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Craig PerryEast Asian Politics Richard Kraus

US-China Relations 1969-79

Since the 1949 communist victory in the Chinese civil war,

there had been no diplomatic recognition between the United

States and the People’s Republic of China (PRC). During the

1950’s, the United States had engaged in military confrontation

with the PRC on the Korean Peninsula and had almost done so in

the Taiwan straits. The United States was committed to the

security of the Republic of China (ROC/Taiwan) by the 1954 Mutual

Defense Treaty (MDT). By the 1960’s there had been a sea change

in attitudes towards the PRC in both diplomatic/political circles

and in popular opinion. The ‘China lobby’ of cold warriors that

adamantly and unconditionally supported the ROC was losing ground

to a more pragmatic faction who favored engagement, to various

degrees, with the PRC. The process of negotiating diplomatic

recognition formally began under Richard Nixon but did not

conclude until the Presidency of Jimmy Carter. During this period

(1969-1979), the international situation changed. The political

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players in the negotiations changed with the vicissitudes of

domestic politics. The motivations and justifications of the

players altered. The reasons for seeking rapprochement, and the

perceived benefits of this, varied not in kind but in emphasis

during this period. For the United States, its concerns were

primarily strategic and secondarily economic. China’s communist

dictatorship was as oppressive, if not worse, than that of the

Soviet Union during this period. This belies any US arguments

based in defense of human rights and liberty. For China during

this period, there is a shift in emphasis from its security

concerns to the exigencies of economic development. On the other

hand, there are certain constants that underpinned the whole

process. First, the central narrative of this period is the

triangular relationship between the United States, the Soviet

Union, and the PRC. International Relations don’t fit into such a

neat construct as this, but it is indisputable that the

relationships between these three main state actors were the

primary concerns of the politicians and diplomats involved. The

relationships the ‘big three’ had with Japan, Taiwan, Vietnam,

and others were all secondary. Second, despite the ideological

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rhetoric of the supposedly bipolar world of the cold war, by the

end of the 1960’s, international relations were dominated by non-

ideological Realist assumptions about the nature of Great Power

interaction.

The International Situation in 1968-69

The United States was highly divided in 1968. The Vietnam

War was escalating and more Americans were speaking out against

it. There was ongoing conflict about race relations and the civil

rights movement. The polarities of the ‘establishment’ and the

‘counterculture’ fought for hearts and minds in the streets, in

the media, and through the political process. Norman Mailer gives

an impressionistic depiction of the political turmoil in the

United States in Miami and the Siege of Chicago, “Left-wing demons,

white and Black, working to inflame the conservative heart of

America, while Right-wing devils exacerbate Blacks and drove the

New Left and liberal middle class into prides of hopeless

position. And the country roaring like a bull in its wounds,

coughing like a sick lung in the smog…” (Mailer 15). Richard

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Nixon was elected to office for 1968. He promised to end the

conflict in Vietnam. Nixon was committed to having ‘peace with

honor’. The United States needed to exit Vietnam while

maintaining as much credibility as possible.

There are two main historical processes that must be

understood, if one is to understand the motivations of Chinese

leaders during the period of rapprochement. First is the Cultural

Revolution. Second is the Sino-Soviet estrangement and eventual

military conflict. Mao launched the Cultural Revolution in 1966

as an assault on what he saw as the ossification and

bureaucratization of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and of the

revolution in general. In practice it was a wave of fanatical

violence that swept the country and had to eventually be

suppressed by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). The turbulence

of America in the 1960’s was nothing in comparison to China, “The

leaders of the Cultural Revolution called for a comprehensive

attack on the four old elements within Chinese society…With the

euphoria, fear, excitement, and tension that gripped the country,

violence grew apace. Thousands of intellectuals and others were

beaten to death or died of their injuries. Countless others

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committed suicide…Many of the suicides killed themselves only

after futile attempts to avoid Red Guard harassment by destroying

their own libraries and art collections. Thousands were

imprisoned, often in solitary confinement, for years. Millions

were relocated to purify themselves through labor in the

countryside” (Spence 606). The factional struggles that plagued

the upper echelons of the party were between the ultra-leftists

(centered around Lin Biao and Jiang Qing) and the pragmatists

(Zhou Enlai and Deng Xiaoping). The ultra-leftists were the

ideologically inspired backbone of the Cultural Revolution and

they were adamantly opposed to any negotiations with the United

States. These struggles would persist until the consolidation of

power by Deng Xiaoping in the mid-1970’s. Thus, domestic politics

weighed heavily in the diplomatic decision-making process of Mao,

Zhou, and Deng.

