Taiwan’s Undeveloped/Ignored Political Demography:

The Potential Benefits Foreign Spouses and Their Offspring Can Contribute to Taiwan Politically and Economically.

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Abstract

Taiwan’s rapid economic growth and unhurried but impressive democratization have

raised skepticism concerning the nationalist ideology, and have led to a variety of

alternative conceptualizations vying for dominance in the ongoing nation-state building

project (Cheng, 2002). Despite changes in its immigration policies and nationality laws,

it remains extremely difficult to become a neutralized citizen of Taiwan, except for the

spouses and children of Taiwanese citizens (Cheng, 2002; Tseng, 2004). Prior to the

changes in the Nationality Act in 1999, foreigners could not be naturalized as

Taiwanese citizens, except for foreign women married to Taiwanese men. Foreign

women were seen as “naturalizable” because of their role in the continuation of

Taiwanese “blood,” which stems from patriarchal values that regard women as breeding

objects rather than as independent subjects. This view is still very prominent within the

Taiwanese culture, dad is the breadwinner and mom stays at home taking care of the

children. With the increasing number of immigrant women from Southeast Asia and

Mainland China, concerns over the “deterioration of the quality of the next generation”

led the government to add more barriers for “foreign brides” to acquire citizenship. The

requirements include undergoing more medical examinations, residence in Taiwan for a

certain period of time, abandoning their original nationality, financial requirements, and

passing the Chinese language proficiency exams.

Keywords: Immigration, foreign nationals, Taiwan, South East Asian Migrants, foreign

spouses, neutralization, voting rights, economy, Mainland China, political

transformation, birthrate

1. Introduction

Most countries around the globe allow the integration of immigrants into their citizenry

through naturalization although the criteria they use vary. Three principles describe

extant practices: descent, place of birth, and place of residence (Faist, 2000). Taiwan’s

laws on citizenship have been based on the principle of decent. The linking of national

identity with the state was established nearly a century ago by Sun Yat-Sen, the founder

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of the Republic of China (ROC), which mirrors the traditional Chinese emphasis on

lineage and ancestry in the context of Manchurian minority rule and foreign imperialism

(Cheng, 2002).

Taiwan’s rapid economic growth and unhurried but impressive democratization have

raised skepticism concerning the nationalist ideology, and have led to a variety of

alternative conceptualizations vying for dominance in the ongoing nation-state building

project (Cheng, 2002). Despite changes in its immigration policies and nationality laws,

it remains extremely difficult to become a neutralized citizen of Taiwan, except for the

spouses and children of Taiwanese citizens (Cheng, 2002; Tseng, 2004). Prior to the

changes in the Nationality Act in 1999, foreigners could not be naturalized as

Taiwanese citizens, except for foreign women married to Taiwanese men. Foreign

women were seen as “naturalizable” because of their role in the continuation of

Taiwanese “blood,” which stems from patriarchal values that regard women as breeding

objects rather than as independent subjects. This view is still very prominent within the

Taiwanese culture, dad is the breadwinner and mom stays at home taking care of the

children. With the increasing number of immigrant women from Southeast Asia and

Mainland China, concerns over the “deterioration of the quality of the next generation”

led the government to add more barriers for “foreign brides” to acquire citizenship. The

requirements include undergoing more medical examinations, residence in Taiwan for a

certain period of time, abandoning their original nationality, financial requirements, and

passing the Chinese language proficiency exams.

However in 2010 Taiwan’s total fertility rate was 0.9 babies per woman, according to

baseline estimates compiled by Taiwan’s Council for Economic Planning and

Development. That’s less than in the 196 other countries and territories tracked by the

United Nations. Taiwan’s 23 million population will fall to less than 19 million by 2060,

according to the council. Which highlights the question can this possibly new ‘foreign’

infused demography developing in Taiwan assist in keeping Taiwan economically afloat

instead of a massive foreign workforce influx? Can this new demography change the

political agenda of political parties in Taiwan struggling with an uncertain future or

possibly help to rise to attain power?

