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We are sorry: Intergroupapologies and their tenuous linkwith intergroup forgivenessMatthew J. Hornsey a & Michael J. A. Wohl ba School of Psychology , University of Queensland ,Australiab Carleton University , Ottawa , CanadaPublished online: 26 Jul 2013.

To cite this article: Matthew J. Hornsey & Michael J. A. Wohl (2013) We are sorry:Intergroup apologies and their tenuous link with intergroup forgiveness, EuropeanReview of Social Psychology, 24:1, 1-31, DOI: 10.1080/10463283.2013.822206

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We are sorry: Intergroup apologies and their tenuouslink with intergroup forgiveness

Matthew J. Hornsey1 and Michael J. A. Wohl2

1 School of Psychology, University of Queensland, Australia2 Carleton University, Ottawa, Canada

It is widely assumed that official apologies for historical transgressions lay thegroundwork for intergroup forgiveness. Surprisingly, however, evidence for acausal relationship between intergroup apologies and forgiveness is limited. Inthis chapter we review a series of studies examining the conditions under whichintergroup apologies appear to promote intergroup forgiveness, the conditionsunder which they have no observable effect on intergroup forgiveness, and theconditions under which they appear to undermine intergroup forgiveness. Theresearch identifies hidden pitfalls of intergroup apologies for victims, insights thatspeak to broader themes of trust and reconciliation between groups. A trust-basedmodel is described outlining the conditions that might moderate the apology–forgiveness link.

Keywords: Apology; Intergroup forgiveness; Reparations; Transgressions; Conflict;Peace; Reconciliation.

Intergroup apologies are relatively recent inventions. Until WWII there was littleevidence that nations, corporations, or religious organisations spent time soul-searching about whether they should apologise for historical transgressions.Compensation (broadly interpreted) was somewhat common, but “sorry” didnot appear to be part of the language of intergroup relations. Since WWII thissituation has changed dramatically. A trickle of apologies since the 1950s turnedinto a stream in the 1980s and has grown exponentially since. Indeed, the trendfor one group to apologise to another for historical and contemporary harms hasreached such a level that some commentators refer to it as an “age of apology”(Brooks, 1999).

Correspondence should be addressed to Professor Matthew Hornsey, School of Psychology,University of Queensland, St Lucia 4072, Queensland, Australia. E-mail: m.hornsey@uq.edu.au

Preparation of this paper was supported by a grant from the Australian Research Council to thefirst author and by a grant from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada tothe second author.

European Review of Social Psychology, 2013Vol. 24, No. 1, 1–31, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10463283.2013.822206

© 2013 European Association of Social Psychology

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In the last decade alone the US government has apologised for the AbuGhraib prisoner abuse, for the actions of soldiers in Afghanistan, for friendlyfire incidents that cost the lives of allied soldiers, and (partially) for the death of aChinese pilot after a collision with an American spy plane. The Canadian andNew Zealand governments each apologised for Chinese head taxes imposed inthe early twentieth century, and the Canadian, British, and Australian govern-ments each apologised for radical child fostering policies in the mid-twentiethcentury. Major corporations have apologised for producing unsafe toys, forcatastrophic oil spills, for nuclear leaks, and for plane accidents. The Catholicchurch has made a series of apologies: for facilitating forced adoptions, for notdoing enough to prevent child abuse, for the church’s treatment of women, forChristian involvement in the slave trade, for anti-Protestant violence during theCounter-Reformation, for the treatment of Galileo and Jan Hus, and for injusticescommitted by missionaries against indigenous peoples in the South Pacific.

It is not immediately clear what has caused this growth in intergroup apolo-gies, but it is notable that the dramatic increase has coincided with an upsurge inpolitical discourse on equality, moral accountability, and intergroup reconcilia-tion. Intergroup apologies are invested with great hope: From the victims’ pointof view they represent an acknowledgement of past harm, an affirmation ofshared moral standards, a recalibration of power and status relationships, abestowment of dignity, a symbolic gesture of intent for the future, and a chanceto lay to rest ghosts of the past (see Minow, 1998; Tutu, 1999). From thetransgressors’ point of view they represent an opportunity to unshackle thecollective memory from guilt, a removal of a moral stain, and an investment inreconciliation and intergroup harmony in the future (see Nobles, 2008; Tavuchis,1991). In this sense apologies are located in a moral context, but they also have autilitarian element. It is almost universally recognised that a failure to acknowl-edge transgressions of the past can sow the seeds for intergroup conflict in thefuture. So groups make apologies not only because it is the moral and “right”thing to do, but also in the hope that apologies will work in terms of promotingintergroup forgiveness and maintaining intergroup harmony.

In this chapter we focus attention on the latter consideration—do apologieswork? Specifically, we examine empirical research on intergroup apologiesstemming from our respective laboratories (as well as others) and discusswhether intergroup apologies promote forgiveness in members of victim groups.Importantly, this research does not speak to the question of whether groupsshould apologise for transgressions (for the record we think they should, forreasons that are elaborated in Wohl, Hornsey, & Philpot, 2011). Neither shouldthe research discussed be interpreted as implying that the sole reason to apologisewould be to promote forgiveness, or that it is a victim’s responsibility to forgivein the face of an apology (indeed this notion is critiqued elsewhere; see Harth,Hornsey, & Barlow, 2011; Wohl et al., 2011).

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Before we review this literature, we declare one last caveat (or apology inadvance). Because our respective labs are in Australia and Canada, the studiesreviewed below disproportionately draw on contexts in which Australians andCanadians were either transgressors or victims. Readers outside social psychologymay bridle at the narrow range of contexts, and the presumption that the under-lying processes that we articulate here can necessarily be extrapolated into othercountries (especially non-Western cultures) and other contexts. To this we providethe usual social psychological defence: Although we acknowledge that everycontext is different, and that these differences are sometimes profound, our analysisconcerns itself with the psychology of trust and intergroup relations, issues that inthe past have been found to be quite robust across cultures and contexts. We dopresume, then, that the parameters and processes discussed below apply to mostcontexts, most of the time, and we ask for forgiveness in advance for those who areoffended by any glibness or crudeness of analysis that this implies.

SETTING THE STAGE: DEFINITION OF APOLOGIES ANDFORGIVENESS

Most theorists agree that apologies are commonly defined as communications inwhich offending parties acknowledge responsibility or guilt for an offence, andexpress regret or remorse for this offence to an offended party (Scher & Darley,1997; Tavuchis, 1991). An expression of responsibility is also essential; withoutthis element a statement of regret or remorse functions more as an expression ofcondolence, empathy, or sympathy than as a true apology (Lazare, 2004). All ofthe apologies discussed in this article include these basic elements.

The most extensive analysis of the content of spoken apologies is the CrossCultural Speech Acts Realisation Project (see Blum-Kulka, House, & Kasper,1989; Blum-Kulka & Oshtain, 1984; Scher & Darley, 1997) that studied inter-personal apologies across five countries. Content analysis identified four basicelements of an apology speech act. Two of the elements—expression of remorseand responsibility to the victim—have already been discussed. In addition tothese elements it was found that apologies often include promises of forbearance(e.g., “It will never happen again”), and offers of repair (e.g., “I will make it up toyou”). Some of the studies on intergroup apology we review in this chapterinclude all of these ingredients, and some do not, although it remains an openquestion whether or not the inclusion of multiple criteria adds to the effectivenessof an apology.

Forgiveness is not as easily defined as apologies. Indeed, scholars from manydifferent disciplines have grappled with the definition of forgiveness, includingresearchers in religion, philosophy, political science, and psychology. At presentthere is only a broad, workable consensus on what forgiveness is not.Specifically, forgiveness is generally recognised to be distinct from forgetting,excusing, or condoning hurtful behaviour (see McCullough, Pargament, &

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Thoresen, 2000; Murphy & Hampton, 1988). With regard to what forgiveness is,there are some conceptual debates. Some theorists emphasise the interpersonalnature of forgiveness (Flanigan, 1994), while others state that it is an intrapsychicprocess (McCullough, 2000, 2001; Murphy & Hampton, 1988), and manymaintain that it is both (Pargament, McCullough, & Thoresen, 2000;Zechmeister & Romero, 2002). Others argue that forgiveness has behaviouralcorollaries—for example reduction in revenge and avoidance motivations—thatare central to the definition of the construct (McCullough, Worthington, &Rachal, 1997).

