Olusola Tolulope Ogunyemi, whose solid support

kept me going and my sisters Bolatito Ogunyemi, Oluyomi Ogunyemi, Mercy Nssien, Esther

Odulaja and Opeyemi Fashanu; your encouragements kept me on track.

Lastly, I would like to thank Babatunde Ayoolami David for making this possible. I really

appreciate your undying love and support.


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CERTIFICATION

I, Olufunke Olubusola Ogunyemi hereby certify that this work is a result of my personal

research and references to other people’s work has been duly acknowledged. This work has

never been presented anywhere for the award of the Master’s degree or academic certificate.


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DEDICATION

I dedicate this work to the Almighty God, who gave me the oil of ease and the finisher’s

grace throughout the period of carrying out his research. Zechariah 4:9


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ABSTRACT

This study contributes to the continuing debate on the root causes of the ongoing conflict in

South Sudan. This work attempts to determine the main reasons why this young sovereign

state would go into conflict after two years of gaining its independence. Though, the conflict

was presented as an ethnic violence by the South Sudan government, this research carried out

for this work highlights the fact that ethnic violence is secondary compared to the primary

issues that triggered the conflict. The primary issues include but not limited to; poor policy

choices, inappropriate political structure, unresolved issues with Sudan and corruption.

Although there are other primary issues, these are not included in this work as the exhaustive

research and analyses show that, the primary issues highlighted in this work are core in

achieving sustainable peace in South Sudan. This study also examines the actions of the

United States of America and the rest of the international community that has contributed to

the conflict in South Sudan. The contention in this work is that if the primary issues are

tackled, this will end the conflict. It concludes on an analysis that South Sudan is capable of

overcoming these primary issues. This work is purely based on secondary materials such as

books, journals, articles, newspapers, magazines and internet sources to reinforce the

arguments presented.


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TABLE OF CONTENTS ABBREVIATIONS ..................................................................................................................... 7

CHAPTER ONE ......................................................................................................................... 8

GENERAL INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................... 8

1.1 Context of the Study ..................................................................................................... 8

1.2 Statement of the Problem ............................................................................................. 9

1.3 Objective of the Study ....................................................................................................... 9

1.4 Aims of the Study .............................................................................................................. 9

1.5 Methodology of Data Collection ......................................................................................... 9

CHAPTER TWO .................................................................................................................. 11

SOUTH SUDAN UNRAVELED BECAUSE NATION BUILDING WAS RELATIVELY

NEGLECTED ....................................................................................................................... 11

2.1 Introduction .................................................................................................................... 11

2.2 South Sudan’s Options of Reconstruction: State-building and Nation-building ............... 12

2.3 The Actual Policies Chosen by the Government of South Sudan (GoSS) and Donors ...... 16

2.4 Assessment of South Sudan’s Policy Choice in the Light of Historical Realities and

Contemporary Context. ........................................................................................................ 18

2.5 Conclusion ....................................................................................................................... 19

CHAPTER THREE .................................................................................................................. 21

THE INAPPROPRIATE POLITICAL STRUCTURE OF THE SPLM AS A CONTRIBUTING

FACTOR TO SOUTH SUDAN’S CONFLICT ......................................................................... 21

3.1 Introduction .................................................................................................................... 21

3.2 Liberation Movement Vs Political Party .......................................................................... 22

3.3 The Importance of Reforming the SPLM ........................................................................ 24

3.4 The SPLM’s Failure to Transform -----Paraphrasing Roque .......................................... 25

3.5 SPLM’s History of Internal Conflict................................................................................ 28

3.6 Conclusion ....................................................................................................................... 30

CHAPTER FOUR .................................................................................................................... 31


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SUDAN UNDERMINING SOUTH SUDAN: A CONTRIBUTORY FACTOR TO THE SOUTH

SUDAN CONFLICT ................................................................................................................. 31

4.1 Introduction .................................................................................................................... 31

4.2 The Impact of South Sudan’s Secession on Sudan ........................................................... 32

4.3 Conclusion ....................................................................................................................... 40

CHAPTER FIVE ...................................................................................................................... 41

CORRUPTION: A CONTRIBUTORY FACTOR TO THE SOUTH SUDAN CONFLICT ...... 41

5.1 Introduction ..................................................................................................................... 41

5.2 Corruption in South Sudan ............................................................................................. 42

5.3 Corrupt Foundation of South Sudan ............................................................................... 45

5.4 The International Community’s Failure to Curb Corruption in South Sudan ................. 48

5.5 Conclusion ....................................................................................................................... 48

CHAPTER SIX ......................................................................................................................... 50

CONCLUSION ......................................................................................................................... 50


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ABBREVIATIONS

CPA- Comprehensive Peace Agreement

USIP-United States Institute of Peace

BBC- British Broadcasting Corporation

UN- United Nations

GoSS- Government of South Sudan

GoS- Government of Sudan

OECD- Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development

PRIO- Peace Research Institute Oslo

SPLM- Sudan People’s Liberation Movement

SPLA- Sudan People’s Liberation Army

USA- United States of America

EU- European Union

UNESCO- United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization

NCP- National Congress Party

OPEC- Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries

KPMG- Klynveld Peat Main Geordeler

FDI- Foreign Direct Investment

ICG- International Crisis Group


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CHAPTER ONE

GENERAL INTRODUCTION

1.1 Context of the Study

The world’s youngest state South Sudan plunged into conflict on the evening of the 15th of

December 2013 in the capital, Juba just two years after they got their independence (ICG

2014: i). The SPLA forces split along ethnic lines between the government and those loyal to

the former Vice President Reik Machar. The United Nations reports that the fighting moved

rapidly from the barracks to civilian neighbourhoods which triggered ethnic violence

amongst the civilians. The UN estimates that as a result of the conflict, thousands have been

killed and there are targeted attacks against civilians.

South Sudan was declared as an independent country on the 9th of July, 2011 which brought

an end to a prolonged civil war of liberation between the years of 1955- 1972 and 1983-2005.

The civil war that engulfed Sudan was predominantly socio-economic and political

marginalisation of the South by the North’s Arab-Islamic government. Prior to independence,

the CPA that was signed on the 9th of January 2005 enabled South Sudan to operate as an

autonomous government. This enabled the North and South to experience a ‘fragile peace’

before tensions resumed again from 2008-2009 (BBC 2014). Virtually all peace processes

were exhausted and when reconciliation could not be achieved with the North, independence

was granted to the South; comprising of sixty cultural and linguistic groups (USIP 2011).

However, the conflict that erupted barely two years after their independence shocked the

world. The President Salva Kiir, who is from the Dinka tribe and Reik Machar from the Nuer

tribe are using the historical ethnic rivalry to pull the communities into their personal feud.

Their act, however, gave the impression that the cause of the South Sudan conflict is

basically ethnic rivalry. The conflict sparked an international outcry as to why conflict

should arise in South Sudan despite the fact that they have been fighting to achieve peace for

a very long time. Therefore, this research attempts to investigate and analyse the root causes

of the conflict in South Sudan.


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1.2 Statement of the Problem

This dissertation attempts to answer three questions. Firstly, this dissertation tackles why

there is conflict in the young sovereign state shortly after gaining its independence. Although

the South Sudan conflict is obviously an ethnic conflict this research will investigate and

determine the primary causes of the conflict. In establishing the primary causes of the

conflict, this work will examine and analyse the degree of their impacts on the South Sudan

population. This work will establish how South Sudan can overcome these issues before the

young state is categorised as a failed state.

1.3 Objective of the Study

To investigate and analyse the root causes of the ongoing conflict in South Sudan.

1.4 Aims of the Study

• To analyse how South Sudan’s policy option of reconstruction contributed to the

conflict

• To analyse the power struggle amongst the political elites in contributing to South

Sudan’s conflict

• To investigate conspiracies concerning Sudan’s involvement in the South Sudan’s

conflict

• To analyse the negligence of the international community and how it has helped fuel

the conflict.

1.5 Methodology of Data Collection

The approach used in writing this qualitative research includes the use of secondary sources.

This involves references to books, chapters in books, and journal articles from Coventry

University’s Lanchester Library and also the University of Birmingham’s online Library. In

writing this research work, internationally acknowledged academic journal articles such as

The African Symposium, The Forum, Organisation for Economic Cooperation and

Development (OECD), United States Institute of Peace, Institute of Security Studies and

African Affairs was consulted to give this research its due credibility. This research work

also made use of journals of South Sudan think- tanks like the Sudd Institute journal. This

journal was able to provide an insider’s view into the South Sudan’s conflict. The Human

Security Baseline Assessment for South Sudan (HSBA) is an internationally acknowledged

project in South Sudan which was able to give empirical evidence concerning the armed

violence in South Sudan. This work also made use of academic articles such as The Guardian


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and Foreign Affairs. In complementing this research, this work made use of sources such as

the BBC, Aljazeera, Reuters, and New York Times.

Due to the uniqueness and the limited availability of information, I consulted internet sources

for informed opinion. I also complemented the internet sources with local online newspapers

from South Sudan like the South Sudan News Agency, Sudan Tribune, and Pambazuka News.

These newspapers proved to be very informative in giving the South Sudan’s perspective of

the causes of the conflict.


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CHAPTER TWO

SOUTH SUDAN UNRAVELED BECAUSE NATION BUILDING WAS

RELATIVELY NEGLECTED

2.1 Introduction

The independence proclamation of South Sudan as a national government has its

responsibilities and that includes taking control of the new country’s public administration

and development management (Jok 2011). The Professor of African Studies in the

department of History at Loyola Marymount University, Jok Madut Jok asserts that

a viable South Sudan has to stand on four strong pillars; Political unity, a disciplined military, quick and equitable service delivery and a vibrant civil society (2011: 1).

Jok raised some inherent factors that might hinder the youngest sovereign state from

achieving its goals which are:

poor infrastructures, a volatile political climate, limited capacity for governance, weak state institutions, financial crises, violent ethnic divisions and an uncertain regional and international political atmosphere (2011:2).

The South Sudan Development Plan for 2011 till 2013 stated that Tribal Animosity is the

greatest threat to the development of South Sudan. Yet despite these warnings about ‘violent

ethnic divisions’ and ‘tribal animosity’, an assessment was conducted by the Sudan’s People

Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A), the Government of Sudan (GoS) and the World

Bank concerning the top development priorities for South Sudan and they concluded that the

most important development project was developing institutional infrastructure for better

governance (Larson et al 2013: 9). Dr. Nicolas Lemay- Herbert, a senior lecturer of the

department of International Development in the University of Birmingham contends against

not assessing the state of ethnic divisions in as a state before embarking on institutional

projects by stating that

The paradox of attempting to reconstruct state institutions without considering the socio-political cohesion of societies recurs throughout the world most notably today in the Middle-East, Africa and the Balkans (2014: 89).


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Furthermore, Lemay-Herbert criticizes the governments that concentrate more on state-

building projects instead of addressing the fundamental problems that stagnates the

development programmes in those states. Dr Lemay-Herbert contends that most governments

in Africa believe that satisfying the immediate needs of the people is a way to achieve unity;

that as long as they give them what they want, peace can be established. In his view,

constructing state institutions is not enough in achieving state political cohesion. The head of

the UN Development Programme and former prime minister of New Zealand, Helen Clark

holds a similar view. She argues that

The chaos in South Sudan should not have come as a surprise after donors sought to build a state without addressing its more profound problems of internal conflict and political reconciliation (2014: 2).

