European Monetary Union in Africa

I. Introduction

European Economic and Monetary Union excludes at present three EU member states, but

extends to sovereign states not subject to the Treaties (Monaco, the Vatican) and some overseas

areas of member states, such as the African island of Mayotte, part of France. In addition a large

part of Africa is in a monetary but not a currency union with the EU. EMU’s monetary shadow

over independent Africa is the subject of this article. Here three regional currencies, long in the

monetary area of France, are now but local expressions of the euro, to which two former

Portuguese colonies have now added their own local currency variants.

In the 1990s the impending introduction of the single European currency aroused considerable

anxiety in those African countries facing probable inclusion in the EU’s monetary union. Should

the EC institutions take over responsibility for monetary policy in the former French African

overseas territories, although they were not in the EU, and were never part of the EEC before

independence? Should France instead maintain its monetary guarantee, and if so, should the

CFA franc be decoupled from the future European currency? Should the CFA franc zones

perhaps simply disappear?

Paris, Brussels and the African governments concerned finally agreed that the currencies in the

fourteen Francophone states should become local variants of the euro. In 1998 two former

overseas countries of Portugal decided to join the CFA zone, and were also pegged to the euro

the following year. Two of the three CFA franc cum euro monetary zones have since expanded,

and have also integrated economically. This paper puts the evolving African euro zone in its

historical context, and considers what has changed with the changeover from the franc CFA

pegged to the French franc, to one pegged to the euro. Do the African nations affected wish to

maintain their common pseudo-currency? The paper then considers the suggestion that Africa’s

proxy euro zone should expand to take in perhaps the entire sub Saharan continent, which has

long had a privileged relationship with the EU. Whatever its eventual size, do Africans and

Europeans see a European monetary zone in Africa as an opportunity or as an anachronistic

burden? Do Africans within the zone want to remain tied to the EU to a degree that exists in no

other sovereign states outside Europe, or do they prefer to aim eventually for a common

currency of their own? Before considering these questions, it is of interest to sketch a brief

historical background.

II The Colonial Era

That there should now be a pan-European monetary zone in Africa would have pleased the

wartime British Federal Union. Its Colonial Committee, having considered whether a future

currency union should include dependent territories, agreed that a European Federation should

give collective financial aid to backward overseas areas and that there should be free trade

between them and the Federation. However the difficult matter of a currency union between the

member states and their dependencies was shelved. (Ransome, 1991, 53-7, 118- 20, 126-9, 167-

92, 177.) The place of colonial currencies in a pan - European union also exercised French

theorists after the 1940 defeat. As one official publication pointed out, war was forging the new

Europe and opening up the possibility of a European co-operative venture in Africa; a planned

pan-European economy with supranational organisations, a single customs area, and a common

currency would efficiently develop overseas and continental resources. The Reichsmark would

be the currency of colonial Africa, irrespective of which European nation was the administrative

power in a particular area. (Postal, 1941, 43 - 51.).

After the Second World War the French Union remained a unified economic zone with a

common external customs duty, becoming in 1948 a monetary union, the zone franc area. This

had six local currencies, all pegged to the French franc. These arrangements gave France access

to primary resources without exchange rate fluctuations or charges, saving substantial sums in

foreign exchange. At this time France was pursuing a twin foreign policy aim: to achieve

European co-operation or integration while maintaining rule over the African territories. (Leduc,

1953, 29-30). The currency question in the colonies arose because French negotiators wanted to

associate or incorporate the French-African bloc into the planned European Political

Community. A co-ordinated monetary policy and a single currency were essential on a pan

European level, lest the burden of developing the dependencies devalue the franc. A weak,

unstable franc would also discourage European investments in her overseas possessions. A

single European monetary policy for the whole would protect the franc, and prevent the need to

devalue against other national currencies. A European Bank would co-ordinate overseas

investment funds. (Leduc, Oct. 1953, 29-30; idem, Sept. 1953, 18-21.)

France’s prospective European partners were not convinced of the merits of a Eurafrican

monetary union, or of colonial links of any kind. Tensions over political and economic ties with

the African colonies bedevilled negotiations into the mid 1950s after the scrapping of the EPC.

When the six Foreign Ministers of the European Coal and Steel Community met to negotiate a

Common Market in Venice in May 1956, the French delegation insisted that the mainly African

dependencies had to be included or associated with it. The Belgians and Italians agreed, but the

German and Dutch delegations balked at financing what they saw as French imperial ambitions.

(Kitzinger, 1959, 42 -5). A common currency was therefore no longer considered even among

the metropolitan areas of the Six, let alone in the dependencies.

III Independence, the EEC and the franc zone

Though a Eurafrican monetary union among the Six was shelved, the 1957 Rome Treaty had a

Declaration of Intent inviting independent states bound to France by the obligations of the franc

zone (Tunisia and Morocco) to negotiate economic conventions with the EEC. By the early

1960s thirteen French African colonies had become independent, though these continued to peg

their currencies to the French franc. The 1962 Evian Accords temporarily maintained free

Algeria in the zone, although it now had its own central bank.

The Yaoundé Agreement set up between the EEC and the associated Eighteen enabled

contributions from the other five EEC member states to ease the burden upon France in the

thirteen former colonies, while retaining control of fiscal and monetary policies there. Eleven of

the thirteen were in the CFA franc zone; the remaining two were the Malagasy and Comoros

francs. The burden was, admittedly, small, amounting to under 3% of the volume of francs in

use in France. (Fabra, 1972.)

Meeting at Cotonou in 1958 French African leaders announced their intention to seek

independence. Rather than accept French and Common Market aid, they would establish

relations with their already independent neighbours, and ultimately create a United States of

Africa. (Mortimer, 1969, 306-9). In the early 1960s the leaders of the now sovereign states

declared that they would no longer sacrifice the long-term advantages of free trade and industrial

autonomy for the short-term gains derived from French assistance. As the United Nations

Economic Commission for Africa put it, ‘association with the EEC can easily tend to perpetuate

economic dependency and thus turn out to be a long term disadvantage to the country

concerned.” (UN Economic and Social Council, 7 December 1960).

Leading Pan Africanist and Ghana President Kwame Nkrumah argued that the European

Development Fund was collective colonialism, a hindrance to horizontal trade and

industrialisation in Africa. Piece meal vertical relationships with the EEC forced African nations

to undercut one another’s prices and divided them into two camps. European aid funding would

never compensate for low commodity prices and the loss of freedom to negotiate. Its subsidies

came from the profits made out of forcing down commodity prices. In addition, the funds

dedicated to projects returned mostly to the home countries by way of expatriates’ salaries,

banking charges, and so on. Association would divide and weaken African states. Even if all

joined the EEC arrangement, they could never dictate the terms of association. African states

should instead unite as an African Common Market, and together decide freely where best to

trade and secure capital. If the Europeans could combine to secure the best trade conditions, then

so too could Africans. Association with a European preferential market would not improve

export conditions. Europe would have to buy primary products from them in any case, while

association enabled France the more easily to block the development of competing industries.

