DISCUSSION ARTICLE 11:

Thomas Reid and Common Sense Foundationalism·

"" ]ames G. Hanink

"But, on the other hand, philosophy ... has noother root but the principles of common sense ...severed from this root, its honours wither, its sapis dried up, it dies and rots." 1

IDespite Reid's regard for "common sense," philosophy often

gets its start in the which common sense generates. Forexample, common sense teIls HS that not just any claim meritsbelief. An assertion that gets ''backed up," however, is perhapsanother matter. Indeed, the more important the claim, the morewe are apt to insist that it have support. Yet common sense alsosays that we cannot "go on arguing forever," although any numberof issues incite such disputation. Nonetheless, if important claimsdo require foundational premises, it seems to follow that thosepremises also need support-or else one's foundation is itself ar-hitrary. And so, we discover, common sense urges us both to pushour arguments to a deeper level and to bring them to a halt on thepain of infinite regress. What are we to do? Enter the philosopher,01' hetter, we shaII see, the philosopher of common sense.Philosophers of a certain bent, the "classical foundationalists,"

have lang offered an influential solution to the problem of whensupport for a contested claim might reasonably come to an end.2

* I thank Robert Gordh, Philip Devine, Carroll Kearley, Mark Morelli,and John Popiden for their comments on an earlier version of this essay.1 Thomas Reid, An Inquiry into the Human Mind, ed. Timothy Duggan,

(Chicago, 1970), p. 13.2 Descartes, Locke, and Russell are in this tradition.

91

92 Ja,mes G. Hanink

Their solution, "classjcal roundationalism," ia intended as a gen-eral framework for rational belief.3 According to the classicalfoundationalist, {'1 is within hjs epistemic rights in believing thatp ir and only if p is properly basic or derived rrom properly basicpropositions. In turn, p is properly basic for S if and only if pis selr-evident or incorrigible or, more permissively, evident to thesenses. Informally put, arguments should came to an end whenthey hit upon properly basic beliefs.Alvin Plantinga, however, has shown that this brand of founda-

tionalism suffers rrom two fatal defects.4 First, it cannot admitas rational many beliefs that surely are. Consider, for example,veridical memory claims like

(1) I bad Wbeaties for breakfast.

Typically, my knowledge that (1) is not inrerential. So (1) isnot rational as a derived belief. Is it, then, rational as a basicbelief? No, for (1) fails to meet the proposed criteria ror properbasicality. After all, (1) is neither a logical truth noraccompaniedby a compelling "luster," the usual marks or self-evidence for theclassical roundationalist. Nor is (1) incorrigible. l\ly believing(1) by no means shows it true. Nor is (1) evident to the senses.The past event to which it rerers is not IlOW an object of perception.Of course, nothing much rides on (1). But propositions such as

(2) The world bas existed for a long time.

or

(3) There are otber intelligent persons.

are of great significance. And (2) and (3) are rational belierswhich iare no better than (1) with respect to derivability frombasic beliefs. Moreover, neither (2) nor (3) pass muster as prop-erly basic. They are not logical truths and, it seems, do not carrythe luster that compels the skeptic's assent. Or so says the skeptic.either proposition, to be sure, i8 incorrigible nor evident to the

senses.

8 For a detailed account of classical foundationalisnl, see Alvin Plan·tinga's tC Reason and Belief in -God/'. in .Fa.itk. ·and Rationality, ed. AlvinPlantinga and Nicholas Wolterstorff (Notre Dame, 1984), pp. 47·5f.l.

4: Ibid., pp. 59-63.

Reid arui Foundationalism 93

So classical foundationalism, hereafter eLF;: ·is too restrictive.It rejects as rational even paradigm rational beliefs. But CLFhas a second flaw. Suppose we construct a complex proposition,pCLF, which states the tenets of OIjF. Upon inspection, pCLF isneither self-evident nor incorrigible nor evident to the senses. Canoue, perhaps, derive pCI.JF from beliefs that are properly basic?It seems not. But if pCI1F' is nejther properly basic nor' derivablefrom beliefs that are, then we have, given CLI1\ no rational basisfor accepting CLF. Thus, CLF is self-defeating.5Where, then, do we stand? Common sense has generated a prob-

lem, but CLF-one of modern philosophy's chief solutions to thisproblem-js no solution at all. Perhaps, though, common sense,as patient aa it is problematical, will give us a second chance.Thomas Reid, in fact, seems already to have explored, in an oftenneglected chapter of modern philosophy, such a second chance.l1eid's proposal is not to reject foundationalism but, rather, to'broaden the criteria forproperly basic beliefs. It is to Reid'sbroader "common sense foundationalism" that we now turn.

11Jln initial point in Reid's foundationalism is a shift in terminol-

ogy. Hedoes not speak explicitly of "basic" and " derived " beliefsor of "proper basicality." Instead Reid's discussion centers ona first principles." His most sustained analysis of these first prin-ciples is set jn his treatment of "judgments," those acts of themind "whereby one thing is affirmed or denied of another." 6

Sonle judgments "are intuitive, others grounded on argument,"and argument is due when our judgments are in " suspense " eventhough we "apprehend them distinctly and perfectly understandtheir meaning ..." 7 Intuitive judgments, however, are themselvesstarting points or first principles upon which arguments must bebased. Given this introductory distinction, Reid begins to workout, though he is not always so careful as he should be, a fulleraecount of the character of first principles.

5 For a rigorous statement of this see Plantinga, Opa oit., pp. 59-63.6 Thomas Reid, Essays on the Intellectual Powers 01 Man, ,ed. Baruch

Brody, (Cambridge, 1969), p. 532. (Hereafter, cited as InteltectualPowers.)

