the transition towards digital television and the future role of psbs
TRANSCRIPT
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Università Commerciale “Luigi Bocconi”
Facoltà di Economia
Corso di Laurea Specialistica in Discipline Economiche e Sociali
The transition towards digital television and the future role of PSBs:
a comparative analysis of the British and Italian case histories
Relatore: prof. Michele Polo
Controrelatore: prof. Chiara Fumagalli
Tesi di Laurea Specialistica di:
Emanuele Frezza
Matricola: 1364579
Anno accademico: 2009/2010
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Abstract The digitisation of communication media system and the transition towards a developed as well as fully interactive digital television (DTV) market have been among the most challenging European integration processes of the last years. The switch to such new technology has represented a breakthrough for the whole TV sector, in particular the launch of the digital terrestrial platform is not only leading to the switch‐off of analogue transmission form but it is also questioning the role and the need for national public service broadcasters as currently intended. This work aims at investigating the evolution of DTV together with its main implications through a comparison between the development occurred within the British television market, which was the European forerunner and is characterised by a mature multiplatform environment, and the Italian current digital migration path, in order to identify what competitive conditions and optimal policy prescriptions can be favoured to manage the transition and sustain its future success.
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Contents
1 INTRODUCTION 7
2 DIGITAL TELEVISION IN EUROPE 10
2.1 AN INTRODUCTIVE OVERVIEW 10 2.2 SATELLITE, CABLE AND TERRESTRIAL: THREE MAIN DIGITAL PLATFORMS 14 2.3 EU APPROACH TOWARDS DIGITAL SWITCHOVER 19 2.4 ANALOGUE SPECTRUM SWITCH‐OFF AND THE CHALLENGES FOR PUBLIC POLICIES 24 2.5 PUBLIC SERVICE BROADCASTERS IN THE DIGITAL ERA 27
3 UK TELEVISION MARKET 32
3.1 DIGITAL PENETRATION IN THE EUROPEAN FIRST‐MOVER COUNTRY 32 3.1.1 FIRST NEGATIVE EXPERIMENT OF DIGITAL TERRESTRIAL TELEVISION 33 3.1.2 THE FREE‐TO‐AIR SUCCESSFUL MODEL FOR DTTV 37 3.2 THE ROLE AND THE STRATEGY OF THE BBC IN THE DIGITAL MIGRATION 42 3.3 PUBLIC POLICY SUPPORT TO DIGITAL TELEVISION AND SWITCHOVER 49
4 TELEVISION MARKET IN ITALY 57
4.1 THE ROAD TOWARDS DIGITISATION IN THE ITALIAN DUOPOLISTIC MARKET 57 4.2 THE NATIONAL FREQUENCY ASSIGNMENT POLICY 63 4.3 THE DTTV SWITCHOVER AND THE REGION‐BY‐REGION ROLL OUT 69 4.4 THE NEW CHALLENGES FOR THE PUBLIC SERVICE: RAI INTO THE DIGITAL WORLD 75 4.5 THE MAIN NATIONAL POLICIES SUPPORTING DTTV INTRODUCTION INTO SOCIETY 80
5 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 86
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1 INTRODUCTION
Television industry has been undergoing a broad number of major changes since the
launch of the very first transmissions and across its whole history it has
progressively become the main stage where the impact of incremental technological
development showed its most remarkable effects on citizensʹ information, social
awareness, education and entertainment, thus generally affecting their standard or
even quality of life.
In the last years, the still on‐going deep penetration of digital technology within
television sector has represented a worldwide process whose implications and
potentialities can be considered embodying probably one of the greatest challenges
for our current communication and media society.
Nowadays, in particular, in the framework of the European process of economic,
social and political integration the enhancement of this latter innovation has been
regarded as a powerful and efficient mean to reduce geographical and cultural
distances within a continuously more interconnected population and, therefore, to
strengthen the effectiveness of the convergence towards a common technological
environment in which significant advantages and benefits could be more easily
accessible to all communities wherever located.
As a consequence, the creation of an interactive digital platform in the context of the
television market not only implies large scale reorganisation for the industry itself,
but furthermore, it involves a change that has to be considered revolutionary rather
than just evolutionary.
In addition, this fundamental innovation entails inner changes in the economics of
communications and provides a push for opening a consistent debate around the
balance of powers and the competitive conditions existing inside TV markets.
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Across every European Union (EU) member state, the transition from the old
analogue form of broadcasting to the new digital technique has been assuming both
common characteristics, according to the way basic community recommendations
have been globally acknowledged, and country‐specific features, according to the
mix of policies put in action by each different nation to foster the digital take up.
Indeed, the current work points at studying the European road towards the
completion of television signals’ digitisation, focusing the attention mainly on one
key aspect: the switch to digital of the terrestrial platform, which was historically the
most spread and affordable network in the whole continent and whose role had been
essential in providing television services to EU citizens for decades.
Along with the transition to the new platform, the analysis will look carefully at the
relevant implications that the adoption of such technology could have for the activity
of the incumbent traditional public service broadcasters (PSBs) whose primary role
within the terrestrial was a constant in all countries.
As a matter of fact, this study investigates the above discussed issues through the
comparison of two significant European television markets that have been
experiencing different histories as far as digital TV introduction is concerned, that is
the British and Italian ones. The choice of these countries has been motivated by the
fact that their markets, although being characterized by the presence of some
common features, register important differences in terms of the equilibrium among
existing platforms as well as operators and provide an example of a mature and a
younger digital context respectively.
The first chapter describes the penetration of digital transmission in Europe through
its adoption on the most popular and most used platforms and analyses the main
steps towards digitisation completion. The second and third chapters present the
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digital migration in the United Kingdom and in Italy, shedding the light on the main
public policies implemented to help that process and on the current arising
challenges for PSBs.
Finally, a last conclusive chapter collects the main evidences from the comparative
effort and identifies the optimal and more effective policies in order to manage the
transition successfully and guarantee digital platform’s competitive sustainability.
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2 DIGITAL TELEVISION IN EUROPE
2.1 An introductive overview
During the last forty years, the EU attention in shaping television policy has always
been aimed at the fulfilment of its main goals: the promotion of European integration
and social objectives. Television not only constitutes the broadest segment of the
European audio‐visual sector, but it represents also the primary source of
information for most of the population in the EU 27 member states; nowadays
around 99 % of European citizens own one or more TV sets.
From the so‐called “Television without Frontiers” Directive (EC 1989) the EU has
been progressively implementing policies to favour the Community coordination of
national legislations to guarantee and defend fundamental principles applicable to
the audio‐visual industry. To be more precise, the areas of intervention concerned,
among the others, the access of the public to major broadcasting events, the laws
applicable to TV transmissions, television sponsorship and advertising, and
moreover other core issues of interest as the protection of minors and the right of
reply.
The historical role of television in bringing information as well as entertainment into
people’s life, together with its widespread consideration as the most familiar
medium of communication which contributed to provide social and cultural
education and to build a concrete understanding of the world, is the reason why
member states in Europe have been required to conform to specific criteria and to
follow common guidelines in taking active public policy decisions.
As a consequence, in the European view the underlying idea of any policy decision
has been to reinforce the strength of an “Information Society” that affects population
at large, with important social and economic implications.
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The transition from analogue to digital TV needs to be observed within such a
framework and the innovations introduced through the development of the digital
technology represent a more critical value the higher the number of people reached
by the technology itself.
From a technical perspective, digitisation implies turning data into binary digits for
different scopes: from storing to transmission purposes. As far as digital TV is
concerned, the process consists of sampling and encoding video signals as a stream
of zeros and ones, and then conveying such data stream through a transportation
medium. A key feature of digital technology is that there is no specific platform or
network required, but all available networks can be used for signals transmission
(e.g. satellite, coax and fibre‐optic cable, terrestrial transmitters, digital subscriber
lines (DSL), high frequency wireless, etc…). Thus, the stream of data is sent to a
receiving device, as a set‐top box terminal or a digital TV set, where the original
video signal is finally reassembled.
It has to be noticed that digitisation allows the compression and packaging of the
digitized video signal to the point that, not only it can be transmitted in a more
efficient way, that is using less bandwidth, but also it reduces the needed amount of
transport capacity per data unit. Therefore, a greater number of channels can be
transmitted over the airwaves, compared to the use of analogue technology.
According to Benkler (1998), digital technology is “a potential vehicle for achieving a
broad distribution of access to, and participation in, the social processes of
knowledge production”.
Given previous considerations, it is understandable how national public authorities
decided to take a prominent role in the development of digital TV, in order to
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regulate the migration from analogue to DTV, the so‐called Digital Switchover, and
to provide the largest possible diffusion of related social benefits.
In 2003, the European Commission stated that it had no intention to force member
countries to adopt a uniform set of policies, leaving them freedom in managing the
transition phase towards digitisation, even though, it reminded local policy makers
of the importance and sensitiveness of their actions. Removing the obstacles to digital
development and promoting interoperability and freedom of choice had to be
considered as the true goals of a responsible public policy.
Those types of considerations were in line with what stressed one year before by the
Commission itself in the action plan entitled “eEurope 2005: An information society
for all” about the digital switchover process: “In order to speed up the transition to
digital television, Member States should create transparency as far as the conditions
for the envisaged switchover are concerned. Member States should publish by end
2003 their intentions regarding a possible switchover. These could include a road
map, and an assessment of market conditions, and possibly a date for the closure of
analogue terrestrial television broadcasting which would enable the recovery and re‐
farming of frequencies. National switchover plans should also be an opportunity to
demonstrate a platform‐neutral approach to digital television, taking into account
competing delivery mechanisms (primarily satellite, cable and terrestrial).”
In the last decade, the importance of the completion of the switch from analogue to
digital has been remarked, at both European and national level, because of the
significant benefits for consumers, producers and network owners. The main
included advantages are the following:
• more efficient use of radio spectrum: as mentioned above a higher amount of
data can be transmitted within the same bandwidth, the issue of spectrum
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scarcity is no longer at stake and, furthermore, exceeding spectrum can be
released to allow the development of more television or for alternative uses
(other consumer services);
• increased choice for viewers: it is possible to broadcast from five to ten digital
channels using the same amount of transmission capacity which was required
for one single analogue channel, determining an increase in television content
supply;
• superior image resolution and audio quality: to give an example, high
definition television (HDTV) cannot be transmitted over analogue channels,
while its transmission can be supported by digital technology. In addition,
video signals compression and reassembling, through digitisation, implies
removing from them any possible interference, so to obtain a clearer sound
quality;
• improved interactivity: for example, the possibility to interact with a return
path enables viewers to check the listing of TV programs thanks to a user
friendly interface;
• reduction in transmission costs: the ability to increase the number of
transmitted channels for the same cost and the eventual decrease of
transaction costs have the effect of freeing up resources to be invested in
consumer services.
Besides the identification of these positive effects of digitisation, the EU focused the
attention on the possible drawbacks entailed by the analogue switch‐off. As
expressed in the book “Digital Terrestrial Television in Europe” (2005), edited by
Allan Brown and Robert G. Picard, the principal threat is the possible social
exclusion deriving from the fact that only a fraction of people has access to digital TV
contents; the creation of a “two‐tier” society in which digital technology is available
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only to a part of the population, who enjoys exclusively the above mentioned
benefits, is what every public authority would like to prevent from happening.
2.2 Satellite, Cable and Terrestrial: three main Digital Platforms
Digital Television (DTV) was introduced in Europe almost fifteen years ago and since
then it has experienced a remarkably significant growth. The initial adoption of
digital technology for programs transmission occurred in France, where in April 1996
the pay‐tv service Canal+ became the first broadcaster in Europe to launch digital
satellite television. Shortly after, digital TV was introduced also on cable network
and around the end of 1998 digital terrestrial transmissions started in the United
Kingdom (UK) as well. At the beginning of 1999 the process of content digitisation
was already involving the three main television platforms which had so far relied on
the use of other broadcasting technologies.
It has to be reminded how EU member states differ broadly with respect to the
adoption of television platforms, but a first step to simplify the investigation of
platforms penetration in each country is to divide them in two categories according
to whether they have a relevant terrestrial presence or not (Adda and Ottaviani,
2005).
Terrestrial is, in fact, the oldest network ever adopted and still the primary means of
broadcasting television services in many European countries. Despite its historical
disadvantages related to limitation in bandwidth and very poor interactivity, it has
been broadcasting free‐to‐air (FTA) channels available for everyone using a simple
and easily affordable technology (analogue) characterized by high portability,
approaching a needed universal coverage of regions and families. The latter
considerations can explain the reason behind such a distinction.
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Among those that could be called terrestrial countries, Adda and Ottaviani register
especially southern and western states, as France, Spain, Italy, Portugal, Greece and
also the UK. In particular, in the Mediterranean regions aerial usage for the reception
of analogue TV signals is still dominating the scene and this situation will not change
until the completion of analogue switch‐off.
When talking, instead, about non‐terrestrial countries, the authors refer more to central
and northern states, for example Denmark, Finland and Sweden in the Scandinavian
area, but also Germany, Austria and the Benelux. The former regions experience a
significant penetration of cable, while the latter1 tend to receive television
transmission through Satellite TV via satellite dish.
These two important types of network are characterised by different features
compared to terrestrial, and a brief discussion about such features is essential to
understand the implications for their digital transition.
Cable platforms enable a high interoperability thanks to a return path for
sophisticated interactive services which permits a bi‐directional transmission (or
“two‐way communication”). Moreover, another advantage of cable is a high
transmission capacity, as shown by the potential for broadcasting many more
channels than terrestrial platforms.
However, building this network requires a very costly effort and its portability is
quite limited.
Satellite is instead a network whose construction cost is much lower, given that
eventual sunk costs are relatively smaller, but, at the same time, it is characterised by
1 Satellite TV is most prevalent in Austria (49%) and Germany (47%), see “E‐Communication Household Survey”, Special Eurobarometer 335, October 2010.