Her criticism is based on the fact that donors with the full support of the GoSS believe that

building infrastructures will help achieve peace thereby neglecting the fundamental problems

such as ethnic rivalry. The present violence in South Sudan is history merely repeating itself.

Whilst the declaration of independence has made South Sudan a state, it has not made it

automatically a unified nation. It is still very much a territory comprising of many ethnic

groups who see themselves as rivals and not as co-citizens. Indeed many South Sudanese

complain that they feel exempted from the government that makes keys decisions (Jok

2011:4).

This chapter will explore further the argument that one of the major reasons why South

Sudan plunged into another civil war on the 15th of October, 2013 was that donors and the

government devoted most of their resources to state-building while neglecting nation-

building.

2.2 South Sudan’s Options of Reconstruction: State-building and Nation-building

At independence, South Sudan had two policy options of reconstruction: state-building and

nation-building. There is question as to whether the GoSS understands the difference between

the two policy options and the consequences of following one rather than the other.

Research of what is meant by the two policy options of state-building and nation-building

shows there are no universally agreed definitions on state-building and nation- building, this

dissertation has however been able to highlight clear analysis of definitions given by some

scholars on state-building. A political scientist, Professor Samson Wassara indicates that


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State-building provides for the construction of functional institutions of control over a defined territory, to hold the monopoly of power over economic, political and social structures. (2013:41)

Likewise, an American political scientist and economist, Dr Francis Fukuyama purports that

‘State- building is the creation of new government institutions and the strengthening of new

ones’ (2005:xvii). The definitions given by Professor Wassara and Dr Fukuyama indicates

that state-building is narrowly focused on institutions. However, this dissertation prefers the

wider definition offered by the OECD that state-building is the

purposeful action to develop the capacity, institutions and legitimacy of the state in relation to an effective political process for negotiating the mutual demands between state and societal groups (2008:14).

The OECD’S perspective of state-building is perhaps better because it highlights that the

state goes beyond formal institutions but by also strengthening its capacity to rule the nation

and its legitimacy as a state through such things as legislation, effective service delivery,

marginalising non-state actors.

George Omondi, of the Maastricht Graduate School of Governance highlights the policy and

development planning of South Sudan. The development planning of South Sudan was

categorised according to short, medium and long term priorities. In the short term, the GoSS

plan was to focus on humanitarian crisis in order to alleviate the crises resulting from the

return of the South Sudanese from the Northern Sudan after the referendum. The plan was to

build public facilities and basic infrastructure so as to boost economic activities.

Establishment of elementary state features like national currency, interim constitution, and

diplomatic accreditation are also formed part of the short term priority. The medium priority

of developing South Sudan entailed economic recovery and socio-political stability. Lastly,

the long term priority of the GoSS was formulating development visions based on sustainable

trajectories of growth (2013:2). This appears to verify that the subject of promoting ethnic

cohesion was excluded in the priorities for development planning of South Sudan.

Though some scholars have tried to argue that there is little distinction between state-building

and nation-building, most scholars however disagree. In contrast to state-building, nation-

building can be understood in a different context. Professor Jochen Hippler, a political


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analyst and a researcher at the institute of Development and Peace at the University of

Diusburg- Essen defines nation-building as

a process of socio-political development, which ideally- usually over a longer historical span-allows initially loosely linked communities to become a common society with a nation-state corresponding to it (2005:6).

Hippler infers that nation-building involves different instruments such as ‘economic

integration, political centralisation, bureaucratic control, military conquest or subjugation,

creation of common interest, democratisation and establishment of common citizenship or

repression and acts of ethnic cleansing’ (2005:6). Likewise, Charles Call, who is an Assistant

Professor of Peace and Conflict Resolution alongside Ambassador Elizabeth Cousens, a U.S.

representative of the UN Economic and Social Council gives the definition of nation-

building. They define

Nation-building as actions undertaken usually by national actors, to forge a sense of common nationhood, usually in order to overcome ethnic, sectarian, or communal differences; usually to counter alternate sources of identity and loyalty (2007:3).

In other words, Call and Cousens argue that nation- building is trying to create a shared

identity among people that at present see themselves as distinct and even as rivals. It typically

includes ‘flag-waving’ propaganda, national events and major development projects.

Meanwhile, Dr Nicolas Lemay-Herbert argues that state-building is solely the reconstruction

of the institutions while nation building is the process of constructing a new national identity.

In other words, nation-building and state-building are different and they is no way they can

be used interchangeably.

Call (2008:5) maintains that state-building is undertaken by ‘international or national actors

to establish, reform, or strengthen the institutions of the state and their relation to society.’

While Nation-building involves

actions undertaken, usually by national actors, to forge a sense of common nationhood (1) to overcome ethnic, sectarian, or communal differences; 2) to counter alternate sources of identity and loyalty; and (3) to mobilize a population behind a parallel State-building project. (2008:5)


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The first distinction Call highlighted corresponds with Lemay Herbert’s distinction that state-

building involves constructing new infrastructures that will help ease the smooth running of

the state. Also, nation-building is the purposeful action of the government in fostering

national unity in a multi ethnic society like South Sudan. The second distinction is that state-

building is undertaken by national actors with the aid of foreign bodies such as the UN and

the EU. Though, the US ambassador to the EU, James Dobbins et al argues that ‘Nation-

building always requires the integration of national and international effort’ (2007: xxii).

However, it could be deduced from the above that the international donor’s capability is

limited and the bulk of the responsibility of fostering national unity still lies with the GoSS.

Jok (2011:3-4) highlights that the citizens of South Sudan indicated factors that will threaten

the country’s transformation into statehood. Those factors are

tribalism, nepotism, corruption, exclusion on ethnic age or gender bases, lack of meritocracy in hiring and the lack of a respectable constitution that spells out a clear social contract between government and citizens’. ‘The people of South Sudan began to realize that the ethnic composition of the country could be a liability if it is not carefully managed. (2011:3)

Becoming a nation exposed the citizens to the gap in their differences. They realized that the

ethnic composition of the country would pose as a problem for them if it is not properly

managed by the GoSS. The Rift Valley Institute and the University’s Center for Peace and

Development Studies recognized the need to educate the South Sudanese on the differences

between the concept of state-building and nation-building so as to avert chaos. Therefore,

series of lectures were organised. The lectures focused on the topic Culture and Nation in

South Sudan. The lectures enlightened the South Sudan citizens and therefore raised a lot of

questions on the viability of South Sudan as a nation. It dealt with the role of cultural

diversity in development. On this note, Jok therefore asserts that

most people are aware of the distinction between nation building and state building, understanding that they are related but different projects, and the idea of nation building is a concern of everyone throughout South Sudan. (2011:4)

Thus, it infers that when nation-building is being discussed in South Sudan, they are referring

to a national political project that would foster national cohesion and a collective national

identity in the bid to prevent ethnic discord.


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2.3 The Actual Policies Chosen by the GoSS and Donors

The theme for South Sudan’s development plan from 2011- 2013 is ‘Realising Freedom,

Equality, Justice and Peace and Prosperity for all’. Based on this theme, South Sudan’s key

national objectives were centred on nation-building and state-building. The South Sudan’s

Development Plan consists of four main pillars and they include Good governance, Increased

Prosperity, Enhanced quality of life and Safety and Security.

Lacher (2012:3) affirms that across South Sudan, there has been infrastructural development.

Students now attend newly constructed schools, women give birth to new-borns in new rural

health clinics; Mobile phones are easily accessible in the outdoor markets for youths. Also,

there has been a drastic change in the capital Juba, new ministry buildings have been

constructed for the new government of South Sudan, and also new solar-powered streets

lamps have been erected for easy transportation in the night. This gave rise to Jok’s assertion

that ‘The government of South Sudan and its development partners appear to be heavily

focused on state-building and less so on nation-building’ (2011:1).

The civil war before independence left the state incapable of performing their duties so

construction of public institutions brought relief to the people. But, improvement on

infrastructures does not dim the fact that the country still battles corruption, insecurity,

political instability and ethnic rivalry. Before the civil war began, Jok attested to the fact that

South Sudan was divided because of the diversity in ethnicity, culture and language which

would create problems for the young country.

It can be argued that the GoSS would have at one point tried to address nation-building. This

is evident in the UNESCO culture programme for South Sudan. It has been working closely

with the ministry of culture, youth, and sports to help them realize their plans for developing

cultural institutions which will be key elements of their work to build an inclusive nation. In

Jok’s journal Mapping the Sources of Conflict and Insecurity in South Sudan, he confirms

that the government of South Sudan has tried on many occasions to confront the ethnic

rivalry ravaging the young country. They tried tackling the ethnic rivalry by using the police

to provide security and disarming the armed civilians. He claims that the initiative turned out

to be unsuccessful because the police are ill-trained and poorly equipped. It resulted in the

police being attacked by the tribal militias who are always more equipped than the police

force. As a result of the failure of the use of police force in tackling the ethnic violence, the

government of South Sudan deployed the army to break up the ethnic feuds. (2013: 6)


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Notwithstanding the fact that the GoSS tried tackling ethnic rivalry, Jok criticizes the

government for taking the approach in the deployment of the army amongst civilians as this

can result in the remilitarization of the society. The GoSS action of the deployment of army

amongst the civilians has also made the citizens of South Sudan mistrust the state’s ability in

building a unified nation. In other words, the GoSS tried tackling ethnic rivalry but based on

the evidence given, clearly they failed. This prompted Wassara to conclude that nation-

building in South Sudan is a very difficult task because the government encountered a host of

setbacks when trying to tackle ethnic rivalry. Based on Jok’s criticism, the GoSS method of

handling ethnic rival was not the best and unfortunately they gave up the fight easily.

Possibly, the ethnic rivalry can still be tackled, if only the GoSS can take it more seriously.

The international donors also had their responsibility in helping South Sudan achieve its

Development Plan. Wolfram Lacher, an associate fellow at the German Institute for

International and Security Affairs maintains that

The key objective of external support is to stabilise a state that is emerging from decades of civil war, riven by internal conflict and marred by underdevelopment. Donors are hoping to prevent South Sudan from imploding under its internal tensions and to preclude further destabilisation of the conflict- ridden region. (2012: 5)

He implies that the international donors clearly went to South Sudan with a specific agenda in

building a state free from chaos. Evidently, the international donors went to South Sudan to

help build a nation but clearly their plans must have been derailed. Larson et al asserts that

context was largely overlooked during the South Sudan’s crucial interim period and after independence in order to pursue the international donor’s preferred state building agenda (2013:9).