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To find a solution to the declining population of Taiwan which will have a direct impact

on the economy (which has already suffered marginalization from international markets

due to China) it faces another obstacle which could prevent the problem to be solved

from the inside, is the growing Taiwanese national identity question. With its salience in

Taiwan’s national politics, the question of national identity has gained wide attention

from both the general public and social scientists, local and international. Many

important findings have already been made. This question of Taiwanese national

identity contends that one of the two types based on identification of the political

community in Taiwan. It is also stimulated through democratic political participation. The

state thus constitutes the principal element whether in the definition or in the formation

of Taiwanese national identity. On the other hand of the Taiwanese national identity is

the Chinese national identity in terms of the state. The basis of Chinese national identity

among people in Taiwan is mainly their identification with the state of the Republic of

China, with a sensitive linkage with Chinese ethnicity, culture and history of Mainland

China. Even though with various characteristics overlapping between the two identities

it creates a puzzling nationalist phenomenon in Taiwan. Taiwan’s national identity

question is not different from the “stateness problem”1 that some European and post-

communist countries have encountered. However, the case of Taiwan is distinct from

these polities in that the native nationalist movement is competing for people’s

allegiance not with one single state but with two Chinese states Taiwan’s national

identity question hence involves not only center-periphery (and/or majority-minority)

struggles, but also the triadic relationship among the native Taiwanese nationalist

movement, the Republic of China (ROC), and the People’s Republic of China (PRC).

This distinctive feature is important for understanding the dynamics of national identity

question in Taiwan since the 1990s (Shen, 2013).

More importantly is how this phenomenon evolves through political participation in

Taiwan’s democratic regime. While democratic institutions and practices redefine the de

jure territory of the state (the Republic of China), democratic citizenship and

neutralization provide a new base for collective self-understanding of what the 1 A” stateness” problem is defined by Linz and Stepan as “a significant proportion of the population doesnot accept the boundaries of the territorial state (whether constituted democratically or not) as a legitimatepolitical unit to which they owe obedience” (Linz and Stepan 1996, p.16).

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Taiwanese national identity implies. Through participation in democratic political

processes, identification with the Taiwan-wide political community would be cultivated

among the populace.

According to a survey done by Cathay Charity Foundation in 2012 there is about 470

000 plus married spouses in Taiwan (of which 180 000 plus are unemployed).

Furthermore according to the Ministry of the Interior there are 41000 foreign spouses

who have not yet acquired Taiwan nationality residing on the island, excluding the

1151242 plus that have already neutralized since the law changed in 1988. Interestingly

to note that one out of every 10 Taiwanese elementary and middle school children now

has a foreign-born mother. Despite these dramatic changes to Taiwanese society, the

country’s immigration laws have been largely left untouched, failing to adequately

protect the bond between immigrant mothers and their Taiwan-born children when

cross-border marriages go wrong.

The declining growth and eventual decrease of the population of Taiwan will have huge

impacts on the island’s economy. Immigration has the potential to offset declines in the

working-age population, it is not surprising that the government is eager to welcome

‘new Taiwanese’ (Grant et al. 2004). Interestingly enough, however, it is a different idea

that makes legislators call for immigration agencies abroad: namely the idea that

‘foreign’ and ‘Mainland brides’ have higher fertility than Taiwanese-born women. Not by

working but by giving birth, it is believed, immigrants could boost Taiwan’s economy.

But is there reason to argue that the minorities constituted by female marriage migrants

have higher fertility than Taiwanese-born women? Is there empirical evidence to

support the government’s policy to stimulate cross-border marriages between

Taiwanese men and brides from Southeast Asia and Mainland China?

This paper aims first aims to create a better understanding of ‘foreign spouses’ in

Taiwan and how they play a vital role in the current and future Taiwanese society.

