This article was downloaded by:[Ingenta Content Distribution]On: 7 December 2007Access Details: [subscription number 768420433]Publisher: RoutledgeInforma Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954Registered office: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK

South European Society and PoliticsPublication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information:http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/title~content=t713636479

Tricks and Treats: The 2005 Italian Electoral Law andIts ConsequencesGianfranco Pasquino

Online Publication Date: 01 March 2007To cite this Article: Pasquino, Gianfranco (2007) 'Tricks and Treats: The 2005 ItalianElectoral Law and Its Consequences', South European Society and Politics, 12:1, 79- 93To link to this article: DOI: 10.1080/13608740601155500URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13608740601155500

PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE

Full terms and conditions of use: http://www.informaworld.com/terms-and-conditions-of-access.pdf

This article maybe used for research, teaching and private study purposes. Any substantial or systematic reproduction,re-distribution, re-selling, loan or sub-licensing, systematic supply or distribution in any form to anyone is expresslyforbidden.

The publisher does not give any warranty express or implied or make any representation that the contents will becomplete or accurate or up to date. The accuracy of any instructions, formulae and drug doses should beindependently verified with primary sources. The publisher shall not be liable for any loss, actions, claims, proceedings,demand or costs or damages whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with orarising out of the use of this material.

Dow

nloa

ded

By:

[Ing

enta

Con

tent

Dis

tribu

tion]

At:

20:4

5 7

Dec

embe

r 200

7

SOUTH EUROPEAN ELECTION WATCH

Tricks and Treats: The 2005 ItalianElectoral Law and Its ConsequencesGianfranco Pasquino

In autumn 2005, a few months before the April 2006 elections, the ruling coalition Casadelle Liberta (House of Freedoms) decided to reform the Italian electoral law. This articleanalyses the fundamentally partisan reasons leading to the reform and the outcome.

The new electoral law is a form of proportional representation with closed lists whichallocates a sizable seat bonus to the coalition obtaining the highest number of votes.

The article concludes by suggesting that under the old law the House of Freedoms mighthave won the national election. Seen in the light of its blatant partisan purposes, the new

Italian electoral law simply backfired.

Keywords: Italy, Elections; Electoral Reform; Proportional Representation; Majority Bonus

In autumn 2005, just a few months before the 2006 general elections and in the midst

of the approval procedure for a complex constitutional reform, the Italian governingcoalition, Casa delle Liberta, introduced and approved a controversial reform of theelectoral law. Largely grounded on a proportional distribution of seats, the new law

also includes a significant majority bonus for the coalition that wins the highestnumber of votes.

Italians had voted three times in national elections (1994, 1996 and 2001), using thesame electoral law. Dubbed ‘Mattarellum’ from the name of its rapporteur, the former

Christian Democrat, Sergio Mattarella,1 the old law allocated three-quarters of theseats in single-member constituencies through a plurality method and the remaining

one-quarter on party lists through a proportional method. For the House of Deputies,the proportional seats could go only to those parties that had received on a separate

ballot at least 4 per cent of the national vote; for the Senate to the best losers in regional

ISSN 1360-8746 (print)/ISSN 1743-9612 (online) q 2007 Taylor & Francis

DOI: 10.1080/13608740601155500

South European Society & Politics

Vol. 12, No. 1, March 2007, pp. 79–93

Dow

nloa

ded

By:

[Ing

enta

Con

tent

Dis

tribu

tion]

At:

20:4

5 7

Dec

embe

r 200

7

constituencies.2 One should not forget that the reform of the Italian proportional lawutilized from 1946 up to the 1992 elections (Wertman 1977) had been imposed by a

popular referendum activated by some parliamentarians, various socio-economic andcultural associations and many dissatisfied citizens.3 However, the two texts were

finally drafted by the parliamentarians, who are not constitutionally obliged to followfully the preferences manifested by voters. This explains why the two laws differ

somewhat in details that are not minor. In 2005 the centre-right governing majority ofthe Casa delle Liberta’ decided once more to reform the electoral law and introduced

a proportional law containing a majority bonus to be attributed to the winningcoalition. In this article, I will briefly analyse the Mattarellum, compare it with the newproportional law and, finally, evaluate the impact and consequences of the new law on

the results of the 2006 Italian national elections.

The Background

After the rejection by the pentapartito (DC þ PSI þ PSDI þ PRI þ PLI)4 coalition

of all attempts to reform the existing national and local electoral laws and followingthe failure of a special Bicameral Committee (1992–93) to reach a joint proposal for

institutional and electoral reforms, the popular referendum was the last resort forthose who wanted to transform the functioning of the Italian political system and to

improve the quality of democracy. Italian referendums can only repeal existing laws(or parts of them). The promoters of the referendum skilfully deleted some words

and/or sentences from the existing law for the Senate to reach the kind of outcomedescribed above. Previously, in a 1991 referendum held on a minor electoral clause, thereduction from three/four to one of the number of preferences to be given to party

candidates in multi-candidate lists had received the unexpected and significantapproval of more than 60 per cent of the votes (Pasquino 1993). This had happened

even though it had been vehemently opposed by all the parties of the governingpentapartito coalition as well as by the Northern League and the neo-fascist