This suggests that the international donors concluded that South Sudan being a post conflict

state, needed to portray the characteristics of a ‘modern state’ and in achieving this they have

to give state building maximum attention. In agreement with Larson et al, they overlooked

the context of South Sudan which is a multi- ethnic society that has known nothing but war

for over 50 years. Their failure to tackle these fundamental problems plunged the country into

civil war thereby causing a major setback in their state building agenda for Sudan. Lacher

affirms that

Donor’s experiences to date suggest that international support for state-building and stabilisation in South Sudan


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has not only failed but has often had unintended or even counterproductive consequences. (2012:6)

The unintended or even counter-productive consequence implies the triggering of ethnic

violence in the society

2.4 Assessment of South Sudan’s Policy Choice in the Light of Historical Realities and

Contemporary Context.

Khalif Mustafa Medani, an associate professor of political science at McGill University,

Canada considers that there should be an evaluation of procedures the government of South

Sudan and the international community have undertaken to prevent the ethnic rivalry between

the two largest ethnic groups: the Dinka and the Nuer or if they have simply neglected ethnic

diversity then face the consequences (2014). In South Sudan, ethnic diversity was not

considered as an issue because the government and international leaders were more interested

in building a state therefore they are currently scrambling to exercise damage control due to

their poor judgement.

Golding (2014) maintains that the conflict in South Sudan is deeply rooted in history. He

claims that the tribes in South Sudan have always had hostilities towards one another and it

has developed into mistrust and rivalry which has therefore complicated the political

trajectory of South Sudan. The research professor and executive director of world peace

foundation, Alex de Waal alongside the chief of staff of the African Union High-level

Implementation panel for Sudan and South, Abdul Mohammed (2014: 2) stated that though

John Garang, the SPLM leader promoted a socially equitable Sudan, the SPLM depended so

much on appeals to racial and ethnic solidarity. They later came to regret this method of

cohesion among the SPLM as it resulted in the movement splitting along ethnic lines. The

setback and split occurred when Lam Akol, a South Sudanese Politician of Shilluk descent

and Reik Machar, the SPLM/A’s rebel leader from the Nuer tribe disagreed with the

objectives of John Garang. The split occurred when Akol published a document titled Why

Garang Must Go. Machar and Akol made the public aware of the split which was later

known as the Nasir declaration. The SPLA-Nasir declared a coup which John Garang

denounced. The two factions of the SPLA that divided fought against each other and there

was a lot of bloodshed (PaanLuel Wel 2011).


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The Khartoum government has been trying to instigate ethnic violence among the southerners

and so due to the poor judgement of the SPLM, they were able to succeed (Sudan Tribune

2011). In the 1990s, most of the fighting was among the southerners and thousands of people

in South Sudan died through bloodshed and famine. ‘In the end, the policies of the

Khartoum’s Arabization and Islamization policies to create a unified Arab- Islamic Sudanese

identity and these policies only served to enhance the South’s consciousness as a distinct

entity, and secession appeared as the only solution’ (Jacon et al 2012: 522). The distinct

entity as implied was that their cooperation was based on the struggle for independence.

However, Khartoum’s actions compounded the ethnic issues in the South. Jok (2011:9)

argues that ‘So far, the unity of purpose that kept the South together as a political entity has

been in a sense, a negative unity, driven by opposition to the North’. He opines that the

struggle against the North for independence served as the only historical unification for the

South Sudanese. Since the independence has been granted, the people have had a chance to

assess themselves and discovered the huge gap in their differences. The report given by the

United States Institute of Peace (2011) posits that after independence in South Sudan, the

people believed more in their tribal and religious organizations than the national government

of South Sudan. It is argued that these are major motivators of conflict in a multi ethnic

society like South Sudan. Political powers in South Sudan view the ethnic rivalry as an

opportunity to exploit their political ambitions.

2.5 Conclusion

In analysing the failures of the GoSS and the International community in tackling nation-

building, it is evident that they were aware of the warning signals that South Sudan might

implode due to internal tensions in which ethnic rivalry was a major concern. Evidence has

shown that the Government of South Sudan has attempted to tackle ethnic rivalry which is a

major component of nation building, so it is fair to conclude that nation-building was

relatively neglected and major priority was placed on state-building.

In agreement with Collier’s (2009) argument that nation-building should be used to promote

state-building and not the other way round. Lacher (2012:6) argues that ‘In view of the frail

prospects of success and unpredictable consequences of external support, donors should

significantly scale down their ambitions in South Sudan’. It can be deduced that the

international donors were impatient in evaluating the context of South Sudan before making

huge investments. He clarifies that though supporting the development of health, education


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and state infrastructure is very important in the implementation of day to day activities in the

state, the international donors should have made their donations conditional for South Sudan.

Perhaps, this would have helped South Sudan maintain national unity. The international

community cannot be blamed entirely for the lack of national cohesion in South Sudan as that

responsibility lies solely with the Government of South Sudan.


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CHAPTER THREE

THE INAPPROPRIATE POLITICAL STRUCTURE OF THE SPLM AS A

CONTRIBUTING FACTOR TO SOUTH SUDAN’S CONFLICT

3.1 Introduction

The conflict that started on the 15th of December 2013 in South Sudan barely three years after

its independence was primarily triggered by the political crisis within the South Sudanese

People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM). This occurred partly as a result of President Salva

Kiir dissolving his entire cabinet on 3rd July 2013. It included the dismissal of the Vice

President, Riek Machar and the suspension of the SPLM’s Secretary General, Pagan Amum

(The Sudd Institute 2014:1). Mehari Taddele Maru, an international Consultant on African

Union Affairs maintains that it was this dismissal that sparked an armed confrontation at the

presidential palace between the army officials loyal to the president and soldiers in support of

the former vice president, Reik Machar which deteriorated into the civil war (2013:1).

Historically, the SPLM became the political wing of the Sudan People’s Liberation Army

(SPLA) in 1983. The SPLM was a key political opponent of the oppressive Sudan

government during the second Sudanese civil war and its major goal was to bring about

and/or influence a regime change. The politics of the SPLM was exclusively handled by an

army colonel, John Garang, who became its commander-in-chief. On the 9th of January 2005,

the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) was signed between the SPLM and the

Government of Sudan and since then the SPLA/M has developed from being a guerrilla

movement to a political party (SPLM 2014).

A researcher at the Berghof Center for Conflict Management, Veronique Dudouet, asserts that

the transition from armed resistance to conventional politics requires adopting a new political culture, formulating a new programme, installing party organisational structures, recruiting party cadres and building their capacity to govern (2009:38).

This infers that the transformation of a guerrilla movement is a herculean task. In Dudouet’s

opinion for any liberation movement to become successful in conventional politics, the

movement must be able to fulfil the requirements highlighted. However, based on the latest

developments within the SPLM, the political party has not portrayed the traits of a


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transformed guerrilla movement to a political party. Therefore, this chapter argues that this

lack of reformation by the SPLM is one of the contributing factors to the current conflict.

3.2 Liberation Movement Vs Political Party

To understand the gulf that the SPLM had to make from liberation movement to political

party, it is worth reflecting on the very different characteristics of the liberation movement

and the political party. Professor of International Law Nalino Ronzitti defines the liberation

movement thus;

War of national Liberation means the armed struggle waged by a people through its liberation movement against the established government to reach self-determination. The definition is primarily intended to cover (i) the struggles of the people under colonial rule (ii) the struggles of the people against a government which though not colonial or racist, is nevertheless not conducting itself according to the principle of equal rights and self-determination as embodied in the U.N. Declaration on Friendly Relations. The Biafran, Bangladesh and Palestinian conflicts characterize a type (iii) situation (1991:184).

Likewise, Dr. Jeff Sluka who is an Associate Professor in the Social Anthropology

Programme of Massey University purports that

peoples movements seeking freedom, independence, and/or autonomy from what are perceived as oppressive and usually "alien" regimes. They are popular movements supported by whole communities of subjugated people, and depend on the active support of the population, mobilized by a revolutionary party or organisation. (1996:7).

The author of Election and Party Systems in the Commonwealth Caribbean, Patrick A.

Emmanuel defines a political party as

an association of people under a specific name whose primary purposes are the achievement and exercise of governmental power. To ensure governmental power there is regularly held elections and the successful party will receive this ultimate power. The success of a political party is characterised by: the leadership; the structure and organization combined with features of charisma or rational-legality; ideology and plans espoused from time to time through their manifesto (1992).

Firstly, they agree on some policies that will benefit the society. Secondly, though they may

express different views, they utilise the element of persuasion to make others believe in their

policies. Thirdly, they gain popular support by seeking to implement these policies. Fourthly,


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the party system reflects the political divisions in the country. Lastly, a political party is

known based on their policies.

Liberation movements therefore are very different organisations from political parties, it is

clear that there is a vast difference between the two concepts. The liberation movement has to

do with purposeful protests for liberation from an oppressive government and it is often

characterised with armed violence. In contrast, political parties are more persuasive in nature.

They make others believe in their policies by persuading them and it is obviously free from

violence.

Concerning the traits the SPLM is exhibiting, Paula Cristine Roque, a researcher on Conflict

Analysis at the Oxford Department of International Development argues that

The behavioural DNA of the revolution and liberation struggle is still very much present within the SPLM. During the war, the SPLM’s High Command controlled the political party. The SPLM has not yet undergone a complete transformation from national liberation movement to political party (2012:68).

Roque’s argument suggests that even after South Sudan got their independence, they had still

not transformed from the liberation movement because of the traits the ruling class exhibited.

The Sudd Institute describes the impact of the SPLM’s internal crisis on the citizens by

stating that

The eruption of this unconscionable military confrontation, which has clearly inflicted untold suffering and destruction

on innocent citizenry in terms of lives lost, their way of life, individual and social relations, and certainly not to mention damage to property, showcases in great measure the inexcusable failure of collective leadership on the part of those entrusted, top-leveled stewards (2014:12). The failure of the leaders of South Sudan in managing their political differences in a

constructive manner caused the conflict to escalate. The Political Analyst, Abraham Awolich

confirms that ‘The Political crisis in the party is deeply rooted in the party’s incomplete

democratisation and transformation process’ (2013:9). In the same way, Maru argues that the

internal crisis of the SPLM was ‘borne out of a post-independence political indulgence and

inclination marked by the absence of any credible and meaningful reform’ (2013).

Roque maintains that when the SPLM was still a liberation movement, it used its military

strategies and was able to defeat the Sudan forces but what is needed in the post-civil war era

is the employment of political strategies in tackling the most difficult phase of liberation -


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which is nation-building and state-building (2012:68). Maru explains that the reason why the

tactics of the liberation movement will not yield results is because ‘during the armed struggle

for independence, the glue that kept the various divergent forces of the SPLM intact was their

common enemy in Khartoum and their aspiration for self-determination and independence’

(2013). However, he claims that at present

the glue is not strong enough to hold all divergent views together, and the SPLM is no longer a liberation movement. It is a ruling party, and as such should behave democratically to allow the South Sudanese people to exercise all the rights for which they fought (2013).

Considering all these arguments by Roque and Maru, it is clear that the SPLM, which was

founded on one purpose, namely to fight for liberation, has now with independence achieved

lost that ‘sense of purpose’. Having become the ruling party, they have to find another

common purpose to be able to achieve cohesion in South Sudan.

3.3 The Importance of Reforming the SPLM

Although there are debates on how the importance of a party reform will resolve the current

conflict in South Sudan, Roque argues that

addressing the leadership struggle through a power-sharing agreement and installing mechanisms to rebuild the state while dealing with governance problems may stop the main conflict and pave the way for peace (2014:3).