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the impossibility of a two‐way communication, it has to rely on a telecom line with a
modem to provide interactivity and portability is low as well. It has to be reminded
that satellite signals are also referred to as “direct to home” (DTH).
Let’s now look at the main implications of digitisation for the three presented
platforms:
Digital Terrestrial Television (DTTV): consumers can use a conventional television
aerial to receive digital signals, but, in order to convert those signals into analogue
form, a set‐top box (STB) is required unless their television is equipped with an
integrated DTV receiver. As already pointed out, digital compression allows to
broadcast many more channels (using the same transmission capacity, channels
delivery increases of about six times) widening content supply directed to viewers.
Interactivity, instead, is not developed.
Digital Cable: because of the previously remarked aspects, digitisation of cable
network requires long‐term investments and unavoidable sunk costs, turning out in
a very onerous operation. In addition, a specific kind of STB, different from the case
of terrestrial, is required to receive digital signals.
Cable platforms used to allow a very consistent number of channels even through the
old analogue technology, therefore the potential increase of transmission determined
by a switch to digital is not the main reachable advantage. The major benefit lies in
the improvements as far as interactivity is concerned.
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Digital Satellite: even in this case, digital reception is possible only using an ad hoc
STB besides the satellite dish; likewise cable, the number of digital channels
provided2 is definitely high, but interactivity is otherwise limited, as for DTTV.
Figure 1: Means of receiving television (EU)
Dec. 2005– Jan. 2006 Nov.–Dec. 2006 Nov.–Dec. 2007 Nov.–Dec. 2008 Nov.–Dec. 2009 (EU 25)
Source: “E‐Communication Household Survey”, Special Eurobarometer 335, October
2010.
2 Cable and Satellite can broadcast up to 500 DTV channels, almost ten times more than through analogue technology, see “Digital Terrestrial Television in Europe” (2005), ch.1 by Marsden and Ariňo.
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From the graph presented above, it can be noticed how the three main platforms
described are actually the predominant systems for receiving TV at the European
level. In fact, by the end of 2009, aerial, cable and satellite covered respectively 34%,
30% and 24% of EU households, while digital terrestrial television was immediately
following with 23%. Furthermore, the value reached by DTTV has to be remarked in
the light of the continuous increase of the platform’s presence among European
families: at the end of 2005 coverage was only 5%. This progressive rise is also a
reason for explaining aerial’s decline in the last years.
The penetration of digital technology into society through our networks of interest
can be better observed thanks to the following two pie charts. Here is a comparison
between the percentages of digital households for each platform in two different time
periods: an early digital transition stage (2003) and a recent more mature stage
(2009). For a matter of precision, it has to be underlined that for 2009 we do not
consider the whole EU 27 picture but only western countries; however, the values
presented can be considered a good proxy to show the EU general trend.
Figure 2:
Source: Strategy Analytics, “Digital TV Devices: European Market Forecast, July
2003”
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Figure 3:
Source: Strategy Analytics, “Western Europe Digital Television Forecast: 1H’09”
It is immediate to note that, while migration to digital was initially a Satellite‐led
phenomenon, afterwards the number of terrestrial households increased significantly
until exceeding those in Satellite. As far as cable is concerned, no relevant changes
occurred in terms of its utilization, given the small increase.
It is important to add that these graphs do not provide us with information about
global increase of digital households in time, but they represent indicators of
platform’s degree of diffusion.
2.3 EU approach towards digital switchover
The plans for switching over digital transmissions throughout Europe have been one
of the main priorities of European regulators and authorities in recent years. Even
though the direct responsibility for promoting and managing such plans belongs to
national policy makers, the internal debate within EU institutions has developed the
consciousness that there exists some room for a supranational intervention.
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According to a broad number of scholars, among which Petros Iosifidis (2006), new
digital technologies and services rely on the possibility of achieving a critical number
of users and, furthermore, they become more attractive with an increased installed
base of technology in the area of interest. The application of this concept to the
European environment is far from difficult; therefore, the importance of an external
regulator which controls the way every single country shapes and implements its
own set of policies is a key prerequisite for a virtuous transition.
In a context where different member states adopted differing prescriptions, an effort
to harmonize them all could contribute, quoting Iosifidis, to “achieving a level
playing field and eliminating legal uncertainty”, thus facilitating technology
diffusion.
The inner reasoning behind these types of considerations can be found in the nature
of television market itself. In fact, being this market characterised by the presence of
platforms which enable interactions between end‐users, it belongs to the family of
the so called “two‐sided markets” (Rochet and Tirole, 2006). Specifically, these users
can be divided in two groups: on the one hand, there are just TV viewers while on
the other hand, there are either advertisers or content providers.
According to general theory, in these types of markets, each side, that is each end‐
user, has to be charged in an appropriate way in order to get both of them “on
board” of the platform, which represents the sole location where to reach the
convergence of their heterogeneous interests. This specific feature has to be kept in
mind when dealing with the transition to digitisation, because the impact of
switching technology cannot be analysed and weighted properly without
considering market implications.
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As already described, the transition to digital requires two types of investments: on
the one hand broadcasters have to invest in new transmission plants, while on the
other hand consumers have to buy the equipment to receive and decode digital
signals. For both actors the incentives to make those moves are cost‐dependent;
viewers would buy the equipment only if the price is affordable and the new TV
content supply is appealing, and content providers would provide a valuable offer of
digital programs only if the percentage of households digitally covered is large
enough to extract a minimum profit from their activity. This example of “chicken and
egg” problem reveals that some sort of coordination among stakeholders is necessary
(Adda and Ottaviani, 2005), and a preliminary step to help such coordination is to
enhance the homogeneity of the regulatory framework within which all the actors
meet and negotiate.
Digital TV penetration has been a quite slow process in its first stages, namely from
the end of the nineties until end of 2004, but its trend has become more steady since
then. This is quite clear looking at the evolution of the digitisation process for the
three main platforms as a whole, whereas different paths can be noticed when
considering each of them separately. The main example of the latter aspect can be
represented by the fact that satellite network digitisation involved the largest amount
of resources in the first years of transition process, while the so much needed
terrestrial migration to the new technology took off just a couple of years afterwards
and experienced significant improvements particularly in recent times.
Terrestrial broadcasting was to be digitised only after cable and satellite networks,
but its transition has been widely considered, by both national governments and
European institutions, as the core pre‐requisite for the global success of the
switchover process. Given its absolute diffusion among European households
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belonging to every single member state and given also the requirement of upgrading
receiving technology up to consumers, DTTV introduction has been regarded as a
sensitive as well as unavoidable issue.
In the view of Allan Brown and Robert G. Picard (2005), a free‐to‐air (FTA)
multichannel offer was the only possible way to enhance the digitalisation of a
European society that has to be reached by multilateral and freely accessible
information, therefore the switch to digital of terrestrial platforms was the most
democratic and effective solution to pursue such goal.
In addition, it is noticeable that cable and satellite not only cannot guarantee the
same universal coverage which is affordable thanks to DTTV, because of their lower
popularity and presence within households, but also cannot allow low cost access to
digital contents, given that the predominant model on those networks used to be
pay‐TV. Although digitising those platforms broadcasting has proved to be effective
in the starting phase of DTV launch, their limitations in expanding coverage are well
documented. As a consequence, the need for digitisation of terrestrial transmission is
even more urgent as far as the process approach a mature consolidation.
In 2005 the European Commission, through the Directorate General (DG) for
Information Society and Media, published the report “Communication on
Accelerating the Transition from Analogue to Digital broadcasting”, which identified
2012 as a possible realistic deadline for the completion of digital switchover and the
simultaneous analogue switch‐off. DG Commissioner Vivian Reading claimed that
the recommendation of a precise final time horizon was motivated by the necessity
“to give a political signal to market participants and customers that digital TV would
soon be a reality”.
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From a national perspective, the introduction of DTTV started in 1998 with the first
digitised programs broadcast in the United Kingdom, and since then all other
member states started to launch digital terrestrial transmission, giving birth to a very
fragmented market picture. The differing starting timeline of DTTV adoption have
had the effect of postponing a final affordable European deadline for the transition
completion, and nowadays the situation shows countries in extremely diversified
conditions, moving from nations which have already switched‐off analogue signals
(e.g. the Netherlands) to others which are not expected to do it in less than four
years’ time (e.g. Poland).
Table 1: DTTV launch completion and expected dates for analogue switch‐off
Country DTTV complete launch Switch‐off dates
Austria October 2006 2010
Belgium 2005 2011
Bulgaria 2003 December 2012
Cyprus 2007 December 2012
Czech Republic October 2005 2010
Denmark March 2006 September 2009
Estonia 2006 2010
Finland October 2002 August 2007
France March 2005 December 2011
Germany 2004 December 2008
Greece March 2006 December 2010
Hungary 2008 December 2012
Ireland 2009 2012
Italy 2004 December 2012
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Latvia 2007 December 2012
Lithuania 2008 December 2012
Luxembourg April 2006 September 2006
Malta June 2010 December 2010
Netherlands 2003 December 2006
Poland 2009 December 2014
Portugal 2007 December 2012
Romania December 2009 December 2012
Slovakia 2009 December 2012
Slovenia 2008 2011
Spain May 2000 2010
Sweden September 1999 October 2007
United Kingdom November 1998 December 2012
Source: “Digital broadcasting” (2006), ch.4 by Fontaine and Pogorel; Iosifidis (2007);
and 2009 Annual Report by Association of Commercial Television in Europe (ACT).
2.4 Analogue spectrum switch‐off and the challenges for public
policies
In the framework of the 2002 “eEurope 2005” Communication, the European
Commission suggested some essential ingredients for member states analogue
switch‐off plans. The emphasis was put on two main aspects: first, it should have
been a “market‐led process, not a simple infrastructure change with no added value
for citizens”, and second, analogue shut‐off should have not occurred before “digital
broadcasting has achieved almost universal penetration, in order to minimize social
costs”.
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Even though the attention was focused on the role of market forces, it was also
commonly agreed that public authorities’ intervention was key in creating the
conditions to successfully complete the transition.
To fulfil the goal of providing continuity of services for consumers, simulcast
obligations have been imposed during the transition phase. This means a duty for the
already existent terrestrial operators to broadcast their contents in analogue and
digital format at the same time, until digital completion.
Relying on many scholars’ opinion, a simulcast period has been negatively perceived
by both governments and TV operators. According to Hazlett and Mueller (2004),
simulcasting implies duplicative and, therefore, suboptimal use of the spectrum, and
only the end of such regime would free up a considerable amount of additional
bandwidth. In addition, the transmission costs for operators are much higher in this
phase, which cannot be long‐term sustainable.
With respect to these evidences, different governments’ attempts to speed up
digitisation completion can be explained as an effort to shorten the simulcasting
period as much as possible, in order to catch sooner the expected benefit from
switching technology and avoid excessive budgetary expenditures.
The requirement not to switch‐off analogue until digital broadcasting is almost
“ubiquitous” has been considered by policymakers one of the greatest reasons for a
slow migration path; as Hazlett and Mueller noticed, that type of political constraint
tends to lead the transition process to a true stalemate.
Another relevant element of analysis concerns the fact that the transition to digital in
the case of the terrestrial network is not comparable with digital switchover in cable
and satellite platforms, where the process was led by the commercial strategies of
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private channels operators, whose primary goal was to increase their expected
revenues and profits. In fact, as far as terrestrial is concerned, the various issues at
stake raised complex and controversial problems, and therefore public intervention
found not only the room but also the necessity to intervene with increasingly higher
degree of penetration and effectiveness.
Collateral and functional to pluralism defence, that means the guarantee of universal
coverage and free access, is the “social obstacle” represented by the cost of adapting
receiving facilities for analogue households. In most European countries there exist
different forms of public subsidies to help people in purchasing a set‐top box or to
prompt them to buy new equipment with an already integrated digital system
receiver, but, from a broader perspective, what is asked to policymakers is “to set a
rationale that legitimizes this substitutive technological evolution, clearly identifying
its core reasons and benefits, and justifies the economic efforts that citizens will be
forced to make if they want to become digital and continue watching television”
(Roberto Suárez Candel, 2007).
Furthermore, the lower amount of increased channels on DTTV with respect to
digital cable and satellite, together with the higher difficulties for stakeholders in
raising funds and resources in a context where both public and private channels
mainly broadcast in a FTA mode, could actually undermine or slow down digital
transition. Therefore, as stated by Suárez Candel, pluralistic concerns could derive
from the eventual migration of households to the other two networks owned by
private companies providing pay contents. This possible “downturn of social use”
could have effects also on public information and programs diversity, and public
policy should take those issues into account.
However, it needs to be remarked that the digitisation of the terrestrial platform is
indeed introducing more competition into a market which was structurally less
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competitive than those on the other networks. Such trend, favored by many
politicians and scholars, is simultaneously raising a further concern for policymakers:
it brings a greater level of uncertainty for incumbent TV operators, who could have
incentives to delay their transition to try to benefit as much as possible from their
current leading position. It is also up to national policy to help the latter ones in
foreseeing the long‐term benefits from interoperability and new business
opportunities.
According to these considerations, Europe represents a good example to investigate
and compare different national approaches to DTTV migration, with the chance to
outline what policies have been implemented by public authorities to help and
govern such process. Moreover, in a context of television markets’
internationalization, where the development of digital networks is affecting
consumers as well as operators worldwide, the central role assumed by local public
administrations is an even more interesting aspect to describe. In Hernan Galperin’s
opinion, expressed in his work “New Television, Old Politics” (2004), the main
controversial aspect of this situation is that in a moment when globalisation forces
are somehow undermining the strength of national policies, such a decline in
national sovereignty does not seem to affect the telecommunication market in depth.