Secondly the challenges in which these foreign spouses are encountering, in dealing

with their integration into the Taiwanese society which is based on a deeper Chinese

political matter. Thirdly how these ‘new immigrants’ can utilize their strength to gain

2 MOFA, Ministry of Foreign Affairs website (Chinese version, English site outdated)

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political power within a society with decline in birthrate, aging society and which in the

end will affect the economic performance of Taiwan. Fourthly how Taiwan could be

looking at this trend of humanitarian globalization. Lastly how the current two political

blocks can; Pan-Blue (Kuomintang-KMT & Peoples First Party-PFP) and the Pan-Green

(DPP-Democratic Progressive Party, Taiwan Solidarity Union-TSU and the ‘new’ New

Power Party-NPP) use this new demography to firstly develop more progressive

immigration policies and also secure their support and votes.

2.1 Key Observations about Population Growth and Stimuli

Based on Foreign Nationals and Foreign Spouses:

1 out of 10 elementary and middle school students are born from a foreign mom;

therefore based on the 2014 Statistics – children aged 5 – 14 = 3 277 300 thus +-

327730 of a foreign mom and about 240 000 children of Southeast Asian parents

working in Taiwan.

From 2000 to 2010 the foreign residents (with a valid Alien Residence Card –ARC or

Alien Permanent Residence Card – APRC) compared to nationals increase from 1,8

percent to 2,43 percent of the population which is quite significant compared with the

projected 140 000 Taiwanese individuals lost from the workforce starting in 2015;

In 2015 according to MOFA 15181 foreign women married Taiwanese men. For

which 55.8 percent was from China, Hong Kong or Macau, 27.7 percent was from

Southeast Asia and 16.5 percent was from somewhere else.

The Ministry of the Interior (MOI) has noted that foreign spouses of Taiwanese have

continued to decrease over the past five year. Which could indicate that a ratio of

foreign spouse have reached a saturation point.

Based on Current Taiwanese Citizens:

People in Taiwan tend to wait until their mid-30's to get married;

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High population density. Most of the people in Taiwan live in very dense areas with

limited space. Thus to just open up the borders to foreigners to boost the population

numbers would create other social problems;

Low wages. The average Taiwanese makes about TWD$30,000 per month. Average

childcare can cost up to half of your monthly salary. Thus young couples either do not

have children or they only have one;

Many women are focused on becoming educated and becoming career oriented.

They tend to believe children will interfere with their freedom;

The cost of delivering a baby at the hospital. And the expensive follow-up care for the

mother;

Taiwan does not have extremely large rural or poverty stricken areas. These types of

areas tend to produce lots of children;

The large amount of abortions that take place in Taiwan;

High working hours + low salaries = high stress. Stress leads to lower levels of

lovemaking; and

Family pressure to focus on career.

2.2 Determinants of fertility

Yang and Lu (2010) made the following analysis of foreign spouses in Taiwan, mainly

South East Asian brides in Asian Cross-border Marriage: Migration Demographic

Patterns and Social Issues, which was reflected in the one-on-one interviews done in

preparation of this paper.

Age: The analysis shows that the age of the female marriage migrants are negatively

related to their fertility. It seems that with the increase of age, the number of children

they will have becomes smaller. Since the Taiwanese men who opt for a ‘foreign’ or

‘Mainland bride’ tend to be middle-aged, the pressure to perpetuate the lineage is quite

strong.

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Employment Status: The employment status of both the female marriage migrant and

her spouse appears to have a strong yet gender-specific effect on fertility. If her

husband has a steady job, this has a positive effect on the fertility of the female

marriage migrant. If on the other hand she has a steady job, this affects her fertility in a

negative way. It is understandable that if the spouse is employed and his bride does not

work but fulfills the role of housewife, there might be little reason to postpone a

pregnancy after an initial period of settling into the new environment and becoming

acquainted with her new relatives.

