1

The juxtaposition between recognition and understanding of the Papuans about

the inside Papua common development and the Price of Indonesian national integrity

Safarini Aidilla, Amd.Im., SH., MPA., PhD-ing

Abstract:

The strategic development of Papua has been focused currently in the reformation era

of how the regional localities as so called the donation of the revenue ownerships in gaining

the natural resources to be allocated to as proper as function to the domain areas such as

Papua and West Papua. The establishment of this twin sisters provinces cannot alone without

sacrifice. The influence of the Netherlands since before the establishment of the republic for

the purpose of the taxation collection, the remaining colonization influence of the Netherland

in papua based on the international treaty, the massive mobilization of peoples based on the

origin provinces and professional occupation to come to Papua had a purpose until the

confirmation of Pepera (“Act of Free Choice” in Irian Jaya under the UNTEA --United

Nations Temporary Executive Authority--, supervision in 1969) based on the proxy of the

headmasters in the soil of Papua that have been shifted to the purpose of the integrity utopian

and patronage principle as well as the central confirmation of administrative structure and

decentralization strategy. Within the pipelines of development infrastructure in Papua since

Pepera to reformation era, Papua has forced not only the implementation of the big-bang

theory happen on the land, but also the social-cultural based on the indigenous

representative had portrayed the communal construction in Papua that these not only

represent the qualitative factual evidence of the poverty rate reduction, but also the

possibility of unity based on the recognition gaining made by the Papuans. Amidst the

controversy of the OPM that has to be dealt with the Indonesian military and police clad, the

legalization of the Papuan proliferation has been implemented as the policy solutions in

assisting the localities through the patterns of APBD (Provincial Budget Revenue &

Expenditure Allocation) and DUA (Dana Alokasi Umum --General Allocation Fund --) &

DAK (Dana Alokasi Khusus --Special Allocation Fund--) as well as the central financial

plans for the disadvantaged areas. Moreover, the budget watchdog from the central authority

and the central program for gaining the heart of the OPM’s needs to the Indonesian

government program in Papua and West Papua only be installed by the genesis of the policy

determination for the purpose of safeguarding the governance concept to the provincial

levels, and the blending of political security over the military, police, and civil-police as well

as civil-military for supervising the commitment of preserving national security among the

trilateral juxtaposition of the following constructive conducts: the state’s role for providing

security, the security apparatus and law enforcers for committing the state’s tasks and

valuing the essense of security of human rights for common peoples and for producing the

2

social security to the sake of common security, and the civil empowerment for securing their

environment based on the civil society interest and the central-local government targeted

programs. This journal has the purpose of understanding the degree of the crossroads

between the two integration principles to be the concession roads between the two

interrelated interests, those are Indonesia with its integrity and open door principle for the

external commercial infrastractures and the OPM identification that seems anti-integration

with the hawkish attitudes in pursuing its interests.

Papuans recognition and understanding are two terms to describe how the shift of the

administration changing in Papua since the historic clad of the Netherlands West Indies

recognition of Western part of Papua within the well known time series such as Indonesian

independence, the Old Order to hand over of Papua to Indonesian government to UNTEA in

1962, the Pepera in 1969 to the New Order and the reformation era to test the implementation

of the big-bang theories of decentralization in order to understand the parameters of the

obscurity in determining the two schemes between Papuans understanding and the

government administration for the purpose of development land and peoples. To determine

the differences between both terms, it is heavily relying on the means and the course of the

rulers. In 1365 the Majapahit emperor annotated its occupation over Papua and given the

name as written on the Kertagama manuscripts notifying the social contact connected Papuan

to peoples in Majapahit1. To the mid 17 century, the Western countries had dependency with

the Papuan where the contracts had constructed their interests for monopolizing the economic

gaining (plantation, fishery products, forestry products, and agrarian exploration) to gauge

their relevancy on economic orientation2. In the 19 century, the Western countries involving

the Netherlands, UK, and Germany flicked the conquest competiton over the New Genuea

land as their colonies3.

The 20 century marked with the two world war played a big role in changing the

Papuan administration. The shifting name from governor to regency detached from the

Maluccan regency to follow of what Jan P.K. van Eechoud’s decison as the condition in

Indonesia had annunciation its independence as well as this area confirmed as the

resettlement for Netherland Indies descendant that could not repatriate back to Netherlands

immediately4. Aftermath of the Indonesian independence in 1945, Papua remained as the

1 Mansoben, Johszua Roberrt, Sistem Politik Tradisional di Irian Jaya, Jakarta: LIPI-RUL, 1995, p.69

2 Medeelingen van het Bureau de Bestuurzaken der Buitengewesten Bewrkt doar het Encylopadae Bureau, Batavia: Javasche

Boekhanden & Drukerij, 1920, pp.195-196, p.134,

3 Ricklefs, Sejarah Indonesia Modern, Yogyakarta: Gadjah Mada University Press, 1988, p.200; Koentjaraningrat & Harsja W.

Bachtiar, Penduduk Irian Barat, 1963, pp.57-8

4 Koentjaraningrat-Harsja W Bachtiar, Penduduk Irian Barat, 1963, p.80; and Bone, Robert C., The Dynamics of the Western New

Guinea (Irian Barat) Problem, Itchana: Cornell University, 1958, p.22

3

eastern detachment part of the Indonesian archipelagic states which this area had been

separated administratively with Maluccan, and the Papuan regency had been changed into the

governor of Papua which had direct controlled by the Netherlands and it was as a part of the

Kingdom of the Netherlands with S.L.J. van Waardenburg as the Governor to the Papuan

Land5. Since being the governor, the Netherland administration expanded its territory with 4

(four) determination policies since 1949-1962 such as: (1) administering the Papua that was

named Netherland Niew Guinea (NNG) by the typical of appointing the Netherland’s patron

to be the governor of NNG (1949-1954)6; (2) distributing the NNG’s territory by categorizing

the land into the expolatie-ressort and building the innenpolitik or the local government

institutions devided into 4 provinces (Afdeeling) and 20 regents (Onderafdeeling) which were

most of the control to appoint the head of local government on the hand of the Kingdom of

the Netherlands with the purpose of having the taxation from the local people to the NNG

administraters7; (3) the Melanesian etnicity based on policy agenda had be embarked in 1958

made by The Netherlands-Australia to connect NNG and Solomon island as the federation

state under both countries alliances8 with the influence of the Netherlands people on the

construction of making NNG as the residing place (Holland di daerah Tropis -- Holland at the

tropical region) of Indo-Netherlands and The pure Netherlands based on the Netherlands’

citizenships regulations; and, (4) the ending position of the Netherland colony to NNG by

handing over the NNG to Indonesian government via UNTEA in 1962 with the enhancement

of what the Netherlands did to the areas of regional distribution, politics, demography, social,

and economy.

