values, beliefs, and proenvironmental action: attitude formation toward emergent attitude objects1

Values, Beliefs, and Proenvironmental Action: Attitude Formation Toward Emergent Attitude Objects1

PAUL C. STERN^ National Research Council

Washington, DC

THOMAS DIETZ George Mason University

LINDA KALOF GREGORY A. GUAGNANO State University of New York, Plattsburgh George Mason University

Discoveries in environmental science become the raw material for constructing social attitude objects, individual attitudes, and broad public concerns. We explored a model in which individuals construct. attitudes to new or emergent attitude objects by ref- erencing personal values and beliefs about the consequences of the objects for their values. We found that a subset of the major clusters identified in value theory is associated with willingness to take proenvironmental action; that a biospheric value orientation cannot yet be discerned in a general population sample; that willingness to take proenvironmental action is a function of both values and beliefs, with values also predicting beliefs; and that gender differences can be attributed to both beliefs and values. Our model has promise for explicating the factors determining public concern with environmental conditions.

The modern environmental movement has been a series of mobilizations of public responses to new or emergent attitude objects. Before Silent Spring (Carson, 1962), few had attitudes about the ecological effects of pesticides; before the events at Love Canal in 1979, few had attitudes about hazardous waste dumps; in 1994, environmental estrogens (Stone, 1994) and disruption of the global nitrogen cycle (Ayres, Schlesinger, & Socolow, 1994) appeared as possible social attitude objects in the making. Newly discovered or publicized environmental conditions often bring forth public reaction, but not always (despite government warnings, there has been little public outcry about

'This research was supported in part by U.S. National Science Foundation grants SES- 921 1591 and SES-9224036 and by the Northern Virginia Survey Research Laboratory of George Mason University. The views expressed are not necessarily those of the U.S. National Research Council. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the 1994 meeting of the American Sociological Association, Los Angeles, California.

*Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Paul C. Stern, National Research Council, Commission on Behavioral and Social Sciences and Education, 2101 Con- stitution Avenue, Washington, DC 2041 8.

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Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 1995, 25, 18, pp. 161 1-1 636 Copyright 0 1995 by V. H. Winston I!?, Son, Inc. All rights reserved.

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exposure to radon in homes). So, although it is safe to expect many newly described environmental conditions to take form as social attitude objects, it is not easy to predict what form they will take, what attitudes will form about them, or whether “public opinion” will be of one mind or be fragmented with regard to a particular new social entity.

The biophysical environment is not the only source of emergent or fluid attitude objects. Over the past few decades in the U.S., new objects have included spousal abuse, child kidnapping, terrorism, drunk driving, reverse discrimination, government paperwork reduction, and many others outside the environmental arena. It is also common for attitude objects to change their content or frames. For example, reverse discrimination is not simply the negative of “affirmative action”; subtle changes in the content of the object have probably resulted from this reframing (Gamson & Modigliani, 1987).

It is worth noting that the phenomena that exemplify new attitude objects typically exist long before the attitude object takes the shape implied by a descriptive phrase such as “toxic waste,” “global warming,” or “spousal abuse.” Even when science identifies a previously unknown phenomenon such as the decreased concentration of stratospheric ozone during winter in the Antarctic, it takes a complex social process to transform the scientific findings into a social attitude object such as “the ozone hole.” It is also worth noting that attitude objects-even those “discovered” by science-are continually being transformed. For example, many scientists now believe that global warming is a misnomer for a set of phenomena that may have their greatest social impor- tance not because of temperature changes per se, but because they change global patterns of rainfall and storm activity or the geographic distribution of disease vectors. Many scientists now would rather have people form attitudes about “global climatic change” than global warming.

The social processes that crystallize a set of phenomena into an attitude object, or that reshape that object, are beyond the scope of this paper (but see, e.g., Dietz, Stern, & Rycroft, 1989; Gamson, 1992b; Rochefort & Cobb, 1994; Snow, Rochford, Worden, & Benford, 1986). Our focus here is at the individual level. We ask how individuals form attitudes about “objects” that are in the process of being created or redefined. Answering this question requires a theory of attitude formation that can address new or emergent, unstable attitude objects.

Traditional attitude theory offers little on which to build such a theory, largely because it tends to make the simplifying assumptions that attitude objects exist independently of social processes and that they do not appear, disappear, or transform themselves over the period within which they are being measured. These assumptions are particularly unrealistic when the attitude objects concern phenomena about which even expert knowledge is in flux. The

ATTITUDE FORMATION 161 3

literature on attitude formation is not very helpful either. For example, in his review of the attitude literature, McGuire (1985) identifies four factors that “initially establish attitudes” (p. 253): Genetic determinants; transient physi- ological factors; direct experience with the attitude object; and social processes such as socialization, indoctrination, and peer pressure. The first two of these are not particularly relevant for the kinds of attitude objects that have been the focus of the environmental movement, and the last two are less relevant than they may seem. Most people know environmental phenomena such as climate change, ozone depletion, and even air and water pollution only indirectly (mainly through accounts in the mass media), because the sense organs are unreliable indicators of them. And although social processes such as peer pressure and indoctrination are clearly important in forming attitudes about emergent objects, the empirical research is mainly concerned with attitudes about well-established attitude objects.

