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C3S Issue Brief: 004/2020

Geopolitics of Water and Security Implications: Understanding of India-China Transboundary Water Dispute

Japungsar Basumatary

Research Intern

Chennai Centre for

China Studies

July 07 2020

Geopolitics of Water and Security Implications: Understanding of India-China Transboundary Water Dispute

Abstract

Broadening and widening the scope of security studies includes several non-traditional

security threats. These existential threats are included by many scholars to be examined as the

security challenges in security studies. Several existential issues and threats such as economic,

food, health, political, transnational organized crime, gender, terrorism, and others have been

studied by many scholars in contemporary security studies. However, water security has not

been fully perceived by many people as a security challenge. It has not been focused

systematically that can be securitized in security studies. Therefore, this paper examines water

security and its challenges in contemporary security studies. This paper delves into the three

levels of the perspective of conceptual analysis where water security pertains to be an

emerging security challenge in security studies. The first level focuses on human security

perspective dealing with food, health, economic and environmental aspects of the concept of

Human Security. Second level deals with the understanding of water as the source of intra-

state as well as the inter-state conflict that may escalate into a hot war. Lastly, water security is

looked into the geopolitical perspective particularly how water plays a key role in shaping the

diplomatic and strategic interests of riparian states.

Assessing this framework into the case of transboundary river water relations between

India and China, the paper examines the water sharing relations and illustrates the threat

perception to both countries. The water diversion project of China and other policies or

activities in the shared rive become the major concerns for India particularly in terms of

human security and geopolitical terms. Besides, the Chinese attitude towards less and no

cooperation with the government of India indicates the political instability and regional

conflict predict in the region.

Introduction

Transboundary Rivers in contemporary world politics have become one of the major sources of

issues to the bilateral or multilateral riparian relations among the countries. Freshwater scarcity

and the stress of water crisis caused by the rapid population growth, climate change,

industrialization, and urbanization including pollution have been immense concerns for upstream

and downstream river basin countries in many parts of the world.

Therefore, this paper describes the conceptual understanding of how water plays a key role

in shaping contemporary international relations among the riparian countries and makes an

influence on national as well as regional security. Here, water, geopolitics, and security will be

discussed in the conceptual framework to illustrate the geopolitics of water and its security

implications through the three levels of analysis.

First, the human security approach is applied to the understanding of the water crisis and

its issues that impact on the individual or people-centric security dilemma. This approach

illustrates the security implications stemming from the shared river courses that concern the

downstream riparian states for their human security challenges including biodiversity.

Second, shared river water is discussed as the source of violent conflict between the host

countries and examines the security implications. Indeed, several arguments have been given by

many academicians and policymakers especially the government-anchored that the shared river

course leads to violent conflict whether it is intra-state or interstate. Variables such as climate

change, absence of agreement and treaties, historical rivalries, dam projects, and diversion, etc.

have become apparent that have been examined.

Third, the paper delves into the framework of water as a source of geopolitics and it has the

potentiality in shaping the bilateral and multilateral relations among the riparian states. It should

be noted that the impact of a transboundary river basin on external and strategic interest is

examined as the perception of security threats by the riparian states. Shared river dispute is not a

security threat and it is de-securitized as argued by some of the studies (Biba 2014c). However,

this paper is an attempt to examine and illustrate the issue that impacts the strategic and

diplomatic relations among the countries with certain cases of transboundary river disputes in the

world. Emerging political instability in the disputed region makes this framework more

interesting to discuss the transboundary river dispute and examine what security implications are.

