the electoral trap: why the eu should think beyond belarus's parliamentary election

The elecToral Trap

anaïs Marin FIIa BrIeFING paper 111 • September 2012

U L KO P O L I I T T I N EN INS T I T U U T T I

U T R I K E S P O L I T I S K A INS T I T U T E T

THE F I N N I S H I N S T I T U T E OF I N T E R N AT I O N A L AFFA IR S

111

Why The eU ShoUld ThINk BeyoNd

BelarUS’S parlIaMeNTary elecTIoN

• One should not expect the 23 September election to complywith democratic standards.ThecurrentlegislationinBelarusdoesnotguaranteeafreeandfairprocess.Theinstitutionalsettingpreventsatransparentvotecountandtheelectionofoppositioncandidates.

• Yet,insendingafull-fledgedobservationmissiontoBelarus,theOSCEagainappearstobegivingofficialMinskthebenefitofthedoubt.Breakingtheviciouscircleofexternalregimelegitimationwould require consistency and restraint in giving this periodic electoral farce any credencewhatsoever.

• Imitating procedural democracy brings regime consolidation for Lukashenka: enticing theoppositionforces–andtheirWesternsupportersforthatmatter–intotheelectoraltrapisapre-emptiveschemetodisqualifythem.Decapitated,divided,distrusted,theoppositionisincapableofcarryingoutregimechange.

• The regime’s repressive build-up also dissuades Belarusians from mobilising to contest thepredictablefraud–fornow.Theyarenonethelessexpressingincreasingdemandsforindependentelectionmonitoring.

• Inviewofthe2015presidentialelections,theEUshouldinvestmoreinthecapacity-buildingandtrainingofcivilsocietyactors,notablydomestic electionobservers.Turningvotersintoreliableruleoflawwatchdogscouldraiseawarenessin,anddemandfordemocracyinBelarus.

The elecToral Trap

FIIa Briefing paper 111

September 2012

Why The eU ShoUld ThINk BeyoNd

BelarUS’S parlIaMeNTary elecTIoN

The eU’s eastern Neighbourhood and russia research programme

The Finnish Institute of International affairs

U L KO P O L I I T T I N EN INS T I T U U T T I

U T R I K E S P O L I T I S K A INS T I T U T E T

THE F I N N I S H I N S T I T U T E OF I N T E R N AT I O N A L AFFA IR S

anaïs Marin

researcher


The FINNISh INSTITUTe oF INTerNaTIoNal aFFaIrS 3

Electionsinmostautocraticregimesbeingamereformality,the23SeptemberparliamentaryelectioninBelarusshouldbringnosurprises:thevotewillpredictablyfallshortofmeetingOSCEdemocracystandards.Havingfendedoffthethreatofapopu-larrevolt,AlexanderLukashenkaisconfidentthatrigged resultswill not be contested fromwithin.However,awareofWesternscepticism,heissurelyexpectingthelegitimacyofthiselectiontobecon-testedfromoutsidethecountry.

In this respect, onemight questionwhether theWest,insendingelectionobservers,isinfactplay-ingbyLukashenka’srules.Whoeverdoessosetsinmotionamechanismoflegitimationthatcontrib-utestoconsolidatingtheregime–aneventualitythatcontradictstheEU’sstatedgoalsofenhancingdemocracyandsupportingcivilsocietyinBelarus.Likethesegmentofthepoliticaloppositionwhichfieldedcandidates,theEUhasfallenintoan“elec-toraltrap”.Thepurposeofthispaperistohighlighthowthishashappened,raisethequestionofwhy,andsuggestawayout.

A predictable farce: the institutional set-up

WhatlessonshavewelearntfrompreviouselectionsinBelarus?Since1996,falsificationshaveensuredthat only state-backed candidates performwell.Lukashenka has proclaimed himself re-electedthree timeswith80%victories, andnot a singleoppositioncandidatehasevermadeittoParliament.

Thereisnoreasontoexpectadifferentoutcomethistime.WhereaspromisesweremadetotheWestin2008and2010,nowMinskisnotevenpretendingtobeholdinganythingbutamasterclassintheuseofpoliticaltechnologiesfor“managed”elections.