7 Ibid., p. 593.

9,4 .Jamts G. Hamnk

They are, he says,

(a) "no sooner understood than they are believed . . . ,"(b) "tbe result of our original powers •.. ,"

and

(c) accompanied by " the light of truth in itself ..." 8

But Reid's (a) and (c) need a careful reading. For he doesnot think that all first principles are immediately or universallyself-evident. First principles need not be self-evident in such a"strong" sense. In some cases, indeed, we might be quite unsurewhether a proposition is a first principle, just as by analogy,"There is areal distinction between persons within the house,and those that are without; yet it may be dubious to whieh theman belangs that stands upon the threshold." 9 Prejudiee, ifnothing else, ean easily obseure a self-evident proposition. Ourunderstanding, too, is often a matter of degree, and thus an epis-temieally self-evident proposition might only gradually beeomeso to a given individual. Of course, if Reid's eonditional self-evidenee is not always apparent, its utility in pieking out firstprineiples is reduced.But any desire neatly to separate first principles from mere

pretenders must be tempered by the history of philosophy. Whilefirst prineiples must be self-evident in the root sense of not need-ing "external" support, philosophers have hardly been in accordabout which prineiples are thus first and self-evident. But is thisimpasse intraetable? Reid is entirely aware that U When, in dis-putes one man maintains that to be a first prineiple, whieh an-other denies, commonly both parties appeal to common sense, andso the matter rests." 10 Yet with the optimism of his century heeontinues to ask "ls there no mark or criterion, whereby firstprineiples that are truly such, may be distinguished from thosethat assume the character without a. just title?" 11 His initialcharacteristics (a ), (b), and (c) are only first steps toward amore ambitious answer to his question.

8 Ibid.Ibid., p. 594.

10 Ibid., p. 596.11Ibid.

ReUla/nd ·Poundatiolialism

Hel'e, though, some further background remarks are in order toclarify the pIace 01 first principles. Thus, Reid reminds us thatOUf reasoning reql1ires, lmder the pain· or infinite regress, thatthere be such principles. (Ir a coherentist scheme occutred toReid, he did not take it seriously.) So we need not rear, unlesswe fear ror reason itself, that we are in search of what might notexist. :First principles, Reid also notes, are of two kinds. Someare contingent truths, and our reasoning from them yieldsclusions which are contingently true. Others are necessary truths,and reasoning from them ean afford us conclusions which are neces-sarily true. It is clear, Reid eontinues, that we would do a greatservice if we could identify these first prineiples upon whieh rea-soning nlust be based. After all, suecess in mathematics and sci-ence owes much to agreement on axioms and definitions. We caIitrace our failure to make more progress in philosophy back to ourconfusion about first principles. It is imperative that we dispelthis confusion.One might admit ,v-hat neid so iar proposes, by way of

ground considerations, and still be pessimistic about identifyingfirst principles. Not so 11eid: "... nature has not left us destituteof means whereby the candid and honest part 01 mankind may bebrought to unanimity when they happen to differ about first prin-ciples." 12 Yet though we may reach such aceord, we do not nowenjoy it. Indeed, it would show a " great want of charity" to sup-pose that even those "who really love truth " mightnot now dis-agree about first principIes.1BBut unless "Te accept relativism, we must suppose that in dis-

puted eases someone has gone wrong. Reid urges us to look firstto our own judgment. The SQurces 01 prejudice are plain enough:bad education, false authority, and party zeal are orten to blame.But suppose the parties to a dispute pass this examination 01 con-science. What then? We canllot resolve the issue by recourse tofirst principles; it is they that are at stake. Yet Reid finds thatour dispute, which "labors under a peculiar still"has advantages oi another kind to compensate tllis.H 14

What are these advantages? Lt\. first advantage i8 that any

12 Ibid., p. 603.13Ibid.14 Ibid., p. 604.

96 Jamu G. Haninkßeetive person can be a "competent j:udge" in identifying firstprinciples.15 Philosophers, however' acute-and here Reid refersto Sextus Empiricus among the ancients and Hume among themoderns-are not, except by academics, given much credence whenthey insult common sense.A second advantage in identifying first principles is th.at, while

they do not admit of direct proof, we ean use indirect argumentsto confirm. them. Reid specifies five such strategies.

(SI) Often someone who denies one first principle affirms another,although there is no good reason to affirm the latter hut reject theformer. This inconsistency gives us an ad hominem argument for rein-stating the denied principle.(82) Often one who denies a first principle fails to see the full impli-eations of the denial. Here a reductio ad absurdum argument is inorder. The denials of first principles get "distinguished from othererrors by this; that they are not only false, hut absurd ..." 16(83) The structure of language carries a certain epistemic weight, sug-gesting as it does fundamental and shared judgments. But we eanappeal to the structure of language in support of the first principlesthat recognize, say, distinctions between substance and quality andthought and its object.17(84) Certain beliefs, we can point out, are prima facie first principlesif only because we form them so early· in life that they could not beplausibly based on argument.(S5) Sorne of our beliefs, finally, are so indispensable to practice thatwe cannot discount them. They are, Reid says in one place, "so nec-essary to the condnet of life" that we " cannot live and act accordingto the rules of common prudence without them." 18

At this stage a recapitulation may be helpful. Reid's projectof constructing an alternative common sense foundationalism(hereafter CSF) faces a critical challenge. How, if at all, canwe identify first principles? On the one hand, they are in somesense self-evident; on the other hand, they are the subject of

15 Ibid.'10 Ibid., p. 806.While he makes no claims as a technical linguist, Reid finds in lan-

guage "the express image and picture of human thoughts" from whichI( we may draw very certain conclusioDs with regard to the original"(lntellectual Powers, p. 39).18 Ibid., p. 30.

Reid and Foundationalism 97

sustained debate in the history of philosophy. The. debate, itselfa source of skepticism, forces us to examine the very starting pointsof reasoning. Can we· ever eome to agree about thern? Reid, wehave seen, thinks that we have the resources to make· real progress.In his' discussion of these resources, further criteria for first

principles have emerged. "Criteria," however, is used advisedly.l?eid suggests, for the most part, necessary conditions for firstprinciple status. But sometimes he gives us a criterion that holdsonly for sonle first principles..At any rate, we ean now give a fullerand aluended, though not complete, eatalogue of his :first prjnciple(( indicators." First principles are

(a*) accepted ","hen understood, in proportion to the degree of under-standing and absence of prejudice;(b*) the result of our original powers;(c*) in need of no external evidence, since they carry the "light oftruth" ;(d·) accessible to ordinary intelligence;(e* ) seldoln open to direct p1'oof;(f*) open to indirect confirmation of va1'ious so1'ts, depending on thepa1'ticular principIe.

