tertullian's concept of the soul and his corporealistic ontology (pre-print)
TRANSCRIPT
43
Tertullian’s Concept of the Soul and His Corporealistic
Ontology* Petr KITZLER
(Prague)
One of the most remarkable theological-philosophical themes
occurring in the work of Tertullian of Carthage is his doctrine of the
soul1, mainly as it is explained in his extensive treatise De anima, the
first overall Christian treatment of this topic2.
* This paper is based on my previous treatment of this topic published in German
as “Nihil enim anima si non corpus. Tertullian und die Körperlichkeit der Seele”,
Wiener Studien, 122 (2009), p. 145-169. Its essential tenets were introduced for the
first time during the Director’s Work-in-Progress Seminar at the Warburg Institute,
School of Advanced Study, University of London in 2008.
1 For a systematic treatment of Tertullian’s Seelenlehre cf., e.g., P. BOUËDRON,
Quid senserit de natura animae Tertullianus, Nannetibus, 1861; (ANONYMOUS),
“Tertullians Seelenlehre”, Der Katholik, 45 (1865), p. 195-231; G. R. HAUSCHILD,
Tertullian’s Psychologie und Erkenntnisstheorie, Programm des städtischen
Gymnasiums Frankfurt am Main 1879-1880, Frankfurt am Main, 1880; G. ESSER,
Die Seelenlehre Tertullians, Paderborn, 1893; F. SEYER, Tertullianus, quae de
anima humana senserit, Unpublished Dissertation Wien, 1937; J. H. WASZINK,
ed., Tertulliani De anima, Amserdam, 1947; H. KARPP, Probleme altchristlicher
Anthropologie. Biblische Anthropologie und philosophische Psychologie bei den
Kirchenvätern des dritten Jahrhunderts, Gütersloh, 1950; J. ALEXANDRE, Une
chair pour la gloire. L’anthropologie réaliste et mystique de Tertullien, Paris,
2001; J. LEAL, La antropología de Tertuliano. Estudio de los tratados polémicos
de los años 207-212 d. C., Roma, 2001; J. BARNES, “Anima Christiana” in Body
and Soul in Ancient Philosophy, ed. D. FREDE, B. REIS, Berlin – New York, 2009,
p. 447-464. Cf. also E. GONZALEZ, The Fate of the Dead in Early Third Century
North African Christianity, Tübingen, 2014.
2 The fundamental critical edition of this treatise together with an unsurpassed
commentary was published by J. H. WASZINK, ed., Tertulliani De anima,
Amsterdam, 1947 (reprint Leiden, 2010); Waszink’s Latin text is reprinted with
minor corrections also in TERTULLIANUS, Opera omnia, 2, Turnhout, 1954
(Corpus Christianorum, Series Latina [= CCSL], 2), p. 779-869 (the Latin
citations of De anima in this paper are taken from this edition); the same author
has published also the index to De anima, cf. J. H. WASZINK, Index verborum et
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This writing, influenced by Tertullian’s attachment to Montanism3
and originating from between 203 and 213 A.D.4, is, however,
neither the first Christian systematics nor the first “textbook of
Christian psychology”, as is sometimes imprecisely claimed5. It is
far more Tertullian’s often one-sided reply to the pagan doctrines of
the soul or to the single elements of these doctrines which were used
by the proponents of the different Christian heresies of the second
and third centuries. This reply has, as usual with Tertullian, one
principal aim: to discredit his enemy and to refute his opinion.
Fifty eight chapters of De anima can be divided – apart from
the introduction (exordium, chapters 1-3) and conclusion (peroratio,
chapter 58) – into three bigger thematic clusters. The first part
(chapters 4-21) is dedicated to main qualities of the soul (the
locutionum quae Tertulliani De anima libro continentur, Bonn, 1935 (reprint
Hildesheim – New York, 1971), as well as the German translation of Tertullian’s
all three “psychological” treatises (De anima, De testimonio animae, De censu
animae), together with an introduction and explanatory notes, cf. TERTULLIAN, Die
Seele ist ein Hauch (Über die Seele, Das Zeugnis der Seele, Vom Ursprung der
Seele), eingeleitet, übersetzt und erläutert von J. H. WASZINK, Zürich – München,
19862 (first edition Zürich, 1980). The modern English translation of De anima
(which I quote throughout this paper) was prepared by E. A. QUAIN, and it is
contained within the book TERTULLIAN, Apologetic Works and Minucius Felix
Octavius, Washington, D. C., 1950 (Fathers of the Church, 10), p. 163-309
(reprint 1962). The Italian translation, furnished with Latin original and
explanatory notes was published as TERTULLIANO, L’anima, ed. M. MENGHI,
Venezia, 1988. For the French series Sources chrétiennes [= SC], the new
commented edition and translation of De anima is being prepared by Jerónimo
Leal.
3 Modern Tertullian scholarship has proved convincingly that Tertullian’s
adherence to Montanism does not make him heretic who had left the Church, cf.,
e.g., D. RANKIN, Tertullian and the Church, Cambridge, 1995; CHR. TREVETT,
Montanism: Gender, Authority and the New Prophecy, Cambridge, 1996.
4 The dating between 210 and 213 was established by J. H. WASZINK, ed.,
Tertulliani De anima, p. 5*-6*. H. TRÄNKLE, “Q. Septimius Florens Tertullianus”
in Die Literatur des Umbruchs. Von der römischen zur christlichen Literatur 117
bis 284 n. Chr., ed. K. SALLMANN, München, 1997 (Handbuch der lateinischen
Literatur der Antike, 4), § 474, p. 438-511, here p. 474-475, has pointed out that
De anima must have been written not long after Tertullian’s treatise Adversus
Hermogenem which leads him to date it to ca. 203.
5 This is what e.g. A.-J. FESTUGIÈRE, “La composition et l’esprit du De anima de
Tertullien”, Revue des Sciences Philosophiques et Théologiques, 33 (1949), p.
129-161, here p. 142, points out.
45
beginning in time, corporeality and form, its dynameis and
uniformity); the second (chapters 22-41) focuses on the origin and
dissemination of the individual soul, including Tertullian’s concept
of traducianism (the soul is transmitted through natural generation
along with the body, and an individual’s soul is derived from the
souls of his or her parents6) and refutation of some philosophical
doctrines (Plato’s anamnesis, metempsychosis); the last thematic
section (chapters 42-58) treats the fate of the soul in the period
between death and resurrection.