Movimento Sociale Italiano (MSI, Italian Social Movement).By 1993 the Italian party system was collapsing and about 90 per cent of the voters

supported a much more incisive reform. This result should by no means be interpretedas a change of mind on the part of most Italian politicians, who, for a variety of reasonsand with various motivations, not all noble and systemic but often purely partisan,

remained proportional in their heart (and often in their behaviour too). With differentemphases, the two dominant subcultures—Christian Democrat and Communist—

had both been staunch supporters of the proportional electoral law.At the beginning of the 1990s, the zeitgeist, the political mood of Italian citizens was

definitely majoritarian. Since, however, neither the Christian Democrats nor the(former) Communists fully and immediately understood the working of the new

electoral system, it was Berlusconi who took advantage of its clauses. Once he haddecided to take the field, he deliberately created two coalitions that were as all-

encompassing as possible. As a consequence, not only did his coalitions win the 1994

80 G. Pasquino

Dow

nloa

ded

By:

[Ing

enta

Con

tent

Dis

tribu

tion]

At:

20:4

5 7

Dec

embe

r 200

7

elections, but he has also been credited with the doubtful, though positive, label of‘bipolarist’, that is, with the not fully deserved merit of having produced bipolar

competition. It is true that his very presence in politics shaped the politicalcompetition around two coalitions with his leadership operating as a linchpin, thereby

giving the voters the possibility of producing highly appreciated outcomes: alternationin office, rotation in government and, as a logical consequence, introducing a certain

dose of political accountability.However, Berlusconi’s bipolar inclination must more correctly be considered

essentially a shrewd political and partisan stance. Twice, in 1999 and in 2000, heproved instrumental in rejecting a referendum intended to affect significantly the waythe proportional allocation of seats would take place and to reduce the coalitional

power of minor parties. The second time, his blatantly partisan slogan, addressedto his supporters, was, ‘Stay home in order to send them [the leaders and

parliamentarians of the centre-left] home.’ Since Italian referendums are valid only ifat least 50 per cent of the registered voters go to the polls, the call to abstain is an easy

game to play. In addition, Berlusconi could count on no small help from theconspicuous nostalgia for the proportional system lingering within the centre-left.

The Motivation for the Reform

The above premise is absolutely indispensable to understanding why in autumn 2005Berlusconi and his coalition partners moved to drastically reform the electoral law and

succeeded in approving a variant of a proportional system. The most importantcontingent reason was, of course, the attempt to unearth a law capable of limiting andpossibly reducing the dimension of what at the time seemed the very likely centre-left

victory and, at the same time, of containing the size of the equally likely centre-rightdefeat. Naturally, the new law had to be justified by pointing to the alleged superior

fairness of a proportional system in the allocation of seats and in the representationof the ‘true’ will and preferences of the electorate.

In practice, there were two more specific reasons. First, Berlusconi had repeatedlydeclared that the Mattarellum put his party and his now single unified coalition at a

disadvantage because they were doing better in terms of votes for their individualparties, but still losing in single-member constituencies.5 Second, Berlusconi’sleadership had been repeatedly challenged by the UDC (Democratic Union of the

Centre, all former Christian Democrats), and especially by its then secretary, MarcoFollini, who went so far as to advocate the holding of primaries for the leadership of the

Casa delle Liberta coalition.Berlusconi did not want to suffer what he considered the ‘humiliation’ of going

through primaries. Nor was he enthusiastic about the probable discovery that,although he would certainly come out the winner, perhaps 30–40 per cent of the Casa

delle Liberta voters would express their preference for a different candidate for theoffice of prime minister. Therefore, he offered the UDC the proportional electoral law

they had always cherished in exchange for not holding primary elections. Because,

South European Society & Politics 81

Dow

nloa

ded

By:

[Ing

enta

Con

tent

Dis

tribu

tion]

At:

20:4

5 7

Dec

embe

r 200

7

among other welcome effects, the proportional electoral law allows a fair evaluation ofthe respective strengths of the various parties, Berlusconi felt confident that his allies

would realize how important and indeed decisive both his party Forza Italia and hepersonally are to the success of the coalition as a whole.

The New Electoral Law

First, I think it is extremely important to utilize as precise a terminology as possiblewhen describing the various electoral formulae. Therefore, I would strongly object to

labelling both the old Mattarellum and the new proportional law as ‘mixed electoralsystems’. There is nothing to gain in putting two very different electoral systems in the

same bag. More precisely, theMattarellum should be defined as a ‘plurality systemwitha proportional modification’ and the new electoral law is certainly a ‘de-personalizedproportional system with a majority bonus’.6 Similarly to the Mattarellum, which was

shaped in two versions (House and Senate), there are two variants of the newproportional representation (PR) law. They concern the way the majority bonus

is attributed.Due to a probably incorrect interpretation of the Constitutional article (art. 57) that

states that ‘the Senate is elected on a regional basis’, the Casa delle Liberta improvisedand hasty electoral reformers made a fateful decision. They opted for the allocation of

a majority bonus region by region. As a consequence, each electoral majority in eachItalian region obtains 55 per cent of seats attributed to that specific region. Since

Italian regions differ significantly in terms of population, to win in the most populous,such as Lombardy (47 seats), Campania (30 seats), Lazio (27 seats), Sicily (26 seats),Veneto (24 seats) and Piedmont (22), is by far more important than to win in Liguria