Finally, Nkrumah thought there should be a common currency to end dependency on European

currency zones. (Nkrumah, 1961, 295; Idem, 1970, 159-164, 181-2). Nkrumah, Guinea

President Sekou Touré and Mali President Modibo Keita subsequently led discussions on an

African Common Market, the nucleus of an eventual Union of African States. (Nkrumah, 1970,

141-2). In the late Sixties Congolese minister Alphonse Nguvulu suggested a Central African

economic zone of the Congo and Zambia, whose strategic materials would then free the entire

continent from aid dependence. (Nguvulu, 1968, 23).

Apart from Mali and Guinea the francophone bloc rejected Nkrumah’s advice. The colonial

acronym zone CFA was recycled to denote both the zone as a whole and each of the two main

African monetary unions. These distinct but inter related economic spaces, the West African

Economic and Monetary Union (UEMOA), and the Central African Economic and Monetary

Community (CEMAC), each have a central bank. UEMOA (Benin, Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger,

Senegal, Togo, Côte d’Ivoire and latecomer Guinea Bissau) uses the acronym CFA for its franc

de la Communauté financière africaine issued by the Central Bank of West African States or

BEAC. CEMAC (Cameroon, Central African Republic, Congo Republic, Chad, Equatorial

Guinea and Gabon) has as the Bank of Central African States or BCEAO, whose CFA currency

stands for franc de la Co-opération financière en Afrique centrale. The third currency now tied

to the euro is the Comoros franc, used in the former French colony near the East African coast.

Though all three currencies look distinctive, they are local variants of one pseudo currency,

itself a variant of the euro.

Though the GDP of the entire CFA franc zone is roughly equivalent to that of Nigeria, France

derives economic advantages from the arrangement as well as political, military and cultural

influence. It provides security for French, and now European investors, as profits can be

repatriated without risk. It was and is a stable export market for mainly French goods. In

addition, though the mechanism differs in each case, France can block any monetary decision in

the three CFA zones, thanks to its representatives on the Administrative Council of each. The

costs to France of monetary union with the African states have been justified as an indirect form

of development aid, as France makes up for any negative balance of payments. (Nguvulu, 1968,

p. 142).

Divergent African views

For Africans the franc zone has both advantages and disadvantages. The currencies’ dependence

on the French Treasury ensures long-term stability and encourages inward investment. Policy

convergence due to the free movement of currency has increased owing to recent further

integration and regular consultations between member states. (Hugon, 1994, 175-210). The

zones have neither foreign exchange restrictions nor balance of payments deficits, as Paris

underwrites their imports. Travellers can afford the living expenses abroad thanks to their

relatively strong currency (even after the devaluation), unlike their impoverished African

neighbours. As the educated are better paid than their counterparts outside the zones, they can

afford the unrestricted imported luxuries. While African critics argue that the artificial currency

maintains the pro-French urban elites in a comfortable lifestyle, apologists reply that this

encourages them to stay. In contrast, Ghana and Nigeria’s successive devaluations have

accelerated the brain drain. (Ngoupandé, 2002, 118-21).

Critics add that massive capital flight from the zones to Paris or Switzerland far exceeds foreign

aid and investment received. Though high interest rates attract inward investment, the poor

cannot obtain credit to finance new businesses, owing to the costs of borrowing money. The in

theory unrestricted access to the European market in fact confronts duties imposed on

manufactured goods and foods in competition with domestic producers. As prices are high

relative to neighbouring countries’, CFA countries rarely export to southern markets, cannot

expand their manufacturing industries and instead have to export cheap primary products to

Europe. Trade within the CFA zone is minimal - in the West African sector internal trade never

exceeds ten per cent of total exports, while in the Central African sector it has declined to less

than one per cent - so does not offset dependency on vertical trade. Trade between the CFA zone

and the wider regions is due in part to product duplication, in part to the substantial exodus of

CFA francs, as locals buy consumer goods much cheaper, for example over the border in

Nigeria. As the Anglophone countries cannot afford imported goods, they learn self- sufficiency.

(Ngoupandé, 2002, 120-1). Dependency on France remains total, as the French Treasury still

holds 65% of the zone’s receipts. This means that the compensatory aid France gives is in reality

only a partial restitution of export earnings. More generally, with monetary control comes

political domination. The franc zone is a neo colonialist mechanism. (Page, 1996; Tchundjang

Pouemi, 1980).

The 1994 devaluation

By the mid -1980s the CFA francs were increasingly overvalued relative to other African

currencies. The strong CFA franc made imports cheaper - about 60% of exchanges were and

remain with the EU- and made the zone more attractive to French businesses and banks,

responsible for massive capital repatriation. Further, competitive devaluations in neighbouring

countries flooded the zones with cheap products, encouraged cross border smuggling and black

market transactions, and reduced tax revenue. While Paris made good the official balance of

payments deficits, capital flight continued. Paris and local elites resisted for a decade

International Monetary Fund pressure to devalue. Finally in early 1994 the French government

halved the value of the CFA franc from 50 to 100 to one, without prior consultation of the zone

franc governments. The French President announced the decision at the Franco-African Summit

in Dakar that January, to the consternation of those present. They agreed to sign when Paris

promised to indemnify their state and private sectors and to cancel debts, on condition that they

reformed their banking sectors.

Devaluation was supposed to facilitate exports of primary products. But as the prices of these

are expressed in dollars, and world prices have fallen, devaluation neither encouraged local

investment and production nor encouraged regional trade with countries outside the zone (La

Dévaluation du franc CFA, 1995.) The confidence local populations felt in their local currencies

declined after the 1994 devaluation. Countries have had to increase exports of primary products

to earn the same as before. Imports cost half as much again, with salaries hardly rising. The

fixed parity against the euro continues to prevent the adjustments of local currencies necessary

to increase exports. (Fraternité Matin, 5th Nov. 1998; Dearden, 1999, 1).

Since the CFA franc displays local symbols, local populations gave the money local names,

obscuring its colonial origins. However, according to Senegalese philosopher Souleymane

Bachir Diagne, the 1994 unilateral devaluation demonstrated that despite appearances the

currencies were entirely under the control of international monetary institutions and the French

Ministry of Co-operation, unperturbed by the united opposition of the African governments

affected. (Diagne, 2001). As January 2002 approached there was a shortage of CFA notes, as the

French printer was busy manufacturing euro notes for France. (The Economist, 9th 2002, 67).

Economic Integration

In the early 1990s the two main sub zones seemed about to split up as the oil rich Central

African component was expected to devalue unilaterally, ending the franc zone altogether.