Although free competition and self‐regulation are invoked from many parts to rule
this market, state authorities are finding new ways to exercise control and are
cooperating together in shaping supranational regulation.
2.5 Public Service Broadcasters in the digital era
Throughout the analysis presented in the paragraphs above, it has been stressed how
public intervention for the digitisation of the terrestrial network was required
because of its unique characteristic as well as historical role. Such platform has
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always been attributed special functions and objectives: the existence of a strict link
with the concept of public audio‐visual service provision has always represented its
main feature.
The tradition of terrestrial television is denoted indeed by the evolutionary process
and lives of two actors, namely public service broadcasters (PSB) and commercial
FTA operators, with the first one being in a core position of pre‐eminence.
Furthermore, according to Humphreys (1996), in a consistent number of European
countries public broadcasters have represented the strategic instrument for their
governments to directly intervene in the audio‐visual sector, ending up in controlling
and regulating it from a favourable position for decades.
Actually, in a context of analogue broadcasting, governments regulation of terrestrial
television was generally premised on the notion that the natural limitations of
electromagnetic spectrum called for a political scrutiny of TV transmission so to
ensure the use of such a scarce public resource for the benefit of all; that is why in
many EU member states, operators were brought under government’s wings
(Galperin, 2004).
In the current digital scenario, new challenges are now at stake for public service
broadcasters. At the beginning of the transition phase in Europe, every public service
broadcaster was potentially in both a passive and active position (Suárez Candel,
2007): on the one hand, digitisation could influence their internal transformation
processes and modify the pace of their structural changes, whereas on the other
hand, PSB could take an active part in the migration towards digitisation, with a
degree of involvement depending on the role designed for them by national
administrations.
29
For example, in the UK the British government, in an attempt to accelerate the uptake
of digital services, has prescribed special purposes for the main public TV operator,
the BBC.
Through a 2006 White Paper published by the Department for Culture, Media and
Sport (DCMS) and called “Building Digital Britain”, a various set of tasks has been
pointed out. Among these duties, there is the provision of constant information
about digital TV, in particular as far as the public campaign relating to switchover is
concerned, but also the requirement to organise and coordinate the technical process,
and to create and fund a scheme to assist the more vulnerable consumers in making
the switch.
However, assuming a deeper perspective, the on‐going digital transition has raised a
more general debate about the future and legitimization of public service in the
television market, and therefore, the same conditions at the base of PSB’s existence
have been surrounded by an increasing level of uncertainty. In past decades, despite
the growth of commercial operators and the wave of privatizations within the sector,
public broadcasters were able to maintain their solid role, but the voices who
questioned the concept and the implemented forms of public service were already
there (Galperin, 2004).
The switch to digital technology had the effect of renewing this type of questions and
emphasized the speeches around the legitimate role of the state in the regulation of
terrestrial broadcasting. One of the main reasons for this can be found in the benefits
deriving from the technological innovation that has been introduced. In fact, by
releasing a large amount of bandwidth, by eroding transmission bottlenecks, and by
permitting many more channels to be broadcast, the rationale for the existence of a
national managed TV operator, granting free and global access to information
30
otherwise not affordable for everyone, has become weaker. To sum up, the core
arguments used to legitimize PSB’s presence have been overcome thanks to
technology development.
As a consequence, the contents under discussion moved further and involved also
the characteristics of the service offered by PSB. Despite the opposition of different
views, some of them wanting PSB to have no future, while others claiming that PSB
has to keep existing in the new scenario, according to Jakubowicz (2006) one thing is
certain: if PSB is to have a future, significant changes and a redefinition of its role, its
activities and its main funding schemes is needed. The latter aspect, for instance, has
attracted an important debate even on its own; PSB has been financed in many
countries with both public budget and revenues from advertising with the effect of
becoming similar to commercial operators in terms of programs offer and starting to
compete with them on the same ground (Suárez Candel, 2007), somehow regardless
of its fundamental principles and objectives.
The potential for a broader multichannel offer due to digitisation and the following
enhancement of the technological convergence of broadcasting means is therefore
questioning the role of PSB more effectively than ever. According to many scholars
the television system, and the media system in general, has been evolving towards a
liberal model where multiple actors and free competition can be the real tools to
reach those objectives whose achievement used to be in exclusive hands. This is what
PSB will likely face in the near future, if not now.
In order to try to investigate the aforementioned aspects more in depth and with the
help of concrete examples, in the next part of this work it is presented a comparison
between two European television markets already launched towards digital
31
completion. First, I study the United Kingdom market, which was the European
forerunner in adopting digital technology for terrestrial transmissions and has
reached almost 95% of households digital coverage (Ofcom, 2010); it is considered an
example of a mature multichannel market with a high degree of platform
competition among Satellite, Cable and DTTV. Then, I analyse the case of Italy,
which started switching‐off the analogue signal a couple of years later, in 2004, on a
region‐by‐region basis, and it is characterised by a deep penetration of terrestrial
television, while only few households are covered by the other two networks. As
indicated in the initial introduction to this work, the study of the evolution of DTTV
and its implications for PSB perspectives is going to be the central topic of this
comparing effort and the foundation for proposing a conscious policy suggestion.
32
3 UK TELEVISION MARKET
3.1 Digital penetration in the European first‐mover country
At the end of 2009, the take up of digital television in UK households stood at around
91.4%, which marked an increase of about 3% compared to the previous year and
another relevant step towards digitisation completion in the country. Such value has
to be observed in the light of the UK government commitment to switch‐off analogue
delivery of television only when at least 95% of consumers will have access to digital
equipment, assuming the latter as a proper indicator of affordability.
By that time, Satellite TV was on the main TV set in 38% of households’ homes,
digital terrestrial television was received by 39.6% of UK homes, while cable TV
accounted for 12.4%.
In order to analyse how digital technology penetrated the country and why this
happened in UK before and also more successfully than in the majority of other EU
member states, it is important to explain what conditions helped and pushed these
processes onwards.
In particular, the attention will be focused on the development of DTTV, starting
from the reasons behind the choice of such a move and then presenting a clear study
of the main policies implemented by the British government in dealing with it.
As preliminary step, one core distinction concerning the digitisation of the three UK
platforms has to be made. For instance, the digitisation of both cable and Satellite
platforms all over the nation has been considered the consequence of a specific
commercial policy choice; as Martin Cave (2006) suggests in the book “Digital
Broadcasting”, local TV operators decided to switch technology because of possible
economic net benefits deriving from it, even though the efforts to be sustained were
known: on the one hand, cable operators needed to make important network
33
investments if they wanted to take advantage of a greater channel capacity, while
Satellite players, on the other hand, had to be endowed with further transponder
capacity for being able to cope with the simulcasting period. However, despite
having to face this type of sunk costs, cable operators completed their networks
upgrading to digital more than five years ago and the principal Satellite operator,
namely BSkyB, converted all its customers to the new technology in a three year
period, from 1998 to 2001.
The development of DTTV, instead, was a public matter, aiming at the creation of a
third multichannel platform and providing the potentiality for switching‐off
analogue transmission entirely. According to Galperin (2004) a basic element that
fostered the introduction of digital terrestrial television was a combination of two
government policy goals: promoting the country as a European leader in information
technologies and creating a challenger for BskyB which was dominant in the
analogue pay‐TV sector.
3.1.1 First negative experiment of digital terrestrial television
The birth date of DTTV in the UK has been widely considered to be August 1995,
when the White Paper “Digital Terrestrial Broadcasting: The Government’s
Proposals” was published by the Department of National Heritage (DNH). For the
first time, this document laid down the general outlines of the regulatory framework
under which digital terrestrial television was to be promoted and launched; in fact, a
new legal framework was considered essential to allow a fair competition between
terrestrial broadcasters and Satellite or cable operators also in the new digital context.
Furthermore, the White Paper introduced also some policy objectives which DTTV
would have had to deliver in the near future, among which the delivery of many
more television channels and the release of a significant amount of spectrum for
additional broadcast or for alternative use.
34
The latter proposals provided right after the basis for a new legislation. On the
following year, the 1996 Broadcasting Act set the rules for the creation of DTTV; in
particular it established a frequency plan which designated six national digital
multiplexes, each capable of broadcasting from four to six channels. Some of them
were allocated for the already existing terrestrial broadcasters, with one entire
multiplex entrusted to the BBC, the biggest public TV operator in the country,
another one to its main competitor, Independent Television (ITV), through its
Channel 3, but together with the other public operator Channel 4, and one half of a
third one dedicated to Channel 5, a private player already operating in analogue
since 1997. Thus, there remained three entire multiplexes with no mandated use,
available to commercial operators either for free‐to‐air or for pay‐TV transmission
and whose allocation had to be determined through an auction. This process would
have been handled by the Independent Television Commission (ITC), which used to
be the UK commercial TV regulator at the time and had directly contributed to
sketch the main digital television policy guidelines at the basis of the Broadcasting
Act itself.
The only limitation introduced by the Act stated that a single TV company could get
the licence to operate on a maximum of three multiplexes, therefore the three ones
left could have been potentially controlled even by a single operator.
In addition, it was remarked that every single bid made by TV operators which
wanted to operate on digital terrestrial television would have been evaluated on the
basis of just one measure: the ability to “promote the development of digital
terrestrial broadcasting in the UK otherwise than by Satellite”. This last element
shows how the main concern of the UK government was, indeed, preventing BSkyB
from translating its domination of analogue pay‐TV into digital television (Smith,
2009).
35
At the beginning of 1997, the ITC received two bids for the three available
multiplexes: one by the principal cable operator all over the country, the american
Digital Television Network (DTN), and another one by a joint venture involving
BskyB and the two largest players within ITV, namely Carlton and Granada. The
name of this latter new formed group was British Digital Broadcasting (BDB).
The ITC decided to award the licence to BDB, but not at any cost. In fact, the
regulator feared the presence of the already dominant BSkyB within the joint
venture, being also put under pressure by the European Commission which had
serious concerns about the future of competition in the UK multi‐channel television
market. Therefore, a condition it was imposed: BSkyB would have had to withdraw
as a shareholder. Still according to Smith (2009), it is interesting to note how the
authority required at the same time that BSkyB would remain inside BDB as a
content and program provider, because it wanted to avoid that its premium content
channels could be used to favour the promotion and the start‐up of digital satellite
and cable, meaning a potential high damage for DTTV’s future. Quoting his words,
“the ITC had concluded that BSkyB was too powerful to be one of the owners of
BDB, but also too powerful to be left out of the winning group altogether”.
As Peter Goodwin states in the book “Digital Terrestrial Broadcasting in Europe”
(2005), BSkyB moved from being a potential accomplishing stakeholder promoting
the development of digital terrestrial to becoming a possible aggressive competitor.
Afterwards, BDB was renamed On‐Digital and started to broadcast pay‐TV programs
in November 1998, when BSkyB had already launched its own digital satellite
service, namely Sky Digital, since a month and a half. In terms of content provision,
On‐Digital’s offer was made of 18 channels, among which a significant number had
been developed by Carlton and Granada, even if some of the most important
programs from the BBC and BSKyB were also included.
36
Goodwin points out how at the time the British multi‐channel market had reached a
high level of growth, with a great increase during the latest years in the number of
satellite and cable subscribers, amounting to 3,6 million and 2,8 million respectively,
representing together more than 25% of the UK households.
In this context, with a growing number of households subscribing to the other main
platforms alternative to terrestrial, Sky Digital took‐off and doubled its customers in
a couple of years. Thanks to the introduction of free set‐top boxes its success
increased to the point that it could switch‐off its analogue DTH service, given that it
had been able to convert the core of its analogue satellite subscribers to the new
digital technology.
On the contrary, On‐Digital (soon after renamed ITV Digital) turned out to have a
lower coverage than expected, around just 60%, and suffered also from another
relevant issue, the fact of being tied to BSkyB as a purchaser of premium
programming. In fact, as remarked by Martin Cave, almost 70% of ITV Digital’s
program revenues had to be given to BSkyB every year.
As a consequence of these difficulties, ITV Digital was declared bankrupt in 2002 and
this represented a big turmoil and a temporary stop in the transition towards the
terrestrial embracing of digital technology. The situation could be summed up
through the words expressed by Barry Cox, the actual chairman of Digital UK3, who
was instead at the time Deputy Chairman of Channel 4, according to whom DTTV in
the country “had become a pay television phenomenon, heavily dominated by Sky”.
3 Digital UK is an independent not‐for‐profit company which leads the UK’s switchover process to digital television. It basically provides impartial information on what people need to do to prepare for the switch to digital, and when they need to do it. The company was set up by public broadcasters (BBC, ITV, Channel 4, Channel 5 and S4C) at the request of the Government.
37
3.1.2 The free‐to‐air successful model for DTTV
In May 2002, a second phase in the transition process to DTTV started. ITC invited
applications for the same three multiplex licences that had been left empty after ITV
Digital’s bankruptcy and received a total of six applications for one or more of those.
Two months later, the licence was awarded to a consortium composed by the BBC,
which was interested in one multiplex, together with its privatized transmission
entity, namely Crown Castle, which was bidding for the other two, but including
also the same BSkyB. The consortium was rebranded as Freeview and it attracted a
lot of attention since the beginning because of its criticism towards the previous
model of ITV; in fact, the consortium considered not possible for a pay operator to
exploit such platform in a profitable and successful way and the recent failure was
seen as the direct proof of it. As Goodwin also underlines, the players within
Freeview considered that DTTV services needed to be available free‐to‐air in order to
differentiate digital terrestrial from cable and satellite and to offer analogue
consumers something similar but improved with respect to their previous
experience.