In this paper, I want to focus on one particular point of Tertullian’s
doctrine of the soul, a point which seems to be rather surprising in
the context of patristic thought: Tertullian claims the soul to be
corporeal and this corporeality (corporalitas) is, according to him,
one of its main qualities7. The overall definition of the soul can be
found in chapter 22 of De anima:
The soul, therefore, we declare to be born of the breath of God,
immortal, corporeal, possessed of a definite form, simple in
substance, conscious of itself, developing in various ways, free in
its choices, liable to accidental change, variable in disposition,
rational, supreme, gifted with foresight, developed out of the one
original soul8.
What should this corporeality, which is placed by Tertullian right
after the divine origin and immortality, mean? The most exhaustive
6 Cf. exhaustively P. KITZLER, “Ex uno homine tota haec animarum redundantia.
Ursprung, Entstehung und Weitergabe der individuellen Seele nach Tertullian”,
Vigiliae Christianae, 64 (2010), p. 353-381, with further references. Cf. also
recently T. G. Petrey, “Semen Stains: Seminal Procreation and the Patrilineal
Genealogy of Salvation in Tertullian”, Journal of Early Christian Studies, 22
(2014), p. 343-372.
7 The term corporalitas is Tertullian’s neologism, cf. H. HOPPE, Beiträge zur
Sprache und Kritik Tertullians, Lund, 1932, p. 134. Besides Tertullian’s treatises it
features only in the work of HILARIUS PICTAVIENSIS, Comm. in Matth. IV,4 / SC
254,132, and Tract. super Psalm., instr. ps. 6 / CCSL 61,7. It is also used in the
treatise De statu animae by Claudianus Mamertus (5th century) who defended the
incorporality of the soul against Faustus of Riez.
8 TERTULLIANUS, De an. 22,2 / CCSL 2,814: Definimus animam dei flatu natam,
immortalem, corporalem, effigiatam, substantia simplicem, de suo sapientem,
varie procedentem, liberam arbitrii, accidentis obnoxiam, per ingenia mutabilem,
rationalem, dominatricem, divinatricem, ex una redundantem.
46
explication is to be found in chapters 5 to 9 of De anima, but before
we deal with the arguments mentioned there, it is necessary to sketch
the general context into which this doctrine of the corporeality of the
soul is put.
Tertullian’s conviction about the corporeality of the soul, or
better to say about the fact that even the soul must have its body
(corpus), is part of his corporealistic ontology, whose principal thesis
is that everything which is distinguished by a real and independent
being must be corporeal.
Yet even when they affirm that the soul was invisible, they
define it as corporeal, as possessing that which is invisible: for
if it possesses nothing invisible how can it be described as
invisible? Indeed it cannot even exist if it possesses nothing by
which to exist. But since it does exist it must of necessity
possess something by which it exists. If it does possess
something by which it exists, this must be its body. Everything
that exists is a body of some kind or another. Nothing is
incorporeal except what does not exist9.
Tertullian borrowed the doctrine of the corporeality of everything
that exists from Stoicism, which has been part of Popularphilosophie
since the first century B.C. and whose ideas were part of cultural
koine10. The ground of Stoic “corporealism”, the thesis that every
being, every substance, must be corporeal11, was Zeno’s notion that
what really exists can only be that which “makes something”
( ) or which “suffers” ( ); these qualities, however,
belong only to corporeal things12. The Stoics considered only four
9 TERTULLIANUS, De carne Chr. 11,3-4 / CCSL 2,895: Et tum, cum invisibilem
[scil. animam] dicunt, corporalem constituunt, habentem quod invisibile sit. Nihil
enim habens invisibile quomodo invisibilis potest dici? Sed nec esse quidem potest,
nihil habens per quod sit. Cum autem sit, habeat necesse est aliquid, per quod est.
Si habet aliquid, per quod est, hoc erit corpus eius. Omne, quod est, corpus est sui
generis. Nihil est incorporale nisi quod non est. English translation by E. EVANS,
Tertullian’s Treatise on the Incarnation, London, 1956, p. 43.
10 Cf. C. MORESCHINI, “Tertulliano tra Stoicismo e Platonismo” in Kerygma und
Logos. Festschrift für Carl Andresen zum 70. Geburtstag, ed. A. M. RITTER,
Göttingen, 1979, p. 367-379, here p. 368.
11 Cf., e.g., J. M. RIST, Stoic Philosophy, Cambridge, 1969, p. 152sqq.
12 Cf. Stoicorum veterum fragmenta (= SVF), ed. I. AB ARNIM, 1-4, Leipzig –
Berlin, 1921-1924, 2,363 (from SEXTUS EMPIRICUS):
47
“things” to be incorporeal: “sayable” ( ), “void” ( ),
“place” ( ) and “time” ( )13 – however, due to their
incorporeality, these were also considered not existent in a full sense.
Whereas the Stoics taught that their first category, ,
or corporeal substance, is the same in all things and the divine in its
materiality does not differ from the universe as a whole14, for
Tertullian all existing things share corporeality (corporalitas), but
this corporeality is in every single thing sui generis. That is also
why, as Tertullian explains, we cannot consider things that do not
conform to our common criterion of corporeality to be incorporeal15.
Tertullian agrees with the Stoics that God is also corporeal because
he really exists. For the Stoics, however, God is “absorbed” into the
body of the material universe and therefore he is neither transcendent
toward it nor “qualitatively” distinguishable from it. For Tertullian,
on the other hand, God’s corporeality too is sui generis: the
substance of God is spirit (spiritus)16, but even this spirit must have
its body in order to really exist. “For who will deny that God is body,
although God is a spirit? For spirit is body, of its own kind, in its
own form.17”
13 Cf. SVF 2,331 (from SEXTUS EMPIRICUS).
14 Cf., e.g., SVF 2,309 (from SEXTUS EMPIRICUS):
…; SVF 2,310 (from CHALCIDIUS): …
… See
also J. BRUNSCHWIG, “The Stoic Theory of the Supreme Genus and Platonic
Ontology” in IDEM, Papers in Hellenistic Philosophy, transl. JANET LLOYD,
Cambridge, 1994, p. 92-157; IDEM, “Stoic Metaphysics” in Cambridge Companion
to the Stoics, ed. B. INWOOD, Cambridge, 2003, p. 206-232; M. E. REESOR, “The
Stoic Categories”, The American Journal of Philology, 78 (1957), p. 63-82.
15 Cf. TERTULLIANUS, De an. 8,1 / CCSL 2,790.
16 Cf., e.g. TERTULLIANUS, Apol. 21,11 / CCSL 1,124; De orat. 28,2 / CCSL 1,273
(with reference to John 4,23-24); Adv. Hermog. 32,3 / CCSL 1,424. See also CHR.
