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What is Innovation?

Søren Harnow Klausen

[Draft; to appear in Shiu, E. (ed.). Anthology onInnovation (Routledge)]

This paper addresses the very general question ofwhat should be understood by innovation, and howinnovation relates to phenomena like creativity,entrepreneurship, commercialization, learning andinvention. The question is treated mainly by meansof the sort of conceptual analysis typical of aphilosophical approach. However, this is done witheye to both sociological theories and resultspertaining to innovation, and to possibleapplications to practice and empirical research.The guiding idea behind the paper is thatconceptual clarification and unprejudicedreflection is needed in order to move forward onthe more specific challenges of understanding andfurthering innovation in practice.

Conceptual and theoretical work on innovationhas been relatively sparse, not least as comparedto the extensive and still rapidly growingliterature on the neighboring notion ofcreativity. In his comprehensive review of thefield, Fagerberg rightly noted that even though

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innovation been dealt with by economics, theinnovation process itself has been treated more orless like a “black box” (Fagerberg 2005, 3).Schumpeter’s (1934) groundbreaking analysis stillremains unique in its depth and scope, even thoughit was confined to a few pages. It has beencommented upon and applied extensively, but hardlydeveloped further or revised. Most extant studiesgo on very rapidly to analyze specific forms ofinnovation (e.g. von Hippel (1988), who isparticularly concerned with end-user innovation),sometimes very specific forms or aspects (e.g.Cristensen & Overdorf 2000, who emphasize so-called “disruptive” innovation).

This tendency is understandable. Most scholars,even of a more theoretical orientation, areobviously interested in pushing innovation, byidentifying particularly attractive paths andstrategies. In a way, they are trying to beinnovative themselves; this makes them naturallyselective. A more disengaged, birds-eyeperspective on innovation may seem almost like acontradiction in terms. But it really is not.Among the many, many sources of innovation,stepping back and taking a fresh and broad viewmay not be the least fecund.

1. Conceptual confusion and clarification

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One need not know what one is doing in order to do itproperly. Ever since Socrates questioned his fellowAthenians on their deepest assumptions, it has been clearthat people, even the cleverest and most successful,rarely know the precise content of the notions theyemploy – at least not explicitly. It has also becomeclear – perhaps contrary to what Socrates thought – thatthis need not matter greatly. There is strong evidencefrom the history of science that evading fundamentalquestions about definitions can be outright conducive topractical success. Modern mathematics took off when itabandoned the traditional attempt to understand whatmathematics is really about and concentrated on making itwork. Nobel laureate Richard Feynman is said to havequibbled that “philosophy of science is of as much use tophysics as ornithology is to birds”, and whilephilosophers have, with some justification, protestedthat birds might have benefitted from ornithology if theyhad been able to acquire such knowledge, he was surely onto something.

Knowing what one does and talks about can, however,still be of considerable practical importance. Innovationwill no doubt take place regardless of whether weunderstand it or not. But the many current attempts tofurther innovation will no doubt have a bigger chance atsucceeding if they are informed by a sufficiently cleargrasp of what exactly they are aiming at. Understandinginnovation as such is also a precondition for bothraising and discussing urgent questions about theimportance and value of innovation relative to othergoals and concerns. At present, it is almost universallytaken for granted that innovation is always a good thingand a neat and obvious solution to all sorts of problems.

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This naïve stance can and should be corrected. Thebenefits of innovation come at a price. A more preciseunderstanding may turn the otherwise trivial belief inthe unsurpassed value of innovation into a morecontroversial, interesting and perhaps even empiricallytestable hypothesis.

As a first rough cut, it can be noted that the term“innovation” is used in two different ways, one broad andthe other narrower. According to the broad usage,“innovation” is roughly synonymous with “creativity” –both expressions referring to the production of somethingwhich is 1) novel and 2) use- or meaningful (see Klausen2010 for some amendments of this definition ofcreativity). This is reflected in utterances like “she’sa very innovative musician”, which indicates that theperson in question is capable of playing or composing innew and interesting way, but does not ascribe to her anyspecial ability to achieve popularity or practicalsuccess. An innovative musician can be very inept attranslating her musical ideas into something popular orcommercially useful; the poor but gifted artist is notjust a cliché, it is a definite possibility.

With this characterization I have already hinted atthe other, narrower meaning of “innovation”. Ofteninnovation is understood as the translation of ideas orinventions into something which is more or lessimmediately useful (McKeown 2008). It is far from unusualto narrow it even further, requiring that innovationshould lead to something which is commercially exploitable.Innovation is, according to this understanding, thedevelopment of something which someone would like to payfor. Sometimes innovation is said to consist in, or atleast to comprise, ideas or products “being brought to

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the market” (or at least being “marketable”; see e.g.Höfer 2011, 78). Innovation is assumed to involve, orpoint directly towards, commercialization

The relationship between the broad and narrow ofnotion of innovation is complex and often misunderstood(see section 2 below). But it is standardly assumed thatwhereas creativity refers to the very act of producingsomething new and meaningful, innovation is a process ofmodification, conversion, translation or application, in which thecreative product is made concretely useful (see Fagerberg2005, 5). Often the innovation process is depicted asconsisting of two discrete stages: First, someimpractical researcher or artist gets an original andimaginative, yet inapplicable idea. Later on, lessprofound, but practically smart and cunning individualsmanage to modify this idea so as to make it practicallyuseful and eventually marketable. This is a cliché, notan accurate picture of the typical innovation process,but at least it captures a widespread way of thinkingabout innovation.

It should be emphasized that the narrower, practice-oriented notion of innovation is still quite broad.Further subdivisions are in place. In particular, it isimportant to distinguish the notion of practice-orientedinnovation in general and technological innovation. Thelatter, which is really only one type of practice-oriented innovation among others, is often considered theparadigm example of innovation. Talk about innovation islikely to evoke images of computers, Ipads, molecularmedicine or hydrogen vehicles. Sometimes innovation isequated with technological invention, and bothexpressions used in a product, rather than a processsense: the expression “an innovation” is used to refer to

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a particular gadget (see for instance the list ofimportant “innovations” that come from universityresearch compiled by Marquis (2012), which comprises onlyconcrete objects like fluoride toothpaste an e-ink).This fixation with technology – understood mainly astechnological devices – has caused scholars and laypeoplealike to overlook the many other important kinds andmanifestations of innovation and thus to the fact thateven the narrow notion of innovation is actually quiteinclusive.