Items (a*) through (e*) are necessary conditions for first prin-ciple status. Both (a*) and (c*) might seem to be sufficient con-ditions for this status. But we must be careful here, since Heidlater observes, perhaps as an aiterthought, that first principles arenon-trivial; and any number of trivial propositions meet both (a*)and (c*) .19Reid's next step is to show just how these indicators identify

specific first principIes. For those of us interested in moving beyondeLF to a broader es]', a major question is whether the first prin-ciples so identified give us a sufficiently wider base than the classi-cal foundationalist ofiers. Of course, progress in recognizing asrational the paracligm eRses of rational beliefs excluded by eLF\vill corne at too high a price if irrational beliefs are admitted asfirst principles. .A further major question is what status the CSF

19 On the non-trivial character of first principles, Reid Dotes: "I grantthat there are innumerable seIl-evident propositioDs, which have neitherdignity Dor utility, and therefore deserve not the Dame ofaxioms, 88 thatname is commonly understood to imply, not only self-evidence but Bomedegree of dignity or utility" (Intelleotual Powers, p. 683).

.: James G.'Hanink

indicators of first principles turn out to have. If they are somehowself-defeating, CSF will have fared no better than CL·F.Reid first employs his set of indicators to (supposed) first prin-

ciples of contingent truths, since on his view we more often deal,vith them than with necessary truths. vVhile he suspects that hisinventory is imperfect, he identifies a full dozen entries. Here wecan consider each contingent principle, in paraphrased forIn, andnote the indicator(s) to which Reid chiefly appeals.

CPl The mental states of which one is conscious do wat.

We are all, Reid says, immediately convinced of th'is truth, "theonly principIe of common sense that has never directly been calledin question." 20 We know CPl by way of an original power of themind and not because of any proof.

CP2 The consciousness one experiences belongs to the person that one18.

There is no direct proof of this, hut Reid argues that its denialleads to absurdity. Against Bume he avers that if mental opera-tions " can be ascribed to a succession of ideas and impressions, ina consistency with common sense, I should be very glad to knowwhat is nonsense." 21

CP3 Memory can afford veridical testimony about the past.

This principle has nearly universal acceptance and "claims ou1"assent upon its own authority." 22 Skeptical arguments against thereliahility of memory turn out to rest on a representationalist modelthat would equal1y undermine .perception.

CP4 One's personal identity is (at least) as continuous as one'smemory.

This principle is linked with OP3. "Every thing we rememberhas such a relation to ourselves, as to imply necessarily our existenceat the time remembered." 23 But we know this immediately anelnot by reasoning.

20 Ibid., p. 618.21 Ibid., p. 622.22Ibid.28 Ibid., p. 625.

Re·id and Foundationalism 99

CP5 What one distinctly perceives exists and is what Olle perceives itto be.

Again, prior to philosophicalconfusions, this principle is alwaysaccepted. It needs no proof. B1erkeley's denial of it leads to a"dismal system" of practical solipsism. But how? Not from his"strict and accurate" reasoning but from the spurious prineiples"eonlmonly received by philosophers" that ideas rather thall ex-ternal objeets are the imnlediate objeets of perception.24 l\.n adhominem against such philosophers is that their prineiple, whiehleads to absurdity, has no more grounding than CP5.

CP6 One has some power over one's actions and choices.

To deny this, Reid insists, is to deny moral responsibility and thereality of deliberation. The conviction that we have such po,ver is" so early, so general, and so interwoven with the whole of humanconduct" that it parallels our conviction that an external worldexists.25

CP7 Human reason is not systematically fallacious.

Here Reid comnlents that " If any truth ean be said to be priorto all the others in the order of nature, this 8eems to have the bestclaim," for the reliability of any argunlent presupposes it. 26 Theprinciple itself admits of no direct proof, but it shows its ownevidence rather like the light which sho,vs itself in revealing visibleobjects.In eonsidering CP7 Reid, a bit tardily, also suggests a new pair

of indicators of, though neither sufficient nor necessary conditionsfor, first principle status. A first property that CP7 shares" withmany other first principles, and whieh can hardly be found in anyprinciple that is built solely upon reasoning" is that it usually"produces its effect without ever heing attended to, or made anobject of thought." 27 We simply begin by trusting reason. A sec-ond property CP7 shares with many other first principles is thatthey alike "force assent in partieular instal1ces nlore powerrully

24 Ibid., p. 627.25 Ibid., p. 630.26 Ibid., p. 631.27 Ibid., p. 632.

100 James G. Hanink

than when they are turned into a general proposition." 28 Thus,skeptics might quarrel with CP7 yet appeal to reason in so doing.

CP8 There are other persons besides oneself.

ChiIden, Heid observes, show a conviction that this is so, muchtoo soon for it to be a produet of reasoning. .A..dults retain thisbelief, though their for it might not be persuasive. In-terestingly, Reid thinks that CP8, unlike almost all other firstprinciples, admits a measure of positive, if analogieal, support.For "to prove that other men are living and intelligent" we eanargue "that their words and actions indicate like powers of under-standing as we are conscious of in ourselves." 29

CP9 There are natural physical signs of certain mental states and dis-positions.

We nearly all believe that how people look gives some indicationof what they fee1. This belief, Reid holds, cannot simply cometrom experience. When we experience both the sign and that whichit signifies as always conjoined, our belief in the link between thetwo is due to experience. But we do not experience the mentalstates of others. So experience does not teach us the relation inquestion. Rather just as a piece of music naturally conveys arange of feeling, so do our physical expressions.

CPIO Some weight is due to human testimony in matters of fact andeven to human authority in Inatters of opinion.

Reid's chief comment about CPI0 underscores its sUTvival value."If children were so framed, as to pay no regard to testimony 01'

to authority, they must, in the literal sense, perish for lack ofknowledge." 30 Adults, of course, must calibrate the credence theygive to testimony and authority. But CPIO still retains its force.