Education Level: Female marriage migrants whose level of education is lower than

high school tend to have higher fertility than those ‘foreign’ and ‘Mainland brides’ with a

high school diploma. This pattern is found for both first and second birth. Female

marriage migrants with a higher education level are more likely to find employment in

Taiwan and, as a result, might have fewer children.

Place of Residence: The results on the effects of the geographic location of female

marriage migrants and their spouses on fertility are rather mixed. Compared to ‘foreign’

and ‘Mainland brides’ living on offshore islands, the female marriage migrants in all

other parts of Taiwan tend to delay their first birth and have a lower chance of having

one in the first place. In addition, the chance of Mainland Chinese brides living in the

Northern and Central parts of Taiwan having a second birth is 40 percent lower than

those living on offshore islands, while the chances of those in the Central and Southern

part of Taiwan are 20 and 25 percent lower than the control group. It is most probable

that many of the Taiwanese men who live on the offshore islands and marry female

marriage migrants are fishermen, have slightly more traditional values, and prefer larger

families than their counterparts in other Taiwanese regions.

Social Welfare: It is believed that during the initial stage of the phenomenon of cross-

border marriage between Mainland China and Taiwan, many of the spouses were

veterans. Since they enjoy the benefits of a pension plan, their newly built families are

the recipients of social welfare. Social welfare status of the husbands as is also included

as a variable. Results show a negative relation between social welfare and fertility for

both the first and second births of female marriage migrants, indicating a strong income

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effect. That is, those ‘foreign’ and ‘Mainland brides’ married to a Taiwanese man who

has some kind of welfare support tend to have lower fertility than those married to men

who are not registered for such plans.

Legal Status: Female marriage migrants without a residence permit for Taiwan appear

to have lower fertility than those who have a visa that allows them to stay in Taiwan

permanently. Instability of the household income has been shown to reduce the

chances for Mainland Chinese and Vietnamese brides to have a child; a temporary

status of their visa will lower those chances even more.

First Child’s Sex: In addition, the sex of the first child has a strong effect on the

decision by the couples to have a next child. We found that if the first child’s sex is a

female, the decision to have another child is 1.4 times higher for both Mainland and

Vietnamese couples estimated from the data. It is clear that the cultural ideology to

continue the patrilineage still has a very strong influence on cross-border marriage

families. For many of the Taiwanese husbands who married foreign brides, one of the

major reasons to do so is to continue the family lineage. But, on the other hand, if their

first birth is a male child, many of them tend to not have a second child to follow the

pattern of other Taiwanese couples nowadays and decide to have only one child on the

island.

2.3 Identified trends indicating a need to review immigration policies in Taiwan

The impact on Taiwan’s economy and civic society could be profound. Starting last year

- 2015, the number of people in the workforce will begin declining by 140,000 annually.

In 2021, the overall size of the population will also begin to shrink, according to National

Development Council (NDC) forecasts. Currently we are looking at about 14 percent of

the population is 65 years and older, 69 percent is 15-64 years old and 11 percent is 0-

14 years old. In the year 2016 people 65 years and older would have increased to 42

percent will be, 14-64 years old would have decreased to 49 percent and 0-14 will also

have decreased to only 9% of the population. By the year 2025 Taiwan will be ‘super-

aged’ society and the working aged population will decrease by 180, 000 per year.

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3. Understanding people’s attitudes towards immigration

The theories that explain the determinants of attitudes towards immigration are diverse.

Some emphasize the importance of economic competition, while others emphasize

cultural, political and other aspects of life. Generally, the theories can be divided into

two groups – individual and collective theories. What distinguishes the two groups is the

level of measurement; for example, country/region and person. The same factor

enables a further two categories to be defined in the group of collective theories –

national and regional. This study will however mainly rely upon individual economic

theories (micro-approach) in considering the empirical focus of the paper.