The launch of Freeview turned out to be successful from the first months of its
existence, and this positive performance brought the BBC to become the central and
core point of the UK DTTV policy; moreover, in the words of Smith (2009), it began
to be “used by the UK government as the chief policy instrument through which it
could achieve its digital TV policy objectives”.
The following graph provides a good example of how DTTV penetration of TV
households in the UK increased with the launch of the new service, showing in
particular the shift from ITV Digital’s modest results to Freeview’s remarkable ones.
Precisely, the time period taken into account embraces the four years from the end of
2000 to the end of 2004.
38
Figure 4: DTTV penetration of TV households in the UK
Source: “Public policy treatment of digital terrestrial television in communications
markets”, Analysys (2005)
However, it is important to remind that by the end of 2002, according to ITC sources
out of the 11,3 million digital households, around 6,5 million were subscribers to Sky
Digital and 2,2 million were digital cable ones. Digital terrestrial accounted for
slightly less than 1,8 million.
Therefore, one conclusion that can be tracked down from this glance at how digital
technology penetrated the UK television market is that this process was initially led
by Satellite, which was then the primary driver of the process, having as many
subscribers as more than half of the whole digitally covered population.
To deepen the debate about the latter issue, it is interesting to provide here a further
consideration expressed by Peter Goodwin as far as the ITV failure is concerned.
According to him, DTTV was a technology that could offer simply less than the
already established Satellite and cable, but the UK government seemed not to notice
it and by inviting commercial operators, which were offering pay models, to bid for
39
the new platform, it opened the doors to the following unavoidable and
unsustainable platform war against Sky Digital. Furthermore, he adds, being
somehow provocative, that in this case the government decided not to pick winners
and left DTTV to commercial operators, while it could have been a smarter strategy
acting otherwise.
On the contrary, the model established in mid‐2002 around a strong operator such as
the new born Freeview was basically a free‐to‐air model led by a publicly funded
broadcaster, the BBC. According to Petros Iosifidis (2006), the redirection of DTTV
towards free‐to‐air services proved to be so successful because it addressed its offer
to many households who were historically negative about pay‐TV, recreating in the
end a more solid public confidence around digital television. As a consequence, it
provided a viable alternative to Satellite and cable pay offers and reinforced
competition among different platforms, something that had been previously
distorted given ITV’s disappearance.
By the end of 2006, the terrestrial platform through Freeview provided more than
70% of British population with access to 30 free‐to‐air digital television program
services plus 10 additional digital pay channels. Among the free channels
broadcasted were included not only the BBC, ITV, Channel 4 and Channel 5 together
with other classic terrestrial services, but also further channels from BSkyB and
UKTV, the latter being a digital cable and satellite network, formed through a joint
venture between BBC Worldwide, a commercial subsidiary of the BBC, and Virgin
Media, the major national cable company. The digital terrestrial pay offer, instead,
include services from operators as Top Up TV, with its premium movies and sport
contents, and the thematic ESPN, for whom subscription was required.
40
Indeed, from the second half of 2002 up to 2005 the global picture of UK digital
television changed deeply. DTTV’s share of the digital television market increased
from 11.9% to 30.4%, while Satellite increased slightly from 28.9% to 34.7% and cable,
instead, registered a small drop from 13.4% to 13.2%. Therefore, Satellite remained
the market leader, but its position was slowly being eroded by digital terrestrial, and
by the end of 2006 its primary position was finally overtaken.
From the following graph it is possible to look at the evolution of the UK digital
television market, considering the development path of the main platforms in the last
decade.
Figure 5: Households take‐up of television services (1999‐2009)
Source: Ofcom (2010)
Some other considerations can be drawn about the market’s evolutionary path
during the last five years. First, it is noticeable how cable’s decline kept being slow
but steady reaching 12.4% at the end of 2009; second, it has to remarked that from
2006 on both satellite and digital terrestrial moved in a very similar way, with DTTV
41
slightly above in terms of a few percentage points but with frequent approaches as
well as overlaps.
In addition, it can be seen that since 2006 the British multi‐channel system is almost
all digital and the trend could indicate the end of 2011, for instance, as a foreseeable
timeline to reach the 95% households’ coverage target.
Another significant event contributed to approach the universal digital coverage at a
faster pace. This was the launch, in the late 2004, of a second relevant service
expected to play a major role in the UK TV market: the subscription‐free digital
service Freesat. The latter was a free‐to‐air service introduced by BskyB on its
satellite platform, which provided a set of channels similar to those on Freeview and
was largely perceived as a strategic and defensive move in response to the rival’s
success. While BskyB’s intention was mainly to keep expanding its activity without
having to cut its prices, as it had been forced to do by the entry of Freeview (Martin
Cave, 2004), many television experts, instead, welcomed this opportunity as a further
chance to help digital take‐up as well as switchover. In fact, Freeview could not cover
more than the already reached 73% of the population and the new service might
have been an effective tool to enhance digital penetration.
However, one last actor was still about to enter the market. In September 2005,
indeed, the BBC and ITV announced their intention to broadcast an unencrypted
free‐to‐air digital satellite service as well. The project was a joint venture between the
two operators and its official launch occurred on 6 May 2008; moreover, the BBC and
ITV renamed the service Freesat, using the same label introduced by BskyB for its
equivalent and already established activity. From this moment on, digital TV market
started to be characterized principally by the competition among such three entities.
42
Thus, if the initial phase of digital introduction had been perceived as a sort of
Satellite monopoly, the following phase has been characterised, with the exception of
the birth of the two Freesat services, by the rise of a free‐to‐air model of DTTV,
within which the BBC was the main actor. As noticed by Smith and Steemers (2007),
in the transition towards British full digital switchover the largest national public
operator presented itself and was addressed by the government as one of the leading
figures in charge of contributing consistently to such a process. Therefore, for the
purpose of this study, the BBC’s part in accomplishing digitisation needs to be
carefully analysed.
3.2 The role and the strategy of the BBC in the digital migration
In the previous section it has been explained how the establishment of Freeview was
a project directly instigated by the BBC, which assumed a leading role in developing
the new service. Assuming a practical perspective, there seems to have been two
major reasons, among the others, that pushed the corporation to take such a role
(Smith, 2007): first, the BBC’s audience was lower in houses equipped to receive
BskyB compared to those where households received TV only through analogue or
digital terrestrial, therefore it was in its own interest to promote DTTV instead of
digital satellite; second, the possibility to act as a leader in this new stage was also
perceived as a defensive mechanism against neo‐liberal calls for the abolition of the
licence fee and the introduction of a subscription‐based funding mechanism.
On the ground of the well‐acknowledged success of Freeview, the BBC was able to
reinforce its position through concrete proofs of the effort put at stake. In a 2004
report commissioned by Department for Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS) called
“Progress Towards Achieving Digital Switchover: A BBC Report to the
Government”, the description of Freeview’s performance was, indeed, presented as a
43
noticeable example of how the public broadcaster was contributing to help the
government’s plan for digital switchover.
According to what is generally pointed out by Michael Starks in his book “Switching
to digital television: UK public policy and the market” (2007) the British Labour
government at the time was willing to recognize to the BBC the central role in digital
take‐up for which the corporation had already self‐promoted itself. On the one hand,
there was an ideological motivation, which is the belief within the ruling political
party of the need to support the service of public broadcasting, while on the other
hand, there was a pragmatic reason represented by the unavoidable recognition of
the continuous growth of Freeview, meaning that the BBC was definitely going to
play a significant role in the time to come.
A few months later, the corporation published another report titled “Building Public
Value: Renewing the BBC for a Digital World”. In the context of this work, it outlined
the main purposes and activities for the next decade, enhancing its future key role in
the digital switchover. Quoting from the same report, the BBC claimed to be ready to
“invest in digital infrastructure, content services and promotion to help bring the
benefits of the new digital technologies to everyone” aiming to be at the head of the
construction “of a full digital Britain”.
In March 2006, the government published the White Paper “Building Digital Britain”,
which has been already briefly mentioned in the first chapter. Throughout the
document not only the BBC’s leading role was reaffirmed, but its key responsibilities
in the switchover were also identified. As expressed by Starks (2007), the latter can be
grouped into three core activities: extending the digital transmission network,
informing the public both directly and through the company Digital UK, and also
helping the most vulnerable TV audience in facing the technical difficulties related to
the transition from analogue to digital.
44
In the words of Galperin (2004), it is somehow understandable how the development
of DTTV ended to be managed by the State but through the use of an effective arm
such as the BBC. Although one of the first justifications for the introduction of digital
terrestrial was to create a competitive force capable of providing an alternative to
BskyB’s dominance of the pay‐TV sector, the possibility to realize a smooth transition
seemed to be achievable at best following this path. In fact, according to many
politicians, it was preferable to let the BBC run this process instead of involving a
direct government spending or requiring the set‐up of potential intrusive regulation
on digital equipment as well as services. Galperin argues that for the Blair
administration in charge at that time, such a solution looked like the most acceptable
and attractive political strategy. In addition, the author explains that what emerged
from this strategic choice is the build‐up of a government‐industry partnership,
where the first controlled the second in terms of its funding, that is the licence fee,
and its service provision in order to monitor the transition progress, whereas the
second benefited from a not unfavourable regulatory treatment. To many
perspectives this condition seemed to imply relevant industrial policy concerns,
however, according also to Galperin, it has to be evaluated in the context of an
aggressive promotion of market competition in the broadcasting service, which was
considered the final and most important goal.
Furthermore, the government’s White Paper did resolve also some relevant questions
concerning the future of the BBC’s role in a new era of multiplatform devices,
addressing the issue of its public funding. In fact, in the document it is reported that
the licence fee funding mechanism is assured until 2016, a choice based on the
Corporation’s contribution to providing the audience with impartial information and
to promoting the cultural life of the country. As a consequence, such decision placed
the BBC in a better position than its commercially funded terrestrial broadcasting
45
rivals, for instance ITV, Channel 4 and 5, who also “have public service obligations,
but whose advertising income and funding models are under threat from further
audience fragmentation and changes in media consumption habits” (Smith and
Steemers, 2007).
In the context of the debate on the future existence of public service broadcasting as
long as the digital switchover will be completed, one of the arguments raised by
those supporting its survival is, indeed, that commercial operators would have
increasing difficulties in keeping a good quality standard for their programming if
their audience will decrease and assume a small niche dimension. As indicated
above, the reason for this could be their exposure to an increasing market
fragmentation as well as audience segmentation, which is one of the first
consequences of having many more digital channels available (Payne, 2010). In that
case, commercial operators would be less able even to support their former core
services.
In addition to previous considerations, it is noticeable that the challenge ahead for
the corporation is to shape a future strategy to cope with the possible changes
implied by digitisation completion. For example, among the main issues to take into
account there is the review of the relationship with its audience, whose nature and
composition could change or evolve, but also the rethink of the current funding
system, given that by 2016 the country is expected to be completely digital and the
BBC will have no reasons to keep on informing the public about the switchover,
extend the digital network and provide help to weaker customers as it is right now
(Smith and Steemers, 2007).
As described by Payne (2010), the licence fee argument is going to play a relevant
role in the years to come also because viewers will probably be less willing to pay a
46
compulsory charge for a few channels, they might or might not watch, when the
alternative free digital offer would have become extremely broad, allowing the
audience to choose many more options. According also to a DCMS publication
released in 2008, namely “Funding the BBC – The Television Licence Fee and
Alternative options”, the resistance from the audience side to pay the fee could have
the effect of decreasing public respect and affection for the BBC.
The proportion of the debate around the future of the existing funding mechanism
can be better understood specifying its basic characteristics. To be precise, in the UK
a television licence is required to receive any live television transmission, whether it
is received via terrestrial, satellite, cable or the Internet; it is set annually by
the Secretary of State, Culture and Sport with the BBC responsible for collecting
payment and it is classified as a law tax. The latter is almost entirely used to fund
the BBC’s domestic radio, television and internet services.
Therefore, what comes to light is an immediate conflict between this system and the
enlargement of a multiplatform, multichannel environment, reinforcing what
presented in previous paragraphs’ analysis.
In the latest years, the BBC constantly argued that it would be able to offer new
forms of public provision in line with its public service objectives even with the new
technical developments. Paul Smith (2009) states that “in pursuing this path the BBC
is relying on political willingness to further endow public service broadcasting with a
social purpose, which, while reflecting changes in society, still accepts some forms of
media provision as universally available public goods which fulfil specific objectives
that are noticeably different from the profit‐orientated objectives of commercial
media and contribute to the well‐being of culture, society and the political system”.
Moreover, according to him, if public service broadcasting is going to survive and
47
maintain such a role, then the main problem lies in determining which activities it
will cover precisely, and the extent to which they deserve public funding.
While making an effort to provide an answer to those challenges, the BBC’s approach
can be gathered from the words of the Director‐General Mark Thompson
pronounced in April 2006 at the launch of the corporation’s “Creative Future”
content strategy program. In his view “the BBC should no longer think of itself as a
broadcaster of TV and radio with some new media on the side. We should aim to
deliver public service content to our audiences in whatever media and on whatever
device makes sense for them whether they’re at home or on the move. We can deliver
much more public value when we think across all platforms, rather than focusing
separately on different platforms or channels. We need a new relationship with our
audiences. They won’t just be audiences anymore, but participants and partners. We
need to get to know them as individuals and communities and let them configure
our content services in ways that work best for them”.
Such program outlined the new cross‐platform content strategies of the corporation
and represented a new editorial blueprint designed to deliver more value, more
freedom of choice and easier content fruition to the audience. However, the program
was still built on the central informative function that characterises BBC’s history.
In following this direction, the BBC seemed to move close to the concept of
universality of content provision and access expressed by the international expert in
broadcasting Karol Jakubowicz (2006), for whom the former means releasing
programs across a full portfolio of services targeted at both specific and general
audiences, while the second means being present on all relevant media and
platforms enabling viewers to choose how to reach the content they are interested to,
48
with the final result of endowing the public with the greatest amount of benefits over
all.