(Dupont, 1995). This crisis averted, it had then been agreed to turn the eight-member West

African Monetary Union gradually into a common market with a central economic authority,

harmonised tax and other policies, the West African Monetary and Economic Union (UEMOA).

The Central African Monetary Union became the Central African Economic and Monetary

Union, CEMAC. By 1993 there were Convergence Councils, whose brief was to harmonise

budgetary policy within and between the zones. However the 1994 devaluation shattered the

feeling of security engendered by a stable and strong currency in a zone previously free of the

crises suffered in other African states. The changeover to the euro has not affected these

developments.

IV The CFA Zone becomes a

The 1992 Treaty on European Union set out the conditions of a monetary union. Though it did

not mention the CFA franc zone, the Treaty had a Protocol guaranteeing France the right after

EMU to determine the exchange rate of France’s other postcolonial franc, the Pacific franc,

against the euro. (Protocol 1992). Officials from traditionally anti-colonial Germany and the

Netherlands had not objected to taking on indirect responsibility for the Pacific franc, used in

three French island groups. However the CFA franc is much more extensively used than its

sister franc, though the fifteen countries concerned use only 3% of total French currency in

circulation. Finance ministers from the two sceptical member states, joined now by Austria, saw

no reason in the mid 1990s to tie the euro to sovereign countries, countries that did not satisfy

the convergence criteria set out in the TEU. Consequently, while the Pacific franc changeover

required only a Protocol, the later change over to a euro zone had to overcome legal and

political obstacles from France’s partners.

That France should expect Brussels to accept an accident of colonial history was predictable,

given the long history of French pressure upon her partners whenever her European and imperial

ambitions appeared to conflict. Equally predictable was the reluctance of the Germans, the

Dutch, and new EU member Austria to inherit an arrangement that predated the Rome Treaties

and could weaken the euro’s international standing.

The uncertainty and apprehension in the franc zone as EMU approached was nothing new.

Already in the late 1980s the governments and banks of the zone franc countries had been

concerned about the possible effects of the Single European Act. Their anxiety increased after

the 1994 devaluation, when there was speculation over whether France would allow the CFA

currency to float freely after itself joining EMU, or alternatively would devalue it once more

before the parities of member state currencies were fixed. Others noted that if France remained

the guarantor of the CFA francs, and if France had difficulty meeting the European Central

Bank’s strict budgetary constraints, then she might suspend or end her support of her African

currencies, and investment there would dry up. If Brussels took over the parity agreement,

Brussels too might devalue the CFA euro unilaterally. (African Agenda, 1998). Either way,

there was concern that the budgetary constraints imposed on EMU members would apply also to

the franc CFA zone. These would be difficult, if not impossible, to comply with, as the 1994

devaluation had increased external debt.

In sum, there were at least three possible scenarios, assuming there was to be no decoupling: in

the first, the Europeans could interpret the French arrangement with the zone as a budgetary

agreement as allowed in TEU Article 109, in which case little would change. France would

remain responsible, even though there would no longer be a French franc. The CFA francs

would be the African euro in effect, but without the ECB, ECOFIN or the EMU ministers

having any legal say. These might give an opinion, but could not block any decision the French

Treasury might make. In that case, too, EMU constraints would not apply to Africa. Second, the

CFA franc could be tied to the euro as part of a monetary agreement. This would give the EC

institutions (or the ECB) the right to set conditions, rather than France alone. Third, there might

be no formal arrangement at all, though the CFA franc would be indexed to the euro. In that

case Paris might retain the right to change the parity of the two, without even consulting the

other EMU member states (De Yedagne, 1997).

The Treaty allowed for some ambiguity with respect to the adoption or modification of

exchange rates with areas outside EMU. The fact that the CFA franc was freely convertible into

French francs, soon euros, meant that the zone could be interpreted as .an internal EC matter, in

which case the ECB is involved, as it controls the application of the single monetary policy. On

the other hand the agreement between the French Treasury and the zone’s three regional central

banks could be seen as external to EMU, since the convertibility of the CFA francs do not

constitute a monetary agreement; neither the French nor the European central bank is involved.

Therefore there is no requirement to secure the agreement of all member states. The TEU’s

Article 239 adds that the EMU provisions will not affect previously contracted monetary

obligations. France also cited Article 109 of the Treaty on European Union, which permits

European states to enter agreements with other states.

The ambiguity created by these two Articles provided the loophole the French authorities

needed. The Council of the European Union (meeting as ECOFIN) would have preferred to have

the right to veto the arrangement. (Bi Hue Goore, 1998). That possibility excluded, after

protracted negotiations the ECOFIN ministers decided on the 23rd November 1998 that Article

109 applied: the monetary agreement did not affect the stability of the value of the euro (Les

Echos, 3rd and 7th July and 29th Sept. 1998). The French authorities could continue to honour the

Agreements signed with the three Central Banks. The Treasury could guarantee the

convertibility of the CFA francs into euros as it had previously, provided that the Council, the

ECB and EMU ministers approved proposed changes in the future, such as the addition of new

members into the zones. Nor was the CFA arrangement to set a precedent; France’s arrangement

was a historical legacy from colonial days that united Europe had now agreed to take over, albeit

in a minimalist fashion (98/683/CE. Fouda and Stasavage, Feb. 2000). The French Treasury may

change the parity of its anachronistically named francs against the euro, merely informing the

ECB and the Council beforehand. It is curious that the term franc has disappeared in France

while subsisting in the former colonies.

In an atmosphere of uncertainty owing to the reluctance of German, Austrian and Dutch

financial authorities to countenance any monetary laxity, the French pledged at the 1996 Franco-

African Summit (Ouagadougou) to maintain the relation between the zone’s central banks and

the French Treasury. President Chirac reassured his African counterparts that after EMU France

would not share the decision - making power over its monetary policy there, and would continue

to guarantee the convertibility of CFA francs. Since the French Central Bank, soon to be part of

the ECB, had never been involved in the longstanding arrangement, there was no reason to

involve the ECB in the future. The French Treasury would continue its budgetary and financial

support.

In late 1998 the zone franc Economics and Finance Ministers learned from their French and

Austrian counterparts in Paris that the transfer to the euro would not mean decoupling of the

currencies. (Financial Times, Le Figaro, 2 Oct. 1998; Les Echos, 1 Oct. 1998; Le Jour, 30 Sept.

1998, Le Figaro 7th July 1998). While it was now clear that European Monetary Union did not

require the dismantling of the franc zone, uncertainty remained over the parity between the two.

The then fourteen African countries concerned knew that there would be a simple changeover to

a fixed parity, as a result of a European Central Bank decision of July 1998. However they

feared the rate would mean another devaluation, given that the EU and France were both

reducing their aid (l’Humanité, 6th Dec. 1998; Figaro 27th Nov. 1998.) French Ministers have

assured African leaders that the changeover to the euro would not entail another devaluation.