Assessing this framework into the case of transboundary river water relations between

India and China, the paper examines both countries in so far as the water conflict and

cooperation are concerned and illustrates the threat perception to security challenges for both

countries. The diversion of water as part of the Chinese megaprojects such as north-south water

diversion and controlling of hydropower become the major concerns for India. Consequently, it

affects availability of water for livelihood, agriculture, fishing and increases salinity in the

downstream region. Besides, the Chinese attitude towards less and no cooperation with the

government of India indicates the political instability and regional conflict are predicted in the

region. Assessing military capability and emerging economic power, China is perceived by other

riparian countries as resource quest. The harnessing hydropower and unilateral water diversion

as part of the north-south water diversion project have become prominent examples. A

combination of these factors has the potential to affect external relations between India and

China.

While China is one of the countries with the largest number of transboundary rivers in the

world ranking third together with Chile and second to Russia and Argentina (Zhang and Li

2018). In Asia (Southeast, South, Central, and Northeast Asia), China is central to regional water

games and issues due to these regions are dependent on incoming water from China (Biba 2014).

Some of the major transboundary river courses are Amur River, Yalu River, Tumen River,

Suifen River, Irrawaddy River, Salween River, Mekong River, Pearl River, Brahmaputra River,

Ganges River, Indus River, Red River, Irtysh–Ob River, and Ili River (Zhang and Li 2018). All

of them mostly originate in Tibet, hence many tributaries flow to many countries. Therefore,

Tibet has become a strategic importance for China as a buffer.

The water sharing dispute between India and China is seen as a serious concern over the

Brahmaputra River. Both countries have also water-sharing over the Indus River and other

tributaries of largely called the Ganga-Brahmaputra-Meghna River Basin. Both countries signed

a Memorandum of Understanding in 2002 after two years of flood occurred in the Siang district

of Arunachal Pradesh. It is claimed that the flood inundating large swaths of land making

millions of people homeless was the result of Chinese dams. After a series of talks between the

two countries, a Memorandum of Understanding was signed in 2002 and in 2005, 2006, and

2008 for the data sharing during the flood season (Holslag 2011).

Table No.1: Initiatives for Data Sharing over the Transboundary River between India and China

Years Initiatives for Hydrological Data Sharing

2002 :MoU between India and China on the provision of data sharing during flood

season.

2005 :MoU between India and China over the data sharing during flood season

particularly over the Sutlej River

2006 :Expert level mechanism to share data, cooperation, emergency management

including other transboundary issues.

2008 :MoU on the provision of data sharing during flood season over the Brahmaputra

River for 2008 and 2012

Source: Modified from Jonathan Holslag’s article (2011).

Over the last few decades, many Indian writers (academicians, media, and government officials)

have viewed China as a dangerous actor(Biba 2014c). Chellaney argued that control over Tibet‘s

water resources gives China enormous strategic latitude with its neighbors and that China is

likely to use water as a source of political leverage against India (Chellaney 2011). All these

factors will be examined as a threat to the diplomatic and strategic interests of the riparian states.

Vishwanath (2018) argues that water is not only defined in security terms, rather it has become

one of the important aspects of policy concerns for many countries in the world.

So far, this paper is an attempt to discuss the significant issues related to water sharing and

its implications through the new framework. It does not present the new case or things from the

case of water sharing dispute and security challenges between India and China. Nonetheless, the

water issue will be examined into the framework that water sharing even if not securitized makes

both countries vulnerable in many ways. The paper lastly discusses the options and challenges of

Bangladesh being one of the downstream riparian countries among the Brahmaputra‘s river basin

states.

Setting Framework for Analysis: Water, Geopolitics and Security

Implications

It should be noted that the shared river water includes lakes, aquifers, and river basins. The river

basin is also classified into three types i.e. transnational or transboundary river, border river, and

mixed river (Zhang and Li 2018a). Here, apart from lakes and aquifers; the transboundary river

basin and its stemming issues impacting on the upper stream and downstream politics will be

discussed at the three levels of analysis. The analysis through the variables depending on these

three levels has been structured in the following figure (fig. no.1).