The relationship between the comrade-states in the struggle

for world revolution had always been a rocky one. However, after

the death of Stalin, the relationship between the Soviet Union

and the PRC began a precipitous decline. At the twentieth Party

Congress on 14th of February, 1956, Krushchev made his famous

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indictment of the Stalinist cult of personality (Service 338).

By extension, this criticism could be applied to Mao. 1960 was a

critical year of thinly veiled polemics and tit-for-tat

diplomatic moves (Spence 589). Finally, in 1969, there was a

border conflict between the two states that resulted in 100

Russian casualties and 800 Chinese casualties (Spence 616). The

Chinese had come to see the USSR as a bigger threat than the

United States.

During the period 1969-79, the Soviet Union had a greater

degree of internal stability than China and perhaps was on a

level similar to that of the United States (of course, comparing

a communist dictatorship and a democracy is an apples-and-oranges

argument on most levels). With the ouster of Krushchev and the

consolidation of Brezhnev’s position at the top of the party, the

Russian leadership was internally consistent and stable. During

the 1960’s, the Soviet agricultural sector grew. By 1970, the

Soviet Union had achieved military parity with the United States.

There was ongoing systematic repression of dissidents (Service

376-410).

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Nixon, Kissinger, and the Real World.

Richard Nixon and his National Security Advisor Henry

Kissinger were Realists in their view of international relations.

This is a statement on par with saying that the sun is warm. The

two shared a breadth of vision concerning the world that is

impressive. One can say this while still fundamentally

disagreeing with many of the assumptions, strategies, tactics,

and obvious moral shortcomings of the two. According to Jeremy

Suri, “Fears of democratic chaos and anxieties about pervasive

threats—these were the anchors for Nixon and Kissinger’s working

relationship. They had a dark view of human nature and democratic

society…For Nixon and Kissinger, social improvement required firm

national leadership to limit human excesses and restrict human

hatreds. The same applied to the international system, where

competitive states would pummel one another to death without the

force of imposed order from a superior power…Their relationship

was built on fear and frustration. Their policies were built on

obsessions with toughness and secrecy” (Logevall 70). As

previously stated, the most important foreign policy issue

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confronting Nixon when he entered office was resolution of the

conflict in Vietnam. The pressing issue was how to make this

happen.

Logevall states that the three fundamental aspects of a

Realist perspective on international relations are 1) balance of

power between the ‘Great Powers’, 2) triangulation of relations

between these Great Powers, and 3) linkage of different issues in

a quid pro quo (Logevall 1-18). The product of these assumptions

for Nixon and Kissinger was a strategy that relied on the

tensions between the Soviet Union and the PRC. The three main

tactics in the Nixon-Kissinger strategy were Détente with the

Soviet Union, rapprochement with China (and the resultant

triangular diplomacy), and termination of US involvement in

Vietnam (Lovegall 25). Nixon and Kissinger believed that they

could play the PRC and the Soviet Union off of each other to the

benefit of US interests.

In order to set about making this happen, the first thing

the two did was retool the executive foreign policy apparatus to

facilitate their desire to exercise unchecked power. Oddly

parallel to Mao’s view of the CCP at this time, the two felt that

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the State Department had become too bureaucratized and unable to

act in a creative fashion. According to Herring, “Reluctant to

share power and certain that a hidebound bureaucracy could only

be an obstacle to the bold moves they hoped to implement, they

restructured the machinery of government to put the National

Security Council in control of policymaking and Kissinger in

control of the NSC…They used backchannels to hide from their

colleagues developments on crucial issues. The NSC more than

doubled in size and nearly tripled in budget during the Nixon

years. What had been created in 1947 as a coordinating mechanism

became a little State Department” (764). The strengthening of

the NSC would have ramifications for the development and

execution of foreign policy during the Carter administration.