There are concepts in the social science literature, however, that offer hypotheses more germane to the genesis of environmental concern. One line of research points to personal background factors such as age, income, education, and the like as predisposing individuals to environmental concern (for reviews, see Jones & Dunlap, 1992; Van Liere & Dunlap, 1980), and a substan- tial body of ecofeminist literature provides arguments as to why women might be more environmentally concerned than are men (Diamond & Orenstein, 1990; Griffin, 1978; Merchant, 1979). But these lines of argument have not gone far toward articulating and demonstrating mechanisms that might lead from the background variables to environmental attitudes, and they do not lead to predictions of different reactions to different environmental conditions.

A second line of research examines individuals’ judgments of some attitude objects as a function of the risks (and sometimes benefits) they attach to those objects, (e.g., Gould et al., 1988; Slovic, 1987). This approach presumes that attitudes will flow from information about quantitative and qualitative aspects of the risks associated with new attitude objects, modified by the effects of cognitive heuristics and biases. It does not, however, have an individual difference component, so has little to say about which individuals may come to hold which beliefs. Other researchers on risk perception link attitudes to typologies of social institutions and personality traits using the grid-group model developed by Mary Douglas in her analysis of African witchcraft (e.g., Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982). This argument is beginning to be subjected to test. Some researchers report that a measure of egalitarian values and beliefs is positively correlated with measures of concern about technological and environmental risks, while measures of values favoring hierarchy and individualism are negatively correlated (Dake, 199 1; Dake & Thompson, 1993; Wildavsky & Dake, 1990). Others, however, report that cultural theory

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variables have a weaker influence on risk perceptions than other predictors do (e.g., Peters & Slovic, 1995; Sjoberg & Drottz-Sjoberg, 1993). The research on cultural theory variables has not yet controlled statistically for sociodemo- graphic and other likely predictors.

A third approach conceives of environmental concern as a developmental phenomenon; for instance, an expression of higher-order needs within Maslow’s (1 954) need hierarchy. Presumably individuals and collectivities whose basic material and psychological needs are being met are more likely to express concerns beyond themselves, including concerns about the natural environment-what Inglehart (1977, 1990) calls postmaterialist values. Data on this hypothesis are also fragmentary and inconsistent (Brechin & Kempton, 1994; Dunlap, Gallup, & Gallup, 1993; Inglehart, 1992).

A fourth theoretical approach treats environmental concern as the conse- quence of a process of activating personal moral norms based in altruism (e.g., Black, Stern, & Elworth, 1985; Heberlein & Black, 1976; Hopper & Nielsen, 199 1 ; Stem, Dietz, & Black, 1986) or in an emerging “land ethic” (Dunlap & Van Liere, 1977a, 1977b; Heberlein, 1972, 1977) or biospheric value orientation (Stem, Dietz, & Kalof, 1993). In this approach, environmental concerns are a subset of morally tinged human concerns, rooted in universal values. Norms do not flow directly from general psychological predispositions or the products of socialization, but must be activated by beliefs specific to environmental conditions. According to Schwartz’s (1 970, 1977) norm-activation model, the key beliefs are that a particular condition has harmful consequences for other people (or, in the extended version, for valued objects; Stern et al., 1993) and that the individual is responsible for those consequences in the sense that he or she can take action that would prevent them. According to the model, an individual who holds both beliefs will experience a sense of moral obliga- tion (a personal moral norm) to take action to prevent the expected harm. Thus, attitudes flow from human values, information about attitude objects, and social interactions (including mass media reports, messages from interested parties, and informal social contacts) that influence beliefs based on that information. (There is evidence that the New Environmental Paradigm scale [Dunlap & Van Liere, 19781, the most widely used environmental attitude scale, is primarily a measure of beliefs about the negative consequences of human interactions with the environment [Stem, Dietz, & Guagnano, 19951.) This norm-activation line of analysis includes concepts that can explain vari- ations in environmental attitudes across environmental objects and across individuals, as well as providing a mechanism for generating attitudes toward new objects: It predicts that individuals will generate attitudes toward any object that they expect to cause harm to others that they can personally help prevent.

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A Model of Attitude Construction

Our approach begins with the presumption that preferences or attitudes, especially toward new objects, are constructed-either by individuals (e.g., Fischhoff, 199 1 ; Payne, Bettman, & Johnson, 1992; Turner & Martin, 1984) or through social processes (e.g., Dietz et al., 1989; Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982; Gamson, 1992b; Snow et al., 1986). We examine environmental concern with the extended norm activation model of Stern et al. (1993), but deepen the analysis by linking norm-activation to measures of underlying values derived from the work of Rokeach (1968, 1973) and its elaboration by Schwartz (1992). The link to values is important because attitudes toward new objects must be built on something more stable and relatively enduring value orientations might provide this foundation. We do not make the strong claims that values are invariant throughout the life cycle or that they exist independently of social influences. But they do act as general guiding principles in life, and as such are likely guideposts for action in unfamiliar conditions, including the condition of forming attitudes about new social objects. They are also more general than attitudes and, we presume, more stable. We see values as being shaped largely by preadult socialization and, compared with attitudes, as relatively resistant to being reshaped by information. So, faced with an unfamiliar environmental condition, an individual can ask, “What are the implications of this object for the thing I value most?” On the basis of information relevant to that question (either already available or sought out for the purpose), the individual can construct an attitude or opinion.