(La Nouvelle République, 30th Dec. 1998; Les Echos, 5th Jan. and 17th Feb. 1999, 26th April and

26th Sept. 2001; Figaro 11th April and 2nd Oct. 1998).

That October the European Parliament’s Committee on Development and ACP Countries heard

experts explain the likely impact of the euro on ACP countries, and on the CFA zone in

particular. Benefits of pegging the CFA franc to the euro included direct access to EU markets,

low risk investment in the zone, and increased co-operation between its Western and Central

parts. The committee was assured that France’s funding of overdrafts would not affect the euro,

as the GDP of the zone was less than .5% of that of the EU; further, the ECB was not involved.

However the new CFA/euro zone would probably exacerbate distortions in the African regions

of the EU’s primary overseas aid programme, the ACP fund, as European investors would prefer

countries sharing the same currency to those outside. MEPs were concerned too that other

former colonial powers might seek to copy the franc CFA model. Spain might set up a stable

monetary regime with Latin America, or the UK with Nigeria, guaranteeing them an overdraft

facility and pegging their currency to the pound or the peseta. The MEPs learned that the

Council had banned treating the CFA zone as a precedent. The French case was a historical

anomaly; in future no bilateral exchange rate agreement would be allowed. (Mills, 1998).

In 1999 therefore a vast euro monetary zone was born in Africa. French economist Michel

Lelart pronounced the CFA zone a success; its pegging to the euro would reinforce that success.

Monetary union in these African states was now becoming a financial and economic union,

which was the reverse of the European experience (Lelart, 1999). This African integration

within the wider euro zone now included two former Portuguese colonies. Guinea-Bissau had

joined the franc zone in 1998. Cap Verde signed a four-year agreement with Portugal that same

year, giving its escudo a fixed rate against the Portuguese escudo. As parity is now fixed against

the euro the four year agreement is likely to be permanent. Portugal guarantees the

transferability and convertibility of the local currency in the same way that France guarantees

the three currencies for which it is responsible. (Les Echos, 20 th Nov. 1998; Gnassou, Jan-Feb.

2002, 17-8.)

The euro’s value against other currencies is set both by world demand and by the European

Central Bank in Frankfurt, and the value of the three African currencies fluctuates along with it.

Fears that a strong euro might make the franc zone yet more uncompetitive were eased by the

fall in the euro’s value against the dollar, though it did not make the zone’s exports to its

neighbours competitive. The weakened euro did stimulate African exports to the euro currency

zone, though it was less successful in attracting inward investment.

The finance or economics ministers of the African fifteen continue to meet their French

counterpart twice yearly, and the value of the currency remains the prerogative of Paris (or

Lisbon). Power remains in European hands, perpetuating the colonial relationship albeit with

the consent of the countries concerned. (Notre Voie, 25th July 1999). Their consent is based in

part on recognition of France’s role as their advocate in European and international forums.

(Guillaumont and Guillaumont, 1989, 144-5).

In sum, the CFA zone monetary co-operation has been ‘Europeanised;’ parity is now fixed

against the euro instead of the franc. However decision making rests with Paris, and the biennial

ministerial meetings between France and the African Fifteen that make up the three CFA zones

continue; there are no meetings between the (at present) EMU Twelve and the African Fifteen,

and Brussels has not taken over the financial obligation to cover deficits or convert reserves.

V Africa’s

We have seen that the EEC Six set up an economic partnership with 18 former colonies, the

Associated African States and Madagascar. By 1975 this group had added British former

colonies and been renamed the Association of African, Caribbean and Pacific states or ACP.

This is the EU’s major aid programme, covering all of sub Saharan Africa. With the small

territories in the Caribbean and the Pacific, by 2002 there were 78 or 79 members (Cuba being

half in). Sixty-one of them are outside the CFA euro zones.

The originally pan-European ACP arrangement may eventually split into several regional

groupings. For the present, though, the Cotonou Agreement aims to negotiate with regions

without disbanding the collective ACP system. As these regional ‘partnerships’ coincide with

the monetary sub- zones left over from French colonialism, it is arguable that they reinforce the

second -class status of excluded ACP states. This is because in the African euro zones, EU and

member state bilateral aid will consolidate co-operation with the European Twelve euro zone,

due to guaranteed currency stability and the elimination of transaction costs. The new regional

partnerships are likely to expand with the CFA franc / euro zones, as partial or full monetary

union integrates contiguous African members of the ACP/Cotonou grouping. This would export

the EU’s two- speed model to Africa, and create similar tensions and resentments there.

The externally controlled monetary policy in the CFA zone also reduces its impedes trade with

other Cotonou countries. (Dearden, 1999, 5). In addition, though all are in the trade and aid

agreement with the EU, Ghana and Nigeria, the two Anglophone Cotonou members also in the

regional free trade area ECOWAS, complain that its eight CFA fellow members attract EDF

funds at the expense of their own projects. (Fraternité Matin, 13th July 1997).

The two Anglophone members see that their Francophone and Lusophone colleagues attract a

higher proportion of EDF funding per capita than they do, but refuse to overcome these trade

distortions by joining the euro zone, as they cannot accept the loss of sovereignty and monetary

flexibility this would entail. They note that the arrival of the euro zone in Africa has made

transparent a pre-existing two-tier system of rewards in European agreements with the South.

On the other hand the fact that the EC part finances the four-yearly ECOWAS trade fairs (last

held in Accra in 1999) shows that Brussels is not always aligned with the French position.

(Notre Voie, 25th July 1999).

CFA zone expansion

Writing in the late 1980s, the Guillaumonts, French advisors to several franc zone governments,

suggested that a European monetary union would favour African economic integration within

the zone and beyond. They recommended the fusion of the ACP Agreement with a franc zone

opened up to cover much of Africa. Once fixed to a common reference currency, the exchange

rates between African countries would also be fixed. In the case of states trading primarily with

the UK the resulting stability would be the greater if that country were to join EMU also. The

EC could guarantee these currencies in the same way France did, or, more realistically in their

view, provide a limited overdrawing facility in return for good practice. The authors admitted

that their Eurafrican, somewhat neo-colonial proposal would appeal neither to all EC member

states, nor to those African states less dependent on European trade than were the CFA group.

They concluded: “If the Europe of tomorrow is able to establish its own monetary identity,

monetary co-operation with Africa would be an effective way for it to contribute additionally to

the development of that continent.” (Guillaumont and Guillaumont, 1989, 139-50).