Apart from the impact of the 1965 tragedy in Jakarta and part of Java and Bali, the

1969 Pepera conducted in Papua by the UNTEA in line to the purpose of making the NNG to

not being intervene by the foreigners as the end of the Netherland colony in 1962 had stated

to grant the territory to Indonesian government in Jakarta. The result of the Papuan choice

(that had been conducted by the 1,025 Papuan representatives of local councils agreed by

their consensus to remain as part of Indonesia) had been confirmed by the UN General

Assembly to transfer the Papuan territorial area to Indonesia9. Post the 1969 safety transfer of

Papua to Indonesia, the New Order had treated Papua as its 26th province with the political

appointees to be given to the position of provincial and sub provincial levels in order to

ensure the direct control of the central government for the local political elites and a shared

funding budget allocation based on the state’s fiscal policy10

. In the reformation era with the

5 Derx, Jan, Bapa Papoea: Jan P.K, van Eechoud, Een Biografie, Netherland: Uitgerij van Spijk B.V.V., 1987, p.206

6 Ibid. Derx, Jan, Bapa Papoea: Jan P.K, van Eechoud, Een Biografie, Netherland: Uitgerij van Spijk B.V.V., 1987, p.206

7 Koentjaraningrat-Harsja W. Bachtiar, Penduduk Irian Barat, 1963, p.87

8 Djopari, JRG, Pemberontakan Organisasi Papua Merdeka, Jakarta: Grasiondo, 1993, p.36

9 “Indonesia’s return to the UN”, The International and comparative law quarterly, 1967, Cambridge University Press, British

Institute of International and Comparative law, vol.16, no.2, April 1967, pp.289-589.

10 Holland, P. “Regional government and central authority in Indonesia”, in T. Lindsey (ed.), Indonesia: Law and Society,

Federation Press: Sydney, 1999, pp.210-11. And, Anne Booth, “Before the ‘big bang’: decentralization debates and practice in Indonesia”,

4

political and financial measurement have been determined not only from the central

government but also engaging to the local elections, Indonesia faces the big challenges in

terms of the rise of the local identities in relevant to the survival of the Indonesian unity of

the nation-state, and regional budgetary in relevant to the central government program

assigned to the local government11

.

A. Papuan and the cohesion of the Papuan identities

The social construction of Papuans and the Papuan identities can be constructed based

on the time series and the identities that made by the Papuans’ intention to shape their social

construction based on their adaptation to the Papuan environment (tanah ulayat) and their

likeliness to receive other cultures to this extent. The Papuans to those extents reflect of what

“Antipater” had done as the minister at the Roman empire which “could not understand its

fear of alien cultures” in perceiving other cultures other than the indigenous Papuans cultures

and identities. In order to understand of whether the parameters of timidity and the rules

shifting orientation as well as the Papuans’ perception towards its conditions and other

cultural traditions, it is to believe that the Papuan identities have been shaped by the degree of

how the inside Papua want to be recognized and be understood as well as how they recognize

and understand the essense of sacrificing of the term of shifting the paradigm of the

Indonesian colonialization to embracing the Indonesian interests of national integrity. Those

blocs of juxtaposition produce the consciousness and awareness that can be constructed

ethnocentrically and may be inclined to reproduce social cohesion based on community

building to the Papuan identities.

The Papuan’s culture and identities have come as the recognition of them in

identifying themselves to gain and to enhance their interests. The magnificant of the Papuan

civilization firstly has been encrypted on the “Negara Kertagama”12

manucripts written in

1365 as the bible of the Majapahit kingdom in describing about social contacts and the

natural interdependency linking as the needs of the Majapahit crusaders and the Papuans’

interest to welcome other people that came to the areas which at that time still named on their

municipal localities such as Wwanin (this area currently named as Onin, the area nearby Fak-

in Hal Hill, (ed.), Regional Dynamics in a Decentralized Indonesia, Indonesia Update series, Australian National University: Canberra, 2014,

pp.35-7.

11 Hal Hill and Yogi Vidyattama, “Hares and tortoises: regional development dynamics in Indonesia”, in Hal Hill, (ed.), Regional

Dynamics in a Decentralized Indonesia, Indonesia Update series, Australian National University: Canberra, 2014, pp.70-5

12 Negara Kertagama as the Majapahit manuscripts in mentioning about the Majapahit’s explorers to invade the new lands and to

unite the “Nusantara” under the ruling of the Manajaphit kingdom. As part of Nusantara, Majapahit was not stand alone as the kiingdom

in the Indonesian archipelagic states (previously named as “Nusantara”). The Malloccan kingdom recognized the glory of the Majapahit

which have its footprints across Nusantara and to the PNG areas. The statements of the areas in the negara Kertagama as the symbol of

how Majapahit and the stated areas had made relationships and social contacts for the purpose to fulfill their life and interests. For further

reading about the Majapahit’s glory and what had been written in the Negara Kertagama manuscripts can be read on the book of

Koentjaraningrat-Harsja W. Bachtiar and Mansoben. Koentjaraningrat-Harsja W. Bachtiar, Penduduk Irian Barat, 1963, p.56; Mansoben,

Johszua Roberrt, Sistem Politik Tradisional di Irian Jaya, Jakarta: LIPI-RUL, 1995, p.69.

5

Fak), Sran (is knwon as Kowiai, the place nearby Kaimaana), and Wandan (one of the place

in Papua Nieuw Guinea). The romansa of traditional trade and tributes portrayed the

connections from Majapahit to the Papuan aristocracy. The aristocracy still determines the

social political conditions in Papua of where raja-raja or the “kings”13

realized themselves

had only limited credential over receiving taxation and tributes to be submited to the Tidore

Sultan. Until Den Haag Treaty in 1895 concerning the boundary line of NNG territory, the

NNG areas remained of not being intervened by VOC which it only conducted its influence

through the Tidore Sultan under the treaty in 1660 and contact 1667 binding the Papuan over

texation and tributes to the Sultan. Although, the story was different when the British

explores came to procure the natural seasonings from Malloccu and Papua in 1700 and the

harbouring of the British vessel in 1793 at Doreh Gove, and it made the Netherlands to

conduct the establishment of the NNG’s port and the coming of the treaty as the official

demarcation between the Netherlands to the British explorers 14

. Until 1937, the Netherlands

still conducted the political power over NNG from Malloccu Province which had the control

to the area of North Nieuw Guinea, West Nieuw Guinea, and South Nieuw Guinea with the

bureaucracy administration (the beuraucrat personnels in the political structures achieved

status and salaries). The existence of beuraucracy, principally the police agency had been

about securing the Papuan hemisphere in relevant to the social conflicts and penal actions

made by the Papuan indiginous towards others15

.

B. The historic paths of the Papuans unification to Indonesia

After Indonesian independence in 1945, the NNG administration directly moved from

Malloccan to NNG by appointing Jan P.K. Eechoud as the first direct regent on July 15th

1946. Meanwhile, the value of Indonesian independence had to be consented by the Van

Mook’s colonial perception to rebuff the republic state of Indonesia to be the federal unity

state of Indonesia consisting of Java, Sumatra, Kalimantan and Timur Besar openly discussed

on Malino Conference. The purpose of the Netherlands and the Van Mook’s colonial policy

in some extent had acknowledged the Indonesian independence over the territory of not to

include the NNG as its sovereign areas and to debunk of what the Indonesian republic to be

13 The kings reside on the Raja Ampat island (raja Waigeo, raja Salawati, raja Waigama, and raja Missol) and also the kings status

inhibit to the areas of Mac Cluer Gove (raja Rumbati, raja Patipi and raja Ati-ati). In contrast to the Tidore Sultan, he ruled by sailing or

maritime explorer to exchange tributes and collect the texation from the acreditated kings. Those were the Papuan kings before the ruling

of the Netherlands to the NNG (West Papua). As the typical of the sultan, the Tidore Sultan had the three ministers which handling

international affairs (kapitan laut), interior affairs (jogugu), and law (the judge who determined the law). For further reading see, Wal, S.L.

Van Der, Kenang-kenangan Pangrehpraja Belanda 1920-1942, Jakarta: Penerbit Djambatan, 2001, pp.84-5.