The “Creative Future” program represents one example of how the BBC has been
pursuing the opportunities afforded by digital media. As a matter of fact, in the last
decade its focus has been mainly on the development of on demand services, which
could be constantly available on whatever devices, and on facilitating audience
interaction, providing users with the possibility to distribute their own content, in
particular thanks to the improvement in digital internet services (Smith and
Steemers, 2007).
In Georgina Born’s judgment, reported in her working paper “Digitising Democracy”
(2006), the BBC demonstrated to be aware of the need to take carefully into account
the complementarity between services, which is an essential aspect in an age of
technological convergence. By acting at different scale levels, namely platforms,
channels and content in a decreasing order of magnitude, it tried to enable
innovation to occur across and between them.
As a last remark, it has to be seen how the steps taken by public broadcasting in
helping digital take‐up and switchover as well as in spreading its related advantages
could actually turn out to be just those elements undermining the centrality of the
broadcaster’s own role. Therefore, as pointed out also by Smith (2009), the figure of
the BBC as a “trusted guide” and an intermediary between the public and the
information is likely to be threatened more by its future moves in dealing with next
digital challenges than by any other factor.
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3.3 Public policy support to digital television and switchover
In February 2008, the UK government through the Secretary of State for Media,
Culture and Sport completed a process of redefinition of the main policy objectives
and decisions concerning the country’s digital transition. This work represented a
review of the public tasks and goals that had already been pointed out in the 2004
“Digital Television Action Plan”, a document jointly established by the DCMS and
the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI).
Within the new scheme three main policy objectives were indicated as the key ones
to be achieved in order to approach “the universal availability, affordability and
accessibility of DTV”. Precisely, they were the following (Sourbati, 2009):
• to secure that the delivery of the technical changes required to transmit television
pictures and the equipment needed by consumers to receive them is effective;
• to put in place effective arrangements to inform consumers and help them
prepare for the switchover;
• to provide adequate and cost‐effective support to those identified as most likely
to experience difficulties with the switchover.
As far as the second aim is concerned, it can be noticed how several marketing and
information campaigns have been put in action especially between 2001 and 2004
thanks to the coordinated efforts of the DCMS and the DTI. Therefore, in this first
phase the government decided to centrally manage these activities instead of relying
on an external source and, according to many experts, it came out to be an effective
choice because it helped to largely catch public attention.
On the contrary, in 2005 a second phase began in which the information provision
was promoted by Digital UK, the consortium formed by UK’s public broadcasters
50
and multiplex operators. As Maria Sourbati (2009) still remarks, the creation of the
latter entity was promoted by the state to take forward the implementation of digital
switchover in a less pervasive but however successful way.
In the previous section the role of the BBC in leading the British walk towards
digitisation has been carefully analysed. Still, a few comments can be added here for
the completeness of that study and in relation to the current arguments under
debate.
First of all, the BBC was the main promoter of the information campaign during the
second phase given the statutory requirement of administering Digital UK action.
Likewise it has been noticed in previous discussions, the corporation was generally
considered to act not simply as a public broadcaster but rather as the government’s
arm with the duty of realizing its policy prescriptions.
Furthermore, the BBC contributed also actively in helping DTV penetration being a
partner of the free‐to‐air terrestrial consortium Freeview, whose success, according to
Sourbati (2009) once more, had the effect of making DTV reception more affordable
as competition between manufacturers and retailers of digital set‐top boxes resulted
in remarkable price reductions. Thus, the consequence was a positive and significant
step in addressing the first of the three objectives.
Besides the last aspect described above, the government has been trying to project
other initiatives in order to enhance effectively the delivery of technical changes as
well as of the receiving equipment and devices. Among those, two important results
were the introduction of “Digital tick” logo and the publication in 2007 of another
action plan called “The Usability of Digital TV Equipment”. The former is a
certification for goods and services to guarantee that they are designed to work
through switchover; in particular, the logo is owned by the Secretary for Business
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Innovation and Skills (BIS), while Digital UK has been licenced to administer and
coordinate the key aspects about its use. The latter, instead, aimed at fostering the
development and availability in the UK market place of a wide range of DTV
receivers incorporating some commonly agreed optimal practical features.
When looking at the multiple parties involved in the final effort of accomplishing the
digital switchover it has to be kept in mind that every single initiative has constantly
been put under the supervision and the scrutiny of Ofcom, the independent
regulator and competition authority for the communications industry, which has a
statutory duty to further the interest of consumers in communication matters.
Indeed, as formally and legally determined, the authority is responsible for ensuring
competition between digital platforms, the optimal use of the radio spectrum and
that broadcaster and others comply with their licence obligations in areas such as
transmission coverage and reception.
With regard to the third and final objective, it is noticeable that the British
government undertook what can be considered one of its most relevant policy efforts
in order to address such sensitive issue. The result was the so‐called “Digital
Switchover Help Scheme”, whose revised final version was released at the end of
December 2009 and whose primary goal was to provide practical help to those
people who are expected to experience the highest difficulties in making the switch
to DTV. The document was prepared and readjusted a couple of times by the DCMS
with the help of the BBC, which was also appointed as responsible for its delivering.
The underlying idea was to build a tool that could support the government general
switchover plan in handling the most problematic situations and soften the more
dramatic aspects of the region‐by‐region progressive analogue switch‐off.
52
As a consequence, the Help Scheme identified a targeted group of eligible
households to whom it could be applied. Within the document it was stated that the
program would cover only families possessing the following requirements: first,
those with one person aged 75 or more; second, those with one person having a
significant disability in a proper qualification period; and third, those where one
person is registered severely sight impaired or blind.
Therefore, a concrete help would have been available free of charge to all qualifying
households where the qualifying person was also in receipt of an income related
benefit or pension credit, while other households would have been charged to pay
just a modest amount. Such help would consist in one out of the three possible
options presented below:
• appropriate equipment, namely a set‐top box, meeting the core receiver
requirement appropriate for the regional switchover to convert one TV set and,
where requested, the relevant help to install and use such equipment, including
where necessary provision of set‐top aerials or aerial upgrades as appropriate; or
• a contribution of equivalent value within the DTTV option to an integrated digital
television (iDTV), digital video recorder (DVR) or free‐to‐view satellite
equipment which the scheme will make available ; or
• a contribution of equivalent value towards connection to a non‐DTTV platform,
meaning either a free‐to‐view satellite service, or a pay service or any new
platform providing TV services.
Moreover, the scheme was announced to be operated on a platform neutral basis.
The eligible households would get advice on all the options available from the
scheme and they would be also able to choose from whom to receive assistance.
53
In addition, given that the scheme’s eligibility criteria were based on age or
qualification for social security benefits, the promoter’s intention was to involve the
Department of Work and Pensions (DWP) requiring it to disclose social security
information to the BBC, or organisations involving the BBC. This possibility would
have facilitated the identification process of the targeted group and would have also
avoided written claims from TV viewers as well as the need to produce concrete
documentary evidence to prove qualification requirements.
One last remark concerns the fact that the help scheme was expected to be rolled out
following exactly the regional order for switching the signals. Thus, a person living
in an area which was not due to switch for some time would not be eligible until just
before switchover affects them.
For the completeness of this investigation about the policy measures implemented by
the UK government, it has to be reminded that all the initiatives that have been
presented and described can be classified within the general framework of the wide
“Digital Switchover Programme”, whose general intention was to coordinate the
activities of all the different actors and stakeholders involved in the whole project
aimed at reaching digitisation completion.
Finally, there is a further initiative taken by the UK administration which has to be
underlined and whose importance in dealing with the switch from analogue to
digital has been essential: the realization in 2005 of a “Cost Benefit Analysis (CBA) of
Digital Switchover” by a coordinated group of economists belonging to the
Department of Trade and Industry (DTI), the Department for Culture, Media and
Sport (DCMS), and the Radio communications Agency (RA). In the framework of
such study, the experts involved developed a model to evaluate the costs and
benefits to the UK of completing digital switchover through a comparison between
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two possible alternatives: on the one hand the switch‐off of analogue terrestrial
transmissions and the subsequent use of the released radio spectrum, on the other
hand the continuation of both analogue and digital transmissions, namely
simulcasting.
From a technical perspective the model took advantage of estimates provided by a
broad number of industry stakeholders as far as both the various costs of converting
signals and the benefits to broadcasting companies from shutting down analogue
platforms were concerned, whereas the estimates of the costs to consumers who
would not voluntarily convert before switchover as well as those of the benefits
related to future spectrum use where commissioned by the DTI to other external
operative bodies, among which there was also Ofcom.
In the following table are reported the results of the core analysis implemented by
the study; in particular, the indicator took into account is the overall Net Present
Value (NVP) of the digital television switchover as compared with the alternative
option of keeping on simulcasting. Because of the comparative nature of the analysis,
the estimates of costs and benefits4 used in the CBA to calculate the NPV are
practically the estimates of the difference between the switchover and the
simulcasting scenarios. Having explained this, it has to be said that the final step in
calculating the NVP consisted in subtracting those estimates of total costs from those
of total benefits.
Furthermore, it should be noticed that calculations have been done varying the year
of switchover for each of the years from 2010, assumed as first possible time line, to
2015.
4 remember that both costs and benefits values in the table are expressed in £ million (2004)
55
Table 2: Results from CBA model
Year of switchover completion 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Benefits
Consumer benefit in current non‐DTT
areas
3246 2987 2725 2495 2262 2035
Consumer benefit from additional
services in retailed spectrum
787 724 659 605 548 493
Consumer benefit from re‐use of
released spectrum
1181 1086 1011 907 821 740
Imputed consumer benefit of
compulsory migration
689 678 657 626 599 574
Broadcaster benefit from savings on
analogue transmission and energy costs
1377 1282 1191 1103 1018 936
Total Benefits 7280 6759 6244 5736 5247 4778
Costs
Non‐voluntary consumer costs on
reception equipment
2504 2454 2357 2220 2082 1963
Additional consumer energy costs 1651 1529 1412 1297 1187 1081
Broadcaster investment in digital
infrastructure
702 660 619 580 542 505
Marketing & practical support costs 174 169 163 157 152 147
Total costs 5031 4812 4551 4254 3963 3696
Total NPV 2249 1947 1692 1482 1285 1082
Source: CBA (2005)
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As a result, the NPV turned out to be positive in each year, starting from the value of
£2.249 billion for the switchover occurring in 2010. In addition, it can be underlined
how the NPV falls by more than £200 million for each year that the switchover is
delayed and it can be also seen, likewise stated in the CBA, that the eventual loss of
benefit as a consequence of one year of delay is higher than the corresponding loss in
terms of cost.
Another aspect to be underlined is also the fact that this study does not quantify
among the class of benefits the relevant increase of programs and the provision of a
broader and more thematic variety of contents directly implicated by the digital
adoption. It is thus straight forward that taking into account this further detail affects
even more positively the conclusions of the current analysis.
In the end, from this brief glance at the study carried on by the UK government
together with its outcomes, it is possible to understand some basic economic reasons
why the switch‐off of analogue transmission has been at the heart of British
television policy agenda for a decade and it still keeps being a true priority even
though its achievement is almost complete.
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4 TELEVISION MARKET IN ITALY
4.1 The road towards digitisation in the Italian duopolistic market
According to the 2010 “Annual Report” written by the National Communication
Authority (AGCOM) the Italian television market is currently characterised by a
progressive decline of the analogue platform in favour of digital networks. To be
more specific, the latest years witnessed the remarkable development of the digital
terrestrial television and saw also the consolidation of Satellite broadcasting together
with the emergence of other minor platforms.
From a look at the structure of the revenues distribution within the TV sector it can
be noticed that the landscape is dominated by three main actors, namely RAI and
Mediaset on the terrestrial network and Sky Italia on the DTH Satellite, therefore
defining a true oligopolistic condition. Next table reports precisely such values for
the year 2009 and shows clearly what has just been mentioned.
Table 3: Television sector revenues per operator (in % of total revenues)
RAI 31,7
Mediaset 29,2
Sky Italia 31,5
Telecom Italia Media 1,6
TLC Operators 1,0
Other broadcasters 4,9
Total 100,0
Source: AGCOM (2010)
In the framework of this investigation as far as the new digital technique is
concerned, the analysis will be focused on its adoption in the terrestrial platform
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given its historical and absolutely primary position within the national TV
environment. In fact, it is properly the process of digitisation of such network that
has been setting the stage for the largest political, economic and cultural debate
during the last couple of years. As a consequence, this study of the Italian case will
not directly deal with Satellite as well as other less considerable platforms.
To begin with, it is necessary to present an overview of the evolution of the Italian
terrestrial television market across the last decades, narrowing the attention on the
main legislative efforts in order to regulate the market itself and to shape the
conditions for the introduction of the new digital transmission.
Since the mid‐1980s the Italian broadcasting industry has been considered, according
to both television experts, scholars and public opinion, to have become a true
duopoly which was dominated by the following actors: the three channels belonging
to the giant public broadcaster RAI, namely RAI 1, RAI 2 and RAI 3 and the three
networks under the control of Mediaset, that is Canale 5, Italia 1 and Rete 4.
Precisely, the first player was the State financed and controlled corporation existing
from the beginning of television broadcasting in the country, which had been
endowed with a monopolistic power over broadcasting by the government in order
to fulfil the basic informative, educational as well as socio‐political functions that
television was generally believed to have to pursue. The second player, instead, was
the commercial broadcasting company that, after the 1976 Constitutional Court’s
decision concerning the legalization of local private broadcasting in order to promote
market liberalization, had best exploited the opportunities deriving from the
subsequent unregulated expansion of transmission services, as explained by
Francesca Gardini and Hernan Galperin in the book “Digital Terrestrial Television in
Europe” (2005).