Individual theories of attitudes towards immigrants places emphasis on individual

drivers, such as the level of education (human capital theory), personal income,

employment status (individual economic theories), cultural conflicts where there is a

lack of understanding from natives towards immigrants (cultural marginality theory),

level of political involvement (political affiliation theory), interpersonal trust (societal

integration theory) and feeling safe (neighborhood safety theory). Collective theories

focus on aggregated variables, such as the number of immigrants in a country (contact

theory), level of unemployment, unemployment growth rate (collective economic

theories) and amount of foreign investment from a country (foreign investment theory).

According to individual economic theories, individuals with less economic security (i.e.

with a lower level of education, lack of skills, lower level of financial resources) tend to

have more intolerant attitudes towards immigrants. An explanation for this comes from

neoclassical economic theory and trade theory. When a labor supply increases due to

immigration, competition on the labor market becomes tougher. Moreover, the native’s

wages (at least in some skill groups) will decrease. As immigrants tend to be over

represented in low-skilled jobs, then low-skilled natives are more likely to harbor anti-

immigrant attitudes. It has also been established that highly-skilled individuals are more

likely to adopt tolerant attitudes towards immigration than low-skilled, and this effect is

greater in richer countries than in poorer countries, and in more equal countries than in

more unequal ones (O’Rourke and Sinnott 2006).

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According to collective economic theories, a higher unemployment rate in a country

leads to a higher level of anti-immigrant attitudes. The explanation is similar to the

aforementioned – greater competition in the labor market makes natives feel

threatened. It has also been established that in countries with a higher GDP, attitudes

towards immigrants tend to be more positive. However, economic cycles also matter. In

addition to the level of GDP and unemployment, their growth rates influence attitudes.

Economic growth means an increased number of new jobs and less competition in the

labor market even if immigrants enter the country. Therefore, attitudes are more likely to

be tolerant (Kehrberg 2007: 266). In times of economic downturn higher competition on

the labor market reinforced by immigrants turns helps form anti-immigrant attitudes

(Zolberg 1991). But there is unease about the impact of foreign workers on the local

population as the New Power Party (Newly elected political party during the 2016

presidential- and national legislature elections) and various labor groups have opposed

proposed legislation to loosen the regulations over blue and white collar workers in

Taiwan, the groups opposing says it will lead to the decreasing of local workers.

Contact theory and collective threat theory claim that attitudes towards immigrants are

dependent on the relative size of the immigrant population (Quillian 1995, Scheve,

Slaughter 2001). A larger share of immigrants as a percentage of a country’s population

leads to an increased perceived threat of immigrants (both, economic and political).

That, in turn, changes the attitudes into anti-immigrant attitudes. The impact of the

relative size of the immigrant population has therefore two effects, a direct effect by

increasing the perceived threat, and an indirect effect by decreasing political tolerance,

which leads to higher anti-immigrant attitudes (see Kehrberg, 2007).

However, attitudes are not influenced only by the size of the immigrant population. The

level of personal contact also matters. The individual approach to contact theory says

that having a considerable number of immigrants in a neighborhood increases the level

of perceived threat. Therefore, more casual contacts with immigrants can mean

intolerant attitudes. On the other hand, having more personal contact with immigrants

can lead to a higher level of tolerance because a native’s knowledge of immigrants will

improve and they will not be seen as that much of a social threat (Allport 1954,

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Pettigrew 1998, McLaren 2003). According to cultural marginality theory, attitudes

towards immigrants are more tolerant when local people can understand the

immigrants. People who have belonged to minority groups that have been discriminated

against tend to be more tolerant towards other groups in similar situations (Allport

1954).

Human capital theory claims that a higher level of education leads to a higher level of

tolerance. One channel for this is via improved skills and higher qualifications.

Economic security acquired in this way repositions the individual so that s/he does not

have to compete with immigrants on the labor market (Mayda 2006). Another channel

involves education broadening people’s horizon's, which might lead to increased

tolerance. A higher level of education also contributes to political and social

engagement. Consciously this fact of a higher level of education in Taiwan and their

attitude towards immigrants can be observed with their encounters and interactions with

foreign nationals in public and formal environment. Political affiliation theory claims that

people who are alienated politically may be looking for others to blame, and

consequently, may be more negative towards immigrants (Espenshade, Hempstead

1996). Another aspect of political life that influences attitudes towards immigrants is

political tolerance. It has been established that a high level of political tolerance

decreases the probability of negative attitudes to immigration (Kehrberg 2007: 267).