14 Mededeelingen van het Bureau voor de Bestuurzaken der Buitengewesten Bewerkt door het Encyclopadae Bureau, Batavia:

Javasche Boekhanden & Drukerij, 1920, pp.134-5, pp.120-130, p.160; Kamma, F.C., Ajaib di Mata Kita: Masalah Komunikasi antara Timur

dan Barat Dilihat dari sudut Pengalaman Selama Srabad Pekabaran Injil di Irian Jaya, Jakarta: BPK Gunung Mulia, 1981, p.85; and, Clercq,

F.S.A. de, “De West-en Noordkust van Nederlandsch Nieuw Guinea”, Tijdschrift van Nederlandsch Aarrijkskundig Genootschap, X, 1893,

p.165, pp.156-160, p.170-192.

15 Rosmaida Sinaga, Masa Kuasa Belanda di Papua: 1898-1962, Jakarta: Komunitas Bambu, 2013, pp.97-159.

6

ruled by the federalism system. In other words, the shift of the government system had been

about facilitating the Netherland direct control upon the NNG. With the interinsic interest of

the Netherlands influenced over its colony (Indonesia) which announced its rights over the

self-determination to collect the blended perception between the majority and minority

relevance of how the Van Mook demarcation policy can be implemented and the status of

NNG can be determined between the future status of NNG and the detachment of NNG from

Indonesia, the Pangkal Pinang conference held on October 1, 1946 and the Hollandia

conference on December 11, 1946 had been factually pintpointing the obsecurity relevancy

between Indonesia and the Netherlands. In other words, the three conferences had discussed

about their own concerns (the Indo-Netherlands descendents)16

of being part of the

Indonesian government system and of purposing to make NNG still remaining as the

Netherlands’ colony and as the place of their colonizalition17

.

The application of the detachment proposal from the Indo-Netherlands’ descendants

in NNG since 1946 had been in line with the credential status given from the Netherlands

empire to the Indonesian independence in 1949 of when Indonesia still had to survive its post

independence struggle over the invasion of the Dutch, the British, and the Japanese in two

constitutive wars, two negotiations, and two conferences about the resettlement status of

NNG18

. Along with the external invasion towards the Indonesian sovereignty and the

Netherlands as well as the Japanese remaining ruling post the status quo in the mid year of

1945, the US support for Indonesian independence other than to be part of the Japanese-

Fascisme by agreeing to finance a ten millon dollar loan to return the Dutch East Indies

administration to Indonesia based on its independence announcement in 194519

. The prestige

of the unitary nation and the opportunity of the world opinion resonance in the UN had

impacted to Indonesian realpolitik to balance with the two potential constraints over the

attempt of returning the colonial rulers and the domestic constraints of insurgencies in the

name of the communism ideology and the islamist radicalism. After four years (1945-1949)

of warfare and negotiations, the Dutch transferred its sovereignty to the federal government

of Indonesian in 1949-1950 with the manners of negotiation discussions (bilateral and

multilateral dialogues in the UN). The transfer of sovereignty on December, 28 1949 after the

Hague negotiations was a firm instrument to the establishment of the United States of

Indonesia with Soekarno entered Jakarta. In 1950, Indonesia became the 60th member of the

United Nations (UN). But, the August 1950 resolution had made Indonesia to end the federal

16 The interest of the Netherlands towards the NNG had been about on maintaining its interests in NNG, that is to make NNG as

the determined zone for the Indo-Netherlands’ decendents and the place for sheltering the Netherlands businessmen that were moving or

departing from Indonesia. For further reading, Bone, Robert C., The Dynamics of the Westerns New Guinea (Irian Barat) Problem, Itchaca:

Cornell University, 1958, p.22

17 Koentjaraningrat & Harsja W. Bachtiar, Penduduk Irian Barat, Jakarta: Penerbit Universitas, 1963, p.81

18 The wars that had to face by Indonesia those were in September and in October 1945 until the withdrawal of the British on

November 2, 1946.

19 Charles Biden, (5 December 1945), “Independence to Issue”, for Eastern Survey 14 (24): 345-348

7

scheme under the supervision of the UN with the Dutch remaining claim over West Irian20

.

The three conferences (Malino, Pangkal Pinang, and Holandia) in discussing about the status

of the firmed only colonialization of the Netherlands empire at the NNG had focussed this

area for the shuttle condition of the Indo-Netherlands descendants as well as the NNG’s

indigenous living.

NNG colonialiation policy has been transformed in various fields although those still

preserved in time of the Netherlands had to make the NNG remained status quo in 1962 and

be given to the UN resolution to have the fair referendum to indigenous Papuans. The fields

of colonization strategy of the Netherlands in NNG had the goals of exporting other than

making the farming productivity for the local consumption. The goals implemented in 1959

by the endorsement of the autonomy strategy had been on shifting the labours in the farming

production from the Indo-Netherlands to the Papuan indigenous through strengthening the

Farming Division with the program of planting, trimming, harvesting, increasing the local

income through trading the food supply production, conducting socialization, and open the

economic standard for the best export products21

.

The reason of the netherlands preserve status quo: Indo-Netherlands descendants

repatriation and migration from NNG (Schoorl, 2001, pp.152-3) have been constructed under

the constraining caution of the legal format and the phenomenon basis in subscribing the

configuration of what the realism made by the Indonesian government, the externalities, the

indigenous West Papuans and the people residing inside Papuan in choosing of both

construction of repatriation back to the Netherlands, reintegrated back to Indonesia and to be

the Indonesian post the New York Agreement in 1962 and Pepera in 1969. Based on the

Indonesian citizenship Law in 1958 that had transformed of what the social construction

made in the Colonized ruled comprising the Netherlands, the East Asian people, and

Bumiputera, to those by the Act 1958 have shaped into Indonesian nationals and the

foreigners. By the establishment of that rule, the repatriation have been the terminology for

people who decided to return back the state of what their belongs such as in choosing the

option of Kaula negara Hindia Belanda and to be the Netherlands or to the other of the

Netherlands colonies such as Suriname or Antillen and also the Indonesian nationals in the

sense of encircling themselves to be part of the Indonesian legal format of citizenships. In

contrast to migration, this relates to the contrasting treatment that peoples could be preserved

differently based on the legal postulate such as citizenships and duration of stay as well as the

payment of taxation and the residential permission to officially wrapped around to secure the

residents over their in country movement legally towards the sovereignty of one single

country.

20 Ibid, p.36. The two scholars made a debate over Indonesian position. M.C. Ricklefs, A history of modern Indonesia, London,

1981, pp.200-21; Anthony Reid, “Indonesia: revolution without socialism” in R. Jeffrey, ed., Asia, the winning of independence, London,

1981, pp.113-62.

21 ANRI, Memorie van Overgave van de Controleur Manokwari, F.H. Peters, 1961, Reel, No.39, MvO Serie 1e.

8

At one hand, the legal construction of Indonesia had been advocated the incorporation

of the bilateral negotiation between Indonesia and the Netherlands to provide the best remedy

over of what the people which have the ius sanguines and ius soli could decide towards the

legal options of their citizenships affiliation and the intention of legal action to actively and

passively acquiring their citizenships correlation. On the other hand, the international law of

the 1962 New York Agreement and the 1969 Pepera had been so in conjuction to portray the

realism of the interrelated international subjects such as Indonesia, the Netherlands, the USA

lobbier, and the UN. The representative from Indonesia and the Netherlands signed the

“Agreement between the Republic of Indonesia and the Kingdom of the Netherlands

concerning West New Guinea (West Irian) at the United Nations Headquarters in New York

(August 15, 1962) following by the patterns of contrasting arguments over the international

position post the 1962 New York Agreement, that was about to organize a referendum “to

give the Papuans freedom” with the United Nations Secretary General and other United

Nations personnel22

and the interest of the USA led by Kennedy administration to win the

heart of Indonesia among the Western countries with the compensation of the Netherlands to

hold the long-term UN trusteeship and UN-supervised self-determination for the inhabitants

by allowing the UN to have a minimal role in the transfer procedures to make the existence of

the virtual handover from the Netherlands to Indonesian control from implicitly stated in

1962 to the Pepera in 196923

.