Innovation in the narrow, practice oriented senseshould also be distinguished from entrepeneurship. Itsuffices for being innovative that you can come up withsufficiently practical ideas (whereas for you to becreative, or innovative in the broader sense, your ideasneed only be meaningful or potentially useful). Youmustn’t be able to actually implement them successfullyyourself. In particular, you don’t need to have thebusiness acumen, or the courage to take the financialrisks, which may be necessary for their eventualcommercialization. The latter is required forentrepreneurship, but not for innovation per se. (Thisdoes not mean that entrepreneurship is not itself a formof innovation – more on this, and some slightqualifications, in sect. 6 below).

This shows that commercialization, contrary to awidespread assumption, is not a part of even the narrow,practice-oriented notion of innovation. Another reasonfor this distinction is that innovation is not confinedto private enterprises. It has become popular to speak ofsocial innovation, which is aimed not at creating more profit,but e.g. at improving public services or empoweringsocial groups (see e.g. Mumford 2002; Goldsmith 2010).

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While this notion is sometimes stretched too far, and thedifference between innovation in the private and publicsector might be overemphasized, it seems obvious thatinnovation is not confined to the sphere of marketeconomics. For example, the development of a new and moreefficient (and/or more just) system of organ transplantallocation should clearly be considered an innovation,even if it has no commercial impact.

Critical intellectuals have lamented the rise todominance of the narrow notion of innovation. They haverightly pointed out that the etymology of the word isbroader; the Latin innovare merely means “to renew” or “tochange”, and the term was introduced in the 16th centuryas a pejorative expression for a revolutionary attitudewhich was considered problematic at the time, the attemptto transgress existing norms and conventions (Godin2008). This seems to indicate “innovation” and“creativity” should be treated as synonyms. But twothings speak in favor of the narrow notion: First, we donot need two words for the same phenomenon – we can dowith the excellent and well- established term“creativity” as a name for the production of new andmeaningful ideas and things in general. Secondly, it isvery difficult, if not outright futile, to try to changethe linguistic tide. The narrow notion of innovation hascaught on and is currently an integral part of all sortsof societal debates and activities. Whether one likes itor not, one had better adapt to this usage, if one wishesto be heard and understood at all. The criticalintellectuals’ case is served best by insisting thatother forms of idea development (e.g. creativity) arealso important, and by arguing (as I do here) thatinnovation should not be defined too narrowly, that it

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comprises more than technological development andcommercialization.

Broad notions of innovation have been accused ofbeing too vague and opportunistic. There is indeedsomething to this charge. It is common to slide more orless inadvertently between the broad and narrow meaningsof the term, for example when advertising courses orstudy programs. The narrow, practice-oriented notion isinvoked because it promises employment and economicbenefits, the broader, which comprises unconventionalthinking, imagination and artistic creativity, is invokedbecause it has a more sexy and adventurous ring to it.But I suppose that these effects are seldom soughtdeliberately; most people assume, quite sincerely, thatthe two notions are closely linked. While this does showa need for clearer distinctions, and perhaps alsoindicates that many innovation-prompting initiatives lacka clear direction, it has a more positive explanation aswell, since it is quite possible that the two notions areindeed quite intimately connected. Some of the moststriking examples of recent successful innovations (e.g.the famous Apple gadgets) do seem to rely on a mixture oftechnological sophistication, business acumen andcreative thinking about more intangible features likedesign, aesthetic qualities, hitherto unrealized userneeds and preferences etc. Even when the focus is oninnovation in the narrow sense, the broader notion ofcreativity is still lurking in its vicinity.

2. Creativity and innovationThere is thus much to be said for the view that whilecreativity is not sufficient for innovation, it isnevertheless a necessary condition for it (as claimed by

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Amabile 1996). This is roughly correct, but needs somequalification. It is correct in the sense that innovationis itself an instance of creativity – it involves, bynecessity, the production of something new and use- ormeaningful. Often, albeit far from always, innovation isa process of translation or conversion. But even then isnot just a mere transfer of intellectual value; thetranslation makes something new happen or come in tobeing (viz. the really useful product) – it addssomething and so creates new value in its own right.

This is one of the reasons why the popular two-stepmodel described above is grossly inadequate: The modelsuggests that all the creativity is located at a prior,preparatory stage (often depicted as romantic, wild,unconstrained, even serendipitous), whereas nothingreally new is happening at the later stage, which ischaracterized by a rather trivial smartness not worthy ofthe label “creative”. But this is plainly wrong – and itis surprising that so many scholars and professionals whoare well acquainted with, and have a heart for, genuineinnovation, have fallen for a myth which celebrates thedetached and impractical intellectual. For clearlymodifying and converting an idea into something thatserves a wholly new purpose, or greatly enhances itsutility, can be just as creative as coming up with theidea in the first place – after all, inasmuch as theoriginal idea wasn’t readily applicably, it was only“useful” in a very hypothetical sense and, on almost anyaccount, immature. There are many examples of theinnovator, rather than the original inventor, beingcredited with the really creative contribution – JamesWatt is widely known for having improved the steam engine,whereas fewer have heard of Newcomen’s engine, and very

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few of the still earlier patent of Thomas Savery. Asomewhat parallel example from the artistic sphere is thework of Mozart, who is hailed as a creative genius, butwhose contribution consisted in using and furtherdeveloping musical forms already invented by hispredecessors or contemporaries, e.g. C. P. E. Bach, J. C.Bach and Haydn.

Moreover, in quite many cases innovation does not feedon preconceived ideas. Very often, innovators havethemselves come up with the crucial idea. And it is notunusual for the conception of the idea and thedevelopment of the practical solution – and even theprocess of construction or implementation – to go hand inhand; ideas are often formed as the inventor goes along.Insofar as such processes can still be said to involveknowledge and reflection, they seem to be an example ofwhat Schön has termed “reflection in practice” (Schön1983), rather than of work issuing from priordeliberation or of the use of an existing knowledge base.

The two-step model is closely related to the equallypopular – and equally inadequate – so-called linear modelof scientific and technological development, according towhich unconstrained, completely disinterested basicresearch lays the foundation for special and appliedresearch, which in turn provides the means fortechnological development, which eventually leads tocommercially successful products. There are many examplesof deviations from this scheme. Sometimes intermediatesteps are by-passed. Quantum physics have shown to haveunexpected and fairly direct practical applications (e.g.for purposes of cryptography). Biophysics applies verygeneral physical laws to biological systems. Moresignificantly, sometimes technological inventions or

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applied science come first and only later give rise toproblems and theorizing of a more fundamental kind. Thedevelopment of steam engines inspired modernthermodynamics; practical chemistry preceded theinvention of the periodic table and the discovery of thequantum foundations of chemical processes. Powered humanflight, which had been “proven” impossible by Newton andd’Alambert, was carried out by the Wright brotherswithout any scientific basis, and the succeeding attemptsat providing a theoretical foundation for it by Kutta,Prandtl and others turned out to be embarrassinglyincorrect – and so on, and so on. (For further criticismof the linear model, see Kitcher 2001; Pielke 2007; withregard to innovation Kline and Rosenberg 1986; Fagerberg2005, 8f.)