Without this, Dudouet fears that

if former guerrilla leaders are unable to participate in decision making and remain confirmed to working in a system of majoritarian “winner-takes-it-all” democracy, this might create internal discontent. (2009:39).

Furthermore, Roque maintains that for any post conflict country to make a peaceful

transition, there has to be a reformation within the governing part (2014:3). Roque notes that

the ‘the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) of 2005 did not help. It prepared the

political transition, but ‘made no mention of the need to internally reform the SPLM’s party

structures’ (2014:3). It attempted to establish democratic rules without first assessing if the


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internal party systems could accommodate democratic procedures. Furthermore, Roques

reinforces her argument on the importance of reforming the SPLM by arguing that

states are built, institutions reconstructed and developments initiated, but without the organisational structure of a political party to manage the contradictory and volatile processes of nation building, all other initiatives will remain fragile. A party that is accountable to its structures operates in a transparent way and respects the allocationof authority within its ranks will be better positioned to build sustainable peace and will not easily circumvent democratic procedure and electoral politics (2014:3).

The argument is persuasive that in order to ensure sustainable peace in South Sudan there has

to be a reformation of the SPLM. As a liberation movement, the SPLM obviously did a great

job by securing the liberation of the people of South Sudan. Nevertheless, it does not

guarantee that they can ensure cohesion and sustainable peace in the new country with the

liberation mentality. This is why they have to transform fully into a political party to meet the

needs of the people.

3.4 The SPLM’s Failure to Transform This section analyses the reasons as to why the SPLM has failed to transform itself from

being a liberation movement to a political party system. Roque (2014:3) argues that there are

four factors. The first factor is the persistence of a military mindset. The Senior Advisor and

Director Emeritus of the Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation, Henning Melber purports that

When Liberation movements take power, their governments are often marked by military mindsets, categorising people as winners and losers and operating along the lines of command and obedience (2008).

In the context of South Sudan, the Sudd Institute asserts that ‘Despite the signing of the CPA

and subsequently becoming a ruling party, the SPLM seems to have maintained its pre-CPA

politico-military high command hierarchy’ (2014:6). In 2005, when the SPLM led the

national government, positions such as the president, vice president and the speaker of the

National Legislative Assembly were based on seniority in the movement. This explains why

the SPLM party officials working with the government prefer to use their military titles

instead of the designations of their current position in the government (Awolich and Akol

2013: 3).


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After the untimely death of Dr. John Garang in 2005, it was considered a wise decision to

maintain the discipline, order and strategic vision he had instilled in the SPLM and that

entailed maintaining the structure and hierarchy of the army. The structure appeared to have

been successful when the SPLM was still a liberation movement but it is posing as a great

challenge now that it is a political party. Awolich and Akol contend that the ‘civilian

leadership should be built on individual aspirations, experience, merits, and integrity’

(2013:4). However, the decision of the SPLM leaders to keep a military structure is opposed

to the values of democracy and it also reveals that due to the hierarchical structure, officials

can only assess leadership by seniority. Hence, the senior researcher at PRIO and area

specialist for East Africa and the Horn of Africa, Oystein Rolandsen contends that the ‘SPLM

has to change its current configuration as an all-encompassing political movement and

become a political party’ (2007:6).

Professor Christopher Clapham presents an optimistic view by arguing that ‘Virtually all

liberation movements have experienced considerable difficulties in actually making the

transition from struggle to government’ (2012:4) but that as the new regime settles into

office, they come to terms with the fact that ‘running a liberation struggle is a different kind

of exercise from running a government’ because they bring into government the ideals that

shaped their struggle (2012:8).

Samson Wassara, Professor of Political Science at the University of Juba asserts that ‘the

logic of militarism dominated the attitudes of actors on the political stage such as those who

are not with us and have taken up weapons should be crushed militarily’. Furthermore,

Wassara claims that the idea of ‘militarism dominated political discourses with strong support

of political groups’ (2014:1). Likewise, Lauren Hutton, the Research Fellow with the Conflict

Research Unit argues that the ‘depth of militarisation dominates decision making spaces and

tendencies in South Sudan (2014:8).

Secondly, the SPLM failed to transform itself because ‘the operational aspects of

distinguishing the state and the party, and the governance of who should lead who, have been

blurred’ (Roque/Lauren Hutton 2014:3).

The third factor deals with the lack of institutionalisation of the party. Wassara, argues that

the failure of institutionalization of the political system is one of the foundational cause of the

conflict in South Sudan (2014:1). Roque argues that ‘the structure exists, but the party organs


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meet only sporadically and certain individual and key interests eclipse the ability of these

structures to operate independently’ (2014:3).

The fourth factor according to Roque is that ‘ the party is still grappling with divisions among

its elites, especially over the vision/ideology of the SPLM, which has become cemented into

different camps with opposing ideas of how the party should be acting’(2014:3). And how the

party is run is how the government is managed. The Sudd Institute maintains that ‘the

constitution of the SPLM stipulates that the party chairman is its flag bearer for presidential

elections, a position that guarantees one to ultimately become president of South Sudan.

Therefore, the fight within the SPLM is essentially a fight over national power. Given that the

SPLM’s constitution does not allow for free contest for power within the party, the top

political elites do not have much choice because leaving the SPLM is not a winning

proposition, so internal struggle for power is inevitable (2014:9). The SPLM’s internal

struggle has further divided the party into three factions which are President Kiir’s faction,

Machar’s SPLM-in-opposition, and the reformers’ SPLM-in-detention faction.

Roque states that ‘President Kiir’s faction includes key leaders of the SPLM such as Kuol

Maynyang, Daniel Awet and Micheal Makwe: ‘third-level’ SPLM leadership members (Aleu

Anyang Aleu and Telar Den, among others); and former National Congress Party (NCP)

members such as Riek Gai and Tor Deng Mawien’ (2014:4). Other SPLM leaders accused

the men close to the president of causing anarchy within the party. They maintain that the

purpose of causing the internal conflict is to ‘maintain their political relevance within the

party’ (2014:4). However, their actions have caused mistrust amongst the SPLM/A leaders.

The ‘SPLM-in-Opposition’ which is led by the former vice president Riek Machar constitute

of the allies that defected with him in 1991. The Human Security Baseline Assessment for

Sudan and South Sudan criticizes that

Its goals are not well articulated. In interviews, Machar has referred to liberating South Sudan from Salva Kiir in order to achieve democratization and equality in the SPLM and in South Sudan, while denying that he is motivated by personal political interests. In reality, the politicians associated with the opposition are motivated by a combination of a desire for political reform, securing of political positions, and—critically among the majority Nuer contingent—revenge or justice for the December killings in Juba. (2014:1)


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The last faction of the SPLM who are known as the Reformers or ‘The SPLM-in-Detention’

is headed by the former SPLM’s secretary general Pagan Amum and its members constitute

of several Key SPLM leaders who were detained during the liberation struggle and they

include members such as Madam Rebecca Nyandeng (John Garang’s widow) among others.

Roque (2014:4) states that the members of this faction were not part of the rebellion and they

have multi ethnic and multi-regional backgrounds. This faction believes that ‘ The SPLM has

lost its way and the internal reform is the only option to recalibrate what has become a failed

nation-and state-building enterprise’ Therefore, their main goal is to take the lead in

mediating between the other two SPLM faction and also facilitate the party’s new peace

agreement. (2014:4)

All these factions cannot operate alone because they do not have the capacity to lead a reform

process and also govern the country. Nevertheless, the reformer’s faction appears to be the

most balanced faction and has not been tainted by the war and the best hope might lie with

them

3.5 SPLM’s History of Internal Conflict

These internal political conflicts are not new to the SPLM as they have had a long history of

internal tensions before they came into power. The Sudd Institute also confirms that ‘the

internal crises within the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement and Army (SPLM/A) are as

old as the institution itself’ (2014:2). The executive director of the world peace Foundation at

Tufts University, Professor Alex de Waal and the chief of the implementation Panel for

Sudan and South Sudan, Abdul Mohammed purport that ‘Since before independence in July

2011, the SPLM leadership has been split several ways’. Likewise, Roque (2012:68)

maintains that ‘Since its inception in 1983, the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement /Army)

has undergone several important changes and survived ideological contradictions and deep

internal fissures’.

The political crisis of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement started since 1991. Waal and

Mohammed (2014:2) highlight that there was a devastating war between the SPLM’S ethnic

groups in 1991. Likewise, Roque asserts that ‘The SPLM faced its first serious defections in

1991 (2014:5). Reik Machar, a former rebel leader of the SPLM and Lam Akol, a member of

the SPLM defected from the SPLM because of their grievance that John Garang’s (the SPLM

leader) method of ruling had become authoritarian and personalised. They also expressed that

the high command had failed to establish an effective and democratic system. Hence, the


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SPLM split into two factions and the defected group became the SPLM- Nasir faction. The

Nasir faction advocated for the secession of the South. Waal and Mohammed (2014: 2)

argued that the defection in 1991 divided the SPLM and the movement never recovered from

the split. They also assert that ‘Though the SPLM survived, it did so as a profoundly

dysfunctional coalition that papered over deep cracks. It never developed party institutions,

discipline or a social agenda for the areas under its control’ (2014:2). Roque (2014:5) also

agrees that the though ‘the party vision was refined, a governance programme defined, and

the party structures created. However, many important issues remained unaddressed’.

The SPLM faced its second internal crisis in 2004 during the final stage of the CPA. The

crisis is famously known as the Rumbek crisis when Salva Kiir, a rebel leader at the time

confronted John Garang over the mismanagement of the movement and that he had turned

and personalised the movement. He made his grievance known that there was no form of

internal reflection and all processes of inclusive decision-making were ignored. Kiir liaised

with the militants to oppose John Garang militarily. Instead Reik Machar with other officials

appealed to Kiir to back down from attacking John Garang. Their intervention yielded results

as Kirr reconciled with John Garang (Roque 2014: 5).

In 2008, the SPLM experienced a wave of crisis for the third time during the CPA transition.

The SPLM held it second national convention in order to prepare for the 2010 national

elections. The party organs were reorganized and the roles of the youth and women leagues

were restored. However, Roque claims that the 2008 crisis erupted due to the fact that ‘the

delegates were not given the opportunity to debate and devise the SPLM’s new strategy, or

socio-economic and political policies for the government; and that the leadership was not

ready to be challenged. The convention was paralysed for a week while the leadership

decided who would be second in- command in the party, an issue that threatened to split the

SPLM into different power centres where some tried to ethnicise and regionalise their

positions’ (2014:5).