The key elements of our model are broad value orientations and beliefs about the effects of particular attitude objects on those values. One can think of the attitude formation process within our model as a drastically abbreviated form of the calculation normative decision theory would prescribe. Instead of considering all the possible effects of an attitude object, the individual considers a very few made salient by recollection, mass media presentations, or other influences; instead of considering all the values that might be affected, the individual again considers a salient few. The psychological and social processes that influence which effects and which values are considered obviously have a strong framing effect on the attitudes formed and expressed (Dietz & Stern, 1995, for a more detailed account).

This study explores how an analysis of value orientations and of beliefs about the consequences of environmental conditions can account for variation in environmental attitudes. Our main focus in this study is on accounting for the structure of environmental attitudes; we believe that, supplemented by research establishing the processes of attitude formation, our framework can be

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used for analyzing the construction of individual’s attitudes toward a wide range of emergent or transforming social objects.

We begin from the work of Stern et al. (1993) that reconfirmed the relationship between environmental concern, measured as expressed willingness to take a variety of political and economic actions to protect the environment, and some of the key variables derived from the Schwartz (1977) norm-activation model. That study also began an exploration of the role of values in environmental norm activation. It argued that the Schwartz norm-activation model presumed a widespread value orientation toward the welfare of others and postulated that the same elements of the Schwartz model that activate altruistic norms might also activate egoistic or biospheric norms, that is, norms based in alternative value orientation toward self and toward nonhuman objects. The study reported evidence that awareness of negative consequences of environmental conditions for self, for others, and for nonhuman species and the biosphere each predict willingness to act, when the other beliefs are statistically controlled. This finding was interpreted as evidence that three distinct value orientations, toward self, other human beings, and other species and the biosphere, can be distinguished and that each can independently influence intentions to act politically to preserve the environment. The evidence is weak, however, because the value orientations were estimated as regression coefficients linking beliefs to behavioral intentions, rather than measured directly. In addition, the conclusions are lacking in generality because the study used a student sample and investigated only values identified from a reading of the literature on environmentalism, rather than a full set defined by a general theory of human values.

This study attempts to increase the applicability of the approach of Stern et al. (1993) by making an explicit theoretical and empirical link to value theory and by replacing the earlier study with a general population sample. To provide a basis in value theory, we rely on a major ongoing international research effort headed by Shalom Schwartz addressing the question of whether the structure and content of human values contain any cross-cultural universals (Schwartz, 1992). This research program has employed value descriptions derived from the earlier work of Rokeach (1968, 1973) and has used smallest- space analysis to validate 10 types of values as present and related to each other in consistent ways across countries. The 10 value types have been further collapsed into four broader classifications, reliable across countries, that Schwartz has called openness to change (including the value types called self-direction and stimulation, and some items within the value type called hedonism), self-enhancement (including power, achievement, and other items from the hedonism scale), conservation (including the value types called tradition, conformity, and security), and self-transcendence (including the

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value types labeled universalism and benevolence). We consider such clusters of values to correspond to what Stern et al. call value orientations, and we use the terms “value clusters” and “value orientations” interchangeably here.

Two of these clusters or orientations seem, on their face, quite similar to those identified by Stern et al. (1993) and Merchant (1992) from their independent analysis of the rhetoric of environmentalism. Schwartz’s (1 992) self-enhancement cluster appears virtually indistinguishable from the concept of the egoistic value orientation in Stern et al., or Merchant’s concept of an egocentric ethic. Schwartz’s self-transcendence cluster appears to correspond closely to the social-altruistic value orientation of Stern and his colleagues and Merchant’s concept of a homocentric ethic. Although none of Schwartz’s clusters approximates the biospheric value orientation or Mer- chant’s ecocentric ethic, the self-transcendence cluster includes all three of the items on Schwartz’s 56-item value list that seem to reflect such a value orientation: “unity with nature,” “a world of beauty,” and “protecting the environment.” Thus, from the point of view of the literature on environmentalism, the Schwartz analysis fails to distinguish between two ethics or value orientations that are clearly distinct theoretically and that may also be empiri- cally distinct (Stern et al., 1993). (The self-transcendence cluster has elements that represent the value bases of most justice and peace movements, as well as some of the core values advocated by the environmental movement. Some of the justice values, in particular, bear close resemblance to the “egalitarian” values postulated by Wildavsky & Dake [1990] to lie at the root of environmentalism.) The failure to distinguish social from biospheric values may be interpreted as evidence that a biospheric orientation has not yet emerged in modern societies, or is not yet distinct from the social-altruistic one, except among activists and theories of the movement. It may also be that there are too few biosphere-related items on the list of values to reveal the new cluster.

The empirical portion of the present study has several specific objectives. First, it attempts to replicate the findings of Stern et al. (1 993) using a repre- sentative, general population sample. Second, it analyzes a major subset of the Rokeach/Schwartz value items (Schwartz, 1992) to determine whether the Schwartz value clusters correspond as expected with the Stern et al. value orientations and whether a set of RokeachISchwartz items can function as direct measures of those value orientations. Third, it explores whether a biospheric value orientation-the one in the environment literature that is not found in value theory-can be measured in a general population sample. Fourth, it begins an examination of the relationships among value orientations, beliefs about the consequences of environmental conditions, and propensities to act on environmental issues, that can provide a basis for theorizing more

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broadly about the formation of attitudes toward emergent or fluid attitude objects.