The parameters of the “act of free choice” or Pepera in 1969 had been as the

conclusive action over the implementation of the New York Agreement and to sustain the

repercussion procedures over the trilateral side effect which the USA support the Dutch with

its intention but betrayal Indonesian position, so thus the implemented stages agenda have

been constructed before 1969, such as Musyawarah (consultative councils) would be

instructed on procedures to assess the will of the population, the referendum between two

position (to stay or to separate from Indonesia), and the maturity age to be allowed to

participate in the act of the free choice24

. The result of the Papuan choice (that had been

conducted by the 1,025 Papuan representatives of local councils agreed by their consensus to

remain as part of Indonesia) had been confirmed by the UN General Assembly to transfer the

Papuan territorial area to Indonesia25

. In short, the legacy of Soekarno’s foreign policy was in

pursuing the establishment of the Indonesian republic (1945-1949), the Indonesian territorial

integrity in the West Papua (1949-1963; and 1969). The articulation of the course of the

Indonesian foreign policy (“independent and active”) determined by the Indonesian capacity

to produce the foreign policy by encouraging diplomacy (bilateral and multilateral

22 Van Panhuys, H.F., 1980, The Dynamics of the West New Guinea Problem, Equinox Publishing: Jakarta, pp.135-153

23 US Department of State, 95/03/06 Foreign Relations, 1961-63, vo.XXIII, Southeast Asia, Office of the Historian, published on

March 6, 1995, (http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/frus/summaries/950306_FRUS_XXIII_1961-63.htnl) [accessed on September 30, 2014).

24 Ibid.

25 “Indonesia’s return to the UN”, The International and comparative law quarterly, 1967, Cambridge University Press, British

Institute of International and Comparative law, vol.16, no.2, April 1967, pp.289-589.

9

cooperation) and by combining the support from the Indonesian domestic politics (political

consensus) to sustain the Soekarno’s national roles (the implementation of Pancasila on the

two levels) for the purpose of maintaining and sustaining the national integrity of the

archipelagic country.

C. The Papuan identities and the terminology of dissidents under the umbrella of

OPM (Organisasi Papua Merdeka -- The Free Papuan Movement)

Post the 1962 New York Agreement, the existence of UNTEA had been administered

to shift from the Dutch ruling and Indonesian capacity to quickly establish the official

administration with Indonesian policy of national mobility (mobilitas nasional) such as

transmigration to the rare area; although this Indonesian national policy had been challenged

back by the 1969 Pepera with the majority position of the Papuan representation to win of

being Indonesian as the Pepera had been the final precondition to acknowledge Papua to be

part of Indonesia as it is entrusted under the 1962 Agreement and the confirmation of the

Pepera resulted in 1969 referendum with the 2504 UN resolution (XXIV) in November 19,

1969. In order to assist the Indonesian national interest, the 1500-odds Indonesian paratroops

stayed and assisted the Papuan polices officers and the UNTEA forces (comprising 1537

Muslim troops from Pakistan); with the purpose of successfully the withdrawal of the

Netherlands naval and land forces from the territory of West Papua as timetable agreed upon

by the Temporary Administrator (the Commander of UNSF-Pakistani and the Commander-

in-chief-of the Netherlands forces in territory occured on November 15, 1962)26

. As part of

the national interest was on how to successfully transfer the integration of West Papua or the

West New Guinea that was previously named as NNG particularly on how the timidity of

1962 to 1969 could establish the administration that serve the safety transfered of power. The

following activities conducted to support the establishment of the administration based on the

Indonesian rules. Firstly, the transfer of the administration from the Netherlands to UNTEA

(United Nations Temporary Executive Authority) took place on October 1, 1962 symbolized

by the raising of the UN flag and the flown side by side with the Netherlands flag with the

power to ensure the welfare of the West Papuan inhibitants was the UNTEA. Secondly, the

creation of the UNTEA had been supported by UNSF (United Nations Security Force) as the

implementation of the 1962 New York Agreement and the result voting in the UN Assembly

comprising 89 voters to allow and 14 abstentions over acknowledging the role conferred by

the agreement as the Secretary-General to be the external power in securing the transfer from

the Netherlands to Indonesia. Thirdly, the top administrative positions during the 7 months

transition hold by Papuans inhibitants, due to the shortage of adequately trained Papuans,

thus the personnel holding on the position in the UNTEA represented by the 32 nationalities

among them both Dutch and Indonesian personnel attached as the effective liaison. Fourthly,

the main task of the quasi liaison administration of the Netherlands and Indonesian to

26 West New Guinea, UNSF (United Nations Security Force),

[http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unsfbackgr.html] (accessed on September 2, 2014).

10

UNTEA had been on the only areas of (administering the territory, appointing government

officials and member of representative councils, legislaturing for the territory, subjecting to

certain qualifications and guaranteeing civil liberties and property rights). Fifthly, post the

recruitment of qualified officers from Indonesia and liaison officers to tandem the Papuan

police personnels, the UNTEA publicized the articles of the 1962 New York Agreement as

the UN campaigns for promoting discussion groups, helped preparing the population for

transfer of administration to Indonesia as the public campaign to inform the provisions of the

agreement on the question of self-determination for preparing the Pepera. Lastly, the issue of

self-determination had been highlighted in 1963, that was stated on Article XVII through

XXI, the public position distributed to the Papuan inhibitants had been on the options of

“remaining with Indonesia” or “serving their ties with Indonesia”, under the resulted of the

1969 Pepera and the networking that produced by the social construction of the Pepera

choices (conducted by the 1,025 Papuan representatives of local councils). In April 1963, the

Indonesian government conducted the political appointee to assign a Papuan member of the

New Guinea Council, M.E.J. Bonay as the first Governor of Irian Barat (the firstly named of

West Papuan on Indonesian terms that is Irian Barat or West Irian) that was symbolized as a

province of the Republic of Indonesia.

The result of the 1969 Pepera of allowing the Papuan inhabitants was to decide

between the two constructive social-culture. It could be presumably stated that OPM

(Organisasi Papua Merdeka -- Papuan Independence Movement --) might be part of the

inhabitants that was chosen the second option of “serving their ties with Indonesia” with their

conciseness intention to be recognized of political thinking that was principally to create an

independent state of West Papua. The movement of OPM could be preserved as an

conciseness action to exist in Papua and Papua New Guinea and the awareness action to be

acknowledged of their intention that can be sealed only in relevant to the political aspect by

cementing the Papuan ties alliances from abroad and inside West Papua as well as the future

prediction that could link the Melanesian ethnicity networking as a social cultural

connectivity touching the social cohesion devise based on the ethical consideration for

contributing to a predicted aspect such as to make the Melanesian diaspora having affiliation

in time of outside their homeland in West Papua.