The latest crisis which served as a trigger to the current civil war in South Sudan started in a

meeting in March 2013 that supposedly convened to discuss the criticisms from the

grassroots. An argument erupted that caused the top politicians to trade accusations and who

to blame for the failure of the SPLM. Pagan Amum and Reik Machar openly confronted

President Salva Kiir on the apparent failure of the SPLM. A special report from the Sudd

Institute highlights that ‘Riek Machar specifically raised six points outlining the key areas in


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which he thinks the SPLM chairman, Salva Kiir had failed’ (2014:4). The confrontation led

to rifts within the political party as party officials began to publicly talk about the internal

tension within the SPLM. When the internal tension began to escalate, the president decided

to dissolve his entire cabinet and he removed everyone that posed as a threat including the

vice president Reik Machar and Pagan Amum, the SPLM secretary general. However, the

president created a new government wholly excluding all those that did not share his political

views. Based on these circumstances, the Guardian Researcher, David Smith purports that it

is the autocratic behaviour of President Kirr whereby he dismissed his cabinet based on the

fact that they pointed out his failures as the reason for the discord within the SPLM.

Nevertheless, Maru states that ‘it was not surprising that the crisis in the SPLM erupted at the

top echelon of political power’ (2013)

3.6 Conclusion

This chapter has examined the SPLM as a liberation movement and a political party. The

juxtaposition of the analysis reveals that the SPLM is still operating as a liberation movement

despite its claim as a political party. Historically, the SPLM has always been known for its

internal tensions but they remained together based on the fact that they needed to defeat a

common enemy, Sudan. Presently, the situation is reversed and they have to come to terms

with their different visions and ideologies on how the SPLM should operate. Clearly, the

SPLM has outlived its relevance as a liberation movement and for it to continue to maintain

its relevance to the people of South Sudan it has to undergo transformation in all capacities.

Alternatively, the SPLM should be dissolved in order to preserve its laudable historical

achievement of leading the people of South Sudan through secession and then give the

competing parties a chance to express their policies.


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CHAPTER FOUR

SUDAN UNDERMINING SOUTH SUDAN: A CONTRIBUTORY FACTOR TO THE

SOUTH SUDAN CONFLICT

4.1 Introduction

The South Sudan conflict’s agenda changed when rebels of the SPLM-In-Opposition led by

the former Vice President Riek Machar attacked the key oil town, Bentiu on the 29th of

October, 2014. Prior to the seizing of the oil-rich region by rebels, Riek Machar, the rebel

leader met with the Sudanese President Omar Hassan al-Bashir on the 10th of August 2014 in

Khartoum. The rebel leader maintained that the purpose of his visit to Sudan was to seek his

help in resolving the ongoing conflict in South Sudan. As a result, speculations have risen

over the questionable alliance between the rebel leader and the Sudanese President.

Evidently, the Sudan government and South Sudan government have a history of unresolved

conflicts on the issue of oil since the South seceded. James Copnall, the BBC correspondent

for Sudan and South Sudan dating from 2009 to 2012 was able to depict in his book A

Poisonous Thorn in Our Hearts: Sudan and South Sudan’s Bitter and Incomplete Divorce

that

the continued hostility between the regimes in Khartoum and Juba made it even less likely that division might solve the problems either. Despite public protestations of amity, each regime sought to undermine the other (2014).

Likewise, the Sudd Institute issued a special report on the drivers of the South Sudan conflict

and stated that there is evidently no form of trust between Sudan and South Sudan because of

their history of conflict (2014:11).

Riek Machar’s visit was motivated by his personal interest in overthrowing President Salva

Kiir’s government, but the reason he received a listening ear is because of Sudan’s

undeniable interest in undermining the new state of South Sudan and in recovering the oil

they have lost to South Sudan

The extent of the involvement of Sudan in South Sudan’s conflict has been widely debated.

Adeeb Yousif, the Executive Director of Darfur Reconciliation and Development

Organization and Daniel Rothbart, the Professor of Conflict Analysis and Resolution at


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Washington University claim that ‘The Republic of South Sudan and its Ruling Party –the

SPLM- accused Khartoum of supporting militia groups and political movements seeking to

overthrow the nascent government in Juba’ (2012:2). Likewise, Professor Justin Willis of the

Department of History at Durham University argues that the Sudanese government ‘preferred

to keep their Southern neighbour weak and unstable’ and that ‘...Khartoum was arming

insurgents who refused to accept Juba’s authority’ (2014:13). Nonetheless, these accusations

cannot be proved but this chapter will attempt to weight the evidence such as it is.

4.2 The Impact of South Sudan’s Secession on Sudan

It is imperative to understand Sudan’s stake in making South Sudan a weak state. According

to the United States Institute of Peace on Natural Resources, Conflict and Conflict

Resolution, it was argued that a nation’s access to natural resources often determines its

wealth and status in the world economic system (2007:4). The importance of oil in the

international community today symbolises power. In agreement to this assertion, Professor

Roland Dannreuther, of the University of Westminster argues that ‘Access to control of

natural resources, of which energy is the most critical, is a key ingredient of national power

and national interest’ (2010:3). He also stresses the importance of natural resources by stating

that

Much of the world’s supply of oil, and much of its new supplies Such as in Central Asia and Africa, are located in weak, fragile states with multiple inter-state disputes and conflicts and where political and religious extremism is rising. Oil wealth has the paradoxical effect of making these states more powerful international actors, due to their control of vital resources (2010:3).

Deducing from Dannreuther’s arguments, natural resources in a state accelerates growth and

recognition in the international community because of its essentiality in the modern world.

According to the U.S. Energy Information Administration, prior to the secession of South

Sudan, the production of oil which started in the 1990s, made Sudan the second-largest non-

OPEC oil producer in Africa in 2010 (2014:1). According to KPMG’S economic profile on

Sudan,

The oil sector had driven much of Sudan’s GDP growth since it began exporting oil in 1999. For nearly a decade, the economy boomed on the back of increases in oil production, high oil prices, and significant inflows of foreign direct investment (2012:2).


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Likewise, Khalid H.A Siddig, a Professor of the department of Agriculture Economics at the

University of Khartoum states that since the exploitation of oil started in the 1990s, Sudan’s

economy became strengthened based on three economic variables and they include,

The GDP, foreign trade sector, and the Central Bank of Sudan’s reports on the government’s revenue’ (2012:2). As a result, the Sudanese economy became more reliant on oil revenue than agriculture which was their main source of revenue before oil exploitation started. However, the secession of the South in July, 2011 disrupted the economic system of Sudan due to the loss of 75% of its oil revenues to South Sudan. The African Economic data on Sudan claims that ‘The GDP growth declined from 5% in 2010 to 2.8% in 2011 due to the secession of South Sudan reducing the population by about 20% and oil revenue by 75% (2012:1).

The KPMG reports that oil revenues constituted 55% of the government’s income therefore it

had exerted pressure on Sudan’s fiscal budget (2012:2). FDI in Sudan has been suspended as

a result of the sanctions imposed on the country which discourages foreign investors from

investing in Sudan’s economy. Furthermore, China which was a major importer of Sudan’s

oil, has been much more negative in its relationship since the conflict with South Sudan,

Therefore, KPMG’s report in terms of growth of Sudan highlights that, ‘Economic sanctions

against Sudan have long constrained the country’s ability to grow, but none has had the

impact that the loss of oil reserves to South Sudan has had on the economy’ (2012:1).

Presently, South Sudan’s economic policy is focused on dealing with the negative impact of

South Sudan’s secession. It is therefore very plausible that with its economy having collapsed

as a result of the South’s secession, Sudan is intent on revenge and on undermining the young

state. If it can support the rebels in successfully overthrowing President Salva Kiir’s

government, it stands to benefit from it.

Nicasius Achu Check, a Research Specialist and Security Research Programme of the Africa

Institute of South Africa and Thabani Mdlongwa, a Research Intern of the Sustainable

Development Research Programme argue that ‘the North is not ready to let the South go, and

is ready to even use force to reverse the January 2011 referendum’ (2012:4). It is quite

conceivable therefore, that they are expressing their bitterness towards the secession by a

policy of creating conflicts that will help weaken the new nation and make them lose their

credibility. The constant border disputes and now the civil war in South Sudan are clearly

distracting the young state from concentrating majorly on their state building activities.


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Professor Stefan Wolff of the Department of Political Science and International Studies at the

University of Birmingham purports that

The unresolved North-South issues are, in many ways, also at the heart of South Sudan’s wider state-building challenges, several inter-communal conflicts, political disputes, and insurgencies, a complex humanitarian crisis, and a near collapse of the economy compounded, and were exacerbated by, lack of constructive relations between the now neighbouring countries (2012:2).

Dr. Marina Ottaway, the Senior Scholar at the Woodrow Wilson Center and Mai El-Sadany,

a candidate at the Georgetown University Law Center state that the production of oil majorly

takes place below the old colonial line that separated the North from the South. This old

colonial line also served as the border where the two countries split and also the oil fields are

located close to the dividing line (2012:5). Check and Mdlongwa assert that the issue of

identity over the oil-rich region of Abyei was one of the major points that were highlighted

during the 2005 CPA agreement. In the CPA agreement, it was promised that the referendum

will decide if the Abyei territory will join the North or South alongside the vote on South

Sudan’s Independence. Though the Sudanese policy of undermining south Sudan cannot be

proved, few would deny that the referendum never took place due to the fact that the NCP of

Sudan impeding the process. It did so by rejecting the report on the Abyei Boundary

Commission because it failed to determine the original inhabitants of Abyei and who was

eligible vote in the referendum. Meanwhile, the SPLM accepted the report on the Abyei

Boundary Commission. The Sudan Government knew that they would lose the Abyei

territory based on the historical information so they rather they stalled the process of

determining the legitimacy of the Abyei territory.

Yet, Sudan underestimated the capacity of South Sudan as a strong nation believing that if

they can disrupt the processes of determining the legitimacy of the Abyei territory alongside

the independence referendum, it will be difficult for the people of South Sudan to reclaim

ownership. Nevertheless, this did not deter the South from correcting what the CPA failed to

achieve. Check and Mdlongwa state that

In order to “right” what the CPA failed to do, the South unilaterally occupied the Heglig oil region (Abyei territory). This occurred on April 10, 2012, when the South moved close to 5,000 soldiers to the disputed area, pushing its soldiers about 25km into the Republic of Sudan. (2012:4).


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It was argued that the reason why the South made the bold move was to assert their sovereign

right over the territory thereby maintaining that they are the rightful owner of the Abyei

territory. According to Check and Mdlongwa, this attempt by Sudan of weakening the young

sovereign state; South Sudan was thus aborted since

the South has built a strong and formidable army which can stand on its own against the North; by invading the Heglig oil region the South was sending a message that it was ready to take on the North militarily and assert its independence (2012:4).

In their view ‘the invasion is a clear sign that South Sudan is truly a member of the

community of nations empowered to make consequential decisions and defend its perceived

interests, regardless of where these leads’ (2012:5). When Sudan realised the military

capacity of South Sudan and its ability in exercising its sovereignty, they decided to agree on

a demilitarized zone on the border on the 27th of September, 2012. However, the agreement

to cease the border conflict did not deter Sudan from exercising other strategies. Their second

agenda was aimed at crippling South Sudan’s economy by putting pressure on their use of the

pipeline which runs through Sudan.