CPll Much human behavior is predictable.CP12 Natural phenomena will probably resemble what they have beenlike, in similar circumstances, in the paste

'rhat Reid distinguishes between CPll and CP12 shows that hetakes human beings to be more than natural phenomena. Insup-

28 Ibid., p. 633.29 Ibid., pp. 634-635.30 Ibid., p. 640.

Reid and Foundationalism 101.port of CPll, he points out that acting on its denial would makesocial liie impossible. In behalf oi CP12 an immediate reduciioargument shows that its denial would mean that we could not learnfrom experience. But we rightly accept CP12 even before we eon-sider the upshot of its denial. flume, moreover, has done us aservice by showing that CP12 cannot be grounded on reasoning.So, then, we have an overview of Reid's use of his first prin-

ciple indicators in support of a dozen candidates. His confidencein the enterprise doubtless puts him out of fashion in our periodoi epistemological anxiety. Still, Reid is not without his tentativemoments. Of his listing so iar, he notes that such" enumerations,even when made after much reflection, are seldom perfect." 31 Noris the support that l\eid gives his eandidates systematie. Some-times one indicator comes to the fore, sometimes another. He evenintroduces new indicators along the way. But this rough-and-ready approach matches his view of what the nature of the easeallows. :For while in a sense first prineiples win virtually universalassent, we 101' the most part never think of them; and when we dohuman vagaries are not to be diseounted. Thus" what is only avulgar prejudice may be mistaken for a first principle" and arealfirst principle "may, by the enchantment of words, have such amist thrown about it" as to puzzle an honest thinker.32 Thus,when in philosophy genuine tlrst principles are in dispute, they(( require to be handled in a way peculiar to themselves;" they" require not proof, but to be placed in a proper point of view." aaI t is, indeed, this "putting in perspective" that Reid follows inhis treatment of the first principles of contingent truth.On the whoIe, Reid's defense of his proposed first principles of

necessary truths, while it gives us more of the base content of CSF,only reinforces the methodology we have seen so far. Correspond-ingly, our discussions here will be highly selective and consideronly his aeeount oi three representative first prineiples that heterms "metaphysical."With the prineiples again in paraphrased form, we ean first

eonsiderNPI Both the sensory qualities that one perceives and the thoughts of,vhich one is conscious demand a subject.

31 Ibid., p. 643.32 Ibid., p. 33.33Ibid.

102 G. Hanink

To support this Reid claims that the distinction between subjectand quality is a constant of linguistic structure and enjoys uni-versal acceptallce. True, there is no proof of NPl; and doubtlessHunle rightly holds that the metaphysical subject of qualities andof thoughts is given in neither sensation nor consciousness. But"sensation and consciousness are not the only sources of knowl-cdge ..." 34Nor do sensation and consciousness have a groundingsuperior to the original power that enables us to recognize NPl.i\nother of Hume's targets and Reid's first principles is

NP2 Whatever begins to exist ronst have a cause.

To reject this principle, says Reid, is to put an end "to allprudence in the conduct oi life." 35 It is unlikely that we haveany proof of For however much experience we have of eventsheing causec1, NP2 is a llecessary truth. As such, Dur experienceof contingent events cannot establish it. Indeed, our only experienceof causation "i8 in the consciousness we have oi exerting somepo,ver in ordering our thoughts and actions." a6 Thus, we onlyexperience agent causation. Still NP2 wins nearly universal assent.We ordinarily assume it in the practice of our affairs, as does evenHume.

last metaphysical principle Reid examines i8

NP3 From effects that sho'w the signs of intelligence, one can infer anintelligent cause.

Illtelligence is not a sensory property, and yet we know that thereare intelligent agents. Such intelligence we must infer, even inoUr own cases, from effects that suggest it. NP3 licenses us to doso, and without it common life would be impossible.a1 It is, more-

84 Ibid., p. 652.85 Ibid., p. 653.36 Ibid., p. 655.31 With respect to NP3 Reid adds "And I need hardly mention its im-

portance in natural theology" (lntellectual Powers, p. 667). Here heintroduces a brief argument for the existenee of God, the first premiseof ,,,hieh i8 NP3. While R.eid speaks of an argument, one wonders if hemight not have been persuaded to take our experienee of order in natureas triggering (in his language "suggesting") belief in God rather thangrounding it. For this distinrtion, see George I. Mavrodes' "Jerusalemand Athens Revisited," in Faith and Rationality, pp. 198-199.

Reid a11d Fo'U,ndationa.lism 103

over, doubtful that. we could discover this principle through rea-soning. N 01" could an argument for it be based on experience.Such an argument would have to move from contingent premisesto a necessary conclusion. N01' da we really experience a conjunc-tion of effects that show intelligence and intelligent minds. AI-thongh "we have an ül1nlediate kno,vledge of the existence ofthought in ourselves by consciousness, yet vve have uo immediateknowledge of amind. The milld is not an iInluediate object eitherof. sense 01' of consciousness." 38There is nothing nnvel in Reid's argument for NP3. But that

NP3 is a necessary rather than contingent tTuth might give somepause. After all, it seems related to

CP9 There are natural physical signs of eertain mental states and dis-positions.

which is a contingent truth. The difference between the two,though, is not so hard to indicate. Human beings might havebeen so constructed that their voices, expressions, andthe like, did not serve as natural signs of their mental dispositions.But, on Reid's view, intelligence is essentially such that we eaninfel" its existence from certain of its effects.Our review of Reid's account oi first principles, especially of

necessary truths, has been highly abbl'eviated. Rut we now haveberore us both Reid's inclicatol's for first principle status and afairly fnll enumerat,ion oi the first pl'jnciples that he recognized.We have, too, a sense of how he used his indicators in support ofthese principIes. Two maj01' questions ret.urn to center stage.The first is ,vhether Reid's broad common sense foundation vali-dates all the non-inferential beliefs that we ordinarily take to berational without also validating cert.ain non-inferential beliefs thatare not rational. This first question leads to a second. What isthe status of a statement of CSF, that is, pCSF, in light of Ueid'sfirst principle indicators?Unlike CLF, Reid's CSF does not, jt 8eems, l"eject llon-inferen-

tial beliefs that are clearly rational. Consider again three propo-sitions rejected by CLF, beginning with

(1) I had Wheaties for breakfast.