Method

This study analyzes data from computer-assisted telephone interviews of a sample of adults (N = 199) residing in Fairfax County, Virginia (part of the Washington, DC metropolitan area) in late April and early May 1993. House- holds were selected by random-digit dialing, and respondents within households were selected using the “most recent birthday” method. The appropriate individual completed a survey in 62.2% of all English-speaking households reached.

The interviews included a series of Likert-type items to measure beliefs about consequences of environmental conditions for self, for others, and for nonhuman species and the biosphere; Likert-type items to measure willingness to take a variety of political actions to protect the environment; and a selection of 34 value items, including 32 from the RokeachISchwartz value scales and two new items intended to assess the biospheric value orientation.

Measurement of Values

Respondents rated 34 value items, selected to represent Schwartz’s (1 992) four major value clusters and a separate biospheric value orientation, on a 7-point scale from opposed to a judgment that the value is extremely important as a guiding principle in the respondent’s life (exact wording of the value statements and the instructions for rating them are available from the authors). Responses were factor analyzed using iterated principal factors extraction and oblique promax r ~ t a t i o n . ~ We presumed a priori that many of Schwartz’s items reflected the egoistic (E), social-altruistic (S), or biospheric (B) value orientations identified by Stern et al. (1993; Table l). Table l shows the four resulting factor^.^ The factor analysis presents the same general pattern described by Schwartz on the basis of smallest-space analysis. Factor 1 included 10 items: seven items from Schwartz’s self-transcendence value cluster (including all three of those we identified as indicating biospheric values), the two biospheric

3Responses to value items are often quite skewed. Because of this and the relatively small sample size relative to the number of parameters to be estimated, it was not appropriate to use confirmatory factor analysis methods (Bollen, 1989). We have produced essentially identical results to those reported for factor analysis using both cluster analysis and multidimensional scaling, so it is unlikely that the factors are an artifact of method.

4We used the standard conventions of a minimum eigenvalue of 1 .O and a minimum factor loading of 0.4.


Table 1

Factor Scales Derived From 34 Value Items

Item Loading Schwartz clustera

Stern clusterb

Factor 1 : Biospheric-altruistic values

Unity with nature .81 Protecting the environment .81 Preventing pollution .74 Respecting the earth .74

Social justice .59 Helpful .55 A world of beauty .53 Sense of belonging .43

A world at peace .69 Equality .64

Factor 2: Egoistic values

Authority .67 Social power .62 Wealth .48 Influential .44

Factor 3: Openness to change

An exciting life .74 A varied life .59 Curious S O Enjoying life .43

Factor 4: Conservation (traditional values) Honoring parents and elders .85 Honest .71 Family security .62 Self-discipline .56 Obedient .54 Clean .49 Politeness .46 Social order .46 Loyal .40

0 = .89

ST ST - -

ST ST ST ST ST C

0 = .74

SE SE SE SE

e = .77

0 0 0 0

e = .83 C C C C C C C C ST

(table continues)

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Table 1 (continued)

Scale Self- intercorrelations enhancement Openness Tradition

Altruism .17 .55 S O Self-enhancement .39 .24 Openness .32

aAs defined in Schwartz (1992), ST = self-transcendence, SE = self-enhancement, C =

conservation, 0 = openness to change. bAs defined in Stern et al. (1 993), E = egoistic, SA = social-altruistic, B = biospheric.

items we added, and one item from Schwartz’s conservation value cluster. As the four highest factor loadings belonged to items we considered biospheric and the next three belonged to items we considered social-altruistic, this version of Schwartz’s self-transcendence factor might also be described as a biospheric-altruistic value orientation. Factor 2 consisted of four items, all from among the six we selected from the self-enhancement cluster and considered to reflect an egoistic value orientation. Factor 3 consisted of four items, all from among the five we selected from the openness to change cluster. Factor 4 consisted of nine items, eight from the conservation cluster and one from the self-transcendence cluster. To avoid confusion with common usage in the literature on the environmental movement, we refer to Factor 4 as a traditional values cluster, rather than as conservation. Overall, the correspondence between the results of the factor analysis and the clusters defined by Schwartz’s prior work was striking, as was the correspondence between two Schwartz clusters and the Stern et al. value orientations. The factor analysis produced a factor representing the egoistic value orientation and one that clearly combined the biospheric and social-altruistic orientations.

We used Armor’s (1974) principal components method to construct scales for each value cluster. The theta reliability coefficient (equal to the alpha for scales made up of items weighted by their factor loadings) for each value scale is reported in Table 1, along with scale intercorrelations.

Measurement of Behavioral Intentions

Four items were used to create a scale indicating willingness to take proenvironmental action (investing in a company that pollutes, taking a job with such a company, boycotting its products, and signing a petition for tougher environmental laws) to protect the environment. The factor scale based on


these items has a theta reliability of .73. We use this behavioral intention scale rather than a general environmental attitude scale as a dependent measure because we are primarily concerned with linking personal values with attitudes strong enough to produce the kinds of behavioral commitments that make broad public concern visible to public officials.