(8 seats), Marches (8 seats), Umbria (7) and Basilicata (7 seats).7 The risk of anoutcome inappropriately called pareggio (tie), that is, the victory of the centre-left in

the House leading to a sizable parliamentary majority, and a victory for the centre-right in the Senate, although with a slim but absolute majority, became a topic for

what appeared to be somewhat idle scholarly preoccupations.8 At the end of the day,the centre-left has obtained a razor-thin majority in the Senate (158 vs. 156 plus an

independent probably leaning towards the government) only thanks to the vote of theItalians abroad, who were given the opportunity to elect six senators. (Four of theseSenate seats were won by the centre-left and one by the Casa delle Liberta while one has

declared himself ‘independent’).The mechanism adopted for the election of the House of Deputies is definitely less

complicated. There are 27 constituencies, some rather large. For instance, Puglia is thelargest (44 seats) followed by Emilia-Romagna and Lombardy 2 (43 seats), Lombardy

1 and Lazio 1 (40 seats), and Tuscany (38). Other constituencies are quite small: Molise(3), Basilicata (6), Umbria (9) and Valle d’Aosta (one seat only).9 Two elements

deserve particular attention. The first and most important is the attribution of themajority bonus. The law clearly states that the coalition winning the highest number of

votes, calculated as the sum of the votes obtained by all parties and lists having

82 G. Pasquino

Dow

nloa

ded

By:

[Ing

enta

Con

tent

Dis

tribu

tion]

At:

20:4

5 7

Dec

embe

r 200

7

previously declared their affiliation, is entitled to receive 340 parliamentary seats. Thatis significantly more than the absolute majority of the seats in the House (the total

being 630 including 12 seats that are allocated to Italian voters abroad). When thevotes were all counted, the centre-left parliamentary majority was 348, while the losing

centre-right coalition obtained 281 seats (plus one independent).In order to prevent or at least contain the fragmentation of the party system, only

parties and lists that won at least 2 per cent of the vote in each constituency couldobtain seats. If they joined with other parties, the exclusion clause would go up to 4 per

cent. This notwithstanding, nine parties of the centre-left and five parties of the centre-right have obtained parliamentary representation. A higher threshold was politicallyfeasible had the Casa delle Liberta been willing to run the risk of a somewhat tougher

parliamentary battle. Now we can say that the 2 per cent clause has not been veryeffective. We can also add, however, that the new PR has worked the way all PR

electoral systems work, especially when applied in large constituencies. It has provideda faithful photograph of the existing fragmentation of the Italian party system.

Meanwhile, the majority bonus has well served its major purpose, providing thewinning coalition with a sizable parliamentary majority in the House of Deputies.

Moreover, it has decisively contributed to the preservation of bipolar competition, theessential foundation for the possibility of alternation in government and for politicalaccountability. The price to be paid for these cherished political goods has been the

extreme, although traditional and, perhaps, inevitable, heterogeneity of the twocoalitions. A final element to be noted, which initially did not attract enough attention

and criticism, is that the party lists were closed. Therefore, on the one hand, voterswere deprived of the possibility of choosing their favourite candidate. On the other

hand, party leaders were offered the opportunity not just to select their candidates forParliament, but also, in practice, to designate their parliamentarians with reasonable

approximation.

Criticisms of the Timing and Type of the Electoral Reform

Several major criticisms were made of the new proportional electoral law. Some

criticisms concern the method through which it was approved. Others concern thesubstance and the technicalities of the law. As to the method, centre-left political leadersand an exaggerated number of sympathetic fellow-traveller commentators (especially,

those writing in the daily la Repubblica, even though some of them in the past weresanguine advocates of a proportional system) strongly opposed any proportional

reform of the electoral law, especially if it was approved just a few months before theelections. The main thrust of their criticism was in fact twofold. First, no change of the

rules of the game should be made when the game is already being played. Second, nochange of the rules of the game should be imposed by the governing majority without

consultation with the opposition and the latter’s approval. In addition, some sectors ofthe centre-left opposition also remarked that it would not be politically appropriate to

reform the electoral law by reverting to mechanisms similar to those which Italian

South European Society & Politics 83

Dow

nloa

ded

By:

[Ing

enta

Con

tent

Dis

tribu

tion]

At:

20:4

5 7

Dec

embe

r 200

7

voters had eliminated through the 1991 and, especially, the 1993 referendums. Theadoption of such mechanisms would imply not only disregard for but also the total

reversal of the preferences of a conspicuous majority of Italian voters.The latter was an extraordinarily weak objection because there is no constitutional

obligation for Parliament not to, so to speak, ‘interfere’ with the outcome of a popularreferendum held 12 years earlier. Even when the consequence of a referendum consists

in repealing a law, the outcome is not binding on the behaviour and prerogatives ofParliament. As a matter of fact, Parliament—that is, both the parties of the centre-

right and of the centre-left—had already repeatedly violated both the substance andspirit of some significant referendums. More precisely, in 1993 the voters hadabolished some Ministries, including Agriculture and Health. Both Ministries were

promptly brought back into existence with new names. Even more distressing was thereappearance in a different form of provisions for the state financing of political

parties, giving themmore money than at any time in the past, a system that 90 per centof the voters had deliberately struck down. Therefore, having not only participated in

these dubious operations, but also spearheaded them, the centre-left could not reallyuse the argument of the ‘violation of the spirit of the 1993 electoral referendum’ and,

in practice, only some of its representatives did so. However, many centre-left votersexpressed their disappointment through letters to the newspapers and interventions inradio talk shows.