It is further worth noting that the two-step modelapplies best (when at all) to so-called incrementalinnovation, the more or less moderate and continuousimprovements of existing devices or practices. Radicalinnovations can off course also exploit existing, buthitherto neglected or insufficiently understood ideas,but they will often be more markedly creative. There aremany examples of what appear to have been technological“eggs of Columbus”, devices and solutions emerging moreor less out of the blue, without any traceabletheoretical anticipations or prototypes – e.g. theprinting press, eyeglasses, the windmills of the middleages and barbed wire (Mokyr 1990, 138; 294).

3. The many faces of innovation: Schumpeter revisited

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Innovation might necessarily involve creativity. But therelationship is complex in still further respects, andmore qualifications are needed. In fact, it appearspossible to be innovative in a practical, commerciallyrelevant way without being creative in any but the mosttheoretical sense. This follows from one of the mostinfluential definitions of innovation, the one suggestedby the famous Austrian economist Joseph Schumpeter. Hisdefinition is also well suited for highlighting forms ofinnovation other than the technological ones. Schumpeterhas, quite unfairly, come to be seen as an exponent of a“technocapitalist” ideology, whereas his theory is, infact, much more widely applicable and actually emphasizesthe economic importance of “soft” aspects of innovation.

In The Theory of Economic Development (first published inGerman in 1911), Schumpeter defined innovation (or, to bemore exact, “development”) as the “carrying out of newcombinations” (1934, 66). This has a counterpart increativity theory, where creativity has been explained asresulting from a combination of “previously unconnectedmatrices” (Koestler 1964, 230). New ideas do not ariseout of nothing; their novelty usually consists in therearrangement of already existing materials and practices– and creativity is not so much a matter of completelytranscending the given, but rather of being able to seenew patterns and possibilities in that which is alreadyat hand). Schumpeter did not say, but clearlypresupposed, that the new combinations in questions areuseful and can be the basis of commercial success (sincenot any odd recombination will be advantageous).

Schumpeter went on to distinguish five types ofinnovation (loc. cit.):

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1) The introduction of a new good – or of a new qualityof good2) The introduction of a new method of production or anew way of handling a commodity commercially3) The opening of a new market4) The conquest (i.e. making available) of a new sourceof supply of raw materials or half-manufactured goods 5) The carrying out of the new organization of anyindustry, e.g. monopolization

With regard to 2), Schumpeter made the pertinentobservation that a new production method “need by nomeans be founded upon a discovery scientifically new”. Hedid not succumb to the linear model, and he was wellaware that innovation may be based on ideas or productsthat are not novel themselves, and which may even appeareven appear dated from the point of view of science andthe history of technology (think of current attempts atreviving steam technology, Zeppelins, Stone Age dietetc., the popularity of mechanical watches, or the recentsurge in microfinance in Asia and Latin America).

Three further points deserve emphasis. First,Schumpeter defined innovation in a blatantly unromantic,non-idealistic way – which is why his notion ofinnovation only involves creativity in a very theoreticalsense. Creativity is usually thought of as a realcreation of something new and valuable; it is expected tobe a genuine enrichment, to add real value to and thusimprove the existing state of affairs. Innovation inSchumpeter’ sense does not have this implication. To him,monopolization is a prime example of innovation, thoughit arguably stifles competition and so hampers thedevelopment of really smart and cheap solutions. It is

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nevertheless innovation, because it improves the positionof the innovator; and inasmuch as this can be describedas the production of something new and valuable (again,to the innovator, not to society or the world ingeneral), it is also an instance of creativity. Anotherexample of such unconstructive, unromantic innovation isthe infamous practice of certain mobile phone companiesof buying new patents not with the intention of actuallyusing them, but merely to prevent the competitors fromrunning ahead and making their own products obsolete.Further examples include price dumping, price fixing(e.g. collusion) and negative advertising.

These examples highlights the fact that althoughinnovation requires the bringing about of something newand useful, the notion does not specify to whom it has tobe useful and does not require an improvement of generalutility, i.e. “making the world better”. As has beennoted in connection with “pragmatic” definitions of othernotions, e.g. truth (which has been equated withexpediency), “useful” is a highly context-sensitiveexpression. What is useful to the one can, quiteliterally, be fatal to the other – think, for example ofthe invention of the atomic bomb.

Secondly, technology is not essential to innovationin Schumpeter’s sense. Innovation comprises new ways ofhandling commodities and new forms of organization aswell. Schumpeter was thus clearly away that innovationcan take place at every stage in the value chain, andthat no single stage can be said to be of specialimportance. This is consistent with recent findingsindicating that often most value is added in the laterstages of the innovation process, and that the greatesteconomic benefits are gained not from product

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development, but from the development of new businessmodels, branding etc. (Rosted 2005).

Of course, one can insist on defining “technology” sobroad as to cover cases of “organizational innovation” aswell (cf. current Foucault-inspired talk of “technologiesof power” (Rose 1999), which are often exemplified withnew management styles). There is no need to deny that thenotion of technology is, or ought to be, quite inclusive.But in the present context, stretching it far provesunhelpful. It blurs the important point that innovationis not confined to, and should not be modeled on, theproduction of mechanical or electronic devices orchemical substances. Certain forms of spectacularlyadvanced technology in the narrow (“hardware”-) sensecontinues to function as the paradigm example oftechnology in general. Hence any strong linking ofinnovation with technology is likely to give rise tofalse associations and hamper the recognition ofstructural, contextual, procedural, social and humanisticaspects of innovation.

Schumpeter’s definition has also been criticized forbeing narrowly economic or “capitalist”. Obviously hisexamples are taken from the realm of private enterpriseand presuppose some kind of market economy. And it is asleast true, as noted above, that he considers innovationa matter of improving one’s position relative to that ofothers (who could, but need not, be thought of as marketcompetitors). But the “capitalist” bias of Schumpeter’stheory should not be exaggerated. Writing before “the endof history”, at a time at which socialist economic modelswere considered serious contenders, or even expected tobecome dominant by a kind of historical necessity,Schumpeter also envisaged an important role for

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innovation in a socialist economy. He noted for examplethat in such an economy, creative destruction need nothave the dramatic and often disastrous economic andsocial consequences which are typical of a capitalistsystem. Viewing the emergence of greater businesscombines and consortia as comparable to the rise of asocialist economy, he also noted, quite prophetically,that innovation will increasingly become the internalconcern of “one and the same economic body” (1934, 67),thus anticipating problems of organizational innovationand the internal economy of companies.