STEAD, “Divine Substance in Tertullian”, Journal of Theological Studies, 14
(1963), p. 46-66.
17 TERTULLIANUS, Adv. Prax. 7,8 / CCSL 2,1166-1167: Quis enim negabit Deum
corpus esse, etsi Deus spiritus est? Spiritus enim corpus sui generis in sua effigie.
English translation by ERNEST EVANS, Tertullian’s Treatise against Praxeas,
London, 1948, p. 138.
48
To sum up, using corpus or corporalitas Tertullian refers not
only to the corporeality which characterises man or matter. His
corporealism does not equal materialism: corporalitas sui generis is
at the same time a fundamental prerequisite and condition of being,
something of a supreme category, whose opposite is, strictly
speaking, not incorporeal but non-existent18. Everything which exists
in the full sense of this word must be corporeal (corpus), because if
it were not a body, it would be nothing19. Full being, according to
Tertullian, as well as to the Stoics, belongs, however, only to
substances. For Tertullian the substance, notwithstanding the
problems with its definition20 – is a kind of real substrate, which
does not denote – in contrast to the Stoics – unformed
undifferentiated matter21, but it is something which makes every
existing being exactly what it is. Substance is, for Tertullian, always
a concrete entity, which must be determined by its qualities;
substances cannot merge into each other and they are “the body of
each thing”22.
Let us return now to Tertullian’s treatise De anima. From
chapter five onwards Tertullian argues for the corporeality of the
18 Cf. G. ESSER, Die Seelenlehre Tertullians, p. 67-68.
19 Cf. TERTULLIANUS, De an. 7,3 / CCSL 2,790: Nihil enim, si non corpus …; cf.
also SVF 2,359 (from CLEMENT OF ALEXANDRIA).: ...
20 Cf. R. BRAUN, Deus christianorum. Recherches sur le vocabulaire doctrinal de
Tertullien, Paris, 19772, p. 167-194; J. MOINGT, Théologie trinitaire de Tertullien,
2, Paris, 1966, p. 299-304; P. KITZLER, “Tertullians’s Use of Substantia in De
carne Christi”, Hermes, 142 (2014), p. 505-511.
21 Cf. SVF 1,86 (from CHALCIDIUS): … essentiam vero [scil. dicunt] primam rerum
omnium silvam vel antiquissimum fundamentum earum, suapte natura sine vultu et
informe …Cf. also F. SEYER, Tertullianus, quae de anima humana senserit, p. 18:
“Apud Tertullianum vero substantia non est formanda, sed formata materia, i.e.
materia nondum formata substantiae expers est.”
22 Cf. TERTULLIANUS, Adv. Hermog. 35,2 / CCSL 1,427: ...cum ipsa substantia
corpus sit rei cuiusque. See also W. BENDER, Die Lehre über den heiligen Geist
bei Tertullian, München, 1961, p. 21-25; R. BRAUN, Deus Christianorum, p. 179-
183; G. ESSER, Die Seelenlehre Tertullians, p. 66-71; G. R. HAUSCHILD,
Tertullian’s Psychologie und Erkenntnisstheorie, p. 25; H. KARPP, Probleme
altchristlicher Anthropologie, p. 46-47; F. SEYER, Tertullianus, quae de anima
humana senserit, p. 15-22.
49
soul, and it is the most exhaustive treatment of this topic in the
whole of early Christian literature.
Tertullian finds, of course, the main support for his assertion
about the corporeality of the soul in Stoicism, because the Stoics
“will easily prove that the soul is a body, even though they almost
agree with us in saying that the soul is a spirit; for spirit and breath
are very nearly the same thing”23. In chapters five to seven Tertullian
then reproduces the Stoic arguments about the corporeality of the
soul, which he probably borrowed from his main source, Soranus of
Ephesus24: according to Zeno the soul must be corporeal, because its
departure from the body causes death, and that which by its
departure causes death to a living being must be corporeal, because
the incorporeal cannot even touch the corporeal25. This fact is further
reasserted by Chrysippos, whom Tertullian quotes: incorporeal
things cannot be disjointed from the corporeal because they are
virtually not even in contact with each other. The soul, however,
leaves the body when a human being dies, and therefore it must be
corporeal because, if it was incorporeal, it could not leave the body
at all26. The soul must also be corporeal because the similarity
23 TERTULLIANUS, De an. 5,2 / CCSL 2,786: … qui [scil. Stoici] spiritum
praedicantes animam paene nobiscum, qua proxima inter se flatus et spiritus,
tamen corpus animam facile persuadebunt. For the Stoics, the soul is
, cf. SVF 1,135-140; 2,773 (from NEMESIOS). For Tertullian the soul is
flatus factus ex spiritu (De an. 11,3 / CCSL 2,797).
24 To the difficult question of Tertullian’s sources among which the main place
belonged to the renowned physician of Methodic school, Soranus of Ephesus, who
was strongly influenced by Stoicism himself, cf. H. KARPP, “Sorans vier Bücher
und Tertullians Schrift De anima”, Zeitschrift für die
neutestamentliche Wissenschaft, 33 (1934), p. 31-47; R. POLITO, “I quattro libri
Sull’Anima di Sorano e lo scritto De anima di Tertulliano”, Rivista di storia della
filosofia, 3 (1994), p. 423-468; Z. K. VYSOKÝ, Příspěvky k poznání pramenů spisů
Tertullianových a vzájemných vztahů nejstarší apologetické literatury křesťanské,
Praha, 1937, p. 77-120; J. H. Waszink, ed., Tertulliani De anima, p. 21*-47*; P.
PODOLAK, Soranos von Ephesos, : Sammlung der Testimonien,
Kommentar und Einleitung, Berlin, 2010.
25 Cf. TERTULLIANUS, De an. 5,3 / CCSL 2,786-787; cf. also SVF 1,137 (from
NEMESIOS):
26 Cf. TERTULLIANUS, De an. 5,6 / CCSL 2,787.
50
between parents and children manifests itself not only
physiognomically, but also in the sphere of the soul; yet only
something corporeal can accept similarity or dissimilarity and the
soul must therefore be corporeal (animam itaque corpus similitudini
vel dissimilitudini obnoxium)27. The corporeality of the soul is,
according to the Stoics, also obvious from the fact that it shares the
feelings and passions of the body (ex corporalium passionum
communione): for example, the fear or shame of the soul is indicated
by the body turning pale or red28.