Despite the subtle differences that exist, one core belief unites most definitionsof forgiveness: the belief that forgiveness involves a change in emotion andattitude away from negative states regarding the offender towards more positivestates (McCullough et al., 2000). We use this understanding of forgiveness andapply it to the intergroup context. Specifically, the term intergroup forgiveness isapplied to a set of intrapsychic changes in which a reduction in negative emo-tions and cognitions towards an offender group results in a decreased motivationto retaliate or maintain estrangement from that group. In the following sectionswe review some of the small, but increasing, number of studies that haveexamined the antecedents of intergroup apologies and forgiveness. We do sowith an eye towards outlining the conditions under which apologies may or maynot promote intergroup forgiveness.

RESEARCH ON INTERGROUP APOLOGIES

We are aware of little empirical work prior to 2008 (and certainly no experi-mental work) that examined the relationship between intergroup apology andforgiveness. For example, in Brooks’ (1999) seminal collection of 85 chapters onintergroup apologies, there were no quantitative contributions to the question ofintergroup apology effectiveness and only one contribution from a psychologyresearcher: Approaches tended to rely on historical analysis, legal examination,interview data, archival data, and occasionally on intellectualisation and intro-spection. This is perhaps not surprising given the complex, sensitive and multi-dimensional nature of the question, elements of which do not always lendthemselves to empirical analysis.

Where empirical social psychologists had engaged with the issue of inter-group apologies it tended to be as a dependent variable. For example, research oncollective guilt often examined support for (or arguments against) intergroupapologies as an outcome variable on the reasonable assumption that this wouldprovide a broad proxy for reconciliation intentions (see Doosje, Branscombe,Spears, & Manstead, 1998, 2006; Leach, Iyer, & Pedersen, 2006; McGarty et al.,2005). We know from this literature that high levels of collective guilt promotegreater intentions to compensate for an historical transgression (either in terms offinancial reparation, acknowledging negative aspects of a group history, or

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directly apologising). What was absent, however, was an examination of the“What then?” question: Specifically, are there discernable effects of intergroupapologies on victim and transgressor groups?

RESEARCH ON THE ANTECEDENTS OF INTERGROUPFORGIVENESS

Research on forgiveness typically has focused on interpersonal transgressions.After several decades of research we have a relatively sophisticated understand-ing of (a) how to define and measure interpersonal forgiveness, (b) the relationaland intrapsychic sequelae of interpersonal forgiveness (e.g., in terms of well-being and mental health), and (c) the factors that lead people to be more or lesswilling to forgive individual transgressors (for reviews, see Exline, Worthington,Hill, & McCullough, 2003; Fehr, Gelfand, & Nag, 2010).

It has only been relatively recently that social psychologists have conductedempirical work on forgiveness that flows on from an intergroup transgression.Some of this work has focused on the individual differences that make peoplemore or less willing to engage in intergroup forgiveness. For example, Reed andAquino (2003) showed that Americans were more likely to report forgiveness forterrorists following the September 11 attacks if they considered a strong sense ofmorality to be important to their identity.

The literature on intergroup forgiveness accelerated with a raft of studies onthe legacy of Catholic–Protestant conflict in Northern Ireland. McLernon, Cairns,Hewstone, and Smith (2004) found that the degree of hurt Catholics experiencedwas a strong negative predictor of intergroup forgiveness; more so than the typeof hurt (whether verbal abuse, physical abuse, or bereavement) and the amount oftime since the incident. In contrast, forgiveness was positively predicted byoutgroup trust, outgroup contact, the positivity of outgroup attitudes, and per-spective taking / outgroup empathy (Hewstone, Cairns, Voci, Hamberger, &Niens, 2006; Moeschberger, Dixon, Niens, & Cairns, 2005; Noor, Brown,Gonzalez, Manzi, & Lewis, 2008; Noor, Brown, & Prentice, 2008; Tam et al.,2007; see also similar findings in the Bosnian context: Cehajic, Brown, &Castano, 2008). Furthermore, it was clear that people were more willing toforgive transgressions committed by their own group members than by similartransgressions attributed to the outgroup (Hewstone et al., 2004).

Researchers have also been able to promote intergroup forgiveness throughexperimental and clinical interventions. Wohl and Branscombe (2005) primedJewish participants to think of contemporary Germans as members of a distinctoutgroup (Germans) or as co-members of a superordinate “human” identity.Invocation of the inclusive human identity was effective in promoting greaterforgiveness for contemporary Germans (see also Cehajic et al., 2008, for ademonstration of the power of inclusive categorisations as a facilitator of inter-group forgiveness). In addition, a field intervention in Rwanda—involving 12

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hours of psycho-educational lectures, small-group discussion, and empathicsupport—led to reduced trauma symptoms and a more positive orientationtowards members of the rival group, both over time and when compared tocontrol groups (Staub, Pearlman, Gubin, & Hagengimana, 2005).

DO APOLOGIES PROMOTE FORGIVENESS? THE OPTIMISTICEVIDENCE

Early work explicitly examining the effects of collective apologies on intergroupforgiveness was relatively optimistic. Brown, Wohl, and Exline (2008) drew on areal-world historical transgression in which an American F-16 fighter jet acciden-tally dropped a bomb on Canadian soldiers in Afghanistan, killing four andinjuring eight. A pilot study revealed that Canadians were aware of the incidentbut foggy about the official American position and whether any apology had beenmade. This uncertainty allowed for an experimental manipulation of the presenceof an American apology for the incident. In the apology condition the US DefenceSecretary was reported to have expressed “his deep regret and sadness over thetragic accident” and apologised to the families of the casualties as well as theCanadian army. In the no-apology control condition the Defence Secretary merelyassured his Canadian counterpart of the US’s cooperation in the investigation. Thisapology manipulation influenced willingness to forgive, measured using a mod-ified version of McCullough et al.’s (1997) interpersonal forgiveness scale, as areduction in the motive to avoid Americans and seek revenge against Americans.Specifically, Canadian participants were more forgiving of Americans in thepresence of an apology. The apology also translated into willingness to continueCanadian support of American military efforts in Afghanistan.

Informatively, not all Canadians reacted to the apology in a similar manner.The positive apology–forgiveness link was particularly pronounced forCanadians who did not believe being Canadian was an important part of theirself-definition (i.e., low identifiers). Among participants who believed theirnationality was important to their sense of self (i.e., high identifiers) the responseto the apology was also positive in that they reported a greater willingness toforgive compared to those who were not exposed to an apology, but the effectwas not as strong (resulting in a significant interaction; see Figures 1 and 2 forthe interaction of apology and identification on the motive to avoid and seekrevenge against Americans, respectively).

Leonard, Mackie, and Smith (2011) replicated the positive effects of apology,and also specified the emotional underpinnings of these effects. After being toldthat a group of university professors had published a public letter criticising thestudent culture, student participants were told that the authors had either apol-ogised or refused to apologise. Apologising led to reduced desire for retribution(an effect mediated by anger) and increased forgiveness (an effect mediated byrespect).

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DO APOLOGIES PROMOTE FORGIVENESS? THE PESSIMISTICEVIDENCE

At the same time that Brown and colleagues (2008) published data suggestingthat apologies have an ameliorative effect on intergroup hostility, Philpot andHornsey (2008) published a series of studies suggesting otherwise. Philpot andHornsey presented Australian undergraduate students with one of five historical

Figure 2. The interaction between apology and identification as a Canadian on revenge againstAmericans.

Figure 1. The interaction between apology and identification as a Canadian on avoidance ofAmericans.

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cases in which Australians and Australian interests were harmed by outgrouptransgressions: The abuse of Australian POWs by Japanese soldiers in WWII;French nuclear testing in the Mururoa Atoll; Saudi financing of organisationssubsequently implicated in the Bali bombings that killed 88 Australians; sys-tematic doping of East German athletes in the 1970s and 1980s that deniedAustralians medals; and abuses of process in a therapeutic goods company thatresulted in many Australians being hospitalised.1 After reading about a transgres-sion, participants were told either that the transgressing group had apologised orhad not apologised. In the apology condition participants were led to believe thatthe outgroup’s response had contained all the ingredients of a full apology (asdefined by Blum-Kulka & Oshtain, 1984): it used the word “sorry”, there was anacknowledgement of responsibility, there was a promise that it would neverhappen again, and there was an offer of compensation. In the no-apology controlcondition participants were simply told that the outgroup had never formallycommented on the offences.