Fig. 1: Level of Analysis: Water, Geopolitics and Security Implications

Human Security Water and Conflict Water and Geopolitics

threats security threats security threats security

scarcity/crisis individual/ violent local, national political- state and dam, pollution people conflict international/ instability region

salinity political regional impact on

instability external

and strategic

interests

Source: created by the author

First and foremost, the understanding of transboundary river water and its issues from the

perspective of human security is fundamentally dealt with water scarcity or crisis caused by dam

related project, pollution, and salinity. Second, the emerging issues from such developmental

projects related to river water that threaten human survival are prominent. All these issues will be

examined from the perspective of human security linking water-related issues to the concept and

meaning of human security.

Understanding the meaning and concept of human security as given by the United Nation

Development Programe report called ―Human Development Report‖ (1994), the water crisis

becomes the challenging security threat to the non-traditional security challenges. Human

Security means the;

protection from the threats of hunger, infectious disease, crime and repression including sudden and

hurtful disruptions in our daily livelihood(1994). It is also defined that the protection of our vital core

in the ways that enhance freedoms and fulfilment in politics, social, environmental, economic,

military and cultural systems that together give people the building blocks of survival, livelihood and

dignity(CHS Report 2003).

More specifically, the concept of human security is considered in seven elements whereby the

individual is threatened in their daily livelihood, mainly economic, food, health, environmental,

personal, community, and political security(Shinoda 2014). In this regard, water security threats

can be examined as the prominent human security challenges when an individual, group,

community, and the state are threatened by such water-related issues. Water scarcity or crisis and

its related issues are prominent into the human security level of exploring threats to individual or

human survival in terms of food security, health security, economic security, and ecosystem or

environmental security. These four aspects are, apart from other elements closely linked to water

security. The people dependent upon agriculture and securing daily income or economic to lead

their honorable lives are directly connected with accessibility to clean water. Human survival,

development, and societal and economic development are dependent upon adequate accessibility

of clean water and it directly relates to these aspects. It is more clearly seen when a large number

of human deaths result from such water-related hazards; it may be the diseases related to the

scarcity or crisis of clean and useful water. According to the World Health Organization in the

‗World Water Day Report,‘ the 3.4 million people die annually, mostly children, due to water-

related diseases.It is noted that the foremost cause of illness and death in the developing world is

the diarrheal disease. Annually, more than 2.2 million people die from diarrhea; 90 percent of the

deaths are especially children, mostly in developing countries(―WHO World Water Day Report‖

2019).

Besides, water-related issues lead the country from human security concerns to multiples

national security concerns. For instance, the drought hit the state of Somalia in the periods of

2010-12 with the people deaths of around 260 thousand. Severe drought also led Syria to state

failure at the beginning of 2011 (P. Gleick and Iceland 2018). On the other hand, the

management of water resources for the economic development of a country becomes another

prominent human security threats. The displacement and dislocation of a large number of people

stemming from such water resource management like the multipurpose dam-related projects

threaten survival politically, socially, economically, and culturally. For example, about 125

villages, more than 18 thousand families, and approximately 85 thousand 6 hundred people were

affected due to the construction of the Tehri Hydroelectric Project in Uttaranchal(Thapliyal

2011; Salve 2014). The dams built at Saguling, Kedung Ombo, and Cirata in Indonesia have

dislocated around 65 thousand, 30, and 57 thousand people respectively. The Gezhouba Dam in

China displaced more than 20 thousand and the Dienjangkou dam more than 383 thousand

people. In Brazil, the Sobradinho and the Itaparica reservoirs also dislocated 65 thousand and 40

thousand people respectively. In Togo, Africa the Nangbeto Dam displaced around 12 thousand

people(Herschy 1998).

Secondly, the most important and interesting level is assessing shared river water into the water-

conflict approach. This approach has not a bound definition; rather, the scholarly studies,

(counter)arguments and debates are paramount to pain clear picture of how water-conflict nexus

is applied as an approach in this study.