The initial contacts between the United States and the PRC

occurred first through low-level diplomatic intermediaries in

Poland and then indirectly through the Pakistani Ambassador to

the United States (Mann 26-30). Initially, Premier Zhou Enlai

demanded that any talks between the two countries would solely

concern Taiwan and the withdrawal of the United States from the

island. However, Zhou soon sent word through diplomatic channels

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that there would be no ‘Taiwan precondition’ to possible

diplomatic engagement (Mann 29).

In July 1971, Kissinger made a secret trip to Beijing. No

one in the United States media knew; even most in the

administration were unaware. In these initial talks, the two main

concerns were Taiwan (on the part of the PRC) and Vietnam (on the

part of the United States.) Goh states that the American position

as articulated by Kissinger in this first meeting was “realist

and based on the assessment of the national interests; it was not

aimed at fostering conflict among the major powers and would thus

be even-handed; but it was anti-hegemonic and so would favor a

strong PRC which could help to act as counterweight to the Soviet

Union” (478). In his writings, Kissinger portrays himself as a

wily and hard-headed negotiator. In About Face, Mann depicts him

as enamored of Zhou during their first meeting and almost ‘giving

away the store’ in these first negotiations. China’s position on

Taiwan, as articulated by Zhou was unequivocal: “…recognize

Taiwan as an inalienable part of China and a province of China;

withdrawal all its [US] armed forces and military installations

from the area of Taiwan and the Taiwan Straight within a limited

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time period; and consider its [US] defense treaty with the Taiwan

regime invalid” (Kirby 26). Kissinger made major concessions to

Zhou concerning Taiwan including assurances that the US would not

support any Taiwanese independence movements and that diplomatic

recognition would occur during Nixon’s second term (Mann 32-33).

The United States got little in the way of assurances of Chinese

help in dealing with Vietnam.

Nixon publicly announced his plan to visit China on July

15th, 1971. This immediately caused consternation among the

United States traditional allies in the region and with

conservatives in Congress. In the time between Kissinger’s first

secret visit and Nixon’s official state visit to the PRC,

Kissinger made an official public visit to the PRC and Taiwan

lost its representation in the United Nations to the PRC. Nixon

arrived in China on February 21st, 1972 for the ‘week that

changed the world.’ During meetings with Zhou, many issues were

discussed paramount among them was the Soviet Union. Nixon

reiterated the commitments that Kissinger had made in the first

secret meeting with Zhou. Nixon followed a two-track

public/private course on the Taiwan issue. Publically, Nixon

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reiterated the traditional US policy of security commitments to

Taiwan. Privately, to Zhou and Mao, he was promising to

normalization relations with the PRC mostly on the terms that the

Chinese were demanding. Zhou stated to Nixon and Kissinger that

Vietnam was “different from Korea” implying that the Chinese had

no intention of directly intervening in the conflict (Mann 45).

Despite Kissinger’s conception of triangular diplomacy, the

chaotic nature of the world and of history disallowed such neat

planning. One of the main issues during Nixon’s visit was also

the Japanese-United States relationship. Nixon exploited China’s

concerns about potential Japanese militarism in his dealings with

them. According to Komine, Nixon and Kissinger played a ‘Japan

card’ that entailed the “practice of putting pressure on Japan to

increase its defense and regional responsibilities, whilst

emphasizing Japan’s geopolitical aspirations to convince Chinese

leaders of the need for continuing the American military presence

in East Asia…” (495). To further problematize the triangular

construct, there was also discussion of coordination of US and

Chinese policy towards India (Mann 42). What one can see is that

the diplomatic actors involved were simultaneously thinking on a

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regional and global level. Regional tensions and animosity played

out in relation to the global Great Powers. Power dynamics

operate in a multivalent fashion.

The outcome of the negotiations was the Shanghai Communiqué.