Another issue concerned reform of the electoral law just a few months before theelection. Incidentally, few non-partisan commentators also remarked that had the Casa

delle Liberta reformed the electoral law, say, one year after its 2001 electoral victory, thecentre-left would have asked for an early dissolution of Parliament, which would

supposedly have been ‘delegimated’ by the new electoral law. On this phenomenon,there was a very specific Italian precedent. As soon as the Italian Parliament had passed

the two electoral laws drafted along the lines of the outcome of the 1993 referendum,the President of the Republic felt obliged, against the feeble opposition of some parties

and parliamentarians, to dissolve a very short-lived Parliament (1992–94). Indeed,President Oscar Luigi Scalfaro (1992–99) had made his intentions very clear in theimmediate aftermath of the 1993 referendum when appointing Carlo Azeglio Ciampi

to the office of prime minister, by giving him an unusually predefined and limitedmandate: to draft a stringent budgetary law and to supervise the parliamentary

approval of the new electoral laws.Leaving aside the precedent established by President Francois Mitterrand in 1985

when he imposed a return to PR in order to make more difficult the likely 1986 victoryof Chirac’s centre-right coalition, there was also the important Italian precedent of an

electoral reform passed a few months before the 1953 elections. At the end of 1952, theesteemed Christian Democratic Prime Minister, Alcide De Gasperi, was encouraged,even pressured, by the Vatican to reform the Italian proportional electoral law.

Although De Gasperi and his minor centrist allies enjoyed a sizable parliamentarymajority, there had been two somewhat ominous political developments. The first was

the growth in electoral strength, especially in some southern areas and in Rome, of the

84 G. Pasquino

Dow

nloa

ded

By:

[Ing

enta

Con

tent

Dis

tribu

tion]

At:

20:4

5 7

Dec

embe

r 200

7

neo-fascist party MSI. The second development, deriving from the first, was that thegrowth of the MSI would erode the centrist parliamentary majority to a point that

would necessitate the inclusion of the neo-fascists in the governing coalition. This wasa step that Catholic hierarchies were favourable towards while De Gasperi was

adamantly opposed. In order to withstand the pressures from the Vatican, De Gasperiand his Minister of the Interior, Christian Democrat Mario Scelba, felt obliged to draft

a new electoral law. Their goal was both to strengthen the ties among the partiesmaking up the governing majority and to provide the latter with a sizable number

of seats.Both goals could be achieved by giving a significant majority bonus (two-thirds of

the parliamentary seats) to the parties that had declared they belonged to a predefined

coalition, had this coalition received the absolute majority of votes (50 per cent plusone). Of course, the majority bonus would have negatively affected the proportionality

of the outcome and reduced the number of seats won by both the Communists and theSocialists, on the one side, and the neo-fascists, on the other. For a variety of reasons,

the governing parties missed the 50 per cent mark and could not obtain the majoritybonus. The law, successfully dubbed by the left the ‘swindle law’, was quickly repealed

(Piretti 2003; Quagliarello 2003).One could argue that both partisan and systemic purposes were being pursued by

the Christian Democrats in order to save the centrist governing coalition from being

obliged to seek the support of the neo-fascists and to make the political competitionbipolar. If successful, the law might have obliged the Communists to become more

government oriented and, therefore, to moderate some of their positions, while at thesame time giving the Socialists the opportunity of re-equilibrating their coalitional

power with the Communists. Perhaps the most important consequence of the failureof the 1953 electoral reform was that an entire generation, and more, of politicians

became marked with a proportional mentality. The equation ‘PR ¼ democraticregimes’ meant that for decades anyone who proposed revising the electoral law came

to be considered an enemy of the democratic regime.To conclude on the criticisms concerning the timing and method of electoral

reforms, I would say that electoral laws can be reformed at all times, and they can be

reformed even by a small parliamentary majority against the opposition, provided, ofcourse, that the rules and procedures are not drafted in order to fraudulently prevent

the victory of the opposition. Then it is up to the voters, especially those who haveenough interest in politics and are well informed, to express their preferences, taking

into account not only the new rules, but also the motivations behind the reform.

Political and Technical Criticisms

The new Italian proportional law of 2005 was passionately opposed and criticized by

the centre-left and even more by the many political commentators and politicians,above all former Communists and former Christian Democrats, who in the past had

been staunch advocates of a proportional electoral system. Professor Romano Prodi,

South European Society & Politics 85

Dow

nloa

ded

By:

[Ing

enta

Con

tent

Dis

tribu

tion]

At:

20:4

5 7

Dec

embe

r 200

7

the centre-left candidate for the office of prime minister, went out of his way to declarethat the new law was ‘anti-patriottica, incostituzionale, antidemocratica’, but no

detailed explanation was ever provided. A rather bizarre controversy followed withinthe centre-left, as if the critics of the Mattarellum—above all Giovanni Sartori and, if I

may say so, myself as well—had seriously and fatally ‘wounded and weakened’ the‘legitimacy’ of the semi-plurality law to such an extent as to be considered responsible

for opening the door to a proportional system.10

The most important criticism of the Mattarellum made by Sartori is that no

plurality system applied in single-member constituencies in a situation of weak partieswill ever reduce the number of parties, even less so if accompanied by a proportionalmodification. On the contrary, the Mattarellum had encouraged Italian parties to form

all-encompassing coalitions to win single-member constituency seats at the expense ofthe homogeneity of the coalition itself and, subsequently and logically, at the expense

not only of governmental stability, but also of policy-making. The scholars who defendthe Mattarellum, curiously, practically all of them located on the centre-left, argued

that the Mattarellum had made possible the transformation of the pattern of politicalcompetition from multipolar to bipolar. As a consequence, it had also contributed

to the appearance/creation of the conditions leading to alternation in government.Sartori’s rebuttal is based on two observations: (1) that bipolar competition has beenmade possible by the disappearance of anti-system parties; (2) that there was no

governmental stability in the period 1994–2006 and what has existed was bought atthe price of decision-making/policy-making efficacy.

The data on the tenure of Italian governments conclusively prove Sartori’s point.From May 1994, when Berlusconi gave birth to his first government, to May 2005,

when the third Berlusconi government ended a short crisis following the defeat of theCasa delle Liberta in the April regional elections, Italy had eight governments, whose

average tenure was slightly longer than 15 months. While it is true that both Prodi andBerlusconi led long-lasting governments, especially the latter (who at 1,410 days holds

the record for post-war Italian governments), it would be inappropriate to attributethis result to the electoral system. Indeed, the previous record holder, Socialist PrimeMinister Bettino Craxi (August 1983 to June 1986: 1,058 days), operated in a situation

in which PR was the electoral law of the country.Personally, I would add an element especially relevant for those who want an overall

assessment of the Mattarellum. Thanks to a loophole, duly exploited by the electoralstrategists of the Casa delle Liberta, the 2001–6 Parliament never had its 630 plenum.

The Casa delle Liberta used a fraudulent mechanism in order not to lose votes whenthe proportional seats had to be allocated. It was sanctioned for that, thus forfeiting

11 deputies. It is highly doubtful, as the supporters of the Mattarellum have suggested,that the continuous utilization of a faulty electoral system could promise improvedresults and outcomes. Both Sartori and Pasquino (1996) strongly urged the adoption

of a French-type run-off majority system equipped with a moderate exclusionthreshold in order at the same time to encourage the formation of coalitions and

discourage the survival of small parties. Both scholars have gone so far as to advocate

86 G. Pasquino

Dow

nloa

ded

By:

[Ing

enta

Con

tent

Dis

tribu

tion]

At:

20:4

5 7

Dec

embe

r 200

7

semi-presidentialism as the constitutional solution most appropriate to lead the never-ending Italian political and institutional transition to a successful completion.

On the whole, the blame for the inability to reform the Mattarellum must be placedon the major party in each of the two coalitions, Forza Italia and the Left Democrats.

Fearful of losing their minor allies, unwilling to run any electoral and political risk, butperhaps also unable fully to understand both the partisan and the systemic advantages

of a French-type electoral system, the leaders of those parties never put the reform ofthe electoral system high on the political agenda. When Forza Italia did, it was only out

of political expediency. However, one should not for a moment neglect that, under aRawlsian veil of ignorance,11 most centre-left politicians would in all likelihood haveproved themselves at least as much, if not more, opportunistic and expedient as the

centre-right.

The Main Features of the New Proportional Law

It would be utterly wrong to say that the electoral reform of the Casa delle Liberta

constitutes a complete return to the past. Although containing some questionableaspects, for instance several unbalanced constituencies that are large enough to allow

very small parties to win seats, the Italian PR of the past came close to being a highlyproportional law because it had few constraining and limiting clauses. In order to be

admitted to the proportional allocation of seats, parties had to obtain at least 300,000votes nationally and to win a seat in one constituency, that is, to have a concentrated

following of about 62,000–65,000 voters. Although largely proportional, as I haveindicated above, the Casa delle Liberta law does have some clauses curtailing andchannelling the overall proportional inspiration and objectives.

Here, I will deal especially with two important features: the size of theconstituencies, and the blocked vote and its consequences. For both the House and the

Senate, the existing design of the constituencies has been retained. This was due tothe fear of the Casa delle Liberta government that to proceed to any process of

redistricting would have meant running the risk of not having enough time to pass thepertinent electoral legislation. The consequence is that, while from 1946 to 1992, when

the old PR was utilized, there were 32 constituencies, some of them relatively small(e.g. those electing from seven to 15 deputies), the 27 constituencies for the Houseunder the new electoral law, are all generally quite large. Leaving aside Valle d’Aosta,

Molise, Basilicata and Umbria, all the other constituencies elect between ten and44 members of parliament.

It would be quite farfetched to maintain that the Mattarellum had significantlycontributed to the establishment of a satisfactory political and representational

relationship between the parliamentarians elected in single-member constituenciesand their voters. Many parliamentarians had always been ‘parachuted’, especially in

safe constituencies. Moreover, if they were powerful enough, they had no problemin being parachuted again in the same constituency, if not in an even safer one, no

matter what kind of relationship they had established with their voters. The level

South European Society & Politics 87

Dow

nloa

ded

By:

[Ing

enta

Con

tent

Dis

tribu

tion]

At:

20:4

5 7

Dec

embe

r 200

7

of intra-party and inter-party conflict was kept to a minimum. In both coalitions,party leaders had devised a reliable system of allocation of their candidates in very safe,

safe, marginal and unwinnable constituencies, in such a way as to reflect thepercentage of votes received in the most recent previous elections.