These arguments, which Tertullian took over without
modification from his sources, are being confused by the Platonics,
as Tertullian explains, rather by subtlety than truth (subtilitate potius
quam veritate), trying to prove that the soul must be incorporeal
(incorporale)29. The Platonics consider every body to be either
animate or inanimate; inanimate bodies are moved from outside,
whereas animate bodies move by themselves. Since the soul, as the
Platonics teach, according to Tertullian, is moved neither from the
outside nor from the inside, it is not possible to declare it corporeal30.
Against this Tertullian objects that this definition cannot even be
applied to the soul, because it is the very soul itself which animates
the body, and therefore it cannot be defined by something which it
establishes itself. Tertullian considers his concluding counter-
argument to be especially valid: the soul moves the body, and if it
was only an “idle, inane thing” (vacua res), which means if it was
incorporeal and without full being, how could it move something
solid (solida propellere)31?
The second argument against the corporeality of the soul
which the Platonics raise is that it is not the bodily senses which
27 Cf. TERTULLIANUS, De an. 5,5 / CCSL 2,787.
28 Ibidem.
29 Cf. TERTULLIANUS, De an. 6,1 / CCSL 2,787.
30 Cf. PLATO, Phaedr. 245e
31 Cf. TERTULLIANUS, De an. 6,1-3 / CCSL 2,787-788. G. SCHELOWSKY, Der
Apologet Tertullianus in seinem Verhältnis zu der griechisch-römischen
Philosophie, Leipzig, 1901, p. 32, suggests that Tertullian uses this argument
(being declared “senseless” in this context by J. H. WASZINK, ed., Tertulliani De
anima, p. 136) to keep up with the Stoic definition of a body as a thing that “makes
something” or “suffers”; cf. also SVF 1,136 (from GALEN):
[scil. ]
51
predicate the soul. If the soul – like other incorporeal qualities, such
as good and evil – can be perceived only by some kind of intellectual
senses, it must be incorporeal32. The bodily senses, as Tertullian
summarises the doctrine of his Platonic antagonists, predicate
corporeal things, yet the soul and its qualities can be conceived only
by the “rational activity of the mind”, which means the intellectual
senses33. The premise that the soul is perceived by the intellectual
senses is unquestionable, even for Tertullian. However, he wants to
reach the conclusion that these intellectual senses can also perceive
something corporeal – for example, the corporeal soul (anima, quae
corporalis, ab incorporalibus renuntietur). He believes that he can
reach this conclusion by means of some kind of very loose analogy,
which logically does not follow from his arguments: if he succeeds
in proving that the bodily senses can perceive even incorporeal
things, he asserts that the intellectual senses can likewise perceive
something corporeal, and therefore that the soul – being perceived by
the intellectual senses – can be corporeal34.
The third argument of the Platonics against the corporeality
of the soul which is recorded and refuted by Tertullian is that
according to them the soul is nourished by incorporeal substances,
by striving for wisdom (sapientiae studiis), or, as Plato puts it, by the
“truth, by that which is divine and not a matter of opinion”35, and
therefore it must be incorporeal. Whereas the refutation of the
previous arguments can be considered to be based on Tertullian’s
own invention, in this case he uses for the same purpose the
authority of Soranus of Ephesus, whose treatise in four
volumes (today lost) was one of his main sources in De anima. The
counter-argument of Soranus, which Tertullian borrows here, is that
on the contrary the soul is nourished by common, that is to say
corporeal, food, because by its lack or absence it departs from the
body. Nourishment by study has, according to Tertullian, no effect
on the substance of the soul (non substantiae proficiunt); it only
cultivates the soul; that is, it modifies it by accident. But even if we
agree that the soul is nourished by the sciences (artes), even these
32 Cf. TERTULLIANUS, De an. 6,4 / CCSL 2,784.
33 Cf. PLATO, Phd. 79a-d.
34 Cf. TERTULLIANUS, De an. 6,5 / CCSL 2,788.
35 Cf. PLATO, Phd. 84a.
52
sciences are corporeal, according to the Stoics36, and this confirms
the corporeality of the soul37.
The last argument which is refuted by Tertullian is not
attributed to the Platonics but to philosophy in general, which in
Tertullian’s eyes had lost contact with reality, because “the
philosophers are so marvellously abstracted in their speculations that
they can’t see what is in front of them”38. The result is not only the
legendary fall of Thales into the well, which Tertullian does not
neglect to notice spitefully, but also that philosophy (except for the
Stoics) denies the possibility of two bodies existing in one place and,
in consequence, also the corporeality of the soul dwelling in the
body. Tertullian refutes this impossibility of two bodies existing in
one place, observed by Aristotle39, by means of an “ordinary life
argument”; a pregnant woman is, for him, the very example of two
bodies in one place. Everything which is born of something is
actually present in that of which it is born40.
When looking more closely at Tertullian’s arguments refuting
the evidence of the Platonics, it becomes obvious how shaky they
are, which is also a point made by most modern commentators41.
Because we have no time for detailed analysis here, let us say only
that the Stoic proofs of the corporeality of the soul, which Tertullian
borrows, were already being heavily criticised in antiquity (notably
by Alexander of Aphrodisias) and that most of Tertullian’s “counter-
arguments” against the Platonics are probably his own “intellectual
heritage”, as we can judge from their often sophistic form42.
As in his other writings, however, Tertullian cannot be
satisfied with refuting his opponents only by means of “pagan
36 Cf. SVF 2,848 (from PLUTARCH).
37 Cf. TERTULLIANUS, De an. 6,6-7 / CCSL 2,788-789.
38 TERTULLIANUS, De an. 6,8 / CCSL 2,789: ... enormis intentio philosophiae solet
plerumque nec prospicere pro pedibus...
39 Cf. ARISTOTELES, De an. 1,5 409b.
40 Cf. TERTULLIANUS, De an. 6,8-9 / CCSL 2,789-790. For the Christological
application of this thought cf. Adv. Prax. 8,7 / CCSL 2,1168: Omne quod prodit ex
aliquo, secundum sit eius necesse est de quo prodit, non ideo tamen est separatum.
41 Cf. G. ESSER, Tertullians Seelenlehre, p. 72-73; J. H. WASZINK, ed., Tertulliani
De anima, p. 131-135.