Quite generally, one should not understand “economy”too narrowly and endow is with specific politicalmeaning. The original meaning of the (Greek) word wassimply “household management”, and questions of the mostrational use and distribution of the available resources– of all kinds, material as well as immaterial – arepertinent to all forms of life and politicalorganization. So although Schumpeter’s understanding ofinnovation does, to a certain extent, make it an“economic” concept, this need not reduce itsapplicability, nor does it make it politically suspect.

Thirdly and perhaps most noteworthy, Schumpeterpoints out that innovation is not primarily a question offinding new ways to meet existing needs and demands. Thisis a very important insight and a major improvement overclassical economics, which assumes that producers mustadapt to consumers’ wishes. According to Schumpeter, itis rather the producers who create new needs by bringingnew products to the market and if necessary by educatingconsumers, by teaching them to want new things (1934,65). This again might sound politically suspect – one isreminded of the manipulation of hapless consumers by

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unscrupulous advertisers, of attempts to trick peopleinto buying things they could easily do without. Butalthough such cases are indeed covered by Schumpeter’sanalysis, which is, once again, blatantly unromantic, itshould be pointed out that the notion of “educatingconsumers” can have a more positive meaning. Many“macroinventions” have led to real improvements inpeople’s lives – but due to their unpredictable nature,people were not able to even dream about them beforehandand so had to learn about their benefits and overcometheir own initial skepticism (many will be familiar withthe problem of persuading their elderly relatives thatsome piece of contemporary technology or some newarrangement or practice would actually make their life somuch easier).

Schumpeter’s point about inducing needs and demandsthrough education is also pertinent to non-commercialforms of innovation. Many political organizations andsocial movements have not merely attempted to provide anunderprivileged group with something which it has, allthe time, craved for. They have just as often attemptedto create a consciousness among the members of the groupof what they might reasonably demand and could eventuallyget if they were to fight for it. A good example of thisis the women’s movement, which did not proceed on theassumption that all women immediately wantedemancipation, but instead assumed that many of them werevictims to some kind of “false consciousness” andtherefore had to be taught about this option and learn toappreciate it.

It might seem that this emphasis on the role of theproducer clashes with the currently popular idea of“user-driven” innovation. But this conflict is merely

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apparent. What does not, according to Schumpeter, driveinnovation is what consumers presently and concretelydemand. For this will mostly be limited to“microinventions”, i.e. improved or cheaper versions ofalready well-known items (see Mokyr 1990). So-calledused-driver innovation aims at transcending the alreadyknown and articulated needs of consumers and find outwhat they would really like to have. It aims at an improvedunderstanding of the situation of the users, not ofmeeting wishes they have already formed (this has alsobeen noted by Rosted, who speaks aptly about disclosing“unknown user needs” (2005, 35ff.). This applies both tothe most common cases, in which the process is firmlycontrolled by the producer, who employ users as guineapigs and sources of inspiration, and to the still rareexamples of genuinely user-driven innovation, where theprocess is initiated and managed by the users themselves.

4. Paradoxes and problems: Intractable innovation?That innovation is not just about meeting alreadyexisting needs, but also about changing the context andperhaps creating new tasks and need, makes it at onceparticularly important and fascinating, but alsopotentially intractable in both theory and practice. Inthis respect innovation again resembles creativity, eventhough it might have expected that innovation, due to itspractical orientation, would be somewhat easier topredict and control.

Innovation is plagued by what I have termed thecreativity paradox: The very idea of creativity (and ofinnovation as well) harbors a fundamental tension betweennovelty and norm. It is about creating something novel, and

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so about transcending the norms, but it is also aboutcreating something use- or at least meaningful, and sostill about meeting a broader set of expectations or norms(Klausen 2010, 355; 359). This is not just an abstractphilosophical problem. Those who have done assessments ofstudent work will know the difficulty of justly weighingthe more conventional qualities against originality,independence and flexibility of mind. Of course thisproblem almost always finds a pragmatic solution. Butmany retain a feeling that they could not avoid doingsome kind of injustice to the work assessed (ordisregarding the established norms), that conservatismand creativity are both fundamental, but irreconcilablevirtues. A strongly norm-conforming paper doesn’t reallyadd something new, but a very original paper often borderon the conventionally unacceptable. Thomas Kuhn pointedto a similar problematic in the development of science,which he aptly named “The Essential Tension” (Kuhn 1959).

The creativity paradox is related to the better knownlearning paradox espoused by Plato in his dialogue Meno: Wecannot meaningfully search for what we know – since, perhypothesis, we must then possess it, i.e. have found it,already. But neither can we search for that which we donot know – for in that case we will not know even what tosearch for (Meno 80d-e). Again, this is hardly aninsurmountable problem in practice. Learning, theacquisition of new knowledge, does seem to be possible.We are often able to envisage the possible solution to aproblem without yet being able to actually solve it, forexample because we only know the outline of the solutionand still have to work out the details or find a way toimplement it concretely. We can imagine, and work atrealizing, a cheap and effective electric car, a 100 %

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renewable energy supply or an educational system whichensures that 98 % of all students graduate, whileacknowledging that we still don’t know the exact means toattain this goal. Yet the learning paradox still pointsto a fundamental problem with all attempts to achievesignificant progress: We are bound to understand ouroptions and form our wishes from what we already know,and consequently we have difficulties appreciating, letalone striving for, something which deviates radicallyfrom what is already familiar. We can try to overcomethis limitation by deliberately going against the norms,but that will be merely a shot in the dark, since arethen left with no clues as to what to do or what to lookfor.

A very manifest expression of the creativity paradoxis the fact that most creativity tests – and mostassessments of practices for stimulating innovation etc.– make crucial use of expert judgments when it comes todeciding what is to count as genuinely creative or as asignificant innovation. Experts are, per definition,representatives of a specific domain (e.g. art, design,motorcars etc.). This seems extremely reasonable, but hasthe consequence that the results will be judged accordingto fairly conservative standards; products will bemeasured against known paradigms from the domain inquestion. This effect is well known from peer-review ofscientific papers, an institution which no doubt servesthe purpose of ensuring a high quality of the publishedwork, since the immature, the dilettante, the faulty, theobscure is sorted away with great skill and reliability –but which also tends to stifle scientific creativity, bybeing intolerant of very original contributions, whichoften challenge the existing norm and sometimes even aim

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at altering the very domain in question and changing therules of the (cf. the difficulties faced by inter- andtransdisciplinary research).