In all four studies the apology manipulation caused large, significant effectson perceptions of remorse and on response satisfaction. Specifically, participantswho were led to believe that an apology had occurred saw the outgroup assignificantly more remorseful, and were significantly more satisfied with theresponse, than were participants who were led to believe that an apology hadnot been delivered. But means remained below the midpoint in both conditions,indicating that perceptions of non-remorsefulness and dissatisfaction remainedeven in the presence of an apology. Underscoring this theme, on a measure ofulterior motives (e.g., “to what extent do you think the apology was motivated bypressure from outside sources?”; “to what extent do you think the apology wasmotivated by a need to avoid punishment?”) the scores in the apology conditionoften approached the ceiling of the scale.

In all the studies in this paper forgiveness was measured using a 30-item scalecapturing affective, cognitive, and behavioural components of forgiveness(adapted from the Enright Forgiveness Inventory; Enright, Rique, & Cole,2000), as well as a single-item proxy (“To what extent have you forgiven theoffender?”). On both measures in Study 1 the apology manipulation had noeffect. Neither did the apology have an effect on ratings of empathy towards theoutgroup and a measure of likelihood that the outgroup would reoffend. In other

1 In Studies 1–3 of this paper, five historical transgressions were used to boost generalisability ofconclusions. The five transgressions were randomised in the design and specific transgression was notexamined as a separate independent variable in its own right. Note that the transgressions presented toparticipants were grounded in real events with two exceptions. First, the use of Saudi money tofinance terror cells in Indonesia was an allegation deemed credible enough to be investigated byAustralian Federal Police, but to our knowledge was never proven. Second, the relevance of theFrench nuclear testing issue to Australians was boosted by giving the (false) implication that thenuclear tests had damaged the Great Barrier Reef. Of course all participants were thoroughlydebriefed.

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words, there was no evidence for an apology–forgiveness link (see Table 1 for asummary of results).

Philpot and Hornsey reasoned that one cause for the weak and inconsistenteffects of apology was that participants did not have much time to process theapology—emotionally or cognitively—before they were presented with thedependent measures. Study 2 was designed to give participants that time, andto draw out the temporal nature of the apology–forgiveness link. Participantswere presented with the offence information and immediately recorded levels offorgiveness (Time 1). Participants then completed all the key measures fromStudy 1 both immediately after the apology manipulation (Time 2) and again aweek later (Time 3). Interestingly, perceptions of both remorse and satisfactiondeteriorated across time, and particularly so in the apology condition (seeTable 2). If anything, then, attitudes towards the apology seemed to hardenwith time. Although forgiveness levels drifted upwards across time, they did sofrom a low base, and did so equally in the apology and the no-apologyconditions.

One possible reason Studies 1 and 2 failed to find an apology–forgiveness linkis that, as people who were not primary victims of the transgression, participantsbelieved they did not have permission to forgive. Qualitative research inNorthern Ireland suggests that when loved ones are hurt, letting go of angertowards the perpetrators can feel disloyal and disrespectful (McLernon, Cairns, &Hewstone, 2002). It could be, then, that participants are choosing not to forgiveas a way of “keeping faith” with victims. In an effort to unlock the effects ofapology on forgiveness, Philpot and Hornsey designed a third study in which aningroup victim advocated forgiveness. As in the earlier studies, participants weregiven one of five examples of historical transgression, and again were led to

TABLE 1

Effects of apology: Experiment 1, Philpot & Hornsey (2008)

Apology condition No apology condition

30-item forgiveness scale 2.61 (0.86) 2.92 (0.80)Single item forgiveness 2.45 (1.11) 2.55 (1.18)Perceived remorse 3.60a (1.16) 2.50b (1.03)Re-offence likelihood 4.50 (1.90) 4.17 (1.71)Response satisfaction 2.88a (1.43) 1.87b (0.89)Empathy 3.02 (1.47) 3.11 (1.65)Ulterior motives 6.01a (0.90) 4.11b (1.77)

Means not sharing a subscript are significantly different at p < .05. Numbers in parentheses arestandard deviations. All scores rated on a 1–7 scale, except the 30-item forgiveness scale (1–6) andthe single-item forgiveness scale (1–5). Philpot & Hornsey (2008). The final, definitive version of thispaper has been published in Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 34/4, April 2008 by SAGEPublications Ltd, All rights reserved. © SAGE. http://psp.sagepub.com/content/34/4/474

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believe the transgressor group had apologised or had not. After the manipulationof apology participants were either presented with no advocate or with a state-ment in which a person advocated forgiveness. In the key experimental conditionthis passage was ostensibly an extract from an interview with a primary victim.For example, in the context of the Japanese maltreatment of POWs in WWII,participants read:

While I’m sad about what the Japanese did and I want to see that justice is done, I alsothink that it’s time that Australia forgave and moved on. The Japanese were brutal and itmeant that a lot of my mates died. It was horrific and I was torn apart at the time. Butthere comes a time when you just need to forgive people for what they have done. Weneed to deal with the past and get on with the future.

Surprisingly, the advocate manipulation had no effect on any measures,regardless of whether there was an advocate (see Table 3 for a summary).Furthermore, the apology manipulation had the same effects (and non-effects)as it did in Studies 1 and 2: an increase in perceptions of remorse and responsesatisfaction (albeit from a low base) and no discernable effect on forgiveness.Interestingly, the apology manipulation did influence the extent to which parti-cipants from the victimised group felt like they had a right to forgive. However,the effect was in the opposite direction to that predicted; participants reportedsignificantly less of a right to forgive in the apology condition than in the no-apology condition. Although it remains a mystery why this effect was observed,

TABLE 2

Effects of apology: Experiment 2, Philpot & Hornsey (2008)

Measure Time point Apology No apology

30-item forgiveness Time 1 2.99 (0.75) 2.88 (0.81)Time 2 3.56 (1.03) 3.28 (0.89)Time 3 3.61 (0.87) 3.31 (0.93)

Single item forgiveness Time 1 3.15 (1.26) 2.91 (1.19)Time 2 3.41 (1.07) 3.02 (1.18)Time 3 3.52 (0.99) 3.18 (1.05)

Perceived remorse Time 2 4.54b (1.39) 3.22a (1.00)Time 3 3.72b (1.39) 2.68a (0.90)

Response satisfaction Time 2 4.26b (1.42) 2.24a (1.26)Time 3 3.58b (1.28) 2.30a (1.09)

Ulterior motives Time 2 5.65b (0.70) 4.74a (1.45)Time 3 5.68b (1.25) 4.77a (1.66)

Effects of time were significant for all measures except ulterior motives. Effects of apology weresignificant for all measures except forgiveness (means in rows with different subscripts are signifi-cantly different at p < .05). Numbers in parentheses are standard deviations. All scores rated on a 1–7scale, except the single-item forgiveness scale (1–5). Philpot & Hornsey (2008). The final, definitiveversion of this paper has been published in Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 34/4, April2008 by SAGE Publications Ltd, All rights reserved. © SAGE. http://psp.sagepub.com/content/34/4/474

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the perverse effect of apology on perceptions of one’s right to forgive under-scores the generally gloomy picture being painted about the link betweenapologies and forgiveness.

In the fourth and final study of this chapter the design was expanded so thetransgression (and the resultant apology) was linked to either the collective(Japanese generals and soldiers in WWII) or to an individual soldier who hadparticipated in abuses at a notorious POW camp in WWII.2 Also, forgivenesswas measured at three levels: towards Japanese today; towards Japanese generalsand soldiers in WWII; and towards the individual soldier. These levels offorgiveness were not affected by the presence or otherwise of the collectiveapology (i.e., an apology delivered by the Japanese government). This completedthe perfect set of null results when testing the relationship between collectiveapologies and intergroup forgiveness. Interestingly, though, when the apologywas delivered by the individual soldier, forgiveness towards that soldierincreased relative to the no-apology control, an effect that was mediated byperceptions of remorse (see Figure 3). These results suggest that there is potentialfor interpersonal apologies to produce interpersonal forgiveness, but intergroupapologies have no observable effect on intergroup forgiveness.