Theregimehassetthetone.FormonthsAlexanderLukashenkahasstressedthatinthenextlegislaturetherewillbe“noroomforchatterers”.TheheadoftheCentralElectionCommission(CEC),LidziyaYarmoshina,inchargesince1996,claimsthattheelectoral legislation does not need any amend-ment.Thecurrent speakerof the lowerchamberofParliament,UladzimirAndreychanka,warnedin June that “onlypeople loyal to thehomelandshouldmake it to theHouseofRepresentatives”.InLukashenkistrhetoric,thisexcludesoppositioncandidates,whoarepicturedas“traitors”inBela-rus,especiallysincetheirallegedattemptto“derailthepeacefulcourse”ofthelastpresidentialelectionon19December2010.

ElectoralprocessesinBelarusaretightlycontrolledbythestateviaadisciplinedbureaucracy.Repre-sentativesoftheexecutivebranchofpoweralonedecidewhether to registernominees in electoralcommissions.Given the accountability structureoftheadministrativepyramid,civilservantsinter-ferewiththeelectoralprocesswhentoldtodosoand theCEC is fully dependent on the Presidenthimself. Subordinate to the CEC are 110 districtelectioncommissions (DECs,atokrug level),oneper constituency andbelow them6,301 precinct

an official poster calling voters to the 23 September parliamentary

elections. Underneath is the campaign material of dmitri

Shevtsov, the pro-government candidate running in this

constituency. photographed in Minsk, 6 September 2012


electoral commissions (PECs, at polling stationlevel,uchastki),comprising68,945PECmembersaltogether.

InaccordancewithSovietelectoraltraditions,PECmembersandcandidatesstandingforelectioncanbenominated in threeways:by registeredpoliti-calpartiesand“otherpublicorganisations”(dulyregistered associations, trade unions, non-profitorganisations,etc.);bylabourcollectivesofenter-prisesofover300employees;andbycitizens’initia-tivegroupshavingcollected1,000validsignaturesfromlocalvoters.Appealsagainstdecisionsnottoregisternomineesandcandidatesarepossible,butcompliantjudgesseldomoverturnthem.

UndertheamendedArticle34oftheElectoralCode,the shareofcivil servants inPECscannotexceedone third, and another third is reserved for rep-resentativesofpoliticalparties.Yetpluralismisafaçade,astheauthoritiesensurePECsaredominatedby“their”people.AsTable1illustrates,fortheseelections opposition entitiesmanaged to submitonly0.77%ofallPECnominees–forlackofaccesstoadministrativeresources,reservedforpro-gov-ernmentalappointees.The“passingrate”oftheirnominees(0.09%)comparedtopro-governmentalones(80%onaverage)illustratestheextentofthediscrimination.

For unregistered parties without regional repre-sentationoffices,collectingcitizens’signaturesisoftentheonlypossiblenominationchannel.Yetthelocal authoritiesmonopolise it tofield their ownPECmembersand“favourites”.Theyrestrictaccesstobusy streets, public transport andworkplaceswherepicketingforcollectingcitizens’signaturesorcampaigningisallowed.Theyalsorecruit“pocketobservers”fromtheranksoftheBelarusianRepub-licanYouthUnion(BRSM)orassociationsofveter-ans toobstruct theworkof“inimical”observers,whetherdomesticorinternational.

EachPEC is responsible for compilingvoter lists,whichcanbeamendedupuntilelectionday.Intheabsenceofacentralisedvoterlist,cross-checkingformultiple entries isde facto impossible. SincePECsalsosupervisevotingandballotcountsaswellas handling complaints, they are essential linksin the chainof commandallowing the regime tosecuredesiredturnoutlevelsandresults.Addedtotheopacityofballotcountsanddoubtssurrounding

“earlyvoting”1,thishaslongfuelledsuspicionsthatresultsareeasily“adjusted”post hoc inBelarus.2

The regime’s repressive build-up

AuthoritarianismhasenteredaconsolidatedphaseinBelarus;withelectionsapproaching,theregimekeepstighteningitsgrip.Restrictingcompetitionbyoperationoflawisatypicalinstitutional featureof“pre-emptive”authoritarianism.3 Lukashenkaincreasinglyreliesonadditionaltactical measuresto oppress people and dissuade them from pro-testing.Whereasthedangerofanoverthrowbya“colourrevolution”waspre-emptivelydispelledin2006,whattheregimeisafraidofnowisaRussiancivicmobilisationscenario.IfexitpollsandsocialnetworkswereabletobringRussia’selectionsintodisrepute with the general public in 2011-2012,Lukashenka is taking particular pride in testingthetechnologiestopreventthisfromhappeninginBelarusthisautumn.