Both sides engaged in discussions of the wording of the document

right up until its public release. The center point of the

document was the ‘anti-hegemony clause.’ This stated that

“neither should seek hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region, and

each is opposed to efforts by any other country or group of

countries to establish such hegemony; and neither is prepared to

negotiate on behalf of any third party or to enter into

agreements or understandings with the other directed at other

states” (quoted in Goh 484). The unstated third party in this is

the Soviet Union. However, within the regional context of NE

Asia, it is also directed towards the Japanese. The Chinese were

concerned that the Japanese would try to fill any power void left

by the withdrawal of US forces from Taiwan (Komine 505). On the

question of Taiwan, both parties to the document issued

statements that were complimentary but left much unsaid or

deferred. The document reads

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The Chinese side reaffirmed its position: The Taiwan question is thecrucial question obstructing the normalization of relations betweenChina and the United States; the Government of the People's Republic ofChina is the sole legal government of China; Taiwan is a province ofChina which has long been returned to the motherland; the liberation ofTaiwan is China's internal affair in which no other country has theright to interfere; and all U.S. forces and military installations mustbe withdrawn from Taiwan. The Chinese Government firmly opposes anyactivities which aim at the creation of “one China, one Taiwan,” “oneChina, two governments,” “two Chinas,” and “independent Taiwan” oradvocate that “the status of Taiwan remains to be determined.”

The U.S. side declared: The United States acknowledges that all Chineseon either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China andthat Taiwan is a part of China. The United States Government does notchallenge that position. It reaffirms its interest in a peaceful settlement ofthe Taiwan question by the Chinese themselves. With this prospect inmind, it affirms the ultimate objective of the withdrawal of all U.S.forces and military installations from Taiwan. In the meantime, it willprogressively reduce its forces and military installations on Taiwan asthe tension in the area diminishes. (US Dept. of State, italics mine)

The Chinese expounded a set of clear principles. In turn, the

United States took a neutral tone to some of the assertions

(‘does not challenge that position’) and used a language of

contingency (‘as the tensions in the area diminishes’) to

militate against the unequivocal nature of the Chinese

statements. The nature of current US-Taiwan security arrangements

was purposefully left out along with the question of future arms

sales to Taiwan by the United States. These subtle differences

are what allowed for agreement on the document. The other key

component was the tacit understanding reached during the secret

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track of negotiations. Kissinger stated that “the prime minister

[Zhou] seeks clarity, and I am trying for ambiguity” (quoted in

Kirby 41). The final document reflects that tension.

After Nixon’s visit to the PRC, diplomatic negotiations

between the two powers stalled. This was due to several reasons.

Paramount among them was the turbulent domestic situations in

both the United States and China. On the Chinese side, there were

the incessant factional struggles within the CCP. The Chairman

was the main source of this instability, “ [Mao] had vacillated

between the pragmatists [Zhou and Deng] and the ultra-leftists

[Jiang Qing and Lin Biao]. If he favored the pragmatic side, this

would negate the theoretical basis of the Cultural Revolution, an

outcome he would not like to see. But he also yearned for

restoration of order. This was his guiding thought when he put

Zhou Enlai and Deng Xiaoping in charge of the day-to-day work of

the central government…Following Zhou’s death in January 1976,

Deng was forced out of all his posts. This was a disaster…”

(Kirby 78). In the United States, the general public and

political leaders were generally receptive to the outcome of

Nixon’s trip (with notable exceptions on the right.) However,

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knowing that the Chinese would not interfere in Vietnam, Nixon

escalated the conflict with the most intensive bombing to date

(Herring 793). This inflamed domestic opposition to Nixon. Nixon

soon became bogged down in the Watergate scandal. Nixon resigned

on Aug 9th 1974.

“A Subtle Triangle of Relations”

Nixon and Kissinger would have us believe that their policy

of engagement with the PRC was a radical and heretofore

inconceivable break with established US foreign policy. In this

interpretation, they were the visionaries who cut through the

ossified modes of thought and action to change the world. To be

sure, US-PRC relations can be divided into a before and after

based on February 1972. However, throughout the 1960’s there had

been talk in foreign policy and defense circles about altering

the stalemated relationship. Nixon’s famous Foreign Affairs article

of 1967 was part of this debate. He was au courant but certainly

not ahead of the curve on the PRC debate.

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Concerning triangular diplomacy, there is substantial debate

as to its effectiveness and how it manifested itself as praxis.