42 Cf. J. H. WASZINK, Tertulliani De anima, p. 132.
53
wisdom”. The supreme argument corroborating the justice of his
statement – that the soul is corporeal – and consequently the climax
of his whole exposition is the word of God: what Scripture says must
be true43. In chapter seven of his De anima Tertullian thus quotes the
story about Lazarus and the rich man as the proof par excellence of
the corporeality of the soul44. The soul of the rich man surely suffers
in the underworld from thirst and longs for the drop of water from
the happier soul of Lazarus. Tertullian’s exegesis of this passage
from Scripture45 is focused on two points. The first one is connected
with its literal meaning, which Tertullian supports. Against the
allegorical interpretation of this parable, which was probably
common (as Clemens of Alexandria testifies)46, Tertullian again
argues somewhat sophistically. If we should understand the whole
story only as a metaphor (imaginem), why is the name of Lazarus
given? But even if it is really a parable, even then it proves the
corporeality of the soul. The image cannot be completely separated
from its model and if the parable mentions bodily limbs, these must
exist in reality. If this was not the case, Scripture must have lied,
which it cannot. Although the image only copies the truth of the
original, the original must already be contained in this image – the
original must first exist in itself in order that the image can be born47.
43 Cf. TERTULLIANUS, De carne Chr. 3,9 / CCSL 2,878: ...non potest non fuisse,
quod scriptum est.
44 Cf. Luke 16,19-31.
45 Cf. in general, e.g. R. P. C. HANSON, “Notes on Tertullian’s Interpretation of
Scripture”, Journal of Theological Studies, New Series, 22 (1961), p. 273-279; T.
P. O’Malley, Tertullian and the Bible. Language – Imagery – Exegesis, Nijmegen,
1967; J. H. WASZINK, “Tertullian’s Principles and Methods of Exegesis”, in Early
Christian Literature and the Classical Intellectual Tradition, ed. W. R. SCHOEDEL
et al., Paris, 1979, p. 9-31; CH. KANNENGIESSER, Handbook of Patristic Exegesis.
The Bible in Ancient Christianity, Leiden – Boston, 2006, p. 593-622.
46 Cf. CLEMEMS ALEXANDRINUS, Strom. 4,6,30,4:
47 Cf. TERTULLIANUS, De an. 7,1-4 / CCSL 2,790; see also TERTULLIANUS, De
resurr. mort. 30,5 / CCSL 2,959: Nam etsi figmentum veritatis in imagine est,
imago ipsa in veritate est sui: necesse est esse prius sibi id quod alii configuretur.
De vacuo similitudo non conpetit, de nullo parabola non convenit.; Adv. Marc.
V,14,3 / CCSL 1,705: Similitudo autem dicitur, cum est quod videtur. Est enim,
dum alterius par est. Cf. also G. R. HAUSCHILD, Tertullian’s Psychologie, p. 23-
24. As R. H. AYERS, Language, Logic, and Reason in the Church Fathers: A Study
of Tertullian, Augustine, and Aquinas, Hildesheim – New York, 1979, p. 15, sums
54
The second and even more weighty reason why the Lazarus
story must bear witness to the corporeality of the soul is the
scriptural reference to the soul of the rich man being kept in the
underworld (detinetur illic) and tortured there (cruciatur). If the soul
had no body and was a mere nothing, how could it be kept
somewhere and be punished or refreshed there? Only that which has
a body can feel something and if it feels something it must have a
body48.
In the context of early Christian literature Tertullian’s
exegesis of the Lazarus parable is not unique. Irenaeus argues in the
same way, considering this passage to be not a parable but a report
(relatio), which proves that after death souls retain the shape of the
body of the respective deceased, so they can be distinguished from
each other49. At other times Irenaeus claims the soul to be
incorporeal50 or to have the shape of the body in which it dwells,
analogous to water poured into a jar or frozen in a jar which takes
over the jar’s form51. Considering the fact that Tertullian must have
up: “For Tertullian such expressions (scil. figurative or metaphorical) function
inappropriately and are plagued with meaninglessness unless they are capable of
implying literally true statements.”
48 Cf. TERTULLIANUS, De an. 7,3-4 / CCSL 2,790.
49 Cf. IRENAEUS, Adv. haer. 2,34,1 / SC 294,354: Plenissime autem Dominus
docuit non solum perseverare non de corpore in corpus transgredientes animas,
sed et characterem corporis in quo etiam adaptantur custodire eundem, et
meminisse eas operum quae egerunt hic et a quibus cessaverunt, in ea relatione
quae scribitur de divite et de Eleazaro eo qui refrigerabat in sinu Abrahae: in qua
ait divitem cognoscere Elazarum post mortem et Abraham autem similiter …
50 Cf. IRENAEUS, Adv. haer. 5,7,1 / SC 153,84-86: Sed incorporales animae,
quantum ad comparationem mortalium corporum: insufflavit enim in faciem
hominis Deus flatum vitae, et factus est homo in animam viventem: flatus autem
vitae incorporalis.
51 Cf. IRENAEUS, Adv. haer. 2,19,6 / SC 294,192-194: Non enim Angelorum
habebit [sc. semen] similitudinem et speciem, sed animarum in quibus et formatur,
quomodo aqua in vas missa ipsius vasi habebit formam et iam, si gelaverit in eo,
speciem habebit vasculi in quo gelavit, quando ipsae animae corporis habeant
figuram … To Irenaeus’s concept of the soul see especially D. WYRWA,
Seelenverständnis bei Irenäus von Lyon, in – Seele – anima. Festschrift für
Karin Alt zum 7. Mai 1998, ed. J. HOLZHAUSEN, Stuttgart – Leipzig, 1998, p. 301-
334, here especially p. 309-311.
55
known Irenaeus’ works52, he could have borrowed some of his ideas
here and thought them through radically. It is no surprise that it was
Vincentius Victor, one of the few known consistent adherents of
Tertullian’s doctrine of the corporeality of the soul, who insisted also
upon the literal exegesis of the parable of Lazarus and the rich man,
as we know from Augustine53.
The soul must also have its body, as Tertullian thinks, in
order to be able to be punished or rewarded after death. The souls of
all the deceased descend into Hades after death, where they wait for
the Last Judgement, the only exception being the souls of martyrs,
which go directly to heaven54. The Czech scholar Zdeněk K. Vysoký
has drawn attention to the fact55 that the capability of the soul to
accept punishment or reward was equally important for Justin,
whose treatise , which today is lost, he considers to be
one of the main Christian sources of Tertullian’s De anima56. Justin
says of the soul that what is incorporeal cannot feel anything57,
which suggests, as Vysoký remarks, that Justin himself could have
thought of the soul as corporeal and that he could have been one of
Tertullian’s inspiratory sources.