InJune,theCodeofAdministrativeOffenceswasamended to sanction“unauthorisedopinion sur-veys”: individuals conducting exit pollswithoutaccreditationwillnowbefined theequivalentof200euros,andorganisations1,000.ThisobviouslytargetstheVilnius-basedBelarusianpollsterIISEPS,whichpreviouslyrevealeddiscrepanciesbetweenofficialresultsandelectionratingsbasedonpolls.

1 Presentedasa“democratic”achievement,theopportunityto

voteduringthefivedayspriortoelectionSundayisbelieved

tofacilitatemanipulation,eitherbyinfluencingthechoice

ofvoters“bussed”topollingstations(students,soldiersand

factoryworkersareoftentimesforcedtovoteearlier),ordue

totheinsufficientsecuritisationofvotingpremisesandballot

boxesoutsideofvotinghours.

2 Foranoverviewofvoteriggingtechnologies,cf.Anaïs

Marin“BelarusElection.FraudandRepressionasUsual”,

Baltic Worlds,29December2010,http://balticworlds.com/

frauds-and-repression-as-usual/.

3 “Pre-emption”isawaytopreventcontestationfromemerg-

ingbydealingwithitinadvance.Thisparadigmwascoined

bylatepoliticalscientistVitaliSilitskitodescribeLukashen-

ka’sstrategicbuild-upagainsttheriskofdemocraticcon-

tagion.Cf.V.Silitski“PreemptingDemocracy:TheCaseof

Belarus”,Journal of Democracy,16(4),2005,p.83-97.


Regulationswereintroducedtoinstilfearintoeverysegmentofsociety.Followinglastyear’sso-called“Revolution through Social Networks”, the legalqualification of “unauthorisedmass events”waswidenedtoinclude“thoseorganisedvia theinternetforthepurposeofprotestactionor inaction”.

Extending theprerogativesof the security forcesis another way to nip potential contestation inthebud:theymaynowenteranyflatinsearchofpeoplesuspectedofhavingcommittedacrimeorof“intending tocommitone”.Thecontrolarsenalalsoincludesthemandatoryfingerprintingofthewholemale population (allegedly to combat terrorism)andbanningcitizensfromexitingthecountryon“preventivesupervision”grounds.

Grantingcivilservantsandthesecurityforcespayrises(threetimesthisyearalready)pertainstothetactical-operational category of pre-emptivelybuyingtheloyaltyofthepraetorianguard.TheKGBandits“meninplainclothes”areonthealert.Using“blackPR”,via internet“trolls” forexample, thesecurityserviceshaveconductedsuccessfulsmearcampaignstodiscreditandintimidateoppositionactivists.Since thecampaignofficiallystartedon22 August, several administrators of opposition-mindedgroupsinsocialmedianetworkshavebeenarrested.

Apersonalistleadercannottolerateanycompetition.In18yearsofrule,Lukashenkahasalsoeradicatedtheconditionsforpluralism,trustinpoliticalpartiesandevenpopulardemandforamultipartylife.Nonewpartyhasbeenregisteredsince1996.Thesingle-mandatemajoritariansystemfavours“independent”candidates(amisleadinglabelinBelarus):only8ofthe110MPselectedin2008areaffiliatedwithaparty.UnregisteredpartiesandNGOsremainoutsidersasfaraspoliticallifeisconcerned,andpariahsinthemedialandscape.