Laurent Gbagbo, the President of Côte d’Ivoire in 2001- 2, had noted a decade previously that

within the CFA zone the former French colonies feared being marginalized by the Maastricht

Treaty’s common monetary project. He felt that Africa should create economic and political

regional blocs in order to reduce the diverse monetary regimes and minimise dependence on

historical markets. Gbagbo thought however that an African currency tied to the euro should

cover the entire Lomé area, beginning with other states in West Africa joining the CFA West

African Monetary Union. Such an enlarged CFA zone would admittedly perpetuate exchanges

with Europe, but would entrench a strong and stable currency over the entire area. Gbagbo’s

suggestion that ultimately the currency zone would coincide with the Lomé area neglected to

consider if the non-Francophone states would agree to annexation to a European monetary zone;

nor did he ask whether the European Central Bank or EU governments would approve such an

expansion (Gbagbo, 1992, 37-47).

For Paris professor Philippe Hugon a merger of the African ECU zone with the African ACP

states was the logical next step in Eurafrican relations. The divergent economic and monetary

policies of the African ACP states hindered the emergence of the regional agreements that

Brussels encouraged, he thought. He therefore proposed the full integration of the CFA zone

into EMU. In the first stage the CFA franc would be fixed against the ECU (later renamed euro).

Stage two would see at first the French Treasury but progressively Brussels guarantee the

convertibility of African currencies, both within and without the CFA zone, provided all

accepted the monetary and budgetary rules pertaining in Europe. Finally, there would be

complete monetary convergence between a large part of Europe and a large part of Africa. This

made sense in his view because the CFA zones now traded primarily with the EU, rather than

with France alone. The European (Central) Bank would cover any deficit. Hugon admitted that,

‘Naturally, the present interests of the European Community, notably of Germany (dominant at

the monetary level) and of Great Britain do not favour a Eurafrican integration. Furthermore,

African nationalisms may oppose such a project…’ (Hugon, 1994, 187-8). This Eurafrican view

resembles that of his compatriots some forty years earlier who contemplated a European

Political Community gradually forming a customs and monetary union with African colonies.

The African ACP countries have been seeking to reduce or remove regional customs barriers for

some years, whether the euro zone eventually does cover all of sub Saharan Africa, stays as it is

or disappears. We have seen that the Cotonou Agreement of mid 2000 aims to create free trade

areas between the EU and regional groupings in Africa. It is clear that for Brussels the main

CFA-euro zones are to be two of the emerging African regional partnerships with which it

intends to sign free trade agreements. Their efforts prompted the visit of President Nicole

Fontaine of the European Parliament to Ouagadougou (Burkina Faso) in January 2001 on the

occasion of UEOMA’s seventh anniversary. Fontaine compared the integration of UEMOA to

that of the EU, stressing the complementarity of their structure and aims, and conveyed the

Parliament’s support for UEOMA’s Regional Economic Partnership Agreement with the EU,

the first to follow from the EU-ACP Cotonou Agreement. The European Parliament, she

announced, was ready to assist UEOMOA’s endeavour to create its own regional Parliament, as

part of the European Union’s continued cooperation with Africa. For its part the Council of

Ministers of the Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa (CEMAC) decided in

late 2000 to negotiate a similar economic partnership agreement with the EU. (UEOMA 11 th

Dec. 2000).

That Brussels has now signed Regional Economic Partnership Agreements with these two CFA

franc/euro zones and not ECOWAS for example is understandable, given that a monetary union

with the EU already exists in what corresponds largely with the two former French colonial

federations. At present, without such Partnership Agreements with ECOWAS for example, it

seems that a Eurafrican zone is emerging rather than an open trading system. Dividing Africa

into common markets roughly based on the old French zone of influence may have unpleasant

neo-colonial connotations (. Messerlin, 8th Sept. 1998).

Even an enlarged CFA euro zone would perpetuate the division between those African countries

within the euro zone and those without. As noted earlier, German development policy has long

been suspicious of preferential arrangements. As the Lomé agreement came up for reappraisal,

the Germans’ acceptance of ‘monetary co-operation’ between the EU and the ACP states, while

vague, clearly aimed to admit non-francophone ACP members to the CFA zone in order to

reduce French influence. The CFA zone would be the model for a customs union covering the

EU and the entire African ACP area (Dialogreihe Entwicklungspolitik). Though it is unlikely

that German policy makers see the CFA zones as a precedent to tie the currencies of the entire

sub Saharan continent to the euro, we have seen that French analysts believe such a move might

ensure a fairer distribution of resources between North and South. But the German predilection

for liberalisation is likely to prevail over French political considerations. Free trade rules do not

oblige participants to enter into a monetary union. An expansion of Africa’s euro zone would

achieve one of the aims of the colonial Eurafricanists but would run counter to the African

Union’s stated ambition eventually to achieve its own universal currency. African commentators

regard a continental currency as an essential task of the AU (Muchie, 2002, 34-5). Even if the

AU falls short in this respect, African commentators generally prefer the dismantling of the CFA

zones to their expansion, although opinion is divided within the zones themselves.

VI Regional monetary unions instead of the African

Regional integration is supposed to stimulate trade and increase the political weight of the

participants, but may also create protectionist blocs. Africa holds the world record for the

number of regional organisations, most of which are dormant or weak. (McCarthy, 1997).

Already in 1963 the Organisation of African Unity had called for economic integration. The

1980 Pan African Lagos Summit proposed regional customs unions, with common markets and

local monetary unions a later goal. The aim was to end the division born of colonial history

between the Francophone and Anglophone blocs. The OAU came up with an African Economic

Community (AEC). Ratified in 1994, this aims gradually for a continental customs union with

an African Central Bank, a single African currency and a single Pan African Parliament. It will

subsume the other sub Saharan regional groupings, such as COMESA and ECOWAS (in French

CEDEAO), which are legally separate from the monetary cum economic post colonial

arrangements already discussed. The fifteen members Economic Community of West African

States or ECOWAS, created in 1975, is made up of Nigeria, Niger, Ghana, Ivory Coast, Senegal,

Benin, Togo, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Cap Verde, Mali, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Burkina

Faso. ECOWAS was to have a free trade zone in place by 2000, a central bank by 2002, and a

currency union by 2004, but these plans have now been postponed.

African Union

Despite these setbacks, in 2001 a majority of the OAU’s members ratified a treaty based on

Colonel Ghadafi’s plan for an African Union, which has now superseded the OAU and probably

the fledgling AEC too. The AU is to mirror the EU, aiming for a single passport, a single central

bank, and in forty years or so a single currency all over Africa. North African states other than

Libya have been reticent to join, as have some members of ECOWAS and SADC (the Southern

African Customs Union). Nigeria and South Africa, which avoid Libyan aid, were concerned

that their long-standing regional groupings had not had sufficient time to function effectively.

The AU also duplicates, and may supersede, the twenty member Common Market for Eastern

and Southern Africa - a preferential trade area in 1981, a free trade area in 2000 and set to

become a common market and monetary union with its own central bank by 2025. (Shacinda,

2001, 91). Whatever the ultimate fate of these smaller groupings, while the euro -linked former

French and Portuguese colonies provide a monetary model for the AU, the problems of bringing

in a common currency for an entire continent seem at present insurmountable.