Of course, null results in research are notoriously difficult to “sell” becausethere are always multiple plausible reasons why an effect did not occur. Of

TABLE 3

Effects of apology and advocacy: Experiment 3, Philpot & Hornsey (2008)

Apology condition No apology condition

Victim advocate No advocate Victim advocate No advocate

30-item forgiveness scale 3.64 (0.64) 3.51 (0.84) 3.27 (0.78) 3.09 (0.89)Single-item forgiveness 3.46 (0.89) 3.18 (1.10) 3.20 (0.80) 2.67 (1.07)Perceived remorse 3.26 (1.41) 3.38 (1.03) 2.41 (1.36) 2.54 (1.52)Response satisfaction 3.57 (1.30) 3.64 (1.25) 1.86 (1.05) 1.95 (1.05)Right to forgive 3.70 (1.61) 3.82 (1.67) 4.14 (1.37) 3.93 (1.39)Ulterior motives 5.88 (0.82) 5.75 (1.06) 4.44 (1.47) 4.91 (1.23)

Numbers in parentheses are standard deviations. All scores rated on a 1–7 scale, except the single-item forgiveness scale (1–5). In the original study there were also conditions in which the advocatewas an outgroup member or an ingroup member who was not a direct victim. No significant effects ofadvocate emerged on any measure. Main effects of apology emerged on all measures except forgive-ness. Philpot & Hornsey (2008). The final, definitive version of this paper has been published inPersonality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 34/4, April 2008 by SAGE Publications Ltd, All rightsreserved. © SAGE. http://psp.sagepub.com/content/34/4/474

2 In Studies 1–3 no emotion term was used other than “sorry”. In Study 4 the regular apologyscript was counterbalanced with a more emotional script in which the apologiser made reference to“deep remorse”, “regret”, and “grief”. Responses to the “emotional” apology script from the Japanesegovernment were no different from those to the non-emotional script.

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particular concern was the failure of the experimental paradigm to capture thetemporal dimension of forgiveness. Process models (e.g., McCullough, Fincham,& Tsang, 2003; Sells & Hargrave, 1998) emphasise the temporal evolution offorgiveness—apologies and other gestures of reconciliation plant a seed offorgiveness that may flower over time, after a period of emotional and cognitiveprocessing. Although Study 2 in Philpot and Hornsey (2008) used a pre/postdesign, it did so over the course of a relatively short period, much shorter thanthe duration some theorists suggest is needed for observable levels of forgivenessto emerge (see Worthington et al., 2000).

Concerned by this prospect, Philpot and Hornsey (2011) conducted a series ofsurvey studies that avoided the truncated stimulus-measurement routine thatexperiments are bound by. The first study in this paper surveyed 348 participantsfrom three nations that had suffered from Japanese aggression in WWII:Australia (n = 120 university students), the Philippines (n = 94 universitystudents), and Malaysia (n = 134 members of the community all aged over30). Participants were simply asked if they believed Japan had apologised ornot for their WWII aggression (yes, no, or unsure).

This study found evidence at last for a link between apologies and forgiveness.Participants who believed that Japan had apologised for WWII were more forgiv-ing than those who were uncertain or who were certain that Japan had notapologised. Two caveats to this relationship should be noted, however. First, therelationship was relatively weak, accounting for approximately 4% of variance.Second, and more importantly, when participants were asked whether theybelieved Japan had apologised or not for WWII, they appeared to have littleidea. Nearly two-thirds said they were uncertain. Of course not everybody is astudent of history and so the high level of uncertainty should not come as asurprise. What is more interesting is what happened with the 35% who claimedthey were certain about the answer. Of these, the majority (representing 22% of thetotal sample) were certain that Japan had not apologised, and the rest (13% of thetotal sample) were certain that Japan had apologised. It was this last subsample

Individual apology Individual forgiveness

Perceived remorsefulness

.68***.51***

.26** (–.09)

Figure 3. The role of perceived remorsefulness in mediating the effects of an individual apology onforgiveness for the individual: Philpot & Hornsey, 2008; Experiment 4. The final, definitive version ofthis paper has been published in Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 34/4, April 2008 bySAGE Publications Ltd. All rights reserved. ©SAGE. http://psp.sagepub.com/content/34/4/474

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who answered the question correctly. At the time of the study, Japan had madeclose to 20 statements of regret for its WWII aggression, some of which comprisedall the ingredients of a “full” apology and had been legitimised by the Japaneseparliament. Yet only about 1 in 10 people had internalised this fact.

A second data set within the same study confirmed the sense of randomnesscaptured in the Japan data. This study was conducted just a few months after amajor corporate scandal in Australia. The quality assurance processes of a ther-apeutic goods company proved to be so sloppy and corrupt that it resulted in manyAustralian consumers getting sick or being hospitalised. Again, many participants(47.5%) were uncertain of whether or not the company had apologised. Of thosewho were certain, the answers skewed heavily into the “yes” column (46.5%).Only 6% of participants were certain that the company had never apologised. Infact it was this small minority who were correct. Yet nearly half the sample—participants who were given the option to say they were uncertain—“remembered”an apology that had never existed. Of interest also was the fact that thesecompeting memories for the apology had no effect on the 30-item measure offorgiveness, although they did have an effect on the 1-item proxy.

In sum, participants’ representations of apology histories appeared to belargely divorced from reality. This raises the question: If representations of anapology history are not linked to reality, then what are they linked to? In Study 2,Australian participants were again asked whether they believed Japan had apol-ogised for WWII, only this time on a 7-point scale from 1 (I’m completelycertain they haven’t apologised) to 7 (I’m completely certain they have apol-ogised). One week prior, participants completed a number of measures ofideology (right-wing authoritarianism, social dominance orientation, belief in ajust world) as well as a measure of national identification. In terms of predictingawareness of the apology, the only significant variable was national identifica-tion. The more participants identified with being Australian, the less likely theywere to believe that Japan had apologised for WWII.

It is not immediately clear why this might be the case. One possibility—thathigh identifiers have a higher bar for determining whether a statement of regretqualifies as a “true” apology—can be ruled out. At the end of the surveyparticipants were given three statements of regret that Japan has made sinceWWII and rated the extent to which they saw these statements as genuineapologies. This measure was uncorrelated with national identification. A secondpossibility—untestable in this study—is that high identifiers expose themselvesto different sources of information, with the effect that they are less aware of theapology history than are low identifiers. A final possibility is that high identifiersare motivated to believe that Japan has not atoned for their WWII history. Again,this explanation cannot be tested with the data, but it is consistent with recenttheorising that sometimes group members are motivated to hang on to victim-hood, perhaps because historical victimhood offers a rallying point for solidarity,and perhaps as a way of defending the group from accusations of moral

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transgression (Noor, Shnabel, Halabi, & Nadler, 2012; Sullivan, Landau,Branscombe, & Rothschild, 2012; Wohl & Branscombe, 2008).

Interestingly, although national identification was correlated with apologyawareness, it was not reliably correlated with forgiveness. Neither did apologyawareness correlate with forgiveness, representing a failure to replicate the effectdemonstrated in Study 1. Thus, intergroup apologies were non-significantlyrelated to intergroup forgiveness across five of the six studies reported byPhilpot and Hornsey (2008, 2011).

With its disproportionate focus on Australian participants who were notprimary victims of the transgression, readers would be wise not to over-extra-polate from the studies of Philpot and Hornsey to conclude that apologies have aweak capacity to promote forgiveness. But other studies outside this lab reinforcethe pessimistic picture. For example, as part of a 6-year project, Chapman (2007)engaged in textual analysis of the transcripts of the South African Truth andReconciliation Commission, as well as follow-up focus groups among partici-pants. Chapman noted that victims of the apartheid regime rarely raised thenotion of forgiveness spontaneously, and when they did they expressed a reluc-tance to grant it despite the apologies offered. Instead, forgiveness was seen as apassive and weak response to wrongs, which should not be offered merelybecause the perpetrator decides to apologise (see also Digeser, 2001).