What is certain is that, compared with the previous situation, multi-candidateconstituencies, inherited and not redesigned by the Casa delle Liberta electoral

reformers, have automatically and definitely destroyed the likelihood and possibility ofcreating any working relationship between the parliamentarians and their voters at the

expense of any attempt to improve the quality of representation.Finally, the most disturbing feature from the point of view of the power of the

voters, is the fact that the lists of candidates are blocked. By no means should this

be considered an unavoidable consequence of the existence of large constituencies.On the contrary, in the past, Italian voters had enjoyed the opportunity to cast one or

more preference votes. It is true that not many voters, even less Communist voters,resorted to preference voting. However, we know that especially the Christian

Democrats and, in a later period, the Socialists, relied on the number of preferencesobtained by their candidates as a revealing indicator of their popularity and vote-

getting capabilities. Preference voting allowed the emergence of a ranking ofcandidates based not only on their personality/personal qualities, but also on thestrength of party factions. Unfortunately, especially from the 1960s onwards and above

all, although not only, in southern regions, preference voting became associated withand dependent on corrupt exchanges between candidates and lobbies. This is one

reason why it became the target of the first electoral referendum already mentioned.Smaller constituencies in which it is possible to have shorter lists of candidates, all,

then, interested in campaigning in order to become known to the voters, would offer abetter solution to the problem of connecting the candidates with the electorate.

Nevertheless, but not surprisingly, long blocked lists were not the objective ofespecially strong criticism. They allowed the never dead and not at all buried

partitocrazia happily to re-emerge full-blown. This was also because substantially ithad never disappeared. In a manner more visible and more explicit than any time inthe past, party and faction leaders re-acquired and blatantly exercised the power not

only to nominate their candidates, but also in practice to appoint almost all theirparliamentarians. The few exceptions depended exclusively on one important variable:

the reaping of too big an electoral bonanza or the suffering of a defeat of unanticipatedproportions.

Moreover, the new law allowed the candidates to stand in more than one Houseconstituency. For instance, Berlusconi decided to head the lists of Forza Italia in all

constituencies. All the other party leaders, including Prodi, became candidates inseveral constituencies. One consequence of this which has not been fully appreciated isthat those leaders who were elected in several constituencies can significantly affect the

composition of their parliamentary delegation just by choosing where they wouldaccept the election. By so doing, they retain the power to reward or punish specific

members of their party.

88 G. Pasquino

Dow

nloa

ded

By:

[Ing

enta

Con

tent

Dis

tribu

tion]

At:

20:4

5 7

Dec

embe

r 200

7

In spite of the great success of the primary elections organized for the selection andlegitimation of their candidate to the office of prime minister and notwithstanding the

proliferation of primaries at the local level, not for a single moment did the leaders ofthe centre-left think of relying on primaries for the choice of at least some of their

candidates to Parliament (Valbruzzi 2005). Not surprisingly, on the specific feature ofblocked lists, there was not very much of a parliamentary debate or battle. For very

similar reasons, all party leaders seemed quite satisfied to see that the power to choosetheir parliamentary delegations was given back to them.

By no means could the incumbent parliamentarians oppose a clause that would inmost cases work to their advantage while potential candidates within their respectiveparty organizations kept a low profile. To be more precise, it is well known that within

Forza Italia, it is Berlusconi himself who promotes and demotes his parliamentarians.The same situation prevails within the Northern League, where Umberto Bossi’s

choices have so far gone unchallenged. The leader of Alleanza Nazionale, GianfrancoFini, was of course not willing to oppose a feature that would give him the opportunity,

by reducing their supporters’ parliamentary representation and increasing the numberof his own loyal followers, to keep in line some of the party lieutenants who had

challenged him. Well aware of some favourable electoral forecast, the leader of theUDC, Pierferdinando Casini, was happy to utilize his powers of selection to rewardUDC middle level sub-leaders. Finally, although the scramble for selection and

re-selection provoked some discontent among centre-left incumbent parliamentariansand aspirants, it was quickly put to rest. In view of the imminent electoral victory, many

offices of undersecretary were promised as a sot of reimbursement. In the end, the onlymarginal remaining problem consisted in finding a few dozen safe seats for Prodi’s

collaborators.It remains to be seen whether a parliament made up of representatives almost totally

‘appointed’ by party leaders will work better, that is, with greater party discipline andless parliamentary absenteeism, than Italian parliaments of the past.12 Perhaps, the

‘new’ parliamentarians will find crossing party lines (the classic Italian phenomenonof trasformismo) more difficult, Maybe they will resort to it less frequently for fear ofbeing deselected or simply being placed in a lower, unelectable, position on the future

party list. Only a few of them will still be willing to cross party lines and only with theaim of getting a better position on the list of another party.

Concrete Consequences

The Casa delle Liberta electoral reform was fundamentally driven by partisan purposesand goals. Many, if not all, of the centre-left Unione criticisms were similarly inspired

by partisanship. The only criticism that could stand the ‘systemic’ test, that is, ‘onlythose electoral reforms are good that promise to improve the overall working of the

political system’, would have been the one based on the, more or less irreparable,damages the proportional law could inflict upon the bipolar structuring of the Italian

political competition. However, in principle, one could not deny that the existence

South European Society & Politics 89

Dow

nloa

ded

By:

[Ing

enta

Con

tent

Dis

tribu

tion]

At:

20:4

5 7

Dec

embe

r 200

7

of a majority bonus would make it almost imperative for parties to coalesce in order toform potentially winning coalitions.