A popular way of handling the creativity paradoxinvokes the two-step model mentioned in section 2. Thecreative (or innovation) process is divided into twodistinct stages: At the first stage, it is all about“thinking out of the box”, of dispensing with alltraditional constraints and paying no attention to theactual utility or practicability of ideas. This willassumedly produce a “gross pool” of ideas sufficientlylarge and varied for it to be likely that some of themwill, when scrutinized at a later critical state, proveto be practicable or at least capable of being developedin a more practical direction. Whereas the first stage inthe process corresponds to the novelty requirement, andonly this, the second stage of selection and adaptionthus corresponds to the usefulness requirement, and onlythis; it is the place where norms, which are firsttranscended or set aside, reenter the process.

The inspiration to this model comes in part fromevolutionary biology, which takes the raw material ofevolution to be a random (i.e. directionless) creation ofa diversity of traits (through mutation), which is thensubjected to a merciless selection process in which theyare tested for their fitness or “adaptability”. Themodel provides the basis for the popular method ofbrainstorming, i.e. the notion that the first stage in anidea-generation process should consist dispensing withconventional constraints and “let a thousand flowersbloom” (for relevant group psychological criticism ofthis notion, see Paulus & Brown 2003).

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It should not be denied that the two-step model hassomething to be said for it, especially as a way offacing the creativity paradox (if we are too focused,from the outset, on finding the exact practical solution,we will probably keep too closely to existing models andremain stuck with incremental innovation). Yet as I havealready pointed out, the model is hardly empiricallyadequate, and it also has some theoretical flaws. Humaninnovation is not a “blind” process like biologicalevolution – if it were, progress would have been verymuch slower. Innovation processes are ways of consciouslyboosting or surpassing evolution, by virtue of their moredeliberate, focused and economic character. A completelyunconstrained, disorientated production of ideas andprototypes will not only be immensely wasteful, it willhardly provide sufficient material for the subsequentselection process to work on. Although the very firststages in an innovation process are often characterizedby a relatively high degree of openness, boldness andimagination, usually there will already be an awareness,if only implicit, of practical goals, possibilities andconstraints. Eminent innovators generally excel in theirmastery of the “art of the possible”; they have a sense,however inarticulate, of where to head, and do not wastetime on pursuing dead-end paths. They do not letthemselves be bound by conventions, but they do take intoaccount known constraints and difficulties. (This is notcontradicted by the finding that innovators often have anoutstanding ability to persevere in the face ofopposition and difficulties (Klausen, forthcoming)). Thepoint is not that innovators take the line of leastresistance; it is just they opt for something which theytake to have a real chance of succeeding, even though

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others might see it otherwise and considerable challengeswill have to be met).

This alternative model, which sees the incubation ofan idea and consideration of its viability orpracticability as integrated, is supported by severalother pieces of theoretical reasoning and empiricalevidence. One piece of support comes from creativitytheory. I have argued that it is a mistake to separatethe novelty and usefulness requirement: Creative productsare value for being novel in useful ways and useful innovel ways (Klausen 2010, 356). Merely being novel anduseful is not sufficient; a completely new kind ofvehicle would not be considered a genuine innovation ifit were less useful than the existing ones. This speaksagainst relegating novelty and usefulness considerationsto separate phases in the innovation process.

The integrated model is further supported by insightsfrom the philosophy of science. Popper’s view of thescientific process, which he distinguished into aromantic, irrational phase of discovery, where “boldhypotheses” were supposedly generated at random, and asubsequent process of rigorous testing, has now beenabandoned for a historically and psychologically morerealistic picture. New hypotheses do not emerge out ofnowhere. On closer inspection, alleged revolutions andradical breakthroughs almost always turn out to be morecontinuous with the earlier developments than was firstassumed (see e.g. Bird 2008). Scientists rarely engagein mere guesswork; they make qualified guessed based ontheir prior training, experience and backgroundassumptions.

Last but not least, the integrated model fits nicelywith the point that innovation is about grasping inherent

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possibilities, and with the view that creativitytypically consists in the combination of hithertounconnected matrices. This view actually provides sort ofa solution to the creativity paradox. Since a new ideawill, on the recombination view, still be located withina “matrix”, it remains subjected to norms andconstraints, and so meets the usefulness constraint. Butsince this matrix is a new one, a novel and originalmixture, those norms and constraints will not simply bethe old ones, even if they can be traced back to, and arecontinuous with, the norms and constraints of the oldmatrices. To a certain extent, the recombination viewsolves the tension by sketching an appropriate balance,and a positive relationship, between novelty andusefulness (i.e. conformity to norms).

Yet although it is possible to handle and live withthe creativity paradox, it cannot be eliminated. Therewill always be a significant risk of overlooking thereally new and smart solutions (this risk will remainsignificant precisely because we must pay attention tonorms and actual conditions, in order to make any headwayunder time and other resource constraints). What makescreativity and innovation so marvelous and important alsomakes it notoriously difficult to control and fathom. Thephilosophers of romanticism were on to something withtheir – arguably exaggerated – notion of the “product ofgenius”: an object which appears meaningful and almostnecessary, though it could not have been planned in advanceon principles already known (Schelling 1800, 283; cf.also Kant 1790, §49). On encountering such an object, onereacts by thinking “just so!” A product of genius appearsobviously right; in retrospect it appears to one that anybody,including oneself, might – indeed should – have had this

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very same idea, though one must also admit having neveractually thought of it before. The product of geniusitself establishes the set of norms according to which itis to be judged (cf. Schelling 1800, 291).

These – admittedly somewhat lofty – notions turn tohave a surprisingly wide and practical application. Theyare not confined to the sphere of art, nor need there beanything particularly “romantic” about them, except fortheir origin. The idea of a product which so to speakcarries with it is own standards of excellence connectsclosely with Schumpeter’s insight that innovation is notso much about meeting existing demands, but rather aboutchanging the context. Radical innovation usually consistsin formulating a whole new task or creating a new demand,by teaching consumers what they might possibly want. Itis often said of the iPad that it was a device nobodyasked for or even dreamed about; it had to be inventedbefore people could see that they might want it and startjudging devices in the category “tablet” according toclear standards.

Although the two-step model exaggerates the role ofrandomness in the innovation process, it must be admittedthat luck – or, to put it more neutrally, contingentfactors – also plays its part. An innovator may have theluck of producing something which suddenly, due to achange of circumstances, becomes much more useful andthus more in demand. Howard Gardner has pointed out thatEinstein’s scientific mindset matched the premises andchallenges of early 20th century physics perfectly, butturned out to be less appropriate when quantum mechanicscame to the fore (Gardner 1983). Similarly, strongerenvironmental regulations have given manufacturers ofotherwise uncompetitive products a commercial advantage.