88 Reid, Intelleotual Potoers, p. 667.

104 James G. Han·in7c

In (1) we have just a particular instance of CP3, the principlethat memory can be a reliable souree of knowledge.

Next reeall(3) There are other intelligent persons.

WeIl, (3) simply restates CP8. Vfe also considered(2) The world has existed for a long time.

Reid does not expressly consider (2) as a first principle, nor is(2) derivable from his first principles. But it hardly follows that(2) is not a rational belief. For (2) could readily be taken asitself a first principle of contingent truth. Reid, after all, nowheresays that his enumeration is complete. And (2) scores very weIlin terms of his indicators (a*) through (f*). Thus, we acceptits truth as soon as we understand it, taking it neither to need, noradmit of, supporting evidence. the knowledge that (2)is so is accessible to the ordinary person, although we would seldom"think about" (2), as stated. Still, jts particular corollaries geta.ffirmed often enough, for example, " The Rocky Mountains beganto be formed tens of thousands of years ago." That we know that(2), Reid might assert, is due not to any argument but rather ouroriginal constitution. The denial of (2) would at one level have.no practical significance; material objects would be no different.But if, per impossible, we came to believe that the world came intoexistence five minutes ago, our sense of the human enterprise wouldbe incalculably altered.Our reconsideration of (1), (2), and (3) should, then, make it

clear that Reid's epistemje ioundation is broadened both explicitlyand implicitly. It is broadened explicitly in that he admits asfirst principles (or as instances thereof) propositions, such as (1)and (3), that the classical foundationalist does not. It is board-ened implicitly in that Reid's multiple first principle indicators,which go beyond "strong" self-evidence, incorrigibility, and beingevident to the senses, allow us to recognize a proposition like (2)as a first principIe even if Reid did not do so explicitly.A paramount worry, of course, is whether Reid's broader founda-

tions might also admit as first principles propositions that arerationally derective. In one sense this worry is so general thatthere is relatively little we can do to assuage it. For this worrycan be expressed in terms of the open,-ended query " 1a there really

Reid and .Foundationalism 105

justification for aecepting p apart from the evidence 01 some q?"The answer to this question depends, of course, on what pis. Thereis no point in rehearsing Reid's assessment of the first prineipleswe have seen. Eaeh prineiple, it 8eems, is a rational belief. Otherpropositions must be addressed on a case by case basis.Whether Reid's testing proeedure is itself, of course, correct is

the deeper issue. If the eritic of a candidate first prineiple showsthat although the eandidate passes Reid's test it is still defeetive,then the proeedure itself is defeetive. Now we ean hardly establishahead of time that no eritic eould make such a case. Yet it is hardto imagine how a proposition that met Reid's test could be showndefective. No one would in practiee take such a proposition to bedefeetive. On the contrary, onee understood it would win nearlvuniversal assent, at least rrom the unprejudieed. Thus any argu-ment that showed it defective would have to fi.nd a place in a setof beliefs in which that argument's eonclusion eo-existed with itso\vn negation. In such an epistemie impasse, it is hardly elear thatwe would be obligated to reject the belief demanded by ordinarypractice. Thus, it is not elear how the skeptie's argument againstthe eandidate principle, though in isolation perhaps convineing,could ever estabHsh itself.Buteven if the skeptie's argument that a candidate passing

Reid's test ll1ight still be defeetive will always face the objeetionjust sketched, ,ye would do weIl to follow Reid's course and ex-amine the specifie skeptical arguments. If nothing else, they eanlead us to look closely at whether a candidate aetually passes musterin light of Reid's indicators. It is here, no doubt, that we shouldexpeet to find "borderline eases." Examining speeific skeptiealarguments must, however, be saved for another place.'Ve should, though, address directly the status of Reid's CSF

given its own requirements. The parallel question put to CLF,we recall, prompts a decisive objection, since CLF turns out to beself-defeating. For pCLF is neither a basic belief nor, apparently,derivable from basic beliefs. For Reid, S rationally believes p ifand only if p is either a first principle, in terms of Reid.'s testingprocedure, or derivable from first principles. How does this founda-tionalism fare in light of its own strictures?1s, perhaps, pCSF rational because it is derivable from first

prineiples? Does Reid attempt such a derivation? Not explicitly,although he eertainly has his reasons for proposing a foundation-

106 J a1nes G'. H anink

alist structure. A first reason is historical. An axiomatjc methodhas been suceessful in both mathematieal and Newtonian physics.If we suppose a structural harmony within the spheres of knowl-edge, such a nlethod should be of help in philosophy. A secondreason is linguistic. Language requires a structure that uses rulesanel definitions that 1unction much as axioms da. But language,R,eid thinks, refleets the strueture of the mind. So we ought tosuppose that the mind naturally follows an axiomatic process..No'v neither the arguluent from other disciplines nor the argu-

lTIent from language start from Reid's stated first prineiples. Butperhaps the first 01 the pair might be reworked ta da so, if onecould accept as a first prjnciple that the structure of human knowl-edge is unified-an impossible condition for the elassical founda-tiolJalist. So while the prospects of deriving pCL]' are dirn, theprospects of deriving pCSF are perhaps already a bit more en-couTaging.There is, moreover, a third and decisive reason Reid has to affirm

OS]' in partieular, rather than a narrower alternative. The thirdreason, roughly, is tbis: we just do proeeed in aeeord with the dic-tates of CSF. Upon refleetion, we discover that CSF coes approxi-mate OUT epistemic structure. But should it? We ean only saythat at some point the normative merges ,vith the descriptive.89()f course, the ordinary person could not articulate the structureof eonllnon sense. That is the job of the eommon sense philosopher.In doing this job, the common sense phHosopher does not constructsome l1ew set of noetic duties. The goal, instead, is to bring to lightthe salient features oi how we already function, when we functionweIl.Reid's third reason to champion CSF also sllggests that CSF is

derivable from, 01' perhaps even an expression of,

CP7 1-1uman reasoning is not systematically fallacious.