Beliefs About Consequences of Environmental Conditions

Items taken or modified from Stern et al. (1993), assessing awareness of consequences of environmental conditions to self (Acego), to others (ACsoc), and to other species and the biosphere (ACbio), were included in the survey and analyzed to determine whether they formed reliable scales for use with the present sample. The items that formed reliable scales overlapped with those of Stem et al. (1993) in terms of the particular examples of each type of conse- quence they addressed, but they did not duplicate them exactly. The scales and reliability coefficients appear in Table 2. Each AC scale measures the belief that ongoing changes in the natural environment or environmental protection will have negative consequences for a set of objects that corresponds to a particular value orientation.

Results

Relation of Egoistic, Social-Altruistic, and Biospheric Values to Schwartz ’s Value Clusters

As already noted, the egoistic value orientation corresponds strikingly to Schwartz’s (1992) self-enhancement cluster, and Schwartz’s self-transcendence cluster neatly includes almost all of the items we presumed to be social- altruistic or biospheric. Schwartz’s openness to change and conservation clusters appear to reflect value orientations unrelated to those referenced in the environmental literature. Thus, the value distinctions in that literature fit rather easily within value theory as a subset, except that value theory does not differentiate a biospheric orientation from a social-altruistic one.

Detection of a Biospheric Value Orientation in a General Population Sample

Factor analysis of the present data set places the presumably biospheric value items squarely in the same factor with the social-altruistic items-in fact, as Table 1 shows, they have the strongest factor loadings. (Simmons, Binney, & Dodd [1992] report a similar finding. They added a single

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Table 2

Scales of Belieji About Consequences of Environmental Conditions

Item Loading

ACbio 8 = .73

While some local plants and animals may have been harmed by environmental degradation, over the whole earth there has been little effect. -.53

animals will become extinct. .5 1 - S O

Over the next decade, thousands of species of plants and

Claims that we are changing the climate are greatly exaggerated. The balance of nature is strong enough to cope with the impacts

of modern industrial nations. -.46

ACsoc 8 = .71

Environmental protection benefits everyone. Environmental protection will help people have a better quality

.7 1

of life. .71

8 = .77

Environmental protection will provide a better world for me and my children. .71

.7 1 Environmental protection is beneficial to my health.

Note. The factor loadings of a principal components analysis of two variables are equal by constraint. The factor loadings are presented for consistency.

environmental item to a set of Rokeach [ 19731 value items and also found that it loaded on a social-altruistichospheric factor.) Thus, we term Factor 1 a biospheric-altruistic value orientation, Whether a separate biospheric value orientation or a “new ecological paradigm” is in process of emerging in the general population cannot be determined without time series analysis of value structures. Supportive evidence, however, could be sought by comparing the factor structures of different subsets of the population, such as comparing environmental activists, their mobilized opponents, and the general population. Such evidence might also be found by a richer technique of


Table 3

Three Regression Models of Behavioral Intention as a Function of Values and Environmental Belie@

Unstandardized regression coefficients

Beliefs Values Beliefs only only and values

Beliefs ACbio ACsoc Acego

Value factors Biospheric-altruistic Egoistic Openness to change Tradition

Intercept 122

.340***

.I 14

.310**

-.032 .45

.408*** -.261*** -.033 -.068

,005 .35

.260***

.086

.209*

.210*** -.198** -.07 1 -.022

-.026 .52

*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < ,001.

elicitation. Kempton and his colleagues (Kempton, Boster, & Hartley, 1995) have detected something like a biospheric value orientation among nonac- tivists by using ethnographic interview methods. For instance, they report a widespread belief in the sacredness of the biosphere, even among nonreligious individuals.

Relationships Among Values, Beliefs, and Behavioral Intentions

Table 3 displays regressions of the scale of proenvironmental behavioral intentions on the three belief scales, the four values scales, and all seven of the scales together. Stern et al. (1993) found that each measure of awareness of consequences of environmental conditions predicted intentions to act when the other AC measures were statistically controlled. In the present sample, a regression of the political action scale on the AC measures showed significant

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relationships with AC,,, and ACbi,, but not AC,,, (Table 3, column 1). Controlling for all the other value and belief items, the same two types of beliefs remain significantly related to willingness to act politically. The biospheric- altruistic and the egoistic value clusters both relate significantly to willingness to act (in opposite directions, as predicted), and the conservation and openness to change clusters, which reflect value orientations that do not appear in the environment literature, do not. This pattern of findings regarding values and behavioral intentions confirms the view prevalent in the literature on environmentalism about which values are implicated in proenvironmental behavior.

We presume that values may influence environmentally relevant behavior indirectly as well as directly, for example by sensitizing individuals to particular sets of consequences of environmental conditions-those that affect things they value-and by making them especially receptive to messages from social movement actors they view as supportive of those values (Dietz & Stern, 1995). This presumption implies that people with strongly egoistic values will be especially sensitive to information about consequences for themselves and people with strongly social-altruistic or biospheric values will be especially sensitive, respectively, to consequences for other humans and for nonhuman species and the biosphere. It might follow, then, that beliefs about the negative consequences of environmental conditions for particular sets of valued objects (self, others, or the biosphere) would be strongest among those who most strongly value those objects.