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There’s a clear parallel to evolutionary biology. Thetraditional “adaptationist” view came under attack fromGould and Lewontin, who argued that organisms not onlyadapt to existing conditions or occupy existing “niches”.They often create their own niches by actively shaping theirenvironment; making it match their abilities andlimitations rather than evolving to match the priorconditions. Humans are a particularly striking examplethat organisms are not merely objects, but also subjectsof evolution (Lewontin 1983). And there’s a furtherpossibility (parallel to the examples of “luck” above)that the environment changes independently of theorganisms’ own behavior, thus changing the function andvalue of their traits (e.g. through climate changes,continental drift etc.).

This means that “evolution” cannot be thought of as asingle well-defined process, as a distinctive “mechanism”underlying all evolutionary changes. It is now widelyacknowledged that evolutionary explanations are largelybackward-looking (“retrodictive”) and “narrative” (Fodor2008). They tell a selective story about how a certainkind of organism came to look as it currently does,without implying that organisms will generally evolve inthe same way, or that specific initial conditions willnecessarily lead to a certain result. Jerry Fodor hasdrawn an instructive analogy to the feats of winning battlesor getting rich. There are countless ways in which this canbe achieved, depending on how an individual interactswith the circumstances. As Fodor notes, Genghis Khan andthe heirs of Andrew Carnegie became rich in verydifferent ways, and there obviously is no recipe forgetting rich, the many “How to get rich?”-booksnotwithstanding (Fodor 2008, 24).

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Applied to the case of innovation, this means thatthere may be specific strategies and qualities which areconducive to innovation in specific circumstances, andwith regard to specific tasks. There may also be certainmore general traits and habits (e.g. openness,flexibility of mind, perseverance etc.) which increasethe likelihood of coming up with innovations even acrossdifferent circumstances. But much of what leads toinnovation in one context will not work in another; andindividuals or organizations which have difficultiessolving a certain task competitively will still be ableto come out on top, if they are able to redefine task orteach consumers to want something new, which theythemselves happen to be able to deliver. As a musician,you can of course try to trump Bach, Beethoven or Brahmsby beating them in their own ballpark. But you can alsoget into (a new) character as the Beatles and put otherskills to use. Even if you cannot really sing or play, onany mildly standard account, you can still be successful(to varying degrees) by inventing yourself as Bob Dylan,Yoko Ono or Kanye West – just as an apparently inferiorbiological organism can migrate into another environmentor specialize on tasks that have been neglected by itscompetitors.

This doesn’t mean that there are no objectivestandards of good or bad (though innovation is, to alarger extent than creativity, linked to the appreciationof audiences, and thus more “subjective” (cf. Klausen2010, 352ff., for an argument that creativity, bycontrast, is not tied to social acceptance). It couldperhaps be argued that innovations likewise only need tohave a propensity for being practically useful. But I thinkthat the notion should be understood as requiring

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innovations to be fairly immediately useful, not having toawait later changes in the environment or people’sknowledge or taste). It is just that there are endlesspossible genres, endless tasks to be solved and endlessdemands to be made. Within each genre, or with regard toeach task or demand, there are surely better and worsesolutions. But the resort to objectivity does not help tonarrow down the complexity.

Again, this is what makes innovation both so valuableand fascinating and so difficult to predict and control:It is not just about being – or becoming – the best;there are endless ways of changing the game so as to makeone’s assets count for more. This is comforting news tomany, but not to those who are keen on developinginnovation policies or recipes. We might work atoptimizing nanotechnology, developing hydrogen vehiclesor supporting new trends in film and art. But the futuremight just as well belong to other and yet unknownproduct types and genres – flip-flop-music, neo-neo-film-noir, hyperspaceships or what have you. This is noargument for laissez-faire; after all, incrementalinnovations, which are much more predictable, can do alot a good before eventually being rendered obsolete bymore radical ones – and no one knows how long this mighttake. The motor car, for example, has held its ground formore than a century, in spite of perennial fantasies ofits rapid demise, whereas the telefax turned to be almoststillborn. But it does give reason for caution andhumbleness: we should be wary of identifying certainfields, technologies or product types as particularly“innovative”, since this is an attribute they can haveonly on loan, relative to specific circumstances whichmight suddenly change.

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5. Innovation and learningInnovation and learning are widely held to be closelyconnected. For example, Pavitt (2005, 88) notes that theunpredictable character of innovation makes it cruciallydependent on either individual or collective learning.Yet most research literature on innovation has focusedrather one-sidedly on the organization types, commercialarrangements and business policies which might support orhamper innovation (see e.g. Jaffe & Trachtenberg 2002 andmost of the papers in Fagerberg et al. 2005). There hasbeen surprisingly little interest in the individual ororganizational learning processes which presumably liesat the heart of innovation (a small, but notableexception are Lam 2005. Edquist 2005 also emphasizesdifferent kinds of learning (191ff.), but from a systemsperspective, which means that his focus remains on theinstitutional framework rather than on learningprocesses per se).

In fact it is possible to argue that the relationshipbetween innovation and learning is very intimate indeed.To put it bluntly, all innovation involves learning, andall learning exemplifies innovation. Learning is, bydefinition, learning something new, and this also has tobe use- or at least meaningful (acquiring bad habits orreducing one’s performance does not really count aslearning). And innovation likewise seems to be almostalways an example of learning: when it has been carriedout successfully, someone will be able to do something heor she was not able to do before. (Possible exceptionsare those cases where innovation is due solely to achange of circumstances. One might rightly require of

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learning that it involves a certain “subjectiveconditioning”, i.e. an improvement in the capacities ofthe learner. See Paulsen 2009, 49). We might also add anintentionality condition which rules out cases of purelyaccidental discoveries as genuine examples of innovation.An innovation must depend at least partly on an intentionto create something new and useful, even though theeventual product may turn out to be markedly differentfrom how it was intended, or its success depends on otherfeatures than expected (see Klausen 2010, 357ff. for aparallel argument regarding creativity).

It might be objected that all learning may exemplifycreativity but not necessarily innovation. This is formallycorrect. It is possible to learn without improving one’spractical position. One can learn something which isquite meaningful, but nevertheless happens to be oflittle use under current (or sometimes under almost any)circumstances. Some of the verses learnt by heart inSunday schools or madrasas hardly alter the learners’practical position significantly (in fact, such examplescall even the connection between learning and creativityinto question, since a creative product is required to bemeaningful in a novel way. It would, however, beinsensible to deny that the learning of religious versescan be said to give the learner access to a meaning whichis genuinely new to her. Depending on one’s worldview, itmight also be said to improve one’s general position inthe world; and in any case, it might prove useful forpassing certain examinations. The latter point againshows how considerations of the infinity of tasks onemight possibly have to confront inevitably stretch thenotions of creativity and innovation.