According to the former UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali (1985), ―The next

war in the Middle East will be fought over water, not politics‖ (Hamilton 2011). The Vice-

President of the World Bank Ismail Serageldin (1995) argued that ‗the wars of the next century

will be fought over water(Clark 2019).‘

Since then, water has been the geopolitical issue among the countries in many parts of the

world. It had been defined in terms of top agenda for discussion during 2011 as an ‗urgent

security issue‘. The InterAction Council chaired by the former PM of Canada Rt. Hon. Jean

Chretien and the former Chancellor of Austria H.E. Dr. Franz Vranitzky recommended that the

water-related long term issues facing humankind as the prominent security urgent. In this regard,

Dr. Zou‘bi said that ―it is interesting that the Council has taken up the water issue, at the end of

the day, water is all about politics‖ (Hamilton 2011).‘

Apart from that, the water and conflict link has been emphasized by many scholars over

the last couple of decades. They have given various factors that can threaten water as the source

of conflict between the riparian countries. Some of them have discussed the causal link between

water and conflict with the case studies (Westing 1986; P. H. Gleick 1993; Homer-Dixon 1994;

Butts 1997). They have explored many factors that lead to water conflict. Recently, Brahma

Chellaney (2013) has also explored the construction of many dams and other developmental

projects including pollution, overexploitation and excessive river silting those are the significant

factors causing water conflict. The report by Sophie de Bruin et.al (2018) has also given ten

factors causing water conflict such as local water tension, climate change, fertile land shortage,

the spike of food price, displacement of people and migration, economic shocks, dams and

projects, water as the weapon and strategic tools, water as the military target and melting in the

arctic(de Bruin et al. 2018).

Besides, water resources also lead to conflict between the states within a particular country.

For instance, some of the major disputes/conflicts in India are Cauvery Water Dispute between

Kerala, Karnataka, Tamil Nadu and Puducherry (UT); Satluj Yamuna Link Canal Issue that

concerns Punjab and Haryana; Godavari Water Disputes between Maharashtra, Andhra Pradesh,

Karnataka, and Madhya Pradesh & Odisha; Krishna Water Disputes between Maharashtra,

Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka; Narmada Water Disputes that concerns the state of Rajasthan,

Madhya Pradesh, Gujarat and Maharashtra and Ravi & Beas Water between Punjab, Haryana

and Rajasthan(―Inter-State River Water Disputes in India: Is It Time for a New Mechanism

Rather than Tribunals?‖ 2017, 2018).

Focusing on these arguments, the transboundary river courses can be discussed in the

perspective of security. The reasoning behind the violent conflict stemming from the disputed

rivers among the riparian states including intra-states violent results in politically or strategically,

socially, culturally, and economically instability that threatens security at local, national,

regional, or international levels.

Thirdly, the geopolitics of water as a resource with a water-conflict approach is based on the

inter-state conflict in general and diplomatic relations in particular. Focusing on the variables as

given in the figure, the transboundary river water sharing has become one of the key challenges

in bilateral and multilateral relations between and among the countries respectively. Apart from

conflict potentiality over the water resources, political instability, impact on external and

strategic interests of the host countries have been percept as the security threats to the state or

region as a whole.

In the global context, mostly out of more than 260 transboundary river courses have been

contentious between and among the riparian states(―Water Crisis‖ 2019). One of the most

prominent water-sharing issues that occurred in the continent of the world is the Middle Eastern

countries over the transboundary river namely the Tigris-Euphrates river basin, Nile basin, and

Jordan-Yarmuk river basin. The Tigris-Euphrates river basin determines the external relations

between the riparian countries i.e. Turkey, Syria, and Iraq(Drake 1997). The relations among

Ethiopia, Sudan, and Egypt have been under the pressure of water sharing dispute over the Nile

river basin. External relations among the countries of Jordan, Syria, Israel, West Bank, and

Lebanon are also affected by the contentious of water sharing over the Jordan-Yarmuk river

water(Drake 1997). As a result, the countries have been hit by regional instability in many water-

sharing disputed continents mainly Africa, Middle East, South, and Southeast Asia.