The U.S. Energy Information Administration cited that though ‘Most of the oil production is

now in South Sudan, but the country is landlocked and remains dependent on Sudan because

it must use Sudan’s export pipelines’. (2014:1). For South Sudan to be able to conduct any

exportation of oil from South Sudan, it has to make use of Sudan’s transportation

infrastructure to the port of Sudan. In the same way, because of the oil revenue loss, the

South Sudan government has to depend on the fee it charges the Sudan government in order

for its economy to function properly. According to Marina Ottaway and Mai-El Sadanay’s

report, they claim that in order for Sudan to recover its lost oil revenue and so as to further

weaken South Sudan ‘In October, 2011, Khartoum demanded that the South pay $32 per

barrel in transit fees for oil shipped through the pipeline to Port Sudan’. Comparing this price

with the internationally accepted fee, the industry experts claim that the accepted fee for the

transportation of oil is about $2-$3 per barrel.

The exorbitant fee charged by the government of Sudan was clearly a way of crippling the

economy of South Sudan and dominating the oil revenues. The Sudan government continued

frustrating the economy of South Sudan by illegally confiscating $815 million worth of oil

because the disagreement of the financial terms of conditions of exporting the oil. As a result,


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they were able to achieve its goal when South Sudan announced in February 2012 that it will

shut down the production of oil because of the North’s continuous impediments. Although oil

production resumed on the 12th of March, 2013, more aggravation from Sudan took pace.

South Sudan was forced to partially shut in production for a few days at Block 3 and 7 after Sudan turned off the pump station at the central processing facility in Jebelein, Sudan claimed it turned off the pump station because of technical problems, but South Sudan believes the decision was politically motivated (U.S. Energy Information Administration 2014:8).

Thirdly, according to the Guardian’s East Africa correspondent Xan Rice,

Southern Sudan has suspended talks with the northern government after accusing President Omar al-Bashir regime of arming rebel groups before the country’s split in July…Southern officials accused Bashir of using proxy forces to weaken the South and to try and topple its government before secession (2011:1).

Pagan Amum, the former secretary general of South Sudan maintained that the ‘the North

have stepped up their destabilisation of Southern Sudan by creating, training and arming and

financing various militia groups in Southern Sudan’ (2011:2). Although, according to Xan

Rice’s report Khartoum vehemently denies the allegations levelled against them for training

and arming the southern rebels. (2011:1)

Professor Eric Reeves, a full time Sudan Researcher and Analyst gave a report on the leaked

documents of high level meeting of senior military and Security officials of Sudan. The goal

of the meeting was to strategize on how to support the rebels in South Sudan (2012).

According to the minutes of the meeting, the chief of Joint General Staff 1st Lt. Gen. Hashim

Abdalla Mohammed stated that

We must change the balance of forces in South Sudan. Riek, Taban and Dhieu Mathok came and requested support in the areas of training in [Military Intelligence], and especially in Tanks and artillery. They requested armament also. They want to be given advanced weapons. Our reply was that we have no objection, provided that we agree on a common objective. Then we train and supply with the required weapons. For sure we will benefit from their discourse. (Leaked Minutes of Critical August 2014 meeting of senior military and Security Official- Eric Reeves 29 September, 2014)

The Chief Joint Staff also spoke on how their aid to the South Sudan will benefit Sudan by

stating that


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Now that Reik and Taban are fighting to achieve a federal system or self-rule for each region. I think any self-rule for Greater Upper Nile is good for us in terms of border security, oil resources and trade. Now we have to study how to enable them on a well-trained force with efficient military intelligence and logistic staff’ (Leaked Minutes of Critical August 2014 meeting of senior military and Security Official- Eric Reeves 29 September, 2014)

Likewise, the Small Arms Survey (SAS) which is an independent research project located at

the Graduate Institute of International Studies in Geneva, Switzerland conducted a research

on February, 2013 in Pibor town, Jonglei to investigate the weapons used by the South Sudan

rebels. According to the interviews that were conducted in February 2013, it was reported

that defecting militia members, including commanders, claimed the primary source of the

groups arms and ammunition were airdrops orchestrated by Sudan’s National Intelligence

and Security Service, which they claim took place between August 2012 and December 2012

(with a further drop reported after the group’s defection in January 2013). They further

claimed that a fixed-wing aircraft flew direct from Khartoum on the night of each drop.

According to the commanders, the militia groups on the ground were in direct contact with

the aircraft via satellite phone and marked each drop zone with a line of fires immediately

prior to the stop’ (2013:1).

The method of research used by the SAS researchers to uncover evidences that Sudan is

supplying South Sudan with arms includes identifying the model and calibre of the weapons,

the manufacturer/factory marks and the serial number. Arms Investigator, James Bevan

claims that he has

viewed many thousands of military weapons, held by numerous parties to armed conflicts, and have found few weapons that were not marked with a serial number (however faded or damaged). Reviews of thousands of weapons collection records also suggest that the intentional removal of serial numbers is uncommon in the context of armed conflict. The probable reason is that, in contrast to crime situations in which criminals (notably illegal sellers) may fear discovery by law enforcement officials, most combatants have little reason to believe that their weapons will be subject to investigation (2009:131).

The SAS investigators provided pictorial evidences of the ammunitions that were found with

the South Sudan rebels.


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Source: Human Security Baseline Assessment for Sudan and South Sudan (HSBA) 2013

The weapon in the image above has been observed with the South Sudan rebels. Analysing

this weapon, the serial number has been partially effaced, a tactic used to deliberately impede

investigators from tracing the source of the weapons. But the SAS researchers were able to

decode the manufacturer’s identification with the two letter code ‘UH’ as seen on the

weapon. It was discovered that the letter is followed by a set of serial numbers which are

consistent with A30 weapons. This weapon is identical to rocket launchers which are

manufactured at the Yarmouk Industrial Cooperation in Khartoum, Sudan.



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The Chinese CQ (M16-Pattern) assault rifle weapon with the 8-digit serial number 18001883

was found among the stockpile of the South Sudan rebels. Also on the pistol grip of the

weapon (second image), the model designation ‘CQ’ was also found on the weapon. The SAS

investigators assert that, ‘This type of rifle has been observed in Sudan but not in South

Sudan, where its 5.56 calibre is uncommon among assault rifles and their ammunition.’

(2013:3).

Source: Human Security Baseline Assessment for Sudan and South Sudan (HSBC)2013

According to the SAS researchers and the UN Panel of Expert, this Chinese 7.62x54Rmm

ammunition has been documented with the Sudan armed forces in Darfur but these were

found among the South Sudan rebels.


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4.3 Conclusion

This chapter undertook a critical analysis of Sudan’s action in undermining the capabilities of

South Sudan as a strong and independent nation. Based on the evidence presented during the

course of the argument, it concludes that Sudan has tried in significant ways to undermine the

sovereignty of South Sudan. Firstly, their strategy was to cause a border dispute so that it can

distract them from investing fully in their state building activities although the border dispute

succeeded in making South Sudan invest more in their military capacity to be able to defend

their territory. Secondly, they strategized on how to cripple South Sudan’s economy through

squeezing the oil revenues by control of the pipeline. Consequently, these factors contributed

in the ongoing conflict in South Sudan. The leaked minutes of the highly confidential

meeting in Sudan apparently confirms the claim that Sudan actually sponsored the SPLM-In-

Opposition led by Reik Machar because of their interests in the oil.

The assessment above perhaps, suggests that Sudan is bitter over the loss of oil revenue,

international investment and its friendly relationship with China because of the secession of

South Sudan. As long as South Sudan still holds the majority share of the oil revenue, Sudan

will continue to look for means which can be either dubious or legitimate to regain the oil

revenue.

Evidently, Sudan has tried to destroy South Sudan using external forces and they did not

really succeed but presently their tactic of using internal forces is one of the factors that are

contributing to the current conflict in South Sudan


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CHAPTER FIVE

CORRUPTION: A CONTRIBUTORY FACTOR TO THE SOUTH SUDAN

CONFLICT

5.1 Introduction The final argument of this dissertation is that corruption has contributed to South Sudan’s

failure as a state since its prevalence in government has provoked discontent and finally

rebellion. There are different definitions of corruption but in relevance to this work, the

Professor of History and Politics at the University of Mark Philips says it involves:

Degeneration, pervasion, defiling, or tainting of something So that its naturally sound condition is debased. Political Corruption involves the corruption of politics from its naturally sound condition. This is usually seen as the pervasion or destruction of integrity in the discharge of public duties, by bribery or favour, or the use or existence of corrupt practices, especially in a state department or public corporation (2001:118).

Philips’ (2001) definition has encapsulated the essence of corruption. In this definition, he

outlined the key components that portray corruption which involves the public official, the

violation of the public office, and the harm corruption will cause in the interest of the public.

He purports in his definition that in the case of corruption, the public official knowingly

exploits the office for private gains and also for the benefit of a third party. Furthermore,

corruption also describes the situation whereby an official gains access to a good or service

that deprives another official from getting that same service (2001:118).

In the context of corruption causing violent crisis, Professor Philippe LeBillon of the

University of British Columbia purports that corruption influences conflicts and it involves

large scale violence. Furthermore he states that:

In the absence of a political regime legitimating the use of public functions for private interest, such deviation is deemed to be conflictual. The more so when resource control is orchestrated along social identity fault lines defining sharp inequalities fuelling both grievances among marginalized groups and greed-driven jockeying within dominant ones (2001:5).

LeBillon’s definition contends that when there is no legal backing, the use of public function

for personal gains is regarded as corruption. This definition does not only refer to public


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funds but also functions. Similarly, Dr John Emma Vickers of the Department of Humanities

and Social Science at Liverpool John Moores University gives a more targeted definition of

corruption. This definition analyses how corruption is fuelling the ongoing conflict in South

Sudan by arguing that, ‘corruption keeps people poor, it provides the grievance necessary to

pick up a gun, and it suffocates its economic growth- depriving people of the opportunity to

do anything other than fight to survive’ (2014:3). LeBillon and Vickers’ definitions of

corruption are accurate and describe the situation in South Sudan. They both agree that

corruption creates grievances because of the sharp inequality between those misappropriating

government funds and those deprived of the funds resulting in violence. Furthermore, the

Political Analyst Oluwaseun Bamidele asserts corruption contributes to the instability and

triggers civil wars in most African countries (2013:42).

Corruption in government contributes to poverty as political leaders syphon public funds for

their personal use thereby depriving the public of funds for basic amenities. It is not

surprising if the deprived class feel the urge to do something to survive in the corrupt society

and finally turn to violence.

The accusations of corruption in government have been many. In 2013 the U4 Anti-

Corruption Expert gave a report that since South Sudan gained its independence, there have

been manifestations of corruption in various forms and it includes financial and political

corruption, patronage, pervasive tribalism and misuse of power (2013:1). According to the

Transparency International Corruption Index (CPI), South Sudan was ranked as the third

most corrupt country in the world in December 2013.

In the light of these accusations, this chapter will examine if corruption has actually

contributed to the ongoing conflict in South Sudan and retracing to history the foundation of

corruption in South Sudan will also be determined. Also, this work will analyse the role of

the international community in influencing corruption in South Sudan.

5.2 Corruption in South Sudan

On the 3 of May 2012, David Smith, the Guardian’s Africa correspondent claims that South

Sudan President Kiir accused his government ministers of embezzling $4 billion (£2.6

billion) of public funds (2012: 1). If this report is true, this substantiates the deplorable state

of corruption in South Sudan in which that much money can be stolen without restrictions.