Thecrackdownondissentsince19December2010hasarguablyworsenedthedemoralisationandsenseofhopelessnessamongtheopposition,whichhasfailedtodeviseawinningstrategyinresponsetoLukashenka’stactics.Thissituationcanbeattributedtothesuccessofauthoritarianpre-emption:byholdingelectionseverytwoyearssince2000,theregimehassettheagendaforthefool’sbargainintowhichitdragsitsdetractors.Thefrequencyofelectionsconstrainsthetime-spaceopportunitiesformobilisation,forcingtheoppositiontodesignsituationalopportunitytacticsinsteadofalong-termstrategyandgovernmentprogrammes.4

4 AsarguedbyAliaksandrShamiakin“TheAlignmentofForc-

esafterPresidentialElections2010andaSystemProblemof

theBelarusianOpposition”,Analytical Belarusian Center,

11July2012,http://abcby.info/articles/48.

NOMINATION CHANNELNumber of

nominees

Share of all

nominees (in %)

Number of

nominees registered

Average passing

rate (in %)

By political parties and other

public organisations, of which:~36,500 43.1 ~31,230 85.6

pro-governmental parties (1) 3,119 3.7 2,610 83.7

pro-governmental public organisations (2) 26,719 31.4 23,707 88.7

opposition parties (3) 664 0.8 61* 0.1

other public associations ~6,145 7.3 4,844 ~78.8

By citizens’ initiative groups 32,908 38.8 ~26,200 79.6

By labour collectives 15,375 18.1 ~11,170 72.6

TOTAL 84,781 100 68,945 81.3

Table 1. Membership of precinct electoral commissions (PECs)

* Note: of whom 35 registered in Brest oblast’ (south-west Belarus). (1) communist party of Belarus; republican party of labour and Justice; Belarusian Social-Sportive party; agrarian party; republican party. (2) Federation of Trade Unions of Belarus; republican Social Union Belaya Rus’; Belarusian republican youth Union (BRSM); Belarusian Union of Women; Belarusian public association of Veterans. (3) United civic party (UCP); Belarusian party of leftists “Fair World”; BNF-party (Belarusian popular Front); Belarusian Social democratic party Hramada; Belarusian Greens party.


However, the fact that the opposition – and itsWesterndonorsforthatmatter–remainhostagestothisdeceptivegamecanbepartlyblamedonthesystemic weakness of the Belarusian oppositionitself.

Election cycles further divide the opposition

Elections exacerbate the opposition’s structuralincapacitytouniteandsowdiscordintheirranks.Theyalsoconfrontdemocratswithamoraldilemma–whethertoparticipatewhilepoliticalprisonersarestillinprison.ItshouldbenotedthatmostBelaru-siansareindifferenttotheplightoftheseprisoners,asstatepropagandaconsistentlydepictsthejailedactivists as dangerous conspirators in the pay ofWesterninterests.

In2012themainboneofcontentionwhicheventu-allysplittheshort-lived“CoalitionoftheSix”wastheveryissueofwhethertoparticipateinorboycotttheelections.Expertsarguethatbothoptionsare“equallydefeating”,however.5WhilerunningforaseatinapocketParliamentinuncompetitivecondi-tionswouldbeinvain,thealternativeself-exclusionfromtheracenarrowstheopposition’schancesofcommunicatingdemocraticmessagestothelargerpublicandimprovingitsrating.Asaresult,threeuncoordinatedstrategiescoexist:

• active boycott–thepathdefendedbyVitaliRymasheuski’sChristianDemocratsandtheSocialDemocraticAssemblyNarodnaya Hramada,ledbyex-headofstateStanislauShushkevich;

• conditional participation–premisedonthereleaseofpoliticalprisonersandreformofelectorallegislation.ItisadvocatedbyAnatolLyabedzka’sfollowerswithintheUnitedCivicParty(UCP)(whichnominatedcandidatesbutwillwithdrawthemandcallforavote“againstall”ifconditionsarenotmetbythetimeearlyvotingstarts)andalsobytheBNFParty6;

5 DzianisMelyantsouandAlexeiPikulik“ElectionsorBoycott

asElementsoftheOppositionZugzwang”,Belarus Head-

lines,VI,February2012,p.5.

6 Apreviouslypublishedversionofthisbriefingpaperincor-

rectlylistedtheBNFPartyasanadvocateoffullparticipation.