In this regard, all the issues emanating from the shared river water have been the key

challenges in terms of diplomatic and strategic interests. It pertains to be the security issue when

the external relations among the riparian countries become downwards in terms of foreign

policy. Several times, the affected countries raise the issue at the international, regional, and

global levels forum to be discussed and mediated by international institutions. For instance, the

World Bank mediated the Indus River water dispute between India and Pakistan through the

signing of the Indus Water Treaty in 19, 1960(IDSA Task Force 2010; Iram Khalid, n.d.).

In South Asia, the geopolitics of the riparian countries i.e. India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and

Nepal has also been shaped by the transboundary water dispute of the Ganga-Brahmaputra-

Megna and the Indus River basin. Strategically, countries like India and Pakistan have a long

territorial dispute over Kashmir. Indeed, the Indus River basin flows through this disputed

territory that influences bilateral relations and increases political rivalry. In this regard,

transboundary river issues are key challenges in bilateral or multilateral relations. Water dispute

over the Indus River basin is one of the divergent factors leading to military conflict over the

territorial dispute in India-Pakistan relations.

While some of the importance principles of transboundary water sharing have been

provided by many international laws. Such as the 1997 UN Convention on the Law of the Non-

Navigational Uses of International Watercourses, Hormon Doctrine, Helsinki Rules, etc.

However, these have not been fully accepted, rather it has been rejected. For instance, China is

neither the country to agreed nor a signatory member country of any international water treaties

or conventions. China also voted against the UN Convention on the Law of the Non-

Navigational Uses of International Watercourses(Ho 2017).

Assessing the India-China River Dispute in the Framework: searching for

security implications

The water scarcity or crisis caused by climate change, construction of dam-related projects, etc.

is a new challenge to both India and China. From the perspective of the first level of analysis as

discussed in the framework, the most prominent security implications are the shortage of water

in both countries (Kaul 2009), drying agriculture land, changing climate, and water scarcity in

the subcontinent of the Himalaya(Holslag 2011). This section discusses the security implications

for India-China relations over transboundary water sharing based on the three levels of analysis

as we discussed in the previous section.

Human Security Concerns

Unlike water scarcity, flood problem is more noticeable than the scarcity of water in the case of

India-China water dispute. This is a threat to security for India in particular. A large number of

human lives threatened by floods in northeast India have been a piece of evidence that indicates

flood is one of the threats to human security and national security challenge. In the case of flood

2000, Indian officials claimed with the satellite images that the flash floods hit the Indian state of

Arunachal Pradesh due to the dam breached by China on the Tsangpo river (the Brahmaputra in

India(―Chinese Dam Breach Caused Northeast Floods: AFP‖ 2000).

The devastation of the Siang district in Arunachal Pradesh with more than 26 lives

including three strategic bridges swept away by the raging river waters and estimated loss of Rs

139.50 crore have been the major impacts. The Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO) has

claimed with concrete evidence of 30 pictures and 25 images of the eastern and western part of

Tibet respectively, that the flash floods which ravaged large tracts in the border states of

Himachal Pradesh and Arunachal Pradesh last year were caused by the Chinese (Gupta 2001).

Recently, the water discharge by China in the Brahmaputra river basin was the highest over the

last 50 years and raised high alert in three Siang districts of Arunachal Pradesh and Upper

Assam(Choudhury 2018).

Water-Conflict Assessment and Geopolitical Concerns

Over the last few decades, these concerns as perceived by the downstream river basin countries

like India have been the prominent implications of the water war by India and China. The dam-

related projects and flash floods by China are the concerns and burning issues that lead to water

conflict. The recent one, the Chinese project and commissioning in 2014 of the Zangmu

hydropower project on the YarlungTsangpo; China‘s plans to construct a 1,000- km. long tunnel

to divert the flows; and the blackening of the Siang in Arunachal Pradesh in 2017 have become

the major events that bestride relations of India and China including Bangladesh

(―ORF_IssueBrief_328_India-China-Brahmaputra.Pdf‖ 2020).