After summarising all the arguments in favour of the
corporeality of the soul, in chapter eight Tertullian focuses on the
other objections of those who claim the soul to be incorporeal. The
main content of this chapter is the invisibility of the soul, which,
52 Cf. A. VON HARNACK, Tertullians Bibliothek christlicher Schriften, in IDEM,
Kleine Schriften zur Alten Kirche, 2, Leipzig, 1980, p. 227-258.
53 Cf. AUGUSTINUS, De nat. et orig. an. 4,16,23 / Corpus scriptorum
ecclesiasticorum latinorum (= CSEL) 60,402. Tertullian’s polemics against
Vicentius Victor is analysed in detail by A. C. DE VEER, “Aux origines du De
natura et origine animae de saint Augustin”, Revue des études augustiniennes, 19
(1973), p. 121-157. Other authors who interpreted this scriptural passage in a way
similar to Tertullian are listed by J. H. WASZINK, ed., Tertulliani De anima, p. 148-
149.
54 Cf. TERTULLIANUS, De an. 55,5 / CCSL 2,863.
55 Z. K. VYSOKÝ, Příspěvky k poznání, p. 88.
56 Cf. A. VON HARNACK, Tertullians Bibliothek, p. 242-243.
57 Cf. IUSTINUS, Dial. c. Tryph. 1,5:
56
however, does not preclude its corporeality. As we have seen earlier,
in order even to be, the soul must possess something by which it
exists, and when the soul is invisible, it must possess something by
which it is invisible and this something must be its body58. This
invisibility is actually only relative, because the soul is not visible to
the human body, or to the eyes of the body, but it is visible to the
Spirit of God, to itself, or to God’s elected ones (John sees the souls
of martyrs in Apoc. 6, 9)59.
The fact that the soul is invisible flows from the nature of its
corporeal substance and is determined by its own nature. Besides,
of its very nature it is destined to be invisible to certain things60.
The soul is also a body sui generis, just like every other substance
that really exists. Some of its qualities, such as invisibility, are
different from other bodies, but it must share other qualities with the
other bodies. According to this logic Tertullian must attribute to the
soul qualities by which other bodies are characterised, which he
indeed tries to do in chapter nine. Strictly speaking, Tertullian
contradicts himself in this point, since he declared the soul to be a
body sui generis, which means that it must not share the qualities of
other bodies. Tertullian writes that the soul possesses “the cardinal
attributes of bodies”61: it has coherence (habitum), definiteness
(terminum), it is delimited by three dimensions (trifariam
distantivum), and it also has form (effigiem) and colour (colorem).
As the main evidence that the soul has form, which is denied by
Plato (because for him the form implies composition and what is
composite is liable to disintegration and cannot be immortal, while
the soul is immortal)62, Tertullian somewhat curiously introduces a
vision of a fellow-Christian, who, in ecstasy, saw the human soul,
58 Cf. above, note 9.
59 Cf. TERTULLIANUS, De an. 8,5 / CCSL 2,791; 53,6 / CCL 2,861.
60 TERTULLIANUS, De an. 8,4 / CCSL 2,791: Ceterum etsi invisibilis anima, et pro
condicione corporis sui et proprietate substantiae et pro natura etiam eorum
quibus invisiblis esse sortita est.
61 Cf. TERTULLIANUS, De an. 9,1 / CCSL 2,792: ...sollemniora quaeque et
omnimodo debita corpulentiae adesse animae...
62 J. H. WASZINK, ed., Tertulliani De anima, p. 165, points out that this syllogism
does not feature in such a form in the works of Plato, cf. PLATO, Phd. 78b-c;
Phaedr. 247c.
57
which was “soft and light and of an ethereal color, and in shape
altogether like a human being”63. Notwithstanding the importance of
this passage of De anima for the whole complex of theological-
historical questions connected with Tertullian’s Montanism and his
place in the Christian community of Carthage, from the
philosophical point of view it does not yield anything substantive,
and therefore I will not examine it here64.
However, Tertullian considers this vision to be authoritative
because, inspired by the Holy Ghost, it bears witness to the other
specific qualities of the soul: it has the colour of lucid air (aerium ac
lucidum), and this is also confirmed by the fact that the soul is a
“breath” (flatus) and a “sprout” (tradux), originating from the Spirit
of God, and everything which is light and fine resembles the air. The
air is nevertheless not the substance (substantia) of the soul, as many
Greek philosophers believed65. Tertullian tries to find the
confirmation of his conviction that the soul has shape, the shape of
the actual body which it “wears” (eius corporis quod … circumtulit),
in the Old Testament story about the Creation (Gn 2, 7)66: God has
breathed into the face of the first man the breath of life (flatum vitae)
and man became a “living soul” (animam vivam). This breath of
God’s does not equal the Spirit of God or God Himself; it is neither
part of his substance, nor his emanation, but it is an individual
substance, which is the “product” of God’s spirit67, thanks to which
man acquires his substantial kinship and similarity to God and
becomes his image68. This breath of God entered the body of man
through his face and diffused here. At the same time this breath filled
63 Cf. TERTULLIANUS, De an. 9,4 / CCSL 2,793: ...tenera et lucida et aerii coloris,
et forma per omnia humana.
64 For an exhaustive commentary ad locum cf. J. H. WASZINKK, ed., Tertulliani De
anima, p. 167-173; cf also, e.g., L. NASRALLAH, An Ecstasy of Folly. Prophecy
and Authority in Early Christianity, Cambridge (Mass.), 2003.
65 Cf. TERTULLIANUS, De an. 9,5-6 / CCSL 2,792-793.
66 To the extraordinary authority the book of Genesis has for Tertullian, cf. G. T.
Armstrong, Die Genesis in der alten Kirche. Die drei Kirchenväter, Tübingen,
1962, p. 100-101, to Tertullian’s doctrinbe of the soul p. 112-117.
67 Cf. H. KARPP, Probleme altchristlicher Anthropologie, p. 53.
68 Cf. TERTULLIANUS, Adv. Marc. 2,9,2-3 / CCSL 1,484-485: Capit etiam
imaginem spiritus dicere flatum. Nam et ideo homo imago dei, id est spiritus; deus
enim spiritus.