Beginning from 1962, the West Papuan actors attempted to identify themselves with

their political recognition and awareness actions but it was hard to understand of what their

insight intention of declaring independence that require to be studied in this journal to

translate the means of their unlawful autocracy of hope to be identified further in this paper.

One of the OPM actor was such as Seth Rumkorem, the declarator of “the independent of

West Papua”27

. The following had been set by OPM in identifying their actions in both level,

internal and external of the Indonesian territory. Post the 1962 from October 1 to July 1, 1971

could be identified as the first stage of OPM actions in order to solidify the Papuan inhabitant

27 Jim Elmslie, Irian Jaya under the Gun: Indonesian Economic Development versus West Papuan Nationalism, Adelaide: Crawford

House Publishing, 2002, p.33.

11

social cohesion of not pro to the Indonesian government by awakening the West Papuan

nationalism as the purpose of their social, politics and military movement. Although, the set

of “serving their [OPM or any Papuan inhabitant rebellions] ties with Indonesia” could not be

thought by the Indonesian government during those timeframe, due to most of the Indonesian

government’s administration integrity policy had been on the areas of implementing bahasa

Indonesia in Papua, public servants composition appointees with the Jakarta policy to train

the Papuans public servants, and by avoiding to appoint the administrators as necessary as

possible to overrule any biased impact such as replacing the Papuan civil servants with

Indonesians based on Jakarta policy by a campaign of that policy to assist the integration of

West Irian into the Indonesian nation, for instance the sending of many Irianese (the name to

called of West Papuan after the result of the 1969 Pepera) leaders to Jakarta with the leverage

of a free trip and a declaration of loyalty to Indonesia was signed28

. In contrast to the integrity

policy implementation and the intention of the Papuan inhabitants assigned in the

administration province in West Irian, the OPM had been conducted their illegitimate

autocracy of pursuing interests that could be pointed by the elites (Irian or West Papuan’s

actors) commanding instructions towards their linking in Papua and in the internal arena.

Beside Seth Rumkorem, there were three brotherhood, Kebar tribesmen, Perminas Awom and

Lodewijk Mandatjan as their coming from the same village named Arfak, embarking their

political wishful via military means to act as a combatant towards the Indoensian military

starting from July 26, 1965 until 1969. Although the conclusion was the surrender of

Mandatjan in 1969, their 4 years actions had caused the casualty between 6000 Indonesian

troops against the 30,000 people fighting in two areas such as Arfaks and Wissel Lakes

region29

.

The Papuan diaspora that had been brought by the Dutch post the existence of

UNTEA such as Marcus Kaisiepo, Herman Womsiwor, and Nicholas Jouwe, since 1965 had

announced their position as the Papuan actors overseas the West Papuan or Indonesia,

although they had been confirmed about the position of the New York Agreement and the

result of Free Choice Act in 1969, they still conducted the world publication with unfortunate

outcome over their persuasion about their existence before the UN conference30

. The

Indonesian military deradicalization to Papuan insurgency had been conducted in

Cenderawasih University which this institution as a centre for West Papuan nationalism and

clandestine OPM support. The political recognition from Indonesian side to the OPM status

and awareness approach had been conducted towards the Indonesian military placing in West

Papua by capturing the Indonesian army radio on July 1, 1971 and announcing the West

28 Rex Rumakiek, 1985, “West Papua: Asia or Melanesia?” in Inside Indonesia, no.4, March, p.23; Blaskett, 1993, “Resistence

Movements as a Nationalist Force: A Brief History of the OPM”, in Tromf G., (ed.), Islands and Enclaves: Nationalisms and Separatisms in

Island and Littoral Contexts, New Delhi: Sterling, pp.312-41; Hastings, 1982, “Double Dutch and Indonesian”, in May, R.J, and Nelson, H.,

(eds.), Melanesia: Beyond Diversity, Canberra: Research School of Pacific Studies, Australian National University; Jim Elmslie, Irian Jaya

under the Gun: Indonesian Economic Development versus West Papuan Nationalism, Adelaide: Crawford House Publishing, 2002, p.34.

29 May, B., 1978, The Indonesian Tragedy, Londonand Boston: Routledge, p.180

30 Jim Elmslie, Irian Jaya – Under the Gun, Australia: Crawford House Publishing, 2002, p.36

12

Papuan independence with its accompanying constitution accepted by the various groups

supported of what the OPM’s specific set of objectives led by Rex Rumkorem, and his

friends such as Jacob Prai, Robert Kubia, and Markas Victoria31

. The pointed OPM political

programs have ranges in the areas of military; Melanesian ethicity solidarity linking to

fascism sentiment as the principle of their awakening the freedom of expression and

participation; disregarded the administration central political appointees in governing the

West Papuan administration structures by establishing a proxy all West Papuan in placing to

the government; formulating the best remedy over a free health care; support the notion of

environmentally friendly, equality in jobs and housing, peace, justice, democracy, and

religious belief; and the liberal concept of the foreign policy affirming the notion of

coexistence to other sovereign states32

.

Since the early establishment of the Freeport construction in Papua in 1970 after

Ertsberg copper and gold deposits located in the Jayawijaya Mountains found in 1966, this

international corporate with the taxation shared paying directly to the Indonesian government

and the CSR program for developing the Irian Jaya nearby the mining, had been part of the

OPM target of its anarchic military action. The conflict has occurred in 1977 by attacking the

freeport mine and large-scale fighting in the Baliem Valley33

. This installation damage

produced the constraining in Tembagapura, not only impact to devastate the pipelines

carrying the copper concentration, but the casualty between the OPM and the ABRI caused

the gun and bomb attacks with the end up of 3000 Irianese dead counted in time of the

ceasefire34

. The conflict of both side attacking has been perceived as the Indonesian

protection over the freeport, Indonesian facilities, and commercial operations, towards the

OPM in time of them firstly alleging offending to those Indonesian and FDI (Foreign Drect

Investment) complying to Indonesian interests’ installment properties.

The inside anarchic actions conducted by the OPM has been in line with its external

actions of how do the West Papuans existing overseas, such as maintaining the international –

ally OPM representatives by lobbying PNG and the UN for the purpose of gaining sympathy

in treating their case with Markas Victoria as the OPM’s headquarters in West Papua.

Although, of what the external conducts had been conducted by the OPM, it returned with the

little sympathy. The independence of PNG in 1975 and its attempts to have the reciprocal

credential recognition bilaterally with Indonesia, had impacted to sort of little support of the

Melanesian ethnicity devices to support the OPM-PNG allies. In line with, a less luck

31 Ondawame interview, 22/11/94 cited by Jim Elmslie, Irian Jaya – Under the Gun, Australia: Crawford House Publishing, 2002,

p.38.

32 Op.cit., Jim Elmslie, Irian Jaya – Under the Gun, Australia: Crawford House Publishing, 2002, p.52

33 Osborne, Indonesia’s Secret War: The Guerilla Struggle in Irian Jaya, 1985b, Sydney: Allen and Unwin, pp.67-9

34 Ondawame interview, 22/11/94 cited in Jim Elmslie, Irian Jaya – Under the Gun, Australia: Crawford House Publishing, 2002,

p.42; and, Osborne, Indonesia’s Secret War: The Guerilla Struggle in Irian Jaya, 1985b, Sydney: Allen and Unwin, p.69

13

position prior to the UN conferences had been gained by the OPM as the realpolitik condition

in handling of what the extents of the Indonesian diplomacies externally over its geopolitical

existences and UN recognition in obeying to the norms, rules, and good conducts as the UN

member country. Although with the realpolitik of a little sympathy, the OPM still conducted

their announcing radical identity inside the West Papua, such as raising the Morning Star flag

outside the provincial parliament on February 9, 1984, although more than 100 Melanesian

ethnicity had comes to be the members of ABRI35

.