Survey studies conducted before and after the Canadian government’s 2008apology to the Chinese Canadian community for the head tax imposed onChinese Immigrants also tended to confirm the somewhat ambivalent responsethat victim group members can have to apologies (see Wohl, Matheson,Branscombe, & Anisman, in press). This apology was offered because, from1881 to 1885, 15,000 labourers were recruited from China in order to build atrans-Canada railway. Once the railway was completed, the Canadian govern-ment instituted a massive head tax on Chinese immigrants, and all peoples ofChinese descent were denied Canadian citizenship.

In anticipation of the apology being offered, Wohl and colleagues (in press)examined Chinese Canadians’ beliefs about the sincerity of the apology, expecta-tions the apology would improve intergroup relations, and willingness to forgiveEuropean Canadians. They also measured European Canadians’ beliefs andexpectations about the apology. One year after the apology had been deliveredthey re-assessed Chinese Canadians about whether their expectations were metand about their willingness to forgive European Canadians. This represented thefirst time a study had examined perceptions of an apology among members of theperpetrator and victimised groups simultaneously. It was also the first timemembers of a victimised group were assessed at the time of the apology andagain a year later.

Impressions of the apology varied as a function of group membership.Specifically, Chinese Canadians (the victimised group) were more likely thanEuropean Canadians (the perpetrator group) to believe that the apology was

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offered with sincerity. In terms of the perceived outcome of the apology, bothChinese and European Canadians held similar (i.e., non-significantly different),but moderate expectations that the apology would yield improvements in inter-group relations. Moreover, the more participants believed that the apology wassincerely offered, the greater their expectations that the apology would improveintergroup relations.

Importantly, the extent to which European Canadians accepted collective guiltfor the head tax played a moderating role in predicting their impressions andexpectations of the apology expressed on behalf of their group. Only at highlevels of collective guilt acceptance was perceived apology sincerity associatedwith expectations for improved intergroup relations. This result is in line withtheoretical and empirical evidence suggesting that accepting collective guiltmotivates the desire to repair harms committed (Branscombe, 2004; Wohl,Branscombe, & Klar, 2006). Indeed, the text of the apology typically makesexplicit reference to feelings of remorse and the perpetrator group’s desire to actin ways that move relations with the victimised group forward in a pro-socialmanner (Blatz, Schumann, & Ross, 2009).

Chinese Canadians were rather forgiving of European Canadians immediatelyfollowing the apology. This said, among those Chinese Canadians who weremore likely to assign collective guilt to European Canadians for the past trans-gression, forgiveness was dependent on perceiving the apology as sincere.Specifically, at high levels of collective guilt assignment, perceiving the apologyto be sincere was associated with greater forgiveness of European Canadians. Atlower levels of collective guilt assignment, forgiveness was relatively highirrespective of perceived sincerity.

Although impressions and expectations of an apology at the time of itsoffering are informative, a key test of any intergroup apology is whether itproduces the change that is anticipated from its offering. To examine this,Wohl and colleagues (in press) re-assessed Chinese Canadian perceptions oneyear later. Belief that the apology would have a positive impact on intergrouprelations remained unchanged. However, collective guilt assignment moderatedthis effect. Specifically, Chinese Canadians who regarded European Canadians asresponsible for the harm their ancestors experienced were less likely to perceivetangible pro-social change in intergroup relations. This might help explain thefact that, over the course of the year, forgiveness of European Canadians waned.In other words, forgiveness was lower one year after the apology than at the timeof the apology.

A similar pattern was observed within the context of the CanadianGovernment’s apology to Aboriginal Peoples for the abuses suffered in theIndian Residential School (IRS) system. Bombay, Matheson, and Anisman(2013) found that, although the apology raised expectations that it wouldimprove intergroup relations, the apology was not seen to be sufficient to over-come perceived continued discrimination, thus impeding trust in non-Aboriginals

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as well as forgiveness for the IRS. Thus the research coming out of Canadasuggests some initial optimism that an apology would improve intergroup rela-tions. However, the link between apology and forgiveness appears to weakenover time—likely due to expectations not being met.

MODERATORS: WHEN DO APOLOGIES SUCCEED AND WHENDO THEY FAIL?

In light of mixed results some researchers have moved on from examining thequestion “Do intergroup apologies promote forgiveness?” to examining thequestion “Under what conditions do intergroup apologies promote forgiveness?”To date, most attention has been paid to the type of emotions displayed throughthe apology. For example, Giner-Sorolla, Castano, Espinosa, and Brown (2008)presented participants with a “one-to-many” apology (i.e., a single transgressorapologises to his or her many victims) from a ship’s captain who expressedresponsibility for an oil spill. Across studies, the emotional expression carriedwithin the apology was manipulated (i.e., shame versus guilt) as was the pre-sence of an offer of compensation from the oil company. The authors found thatan offer of compensation was received as somewhat insulting by participants, aninsult that was reduced when the captain expressed shame rather than guilt in theapology. Note that there was no baseline no-apology condition in this manu-script, so the effectiveness of the apology per se cannot be determined. But thisstudy highlights how nuances associated with the emotional expression within anapology can have a significant influence on how the apology is received.

More recently, Wohl, Hornsey, and Bennett (2012) drew on principles ofinfrahumanisation to make predictions around what types of emotional expres-sions might be expected to best promote forgiveness. These principles build on adistinction between two types of emotion: primary emotions, which are seen tobe primitive, basic emotions experienced by animals as well as humans (e.g.,fear, anger, sadness, pleasure), and secondary emotions which are higher-orderemotions presumed to be experienced only by humans (e.g., shame, sorrow, guilt,hope). According to Leyen and his colleagues (Leyens et al., 2000; Leyens,Demoulin, Vaes, Gaunt, & Paladino, 2007; Paladino, Vaes, Castano, Demoulin,& Leyens, 2004), the capacity to experience primary emotions is attributedequally to ingroup and outgroup members. However, the capacity to experiencesecondary emotions is attributed more to ingroups than to outgroups.

This perceived differential ability to experience secondary emotions raises aconundrum for outgroup members who wish to express apologies for a historicaltransgression, because many of the emotions that are typically communicatedthrough an apology—guilt, remorse, shame—are secondary emotions. If there isa robust bias such that outgroup members are denied the capacity to experiencethese types of emotions, does this lead to a plausibility problem when anoutgroup member claims that they feel these emotions? If this is the case, it

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would be predicted that outgroup apologies would be more effective when theyare expressed using primary emotions than when they are expressed usingsecondary emotions. To explore this possibility Wohl and colleagues (2012)conducted several studies drawing on real events from the war in Afghanistan.

The first study in this paper was designed to test whether infrahumanisationof outgroups emerges even in the context of a supposedly humanising eventlike an apology. Canadian participants were led to believe that Canadiansoldiers had accidentally killed allies from the Afghanistan National Police(ANP), or vice versa. Participants in each case received an apology from therelevant Defence Minister, and were asked the extent to which they believedthat the transgressor group (Canadian soldiers or the ANP, depending oncondition) felt various primary emotions (confusion, fear, and panic) andsecondary emotions (grief, sorrow, anguish, guilt, and remorse) in response tothe harm they caused.

Unsurprisingly, an intergroup bias in forgiveness was present. Participantsforgave the ingroup more than the outgroup even though the transgressions wereidentical (see also Hewstone et al., 2004). Of more relevance to the currentquestion, there was also a robust tendency to infrahumanise Afghans. In otherwords the Canadian participants attributed more secondary emotion (but equalamounts of primary emotion) to Canadian soldiers than to the ANP. Interestingly,willingness to forgive the ANP increased as a function of the extent to whichvictim group members attributed secondary emotion (not primary emotion) to thetransgressor group, an effect that was mediated by empathy. Support was notfound for alternate models where empathy predicts attribution of secondaryemotions via forgiveness, or where forgiveness predicts attribution of secondaryemotions via empathy. This lends preliminary support to the notion that infra-humanisation matters in the context of forgiveness: Outgroups are disproportio-nately denied the perceived capacity to experience secondary emotions, and themore they are denied this capacity the less likely they are to be forgivenfollowing an intergroup transgression (see also Tam et al., 2007, for a similarfinding in the Northern Ireland context).