This potential water war or conflict between the two riparian countries has been analyzed

by many scholars. Ghosh, Bandyopadhyay, and Modak (2019) have cited that the potential water

war is imminent due to the north-south water diversion project by China to divert water from the

Yarlung Tsangpo (Brahmaputra) and the unwillingness of China to sign agreements and treaties

as realist overriding around the international waterways(Ghosh, Bandyopadhyay, and Modak

2019; Zhang and Li 2018b).

As we know, China is the upper stream country to India and Bangladesh of the

Brahmaputra river and Indus river basin. But, the course of the Indus river is less within Chinese

borders the size population and activities on this river basin is also less compared to the

Brahmaputra (Zhang and Li 2018c). The conflict assessment between India and China over the

Brahmaputra river is imminent when the upstream country (China) overrides around it with

unilateral and less care of other riparian states. As the powerful upper riparian state, China and

its unilateral activities towards the shared river courses is very influential and could trigger

conflict between the two countries.

On the other hand, India and China have been with the longest historical land-border

dispute in history. The water resources could add to the conflict and provide a multiplier effect to

the conflict in the case of the territorial disputes between the two countries. According to Zhang

and Li (2018), “The water could be a source of conflict multiplier, as in the case of China-India

border disputes. When water issues intertwine with border disputes, more severe conflicts can be

induced than the issues of water quantity”(Zhang and Li 2018a).

The human security concerns stemming from the Chinese policies in the Brahmaputra river

likely could trigger the conflict between India and China. And this conflict potentiality could

result in instability in the relations between the two riparian states and hence security

implications. This political instability caused by the water-related issue could also make the more

violent conflict in the case of their territorial dispute and diplomatic relationship.

Apart from the conflict over the transboundary river courses like the Brahmaputra, India

and China could be hostile in relations because of an influence on their strategic interest. This is

due to the Brahmaputra river originates in the region of Tibet and flows towards the very

location which is strategic to both India and China, namely Arunachal Pradesh. Both countries

have their contested territorial claims in these regions.

The geopolitics of shared water resource is influential due to some reasons. First; China is

the upper riparian state and around 19 international rivers lie in the territory of China. Second;

China‘s growing economic and military capability indicates the emerging powerful riparian state

to share the waters and cooperation is in the hand of China (Biba 2014c). Third; China‘s

uncooperative and unwilling attitude to sign agreements and treaties with the downstream

riparian countries makes more potential influence on India(Ghosh, Bandyopadhyay, and Modak

2019; Zhang and Li 2018a; Biba 2014c). Fourth; China‘s domestic water crisis is another factor

that could multiply various issues like unilateral behavior towards water agreement and treaties,

border disputes, and others. China is home to the largest population (20 percent of the world

population) in the world but only less than 7 percent of the global freshwater. China has been

increasingly running of water shortage (Biba 2014a). Fifth, China‘s plans to construct a north-

south water diversion project that attracts many Indian experts, media, think tanks, and

academicians to observe whether the diversion of water dries natural flows of the Brahmaputra

river. The reasoning behind this is that 50 percent of water lies in the territory of China. Last but

not least; Chinese influence in Central Asia, Southern region that cuts down the strategic interest

of India. While India‘s relations with regional actors like the US and Japan and her success of

launching nuclear powers like long-range inter-continental ballistic missile in 2012 April might

be the potential targets in China that demonstrate Delhi‘s concerns more serious (Biba

2014b).These concerns make the water relations between India and China more serious

geopolitically.

Thus, the transboundary river has not been securitized as the security threat (Biba 2014c).