58
up all the inner spaces of the body69. This breath also became thick
and so it took up the shapes of these inner spaces of the body and
solidified, creating a kind of a form70. By this process the exact
casting of the body was created, which fills it completely so that it
has the same limbs as the “real” body, using them when thinking or
dreaming, and therefore Lazarus can have fingers in the underworld
and the rich man can have a tongue. This “casting” is finally the
“inner man” (homo interior) mentioned by St. Paul71; Tertullian is
thus probably the first to interpret this Pauline term
anthropologically, not ethically72. One more thing needs to be
clarified: the existence of two bodies in one place, in this case the
“casting” and the real human body, makes no trouble for Tertullian –
he uses the Stoic notion of mixing,
Even in the matter of the soul’s shape Tertullian could have
used some of the thought parallels in the works of his above-
mentioned Greek predecessors. Irenaeus, for example, explicitly
asserts that souls have the shapes of the human bodies they
inhabited, and so they can be distinguished from each other74. This
topic, however, was elaborated by Tertullian with such consistency
that we can hardly find any parallel in the extant early Christian
literature. The only exception is the above-mentioned Vincentius
69 Also for the Stoics the soul permeates the whole body, cf. SVF 1,145 (from
THEMISTIUS): … ’
70 Cf. TERTULLIANUS, De an. 9,7 / CCSL 2,793: … per faciem statim flatum illum
in interiora transmissum et per universa corporis spatia diffusum simulque divina
aspiratione densatum omni intu linea expressum esse, quam densatus impleverat,
et velut in forma gelasse.
71 Cf. 2Cor 4,16; Rom 7,22.
72 Thus G. SCHELOWSKY, Der Apologet Tertullianus, p. 49.
73 Cf. SVF 2,471 (from STOBAEUS); or is for Stoics such kind of a
mixture when the two constituents permeat perfectly, without, however, loosing
their distinctive qualities. Tertullian is well aware of this “mixture” that he uses in
the Christological and Trinitarian context to explain both natures of Christ, cf.
TERTULLIANUS, Adv. Prax. 27,11 / CCSL 2,1199: ... duplicem statum, non
confusum, sed coniunctum in una persona, deum et hominem Iesum... Cf. also R.
BRAUN, Deus Christianorum, p. 313sqq.; M. L. COLISH, The Stoic Tradition from
Antiquity to the Early Middle Ages, 2: Stoicism in Christian Latin Thought through
the Sixth Century, Leiden, 1985, p. 23-24.
74 Cf. above, note 49.
59
Victor, who even in this matter adhered rigidly to his model: he
speaks about the soul which filled up the body and solidified here,
thus creating the “inner man”75.
4.
Tertullian’s corporealism, which he used by means of Stoic
philosophy in order to give a definition of the human soul and of the
Christian God, did not win out. This, however, does not mean that
his concept of the corporeality of everything which exists found no
response76. Augustine, the first to place Tertullian in his list of
heretics (even though he does not connect his heresy primarily with
his corporealism, but with his adherence to Montanism)77, mentions
his own youthful thoughts, which were not different to what
Tertullian thought. Augustine imagined evil to be not only a
substance but even something corporeal, and he was able to imagine
the mind only as corporeal, too78. It seemed to him that corporeality
belongs not only to the soul but also to God himself79.
75 Cf. AUGUSTINUS, De nat. et orig. an. 4,14,20 / CSEL 60,399-400; 4,20,33 /
CSEL 60,411.
76 Besides Vincentius Victor, the main adherents of the corporeality of the soul,
apparently inspired by Tertullian, were Cassianus, Hilarius Pictaviensis and
Faustus of Riez, cf. M. L. COLISH, Stoic Tradition, 2, p. 121-122, 124-125 and
128-129. To the doctrine of Faustus of Riez and its critique by Claudius
Mammertus cf. E. L. FRONTIN, Christianisme et culture philosophique au
cinquième siècle. La querelle de l’âme humaine en Occident, Paris, 1959.
77 Cf. AUGUSTINUS, De haer. 86 / CCSL 46,338-339.
78 Cf. AUGUSTINUS, Confess. 5,10,20 / CCSL 27,69: … quod [scil. malum] mihi
nescienti non solum aliqua substantia, sed etiam corporea videbatur, quia et
mentem cogitare non noveram nisi eam subtile corpus esse, quod tamen per loci
spatia diffunderetur …
79 Cf. AUGUSTINUS, Solil. 2,17,31 / Patrologia latina (= PL) 32,900: Viderentur, si
aut inane nihil esse certum haberem, aut ipsum animum inter corpora
numerandum arbitrarer, aut etiam Deum corpus aliquod esse crederem. Cf. also
AUGUSTINUS, Ep. 166,2,4 / CSEL 44,550,13: … si corpus est omnis substantia vel
essentia vel si quid aptius nuncupatur id, quod aliquo modo est in se ipso, corpus
est anima; see also Confess. 7,1,1 / CCSL 27,92. The first to have proved that the
idea of corporealism (belief in a corporeal God) was not so rare in the early
Church as has been suggested was D. L. PAULSEN, “Early Christian Belief in a
Corporeal Deity: Origen and Augustine as Reluctant Witnesess”, The Harvard
Theological Review, 83 (1990), p. 105-116, who claims that (p. 105): “…ordinary
60
Although Augustine, like almost all early Christian thinkers,
became attached to the side of Tertullian’s opponents in the question
of the corporeality of the soul80, it seems that in considering his own
spiritual progression he had some sympathy for Tertullian’s doctrine
and he even defends it in a way. According to his words, Tertullian
thought the soul and God to be corporeal because he was not able to
think of them as incorporeal and he was afraid that if they were not a
body, they would be nothing and would not exist at all81. Besides,
Augustine continues, God can be called a body, a body sui generis,
in the sense that God really exists, he is something and he is not the
quality of the soul or body82.
Tertullian’s motivation for proclaiming the soul to be
corporeal, however, is apparently more complex. His primary goal
was to eliminate Gnostic and related doctrines inspired by Platonism
(e.g. the Valentinians, Hermogenes, or Marcion) because in his eyes
it is, for example, the very Platonism, with its mistrust in the fidelity
Christians for at least the first three centuries of the current era commonly (and
perhaps generally) believed God to be corporeal.” See also C. W. GRIFFIN, D. L.
PAULSEN, “Augustine and the Corporeality of God”, The Harvard Theological
Review, 95 (2002), p 97-118, who conclude: “the conception of an
anthropomorphic/corporeal deity was the only theology Augustine had known …
before Milan” (p. 118).
80 Cf. AUGUSTINUS, De beata vita, 1,4 / CCSL 29,67: … cum de deo cogitaretur,
nihil omnino corporis esse cogitandum, neque cum de anima; nam id est unum in
rebus proximum deo. On Augustine’s own hesitating attitude to the question of
ensoulment cf. also L. KARFÍKOVÁ, Grace and the Will according to Tertullian,
Leiden, 2012, p. 214-224; cf. also the overview of D. A. JONES, The Soul of the
Embryo. An Enquiry into the Status of the Human Embryo in the Christian
Tradition, London – New York, 2004, p. 92-108.