Amidst, all of what Indonesian government have done in Papua, the OPM still

kidnapped the seven Indonesian officials, including several high-ranking army officers. This

means that no matters how hard the efforts of Indonesia since the New York Agreement in

1962, the OPM still attempted to identify itself as a different Melanesian ethnicity rather than

others that have been part of the integral identity among the Indonesians and as the mutual

respect individuals among the individuals from other countries. The contrasting efforts of the

OPM from Indonesian has been about the means of the political security orientation and the

way in managing the Melanesia ethnicity social-cultural agenda. At one hand, Indonesia has

emphasized about the political integrity in managing its administrative structure in balancing

the central authority and provincial integration rectitude based on the patronage (central

appointees), provincial identity in cultural approaches, funding allocation for infrastructure

basis, state direct investment for transfer of technology and managerial knowledge as the

virtues. On the other hand, the OPM has two central elites in managing of what the means of

the OPM conducted its identity and its gathering sympathy with the similar Melanesia

ethnicity. It has the contrasting posit from what Rex Rumkorem and John Somen ever since

thinking about the means of articulating the West Papuan independence, although both OPM

elites recognized of what the causal determination in the 1962 New York Agreement. Rex

Rumkorem with his realism approach conducting his first attacking and first step engagement

in pursuing its political program in West Papua and towards the outside world such as PNG,

UN, and the Netherlands. In contrast to John Somen, he with his factionalism and

coordinated programs has the networking alliances based on pursuing interest approach to get

done of what his programs in the areas of the Melanesian approach with the European-based

OPM and conducting the seizing control towards its enemy via kidnapping over the

Indonesian strategic integrity program such as transmigration camp due to he has the funding

to purchase the armaments. With the capacity of the OPM to have the linking in gaining

funding revenue from a variety of sources, Somen has an order internationally to do:

companies’ taxing (unlawful taxing), cash-cropping (the cultivation of coffees, marijuana,

sandalwoods to send to Australia, and other international supply chain in having money and

arm inventory), and the sale of gold and diamonds36

.

35 Jim Elmslie, Irian Jaya – Under the Gun, Australia: Crawford House Publishing, 2002, p.45.

36 Jim Elmslie, Irian Jaya – Under the Gun, Australia: Crawford House Publishing, 2002, pp.62-64.

14

By those means of the juxtaposition level of recognition and understanding between

Indonesia and the OPM, both side understood of what had been conducted by them having

the orientation of how to gain control inside West Papuan on their own hands. The series of

arm fiasco between both sides had brought virtues in social justice of what each side wanted

to want in declaring their pursuing of interest in relevant to the juxtaposition virtues over

Melanesian identity and Melanesian integrity. The source of funding has been perceived

through lessons in the eyes of the OPM, of where the Melanesian integrity could gain

lawfully of what they could have even more under the umbrella of the Indonesian province of

West Papua other than the uprising linking to the unlawful conducts towards the strategic

Indonesian FDI facilities and commercial businesses which had been conducted under the

autocracy of hope of two entities’ ambitions. Both Rex Rumkorem and John Somen had core

actions of how to gain control in handling the inside Papua with their own knowledge by

raising the OPM flag and harsh attacking towards Indonesian and comercial corporates. The

means of insurgencies towards the Indonesian unity policy and securing the international

Direct investment to the mining settlement and commercial business as well as the

government installation had been the tangible conducts conducted by the OPM since 1962 its

announcing of independence and the national dialogue with West Papuan in early 1999 still

maintained the independence discussion as the OPM proposal with the refusal conclusion

noted by the Habibie’s regime although the highlighted options to the OPM has been about

the forms of autonomy in economic development, types of federalism away from the

independence discussion.

D. The distribution of power in Papua and Decentralization

Post 1999 subscribes of how West Papua could position itself with the foreseeable

threat of the provincial policy on the area of the independence conclusion output along the

possible discussion between the OPM and Indonesia. Although federalism with the special

autonomy emphasis on the economic development has been decided as the Indonesian

proposed remedy in calling the sense of gaining sympathy other than the exit road of freedom

of declaring back of the OPM identity as the state as the goal of its pursuit of interest in

relevant of gaining all the name of West Papua on the sake of the OPM. With this possible

insurgency tidal wave towards the Indonesian national integrity, Indonesia has to be reformed

its central and provincial relationships to apply the concept of decentralization based on

delegation of the central authority to the local level on political, security, economy in

allocating financial localities, and social culture under the banner of the legalized legal

construction. Firstly inception, the 1945 General Constitution amanded as it points over the

confirmation of the republic state of how the unitary state of Indonesia is divided into

provincial regions and areas of the province consisting of the local authority configuring

below the local government consists of districts and muncipalities governed by laws. This

concept of local government autonomy roles defines of how the republic state still has the

affairs extended to the local government on behalf of what the central government authority

delegating its power over public policy, electing the provincial/local elites, and human

15

resource management as well as the strategic planning into implementation. In other words,

the legal context sheds the decentralization policy reflected on the article 1, and article 18 (1)

and (5) of the 1945 General Constitution.

The lexicon of independence, has been perceived by the Indonesian reformist

government post the 1998 transition and the reformist government resulted from the 1999

general election as the terminology of self determination that reply by the extraordinary

approach of granting the special autonomy in performing decentralization based on the

democratic concept as virtues of central-local spreading power in motion from the nexus of

power authority to delegation of the provincial so as to the local peripheries. One and half

decade of the reformation era offering the determination over the self-determination proposal

to the provincial level and the special condition occured inside West Papua, the analysis of

the West Papua adjustable adaptation on the central public policy of decentralization and the

provincial’s capacity to adopt the best approach to satisfy the decentralization in

implementation could be splited into two stages. The first stage of self-determination is in

seeking its needs to be articulated and the second stage is on how the decentralization as the

extended far reaching of the central government could effort the provincial rule authonomy to

be implemented at the local level. The first stage had been on how to reduce the

radicalization over the possible turmoil as before had been conducted by the OPM as the

history prior the reformation era had recorded. The conflict resolution subscribes the remedy

through the existence of the political, social and cultural institution such as Assembly of the

peoples of Papua (MRP -- Majelis Rakyat Papua--). Moreover, by the establishment of the

legal law as the proxy of democratization and decentralization have been the two approaches

in handling the causes of the West Papuan’s problems. Those have been about political

security and economic disparities which military as the existing of the central power and

special authonomy based on additional funding in relevant to the project allocation have been

the answer for dealing with the economic inequality.