Table 4 shows that the picture is not this simple. The regressions show that the belief that anthropogenic environmental changes have negative consequences for oneself (AC,,,) is related directly to the biospheric-altruistic value cluster and inversely to the traditional values cluster, but is unrelated to egoistic or openness-to-change values; that only biospheric-altruistic values are related to beliefs about consequences for others; and that beliefs about biospheric consequences are related to the biospheric-altruistic, egoistic, and traditional values clusters (though not in the same direction). If a sensitization mechanism is operating, it appears that having strong biospheric-altruistic values sensitizes an individual to information about the state of the natural environment generally, resulting in a stronger belief that anthropogenic environmental changes have negative consequences for all classes of objects. However, the pattern of value relationships involving ACbio, with biospheric-altruistic values relating positively and both traditional and egoistic values relating negatively, suggests another causal mechanism. This mechanism can be understood in reference to a current political debate about certain environmental issues, particularly those of global climate change and biodiversity, which are reflected strongly in the ACbio scale items. Beliefs about the biospheric consequences of these environmental conditions (an issue about which scientific uncertainty is particularly


Table 4

Unstandardized Regression Coefficients of Beliefs About Consequences of Environmental Conditions on Value Factors

Value cluster ACbio ACsoc ACego

Biospheric-altruistic .357*** .338*** .482*** Egoistic -.290*** -.I14 .I05 Openness to change .009 .047 -.073 Tradition -.125* -.049 -_ 104*

Intercept R2

.008 .013 .009

.24 .28 .35

*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001

well publicized) might be interpreted as value driven. Individuals who hold strong traditional and materialistic values, which environmentalists often claim will need to be sacrificed to preserve the environment, tend to deny that human activities are harmful to nature; those who value the biosphere for its own sake tend to accept the proposition that human activities threaten natural systems. Note, however, that the value-driveness of environmental beliefs, if the R2 values in Table 3 provide a meaningful index, is not greater for beliefs about biospheric consequences than for other kinds of consequences of anthropogenic change in the natural environment.

The present data raise the question of the extent to which value-belief links in an area of great scientific uncertainty result from a mediated process in which values sensitize individuals selectively to information which they then use to construct information-based beliefs, as against a more direct influence process in which beliefs are selected so as to be congruent with values. This is a delicate question in environmental policy debates because the claim that beliefs are value driven rather than based on scientific evidence is often raised to discredit participants in those debates, particularly environmentalists concerned about the possibility of low-probability disastrous events that have not yet occurred (Dietz et al., 1989). The present findings, suggesting the possibility of value-driveness of environmental beliefs, do not single out either positive or negative AC beliefs as being particularly value driven. That is, while environmentalists may be particularly willing to believe claims regarding adverse consequences of environmental change for themselves, others, and the

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biosphere, those opposed to the environmental movement are just as predis- posed to believe contrary claims. Our general conclusion is that values are linked to the frames used to interpret information provided by the media and other sources.

Implications of Data for Other Hypotheses About Environmental Concern

Developmental hypotheses. Theories of environmental concern such as Inglehart’s (1 990) that predicts environmentalism on progress through a Maslowian hierarchy of needs (Maslow, 1954) can be interpreted in terms of Schwartz’s (1992) four value clusters and examined by using the present data. We propose that the traditional value cluster, which emphasizes values such as conformity and security, reflects a low level on Maslow’s hierarchy and a materialist (or possibly prematerialist) world view in Inglehart’s terms. As such, it should be negatively related to environmental concern. The same should be true of the cluster of egoistic, or self-enhancement, values. Both the openness to change and the self-transcendence, or biospheric-altruistic, clusters represent higher-level Maslowian needs and seem quite congruent with Inglehart’s postmaterialistic values. Consequently, a developmental analysis might predict that they would correlate positively with environmental concern.

The data support only some of these predictions. Egoistic and biospheric- altruistic values both affect environmental concern directly, and both also affect beliefs that are linked to environmental concern. These relationships are all in the direction a developmental analysis would predict, and some are quite strong. Traditional values and openness to change, however, show no direct effects on environmental concern, and only two weak effects on environmentally important beliefs (the negative links between traditional values and AC,,, and ACbi,). Thus, both the Maslowian approach and the theory of postmaterialism appear to combine within the same categories environmentally relevant and environmentally irrelevant values. The present data suggest that neither theory is sufficiently differentiated for the purpose of analyzing environmental concern.

The risk-perception approach. The AC variables in the present model are readily interpreted as perceptions of risk to self, others, and the biosphere. In these terms, our data imply that perceived risks to self, which are commonly analyzed within the risk-perception approach, do in fact predict willingness to act (which might be interpreted as an indicator of unacceptability of risk). However, perceived risk to the biosphere, which is not always addressed in the risk-perception paradigm, was at least as strong a predictor of willingness to act. This finding suggests that some risk-perception approaches are unrealistic


in assuming that risk acceptability is (or should be) based only on private self-interest. Our data also show that considering value orientations can add predictive power to an analysis that only addresses risk perceptions. They suggest that risk acceptability is a function of altruistic values, including concern for nonhuman objects, in addition to egoistic values. Our data may be consistent with some of the predictions of the cultural theory of risk. If we equate egalitarianism with the biospheric-altruistic value orientation (which includes equality as a scale item), individualism with egoistic values, hierarchy with traditional values, and the belief in the fragility of nature with the present findings can be interpreted as supporting several hypotheses from cultural theory. But these identities, though plausible, are not established. We leave it for further research to determine whether the two theoretical accounts are translatable, or whether cultural theory can account for data on environmentalism as well as the present model can.