• full participation–thechoicemadebyFairWorld,TelltheTruth,ForFreedomandtheSocialistDemocratParty(headedbyjailedpresidentialcandidateMikolaStatkevich).

Whereas takingpart in the electoral farce grantsthe process, and the parliamentary institutionitself,undeservedlegitimacy,theboycottstrategyseemsdoomed to failure as only 14.2%of polledvoterssupportit.7Theauthoritieseasilysabotagedtheboycottcampaign“Ignor-2012”byaccusingitsparticipantsof“unlawfulearlycampaigning”andbanningthemfromthestatemedia.

Outofthe494candidatesnominated(afigureup25%comparedwith2008),theCECregistered372.Theshareofnomineesdeniedregistration(24.6%)complies with CEC forecasts. As a result of therejections,infourconstituencieselectionswillbenon-competitive,sinceonlyonecandidateisrun-ning. Cynically enough, the passing rate ofUCPcandidateswhoannouncedtheywillwithdrawishigh,as isthatofthe93nomineesoftheLiberal-DemocraticParty,apuppetrightistpartyallegedlyshiftingfrompro-governmentaltooppositionist.Asfortheradicalopposition,althoughtheCECappearsreadytoletBNF-Partynationalistsrun(only9%oftheirnomineesweredeniedregistration),fallaciouspretextswereinvokedforrejectingthecandidacyofAliaksandrMilinkevich(leaderof“ForFreedom”),aprominentoppositionfigurewhomtheUSandtheEUhadbackedinthe2006presidentialelections.

Acertainrotationcanbeexpectedgiventhatonly21 incumbents (19% of the actingMPs) are run-ningforaseatagain;yetitwillleadtorejuvenatingtheParliamentrather thanradicallychanging itssociologicalandideologicalfoundations.Since115(31%)oftheregisteredcandidateswerefieldedbyoppositionparties,itistheoreticallyplausiblethatafewofthemwillgainseats.Thiswouldgivethevoteasemblanceoffairness,withoutentailingmuchriskfortheregime,however.

7 Nationalpollconductedbetween2and12Junewith1,498

respondents.Questionsanddata(inRussian)availableat

www.iiseps.org/data.html,lastaccessed22August2012.


The EU’s inconsistencies facilitate regime consolidation

Entrappedby itsown“carrotandstick”policies,weakenedbyinternaldivisionsandcontradictions,misledbygrant-seekersfromwithintheBelarusianopposition,theEUstilllacksacomprehensivestrat-egytowardsBelarus.Foronce,theelectionisnotbeingheldaheadofschedule:theEUhadplentyoftimetoprepareforitanddesigncontingencyplans.

Swappingunrealisticdemands,suchasrespectforelectoraldemocracystandards,formoresocially-oriented demands that round-tablemeetings beheld betweenbureaucrats and representatives ofcivilsocietyforexample,couldhavetriggeredapar-adigmshift.Instead,theEU-27hasadopteda“waitand see” approach. Despite diplomatic tensionsfollowingtheexpulsionoftheSwedishambassadorfromMinskon8August,Europeanspostponedtheadoptionofajointandclear-cutresponseuntillateOctober.

ThefactthatseveralEUgovernmentsuncondition-allymandatedobserverstotheOSCEdulygrantstheelectionundeservedexternallegitimacy.ByinvitingCECchairpersonLidziyaYarmoshina–onavisa-banlistsince2006–toitsJulymeetinginVienna,theOSCEsentthedisturbingsignalthatitremainsreadytoplayLukashenka’sdeceptivegame.

Thisinconsistencyis indeedpuzzlingas itcontra-dictsfirmerpositionsdeclaredearlieron.Westerndemocraciesneverrecognisedtheabusivedissolu-tionoftheBelarusianParliamentafterthesuspiciousNovember1996referendumwherebyLukashenkaappropriated all legislative prerogatives. Provenfraudinthe2008voteledWesterndemocraciestodenytheoutgoinglegislatureanylegitimacy;hencetheEUdidnotsendBelarusianMPsaninvitationtojoinEuronest, theparliamentaryassemblyof theEasternPartnership.Furthermore,inJanuary2011,BelaruscloseddowntheOSCEofficeinMinsk,argu-ingithad“fulfilleditsmission”.