Such pan- African plans hark back to Nkrumah’s original ambitions, and run counter to French

ambitions to retain influence in Africa. African intellectuals do not generally agree with their

French colleagues that expanding the European monetary presence in Africa is in the interest of

the Africans themselves (Ndumbe III, 1995). Mamadou Koulibaly of Abidjan’s National

University has noted with distaste the implicit worldview in the thesis of both the Guillamonts

and Hugon (see above) that a future European monetary expansion in Africa should coincide

with the existing preferential trade and aid agreement. Koulibaly saw in this a rehash of the old

colonial geopolitics according to which Europe and Africa, or Eurafrica, should be one of three

geo-economic and political blocs. He dismissed the alleged merits of a converged Eurafrican

monetary union and ACP aid and trade arrangement. His concern was not whether recipients of

European development aid should have their currencies underwritten by the European Central

Bank or by the French Treasury, but rather the broader issue, namely whether the monetary

agreement with France should apply throughout the larger African ACP zone, which now covers

all of sub Saharan Africa. He criticised the ‘democratic deficit’ inherent in this postcolonial

arrangement. The democratic principles the EU makes a condition of aid to ACP countries

should also apply in the monetary sphere, he feels. That means that governments and

populations must be free to reject membership of the CFA/euro zone. Instead, CFA zone

governments had no control over their monetary policy. To suggest that all of sub Saharan

Africa should be under European tutelage indefinitely was to imply that Africans could not run

their economies competently without external assistance. He doubted the alleged impressive

performance of economies in the CFA zone. There was a gross disproportion in the way the

French Treasury distributed reserves, as poor countries gained least from the collective

arrangement. While France made up for any shortfall, countries could not obtain credit or

interest on the best available terms. The system encouraged waste and irresponsibility.

(Koulibaly, 1994, 195-210; Ela, 1998, 363-85).

Since 1997 the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) to which UEMOA

belongs, has been proposing its own monetary union. But while there is in principle agreement,

there is conflict over the nature of the future common currency. Many in the former French

colonies wish to continue their CFA franc/euro parity and extend this to the larger zone.

However Ghana and Nigeria want to end what they regard as a neo-colonial and restrictive

arrangement among Francophone members, which as noted disadvantages them economically as

far as aid is concerned, though opinion is divided as to the wider economic consequences. But

we have seen that dissent exists in the African euro bloc, too. After all, many of its member

states have joined other regional groupings, and its economists and politicians have been

assessing the merits of African monetary unions or common markets. (Hadjimichael and Caly,

1998, 27-8.

The governments of the CFA zone may not agree with intellectuals such as Koulibaly. The G7

group of rich countries had decided in 1996 to cancel the debt of the most indebted nations. Of

France’s total contribution of over ten billion euros 6.4 billion had gone to the zone. Perhaps

there was insufficient consultation about its disbursement, but that did not mean that the African

CFA states wanted to sever links. The most potent symbol of such links remained the monetary

guarantees. In an interview in early 1998 economist Hakim Ben Hamouda reflected upon the

future of the CFA franc zone, the subject of an international economic symposium in Dakar that

September. Noting that the African political elite had agreed post hoc to the 1994 devaluation,

he added that it was a unilateral decision by Europeans and Americans, never discussed among

African economists or raised in public debate. Whatever the merits of monetary and economic

ties, he concluded, it was essential to hold open discussions about the future of the monetary

zone and of African union as a whole. (Diaw, May 1998).

Sanou Mbaye, a Senegalese former economist at the African Development Bank, has been

arguing for years that the CFA zone should go. He says that a common regional currency

dependent on France might have been beneficial if the two federations had remained in place

after independence. As it was, a common currency area divided by customs barriers perpetuated

exchanges with France rather than within the zones. Most Francophone African countries

surrendered control over their foreign reserves, creating profits for French firms and the elite.

France maintains a protected market for its own manufactured goods and ensures a secure

supply of raw materials, even if that means supporting unpopular undemocratic regimes. Mbaye

concludes that the francophone countries should establish their own central bank. In his view

France has weakened the entire region’s bargaining power by persuading the two monetary

unions to integrate their economies instead of abandoning links with Europe and joining Ghana

and Nigeria within ECOWAS. Attempting to make an economic union out of an artificial

monetary union simply means that at little cost to itself France maintains a captive market for its

products and services and gains political influence. French firms benefit from cheap labour and

materials, and repatriate most of the profits. Worse, local governments, under pressure from

international agencies such as the IMF and the World Bank, have sold their assets to French

companies. In short, the zone franc is deleterious colonial relic; it should go. (Mbaye, March

1994; 27 Dec. 1993- 9 Jan. 1994; April, 2000; 7th May 2000; 5-11th Feb. 2001).

Former Prime Minister of the Central African Republic and academic at Bangui University

Jean-Paul Ngoupandé disagrees. He thinks that though the currency arrangement may infantilise

the Francophone governments, the eight member West African euro zone at least should

continue, even if the fifteen-member ECOWAS zone introduces a single currency. He does not

explain how this would work in practice. (Ngoupandé, 2002, 16-19 and 358-9).

Will the West African CFA franc/euro zone expand to take in not only Cap Verde but also

ECOWAS members Liberia, Ghana, Sierra Leone and Nigeria? The agreement of all EMU

finance ministers would be required. Alternatively, ECOWAS could have its own common

currency, which it has now stated as its aim. Professor and consultant to the World Bank

Tchetche N’Guessan of Côte d’Ivoire warned that European monetary policy was not suitable

for African conditions, and that the three currencies within the CFA franc monetary area should

instead have a single currency (N’Guessan, 1996). In 1998 N’Guessan went on to suggest that

ECOWAS should have its own single currency, based on a basket of strong and weak

currencies, including the euro. (Kouassi, 11th Nov. 1998). N’Guessan implied that the CFA

zone should ultimately go. Gabonese economist Nicolas Agbohou has argued in a recent book

that the CFA franc/euro zone, far from benefiting Francophone Africa, maintains its peoples in a

state of economic and political dependency. Their poverty is due in large part to the constraints

of this unequal relationship, he says. Unlike Ngoupandé, he sees no advantage in monetary links

with Europe. Agbohou, 1999).