James Mann corroborates Nixon and Kissinger’s theory by averring

that the policy in execution did not favor either China or the

Soviet Union (during Nixon’s terms in office). Evelyn Goh

believes that the construct was always artificial due to the

asymmetry between the global power of the Soviet Union and the

regional power of the PRC. However, I think that this is to

fundamentally misread the nature of Chinese power. What she is

doing is relying on quantitative measures (nuclear weapons,

tanks, etc.) as the sole means of determining ‘strength’. This is

analogous to what the United States did, much to its own

detriment, in reference to the Vietnamese. During the period

1955-1980, the Vietnamese successfully fought off aggression from

the French, Americans, and Chinese, not to mention executing a

successful invasion of Cambodia. Strength is more than just

numbers. Jussi M. Hanhimäki makes a pessimistic assessment of the

effectiveness of triangular diplomacy. He points to the failure

of Nixon and Kissinger to get any concrete assistance from either

China or the Soviet Union on the issue of Vietnam (Logevall 13).

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Furthermore, “The new Sino-American relationship did not

translate into a major diplomatic tool. After 1971, there were

very few instances when the USSR practiced restraint that could

be directly attributed to its concern over a ‘Washington-Beijing

axis’” (Logevall 37).

TRANSITIONS

When Gerald Ford took over the presidency after Nixon’s

resignation, he kept on Kissinger as head of the NSC. Kissinger

also became secretary of state for part of this period. The goal

was to maintain consistency in US Foreign policy during the

difficult and unexpected transition. During this period,

Kissinger continued to make trips to the PRC engaging in

dialogue. It was on one of these trips that Kissinger informed

Zhou and Mao that normalization would be delayed indefinitely

(Mann 69). The Chinese were furious at this and began to doubt

the sincerity of US intentions. While this period was generally

one of stagnation, there were some moves that retrospectively

were of great importance during the Carter Administration. As a

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goodwill gesture early in the US-PRC negotiations, the United

States had offered intelligence to the Chinese on Soviet military

positions. In October 1975, for the first time, the United States

offered to institutionalize intelligence exchanges in an ongoing

process with the Chinese (Mann 73). The United States also worked

on backchannel sales of technology to China (Mann 74). These

types of technological, intelligence, and eventually military

exchanges would be central to Carter’s engagement with the PRC.

In 1976, both Zhou Enlai and Mao Zedong died. The factional

stuggles in the CCP came to a close with the arrest of the ‘Gang

of Four’ (Jiang Ching’s faction) and the consolidation of Deng

Xiaoping’s rule. It would be up to Deng and Carter to finalize

the normalization of US-PRC relations.

Carter And Normalization

Under President Jimmy Carter, there was a tension among his

foreign policy cabinet members. On the one hand, there was

Secretary of State Cyrus Vance. Vance believed that the United

States should deploy triangular diplomacy with an even hand and

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not favor either the PRC or USSR. The head of the NSC, Zbigniew

Brzezinski, believed that the United States should tacitly align

itself with China to put pressure on the USSR. During the course

of Carter’s term (1976-1980), Carter moved from favoring Vance to

favoring Brzezinski (Herring 839).

When Carter ran for office, he ran on a platform that

included a strong commitment to human rights. He pledged that no

longer would the United States turn a blind eye to atrocities

committed by allies of the United States. While Carter made a

real attempt to apply these standards, other considerations often

trumped human rights. When Carter deferred on human rights issues

the results were mixed for the effectiveness of his foreign

policy. In the case of Iran, his pragmatism concerning the Shah

of Iran, morphed into his worse foreign policy failure and

perhaps the main factor in his inability to be reelected. In the

case of China, it is clear that his ignoring human rights issues

paid dividends for US interests. For as Brian Hilton states, “…

PRC human rights violations played virtually no role in the

administration’s discussions of normalization” (601).

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By the time Carter was in office, Deng Xiaoping had

solidified his hold on the leadership of the CCP. Deng’s concerns

were now two fold and interrelated. Deng knew that he needed to

undertake a program of economic modernization if China was to be

a world power. Deng also knew that he needed a stable

international security situation to make this happen. For Deng,

technology and trade with the United States were essential

components of the process of economic modernization. On the

security front, the growing closeness of the USSR and Vietnam

posed a threat of encirclement (Spence 652-659).

The Chinese position had been consistent since the

beginning of negotiations on normalization. The ‘Japan Formula’

was the foundation for all talks. As Fardella sums it up, it

consisted of, “…breaking off diplomatic relations with Taipei,

the end of the MDT, and the withdrawal of American troops from

the island…[US insistence that Beijing agree] to a peaceful

resolution of reunification with Taipei, had disintegrated into a

simple ‘request’ made that Beijing should not oppose any American

statement in this direction” (549). In other words, Mao and Zhou

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had carried themselves well in the opening rounds of negotiations

and China was in a very strong bargaining position.