Table 2. Political forces in presence

NOMINATION CHANNELs* Nominated Registered Passing rate (in %)

By political parties and other organisations

Pro-governmental parties 136 101 74.2

liberal-democratic party of Belarus 93 70 77.8

communist party of Belarus 23 21 91.3

republican party of labour and Justice 19 9 47.4

Belarusian Social-Sportive party 1 1 100

Opposition parties 128 102 79.6

United civil party 48 35 73

Belarusian popular Front 33 30 90

Belarusian party of leftists “Fair World” 32 26 80

Belarusian Social democratic party Hramada 15 11 73.3

By citizens’ initiative groups, including: n/k n/k 56

“Tell the Truth!” campaign 25 13 52

For Freedom Movement n/k n/k n/k

By labour collectives 19 16 84.2

By labour collectives and initiative groups 89 89 100

Other combinations of nomination channels n/k n/k n/k

TOTAL 494 372 75.3

* The three available nomination channels can be combined. hence 96 candidates for registration combined two nomination methods and 4 all three methods, according to the CEC. The latter does not provide detailed data as to whether a candidate having used a channel other than party-nomination can be considered pro-governmental or pro-opposition, for example.

Sources: CEC data; ‘human rights defenders for Free elections’ July and august monitoring reports (www.european-exchange.org); author’s calculations (and approximations when data missing).


Both hard and soft conditionality has failed todemocratiseBelarus,butinthemeantimetheWesthas learnt toplayLukashenka’sown“carrotandstick” repertoire.Whereas escalating confronta-tionwiththeWestandrepressionagainstinternalenemies(the“5thcolumn”ofpoliticalopponents,civic activists and independent media) are twosidesofthesame“stick”,mimickingelectionsandinvitinginternationalobserverstomonitorthemarecomplementarysidesofthesame“carrot”.

The 23 September election is a trap for WesterndemocraciesbecauseLukashenkamayfoolthemagainbyplayinghisjokercard(releasingpoliticalprisoners)beforevotingstarts,orbyhand-picking“construc-tive”oppositioncandidatesfortheParliament.Shoulditconvincethelessprincipledobservers,thisappar-entprogresswouldearnhimtherewardofreturningto the “normalisation” agenda on his own terms.Democracyimitationbringstheregimetheminimallegitimationneededtogainbenevolencefrompoten-tialWesterninvestorsandcreditors.

Instead,Belarus’sworseninghumanrightsrecord8shouldprompttheEUtosticktoitsprinciples.WhytheWestkeepsonplayingbyLukashenka’srulesremainsamysteryformostoutsideanalysts.ThefactthatBrusselsdidnotobjecttocontinuingbusinessasusualwiththeBelarusianForeignMinistryaftertheformerHeadofthePresidentialAdministration,UladzimirMakey(onitsvisa-banlistforhisroleintheon-going crackdownagainst theopposition),wasappointedForeignMinisteron20August,fuelsspeculationthatsomeEUgovernmentshavealreadyagreedtonegotiatea“reset”withofficialMinsk,oranexitstrategyforthe“lastdictatorofEurope”.

TheideathatLukashenka,ifofferedaninternationalpositionsuchas futurechairmanof theRussia-ledEurasianUnion,couldleaveofficewillinglybeforehistermendswasrecentlyairedbySiarheiHaydukevich,the leaderof theLiberalDemocraticParty (LDPB).9

8 Thisworryingevolutioniswelldocumentedinthereports

releasedlastJulybytheUNHumanRightsCouncil,theOSCE

ParliamentaryAssemblyandtheEuropeanParliament.

9 QuotedbyDenisLavnikevich“Thedecisiononthedeputies

oftheparliamentisalreadymade”,Belarus Security Blog,

28June2012,www.bsblog.info/?p=1226.Theideamightbe

discardedasunseriousgiventhatHaydukevichisoftenseen

asaBelarusianavatarofVladimirZhirinovsky.