81 Cf. AUGUSTINUS, De Gen. ad litt. 10,25 / CSEL 28.1,328: Denique Tertullianus,
quia corpus esse animam credidit non ob aliud, nisi quod eam incorpoream
cogitare non potuit et ideo timuit, ne nihil esset, si corpus non esset, nec de deo
valuit aliter sapere: qui sane quoniam est acutus interdum contra opinionem suam
visa veritate superatur.
82 Cf. AUGUSTINUS, De haer. 86 / CCSL 46,338: Posset enim quoquo modo putari
ipsam naturam substantiamque divinam corpus vocare, non tale corpus cuius
partes aliae maiores, aliae minores valeant vel debeant cogitari, qualia sunt
omnia quae proprie dicimus corpora, quamvis de anima tale aliquid sentiat. Sed
potuit, ut dixi, propterea putari corpus deum dicere, quia non est nihil, non est
inanitas, non est corporis vel animae qualitas, sed ubique totus, et per locorum
spatia nulla partitus, in sua tamen natura atque substantia incommutabiliter
permanet.
61
of the senses, which is the source of Gnostic Docetism or of the
effort to separate God from the material world and to deny God’s
obvious connection with what he created83. The suspicion that
Tertullian developed his concept of the corporeal soul as a direct
response to refute his heretic opponents seems to be confirmed by
the fact that it is in his anti-heretic treatises where it appears for the
first time84. In his Apologeticum, which is one of his earliest
writings, Tertullian says that when the Judgement Day will come,
the souls alone would not be able to feel any punishment would they
be deprived of materia stabilis, that is of body85. This belief which
clearly contradicts his attitude expressed in De anima, Tertullian
repeats also in De resurrectione mortuorum, but this time he ascribes
it to “ordinary people” (vulgus) and – in polemics against the
Gnostics who denied the resurrection of the flesh – claims himself to
be an adherent of the corporeality of the soul formulated in his De
anima86.
The concept of the corporeality of the soul that Tertullian
defends fiercely in his De anima to refute the dangers of Gnostic
“idealism”, has, however, also a positive corollary for other difficult
aspects of the nascent early Christian theology. According to
83 Cf. M. L. COLISH, The Stoic Tradition, 2, p. 19. For (early) modern implications
of Tertullian’s notion of the corporeal soul, cf. R. BRENNAN, “Has a Frog Human a
Soul – Huxley, Tertullian, Physicalism and the soul. Some Historical
Antecedents”, Scottish Journal of Theology, 66 (2013), p. 400-413.
84 Already P. BOUËDRON, Quid senserit de natura animae Tertullianus, p. 66-74,
has pointed this out.
85 Cf. TERTULLIANUS, Apol. 48,4 / CCSL 1,166: Ideoque repraesentabuntur et
corpora, quia neque pati quicquam potest anima sola sine materia stabili, id est
carne...
86 Cf. TERTULLIAN, De resurr. mort. 17,1-2 / CCSL 2,941: Simplicior quisque
fautor sententiae nostrae putabit carnem etiam idcirco repraesentandam esse
iudicio, quia aliter anima non capiat passionem tormenti seu refrigerii, utpote
incorporalis; hoc enim vulgus existimat. Nos autem animam corporalem et hic
profitemur et in suo volumine probavimus, habentem proprium genus
[substantiae] soliditatis, per quam quid et sentire et pati possit. Nam et nunc
animas torqueri foverique penes inferos, licet nudas, licet adhuc exules carnis,
probabit <E>l<e>azari exemplum. Cf., however, P. SINISCALCO, “Anima sine
materia stabili. Per la storia dell’interpretazione di alcuni passi di Tertulliano
(Apol. 48,4; Test. 4,1)” in Hommage à René Braun, 2: Autour de Tertullien, ed. J.
GRANAROLO, M. BIRAUD, Nice, 1990, p. 111-128, who tries to reconcile these
contradictions asserting that Tertullian’s doctrine remained unchanged.
62
Tertullian, the soul must be corporeal because it has its origin in the
corporeal God. If then the nature of God is corporeal, it helps
Tertullian to solve the problem of both the natures of Christ, which,
according to the principle of Stoic , can co-exist as two
corporeal components in one person without being confused or
without losing their individual substance. The logical consequence of
this concept is also a doctrine of the corporeality of the soul, which
will be analogically mixed with the body.
Though Tertullian found the most effective weapons against
his opponents in Stoicism, it is not precise to call him “the
Heraclitean Stoic”, as Eric Osborn does87. Tertullian was not
“primarily or exclusively a supporter, an enemy, or a transformer of
Stoicism. He does all of these things simultaneously and to
approximately the same degree88.” His use of the Stoic tradition, as
well as of the antique cultural tradition in general, is utilitarian and
eclectic, always with respect to the context and specific opponent he
wants to refute. At the same time, there is something more in his
approach: he also uses this cultural tradition, which he belongs to, as
a tool for exploring the Christian faith; he redefines this tradition in
terms of the new Christian religion and its needs and contributes – in
the words of Jean-Claude Fredouille – to its final “conversion”89.
87 E. OSBORN, Tertullian, First Theologian of the West, Cambridge, 1997, p. 163.
88 M. L. COLISH, The Stoic Tradition, 2, p. 13.
89 Cf. J.-CL. FREDOUILLE, Tertullien et la conversion de la culture antique, Paris,
1972.
63
Summary
This paper focuses on Tertullian’s concept of the human soul (as
treated mainly in his De anima), and especially on Tertullian’s
notion of its corporeality (corporalitas) which he advocates and
which can seem surprising at the first glance. First, the philosophical
context of this idea is examined: according to Tertullian’s
“corporealistic ontology” borrowed from Stoicism, the corporeality
is a necessary prerequisite of everything that really is, including God
and soul that have to have its “bodies” (corpus) in order to exist in
the first place. These bodies, however, are always sui generis, and
Tertullian’s corporealism thus does not equal materialism. From the
subsequent analysis of Tertullian’s arguments in favour of the soul’s
corporeality it follows that the Carthaginian probably developed this
doctrine only later in his life as a direct response to refute his
“heretic” opponents inspired by Platonism, and he could probably
draw on similar thoughts expressed by Justin. Although his concept
did not win out and found only extremely limited response in later
centuries, it cannot be considered an isolated thought experiment
only, which is testified to at least by remarks by Augustine that he
had dealt with similar problems in his youth.