An argument could be made that a simple way for transgressor groups toovercome the dampening effects of infrahumanisation on forgiveness would beto express uniquely human, secondary emotion in their apologies. In this under-standing, expression of secondary emotions should have a humanising effect onhow the outgroup is perceived, leading to an increase in forgiveness. Vaes andcolleagues, however, found that the expression of secondary emotions by anoutgroup is inconsistent with ingroup members’ beliefs about the outgroup’semotional capacity (Vaes, Paladino, Castelli, Leyens, & Giovanazzi, 2003). Inthis light, should outgroups express secondary emotions a plausibility gap mightopen between what the outgroup claims to feel and what the outgroup is believedto have the capacity to feel—a plausibility gap that might undermine forgiveness.If this is the case, expressing secondary emotions in an intergroup apology might

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be counter-productive. Studies 2a and 2b were designed to test whether theefficacy of (outgroup) apologies would be helped or hindered by the expressionof secondary emotions compared to primary emotions.

To test the competing predictions, in Study 2a Canadian participants receivedan apology from the Afghan Defence Minister for the friendly fire incidentreferred to in the first study. The apology was expressed using either primaryemotion terms (they were “angered and saddened” by the incident) or secondaryemotion terms (they felt “shame and concern” about the incident). In Study 2bAmerican participants were told of an incident in which poor quality controlmechanisms led to China exporting toys coated with lead paint to the US (thisevent was based on a real incident but adapted to suit the experimental purposes).The apology from the Chinese Minister of Commerce was expressed using eitherprimary emotion terms (they were “enraged and saddened” by the incident) orsecondary emotion terms (they felt “dejected and repulsed” by the incident). Thisset of primary and secondary emotion terms was chosen on the basis of pilottesting: These primary and secondary emotion terms were rated differently onperceived human uniqueness (confirming their status as genuinely primary andsecondary emotions), but they did not differ in levels of negative affectivity,morality, or arousal.

The key hypothesis was confirmed: In both studies participants were moreforgiving when they received an apology using primary emotion terms ascompared to secondary emotion terms. One might speculate that this effectoccurred simply because the primary emotion terms we used fitted the apologycontext better than the secondary emotion terms we used, and so were seen to bemore normative, sensitive, and appropriate to that context. But there are twofeatures of the studies that speak against this possibility. First, the effect wasfound across two different contexts using two different sets of primary andsecondary emotion terms. Second, and perhaps more importantly, the effectwas mediated through a trust mechanism, which is consistent with an infrahu-manisation frame. In Study 2b we measured the extent to which Canadiansbelieved Afghans actually felt the emotions that were being expressed.Participants were significantly more trusting of the integrity of the emotions inthe primary emotion condition than in the secondary emotion condition, and thisintergroup bias in attribution of trust partially mediated the effect of type ofapology on forgiveness.

To further rule out a “fit” explanation, Study 3 put the same apologies in themouth of an ingroup transgressor, and tested whether this had the same effect.Because ingroup members are not infrahumanised, one would expect that primaryand secondary emotions would be equally effective in the context of ingroupapologies, and that the effects described in Studies 2a and 2b would be specific tooutgroup apologies. In this study we returned to the same design as used in Study 1:Canadian participants were told that their ingroup (Canadian soldiers) had trans-gressed against Afghans or that the outgroup (the ANP) had transgressed against

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Canadians. Apologies communicated using either primary or secondary emotionswere compared to a baseline condition in which no apology was given at all.

The results confirmed the predictions. Replicating Study 1 of the same paper,participants were more forgiving when the transgression was committed byingroup than by outgroup members. More relevant, however, was that the effectsof the emotional expression were specific to the outgroup apology. When theapology was delivered by the outgroup, it promoted more forgiveness when itwas expressed using primary than when it was expressed using secondaryemotions (interestingly, forgiveness in the secondary emotion condition wasequivalent to the condition in which no apology was received at all). No sucheffect emerged when the ingroup was the group making the apology: In this caseforgiveness was uniformly high across all conditions. Consistent with our pro-posed theoretical mechanism—and consistent with Study 2b—this interactioneffect was mediated through trust that the transgressors genuinely felt theexpressed emotion.

To date, the studies pose a rather tricky question for outgroup transgressors:How can outgroup transgressors communicate genuine remorse, shame, and soforth if members of the transgressed group routinely deny their capacity toactually experience the emotions that are being communicated? The results ofStudy 3 suggest a possible way forward. It was notable in Study 3 that theimplicit trust offered ingroup members laid the groundwork for forgiveness, andappeared to do so regardless of what type of emotion had been used (and indeedwhether an apology had occurred at all). We argued that outgroup members canutilise this implicit trust by delivering the apology through a respected ingroupproxy. Although rare, such a technique is not without precedent: When the UKPrime Minister Tony Blair expressed an apology to the Irish for British inactionduring the potato famine in the mid-nineteenth century the apology was read outnot by Blair himself, but by Gabriel Byrne, an Irish actor. It is possible thathaving an ingroup member act as a gatekeeper for the apology would helpcircumvent some of the suspicion around emotional genuineness that is soapparent in the previous studies.

In Study 4 of Wohl et al. (2012) Canadian participants read about a friendlyfire incident in which ANP soldiers accidentally killed Canadian soldiers. Thesubsequent apology was expressed using either primary emotions, secondaryemotions, or no emotion at all. Half the participants were told that the apologywas communicated directly by the Afghan Defence Minister (as per the previousstudies). The other half of participants were told that the Afghan DefenceMinister had expressed these sentiments to his Canadian counterpart (GeneralHillier, a man revered in Canada), and had asked that the sentiments be passed onby Hillier to the Canadian people (an apology by proxy).

The effects were in the predicted direction (see Figure 4). When expresseddirectly by the Afghan Defence Minister, the same pattern of results observed inprevious studies emerged again: Forgiveness was greater when the apology was

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expressed using primary compared to secondary emotions (note that the effectsof the primary emotion condition were equivalent to the effects of a controlcondition in which the apology was expressed with no emotion, suggesting thatthe use of secondary emotions is hurting forgiveness rather than primary emo-tional expressions helping it). When the very same sentiments were expressedthrough the ingroup proxy, however, there was a deep and broad change inopinion: Forgiveness was considerably higher, and uniformly so, regardless ofwhether the Afghan Defence Minister had chosen primary emotion terms, sec-ondary emotion terms, or no emotion at all. It is notable also that exactly thesame pattern of results emerged on trust that the Afghan Defence Ministeractually felt the emotions being expressed, and that these effects on trustmediated the effects on forgiveness.

In the last study of Wohl et al. (2012) this effect was replicated but with moreof an empirical eye on the presumed infrahumanisation mechanism. The designwas similar to that used in the previous study, but prior to conducting the mainexperiment participants rated the extent to which they believed Afghans andCanadians are able to feel certain primary and secondary emotions. The experi-mental results mirrored those of the previous study: An apology by the ANPexpressed using primary emotions promoted more forgiveness than an apologyexpressed using secondary emotions, an effect that was eliminated if the apologywas expressed via an ingroup proxy. Importantly, this effect was most pro-nounced among participants who were low in their ratings of the extent towhich Afghans were capable of experiencing secondary emotions. In otherwords, the effects were moderated by levels of infrahumanisation in a way thatis consistent with our theorising and in a way that helps lend psychologicalcoherence to the results of all six experiments.

3.55

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Afghan Minister Wardak General Hillier

Forg

iven

ess

Primary emotion

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Figure 4. Forgiveness as a function of the emotional content of the apology and its method ofdelivery.

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LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS

Social psychological research on intergroup apologies is still very young, and sofundamental questions remain. For example, the empirical focus to date hasexclusively been on the effects of apologies on victim groups, but far lessresearch has focused on how members of transgressor groups feel about apolo-gies (Zaiser & Giner-Sorolla, in press, is a recent exception). Knowing the effectsthat apologies have on transgressor groups remains important in part because it israre that leaders have political permission to make an apology that is notsupported by their constituency (and it is questionable whether such an apologywould win support from the victim group anyway).