However eccentric it may sound, such a scenariomightbetothelikingofpartoftheBelarusianbureau-cracy. “Fair Electionswithout Lukashenka” couldalsobecomeaunitingsloganfortheoppositionandencourageittodraftajointgovernmentprogrammeabletoappealtothewiderBelarusianpublic.

Lookingbeyond2012tothe2015presidentialelec-tion – the only one that counts in a personalistregime–themostconsistentstepfortheEUnowistoignoreLukashenkaaltogether.Afterall,WesterndemocraciesdidnotrecognisetheriggedOctober2004 referendumwhich lifted the constitutionallimitationofthepresidentialtermtotwomandates.

Recommendations for de-legitimising the regime:

supporting the awakening of civil society

Thereisnoroomforpro-democracymovementstoseekregimechangevia electionsinBelarus;neitherwillBelarusiansriseupagainsttheircurrentleader.However, recent sociological surveys reveal theawakeningofa“civicsense”inBelarus.AsinRussia,agrowingnumberofBelarusians,includingthosewithin the bureaucracy and the economic elite,realisethattheregimeisdupingthem.

ThelastelectoralcycleinRussiashowedthatirre-spectiveoftheirpoliticalpreferences,citizensnowwant to hold the state accountable for electoralfraud. Although mobilisation in Russia did notevolve intoa“colourrevolution”, the fact that itundermines the legitimacy of Putin’s regime isobviousfromaBelarusianstandpointaswell.ThistrenddeservesmoreattentionintheWest.Callingforfairer electionsisanapoliticalenoughdemandfor rallying a critical mass of supporters whomstraightforwardoppositiontoLukashenkahasnotmanagedtoconvincesofar.

InBelarus,thefirstsignsofacivicawakeningcamein2011followingthecurrencycrisis,whichledtothecollapseoftheso-called“Belarusianeconomicmiracle”andthesubsequent“socialcontract”alleg-edlycementingthepatriarchalrelationshipbetweenLukashenkaand“his”people.InMaycar-driversangryoverpetrolpricerisestartedawaveofstreetprotestsorganisedviasocialnetworks.The11AprilMinskmetrobombingshookthe“havenofsecurity”myth,whichlamentablycollapsedwiththeSwedish“teddybear”attackon4July2012.Asforthemyth


thata“balancedmultivectorforeignpolicy”securesBelarus’ssovereignty,ithasalsounravelled.FullyisolatedfromtheWest,BelarusismorevulnerabletothepressuresofRussia’seconomicappetite.

The“manageddemocracy”mythcouldwellbethenext to fall apart: according toan IISEPSpoll, inJunelessthan37%thoughtthat“theelectionswillbefreeandfair”;55%agreedwiththestatementthat“theelectionresultwillnotdependonmyvote”and47%that“theauthoritieshavealreadydecidedonthedistributionofseatsinParliament”.SurveysshowthatBelarusianshavelosttrustintheirleader-shipanditsgovernancemodel.Agrowingnumber(77.3%inJune)believethat“Belarusneedschanges”.True,theyarescepticalastowhethertheoppositioncanbringaboutpositivechange,andonly10%havethestaminatofightforitthemselves.However,inmid-2011 thousandssilentlyhit thestreetswhentheirpersonalwelfarewasatstake.Theymightnowinnovatewithothercivic disobedienceactions iftheirelectoralrightsarefurtherabused.

Infact,BelarusiansmayhavelostfaithinLukashen-ka’s electoral farces, but they are gaining confi-dence inparticipativedemocracy–andhence inthemselves.AccordingtoIISEPS,inJune67.3%ofrespondentsagreedwiththestatementthat“inde-pendent observation favours amore honest andobjectiveelection”,22.7%werereadyto“becomeobservers” and 28% to “provide observers withinformationonviolations”.Thesearehighfiguresforareputedlyapatheticalandacceptingelectorate.