The president is said to have lamented that after the clamour for freedom, justice and


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inequality; and to have accused his ministers of having forgotten the purpose to which they

fought for their freedom (Smith 2012:1).

This incident apparently prompted the President to launch a campaign against corruption by

adopting the “zero tolerance” policy approach. (Awolich 2013:1) He commenced his

approach by probing two senior ministers, Deng Alor and Ksoti Manibe for their apparent

illegal transfer of nearly eight million dollars without the consent of the presidency and other

relevant ministers (Awolich 2013:1). However, according leaked documents Deng Alor and

Kosti Manibe were wrongly accused (South Sudan News Agency 2013: 1). Nevertheless,

this did not deter the public from commending the ‘courage and decisiveness’ of the

President to fight corruption in South Sudan (Awolich 2013:1). The fact that Deng and Ksoti

seem to have been wrongly accused does not imply that there are no other cases of

corruption. Greg Larson et al cited a case of corruption in South Sudan whereby an

anonymous donor official distinguishes between the Real Ministry of Finance and the fake

ministry of finance. He claims that:

The fake ministry is the one working with the donors and the technical advisors on budget allocations, promoting the outward appearance of high functionality, while the Real Ministry is operated through backdoor dealings between South Sudanese officials, concealed from the donor view. As the donor official says: ‘The technical advisors help prepare budget allocations, but then The army generals wheel into the minister’s office, and they make the real allocations. (2013:21)

This type of corruption is thought rampant amongst the institutions of South Sudan and it is

feared that most government officials steal money without facing consequences. The World

Bank reports that the expenditure of the government of South Sudan on health, education and

investment is very low because of the government’s lack of budgetary discipline. (2013:16)

Waal contends that the only way cohesion can be maintained amongst the leaders of the

SPLM was to give them loosely regulated access to the South Sudan’s state funds for private

enrichment (2014:39). He argues that Kiir recognized that the political members are only in

pursuit of their personal interest therefore he made them have access to public funds with

minimal restrictions so as to maintain cohesion (2014:39). This interpretation would imply

that the President’s fight against corruption is a belated attempt to redeem society from the

corruption which he had earlier permitted. He realized that the ‘kleptocratic’ system was


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weakening the strength of the new nation and would later result in conflict thereby arguing

that ‘once there is corruption, there is insecurity’ (Waal 2014: 361).

Corruption almost certainly served as a factor as to why President Salva Kiir shut out his

‘political rivals’ i.e. government officials in South Sudan from the club of ‘kleptocrats’ where

public funds can be stolen with impunity. It was this clamping down on corruption that

resulted in conflict (2014:4). Waal and Mohammed argue that President Kiir’s dismissal of

his entire cabinet on the 24th of July, 2013 meant that those who were affected, including the

Vice President Reik Machar, could not have access to these funds. That is why they

mobilized supporters through the ethnic militias to cause conflict in South Sudan (2014:3).

Hence, Abraham Awolich of the Sudd Institute purports that the driver of the present conflict

in South Sudan is corruption. Waal describes the South Sudan system of government as

‘Kleptocratic’ in nature. He contends that

South Sudan governance is characterised by constant bargaining over positions in a governmental hierarchy. The goal of each member of the political class is to be better placed to control funds, for private use or to reward followers. The means includes threat of violence (2014:39).

In other words, the primary purpose of each member in a political party is to be better

positioned in order to gain access to funds for their private use or reward followers that

support their cause. The political leaders in question are desperate and can use any means,

whether through bribery or violence instigating tribal militias, so as to gain access to these

funds (Sudan Tribune 2013). Similarly, Waal claims that profit seeking rebellion was the way

in which army commanders or local political leaders with armed constituents assert their

rights to central authority (2014:39). Accordingly, these actions enabled the sprouting of

rebellion everywhere in the South Sudan society.

Evidently, the South Sudan government is a political market place and therefore needs skilled

political management. However, Waal argues that President Salva Kiir reputably lacks the

proper political management skills of managing the South Sudan Political marketplace. Some

argue he displayed his lack of political skill by not preventing his subordinates from going to

war with the North, thereby halting the production of oil in 2012. Funding of the war with

Sudan consumed 98% of the government’s revenue. This left little or nothing for the


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government of South Sudan to run the young state or to enrich the political elites.

Consequently, this triggered the political struggle between the political elites leading to the

South Sudan conflict when President Kiir could not sustain the government’s “kleptocratic”

nature.

5.3 Corrupt Foundation of South Sudan

Ironically the SPLM was founded in order to bring about an end of corruption in the

government of Sudan. A pattern of persistent corruption can be traced from colonial times to

the independent state of Sudan to the early days of the SPLM and then on to the South Sudan

government. It has become a culture of corruption. Historically, during colonialism the

method of governance in Sudan was administrative and militarised tribalism thereby making

it underdeveloped; this system of government categorized the southerners as inferior citizens.

However, after the independence of Sudan, the successive governments continued the trend

of treating the Southerners as second class citizens. The leaders of South Sudan were aware

of the exclusion of the South in the affairs of the country thereby recognizing the need to

advocate for equality with the North.

The SPLM was founded in order to bring about an end of corrupt government and yet as

Waal claims, the SPLM became a magnet for profit seekers (2014: 352). Likewise, the

SPLM accommodated two types of advocates for change claiming that, ‘most focused on

their racist exclusion from the spoils of government, and sought to be members of the ruling

clique on the same terms as their northern peers’ (Waal 2014:350). While the other South

Sudanese political leaders’ possessed genuine reasons for changes in the affairs of

governance in Sudan (Waal 2014:350).

Dr Peter Adwok Nyaba, a politician in South Sudan, gives an example of a case of corruption

which involves looting of food aid before the South got their independence. He states that

food rations which were meant for refugees were diverted and sold thereby contributing to

the death of thousands due to starvation and disease (1997:55). Secession was not the goal of

the SPLM when it was established instead it was a movement that advocated equality

between the Northerners and Southerners in South Sudan. In a speech by John Garang, when

he addressed the people of South Sudan shortly after the President of Sudan, Jaafar Nimeiri

was overthrown, he depicted Nimeri as the ‘monster’s head’ because he was seen by the

people of Sudan as an oppressive dictator who served as an obstacle to the progress of Sudan.


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Nimeiri’s regime was marked with the institutionalization of bribery and corruption,

depriving the South of fruitful land because he wanted to change the Southern boundaries,

and introducing the Islamic Sharia Law to all Sudanese citizens. In opposition, Garang was

determined to ‘fight a long war’ in order to defeat the ‘institutions of oppression that have

been evolved in Khartoum to oppress the masses of the Sudanese people’ (1985:27). Mathew

Delaney posits that

Garang offered a new nationalist ideology, which he called Sudanism, and it recognized the ethnic, cultural, and religious diversity of Sudan and called for a new, uniquely Sudanese identity. Garang’s Sudanism was therefore inherently opposed to divisiveness and separatism and was disposed to unity (2011:59).

According to Delaney, Garang’s Sudanism advocated a New Sudan which is opposed to

division and oppression. He believed that Sudan needed a leader who could harness the

strength of the different ethnic groups then Sudan would be rid of all forms of violence.

However, after the untimely death of John Garang in a mysterious helicopter crash, Salva

Kiir had to occupy the position and lead the people of South Sudan. In contrast to Garang’s

vision, his political objective was the secession of South Sudan (2014:348). Delaney asserts

that the hope of a United Sudan perished with John Garang. In contrast to John Garang being

described as a saint, Elhag Paul contends that:

the absolute control of the of the entire SPLM/A by Garang constituted an act of corruption in that he used the organization to build himself and perpetuate a personality cult (2012:1)

Paul’s argument lies on the monopoly of power during the period when the SPLM was still a

rebel movement fighting for change in South Sudan. In backing up his claim, he referenced

Professor Robert Klitgaard who argues that ‘monopoly of power is the number one culprit in

perpetuating corruption’. He extends his argument by asserting that the fact that John Garang:

acquired fame and status as a hero in the liberation war in itself is a product of corruption as argued elsewhere that he does not deserve to be called the “father of the nation”. There can not be honor in corruption (2012:1)


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Likewise, John Prendergast maintains that due to the wide scale of corruption in the SPLM,

the NGOs and Donors often connived in the looting of food aids. He confirms that

Diversion [of food aid] was so blatant and wide scale that one official speculated off the record that Garang himself must have been told by US officials that indirect support of him (at the time) would come in the form of plentiful food assistance, which is easily diverted and bartered (1996:23).

This portrays that even during the days of John Garang there was a wide scale of corruption

to the extent that it was normalised and there was no form of consequence for being corrupt.

Delaney argues that when Garang died his vision went with him leaving the SPLM in the

hands of ‘gluttons of Power’. Dr. Cherry Leonardi, a senior lecturer in the Department of

History at Durham University portrays that ‘liberation’ in South Sudan connotes self-

enrichment. She describes how the young soldiers accuse their senior officers of dominating

the profits of the war by stating that ‘The word “liberation” is increasingly used with bitter

irony in reference to senior officers “liberating” land resources and even women from their

rightful owners. It is the commanders who liberated themselves - from poverty’ (2007:16).

Waal maintains that because Kiir wanted to garner support for his political objective, he

adopted the strategy of indulging the SPLM/A fractious leaders’ appetite for self-enrichment

(2014:348). Furthermore, Kiir was afraid that the Khartoum government might bribe the

discontented militia leaders and might disrupt the smooth transition of South Sudan into an

independent nation. Therefore, he doubled the pay of the private soldiers to $150 per month,

which is twice the amount the Sudan armed services get as their monthly wages. Shortly

before the voting of the referendum, he raised their wages again to $220 per month, which

made the SPLA too expensive for the Sudan government. Waal purports that Kiir’s method

of increasing the pay of the soldiers worked, but it only increased corruption (2014:355).

Evidently, the only way the Sudan government could manage conflict was through financial

patronage. This resulted in the large influx of soldiers that were incorporated into the SPLA.

According to the SPLM’s internal audit, a minimum of 40,000 ghost soldiers were recorded

whose salaries were being pocketed by the commanders.

Sadly John Garang’s act of monopolising power did not accommodate checks and balances

and this may have permitted corruption which Kirr later exploited so as to maintain cohesion

within the SPLM.


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5.4 The International Community’s Failure to Curb Corruption in South Sudan

But was corruption entirely the fault of Kiir and his government? Alan Boswell, an African

Correspondent for the McClatchy Newspapers argues that the international Community are to

be partially blamed for the $4 billion of missing state funds of South Sudan because

...this money was directly looted under the noses of the international community, which agreed to supervise the peace process and even provided consultants to do South Sudan’s own bookkeeping (2012:3).

Similarly, Hakeem Legge, a member of the UK South Sudanese diaspora accuses the UK and

US of being accomplices to the South Sudan’s syphoning of money into private accounts in

their countries (2012:2). Boswell specifically criticizes South Sudan’s major donor which is

the United States by stating that they have not put tough measures in place to curb the issue

of corruption. He compares their tough targeted actions against corrupt leaders in Kenya with

the situation in South Sudan and asserts that the U.S has been too lenient in tackling the issue

of corruption in South Sudan. Even though they made heavy donations of $300 million, they

are still reluctant in sanctioning the young state’s corrupt leaders. Whether it is true or not, as

Alan claims that the U.S. has a lot to lose by sanctioning the South Sudan leaders is not clear.