Another area in which there is currently a lack of theoretical nuance is thetype of intergroup context in which an apology is made. Most of the apologiesthat have been used in the literature relate to “many-to-many” transgressions,where the actions of a collective have damaged multiple members of a victimgroup (e.g., Japanese abuse of POWs). But sometimes transgressions are com-mitted by individuals (e.g., incidents of abuse of Iraqi prisoners by individual USsoldiers), and sometimes the victims are individuals (e.g., the shooting down of aChinese pilot by a US surveillance plane in 2001). These “one-to-many”, “many-to-one”, and even “one-to-one” transgressions can occur across sensitive inter-group boundaries, and in that way be considered intergroup apologies. Butnothing is known about whether different psychological processes governresponses to these different types of apologies.

Another important aspect of the intergroup context is the pre-transgressionrelationship between the groups. Sometimes intergroup transgressions can hap-pen in the context of such a strong, shared superordinate identity (e.g., malprac-tice by a national company towards the citizens of that nation) that it becomesquestionable whether it is an intergroup context at all. Alternatively, intergrouptransgressions can occur between groups that have an adversarial history (as isthe case between Canadians and Afghanis) or where a close pre-transgressionrelationship exists (as is the case between Canadians and Americans). Thisvariance in relations likely influences intergroup trust, which could explainwhy an apology was ineffective in the Wohl et al. (2012) studies where thecontext involved the killing of Canadian soldiers by Afghanis, but was effectivein the Brown et al. (2008) studies where the context was the killing of Canadiansolders by the American military. Future work should seek to clarify these issues,both theoretically and empirically.

Another obvious limitation is that the research does not typically investigatethe effects of apologies on direct victims of intergroup transgressions. We havenot, for example, addressed what effect an apology might have on people whowere directly injured, displaced, or left bereaved because of transgressions of thepast. Rather our focus is on what we call secondary victims: Members of groupsthat were victims of historical transgressions, even if those members were not

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directly affected. If apologies are to promote reconciliation they need to beeffective in promoting forgiveness among the broader community, among sub-sequent generations, and among third parties. For this reason it is extremelyimportant to understand the reactions of those who share a common identity withprimary victims but did not suffer directly, as we have done here.

We acknowledge, however, that it is imperative to examine the effects ofintergroup apologies on primary victims, and to date the research on this grouphas mostly relied on qualitative and interview methodologies (e.g., Chapman,2007; Goboda-Madikizela, 2002; Mellor, Bretherton, & Firth, 2007; but seeMcLernon et al., 2004, for a quantitative exception). If controlled comparisonsof primary versus secondary victims were possible it would be interesting to seehow they might differ. On the one hand one might expect that it would be moredifficult for primary victims to forgive because the personal effects of the originaltransgression are by definition more severe. But there are at least two reasons whyprimary victims might be more forgiving than secondary victims. First, as dis-cussed earlier, primary victims do not need to “seek permission” to forgive,whereas secondary victims might feel they do not have the right to forgive.Second, it could be argued that primary victims have more of a motivation toforgive. Some scholars in the interpersonal forgiveness literature argue that for-giveness is an act of self-nurturing for victims, in that it allows them to let go oflayers of pain and resentment that erode psychological and physical health (Exline& Baumeister, 2000; West, 2001). In this sense, direct victims may feel a strongdrive to forgive, even in the face of formidable obstacles. In contrast, secondaryvictims may find it easier to forgive but have less of a motive to do so (and in factmay be motivated to hang on to victimhood for the reasons outlined byBaumeister, Exline, & Sommer, 1998; Noor et al., 2012; Sullivan et al., 2012).

Another limitation is that there is still very little work looking at how thecontent of apologies might affect responses to them. Although there have nowbeen numerous studies looking at emotional expressions embedded within apolo-gies (Giner-Sorolla et al., 2008; Wohl et al., 2012), all these studies have done soin the context of accidental transgressions. Furthermore, the range of emotionalexpressions that has been examined is limited. We have argued that the principlesof infrahumanisation can be used to make a broad-brush a priori case for whichemotional expressions will “work” and which will not, but as the field advancesthere will no doubt be further qualifications to this story. The same is true of theeffectiveness of apologies-by-proxy. The effects reported in Studies 4 and 5 ofWohl et al. (2012) are significant, but specific to a single context and to a singleapologiser. We do not yet have smoking-gun evidence for why the strategyworks, or indeed whether the technique would work in other contexts. It seemslikely, for example, that the effect would be most pronounced if the gatekeeper isa highly trusted and prototypical member of the ingroup, as it was in Wohl andcolleagues’ research. It seems plausible that in other contexts the same strategymay appear indirect and cowardly.

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A final limitation is that the field has not yet reached a point where competingfindings can be reconciled. For example, there is not yet any empirical researchthat can definitively account for why some researchers (Brown et al., 2008;Leonard et al., 2011) have found substantial effects of an apology on forgiveness,whereas others have not (e.g., Philpot & Hornsey, 2008, 2011). However, thereare numerous plausible candidates, and the next step is for researchers to developtechniques allowing for these constructs to be systematically manipulated, so thatintuitions can be replaced with firm, empirical conclusions. In the meantime,however, we outline a trust-based model of responses to intergroup apologies inthe hope that it might provide a framework to guide future research on thisquestion.

A TRUST-BASED MODEL OF RESPONSES TO INTERGROUPAPOLOGIES

One overarching message of the research summarised above is that an apologyalone, standing in isolation, is rarely enough to promote intergroup forgiveness.Although we are a long way from identifying all the reasons for this, it does seemlikely that trust is implicated in multiple ways: Mistrust in the genuineness of themotives for the apology, mistrust in the genuineness of the expressed emotion,and mistrust that the apology will yield systemic change in intergroup relations.Our conviction around this is grounded in data; for example the mediating role oftrust in explaining why primary emotions tend to work better than secondaryemotions (Wohl et al., 2012), the fact that apologies-by-proxy are more trustedthan apologies offered by the outgroup directly (Wohl et al., 2012), the extremelyhigh perceptions of ulterior motives in the work by Philpot and Hornsey (2008),the role of trust constructs in examinations of real-world apologies for the IRSand the Chinese head tax (Bombay et al., 2011; Wohl et al., in press), and the factthat outgroup trust is a critical predictor of forgiveness generally (Hewstoneet al., 2006). Furthermore, trust in motive has shown to be a defining mediatorand moderator of other sensitive forms of intergroup communication (e.g.,criticism of groups from the inside and the outside; see Hornsey, 2005;Hornsey & Imani, 2004).

Nadler and Liviatan (2006) also provide a strong empirical foundation for atrust perspective. In two studies Israelis received statements from a Palestinianleader urging other Palestinians to empathise with the Jewish experience inIsrael. Although they did not constitute apologies per se, the rhetoric used inthese experiments communicated messages of responsibility and humility that arequasi-apologetic, and this research is often discussed in the same breath assubsequent research that assessed apologetic statements directly. Nadler andLiviatan found trust to be a critical moderator of the effect of conciliatorystatements on willingness to forgive. Specifically, conciliatory statements bythe Palestinian leadership “worked” in that they facilitated forgiveness, but

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only among Israelis who had high levels of pre-existing trust in Palestinians.Among Israelis with low pre-existing trust, the effect of the conciliatory state-ment trended towards the negative: Lower levels of forgiveness were reportedcompared to when no conciliatory statement had been received.

Drawing from this basic assumption, we set out to construct a model toexplicate the conditions under which expressions of contrition would have thegreatest impact (see Figure 5). We constructed this model to be empiricallytestable and thus verifiable, with the aim of better understanding how to offer asuccessful intergroup apology. With that said, we acknowledge that most of theelements of the model have not yet been subjected to empirical attention.

In the model we make a distinction between high- and low-trust contexts. Inhigh-trust contexts the apology is more likely to be taken on its merits; in otherwords the apology would be processed heuristically and positively as a genuinegesture of reconciliation and a genuine statement of intent for the future. Thisshould have positive flow-on effects in terms of satisfaction, attributions ofremorse, and forgiveness. In low-trust contexts the apology is more likely to beprocessed defensively, which in this case would manifest itself either as aheuristic dismissal of the message as being false, or a systematic screening ofthe message for signs of insincerity. When viewed through a low-trust lens, thevictim group member might engage in a process of suspicious hypothesis testing

Figure 5. A trust-based model of responses to intergroup apologies.