Whereas the deployment of OSCE observers hasdonelittlesofartoensurethedemocratisationofvoting processes in Belarus, year after year theirpresenceinPECshascontributedtobenchmarkingandawareness-raisingonissuessuchaselectoraltransparency.Asaconsequence,somePECmem-bers,manyelectors,andmostoftheindependentdomestic observers have becomemore proactiveduringthesuspiciousstagesoftheelectoralprocess.Inpreviouselections,domesticobserverscouldbeheard reading out articles of the Electoral Codewhen PEC members were violating procedures.Although,forwantofabetterstrategy,deployingtheir observers remains themost legitimatewayforWesterndemocraciestojustifytheircriticismsofLukashenka’s“elections”,steppingupeffortstobuildBelarusianobservers’owncapacitytolegallycontesttheelectionresultsshouldbecomeapriority.

SeveralNGOsactuallyintendtofieldtraineddomes-ticobserversforthiselection.10AsinRussialastyear,

10 NGO“Viasna”andtheBelarusianHelsinkiCommittee

establishedatask-forceofsome400electionmonitors,the

“HumanRightsDefendersforFreeElections”(cf.theirweekly

reportsonwww.european-exchange.org).Amonitoring

campaign“ForFairElections2012”wasalsolaunchedby13

oppositionpartiesandmovements.AsforBelarusWatch,an

initiativebystudentsoftheVilnius-basedEuropean

HumanitiesUniversityandtheBelarusianHumanRights

House,italsoactivatedits“ElectionObservation–Theory

andPractice”campaign(www.eotp.info).

a propaganda poster that states “For Belarus for

the people” in Minsk during the independence day

celebrations in July 2011. photo: anaïs Marin.


a real-time“mapofviolations”website (electby.org)hasbeencreated to record infringementsofelectoral regulations: it is readily being updatedbased on reports of fraud and abuses observedby volunteers across the country. Although theauthoritieswillsurelyblockaccesstothiswebsite,its very existence is a sign that now even non-opposition-mindedvotersarenotafraid tovoicetheirdiscontent.ThisechoesthesuccessfulpopularmobilisationtriggeredbyUladzimirNyaklyayeu’s“TelltheTruth!”movement,whichlaunchedacam-paignin2010totipoffcorruptionandisnowmak-ingabiographicalinventoryof“Lidziya’ssoldiers”staffingelectoralcommissions.

Alaw-abidingpeopleturnedpassivebytheconstantfearofrepression,BelarusianscouldbecomemoredemandingtowardstheStatewhenrespectfortherule of law is infringedby civil servants.Uncon-vincedbyWesterndemocracystandards,theyareastonishinglyscrupulousanddiligentindefendinginthecourtsthegenuineimplementationofthelaw,howeverimperfectitmaybe.Theemergenceofvol-untary“watchdogs”inBelarusisconsequentlygoodnews,evenifitentailsenhancedrisksthatofficialMinskbeefsuprepressioninresponse.

Sinceitprovedeffectiveinshakingthefoundationsof neighbouring authoritarianRussia earlier thisyear,theEUshouldencouragethispromisingtrendin Belarus. To help Belarusian voters prepare fortheirnextrendezvous withproceduraldemocracy,the2015presidentialelection,theWestshouldstepupeffortstosupportthisburgeoningcivicawaken-ing.Capacity-buildingneeds actions,notwords:whatpro-democraticCSOsneedwhentheircom-puters,mobilephonesandcamerasare seizedbytheKGBisadatabackuponasafeserverabroadandthequick replacementof confiscated technology.


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The Finnish Institute of International affairs is an independent

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Trainingdomestic observersmeans ensuring thewide diffusion of internet videos showing howballotsaresortedindemocraticelections,whereanyvoterisallowedtoparticipateintheworkofaPECorobservevote-counting.Investinginyouthimpliesensuringthatpro-democraticyoungpeople,whoareactiveinternetandsocialnetworkusers,cansafelyremaininBelarustoworkforthefutureof theircountry,not for the regime’s“technolo-gists”orforWesterndonorsabroad.

Afteryearsof investing indemocracy,assistanceprogrammes and in opposition forces–manyofwhichproved“democratic”innameonly,donor-oriented and incapable ofmaturing into partiesabletoenforcepowerchangeinBelarus–theWestshouldnowdesignarealstrategyofcivilsocietyempowerment.

the electoral trap: why the eu should think beyond belarus's parliamentary election

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