When Carter first took office, he was preoccupied with the

negotiations to return the Panama Canal to Panama. Also, Détente

was still viable and there were ongoing discussions with the

Soviet Union concerning SALT II (Strategic Arms Limitation

Talks). Thus, in the first trip of a high ranking US official to

China under Carter, Cyrus Vance articulated a purposefully

extreme position that the Chinese rejected out of hand. However,

as SALT II talks stalled, and tensions between the two

superpowers grew, more emphasis was placed on the talks to

normalize US-PRC relations (Fardella 550).

The most salient feature of the Carter period is the

increased militarization of the US-PRC relationship. In the run

up to normalization, there was a steady increase in technological

and military exchanges. After the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan,

they increased exponentially. Mann believes that the Carter

administration saw China as a “sideshow” in the US-USSR fight and

China was to them, “…not so much a country as a military

strategy…” (97). Brzezinski went to China in March 1978, a clear

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indication of Carter starting to favor his approach to triangular

diplomacy. Brzezinski told the Chinese that the United States

agreed to normalization on most of the terms that China demanded.

It was during this time period that the United States consented

to the sale of weapons to China by European allies (Mann 86-89,

Fardella 554).

From this point on, the negotiations continued to pick up

speed. However, the talks were built around a tactical silence

concerning future arm sales to Taiwan. This is perhaps the most

fascinating part of this diplomatic history. For if no one spoke

then no one could say anything that would go against their avowed

policies. A minimalist approach to negotiating designed to yield

the maximum progress. Eventually, however, the issue had to be

addressed.

In January 1979, Deng came to America and made a successful

diplomatic campaign to woo the American media and public. It was

during the trip that Deng let Carter know that the Chinese were

planning to invade Vietnam. Since the end of US involvement in

Vietnam, the United States had been moving swiftly to restore

relations with Vietnam. However, as the importance of US

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engagement with China increased, the more the Vietnam question

was pushed to the side. With Carter’s implied consent, the

Chinese invaded Vietnam soon after Deng’s trip (Mann 91).

The silence on Taiwanese issues could not last forever

though. In the initial phase of Deng’s talks with US Ambassador

to China Leonard Woodcock, “Deng set out his moderation with

regards to the Taiwan question. Showing his willingness to

respect the social reality existing on Taiwan as well as

representing a sort of peaceful statement on reunification,

although a veiled one…” (Fardella 566). Deng needed normalization

of relations in order to act on his domestic agenda. Brzezinski

knew this and deferred on the arms sales issue until the very

end. Deng could not sacrifice normalization despite this

disagreeable aspect (Fardella 567-571.) On March 1st 1979, the

restoration of US-PRC diplomatic ties was officially announced.

In the end, normalization was achieved not by confronting

the issue of Taiwan but by realizing that it was secondary to the

larger economic and security issues of both countries. From the

beginning, even though the PRC diplomats were in an inferior

position strategically, they carried themselves as if they were a

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world power. They made demands and got concessions on a range of

issues. The United States, led by Carter and Brzezinski, were

able to normalize relations and continue the practice of selling

arms to Taiwan. The diplomatic negotiations were often an

exercise in cognitive dissonance. Both sides temporized or

remained silent on issues that they could not compromise on. An

acceptance of a status quo based on ambiguity became the tacit

rule for diplomatic engagement. In essence, both sides realized

that if a quotidian functionality could develop between them,

there was no need, at least in the short term, to confront

abstract questions of Taiwan’s legal status under international

norms. James Mann takes what I would label a ‘structuralist’

interpretation of US-PRC relations during this period. At many

points in his narrative, he highlights a set of practices or

norms for engagement that were established between 1969 and 1979

that have since become entrenched. Often they were linked to

conscious decisions about tactics, just as frequently, they were

the product of the exigencies of the moment. These structural

features are elaborated around a core of unresolved issues

concerning Taiwan. While there have been some distinctly

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troubling periods in this mutual understanding, particularly the

1996 Taiwan straits crisis, it has functioned well for over

thirty years.

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