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about the transgressor group’s motives: Are they making these commentsbecause they are genuinely sorry, or do they have some other ulterior motive(e.g., to reduce international pressure; to avoid punishment; to improve theirmoral image in the eyes of others)? A consequence of this suspicion is that theapology should be relatively ineffective in terms of increasing satisfaction,attributions of remorse, and forgiveness.

The list of antecedents that might determine whether a context is low- or high-trust (represented on the left-hand side of Figure 5) is divided into variablesassociated with the individual, variables associated with aspects of the intergroupcontext, and variables associated with the delivery of the apology itself. We donot intend to imply that all these variables need to converge to lead to a low- orhigh-trust context (it could be that one is enough). Instead our goal is to give aflavour of the type of factors that might determine the extent to which a particularapology might be viewed through a relatively high-trust or low-trust lens. It is anempirical question as to which of these factors might be weighted more or lessstrongly in determining the type of orientation a particular individual might have,but it is plausible that the weightings might vary considerably depending on thespecific context and the priorities of the individual.

Individual factors include whether a victim group member has a generallytrusting orientation to the world (Rotter, 1967); those who do are, by definition,more likely to see the transgression through a high-trust lens. The other indivi-dual-level factors focus on the specific relationship between the individual andthe relevant groups. For example, people who have high levels of positivecontact with outgroups are more likely to see those outgroups through a positive,high-trust lens. This is consistent with the literature on the effects of contact onboth intergroup bias (Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006) and intergroup forgivenessspecifically (Cehajic et al., 2008; Hewstone et al., 2004, 2006; Moeschbergeret al., 2005).

Furthermore, we argue that low identifiers are more likely to have an open-minded approach to an apology than high identifiers. The case for this can bemade theoretically: From a social identity perspective, trust of ingroup membersand mistrust of outgroup members are expected to be greater to the extent thatthe ingroup is a significant part of one’s self-concept (Bronfenbrenner, 1961;Maoz, Ward, Katz, & Ross, 2002; Tanis & Postmes, 2005; Worchel, 1979). Itmight also be argued that high identifiers are more likely than low identifiers towant to retain victimhood status (Noor et al., 2012; Wohl & Branscombe, 2008).This is also consistent with the empirical work on apologies. For example,Philpot and Hornsey (2011) showed that high identifiers with a victim groupwere less likely to believe that an apology had been delivered, and Brown andcolleagues (2008) found that high identifiers were less forgiving in the face of anapology than low identifiers.

The next five antecedents listed in Figure 5 all relate to aspects of theintergroup context. Three of these relate to the nature of the transgression itself.

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Regardless of the broader socio-structural context, a transgression in itself islikely to damage trust between groups. It seems common sense to suggest thatthis is particularly likely to be the case when the transgression is severe andintentional. It is also more likely to damage trust when the level of outgroupculpability is high; that is, when the transgression was committed with thecomplicity of a broad section of the outgroup population, or by a broad sectionof the outgroup’s leadership. If a transgression is relatively mild and/or accidental—or if the transgression is committed by an isolated and peripheral sub-sectionof the outgroup—the subsequent apology is more likely to be viewed through atrusting lens.

The remaining two factors relate to how psychologically close the ingroup andthe outgroup see themselves to be. The term “intergroup distance” is used here torefer to the level of overlap between two groups in terms of ideology, culture,and history. Canada and Australia would be seen as two countries that have lowintergroup distance: They are both predominantly Anglo, Christian, Western,first-world countries that share similar governance arrangements, the same mon-arch, and the same language. Levels of migration and tourism between the twocountries are relatively high, and perhaps for this reason there is a relatively highlevel of mutual cultural awareness. Furthermore, they have no history of conflictbetween each other, and in fact are more likely to be allies in war. For all thesereasons, these two countries are “familiar” with each other, and we would arguethat this would predispose people to view a transgression and an associatedapology in a relatively trusting and forgiving light. In contrast, Canada andAfghanistan are countries that have high intergroup distance: They have con-spicuous differences in terms of race, religion, language, and government struc-tures, share little in terms of cross-national migration, and are more likely to beopponents in war than allies. It would seem reasonable to expect that the sense of“otherness” associated with high distance contexts would lead people to view atransgression and an associated apology in a relatively untrusting and unforgiv-ing light.

Relevant to the notion of intergroup distance is the extent to which groupsshare a salient superordinate identity. As mentioned earlier, some intergrouptransgressions occur within a tight, superordinate context. When allies engagein friendly fire, they do so as members of a coalition made salient by a sharedexternal threat. This is technically an intergroup transgression, but psychologi-cally may be read more as an ingroup transgression, within which we knowapologies are more likely to result in forgiveness (e.g., Wohl et al., 2012, Studies1 and 3). Similarly, when an Australian therapeutic goods company makesAustralians sick, the transgression can be viewed through an intergroup or anintragroup lens, depending on the extent to which one focuses on the sharednational boundary. This may be why Philpot and Hornsey (2011) showed thatAustralians were predisposed to imagining an apology in the (Australian)

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therapeutic goods context, while at the same time being predisposed to denyingapologies that happened in the Japan / WWII context.

The last two of the antecedents relate to the delivery of the apology itself. First,we argue that apologies expressed using primary emotions are more likely to betrusted than apologies expressed using secondary emotions. This is a straightfor-ward re-articulation of the conclusions of Wohl et al. (2012). It should be noted,though, that this tendency is going to be more pronounced the more victim groupsinfrahumanise the transgressor group. Although infrahumanisation is a robustintergroup phenomenon, it is not universal and so this prediction should not beuniversally applied. Second, we make the case that victim groups attend to whetherthe transgressor group as a whole (as distinct from the group’s representatives) issupportive of the apology. Although this part of the model is not yet grounded indata, it seems common sense that broadly supported apologies are more likely toprovide for high-trust environments. If victim groups feel that the apology does nothave the broad imprimatur of the transgressor group population, it seems unlikelythat it will be successful in communicating genuine remorse.

Our trust-based model was designed to be parsimonious and uncomplicated,partly as a concession to the fact that it is built on a relatively thin empirical base.A consequence of this is that the model is not well-equipped to deal with all thesubtleties of the apology–forgiveness link. For example we have built the modelto account for one-off apologies, and as such it is constructed in a linear wayfrom apologies to forgiveness. It is conceivable, though, that feedback loops mayoperate in the sense that factors we identify as consequences in our model mightinform the antecedents of acceptance of future reconciliation attempts. There isalready some evidence for such circular processes: To the extent that victimgroups withhold forgiveness from transgressor groups in the face of an apology,the transgressor group is less likely to support future reconciliation attempts, thusreinforcing a low-trust context if such attempts are made (Harth et al., 2011).

We have also designed our model to focus exclusively on the psychologicalfactors that might lead to more or less forgiveness in the aftermath of an apology.But we acknowledge that structural and political factors may be equally impor-tant in determining whether or not an apology is accepted (e.g., whether thetransgressor group engages in real change to reduce inequality). Readers inter-ested in those macro-level variables are referred to our staircase model offorgiveness which is focused on the socio-political factors that contextualisethe apology–forgiveness link (Wohl et al., 2011).

CONCLUSION

Our summary of the literature on apology and intergroup forgiveness could beviewed as having a rather pessimistic tone. This is not to say we are anti-apology;as mentioned at the onset of this chapter, the decision as to whether or not toapologise should be made on moral grounds alone, and need not be wrapped up

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in utilitarian concerns about whether an apology should “work” in terms ofpromoting forgiveness. Having said that, we believe it is important to understandthe psychology of victimised groups’ responses to intergroup apologies, toidentify potential roadblocks in the path towards intergroup forgiveness, and touse this knowledge to design apologies and gestures of repair that give injuredintergroup relations the best chance to heal. At the time of writing, the empiricalliterature on this topic is only five years old, and so it is natural that there are stillhuge gaps in our understanding. But we hope that the review above and theassociated model can help provide a useful framework for future investigations.

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