Albeit the economic inequality has been not the precise problem in managing the

cental-domestics budget allocation, the recycle of the realpolitik threats has been about the

fear of Indonesian politicians’ during the establishment of the regional proliferation bill

(ketentuan pemekaran) was that power and economic resources can produce any insurgency

and separatism actions inside the particular localities37

. The establishment of the 2001 Law

No.21 concerning to Special Authonomy Status for Papua has the purposes in the areas of

curing the disparities between two conflicting hopes linking to avoiding the historic abuse of

the human rights principle and preserving humanism approach to all peoples; integrity

principle has been awakening the social justice other than independence state based on the

localities’ interests for development; civil rights acknowledgement linking to the economic

resources in producing the material source of economic development based on the allocation

of funding proportion, and, legality before the law towards the civil rights under the banner of

37 Mietzner, M, October 2007, Local election and authonomy in Papua and Aceh: Mitigating or fueling sesscionism?, Indonesia,

pp.1-39

16

the positivism of the legal laws. The coming of the legal context had part of the policy

solution over the implementation of special autonomy and the burden that could be dissolved

in assisting the localities in developing its management knowledge via the central autocracy

of hopes to be delegated at local level thorugh the patterns of APBD (Anggaran Pendapatan

& Belanja Daerah --Provincial Budget Revenue & Expenditure Allocation--) and DUA

(Dana Alokasi Umum --General Allocation Fund --) & DAK (Dana Alokasi Khusus --Special

Allocation Fund--). Moreover, the budget watchdog from the central authority and the central

program for local dissemination for safeguarding the governance concept to the provincial

levels, and the blending political security over the military, police, and civil-police as well as

civil-military for supervising the commitment of preserving national security among the

trilateral juxtaposition of the following constructive conducts: the state’s role for providing

security, the security apparatus and law enforcers for committing the state’s tasks and valuing

the essense of security of human rights for common peoples and for producing the social

security to the sake of common security, and the civil empowerment for securing their

environment based on the civil society interest and the central-local government targetted

programs.

As Papuan and West Papuan having the 3,5 geographical sized larger than the side

of Java island, with the population of 4 million as 60% from it living in remote areas other

than in urban areas pointed as Jayapura (Papua) and Manokwari (West Papua), the Papuans

work in the area of civil servants and plantation. In order to secure this Papuan demography,

as the central role of Jakarta’s public policy in providing security, the military curb have been

paving ever since the trilateral cooperation in colonizing the West Papuan under the 1962

New York agreement as the shared commitment among Indonesia, the UN and the

Netherlands. As the purpose of the Indonesian military check and finding the equilibrium the

realpolitik inside West Papua has been about securing the West Papua. What have been

conducted by Indonesia in articulating its course of the Indonesian politics of foreign policy

positions in making the crossroads of the international politics by embracing Soviet of its

IMET (International Military Education and Training) for balancing what had been

constructed among the UN and the Netherlands. By this Indonesian position, the US and

followed by Australia attempted to appease Indonesia over the possibility in leaning to the

communism by conducting the mining business with the US corporate of Freemort

MacMoran in 1967, before the 1969 referendum in West Papua among its Papuans social

cultural proxies38

. Although, in time of the transition period, there was the casuality hurted

the Indonesian soldiers in time of the open conflict between the Netherlands and Indonesia39

;

38 Stuart Rollo, “Ending our pragmatic complicity in West Papua”, in ABC, [www.abc.net.au/news/2013-10-28/rollo-west-papua-

complicity/5049204] (accessed on October 24, 2014).

39 Through the year of 1962, the Soekarno’s Foreign Minister, Soebandrio’s policy over embracing the Wesy Papuan to be part of

Indonesia tha was via confronting directly to the Dutch. The infiltration phase of Operation Trikora attempted to force the Dutch’s Navy

for the purpose of getting Vlakke Hoek. Aftermath the incident, the Netherlands suffered minimal outrages and Indonesia endured 73

wounded soldiers and 94 Indonesian soldiers lost their lifes. The second open conflict between the Netherlands and Indonesia was in Biak.

In this time, Indonesia had been supplemented by the Soviet’s military equipment as the leaning to the Eastern Block can be doned by

Indonesia, along the Western assistance to Indonesia had been push forward by the other plot of FDI package and international funding

assistance to establish the freeport in the later years. For further reading, see, Wies Platje, “Dutch Sigint and the Conflict with Indonesia”,

17

the proposal from Elsworth Bunker to transfer the West Papua to Indonesia in May 1963 had

been agreed with the prior patterns of the August 15, 1962 Agreement and the UNTEA

(United Nations Temporrray Executive Authority) to supervise the transition period to shift

the West Papuan colonialization from the Netherlands’s political control to Indonesian

administrative-governing territory40

. After the Act of Free Choice in 1969 to determine the

populations’s views on Papua and West Papua’s future with the result was in favor to

Indonesian position, Indonesian policy to West Papua have been about of how to support the

provincial integration in the variation of central-provincial delegation of power

(administration patronage system) and delegated the central power via decentralization of

authority since the reformation era, post 1999, by allowing the localities to direct in voting

their provincial leaders from the positions of Governors (provincial elections), Regents

(regency elections), Mayors (municipal elections) as the representative of the decentralized

elites. Although ever since 2001 this decentralized election in Papua had not been

implemented similar with other provinces. The direct provincial has just been implemented in

2008; although, in 2014 there is a political consession in amending the direct political

election in the local levels (the implementation of the indirect political election as the phase

of the local political elections)41

.

The policy of integrity with the unification of the regulation implementation to the

provincial level has been the core of the Indonesian national policy by preserving the security

control as the only breaking point at the bottom line in placing the military and police

personnels in local areas. The outline of major events have been the only reason of how the

posture of the military and police assigned the operational military zones. With the legacy of

sharp military control in West Papua and the major events conflicting between Indonesian

and the OPM since 1966 to 2010s, the patterns of casualties impacted to the peoples, the

foreign assets, the state infrastructures, and comercial business. The Indonesian military

personnels, the OPM, and the community consisting of the OPM semitism and the common

peoples record having lost their lives in the major incidents between Indonesian confronting

to the OPM . For about 16,532 civilians has been lost and 36 Indonesian of non Papuan

residents and foreigners have been part of the victims of the conflict between Indonesian

army and police personnels with the OPM . The lost scores from the civilians counting draw

with the similar impact of the death tolls to the Indonesian security personnels and the OPM

as well as the West Papuan National Committe (KNPB) . They were 50; 157; and 1 of total

lost respectively from each side.

Intelligence and National Security, 2001, pp.285-312; and, “Operation Trikora- Indonesia’s Takeover of West New Guinea”, Pathfinder: Air

Power Development Center Bulletin (Air Power Development Center), 2011.

40 Colony of West Papua, United Nations Trusteeship of West Papua, [colonywestpapua.info] (accessed on October 24, 2014).

41 Sunny Tanuwidjaja, “Direct or indirect election: does it matter”, The Jakarta Post, (January 20, 2011),

[www.thejakartapost.com/news/2011/01/20/direct-or-indirect-election-does-it-matter.html] (accessed on October 24, 2014).

18

The social security and welfare indicate the common sense of the central

government policy to the local implementation having the proportion of 80% for the purpose

of financing the government personnel and programs, and the rest of 20% allocated for the

special allocation funding such as education, health and hospital infrastructure,

transportation, and local maintenance. In line to the fix budget proportion that is relatively

uniformed across the provinces in Indonesia, the good gavernance implementing in the ways

of how the universal principles of transparency, social justice, human rights, and democracy

could be implemented by the government program and the civil society empowerment. The

transparency principle portrays on the process making and implementation stages for the

infrastructures building which the approvals run in the lines of parliaments, the government

and the corporate contractors. Although the poor planning procedures mixed with the poor

outcomes that has to be fixed by the more planning and evaluation, the example of three

major investment such as (1) projects to improve access to the highlands, (2) the Trans-Papua

road system; and, (3) infrastructure/industrial/urban schemes42

. Those picture of implemented

infrastructure building have to be ended up with the symtom of the “big-bang”

decentralization in Papua and West Papua which the lack of coordination between levels of

government has to be formed into the ad hoc basis. As an instance, kabupaten roads are being

built without any plans on how they will be connected to the broader provincial and central

government networks as the productive investments to be the policy solution for resolving the

traffic issues. The social justice and human rights run in line with the broader common

perception of how the general public could be retained by the establishment of the

commercial basis in their homeland. The example of Freeport Indonesia runs hospitals and

build roads as benchmark strategy of how the construction and the use of infrastructure

consolidate their interactions43

. The democracy principle not only embodies in the forms of

the political elections, but it also has to be tracked by the political security condition inside

Papua. So that is why the legal condition in 2001 had to be waited for about 7 years until it

can be implemented in 2008 even in 2014 the indirect political election is the unification

format for the provincial election to the Indonesian common national strategy for national

political leaders regeneration.