Whatever the views of African academics in general, CFA zone governments prefer to stay

close to Paris. Conspicuous by their absence from the AEC’s first Assembly of Heads of State

and Government (Harare, June 1997) were delegates from the three CFA franc zones. (The

African Economic Community, http://www.panafricanperspective.com/aec.htm)

The only Francophone country at the AEC meeting in November 2000 was Guinea, which is not

in the CFA zone UEMOA. How can Africa plan a West African monetary union, let alone a Pan

African common market and monetary union, as long as a large group of African countries cling

to the euro? The question is whether Africa should progressively become a monetary Eurafrica,

or whether it should break free and decide its own monetary policy. Both projects have their

supporters, though they are mutually exclusive. The very year in which the AEC came into

force, 1994, was when the two main CFA monetary zones became economic zones. UEMOA is

an obstacle to wider integration, as it splits ECOWAS in two, the mostly Francophone UEMOA

members and the Anglophone rest. It embodies too the rivalry between the Ivory Coast and

Nigeria. (Mair, 29th 2002, 22). ECOWAS alone can bring together former colonies in a political

and economic union. It is doubtful whether this can succeed with such divergent monetary

regimes.

VII Conclusion

Writing in Le monde in early 1992, Daniel Bach welcomed Europe’s ‘initiative’ in creating a

Euro-African ecu zone in Africa. (Bach 1992). Interestingly, he asserted that EMU would

‘reconnect’ the two continents. Monetary union both strengthened Franco-African relations and

entrenched once again a ‘European’ sphere of influence in Africa. A ‘Euro-African monetary

zone’ would expand into sub Saharan Africa, added Bach, though he did not state that the entire

African ACP zone should use the euro, as the Guillaumonts had suggested. We recall that in the

mid 1950s France insisted that her African ‘prolongations’ should be either integrated into pan-

Europe or given privileged association terms. Is a monetary Eurafrica attractive today? In that

case the entire continent south of the Maghreb will realise the old French dream of Eurafrica, in

the monetary and trade spheres if not politically. Though the Economic Commission for Africa

was advocating the replacement of the franc zones with African monetary union in the early

1990s, the francophone bloc appears still to cling to its monetary privileges, stressing the

advantages of trading with a large and wealthy European market on terms other African

countries cannot match. Self-interest prevails over regional solidarity or pan African aspirations.

(Dahou, 1998, 9; Cissé, in Quentin, 13th Dec. 1996).

Koulibaly argues that the CFA zones suffer from their own democratic deficit and lack of

subsidiarity, namely uncontrolled self-serving national leaders, who prize their status as clients

of France instead of allowing business to flourish and grow. He sums up his views with the

metaphor that leaders should throw themselves into the jungle of globalisation rather than

remain inside the zoo waiting for tourists/donors to throw bananas at them, which they then fight

over. The zone has to join the rest of Africa and accept the risks of globalisation, which include

democracy, decentralisation and deregulation. (Koné, 30th Nov. 1998).

The World Bank compared the economies of CFA and non-CFA countries in 2000, concluding

that poverty in the zone had increased. (World Bank, 2001). Kofi Anan for his part remarked at

the 2002 Summit of the World’s Poorest Nations that the rich had to alleviate the disaster that

was Africa.

While the five CEDEAO states have been considering creating a common currency, the eco,

(Figaro, 22ndDec.2001 and 15th April, 2002) others look forward to a common African currency,

the afro, in most or all of sub Saharan Africa. Would any kind of currency reform counter the

continent’s marginalisation? Both a monetary Eurafrica and a pan-Africa with a single currency

would overcome past colonial divisions, but the two are mutually exclusive, and there is no

consensus on the matter. In the long run monetary Eurafrica is more likely to disappear than to

expand further. The CFA zone will eventually have to enter the world jungle rather than remain

within the protected environment of the zoo. The question remains: will it make any difference

to Africa’s poor?

References

African Agenda, (1998) Vol. 1/16, ‘CFA Zone trembles at euro’s approach’.

Anon, (5th Jan. 1999). ‘La zone franc entre soulagement et inquiétude après l’arrimage réussi

du CFA à l’Euro’, Les Echos.

Anon, (15th April 2000) ‘L’eco future monnaie africaine de cinq pays africains’, Figaro.

Anon, (17th April 1999) ‘Les consequences de passage à l’euro sur les accords avec les Etats

tiers utilisant le franc français’, Les Echos.

Anon, (20th Nov. 1998) ‘La Commission de Bruxelles recommande l’arrimage de l’escudo cap-

verdien à l’euro’, Les Echos.

Anon, (22nd Dec. 2002) L’eco future monnaie de la deuxième zone monétaire de la CEDEAO,

Figaro.

Anon, (26th April 2001) ‘Fabius cherche à rassurer les pays de la zone franc’, Les Echos.

Anon, (7th July 1998) ‘Accord de l’Union européenne sur le statut du franc CFA’, Figaro.

Avis de l’Observatoire Permanent de la Coopération française, (1995) Rapport, ‘La Dévaluation

du franc CFA’, (Paris: Desclée et Brouwer,).

Bach Daniel, (14th Jan. 1992,) ‘Pour une union monétaire euro-africaine’, Le monde, Paris.

Banque de France, (April, 2000), Paris, Réunion des Ministres des Finances de la zone franc,

Malabo, le 4 avril 2000.

Dearden, Stephen J.H. (June 1999), ‘The CFA and European Monetary Union’, Discussion

Paper No. 14, (Manchester: European Development Study Group,).

Decision of the Council of the European Union of 23 rd November 1998 concerning exchange

questions relative to the CFA franc and the Comoros franc, 98/683/CE.

De Yedagne, Honorat (1997) ‘Le franc CFA et l’Euro, Les cinq scénarios possibles’, (Abidjan:

Fraternité matin).

Diagne, Souleymane Bachir (2001), ‘Learning from Africa, Special Issue on Values and

Currencies, Perspectives from Five Continents’, Zeitschrift für Kulturaustausch.

Dialogreihe Entwicklungspolitik, Lomé-studien, Options for German Proposals Towards a

reform of European development Policy, at http://www.fes.de/interntl/paiere/6iagb_kp.htm

Diaw, Malick M. (undated), in dossier La nouvelle monnaie européenne et le franc CFA,

compiled on 5th May 1998, at http://www.senegalaisement.com/body/cfa.html

Dupont, Stéphane (3rd Oct. 1995) ‘L’Afrique noire francophone se réinsère dans la communauté

financière internationale’, in Les Echos, Paris.

Ela, Jean-Marc, (1998), Innovations sociales et renaissance de l’Afrique noire: les défis du

monde d’en-bas, (Paris: L’Harmattan,).

Fabra, Paul, (2 Dec. 1972) ‘Zone franc ou zone de pauvreté?’ (Paris: Le monde).

Fouda S.M and Stasavage, D, (Feb. 2000), ‘The CFA franc zone after EMU: Status quo, Reform

or Dissolution’, in The World Economy, vol. 23/2, (Oxford: Blackwell).

Gbagbo, Laurent, (1992), L’Afrique et l’Europe en l’an 2000, in ‘L’Evènement européen,

Initiatives et Débats, dialogues eurafricains’, (Paris: Seuil).