However, there have been rising concerns due to the water dispute. The strategic interest and

non-traditional security challenges have been influenced by the water-related issue in the case of

India and China water relations. The water wars as rumored over the last decade make both

countries more hostile in their diplomatic ties and it has influenced their strategic and security

interests. Both countries are being forced to discuss water disputes as one of the top bilateral

issues to being discussed and make urgency in their relations.

Bangladesh’s Options and Challenges

Bangladesh is the lowest downstream country to share the waters of the Brahmaputra river, The

Ganges, and several tributaries. Bangladesh is highly dependent upon agriculture cultivation. On

the other hand, Bangladesh is one of the underdeveloped countries in the subcontinent of South

Asia and is seen as the most deprived riparian state in the case of water sharing issues. The

unilateral activities and unwillingness of the upstream countries (India and China) to sign any

agreement and treaties with Bangladesh are potential reasons.

India and Bangladesh have long water issues over the Ganges River, Teesta, and the Barak

River. Historically, the issue was first raised by the government of Pakistan when the

government of India announced to construct a barrage at Farakka in the district of Murshidabad,

West Bengal (India)(Kashyap 2016). Second, the Teesta has been a serious concern in bilateral

relations between India and Bangladesh since 1979 when the construction was planned. An ad

hoc agreement was signed by both countries and allocated water sharing 39 percent to India and

36 percent to Bangladesh and 25 percent is unallocated. But Bangladesh demanded equal water

from the remaining unallocated(Ujwala 2017). Third, the Barak River has become another issue

since the project planning was commissioned by India in the mid-2000. Some of the experts

claimed that that the project to be constructed and withdrawing of water would cause immense

damage to the economic development of Bangladesh along with ecosystem and society

particularly drying out the two important rivers i.e. the Surma and the Kushiara(Islam and Islam

2016). Lastly, one of the most challenging tensions between India and Bangladesh is the

National River Linking Project proposed by the Government of India. Several times, the

environmentalists along with the native people criticized the projects not only within India rather

this project remained in cases of India with Bangladesh and Nepal(Richa Singh, n.d.).

In so far, the diversion of water during the lean season leading to extreme water scarcity

and releasing water during the rainy season causing a massive side effect of Bangladeshi people

including loss of resources such as fishery stock, agriculture land, and a huge increase of hazards

like saltwater incursions and erosion of the Ganges delta are the key challenges(Iram Khalid,

n.d.; Hanasz 2014). However, India and Bangladesh have reached on the consensus of the

Ganges Water Agreement in 1977, Two Memorandum of Understanding in 1982, and 1985

respectively. The Ganges Water Treaty in 1996 is one of the successful bilateral treaties over the

Ganges River(Rahaman 2006).

Compared to the Ganges, Teesta, and other river issues, India‘s policies and activities are

seen as far less over the Brahmaputra River compared to other transboundary rivers like the

Ganges, Teesta, Barak, etc. This might be because of the internal situation in India over a couple

of decades. Conflict among the central government, state governments (Assam and Arunachal

Pradesh), and active civil society groups (Vij et al. 2019a).

However, when we talk about the challenges of Bangladesh over the transboundary river

issues, it should be noted that the Brahmaputra is very much reluctant to being discussed in such

regional dialogue meetings. India is under criticism that she does not want to discuss nor

participate in any regional dialogue to resolve the issue. To sum up, challenges and concerns of

Bangladesh over the sharing of the transboundary rivers could be presented on some important

points.

First, Bangladesh is the lowest downstream riparian state to share the Brahmaputra and

other tributaries with India and China. This may be the implications for Bangladesh as the most

deprived country.

Second, India and China‘s use of material power interplay heavily impact the interest of

Bangladesh. Material power interplay in the sense that the geographical position of India and

China over the transboundary river and their control the waters.

Third, unlike China, India‘s internal situation among the central government, state

governments, and civil society groups make it more unclear and unfruitful. Several protests by

the state governments and civil society groups against the central governments over the dam

constructions have been the mistrust in India. This may have negative results in a god and fair

negotiations with Bangladesh over the transboundary river sharing.