Nor can we be certain as Jonathan Jacobs, a researcher of US Foreign Policy purports that the

U.S support for the South Sudan government has nothing to do with democracy and justice

but rather they are interested in the oil reserves (2012:1). What is clear however is as Lacher

suggests that because of the high level of corruption in South Sudan donors should tie their

assistance to South Sudan’s actions against corruption (2012:6). In the same way, Legge

posits that ‘International aid programmes and loans should be linked to the development of

genuine democratic institutions, tackling rampant government corruption’ (2012:3). Waal

also suggested an alternate solution, that sanctions will help attack corruption in South Sudan

(2014:2).

5.5 Conclusion

This chapter has been able to gather significant evidence pointing to the fact that corruption is

one of the factors that contributed to the ongoing conflict in South Sudan. The decision of

President Kiir to stop the club of ‘kleptocrats’ by dismissing his entire cabinet of officials

sparked a response which resulted in the conflict. Also, the chapter was able to establish that


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the foundation of corruption in South Sudan has deep roots –Going back to John Garang who

monopolised power before South Sudan gained its independence. It appears that Kiir realised

that the only way he could keep the SPLM together was to allow corruption because that has

been the trend right from the days of John Garang and also he needed their support so that the

South can secede peacefully. But after gaining power as the president he eventually realised

that corruption can cripple the system hence his decision to flush the ‘kleptocrats’ out of the

system. Sadly, that decision sparked the ongoing conflict in south Sudan that is claiming the

lives of thousands every day. Also, the international community are to be partially blamed for

corruption because corruption happened under their supervision but they continued to indulge

the corrupt leaders in South Sudan.


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CHAPTER SIX

CONCLUSION

The major goal of this dissertation has been to investigate the root causes of the South

Sudan’s civil war. Based on the analysis of the arguments of different scholars, the reasons

are diverse. However, because of precision, this work has been able to highlight the important

factors that contribute to the conflict ranging from poor policy choices, inappropriate party

system structure, Sudan’s conspiracy in South Sudan’s ongoing conflict, and corruption. The

South Sudan conflict which started as a political conflict transformed into an ethnic violence

and the South Sudan government has capitalised on the ethic aspect. Although, the South

Sudan government’s issuing of ethnic statements to get more support from the ethnic tribes is

portraying the conflict as an ethnic violence, the major issue is that South Sudan needs

nation-building to ensure that the people believe in their government. The government of

South Sudan should embark on nation-building projects that would ensure the people of

South Sudan peacefully coexist and so that no militia group would capitalise on the ethnic

rivalry to cause violence. It is only on the nation-building platform that there can be

sustenance of institutional development.

Based on the investigations and analysis made in this work, the political conflict started as a

result of the inappropriate structure of the SPLM. This was the culmination of the political

party not transforming its ideals from being a liberation movement to a political movement.

Though as suggested during the course of the analysis that reformation of the SPLM is the

solution, it might be difficult since there is a power struggle involved and it is majorly

between the current president Salva Kiir and the former Vice President Reik Machar. Also,

implementing any agreement between the warring parties will prove difficult because there is

already a breakdown in trust, cohesion and communication. However, the South Sudan

government has to make an attempt in addressing the internal rivalry amongst the ruling class

before the country plunges into an intractable conflict. In this case, for sustainable peace to be

achieved there has to be a willingness from the warring parties to find a common ground so

that the issue of power struggle can be resolved.

On the issue of conspiracy of Sudan government’s involvement in the ongoing conflict in

South Sudan, the international community i.e. the United States of America whose major

donations to the South Sudan development has made it a major stakeholder should ensure that


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the compromise agreement is adhered to and that there is a fair arrangement in place for both

nations with regards to fees charged for oil transportation.

In South Sudan, sanctioning corruption offenders still remains a great challenge. Although,

the war on corruption launched by President Salva Kiir is commendable but there has not

been any significant achievement and it is still being described as ‘half hearted’. In order for

the war to be effective, the war has to involve prevention, detection and sanctions. If indeed

the government desires the zero tolerance for corruption, firstly, there has to be legal

instruments to enable corruption detection, arraignment and conviction. It is of the best

interest of South Sudan to establish a commission that does not have boundaries in

prosecuting anyone involved in corruption. For example, in Nigeria there is the Economic

and Financial Crimes Commission, a law enforcement agency responsible for the

investigation of financial crimes. If such agency is established, this will transform the

‘kleptocratic’ system in South Sudan responsible for the power struggle and ultimately

contributing to the conflict. Also, the USA and the rest of the international community need

to start demanding for an accountable South Sudan government. They should not just donate

funds for sustainable development but should attach their donations to South Sudan

government’s strict measures on corruption.

Finally, South Sudan is a young state that inherited diverse challenges which resulted in the

conflict but if the South Sudan government can tackle the root causes as highlighted in this

dissertation, peace will be established.


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Toni Weis Berlin: Heinrich-Boll-Stiftung 68-80

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Awolich, A. (2013) ‘SPLM’s Internal Politics: A Catalyst to the Dissolution of Government’

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http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/jsrp/2014/01/23/predictable-causes-and-prospects-of-the-current-political-crisis-in-south-sudan/


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Smith, D. (2012) ‘South Sudan President accuses officials of stealing $4bn of Public Money’

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sudan-president-accuses-officials-stealing [5 June 2012]

South Sudan News Agency (2013) Leaked Documents Show Ministers Kosti Manibe Ngai and Deng Alor Kuol Were Wrongly Accused of Corruption [online] available from http://www.southsudannewsagency.com/news/breaking-news/leaked-documents-show-ministers-kosti-and-deng [14 July 2013]

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http://www.southsudannewsagency.com/news/breaking-news/leaked-documents-show-ministers-kosti-and-deng

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http://www.splmtoday.com/index.php/about

http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article39085


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Tran, M. (2014) ‘South Sudan Failed by Misjudgement of International Community, says UN

chief’ The Guardian [online] available from http://www.theguardian.com/global-

development/2014/jan/22/south-sudan-failed-international-community

Waal, A. and Mohammed, A. (2014) ‘Breakdown in South Sudan: What Went Wrong and

How to Fix It’ Foreign Affairs [online] available

from http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/140617/alex-de-waal-and-abdul-

mohammed/breakdown-in-south-sudan [1 January, 2014]

Waal, A. and Mohammed, A. (2014) ‘US Financial Aid for African Armies and Corruption in Nigeria, South Sudan and Uganda’ New York Times [online] available from http://africajournalismtheworld.com/tag/south-sudan-corruption/ [15 August 2014]

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Africa/Documents/KPMG_Sudan%202012Q3.pdf

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International-Corruption-Perceptions-Index-2013/$FILE/EY-Transparency-International-

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[December 2012]



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Low Risk Research Ethics Approval

Where NO human participants are involved and/or when using secondary data - Undergraduate or Postgraduate or Member of staff evaluating service level quality

Project Title

Why did the world's youngest sovereign state- South Sudan unravel so quickly?

Principal Investigator Certification

I believe that this project does not require research ethics approval. X

I confirm that I have answered all relevant questions in the checklist honestly. X

I confirm that I will carry out the project in the ways described in the checklist. I will immediately suspend research and request a new ethical approval if the project subsequently changes the information I have given in the checklist.

X

Principal Investigator Name: Olufunke Ogunyemi ....................................................................................................

Date: 01/08/2014 .....................................................

Student’s Supervisor (if applicable) I have read the checklist and confirm that it covers all the ethical issues raised by this project fully and frankly. I confirm that I have discussed this project with the student and agree that it does not require research ethics approval. I will continue to review ethical issues in the course of supervision.

Name: Bruce Baker ................................................................................................................

Date: 01/08/2014 .....................................................


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Low Risk Research Ethics Approval Checklist

Applicant Details Project Ref: P26046 Full name: Olufunke Ogunyemi Faculty: [BES] Business, Environment and Society Department: [IS] International Studies and Social Science Module Code: M20ISS Supervisor: Bruce Baker

Project title: Why did the world’s youngest sovereign state- South Sudan unravel so quickly?

Date(s): 04/08/2014 - 05/01/2015 Created: 01/08/2014 09:34

Project Details To analyse the post secession issues bringing the young sovereign state south Sudan to the brink of early collapse.

Participants in your research Questions Yes No Will the project involve human participants? X

Risk to Participants Questions Yes No

Will the project involve human patients/clients, health professionals, and/or patient (client) data and/or health professional data?

X

Will any invasive physical procedure, including collecting tissue or other samples, be used in the research?

X

Is there a risk of physical discomfort to those taking part? X

Is there a risk of psychological or emotional distress to those taking part? X

Is there a risk of challenging the deeply held beliefs of those taking part? X

Is there a risk that previous, current or proposed criminal or illegal acts will be revealed by those taking part?

X

Will the project involve giving any form of professional, medical or legal advice, either directly or indirectly to those taking part?

X


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Risk to Researcher Questions Yes No Will this project put you or others at risk of physical harm, injury or death? X

Will project put you or others at risk of abduction, physical, mental or sexual abuse?

X

Will this project involve participating in acts that may cause psychological or emotional distress to you or to others?

X

Will this project involve observing acts which may cause psychological or emotional distress to you or to others?

X

Will this project involve reading about, listening to or viewing materials that may cause psychological or emotional distress to you or to others?

X

Will this project involve you disclosing personal data to the participants other than your name and the University as your contact and e-mail address?

X

Will this project involve you in unsupervised private discussion with people who are not already known to you?

X

Will this project potentially place you in the situation where you may receive unwelcome media attention?

X

Could the topic or results of this project be seen as illegal or attract the attention of the security services or other agencies?

X

Could the topic or results of this project be viewed as controversial by anyone?

X

Informed Consent of the Participant Questions Yes No

Are any of the participants under the age of 18? X

Are any of the participants unable mentally or physically to give consent? X

Do you intend to observe the activities of individuals or groups without their knowledge and/or informed consent from each participant (or from his or her parent or guardian)?

X


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Participant Confidentiality and Data Protection Questions Yes No

Will the project involve collecting data and information from human participants who will be identifiable in the final report?

X

Will information not already in the public domain about specific individuals or institutions be identifiable through data published or otherwise made available?

X

Do you intend to record, photograph or film individuals or groups without their knowledge or informed consent?

X

Do you intend to use the confidential information, knowledge or trade secrets gathered for any purpose other than this research project?

X

Gatekeeper Risk Questions Yes No

Will this project involve collecting data outside University buildings? X

Do you intend to collect data in shopping centres or other public places? X

Do you intend to gather data within nurseries, schools or colleges? X

Do you intend to gather data within National Health Service premises? X

Other Ethical Issues Questions Yes No Is there any other risk or issue not covered above that may pose a risk to you

or any of the participants? X

Will any activity associated with this project put you or the participants at an ethical, moral or legal risk?

X

Other Documents submitted Risk Assessment Form