:i9 Chisholnl'S argulllent for epistenlological particularisln helpfullyillustrates the mergel' of the nornlative with the descriptive. We cannotbegin witll epistelnie nornlS and then determine ,vhat we know; rather,\ve begin by describing what we. kno,v and then eHcit norms from thisclescription. See Roderick M. Chisholm, The 01 the Grite'rio}!(I\Iilwaukee, 1974). Also helpful is Roger Wertheimer's account of ra·tionality. He holds tha-t "what and how we do think is evidence for theprinciples of rationality, what and ho\v we ought to think." See his"Philosophy on Humanity," in Abortion : Pro and Gon, ed. Robert L.Perkins (Cambridge, 1974), pp. -------

Reid and Foundationalism 107If human reasoning' is as Reid portrays it, then 'CSF gets lieelisedby one of its own axioms. Thus, unlike eIl]" Reid's CSF appearsto 'escape self-referential collapse. If nothing else, this means thatCSF, so far a minority position, merits more attention than philoso-phers have thus iar given it. Still there are three further eritieismsof Reid's CSF that we should consider. :B'or even if his doetrine isonot vulnerable in the ways that the influential CLF is, perhaps itfaHs in ways of its OWD.

111Do Reid's common sense principles, in the end, amount to a bap-

tized skepticism? It is this "skeptic in disguise objeetion" thatwe will consider first.40 No one, doubtless, would lodge a parallelcomplaint against the eiassical foundationalist, however muehstrietures might ultimately induce skeptieism. For the elassical.foundationalist claims that we have knowledge both oi first prin-cipIes and of what we derive from them. Moreover, that knowledgeoI first principIes, limited as it is, seems beyond even philosophiealcavil. On tbe other hand, R,eid adrnits that almost all of his ex-panded set of first prineipies have been ehallenged and yet refusesto offer any proof of them. 18 this not, the eritie asks, eonfessingthat we do not have knowledge of these principIes, despite their.appeal to common sense? Does Reid give 118 anything more thanskepticism with a happy face?This complaint" however, 8eems to rest on a hidden assumption.

It supposes that we cannot know a proposition that someone elsemight rationally dispute uniess what we claim to know has the sortof evidenee in its favor that can be set forth as the premises of anargument. But this underlying "evidentialist assuluption" is notplausible. If we were to aceept it, even the elassical foundationalistwould feel its bite, although this is not mueh noticed. For afoundationalist might easily claim knowledge of, say, a propositionevident to the senses even though it eould not be established byexternal evidence and could rationally be disput.ed by other people.(The same point holds for a self-evident proposition.)

40 For- a quite different discussion of Reid 'aB a 11mitigated" skeptic seeLouise MarcH Lacoste's U The Seriousness of Reid's Sceptical AdmissioDs,"The Monist (April, 1978).

lOS James G. Hanink

Let us consider a single example. Someone might easilybe in aposition rationally to dispute, because of good inductive arguments,that a person who is- now looking atthis essay. is in- fact doing so.And yet the reader who now perceives this article knou's that hedoes so, even if no evidence that can be put in the premises of anargument leads him to the conelusion " I see the essay beforeme."The "skeptic in disguise objection" has, of course, shifted our

attention from rational belief to knowledge. 'Ve should note thisshift, since Reid's eS]' is an account of the former rather than thelatter. Still, Reid would argue that when our belief in first prin-ciples is rational, we are in a position to 'know them. Nonetheless,the objection fails. I t rests on apremise that would disallow knowl-edge that we certainly have, knowledge that even the too Tigorousclassical foundationalist would accept. Ironically, those who finda skeptie in Reid make much more of universal agreement thanwould he.A second criticism of Reid is more worrisome. Ilis foundational-

ism, it alleges, is ultimately relativistic.41 A main form of thisobjection is as follows. 'Vhat we know intuitively as a first prin-ciple we know by way 01 the constitution 01 the human mind. Thus,what we know ia relative to tbe mind. But the human mind,whether it is God's design 01' only the result of evolution, couldbe different than it is and remains open to change. What we in-tuitively know as a first principle might in the future not be anobject of Dur knowledge at all. 'Ve might even conle to think itfalse. Has not common sense knowledge turned. out to be a shakyaffair?,Perhaps Reid's best response here begins with the distinction

the' medium oi lmowledge and the object of knowledge.In the ease oi first principIes, the objects of knowledge .are certainstares of afIairs picked out by certain propositions. The mediumof knowledge is the constitution of the mind as it operates in anormal environment. If, indeed, God (01' evolution) alters thismedium, what we, now k.now will be affect.ed. For ii the medium is

41 For an instance of this criticism see William R. Eakin's " Reid: FirRtPrinciples' and Reason in the Lectures on Natural Theology," in ThornasRei4's Lectures on Natural Theolo,qy (1180), ed. EImer H. Dllncan,(Washington, DC, 1981), p. xxxx.

Reid· and FoundatioMlism 109

strengthened, knowledge is enhanced. And if it is weakened, knowl-edge is impaired. But as matters stand, Reid might point out,we know enough to know that our knowledge is limited. So this"medium relativism," so long as the medium is not taken to beessentially falsifying, seems harmless. Moreover, it is only thisrelativism to which Heid is committed. That certain states ofaffairs could themselves change, quite independently of our mentalconstitution, and that accordingly some first principles are indeedcontingent is a view that Reid also accepts. But if this view isrelativism, it is an entirely proper" reality relativism." Of course,if Reid construed our knowledge as limited to knowledge of ourown constitution, as an object, as opposed to limited by that con-stitution, as a medium, he would be caught in an egocentric pre-dicament as dismal as that to which he thought the Cartesian tra-dition led. But Reid does not so construe knowledge. Hence thecharge of relativism is not persuasive.The last objection that we· should consider is the most serious.