Fourth, India is seen as unaware of Bangladesh‘s challenges over the transboundary rivers.

In the sense, the participation of lower-ranking and retired bureaucrats in regional dialogue

meetings has led to huge criticism of India. These instances show India‘s unwillingness to take

fruitful negotiations with Bangladesh (Vij et al. 2019b).

Last, India's internal security concern is seen as that it may result in delays to discuss any

issues with Bangladesh. India is always prioritizing internal challenges and is seen as avoiding

any commitment to transboundary negotiations. India does not want to show her weakness to the

downstream riparian and she wants more time to maintain an internal crisis. On the other hand,

Bangladesh is very much aware of the internal situation in India about dam construction. This

might be the best option for Bangladesh to maintain her interests over the Brahmaputra River(Vij

et al. 2019d).

But, India considers the Brahmaputra River strategically apparent and has aware of

Bangladesh‘s options. While Bangladesh always tries to use the multilateral principles to discuss

the issues with other riparians states. These instances may harm India when China maintains its

position and uses its interests. Being a member of the Belt and Road Initiative, both countries

(Bangladesh and China) signed 27 agreements and loans of $24 billion when President Xi

Jinping visited Bangladesh in 2016. China also provided to Bangladesh five maritime patrol

vessels, two submarines, 16 fighter jets, and 44 tanks including anti-ship and surface to air

missiles. This is geo-strategically very much concern for India towards Bangladesh in the

contemporary era(Anwar 2019). So far, the water-sharing issue in bilateral relations between the

two countries becomes very influential in their external relations and should be in the priority of

fair negotiation.

Conclusion

The paper has illustrated the factors that trigger potential water conflict and its threat

implications. The impacts of downstream in terms of security particularly at the three levels as

we discussed in the framework have also been observed. Unlike, the potential conflict between

India and China over the international rivers like the Brahmaputra, the geopolitics and their

strategic interests have also been observed linking with the water-related issues and what

security implications may arise. At last, the paper has observed the option for Bangladesh being

the lowest sharing of international waters.

The paper concludes with some points; first, the water conflict is dominant in the bilateral

relations between India and China. Human security or non-traditional security concerns have

become imminent arenas of security challenges to both countries that directly linked with water-

sharing issues. Some scholars argue that the water wars or conflict cannot be fought between

India and China, however, the emerging power in terms of economic and military indicates that

China is hungry for energy power. Second, both countries have been tense historically with

certain territorial disputes which lie in the river basin territory itself. The Indian state of

Arunachal Pradesh is one of the disputed territories with China through which the international

river; the Brahmaputra river flows. Geopolitically, this is the concern to impact the strategic

interests of both riparian states. Third, the emerging global power and recent development by

both countries to influence Central Asia and Southern parts having the nuclear-facilitated

countries make them more vulnerable when we look at the water sharing issue. Therefore, the

water-sharing issue should be taken seriously in the case of India and China relations. At last, the

water scarcity or crisis including flood becomes a threat to human security and can affect the

riparian states in terms of economic and political stability. The lack of agreements and treaties

between and among the riparian states makes it more vulnerable and might lead to conflict or

water war, if not, it has become one of the aspects being discussed in diplomatic relations.

In the case of Bangladesh's challenges, the issue is geostrategically very important for

India. Bangladesh being the closed neighborhood country is concerned for India‘s national

security. The chicken neck of India to the north-eastern region is geographically characterized by

Bangladesh. The geo-strategic concerns for India underlie on Bangladesh in multiple ways.

Bangladesh is a strategic partner and the gateway to the Act East Policy of India. The socio-

cultural and economic route to East Asia is determined. Moreover, the current Rohingya crisis

and instability in Myanmar is very much concern where Bangladesh is the only country to

depend upon in respect of partner towards the Act East Policy(Noolkar-Oak 2017).

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