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Still, the connection remains quite close. Especiallyon modern conceptions of learning as consisting in theacquisition of competences, it follows more or lessdirectly that successful learning will also be an exampleof innovation, although often on a very small scale.Apparent counterexamples can be dismissed by insisting ona more critical and exclusive notion of learning, whichrequires more than the mere amassing of knowledge; or, aswith the above example of religious rote learning, byinsisting on a broad and liberal understanding of“competences” and “tasks” (though one should avoidtrivializing the notion of innovation by equating“useful” with “meaningful” or countenance tasks that havelittle to with actual, practical human concerns). .

A further striking parallel between innovation andlearning is that both are typically brought about throughthe carrying out of novel combinations (cf. the theories ofSchumpeter and Koestler). According to the dominatingtaxonomies of learning outcomes, in particularly theSOLO-taxonomy (Biggs and Collins 1982), the highest formsof learning are those that involve a move beyond thealready appropriated, individual items of knowledge byrestructuring and linking them – the ambitious objectivesare characterized with notions like synthesis and extensionand verbs like “apply”, “relate”, “compare”, “generalize(to a new domain), “create” etc.

There is a further interesting parallel betweeninnovation and knowledge, especially knowing how, whichalso stresses the centrality of learning. According toGilbert Ryle’s classical analysis, knowing how differsfrom mere habitual behavior. A skillful person is more thanmerely “well-drilled”; she is “ready to detect andcorrect lapses, to repeat and improve upon successes, to

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profit from the examples of others” etc. (Ryle 1949,28f.). This means that a real competence, or practicalknowledge, necessarily involves a constant willingness tolearn, a sensitivity to problems and shortcomings as wellas to possibilities for improvement – this obviouslyrelates knowing how to innovation (for some doubts,however, about whether the set of dispositions describedby Ryle is really an absolutely necessary requirement foracting skillfully – it might be too strict and“intellectualist” – se Klausen 2010b)

By focusing on the connection between innovation andlearning, we are made aware of a kind of innovation whichis extremely common and of immense importance, but oftenseems to be neglected, though it has probably beenacknowledged implicitly by many. I am thinking ofinnovation that does not manifest itself directly in newproducts, but primarily in improvement processes which canlead to improved production in a broad sense (includingservices etc.). Ryle’s highlighting of the differencebetween habitual behavior and competent, knowledge-basedpractice points to a well-known phenomenon: There is adifference between merely doing one’s job, of satisfyingthe criteria laid down in advance, and permanentlyadapting and developing one’s routines so as to bettermatch the task, taking into account the inevitable,though mostly very small and gradual, change in thecircumstances, and thus the exact task at the presentmoment, exploiting small possibilities of improvementwherever they occur.

With an expression that, unfortunately, might bemisunderstood (as referring to a certain kind oftechnology, which is not intended), I shall call suchvery small and process-immanent improvement

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nanoinnovation (since it is much smaller than micro-inventions or incremental innovation; another possiblename, which more strongly emphasizes its diminutivecharacter, is picoinventions). The notion has some affinityto Kaufman and Beghetto’s notion of “mini-c creativity”(2009), though the latter is defined in terms ofmeaningful experiences. Nanoinnovation can play animportant role even when the overall product orcompetitive situation is not improved, since it can becrucial for maintaining product quality or competivenessunder hardening circumstances. The partial truth behindRyle’s self-criticism and self- improvement requirementsfor skillfulness is that in most real-life circumstancesmainly doing one’s job alright in the same habitual wayis not sufficient for really doing it alright, sinceperformance will sooner or later deteriorate. Task, evenof the most humdrum sort, are usually moving targets; tokeep matching them, one must keep on the move oneself.

It is difficult to determine the exact significanceof nanoinnovation, which can vary greatly depending onthe background conditions. An educated, “smart” andadaptable workforce is often mentioned as an importantasset for countries or companies, whereas a lack ofability to work independently and responsively areconsidered a major disadvantage, which might cancel outotherwise strong competitive advantages like e.g. lowwages, reliability and steadiness. Nanoinnovation can,however, always be outsmarted by more radical innovation(i.e. macro-inventions being put to use), which rendersobsolete the very processes which the smaller continuousinnovations aim at sustaining and improving. Even veryresponsive and adaptable makers of horse carts soon hadto give in to trains and cars, even though it took quite

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a time before the latter were produced in an equallyrefined and skillful manner. In areas and periods wheremacroinventions are relatively scarce (like parts ofparts of the 20th century arguably were, cf. Mokyr 2002,105ff.), nanoinnovation may be just as important as themicroinventions themselves, which are often spreadquickly and cheaply; the real race is for developing andmaintaining competitive ways of slightly improving,producing and marketing them. This holds not just forinnovation in the commercial sphere, but also for socialinnovation (where “marketing” should be understood as ametaphor for bringing services and practices to thetarget group).

By focusing on nanoinnovation, we are led to see howinnovation is connected to organizational learning.Innovations are solutions to task, or the simultaneouscreation and matching of new tasks. But tasks are notonly posed to individuals, they are also posed toorganizations, which are standardly defined anddelineated according to a specific task or set of tasks.Organizations can thus rightly – and not merelymetaphorically – be described as more or less innovative.The innovative potential of an organization is not justthe sum of the individual abilities of its members. Thedistribution and coordination of subtasks and theallocation of individuals with task-specific innovativepotential to appropriate within the organization iscrucial. It is possible to compensate for deficiencies inthe abilities in individuals by creating appropriateorganizational structures: an individual may be unable tosolve a problem herself, and unable to learn it in thesituation, but knowledge of and easy access to relevantexperts within the organization might do just as well. It

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is likely, however, that even the most cleverly designedorganization will need a continuous “bottom-up”adjustment and a certain responsiveness from its members,who must remain sufficiently perceptive and motivated inorder to properly use and sustain the organizationalarrangements. This again shows the importance ofnanoinnovation.

A final striking parallel between innovation andlearning concerns Schumpeter’s point that innovationoften involves the education of consumers, who must betaught to desire the products which the innovator intendsto bring to them. This applies to teaching, learning andeducation in general: It is seldom merely about teachingstudents something they don’t know, but clearly want toknow. More often, teaching aims at expanding thestudents’ horizon and thus teaching them something whichis not only unknown to them, but which they do not evendesire to know, i.e. which they do not see the point oflearning. There is a clear parallel to user-driveninvention as well: If one wishes to make one’s teachingcentered on students and their particular needs andinterests, one should look to their general situation,background and experiences, but not simply give them whatthey presently desire.

Again, Plato’s learning paradox is lurking in thebackground. One of the most fundamental problems ofteaching is that students need an initial interest in asubject in order to learn it probably – but that, in away, they cannot have such an interest before they havegot to know the subject; its full significance, and thusthe basic motivation for learning it, only shows after ithas been learned (cf. Goldman 1999, 350). The goodteacher copes with this problem much like a talented

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innovator: She produces a desire for the goods she has onoffer as she goes along, by stimulating curiosity,providing stimulating glimpses of the future benefits andmeaningful challenges that await the students beyondtheir present horizon.