Hypotheses about gender. A detailed discussion of the relation of social- structural background variables to values, environmentally relevant beliefs, and behavioral intentions is beyond the scope of this analysis. However, we do with to examine the relationship between gender and environmental concern for two reasons that were described in more detail above. First, the link between gender and environmental concern is one of the most debated topics in the environmental attitudes literature, and we believe our analysis of gender differences in values and beliefs can clarify some of the issues under debate. Second, we believe our approach to values has strong parallels to the ongoing debate in social psychology regarding gender differences in moral reasoning. Gilligan (1982) and the work following her contribution emphasize the logic used in resolving moral dilemmas, a logic that reflects what is valued in such dilemmas: human relationships (the purportedly female “ethic of care”) or adherence to particular abstract moral principles (the purported male ethic). ‘Thus, examining gender differences in environmental concern and in morally tinged beliefs without our theoretical framework may eventually allow a stronger integration of the literature on values and on moral rea~oning.~

5We wish to note a significant flaw in the work we report. As with nearly all social psychological work that considers gender, we look for gender differences in mean values and beliefs, but not in value or belief structure. That is, we conducted factor analyses for all respondents, then looked for gender differences in the factor scores. We believe the arguments of both ecofeminists and especially of Gilligan (1982) suggest that the value structures of men and women may be different, implying that factor structures for men and women will be different. Unfortunately, the skewed response distribution on most value items, the limited sample size, and the large number of parameters that must be estimated to examine group differences in factor structure made it impractical to perform that analysis with these data. We hope to explore the issue more fully in subsequent research.

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Stern et al. (1993) found that women expressed stronger intentions to act than men, even with AC controlled, and that women had stronger AC beliefs for all three kinds of consequences. In the present sample, these results were replicated. Women scored higher on the political action scale when AC beliefs were not controlled statistically (b = 1.24, t = 6.32, p < .001), a relationship that remained strong when the AC variables were controlled (b = 0.79, t = 4.73, p < .001); and women scored higher on each AC scale (for AC,,,, b = 0.88, t =

4 . 2 2 , ~ < .001; for AC,,,, b = 0.65, t = 3 . 2 1 , ~ < .01; for ACbi,, b = 0.91, t =

4.00, p < .OO 1 .) Controlling for gender had only a small effect on the relationships between AC and behavioral intention, mainly by reducing the regression coefficient for AC,,, from 0.3 1 to 0.25.

Using an indirect method of measurement, Stern et al. (1 993) did not find evidence of gender differences in value orientations (i.e., there was no interac- tion between gender and beliefs and thus no evidence for gender differences in value weights applied to the beliefs). The present data allow more careful examination of these issues based on direct measurement of the value orientations. Females have stronger biospheric-altruistic values (b = l .30, t = 4.15, p < .OO 1). Gender-based differences in the other value orientations were not statistically significant, although traditional values were stronger among females in the sample to a degree that approached the .05 statistical significance level (b = 0.53, p < .07). The observed value difference does not entirely account for gender differences in environmental concern, however, because a strong gender difference is still evident, even with value orientations and AC beliefs controlled (Table 5).

Table 5 also present regressions for the AC beliefs on values and gender. It shows that the observed gender differences in AC beliefs can be largely accounted for by gender-based value differences. Compared to the analysis reported above, the regression coefficients for the gender-AC relationships are all reduced by at least half when value orientations are statistically controlled, and only the coefficient for ACbi, remains statistically significant. Our findings lead to somewhat different conclusions from those reported by Stern et al. (1993). The observed gender differences in AC beliefs, which partly account for differences in environmental concern, can in turn be accounted for in part by value differences. Note, however, that one of the value orientations (biospheric-altruistic), ACbi,, and gender all affect behavioral intentions directly when the other variables are controlled. Thus, each variable is significant in its own right.

This analysis begins to reveal psychological mechanisms that can link a social-structural variable such as gender to environmental attitudes and behavior. It shows that gender differences in values and beliefs are implicated in differences in environmental concern, and it highlights the value


'Table 5

Unstandardized Regression Coefficients of Behavioral Intention Scale on Beliefs, Values, and Gender and of Beliefs on Values and Gender

Independent Behavioral variables intention scale ACbio ACsoc ACego

Beliefs ACbio ACsoc Acego

Values Biospheric-altruistic .170*** .320*** .321*** .456*** Egoistic -.118 -.262** -.lo1 -.088 Openness to change -.054 .02 1 .052 -.064 Tradition -.03 1 -.134* -.050 -.105*

Gender (female) .721*** .456* .226 .304

Intercept -.431*** -.252 -.115 -.182 R2 .564 .256 .288 .404

*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.

difference as one needing further analysis. Different strands of feminist theory point to gender differences in social concern (e.g., Gilligan, 1982) and biospheric concern (e.g., Griffin, 1978; Merchant, 1979) as possible explanations of differential environmental attitudes. Our data have failed to disen- tangle these two possible dimensions of value difference. Research aimed at doing so would help address an ongoing debate in feminist writing on the environment.