Gnassou, Appo Laure, (Jan-Feb. 2002), ‘The Impact of the Euro on the ACP Countries’, The

Courier ACP-EU, Brussels, no. 190.

Goore, Bi Hue, (11th Nov. 1997)‘L’Avènement de l’euro, de la nécessite de repenser la zone

CFA’, Fraternité Matin.

Guillaumont Patrick and Sylviane, (1989) ‘The Implications of European Monetary Union for

African Countries’, in Journal of Common Market Studies, vol. 28/2.

Hadjimichael Michael T. and Caly, Michel, (May-June 1998), ‘La zone franc CFA et l’UEM’,

in D+C Développement et Coopération, Deutsche Stiftung für Internationale Entwicklung,

Frankfurt, No. 3.

Hugon, Philippe, (1994) L’Intégration régionale, zone franc et zone écu, in L’Intégration

régionale dans le monde, Innovations et ruptures, GEMDEV, (Paris: Karthala).

Jacques Coubard, (6th Dec. 1996) (Paris: l’Humanité,).

Kitzinger, U. W., (1959). ‘L’Europe face aux pays sous-développés’, in Un Défi à l’Occident,

L’Avenir des pays moins développés. Cours d’été au Collège de l’Europe Libre,

(Nancy/Strasbourg: Berger-Levrault),

Koné, Adama (30th Nov. 1998) ‘L’Implication des politicians menace les economies déclare le

Pr Mamadou Koulibaly’, (Abidjan: Le Jour,)

Kouassi, Georges (11th Nov. 1998) ‘Le Pr Tchetche N’Guessan pour une monnaie africaine’, in

(Abidjan: Fraternité Matin,)

Koulibaly, Mamadou, (1994) ‘Europe, France, Afrique: La réforme de la zone franc et ses

conséquences’. In L’Intégration régionale dans le monde, Innovations et ruptures, GEMDEV,

(Paris: Karthala),

Kum’a Ndumbe III, Alexander, (April 1995) ‘Africa Demands of Europe the right to Survive’,

Circular Letter 33, (Falun: Fortress Europe).

Leduc, Gaston, (Oct. 1953) ‘Les aspects financiers d’une intégration éventuelle de l’Union

française dans une Communauté européenne’, in Nouvelle Revue française d’outre-mer, Suppl.

Leduc, Gaston, (Sept. 1953).’Une banque européenne des investissements?’ In Banque, Paris,

Lelart, Michel (1999) Les conséquences de la monnaie unique pour la Zone Franc (Orléans:

Laboratoire d’Economie).

Mair, Stefan, (29th March 2002) ‘Die regionale Integration und Kooperation in Afrika südlich

der Sahara’, Beilage zur Wochenzeitung Das Parlament, Bonn.

Mbaye, Sanou (27 Dec. 1993- 9 Jan. 1994) ‘Why the CFA franc must go’, in West Africa,

Mbaye, Sanou (5-11th Feb. 2001) Franc zone must go, West Africa,

Mbaye, Sanou (7th May 2000) ‘Sortir du piège’, Le monde.

Mbaye, Sanou, (April, 2000) ‘CFA Franc: A colonial relic’, in West Africa.

Mbaye, Sanou, (March 1994) ‘L’Afrique noire happée par le marché mondial’, (Paris; Le monde

diplomatique,)

McCarthy, Colin, (1997). ‘Regional Integration, Part of the Solution or Part of the Problem?’ in

Ellis, Stephen, Africa Now, (London: Routledge),

Messerlin, Patrick A., (8th Sept. 1998) L’Afrique et l’Union européenne renégocient le cadre de

leurs échanges, Le monde.

Mills, Rob, (Nov. 1998) European Parliament public hearing on the euro and ACP countries,

29th Oct. 1998, Liaison News, no. 41.

Mortimer, Edward, (1969) France and the Africans 1944-60, A Political History, Faber and

Faber Ltd, London.

Muchie, Mammo, (May 2002), ‘Wanted, African Single Currency,’ (London: New African ).

Ngoupandé, Jean-Paul, (2002) L’Afrique sans la France, (Paris: Albin Michel).

Nguvulu, Alphonse, (28 Jan. 1968) Jeune Afrique, no. 368, Paris.

Nicaud, Gérard, (2nd Oct. 1998) ‘L’euro protégé le franc CFA’, Figaro.

Nicolas Agbohou, (1999) Le franc CFA et l’euro contre l’Afrique, (Paris: Ed. Solidarité

mondiale).

N’Guessan, Tchétché (1996) Gouvernance et politique monétaire. A qui profitent les banques

centrales de zone franc? (Paris: Harmattan.)

Nkrumah, Kwame, (1970) Africa Must Unite, (London: Panaf Books Ltd),

Nkrumah, Kwame, (Jan. 1961) ‘Showdown in Central Africa’, Foreign Affairs, vol. 39/2.

Notre Voie, (25th July 1999) Abidjan, Côte d’Ivoire.

Ojo, Oladeji O ed., (1996) Africa and Europe: The Changing Economic Relationship. (London:

Zed books).

Pan-African Perspective, ‘The African Economic Community’,

http://www.panafricanperspective.com/aec.htm

Patrick and Sylviane Guillaumont, (1989) The Implications of European Monetary Union for

African Countries, in Journal of Common Market Studies, vol. 28/2, pp. 139-50.

Postal, Raymond, (1941) Introduction, France 1941, La Révolution nationale constructive. Un

bilan et un programme. (Paris: Ed. Alsatia).

Protocol on France: France will keep the privilege of monetary emission in its overseas

territories under the terms established by its national laws, and will be solely entitled to

determine the parity of the CFP franc.

Ransome, P. (1991).Towards the United States of Europe, (London: Lothian Foundation Press),

Robert, Maurice, (27th Nov. 1998) ‘Une politique africaine frileuse’, Figaro.

Shacinda, Shapi, (Jan.-Feb. 2001) ‘COMESA – Africa’s first Free Trade Area’, in The Courier,

DG for Development, EC, No. 184. (Brussels).

Stephen J.H. Dearden, (June 1999) ‘The CFA and European Monetary Union’, Discussion Paper

No. 14, (Manchester: European Development Study Group),

Tchundjang Pouemi, Joseph (1980) Monnaie, servitude et liberté. La répression monétaire en

Afrique. (Paris: Ed jeune Afrique).

The Economist, (9th Feb. 2002), (London).

UEOMA Commission, Ouagadougou, (Jan. 2001)

Decision No. 59/00-UEAC-085 CM-05, N’djamena, 11th Dec. 2000.

UN Economic and Social Council Document E/CN.14/72, (7 December 1960), The Impact of

Western European Integration on African Trade and Development.

World Bank (2001) ‘Assistance to CFA countries – An Evaluation of Selected Social, Economic

and Regional Aspects of the Bank’s Performance’ (OED).

(Article Length: eight thousand, five hundred and one words.)