6. Conclusion: What innovation is and is not Let me sum up the results of my analysis and try to dealwith some of the tensions that it might have leftunresolved. First, I suggest that innovation (in thecurrently standard, somewhat narrow sense, in which Irecommend that the word be used) should be defined asfollows:

Innovation occurs if and only if there is an intentionalproduction of something which is new and fairly immediately useful (toa novel degree) to a person or (preferably) a larger group.

That the product must be “fairly immediately useful”means that it must either i) be able to actually solve anexisting task or meets an existing demand, or ii) that itcan actually solve (“match”) a new task or meet a newdemand which was created identified or createdsimultaneously with the creation of the product, andwhich was quickly and easily recognized as such. (It isnot required that product actually solves the task, sinceit can happen that an innovation is not implemented dueto various external circumstances).

Innovation in this sense will often consist in the“translation” of an existing, yet still not practicalidea or invention into something concretely useful. Butit can also be a more integrated process which comprises

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the conception of new ideas, invention and innovation,all three elements being interrelated and simultaneouslypresent at each stage in the process.

“Production” should be understood very broadly. It isnot restricted to the creation of concrete “products”,i.e. technical devices and the like, but also comprisesbusiness models, procedures and organizationalarrangements, forms of communication etc.

Innovation must be an intentional production. Though aclear and conscious prediction of the actual outcome andits specific utility is not required, an innovation mustat least stem from an intentional effort to innovate, andthe outcome must have a certain (albeit not very great)similarity with that which was originally intended. Pureserendipitous discoveries do not count as innovations.

It follows from the definition that innovation mustnot necessarily lead to a general improvement of thestate-of-the-art on the field in question. It does notimply maximization of (and not even an increase in)overall utility, since what is useful to a certain groupcan make other and larger groups worse off. An extremelyfuel consuming car may count as innovation, if it is ableto find its buyers among a few super-rich, though itsproduction and use may be a waste of resources and dodamage to the environment. This is one reason whyinnovation is not necessarily a good thing seen from amoral point of view. Some might want to build moralstandards into the notion of innovation, but this wouldconflict with actual usage. It is more convenient andperspicuous to speak simply of responsible and irresponsibleinnovation.

Innovation must be distinguished from entrepreneurship,though the latter is clearly a special case of the

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former. An entrepreneur must be capable of making thingshappen in the social sphere, something which is not required ofan innovator. But I favor a definition ofentrepreneurship that does not tie it closely to businesstasks or aptitude for commercial success, since it shouldbe possible to countenance social entrepreneurship as well.A social entrepreneur will need managerial skills, butthese are not identical with business skills, even though mostreal-life projects in social innovation will requireskillful handling of economic issues as well.

When innovation is distinguished fromentrepreneurship, it becomes more difficult to separateit from invention. In fact I have no definite proposal fora definition of invention, and I think we will have tolive with an ineradicable overlap between the twonotions. I take it, however, that invention is closer tothe broad notion of creativity than innovation, that it liessomewhere in the middle between the two. An inventionneed not be immediately useful. It must, however, be morethan merely a meaningful idea. An invention must bepotentially useful; it must be able some practicalpurpose (though this is itself a rather vague andcontext-dependent notion, as a practical purpose does nothave to be generally acknowledged as such in advance. Wemight gain some clarity by saying that an invention willoften be merely a prototype (albeit of kind that eventuallyproves, or could be, successful), whereas innovation aimsat producing a “full design”, ready to fulfill actualpractical purposes. Typical examples from the businessliterature include the microprocessor, which was itselfan invention, but had to await subsequent innovations inorder to become concretely useful, and the iPod, whichwas itself not an invention, since the handheld MP3-

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player had been introduced several years earlier, butcounts as a major innovation, due to its improved designand user-friendliness. However, these examples also showthe arbitrariness of the distinction, since thecharacterization of innovations as successfulcombinations of already existing features also apply tomany so-called inventions (some argue that Watt inventedthe (modern) steam engine precisely because he addedadditional features to the original, inefficient design.The fact that it was just as much due to the financialsupport and marketing talent of Watt’s partner Boulton, atypical entrepreneur, that his design became the epitome ofa steam engine, highlights the interwoven nature of reallife invention and innovation processes). The differencebetween invention and innovation seems to be, at best, arelative one: Earlier innovations are conceived,retrospectively, as inventions, on which furtherinnovations can be based.

Of course, “invention” also means the creation, i.e. thevery first instance of a product of a certain type. This doesnot really distinguish it from innovation, which is alsosubject to a novelty requirement. But it does indicate adifference as to how much emphasis is put on questions oforigin, uniqueness and ownership. Inventing is about acreator being the very first; innovation is about makingthings useful, with less regard to the question of creditand originality.

On the proposed definitions, Leonardo was extremelycreative, but less innovative, since his visionarydevices were not really able to work. They cannot evencount as inventions, as they were too far from beingactually useful. Enrico Bernardi, who prototyped thepetrol combustion engine at the same time, or perhaps

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even earlier, as Karl Benz, was clearly an inventor, andalso an innovator, though he was insufficientlysuccessful in – and too little concerned with – producingand marketing his vehicles to count as an entrepreneur.By contrast, apart from being an innovator (and maybe,but only maybe, an inventor), Karl Benz was clearly alsoan entrepreneur, who attained commercial andorganizational success beyond what could be expected dueto the performance of his automobiles alone.

Finally, what are the main lessons to be learned fromthis analysis? Most importantly, innovation should beconceived neither too broadly nor too narrowly. It is anarrower, more specific notion than creativity, inasmuchas it is concerned with immediate usefulness. On theother hand, innovation is still a much broader categorythan is often realized. It is not merely found in certainfields and product types (e.g. currently fashionablehigh-tech or the commercial sphere). It can occureverywhere, and especially radical innovation is likelyto occur in new and unexpected fields – this is almost adefinitional truth, but far from trivial – and will oftengo hand in hand with the development of whole new tasksand demands. Though this is no argument againstsupporting emerging technologies or further developmentof currently existing ideas, which may prove sufficientlyrewarding in the short run, it does warn us againstclinging on too tightly to our pet projects andconcentrating our efforts too narrowly. Both the historyof human civilization and conceptual analysis of the verynotion of innovation strongly indicate that we shouldremain open to alternative pathways. So while my analysishas aimed at distinguishing innovation from creativity,and stressed its connections with immediate tasks and

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concrete solutions, it does, in the end, forge a linkbetween the two and reminds us of the practical potentialof radical new ideas.

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