Discussion

Our findings support the following conclusions:

1. Two of the broad value orientations identified in Schwartz's (1992)

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multinational research project correspond closely to those identified in the environmental literature.

2. The biospheric value orientation that appears in the literature on environmentalism cannot yet be differentiated from a more generalized self-transcendent value cluster in the general population.

3. Basic value orientations, and particularly self-transcendent or biospheric-altruistic values, have explanatory power for individuals’ beliefs about environmental conditions and their willingness to take action in response to them. Values have both direct effects on behavioral intentions and indirect effects flowing through beliefs, which may be affected by selective attention to information about valued objects or by direct assimilation to values.

4. An approach to environmental attitudes through a norm-activation model has promise for testing other concepts in the literature on environmental attitudes and for building a theory capable of addressing the broader issue of attitude formation toward emergent or fluid attitude objects. Such an approach is consistent with recent theorizing on the constructive nature of attitudes.

This last point makes the link back from the study of environmental attitudes to the broader theoretical issue of attitude formation. The model we have developed for studying the construction of environmental attitudes, because it is based in more general theories of values and of norm-activation processes, should be applicable generally to attitude formation processes, particularly those that contain a moral dimension.

The present line of research also helps build a conceptual framework and a set of methods that is relevant to the practical task of anticipating human responses to newly identified environmental changes, particularly the emergence of public support and pressure for collective responses to them. Antici- pating public concerns is a daunting task. To perform it, one must have a theory that can account not only for the structure of attitudes, as we do here, but for attitude formation processes. To support a theory of process, of course, requires time-series or experimental data. This study takes a step toward specifying the kinds of attributes that, when attached to newly discovered environmental conditions, may generate public concern with them. Knowledge of these attributes will allow environmental scientists to address a portion of their research effort toward estimating the kinds of effects of environmental conditions that are most likely to arouse public concern. In this way, research


on social psychological construction processes can make a practical contribution to setting scientific research agendas that can provide the kinds of knowledge people need to address their concerns and thus inform their public participation.

A key element in our account of attitude formation is the attribution of consequences to environmental conditions. We see this as a highly contested social process (e.g., the scientific debate over whether pesticide residues in foods are significant causes of cancer in human beings). The present framework yields testable hypotheses about the ways interested parties use rhetoric to advance their positions by manipulating public understanding. Following much recent psychological literature, we presume that task- and context- specific variables, including persuasive messages, may influence the construction of preferences (Payne et al., 1992), for example, by selectively drawing attention to one or another value orientation. Cialdini and his colleagues (e.g., Cialdini, Kallgren, & Reno, 199 1) provide a theoretical framework and experimental evidence for the relevance of such “focus” effects to environmental behavior. Findings from research following our theoretical approach support an interpretation that contingent valuation items on an environmental survey create such a focus effect. These items, which often focus attention on personal expenditures, lead respondents to express preferences more narrowly driven by iin egoistic orientation than they express in response to items concerning political actions (Stern et al., 1993). Similarly, framings can change the way beliefs about consequences influence attitudes. When continent valuation items were framed as contributions to a fund to support environmental protection, willingness to pay was strongly influenced by beliefs about the consequences of environmental degradation, but the effects disappeared when the questions were framed as willingness to pay taxes for the same environmental protections (Guagnano, Dietz, & Stern, 1994).

By theorizing about how attitudes to emergent social objects may be shaped by the information people receive and come to believe about it, the activation model makes a place in attitude theory for the framing and legitimation processes emphasized in recent sociological literature on social movements (e.g., Gamson, 1992a, 1992b; Snow et al., 1986). Influence agents, including environmental movement organizations and their opponents, can be expected to frame environmental conditions so as to activate or deactivate altruistic personal norms by emphasizing or deemphasizing consequences and responsi- bility according to the Schwartz model (Dietz et al., 1989), and they may try to activate or deactivate ecological personal norms in an analogous manner. They may accomplish similar effects by focusing audiences selectively on certain value clusters. For example, if a new environmental condition is presented as having consequences mainly for endangered species, this information focuses

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attention on biospheric values; if it is presented as having consequences for employment, it focuses attention on egoistic values in individuals who expect to be affected and on altruistic values in those who do not. By focusing attention in these ways, issue entrepreneurs can use new information about the environment to influence the formation of attitudes and to mobilize public opinion in support of their positions.

In terms of the issue of predicting new environmental concerns, our account suggests that public concerns will be shaped by information about newly identified environmental conditions that links them to widely held values. They will also be shaped by the actions of organized interests that selectively publicize such information in order to focus people’s attention and shape their attitudes. Thus, individual differences in reactions to new attitude objects may be affected both by differences in stable personal values and in response to available information; similarly, the degree of consensus in public opinion about emergent attitude objects may depend on differences in values, but it will also depend to a great degree on the efforts of organized interests to shape public opinion. The present framework points to specific factors likely to affect public opinion about emergent attitude objects and strategies likely to be used by interest groups in their efforts to influence public opinion.

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values, beliefs, and proenvironmental action: attitude formation toward emergent attitude objects1

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