It is that Reid is unacceptably dogmatic. Thc objection gets madein different ways. Sometimes it is very general: Reid does nothave the " spirit of philosophy." Reid, of course, would reply thatit is the spirit of philosophy that is at issue. Sometimes the objec-tion reduces to the claim that Heid accepts aa first principles propo-sitions that are rationally defective. But we have already consid-ered this charge.42Here, though, vte might focus on the charge of dogmatism in the

specific form Norman Daniels gives it. Concentrating on passagesfrom Reid's early work, A.n Inquiry into the Human Danielsidentifies what he calls Reid's "unrevisability thesis." For Reid,as we have seen, all reasoning rests on first principles. Of these firstprinciples, he says "I am sure they are parts of my constitution,and that I cannot throw thern off." 43 If such principles cannotbe thrown off, then Reid surely holds an unrevisability thesis. Butwhat is wrong with this? The problem, Daniels thinks, is that Reidalso holds that skeptical denials oi first principles cannot be putinto practice. Daniels complains, Reid thus loads the dice inhis own behalf. "Reid 8eems to believe that 'by our constitution 'we are restricted botk to having certain fixed points in 0111- theories

42 See above, p. 104.43 Thomas Reid, An lnquiry into the Huma,tf, Mind, p. 82.

11() . ·Jame-s G. Hanink

about .the world and t() having only that experience or pract'icecomJpqtible with those fixed points." 44

But is this really loading the dice? Has Reid rigged the sup-posedly impartial test of practice in favor of his first principles?It is by TIO means elear that he hase For we might far more benign-1y see Reid as simple affirming that good theory cannot be in con-flict with veridical experience. For Reid, after all, it is a firstprinciple that our reason ia capable of good theorizing or, moregenerally.

CP7 Human reasolling is not systematically fallacious.

It is equally. a first principle that

CP5 .What one distinct1y perceives exists and is what one perceives itto. be.:

Having affirmed CP7, it is hardly surprising that Reid insists tha.tit is compatible with CP5 (Of, for that matter, the principlesaffirming the testilnony of consciousness or memory, and so forth).

should note straight off that, if we do have some experiencethat counts against a supposed first principle, Reid can say thatthe proposed first principle, perhaps onee a borderline ease, nolonger meritsassent. He cannot be read to say that whatever he,thomas Reid, takes to be a firet principIe is indeed such. Hisjudgnients about first principles are fallible, as f;Lre OUfs. But evenif Reid is shown wrong,. because of experience, about some par-ticular principle,' the thesis that there are first principles that arefixedpoints and that our experience must be compatible with them,since both fixed points and range of experience are rooted in ourconstitution, has not been affeeted. This thesis, of course, is theinte1·esting thesis. To be sure, if we limit our viewcif experience to, say, perceptual experience, then we might oftenfail to no.tice tests of practice that could count against snpposedfirst prineiples.45 But this failing to see the range of experience,however much" it .would lead us astray, would not invalidate thec:ore "unrevisability thesis., What might be taken' to testify against the unrevisability thesisis the thatall human experience is so radically limited

44Norman Daniels, Thomas Reid's lnquiry: The Geometry 0/ y'is'iblesand The Oase Yprk, 11)74) ,p.115.

45 DanieIs attribuMs thia' error tO 'Reid, see op.cit., p. 116.

Reid and Foundationalism 111

that we are blocked from seeing how arieher experience would dis..;.qualify our putative first prineiples. Here it seems we return witha vengeanee to the earlier objection that Reid has made knowledgerest on the human eonstitution-though now we are asked to foeuson human experience. It is one thing, says the eritie, for our ex,-perience to be incomplete. It is quite another for it to be essential..ly falsifying. And, the eritie persists, suppose it is? Might not wemistakenly think of first principles as unrevisable when, for all weknow, they are simply false?Reid himself suggests this line of critieism, perhaps unwitting-

ly, in diseussing a mythical group, the "Idomenians," who lackthe sense of touch. Without this sense, they could firmly believe"that two or more bodies may exist in the same place." 46 In sup-port of their view, they eould enlist "the testimony of sense, andthey ean no more doubt of it, than they ean doubt whether theyhave any perception at all." 41 But just as we are pereeptuallysuperior to the Idomenians, perhaps some other beings are superiorto us. Just as our experience discounts what might be a first prin-ciple of the Idomenians, these other beings might reject some ofour first prinl)iples in the light of their rieher experienee. If wedo not confront this possibility, the eritie continues, we embracedogmatism. If we do confront it, we eannot hold our first prin-ciples with anything like Reid's eonfidenee.Yet there are a number of responses to be made to this objec-

tion. First, with an eye to the Idomenians, whether "Two bodiescannot oecupy the same place" is a, first principle ia not altogetherclear. Moreover, this principle would be a contingent rather thana neeessary truth. For it seems logically possible for bodies to bebodies and yet occupy the same place. Whether we could imagineplausible eases where defeetive experiential capacities ealled othereontingent first principles into question, principles about, say,memory or personal identity or the power to act and ehoose ia anopen question. If we could not, the Idomenian ease is less impres-sive. Moreover, it seems that we callnot imagine coherent experi-ences that would show that a first principle of necessary truth wasindeed false. Again, that we cannot generate "Idomenian eases"

46 Thomas Reid, An Inq'llriry i'1lto the H1.Plnan Mirid, p. 132. citesthis passage.41Ibid.

112 J a'rnes G·. Hanink

with respeet to neeessary truths 8eems to limit the force of theoriginal ease.Second, and more importantly, the objection that our experience

might confirm our first principles and yet itself be radically de-fective is in a sense an idle fear. After all, there might be an evilgenius. But have we any reason to think so? No. Evolution mightbe on the verge of revealing whole new realities. But have we anyreason to think so ? No. Our experience might be systematicallydeceptive. But have we any reason to t.hink so? No, nor are wedogmatic if we confidently suppose that it is largely veridical.Third, if we are to make sense out of a story in which human

experienee turns out to be so defective that first principles mustbe revised, that story must be intelligible to uso But it is doubt-ful that we can tell any such intelligible story unless our (general-ly Reidian) first prineiples are honored. Thus, we could not hopeto convince the Idomenians of their limits unless we did so withina framework of shared first principles. So not only does the ob-jection before us violate the epistemic, as weIl as legal, dictum"innocent until proven guilty," but it also can only be suggestedin the most hypothetieal terms.This inability to artieulate, outside of Hume's study, an alterna-

tive to our eommon sense framework is a reflection of the firstprineiple status that Reid gives

CP7 Hurnan reasoning is not systelnatically fallacious.