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According to Padovani (2007), the Italian legislature, although constantly remarking
the importance of achieving a good level of media pluralism for keeping the
democratic system in a healthy condition, has been putting little effort in opposing
the duopoly itself for decades. The improvement of external pluralism, which means
the necessity to guarantee the presence of a plurality of media sources, had been
placed high among the priorities outlined by the Constitutional Court, but the
concrete initiatives of law makers had not properly taken such recommendations into
account.
In 1990, indeed, the so‐called Mammì Law, which represented the first real attempt
to regulate private broadcasting’s behaviour, somehow legitimated the duopoly
existing within the Italian TV market establishing that no single broadcaster could
own more than three out of the nine channels licenced. In particular, the exact
antitrust limit imposed was expressed in terms of 25% of total terrestrial frequencies
assigned.
A concrete but little action to increase the level of competition in the market and
challenge the RAI‐Mediaset dominance was introduced seven years later through the
Maccanico Law. Gardini and Galperin underline that the latter not only established
the new Communication Authority (AGCOM) and provided it with more strength in
shaping antitrust policies and exerting control over media markets, but it also
lowered the previously current limit to 20% and introduced a further limitation,
which consisted in a prohibition for television operators to collect more than 30% of
all the revenues distributed within the market. However, the authors shed also the
light on the fact that the law did not imply any structural change in the Italian TV
system and did not suggest any specific behaviour for the broadcasters to adopt in
order to keep their activities within those legal boundaries.
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Afterwards, in 2001 AGCOM identified in the 31 December 2003 the time deadline by
which one of Mediaset’s three channels exceeding such limits would have to migrate
on digital satellite platform, but the prescription was never respected.
In September 2002 the Italian Parliament expressed a favourable vote on the first
draft of the law that had been presented by the ruling centre‐right majority and was
supposed to govern and structure the transition from analogue to digital television,
which is what would be later called the Gasparri Law. The episode raised a wide
number of concerns, in particular President Carlo Azeglio Ciampi requested law
makers to review the proposed law because it was not addressing in any way the
Constitutional Court decree establishing that every analogue channel exceeding the
transmissions limit was to be sent to a digital platform, namely satellite one
(Padovani, 2007).
According to law makers instead, there was no reason to take such an issue into
account given that the switch to digital television would have allowed many other
players to enter television market, therefore reinforcing and increasing competition
inside it and eliminating the need to migrate exceeding channels.
On 3 May 2004 the final version of the Gasparri Law was approved in a context of
strong opposition but no modifications to the original text were made. Among the
others, the element that caused the most intense debate within the Parliament and
was fiercely criticized by the opposition minority regarded the new definition of
antitrust limitations. The law, indeed, stated that the 30% limit had to be calculated
not just on television market revenues but on the entire media market, thus including
also radio, cinema, the different aspects of advertising, internet, and so on. The law
was indicated by the opposition as a mean to circumvent the previous imposition
defined in 1997 and to allow the duopoly existing in the analogue context to continue
in the new digital one as well.
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It has to be also noticed that among its various prescriptions, such decree determined
for the first time a deadline for the switch from analogue to digital television
transmissions, namely 31 December 2006. The setting of this date generated further
debate between the parliamentary forces as it was considered too close and therefore
not realistic by many perspectives. Indeed, in 2005 the Council of Ministers agreed
on postponing it to the end of 2008, which seemed a more affordable schedule.
A further step concerning the development of the legislation around the shaping of
the future digital environment was represented by another proposal introduced by
the new centre‐left government in October 2006. A few months before the European
Commission had expressed its worries about the fact that the Gasparri Law was
providing anticompetitive advantages to TV operators already broadcasting in the
market while imposing excessive restrictions to potential new entrants. The
European Commission argued that the law was not in compliance with the directive
“Television without Frontiers” (1989) and required the Italian government to modify
the most problematic issues.
The new proposal was formulated by the current Communications Minister at the
time, Paolo Gentiloni and, in particular, it contained two important elements
addressing the problems and concerns expressed at the supranational level: it
required TV broadcasters owning more than two national analogue channels to move
those in excess to a digital platform by the end of 2009 and furthermore, it imposed
that once digitisation completion was reached, content providers for domestic TV
market would have not been able to use more than 20% of total transmitting
capabilities. The introduction of these prescriptions would have caused the allocation
of one RAI channel as well as of the Mediaset’s network Rete 4 on the digital satellite
platform and would have encouraged new operators to enter and start broadcasting
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in the market, as explained by Gardini and Galperin. However, the proposal never
became an effective legislative act.
It should also not be forget that under Gentiloni’s ministry the previous deadline for
the completion of digital switchover was again postponed to the end of 2012 through
the 222 law enacted on 29 November 2007, given the slow penetration rate of the new
technology which had been registered by that time.
The European recommendation for the adoption of remedies aiming at solving the
above described compliance problem was not followed by any formal action. The
two Commissioners directly involved, that is Viviane Reding and Neelie Kroos,
decided to wait and see if and how such measures would have been introduced by
the national government.
To conclude this overview of the main steps taken by the media legislation with
regard to digitisation in Italy, it is useful to deepen the discussion and explain why it
has been felt the need to focus the attention on the challenges faced by the existing
duopoly in the last two decades.
According once more to Galperin (2004), the different policy strategies that have been
implemented in the broadcasting industry in every single European country have
been historically dictated by “national political administrative traditions”, thus
leading to different structures for analogue TV sectors. Given that, the author
remarks the importance of studying the structural features of analogue TV sector
because he believes that the condition and the specific development occurred in that
sector deeply constrain the transition strategy to digital and they can help
understanding the reasons behind the adoption of certain policies instead of others.
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The same concept has been reinforced by another scholar, Alfredo Del Monte, in the
framework of the book “Digital broadcasting” (2006). Throughout his analysis of the
development of DTV in Italy, he underlines how in many states the transition to
digital has been following the well‐known pattern determined by the analogue TV
structure already at stake. Moreover, in his view the Italian example provides the
highest support to this hypothesis, considering how the presence of an untouchable
two‐headed market dominion inevitably affected the shaping of digital policy.
In addition, Del Monte adds that it is predictable to have incumbent operators in the
analogue TV market fighting for delaying the introduction of DTV or adopting
behaviours functional to obtain a dominating role in the new digital market.
Assuming this fact as physiological for the market, a government should design the
allocation of the licences to broadcast in the new digital context in a way to “tilt the
market in favour of new entrants and restrain dominant operators”. As a
consequence, the author’s opinion is that the Italian case represents an example of
how the constraint embodied by the level of concentration existing in the analogue
environment could prevent the realization of such desirable outcome.
In order to deepen the investigation, the structure of the policy for the assignment of
digital frequencies in Italy is going to be the object of the study contained in the next
paragraph.
4.2 The national frequency assignment policy
The National Frequency Plan (PNAF5) approved by AGCOM with the 15/03/CONS
resolution in 2003, and built on the first one released in 1998, destined a total of
eighteen multiplexes to digital television services, among which twelve single‐
frequency networks (SFNs) were for national TV operators, while the other six multi‐
5 “Piano Nazionale di Assegnazione delle Frequenze televisive”
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frequency networks (MFNs) were for regional ones. Given that each multiplex could
carry, on average, three digital channels endowed with the same quality standard as
well as coverage the final number of channels available, and thus related frequencies,
amounted to 54. It was also estimated that the population covered would have been
around 90% of the total national, whereas just 80% of the territory would have
received the signals. These new digital channels would have used fewer spectrum
than the previous analogue ones and it was predicted that once digitisation
completion would have been attained competition in the sector would have
increased because previous limitations associated with bandwidth scarcity would
have no more represented an issue.
Furthermore, it should be noticed that in this initial phase the business model for
DTTV was all free‐to‐view and based only on revenues from advertising.
According to Del Monte, at the eve of the digital transition there were two main
obstacles to overcome in order to enhance the creation of a true competition for
digital TV services. First, the two biggest incumbent broadcasters RAI and Mediaset
owned around almost 80% of the frequencies and towers in the analogue market.
With the completion of the switch to digital, the two actors could broadcast the same
channels they used to in analogue format using no more than 20% of those
frequencies, but it was not likely to expect both RAI and Mediaset surrendering part
of their frequencies.
Second, the initial 1998 frequency plan had freed up a total of four frequencies in
order to launch an equivalent number of digital TV channels; the latter would have
covered the whole national territory. The strategy chosen by the authority was to
create “network providers” and to appoint them to be in charge of the multiplexes. In
particular, only applicants suitable to obtain a licence to be network providers were
65
consequently offered a multiplex, but at the same time no spectrum was allocated to
them. Therefore, in order to broadcast its channels, a network provider had two
possible choices: in case it was already established in the market being an analogue
terrestrial broadcaster, it could use the frequencies already owned; otherwise it could
buy frequencies on the market.
It has to be noticed that the greatest number of frequencies available in the market
where those belonging to the many local TV channels which were experiencing
serious financial difficulties at the time, and thus were eager to sell their frequencies
rather than to make risky investments. Moreover, even the already existing analogue
terrestrial broadcasters were demanding for further frequencies in order to cope with
the dual transmission effort required by the simulcasting period.
For many scholars and TV experts all these elements together with the lack or the
weakness of effective plans to assign frequencies during the past had the effect of
generating an inefficient spectrum allocation.
By the end of 2005 five DTTV multiplexes had been licenced and none of them was
assigned to operators who were not previous terrestrial broadcasters. As a matter of
fact, RAI got two multiplexes while Mediaset, Holland Co‐ordinator and Telecom
Italia got one multiplex each. One feature that contributed to partially mitigate this
condition was the introduction of the requirement for each multiplex owned by an
operator which used to handle at least three analogue terrestrial channels, to rent
40% of its broadcasting capacity to third independent parties. This prescription was
presented within the 66/2001 law and later maintained by the Gasparri Law. In the
light of such requirements, Telecom Italia and Mediaset were directly addressed and
had to behave accordingly to them, while it was decided that RAI did not have to do
it since it had a public nature and role.
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However, in this period a remarkable change occurred in the digital terrestrial
environment: next to the all free‐to‐air business model, pay‐TV contents started to be
offered by a group of broadcasters led by Mediaset. As underlined by Petros Iosifidis
(2007) such action was aimed at challenging the Satellite pay‐TV consortium Sky
Italia through the launch of premium programs on the new alternative and
potentially competitive platform.
Another step towards a more detailed definition of the mechanism to assign the
licences to control multiplexes and broadcast TV contents on their related frequencies
is represented by the 417/07/CONS resolution still approved by AGCOM in 2007.
This document incorporated a review of the previous 2003 PNAF through a public
consultation, but according to many experts, it neither addressed its more critical and
debated aspects nor presented relevant new elements. However, such resolution
together with the immediate following one, namely 603/07/CONS, remarked an
important element already introduced by the law 249/97: the establishment that at
least 1/3 of total frequencies as well as global broadcasting capacity would have been
reserved exclusively to the advantage of local TV operators.
In the context of this evolution towards the definition of a fair frequency assignment
scheme, AGCOM as well as a broad number of independent television experts
contributed to discuss and explain the technical implications of the digital transition.
In particular, among the issues at stake it was underlined the importance of the
switch from a multi‐frequency system as the one existing in the analogue sector
where more frequencies where used to broadcast a single channel in different areas
close to each other, to a more efficient single‐frequency one, currently enabling a sole
multiplex to transmit up to 5 or 6 channels through the use of just one frequency. As
it has been shown when describing the 2003 PNAF, the digital multiplexes can
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actually be either SFNs or MFNs and the choice of one network instead of the other is
considered to be functional to the goal to pursue. Anyhow, the SFNs efficiencies can
provide large advantages where they can be deeply exploited.
By the beginning of 2010 a significant number of multiplexes had already been
licenced and the situation at stake was as follows: five multiplexes each had been
assigned to RAI and Mediaset, three to Telecom Italia Media and the rest to other
national operators like Rete A, TELECAPRI and Centro Europa 7.
As a last step of this investigation the attention should be focused on the most recent
PNAF, which has been approved on 3 June 2010 and whose programmatic structure
received a positive feedback from both the government and the opposition minority.
In the words of the former Communications Minister Paolo Gentiloni, “the frequency
plan recently approved by AGCOM can enhance a more efficient use of a scarce
resource which has been so far surrounded by a jungle‐like environment”.
In detail, the 300/10/CONS resolution identifies 5 additional multiplexes, among
which 3 are available exclusively for the new entrants in the market; these
multiplexes allow the broadcast of 25 national DTTV channels through their related
frequencies. Precisely, 21 are national channels in Digital Video Broadcasting –
Terrestrial technique (DVB‐T) and 4 are national channels in Digital Video
Broadcasting – Handheld technique (DVB‐H). The operators invited to take part to
the auction for the licencing of the two residual multiplexes involve besides RAI and
Mediaset other national broadcasters already owning at least one multiplex,
including the same Telecom Italia Media, Rete A and Centro Europa 7 to name some
of the most relevant ones. However, it has to be remarked that the group of new
operators who are also going to take part to the auction is quite broad, and among
them there is also Sky Italia, which received the necessary approval from the
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European Commission in July of the same year. In particular, this recent decision has
been openly criticized and opposed by Mediaset, given the potential competitive
threaten that an eventual entrance of Sky on DTTV could create for its powerful
deeply‐rooted position. Actually, it has to be noticed that the leader satellite
company has been granted only a conditional access: in fact, according to the
Commission Decision C(2010) 4976, DTTV frequencies could be assigned to Sky Italia
but the company would not be able to launch premium contents before 2015,
therefore having to operate only in free‐to‐air modality for the five years to come. For
a matter of clearness, it has to be added that Sky’s participation to the auction would
be also limited to just one out of the three multiplexes to which it could have had
access.