As to the other recent fear of sudden changes in the governmental coalitions thatwould reverse the outcome of the elections, the so-called ribaltone or turnover of the

governmental majority, no electoral law can by itself prevent such an occurrence.For this reason, the Casa delle Liberta had approved a complex constitutional package

in which a somewhat confused procedure was introduced with the aim of protectingthe prime minister from being weakened and, possibly, ousted by a minority within his

coalition. (No Italian woman has ever held the office of prime minister.) It has to bepointed out that all attempts to make the prime minister invulnerable run the risk, asforcefully argued by Sartori (2006), of freezing a specific government and its prime

minister regardless of their capability to perform and, as a consequence, of negativelyaffecting the most important quality of parliamentary governments: their flexibility

and adaptability in progress.When the votes were finally counted and recounted (at Berlusconi’s request), the

consequences of the new electoral law appeared to some extent paradoxical, to anotherextent extremely interesting. On one important point, the Casa delle Liberta has been

proved right. The majority bonus has preserved bipolar competition and has given thewinning coalition the possibility of obtaining a comfortable majority in the House. Only24,755 votes separate the winning centre-left from the defeated centre-right, but, as

already mentioned, in terms of seats the centre-left government will have 349parliamentarians and the centre-right opposition 281. From the point of view of

‘manufacturing’ a sizable parliamentary majority, the new law has certainly worked.It has done so much to the regret of the centre-right, because of two unexpected events.

First, had the Casa delle Liberta reached an agreement with a minor autonomousLombard list it would have won more votes than the centre-left and, as a consequence,

would enjoy amajority in the House of Deputies. Second, had themajority bonus for theSenate been given not region by region, but nationwide, the Casa delle Liberta would

have won it. In fact, the Casa delle Liberta won more votes than the Unione.In any case, the Unione majority in the Senate is decidedly razor thin: 158 vs 156

plus an independent. The paradox here is that the centre-left enjoys a majority only

because of another of those special features insisted on by the centre-right: extendingthe right to vote to Italians living abroad. Out of six senators elected by Italian voters

abroad, the centre-left has won four, the centre-right only one, and the remainingsenator has indicated his inclination to support the government—any government if

he can get something in exchange for his constituency, that is the Italians living inLatin America and, especially, in Argentina. Not counting the senators elected abroad,

the centre-right would have 155 senators and the centre-left 154. Of course, one shouldnot forget that, after Senator Giorgio Napolitano’s election to the Presidency of theRepublic, there are six life senators whose political inclinations are on the whole

favourable to the left. If one looks at the numerical outcome for the Senate, a positiveevaluation of the new law certainly appears far less grounded. From the point of view of

the centre-right, the so-called proportionellum has tremendously backfired. And if our

90 G. Pasquino

Dow

nloa

ded

By:

[Ing

enta

Con

tent

Dis

tribu

tion]

At:

20:4

5 7

Dec

embe

r 200

7

vantage point is the improvement in the working of the Italian political system, andmore precisely the stability of the government and its policy effectiveness, all sorts of

doubts are more than legitimate.

The Future

During the electoral campaign, Prodi and many of the leaders of the centre-left(understandably not including those of the small parties) repeatedly stated their

intention of immediately repealing the proportional electoral law. In the light of theirascertained differences of opinion, their promise has always sounded rather hollow.

Things look even less promising for the future of any electoral reform. The centre-leftmajority has many other priorities, among them its simple survival. Unless, the centre-

right is willing to collaborate, no reform appears feasible. Moreover, and finally, allelectoral laws create vested interests and veto players. There is no doubt that party

leaders are not especially willing to jettison either the power they have acquired tonominate their parliamentarians or the renewed possibility to run alone and counttheir votes (and make them count). Unless an unexpected and unpredictable

convergence of political interests takes place, it is quite unlikely that the no-nameelectoral law Italy utilized in the 2006 elections will be soon reformed or totally

abandoned.

Notes

[1] Highly critical of the electoral law, Giovanni Sartori successfully dubbed it ‘Mattarellum’,playing with the rapporteur’s name, but also suggesting that the overall tool is a little crazy(in Italian, matto).

[2] There are several descriptions of the Mattarellum. Some of them are incomplete; some aremisleading; some are altogether wrong. Katz (2001) has provided the most satisfactoryexplanation in English.

[3] To launch a referendum it is necessary to collect the signatures of at least 500,000 voters. For anin-depth explanation of the process leading to the electoral referendums see Pasquino (1992).

[4] The acronyms of the Christian Democratic Party (DC), the Italian Socialist Party (PSI), theItalian Republican Party (PRI), the Italian Liberal Party (PLI) and the Italian Social DemocraticParty (PSDI).

[5] For instance, in 2001 Berlusconi’s coalition won 18,390,893 proportional votes and 16,918,020votes in the single-member constituencies. The figures for the Ulivo were respectively13,259,030 and 16,098,646 (Pasquino, 2001).