This prineiple, indeed, is a contingent truth. Our reasoning eouldbe otherwise, as could our mental constitution and experiential ca-pacities. Of course, lor Reid, that human reasoning is not falla-eious, and that our mental constitution and experiential capacitiesare in good order, is another sign of intelligence in the world thatmight weIl lead us to reverence the Creator. But however ourepistemic good fortune has come about, we have no reason to thinki t otherwise.The argument in this last section has been that while Reid's

CSF ia alternatively charged with skepticism, relativism, anddogmatism, none 01 these objections is persuasive. In the priorsection we saw that Reid's eS]' also avoids the sharpest objections,that is, of narrowness and self-referential collapse, posed againstCLF. Does Reid emerge, then, as offering us a promising episte-mological redirection? It 8eems so. There remain, of course, manyissues for common sense foundationalists to pursue.

Reid and Foundationälism

IV

113

In this final seetion \ve ean set forth a short sampIer of ques-tions, three quite speeifie and one rather general, that a eontempo-rary and developed CSF must have on its agenda.Reid's CSF was developed in close harmony with his seientific

concerns, and contemporary CS:H' should doubtless follow suit.48So, to begin, we need to ask how much of Reid's confidence infoundationalism is inspired by Newton's physics in a way that

not, perhaps, be inspired by twentieth century physics.An-other point: does a Kuhnian philosophy of scienee, which .suggestsyet another relativislU, lead to a coherentist episteluology that Reidcould hardly countenance and that would undercut any form offoundationalism ?For philosophers of religion rather thall philosophers of seience

surely a major question ia why Reid dces not, take" God exists"as a first prineiple. His favorite theistie argument, an argumentfrom final causes, is no stronger than the analogical argument forother minds whieh he reviews. But while an argument by analogylor other minds gives 11S a good reason for our belief in otherminds, it is not the real foundation of that belief. After all, thatthere are other minds is a first principIe, and first principIes arenot supposed to have decisive support froln direct argument. Per-haps that there are other minds js the exeeptional ease. Still, onewonders if Heid mightnot have considered taking God's existel1ceas a first principle. I-Ie would, as a Presbyterian divine, likely beaequainted with Calvin's stance that belief in God is both uni-versal, unless culpably distorted by sin, and independent of argu-ment. In addition, if "God exists" is basic, Reid cannot becharged with defending t.headequaey 01 the mind to reeognizefirst prineiples by an appeal to God's goodness and in turn usingfirst principles to establish ,the existenee of a good GOd.49 Heidmay weIl have thought that "God exists" ia too widely denied in

·JS Daniels rightly stresses this theme in Reid.49 See Paul Vernier's "Tholllas Reid on the Foundations of Knowledge

and his ...t\.nswer to Skepticism," in Thomet8 Reid: 01·itical lnte'rpretations,elle Stephen· F. Barker and TOln L. Beauchamp (Philadelphia, 1976), pp.14·15. Vernier sho\vs how Reid avoids a Cartesian circle even 'withouttaking "God exists" as basic. Vernier's account of ho,v. Heid justifieR hisfirst principles is excellent.

114 James G. Hanink

both theory and practice, for whatever reason, to be a plausiblefirst principle. Against this hesitation, one might urge that ifprejudice could confuse us about first principles, as Reid stresses,certainly sin could confuse us even more. 1rloreover, a whole arrayof moral phenomena suggests that we have a knowledge of God inour hearts, however much we on occasion deny it.50But perhaps, after all, Reid's main worry is not so much that

since "God exists" is often denied it cannot be a first principle.Perhaps, rather, it is that since "God exists," on his view, canbe derived from first principles, it cannot be itself a first prin-ciple. Yet might not this worry, too, be put to rest? For suppose" God exists" is derivable from first principles, for example, NP3or even NP2. If belief in God is rational even before we considersuch derivations, as it may weIl be, then "God exists" remains afirst principle in the root sense of not needing external evidence.That it turns out to admit of external evidence simply under-scores the harmony that characterizes the set of first principles.Of course, including "Q-od exists" as a first principle gives even

greater impetus to the task of clarifying Reid's loose "indicators"of first principle status. Certainly we do not find in Reid theclarity' about first principle indicators that we need. ....-\ commonsense epistemologist in our own more exacting milieu surely has aduty to work for greater precision. It is a" mistake, no doubt, tosuppose that we can demand ahead of time a set of necessary andsufficient condition indicators. But we can hope for progress.Plantinga's injunction that we adopt an inductive approach seemscorrect. As he puts it, ce••• criteria for proper basicality must bereached from below rather than above; they should not be pre-sented ex cathedra but argued to and tested by a relevant set ofexamples." 51 An historical review of Reid's language, and ex-amples, is only a first step in this project.Given this sampIer of the ongoing agenda of the common sense

tradition, it is perhaps only prudent for common sense philosophersto emulate Reid's temperate spirit along with his epistemicdoughtiness.

T8 there nOlnark or criterion, whereby first principles that are trulysuch, may be distinguished from those that assume the character"without

no St. Paul, Epistle to the Romans 1, 18-32.51 See Plantinga's U Reason and Belief in

Reid and Foundationalism 115

a just title' I shall humbly offer in the following propositions whatappears to me to be agreeable to truth in these matters, always readyto change my opinion upon conviction.&2

That a candidate first principle is a fit axiom is open to debate,then, even as the criteria for being a first principIe are open tochallenge. But for any chaIIenge, or defense, to have conviction,there must be first principles. Both philosophy and common sensedepend on this much.

Loyola MarymountLos Angeles, Oalifornia.

52 Thomas Reid, lntellectual Power3, p. 596.