Moreover, it has to be observed that in addition to the 5 currently available
multiplexes, it is forecast that once digitisation completion will be attained more
networks would be available to be licenced according to a planned scheme shaped in
order to favour the widest possible participation at fair conditions, even though no
prescriptions on how to build it have been developed yet.
In the light of what has been stated so far, it is interesting to add a couple of
considerations as far as the comparison with the British case is concerned. As
outlined in the previous chapter of this work, in UK the BBC was the sole operator to
receive the control of an entire DTTV multiplex, while the other incumbent operators
were obliged to share transmission capacity on two other multiplexes. In addition,
the government, although defending the leading role of the BBC in the transition
phase, tried to make room also for the entrance of new actors, allowing them to get
licences for digital terrestrial broadcasting.
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According to the already quoted Del Monte, the strategy in Britain was planned so to
modify the structure of the industry and achieve the desirable condition of favouring
new market entrants and limit dominant operators. In Italy, instead, the trend seems
to be mainly characterised by the fact that the structure of the industry in the
analogue sector is changing only slightly, and however not significantly, in the new
digital world. The migration to digital seems to have been built around the goal of
preserving the central role of the two giant incumbents’ duopoly, and use the new
platform also to corner Sky’s ambitions of extending its satellite dominant position,
as later described.
4.3 The DTTV switchover and the region‐by‐region roll out
As far as the timing for the transition to digital is concerned, the law 222/07, besides
fixing 2012 as final deadline for the completion of the passage as a whole, introduced
the precise temporal scheme for the switch‐off of analogue TV signals in every single
Italian region. In a nutshell, the country was divided into sixteen technical areas,
more or less overlapping with the existing regional zones but in some cases including
two or more of them; then for each region a specific switch‐off date was agreed
within the time window going from 2008 to the end of 2012.
As reported in the “Quarto Rapporto sulla Televisione digitale terrestre in Italia ed
Europa” published at the beginning of May 2010 by DGTVi6, by the end of 2009 the
analogue signal had been already switched off for 30% of the population, which
represented the group of the “all digital” citizens. In October 2008 Sardegna was the
6 DGTVi is the Italian association for the development of DTTV which has been set up by RAI, Mediaset, Telecom Italia Media, the multiplex DFree, FRT (Federazione Radio Televisioni) and the operators’ association Aeranti‐Corallo. The group aims at promoting the full development of digital terrestrial TV in the country providing final users with helpful information, enhancing networks interoperability and cooperating with institutional bodies as well as with AGCOM to the implementation of the migration to the new technology.
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first region to switch‐off the signal, then followed in 2009 by Valle d’Aosta, the
western part of Piemonte, Trentino‐Alto Adige, Lazio and Campania, while during
the last year the regions which joined the group were Lombardia, Emilia‐Romagna,
Friuli Venezia Giulia, Veneto and the rest of Piemonte. Therefore, the “all digital”
population has been highly increasing so far and has overcome 60% of the total
value.
The table below puts in evidence the proper region‐by‐region process for the gradual
accomplishment of digitisation completion. The following scheme has been updated
until the end of 2010.
Table 4: Regional scheme for analogue switch‐off
Number
of area
Technical area Switch‐off
date
Transition
status
1 Western Piemonte 24/09–9/10
2009
Completed
2 Valle d’Aosta 14/09–23/09
2009
Completed
3 Lombardia (excluding the Province of
Mantova), Eastern Piemonte and the
Provinces of Parma and Piacenza
25/10–26/11
2010
Completed
4 Trentino Alto Adige 15/10–27/10
2009
Completed
5 Emilia Romagna 27/11–2/12
2010
Completed
6 Veneto, Province of Mantova and Province
of Pordenone
30/11–10/12
2010
Completed
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7 Friuli Venezia giulia 3/12–15/12
2010
Completed
8 Liguria (excluding Province of La Spezia) 1st semester
2011
Not
started
9 Toscana, Umbria, Province of La Spezia
and Province of Viterbo
1st semester
2012
Not
started
10 Marche 1st semester
2011
Not
started
11 Abruzzo, Molise and Province of Foggia 1st semester
2011
Not
started
12 Lazio (excluding the Province of Viterbo) 28/10–13/11
2009
Completed
13 Campania 1/12–16/12
2009
Completed
14 Puglia (excluding the Province of Foggia),
Basilicata, Provinces of Cosenza and
Crotone
1st semester
2011
Not
started
15 Sicilia and Calabria (excluding the
Provinces of Cosenza and Crotone)
2nd semester
2012
Not
started
16 Sardegna 18/10–31/10
2008
Completed
Source: DGTVi (2010)
However, the report adds that if the analysis would have taken into account not
simply the population reached by TV signals exclusively through a digital platform,
but all the families owning at least one digital receiver at home, the number of
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households satisfying such condition would have been around 18,7 million, which
means almost 80% of all citizens.
Moreover, out of this significant number, by February 2010 more than 16 million of
households were endowed with a set‐top box or an integrated receiver for catching
digital terrestrial signals. On the contrary, the number of families owning a set‐top
box for receiving DTH satellite signals for pay‐TV amounted only to 4,7 million and
lower numbers were registered for the third network in terms of importance, namely
IPTV7, therefore witnessing how much the Italian market is characterised by the
dominance of one platform over the others.
In addition, it is also remarkable that by the same date the number of totally
analogue families left was just about 5 million and the trend is keeping on showing
further decrease.
From the following graph it can be observed the evolution of the penetration of
digital television in general, and specifically of DTTV, from the beginning of 2009
until the first months of 2010.
7 “Internet Protocol Television”
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Figure 6:
Total digital and terrestrial digital penetration in Italy (2009 ‐ 2010)
8,110,4
13,816,1
14 14,616,5
18,7
02468
101214161820
households (in million)
DTTVDTV
Feb‐09 Jun‐09 Nov‐09 Feb‐10
Source: DGTVi (2010)
Another aspect underlined by the document is the fact that terrestrial technology
cannot, even potentially, cover the whole territory and thus the whole population in
the country given its particular orographic structure. In Italy such condition opened
the door to the creation of the first national satellite platform for broadcasting free
digital contents, namely TivùSat. Besides transmitting the generic TV offer already
supplied by DTTV, this network is also able to provide a wide number of
international channels thanks to satellite’s coverage of broad geographic areas.
Basically this service can be considered as the equivalent of the UK’s FreeSat.
Moving back to the description of the DTTV service, it is noticeable that its programs’
offer is a quantitatively rich one, whose capacity already included 40 national free
channels by March 2010. Within Europe as a whole the only terrestrial network
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providing a similar service at that time was the UK’s Freeview, which has been
investigated in the context of the previous chapter.
As far as the offer is concerned, it has to be noticed that both RAI and Mediaset have
been developing a significant number of secondary channels which are mainly
thematic ones, in that they focus on a specific kind of content and build their
programming around it. For instance, RAI has launched on DTTV two channels such
as RAI 4 and RAI Movie that propose only TV series or movies, two other sport
channels like RAI Sport 1 and RAI Sport 2, a history channel and other additional
ones still targeting very narrow audiences. On the other side, Mediaset has been
behaving in a similar way through the distribution of channels among which there
are Iris, showing overall movies and documentaries, Mediaset Extra, dedicated to re‐
proposing vintage past successful transmissions, and the kids‐targeted Boing.
However, from the first introduction of a pay subscription‐based offer on the
platform through the launch of Mediaset Premium, the latter service has been
growing evidently. According to various perspectives, the enhancement of Mediaset
pay‐per‐view contents on digital terrestrial has represented a strategic effort to
challenge Sky Italia’s dominance within Satellite pay market and, therefore, an
aggressive attempt to steal part of its audience.
It is interesting to note that, in the Italian case, the evolution of the pay offer on
DTTV seems to have been favoured with respect to the general free one, where
despite the existence of many channels, program’s quality is not comparable and less
appealing. In the words of Cinzia Padovani (2007), what we are witnessing is
probably a polarization of the national television market, where “valuable content is
available for a fee, and only cheap programs are available for free”.
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4.4 The new challenges for the public service: RAI into the digital
world
On May 2010, during the launch of an informative campaign for the transition to
DTTV the president of RAI, Paolo Garimberti, together with the director general
Mauro Masi claimed that the national company had already agreed on destining
between 700 and 750 million euros of budgetary expenditures to the development of
digital terrestrial television. Despite recording an increasing amount of losses in
terms of net revenues and closing the budget year in deficit for the fourth
consecutive time, the public broadcaster remarked its primacy in the transition to
DTTV through the expression of its intention to make such a costly investment.
Likewise the British case, where the BBC played a leading role in fostering and
favouring the switch to digital, in Italy, the main goal of RAI has been to behave as
the major actor in coordinating as well as managing the complex road towards
complete switchover.
With respect to the UK, the element of discontinuity that can be immediately
observed is the following: while the BBC was the sole leader in charge of the
promotion of the new technology, the duopolistic nature of the Italian TV and the
strict ties of both the two broadcasters with the current centre‐right government, led
the group RAI‐Mediaset to promote the digital transition by sharing efforts and
initiatives, sometimes behaving as a unique entity.
The close cooperation within the media sector of a public and a commercial company
in contributing to the accomplishment of a national policy program proposed and
implemented directly by the government, can be thus considered a peculiarity of the
Italian system.
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In any case, this analysis aims at focusing solely on the role of RAI, especially trying
to discuss the actions put at stake by the company to sustain the migration phase and
to investigate how it is going to be able to deal with the new challenges implicated by
the arising national digital landscape and what role it could possibly play in the
times to come.
To provide an example of the importance of RAI’s central involvement in the launch
of DTTV, it can be seen that the government required the public service to guarantee
a complete and continuous territorial coverage during the various regional steps
towards full national analogue switch‐off. Such requirement represented, indeed, the
governmental strategic answer to the eventual increase of the so‐called “digital
divide” due to the transition itself and a mean to achieve a homogeneous digital
diffusion. As depicted by Marsden and Ariňo in the book “Digital Terrestrial
Television in Europe” (2005), the adoption of the new type of technology entails the
burden of additional information, educational and entertainment costs for viewers,
with the eventual consequence of increasing the existing gap between people having
access to television contents and people, instead, at least partially excluded. This
phenomenon is precisely what is labelled as “digital divide”, and whose elimination
is a key objective not just in Italy but in every European country.
As far as RAI’s activity in the transition phase is concerned, it has to be affirmed that
an essential direct effort conducted by the public service was about informing and
preparing customers to deal with the novelties deriving from the migration process.
It is remarkable the fact that RAI was a co‐founder of DGTVi being an active
supporter and organizer of its informative initiatives. Moreover, such campaign has
been brought on through the transmission on its three core channels of public official
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statements and spots together with a provision of announcements in the framework
of TV news and other types of programs.
However, as also briefly pointed out in the paragraphs above, the commitment to
behave as a sort of guiding head in this innovative time of television history, has to
be countervailed with two significant evidences: on the one hand its constant
negative economic performance, and on the other hand, the conspicuous decrease of
its audience in the last years.
As stated by Padovani (2007), even if Italy has been characterised so far by a “limited
multichannel environment” where next to terrestrial free‐to‐air service, pay‐TV and
subscription‐based DTH channels have not reached a high level of development yet,
the general future need for a pervasive and influential public service such as RAI
represents has not to be given for granted. Beyond that, the latter issue is even more
delicate when looking at those plain difficulties that are affecting the service.
To provide an example, it can be noticed how in 2000 the entire RAI’s revenues from
advertising were around 60% those of the commercial operator Mediaset, whereas in
2009, after almost a decade, the value had dropped to 44% (AGCOM, 2010).
Still, the Italian scholar remarks that the supremacy of generalist television is
diminishing and, as a consequence of the audience’s erosion, “RAI will have to
capitalise on other resources in order to take on a central part in the multichannel
and multiplatform audio‐visual markets”. According to an article written in
September 2006 by the journalist Marco Mele on the newspaper “Sole 24 Ore”, given
the current condition of the company, the immersion within digital environment
could have potentially been a significant opportunity to plan a deep internal
restructuring and to redefine the mechanisms governing its functioning.
78
Anyhow, many scholars and experts tend to agree on the fact that the key not only to
RAI’s future success but also simply to its future existence relies on the quality and
the appeal of its content provision. Investing in high level contents is broadly
considered the sole way to stay competitive in the market on a long‐term basis and to
justify the maintenance of its historical position.
In the context of this debate, a further element that needs to be analysed when
looking at the Italian case is whether a system where a public broadcaster offers not
only education and information programs funded by licence fees but also
commercial contents funded through advertising can keep being sustainable, in
particular in the digital era (Del Monte, 2004).
As it has been already explained, digitisation has the effect of questioning the
legitimacy of public operators to regulate television and dominate terrestrial
broadcasting, and furthermore, it reduces if not eliminates the need for public
broadcasters to provide commercial programs.
In the last decades, a wide number of proposals for restructuring RAI’s organisation,
and especially its funding mechanisms, have been presented by many perspectives
including politicians, scholars and sector experts. In shaping such proposals, one
example which has been observed carefully is just the current situation concerning
the British public broadcasting system. Indeed, in the UK market which has been
studied in the previous chapter, there are actually two public operators, because
besides the BBC also Channel 4 is a state‐owned company. Here, the former giant
actor, composed by the two arms BBC 1 and BBC 2, provides only information or
general interest contents and it is funded solely through the described licence fee,
while the latter is funded only through its advertising and commercial activities.
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Among the different proposals, a relevant one was introduced in 2007 by Gentiloni’s
ministry. According to his view, the incidence of advertising revenues for the
company had to diminish and a possible solution was to decide that two channels
(e.g. RAI 1 and RAI 3) would have been funded only through the licence fee, while
the third one would have become completely funded with money from advertising,
recreating therefore a system very similar to the UK’s experience.