The value threats perception from those trilateral juxtaposition has positioned the

central government to engage visibly more via the infrastructure and development approach

in concentrating those two output factors for attaining the outcome of economy and social

cultures and the one things that should be preserved ever since the 1962 New York agreement

has been about political security in human resource management empowerment as the

proportion of the civil servants expanses reflected from APBD on the score of 80%. In this

local budget allocation, the central government still emphasize the political security has to be

valued the civil empowerment and the civil welfare rights upon the areas of community

42 Investing in the Future of Papua and West Papua: Infrastructure for Sustainable Development, “Infrastructure strategies for

Papua and West Papua”, p.5

43 Ibid, p.17

19

engagement, health facilities, education, and social cultural pursuits with the public

information medium for supporting the integrity principle of the provincial interest to

comprehend to the national interests of the central autocracy. Those military grip should

engage more on the areas of educating the people in national tematic issues, workforce

education in transfer of knowledge, and managerinal knowledge based on the social structure

in meeting the value of central-local integrity interests in relevant to avoid the unprecedented,

bias, obscurity, unforseeable threats of local intention towards the self-determination.

E. Conclusion

As this journal being sealed in understanding the spectrum of what the West Papuan

made their history and the interdependence principals connecting the West Papuan with the

integrity principals from Indonesia post the internal-external decision in pointing the better

worth of West Papuan and Papuan to be rules by the political preferences inside Papuans and

the benchmark concept of what the post colonialism and the independent administration had

portrayed of what the Indonesian could be even more made ever since the 1945 independent

in embracing the integrity principle, this paper represents the discourse between the factual

evidence and the hermeneutics approach to interpret the articulation of what the inside West

Papuan attempted to identify themselves and the assimilation approaches that have been

conducted by both sides political recognition over the awareness of disintegration and the

recognized actions made by the Papuan actors or elites in identifying themselves as classified

identification. Moreover, as the understanding requires a metaphor of action articulation, the

genesis of Indonesian action towards the Papuan and the OPM having a relevance of how the

interdependence postulate in supporting the Indonesian national integration could favour the

common interest existing inside Papua other than the micro ethnicity goal in pursuing

interests that relatively coming from the elite centric perception over their bounded rationality

to understanding the common interest or the common relativism as well as the common

rationality in meaning the common sense of communal binding.

The transformation of Indonesian integrity policy has attempted to value in relevant to

the common principles such as equality and freedom of voices or expressions as well as the

intention to build/rebuild the mutual shared of development of West Papuans as some

parameters could be the legitimate resources of the West Papuan elites in representing or

presenting their political orientation and intention. The three genesis of the political security,

economy, and social culture are the breakthrough of how the conception of the Indonesian

national interests of the integrity principles could be favoured to the implementation of the

conception theories of good governance, central-local shared responsibility and delegation

strategy as well as decentralization to the bottom line practices.

The contradiction principle between the Indonesian military and police with the OPM

has to be faced off by the numbers of casualties that guarded the peoples and the

20

infrastructure building in Papua. Although, the values in relevant to the constructive

identification have the similar goals between the both sides of meaning the actual conducts

with self-determination as the precision to be understood complementary with the advance

and proper planning of the Indonesian government to win the two levels game theory

attempted to be conducted by the OPM ever since its announcement of independent in 1962.

The proximity of recognition and understanding can be reflected on the goal of the people in

determining the essence of self-determination of whether it would be value the essence of

constructive identities for the common purpose linking the central to the provincial levels or

the through arrogant value of independence that cannot and cannot be tolerated any relevant

value of common share of belonging.

The history of West Papua and Papua from the NNG until their actual names

determined by the 2001 proliferation law come by purposed and orientation of the subjects

who has conducted the colonization principles. The taxation, police security safeguards,

transfer of technology in housing, plantation and trade, hospital, commercial infrastructure,

public-private collateral buildings, and central-local administration have been subscribed the

essence of the managerial based knowledge to support and to adjust the provincial

development inside Papua. The Melanesian networking although has been awarded by the

colony to produce the circular networking but in some extent there is the sense of the identity

crises of how the ethnic civic engagement is not the only essense of the gaining advantages of

the integrity principle in implementation. The nexus of transmigration for supporting integrity

and provincial economic development has been transformed by getting lessons from the

previous inter land cooperation of collecting texation from the local people to the NNG

administrates until the Jakarta conception for integrity development based on provincial

funding of revenue and expenditures as well as FDI for safeguarding the public-private

partnerships concept of natural resources redemption noted by the Jakarta strategy and

corporate payment of texation and infrastructure building deployment stipulated on the

agreed position of the undersigned contracts participants.

The juxtaposition between consciousness and awareness could be translated from the

interrelated insterest since Indonesian independence in 1945 of how the social-culture based

on the 1949 bilateral legal binding concerning to the trilateral considered migration purposes

stipulated in the government rhetoric by complying to the Indo-Netherlands negotiation

statuette could pattern the political, economy and social-cultures foundation in West Papua.

The Indo-Netherlands credential exchange came along with the capacity of Indonesia to

position itself in the UN as the 60th member. The remaining status of the West Papua had to

be concluded by numbers of precedented key moments colliding into the three conferences in

Malino, Pangkal Pinang, and Holandia to the area of the resettlement status of the Indo-

Netherlands descendants as well as the KING’s indigenous living; the 1962 New York

Agreement as the trilateral standard to establish the transition ruling to succeed the trasfer of

the West Papuan, previously named as NNG under the Netherlands colony to Indonesian

republic; and the 1969 Act of Free Choices for the purpose of getting to know the indepth

interest of the West Papua with the result of pro integration as the conclusion of their

21

intention. Although, the OPM started their struggle to pursue the Melanesian indigenous

independence based on the knowledge of their elites centric in determining their political

orientation at the two level spectrums in the two means of adjoining the international

alliances to be part of the UN conference of the non-status participant and the hawkish

attitudes to identify their illegitimate military power towards the Indonesian military-police

demobilization.

Ever since the 1962 New York Agreement the attempts for the OPM identification

had been recorded that the hawkish attitude was the only means to pursue their outcry to

defeat of what they called as the bottleneck of their political orientation. The 1966 incident

was the first constraint between the OPM to the Indonesian army, and the spectrum of battle

of never ending ceasefires has been initially ended in 2010. The central role of Jakarta’s

public policy in providing security inside West papua and Papua have been transformed by

still demobilizing the military curb with the police complementary position as well as to

adhere the administration rules of central-provincial programs with the good governance

strategies for common shared principles in appeasing the universalistic principles of

transparency, social justice, human rights, and democracy as the portrait of the good

governance program to supplement the runs of the conservative government program and

civil society engagement.

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