[6] I write ‘de-personalized’ in contrast with the German electoral law, which is correctly defined as‘personalized proportional representation’, because Italian voters could not even see the namesof the parliamentary candidates in their constituencies. In fact, no names of candidatesappeared on the ballot. Even worse: writing the name of a candidate on the ballot wouldautomatically lead to the nullification of the vote.

[7] Or perhaps it was not at all a reformers’ mistake because the centre-right could count on asubstantial majority of votes in three out of five of the most populous regions (and it had barelylost the 2005 regional elections in the other two), while the centre-left was governing in all

South European Society & Politics 91

Dow

nloa

ded

By:

[Ing

enta

Con

tent

Dis

tribu

tion]

At:

20:4

5 7

Dec

embe

r 200

7

the least populous regions. The two regions regarded as the heartland of the centre-left, Emilia-Romagna and Tuscany, had 21 and 18 senators, respectively.

[8] ‘Tie’, yet another word taken from football terminology, is a wrong label. The correct one would

be ‘divided government’ (see the excellent book edited by Elgie [2001]). For instance,Chancellor Schroder had to deal with this problem because the red–green coalition (1998–2005) never enjoyed a majority in the Bundesrat. The difference between the German andItalian cases is that the Italian government must receive a vote of confidence from both housesand can be obliged to resign if it loses in either, while in Germany the vote of confidence takesplace in the Bundestag only. Hence, a ‘tie’ in Italy would have not only have produced policystalemates; it would also have prevented the birth of the government.

[9] Note that, because of its tiny electorate, around 200,000 voters, both for the House and the

Senate, the two Valle d’Aosta constituencies are single-member; that is, only one deputy andone senator are elected. Hence, no proportional allocation of seats is possible. In Trentino-AltoAdige, the constituencies were drawn with reference to the provinces. Hence, again, theelectoral system worked in a significant majoritarian way in order to provide parliamentaryrepresentation for the German-speaking minority (Sud Tyroler Volkspartei).

[10] See Sartori (1995; 2004; 2006). For an assessment of the overall contributions by Sartori to

electoral and institutional engineering, see Passigli (2005). Most of Pasquino’s criticisms can befound in articles published in the last ten years in the bimonthly Il Mulino. See also Pasquino(2002).

[11] The ‘veil of ignorance’ indicates a situation in which all players are unable to calculate their

advantages. Therefore, they will choose those rules promising fewer disadvantages for thelosers. The existence of a veil of ignorance is, of course, the best preliminarycondition/requirement for any reform having to do with the rules of the political andconstitutional game (Rawls, 1971).

[12] Sartori’s (1963) analytical and political questions concerning the autonomy and accountability

of Italian parliamentarians have been given new meaning following the implementation of thenew 2005 electoral law.

References

Elgie, R. (ed.) (2001) Divided Government in Comparative Perspective, Oxford University Press,

Oxford.

Katz, R. S. (2001) ‘Reforming the Italian electoral law, 1993’, inMixed-Member Electoral Systems, eds

M. S. Shugart & M. P. Wattenberg, Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 96–122.

Pasquino, G. (1992) ‘The electoral reform referendums’, in Italian Politics: A Review, eds F. Anderlini

& R. Leonardi, vol. 6, Pinter, London, pp. 9–24.

Pasquino, G. (ed.) (1993) Votare un solo candidato. Le conseguenze politiche della preferenza unica,

Il Mulino, Bologna.

Pasquino, G. (1996) ‘Ripartire dal semipresidenzialismo’, Il Mulino, vol. 45, no. 364, pp. 250–258.

Pasquino, G. (2001) ‘Berlusconi’s victory: the Italian general elections of 2001’, South European

Society & Politics, vol. 6, no. 1, pp. 125–137.

Pasquino, G. (2002) Il sistema politico italiano. Autorita, istituzioni, societa, Bononia University Press,

Bologna.

Passigli, S. (2005) ‘Un politologo militante’, in La scienza politica di Giovanni Sartori, ed. G. Pasquino,

Il Mulino, Bologna, pp. 213–246.

Piretti, M. S. (2003) La legge truffa. Il fallimento dell’ingegneria politica, Il Mulino, Bologna.

Quagliariello, G. (2003) La legge elettorale del 1953, Il Mulino, Bologna.

Rawls, J. (1971) A Theory of Justice, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA/London.

92 G. Pasquino

Dow

nloa

ded

By:

[Ing

enta

Con

tent

Dis

tribu

tion]

At:

20:4

5 7

Dec

embe

r 200

7

Sartori, G. (1963) ‘Dove va il Parlamento?’, in Il Parlamento italiano 1946–1963, ed. G. Sartori,Edizioni Scientifiche Italiane, Naples, pp. 281–386.

Sartori, G. (1995) Comparative Constitutional Engineering, Macmillan, New York.Sartori, G. (2004) Mala tempora, Laterza, Rome/Bari.Sartori, G. (2006) Mala costituzione e altri malanni, Laterza, Roma/Bari.Valbruzzi, M. (2005) Primarie. Partecipazione e leadership, Bononia University Press, Bologna.Wertman, D. (1977) ‘The italian electoral process: the elections of June 1976’, in Italy at the Polls.

The Parliamentary Elections of 1976, ed. H. R. Penniman, American Enterprise Institute,Washington, pp. 41–79.

South European Society & Politics 93