Moreover, in 2010 another similar proposition has been promoted by the leader of
the main opposing party, namely “Partito Democratico” (PD), Pier Luigi Bersani. His
intention was still to divide RAI into two separate companies, that means a public
service provider funded through licence fees and a commercial body funded through
advertising following the same mechanisms valid for every existing private operator,
but at the same time claiming for a global reform of its governance. According to his
words pronounced in June 2010, the public broadcaster is in a condition of both
“democratic and economic crisis”; therefore, a solution could be to substitute its
current board of directors with a completely new one which should then appoint a
managing director whose election would be regular only if receiving more than 2/3
of total votes. In addition, a significant element of innovation was represented by the
fact that the director would have been in the position of reporting directly to the
Parliament.
Besides this view just expressed, other different proposals have found common
ground and support across the years. An important example is represented by the
suggestion for a complete privatization of the company which has been put forward
more than once by both centre‐left and centre‐right bodies. As far as such proposition
is concerned, its latest version has been presented in October 2010 by “Futuro e
Libertà” (FLI), the right party created only a couple of months before by a group of
members of the Italian Parliament belonging to the government who decided to
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leave the majority coalition. The two main points identified by the project are
basically the following: first, to sell the entire company’s capital to the State, and
second to assign the provision of public service to private operators selected through
“ad hoc” auctions.
In conclusion, it is significant to report what argued by Michele Polo in the article
“No, non é la BBC” published at the beginning of November 2010 on the website
lavoce.info. In his view, an information‐based public television service managed
according to pluralistic criteria would be an important factor in the Italian TV market
and is now lacking. In order to pursue this goal, RAI’s governance should be shaped
so to allow its leadership not to depend on the government of the day and to
guarantee representation for diverging political, cultural and institutional entities.
4.5 The main national policies supporting DTTV introduction into
society
Over the last decade the Italian governments have been focusing their attention on
how to shape an effective range of public policies in order to enhance the penetration
of the new digital technology and to foster a nation‐wide positive acceptance of the
latter. This fact represents a sort of trait d’union between the country and many other
European nations for whom the explanation to local population and communities of
the potential benefits implied by television signals digitisation and the consequent
effort to spread such benefits in order to not exclude anyone, have been a key
challenge to face.
Among all the initiatives undertaken, a group of relevant actions was the one
established to provide financial facilitations and help to the weakest segments of the
population. In particular, an example of an effective program was the introduction of
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subsidies to purchase interactive set‐top boxes for the reception of DTTV
transmission.
Indeed, in 2005 the government for the first time decided to directly provide a
general subsidy to households satisfying some specific criteria. Shortly after, it was
clarified that these contributions would have been addressed to each region involved
in the switchover according to the needs related to their schedule.
However, a concrete step was taken only with the law 296/2006 through which the
so‐called “Fondo per il passaggio al digitale” was created within the Department for
Communications of the Ministry for Economic Development. Thanks to such fund
the government would have delivered economic contributions equal to 50 euros each
for the purchase of one single decoder to every citizen respecting the following
requirements:
• being at least 65 years old or more by the end of 2009
• having a net income lower than 10 000 euros per year
• having no debts as far as the payment of the licence fees is concerned
• being a first time claimant
As a consequence of the beginning of the region‐by‐region switch‐off, from 2008 the
number of set‐top boxes sold to Italian families increased significantly and by the end
of 2009 it had reached the level of 20,7 million. Therefore, the national project just
described seems to have been an effective tool in helping people to buy the necessary
equipment for accessing the new service.
In addition, it has to be noticed that in the last two years the set‐top boxes purchased
kept‐on increasing at an average rate close to 2,2 million per month and by the end of
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2010 they were around 45 million. More specifically, the figure below shows the
remarkable trend registered in the second half of last year.
Figure 7: Yearly and monthly sales of set‐top boxes (June‐November 2010)
Jun‐10 Jul‐10 Aug‐10 Sept‐10 Oct‐10 Nov‐10
Source: DGTVi (2010)
As reported by the DGTVi report called “Quarto rapporto sulla televisione digitale
terrestre”, what emerges is also that among the whole digital equipment sold to
consumers across the last two years the amount of external set‐top boxes is higher
than the number of television with an integrated receiver. This evidence is
understandable given the lower cost of the former and its applicability to an already
owned analogue TV set; anyhow, it turns out to be clear how a condition of
“compulsory” purchase brought viewers to opt for the less invasive device. Still, for a
matter of precision, it has to be observed that in this period even the sales concerning
TV with integrated receivers have reached levels above the physiological standards
commonly registered.
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Furthermore, in order to provide any additional information concerning digital
terrestrial television’s set‐top boxes, the Department for Communications established
also a web service on the internet. To make some examples, the website contains
information about where to purchase the items, which typologies are covered by the
national subsidy, which are the operative centres for clients’ technical support and
where they are located.
However, the introduction of this public subsidy has been attracting the attention of
the European Commission and in the middle of June 2010 the European Court of
First Instance, that is a jurisdictional body of the EU Court of Justice, affirmed that
such form of contribution violated State Aid policy requirements because it was not
respecting the concept of technological neutrality (or platform neutrality) and was
thus providing an indirect advantage to terrestrial TV operators with respect to those
on satellite. Indeed, by offering financial help exclusively to the purchase of DTTV
set‐top boxes, the Italian government was basically not taking into account the
principle according to which no existing technology should receive a favourable
policy treatment, in order to regulate the market without conferring advantages on a
selection basis.
Furthermore, this condition registered within the Italian market had already been
addressed and debated by the same European Union in 2007 as a consequence of the
consistent complaints reported by satellite broadcasters.
Having explained and discussed the government subsidy scheme, the analysis can
move to investigate other measures promoted at the political level in order to foster
the development of DTTV. One very recent instrument which has been presented by
the government in December 2010 is the so‐called plan “Italia Digitale”. According to
the current Minister for Economic Development Paolo Romani, it represents a tool
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created by the Ministry to stimulate the development of digital infrastructure and
foster a large scale diffusion of digital technology as well as services with the aim of
promoting competition, efficiency and productivity in the context of a global
country’s economic growth.
With regard to what stated by the plan itself, an important aspect concerning the
document is that it underlines the importance of taking in the main principles of the
“Digital Agenda”, an ambitious project launched at the European level with the final
aim of delivering sustainable economic and social benefits through a fully digital
single market based on fast and ultra‐fast interoperable applications for
communications.
As far as digital television is concerned, the Italian plan narrows its attention on the
DTTV roll out as well as on the frequency allocation process. In detail, it is explained
how the regional‐based path towards complete switch‐off is proceeding and it is also
identified a proposition for eventually anticipating the end of such process to the
final months of 2011, therefore one year in advance with respect to the official
schedule. Moreover, it is remarked that in order to achieve this goal the auction to
assign the available frequencies had been anticipated to the current year, 2011, as
well.
A further initiative brought on by the government has been the activation of a
national call centre once more coordinated by the Department for Communications.
This tool enables consumers to receive detailed information on both all existing
opportunities and advantages they can freely access and all possible technical
problems that may occur together with advices for a possible fast solution. According
also to AGCOM (2010), the call centres have been playing an important part in
making citizens more aware of what actually were the direct implications of the
process they were witnessing on their lives. Since the experience of Sardegna’s
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digitisation completion in 2008, the authority claimed also for a strengthening of the
service, considering that its provision could be deeply effective only if guaranteed
constantly on a long‐term basis and thus exceeding the final switchover deadlines.
Finally, the general information campaign about DTTV penetration has to be
considered an additional and essential service to the national community whose
impact on the population was the strongest and the most far‐reaching. Although the
previous section has already dealt with this issue, there is another aspect that needs
to be here outlined. Indeed, relying on the will of the Ministry for Economic
Development which was also the direct funder of such campaign, local TV players in
this phase acted in a primary position having the duty of informing the local areas
reached by their transmission. The underlying idea was that these operators could be
more successful in addressing small and isolated communities, according to the
application of the subsidiarity principle.
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5 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
From this deep investigation of the transition process towards a European integrated
digital television market and from the careful study of the two paths followed in the
UK and in Italy to achieve a complete digital switchover, some significant
considerations and remarks should be drawn, in order to evaluate the main strategic
moves and the key policies applied in both countries. These considerations need to
be brought back to the context of the more general discussion around what optimal
technical features and which competitive conditions should be enhanced in a new
digital world made of almost unlimited spectrum availability, abundant channels
offer and on‐demand programming.
Through our comparative approach, it can be seen that the switch to digital implied
for both nations an increase in terms of contents provision even if some differences
have to be underlined. In the UK the remarkable development of the terrestrial
Freeview involved a broader offer of mainly free‐to‐air programs, with the addition
of some pay‐per‐view subscription‐based channels, and this important offer was
considered as an essential tool to create a concrete alternative to the incumbent wide
Satellite programming promoted by a deeply rooted player such as BSkyB. In fact, in
the British television environment the latter represented an historical component of
the market as a whole and a new offer was to be structured in order to endow
consumers with a broader but still qualitatively high choice.
In this reality, the role of the BBC was undoubtedly central in promoting DTTV’s
take up and it was also exploited by the government to fasten its spread across the
country, somehow replicating in the new landscape the previous analogue terrestrial
conditions and equilibria. However, it can be observed how this process, and more in
general the full launch of DTV, was characterised by a strong promotion of market
competition, considering that within the same Freeview both terrestrial and satellite
87
leaders, namely the BBC and BSkyB, coexisted while competing in other fields, as it
was in the case of their two separate digital free services introduced on the satellite,
namely the two Freesat groups.
Therefore, an important push to provide equal conditions of access to all platforms
for every single operator and to constantly tilt the TV market in favour of new
entrants has been a clear characteristic of the UK environment, and these goals have
been fostered relying also on the idea that they represented the most effective way to
achieve the best possible services to the benefit of consumers and to reduce as much
as possible the divergence between free and pay transmissions quality level.
As far as the Italian case is concerned, DTTV has also introduced much more
channels and created a thematic free‐to‐air offer, even though a high amount of
frequencies has been handled exclusively by the duopoly historically dominating the
terrestrial sector, and national policies have been acting controversially in shaping
the competitive features for the new platform, in the end basically adopting a
protectionist attitude aimed at guaranteeing that RAI and Mediaset centrality was to
be maintained.
In a television market where terrestrial was the leading platform by far, and where
satellite, which was characterised by the prominence of the BSkyB subsidiary Sky
Italia, was not strongly developed yet, the promotion of DTTV has served as a tool to
replicate the previous analogue contents and also to favour the expansion of a
premium offer, especially launched by Mediaset. As a matter of fact, the political
effort to favour the new platform has turned out to enhance the spread of the same
network where the pay offer of the latter operator, plus some other minor ones, had
been introduced.
As a consequence, according also to many TV experts, the digital terrestrial platform
has been perceived not properly as an instrument to promote fair competition among
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all the operating broadcasters but rather as the place where to further increase the
duopolistic strength, in particular through the reinforcement of Mediaset and the
support to its attempt to enlarge activity and become dominant in the pay‐TV offer to
the detriment of Sky Italia’s service on satellite.
The above detailed evidence is reinforced also by two other aspects: first, the
opposition of Mediaset, sustained by the national government, to the eventual
entrance of Sky Italia on the DTTV as allowed by the European Commission and
second, the subsidization policy which has been applied solely to the purchase of “ad
hoc” set‐top boxes, without offering any type of facilitation for buying whatever
equipment required by different platforms.
With regard to the latter aspect it has been noticed that in the UK the provision of
help to citizens, through the “Digital Switchover Help Scheme”, included different
forms of contributions of equivalent value for both DTTV and non‐DTTV equipment,
therefore fostering a platform neutrality approach that is at the basis of an even
competition both inter and intra networks.
In addition to what emerges from such comparison, it is also important to look at the
role of the main public Italian broadcasters in the light of the British BBC’s
experience. Indeed, what can be affirmed is that, although RAI’s attempt to be the
leading figure in the transition to digital terrestrial transmission, there have been and
there still are some elements that tend to undermine it. What can be acknowledged is
that the company is hardly comparable to the UK main public television entity, given
that not only its penetration does not reach any other platform but its services are
also regarded as an old format unable to evolve or strategically innovate its offer, and
the quality of its programs seems to be destined to decrease even more with the
progressive concentration of less and less resources for their realization in a free‐to‐
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air modality. Another aspect to be kept in mind is the role that its financial
difficulties are inevitably playing in limiting its capability of investing in new
appealing contexts.
Therefore, what we are witnessing is the effort of two public operators to keep their
historical role within each national television market and to retool their activities in
order to face the challenges implied by the most inner revolution that has ever
affected TV industry. By now, the BBC appears to have been directed to act in a
strategic way that could better help and sustain its future broadcasting, thanks to a
general regulation of the market aimed at pushing it to compete on different
platform levels but still through the sole provision of informational and educational
content. On the contrary, the actual condition of RAI, currently providing both public
interest and commercial programs, and thus forced to compete also with private
operators, could seriously be a true bottleneck to its transmission’s survival in the
years to come.
From a broader perspective, it has to be observed that full digitisation has fastened
the run towards a more freely accessible television industry and has been pushing for
a deeper process of liberalization, where the provision of any type of content,
including information and education, could potentially be allocated in an efficient
manner to any operator just by market forces. As a consequence the degree to which
PSBs are going to preserve their essential role is believed to depend mostly on their
capability to increase the quality of their public interest format and to strengthen
their pluralistic function. Assuming this, the BBC model reveals once more its
preferable features with respect to RAI’s one and its core development towards the
above standards is confirmed by its relevant inter‐platform diffusion.
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