Chandler and Tsai (2001), who studied the relationship between the feeling of safety

and attitudes towards immigration, have found a weak positive relationship between the

two variables. In addition, we also believe that religion, age and the type of area where

an individual lives may have a certain impact on peoples’ attitudes towards immigrants.

Some authors have argued that age is negatively correlated with attitudes towards

immigrants (Hernes and Knudsen 1992, Quillian 1995) and that the level of tolerance is

higher among women (Hernes and Knudsen 1992). In 1938, Wirth suggested that

exposure to the city’s social heterogeneity promotes tolerance (Wilson 1991). That

means people living in larger cities should have more tolerant attitudes.

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4. What do interracial marriages in Taiwan Resemble?

While interracial marriages have embedded multiple hierarchies (e.g., class, gender,

culture, etc.), merely equipping the foreign spouse to be an obedient wife, qualified

mother and dutiful daughter-in-law, in order to profit the family/state, with enforcement

of various acts, rules, laws and regulations, probably will be the source of some

backlash. The backlash, originates from the nostalgia of patriarchy and stereotyped

gender roles in marriage. In other words, the transnational phenomenon—in this case,

interracial marriages—has increased dramatically in the past couple of years in Taiwan

due to globalization, and indeed represents an image of marriage in 1950s, in which

certain interracial married couples are expecting and re-enacting traditional gender role-

playing in the twenty-first century.

A broad theoretical framework of political participation suggests that citizens who are

connected to and invested in society are more likely to participate in political endeavors

such as voting (Brady, Cogan, & Fiorina 2000; Campbell, Gurin, & Miller 1960; Cho

2006; Lazarfeld, Berelson, & Gaudet 1948; Lipset 1980; Putman 2000), while groups

such as immigrants – who are potentially less connected and invested – are less likely

to participate (Alba & Nee 1997; Cain, Kiewet & Uhlaner 1991; DeSipio 1996).

Consequently the majority of foreign spouses are not seen or not actively involved in

their communities or direct surroundings. You will observe at traditional markets, over

weekends when the husband has to work and the spouse take the children out for the

day that foreign spouses tend to be surrounded by people from their own countries. This

tends to enforce the view of the re-enacting of traditional gender role-playing of where

the wife stays at home and husband is the breadwinner. Thus the husband’s interaction

with the world is the only connection for the foreign spouse and the outside world,

hampering her possible engagement in the society she lives in.

4.1. Participation in elections processes

The majority of elections and political activities are held at the local level, which means

that local politics provide immigrants with many opportunities to practice democratic

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politics, have a voice in their local communities, and influence government on issues

that have a direct impact on their lives. For the foreign-born, positive democratic

experiences at the local level may accelerate and deepen the process of political

incorporation by spurring participation in additional local and national political activities.

Alternatively, if local politics discourages immigrants from political activity, it may also

hinder their political incorporation into the national polity.

First, prior experience with political parties and elections is an important determinant of

turnout. Prior political experiences may be especially important for foreign-born citizens

who have more to learn about politics in Taiwan, and who tend to face more obstacles

to participation than the native-born. Accordingly, membership in a political party, prior

experience voting in a general election, or migration from a democratic country increase

the likelihood that immigrant citizens will vote in local elections.

Second, studies of the general population have found that residents with stronger ties to

their communities are more likely to vote in local elections. Length of residence in a

locality and homeownership are two variables that measure how rooted individuals are

in their communities and are likely to have positive influences on immigrant turnout.

Third, in addition to immigrants’ demographic traits, studies of voting in local elections

have demonstrated that city-level characteristics are also important in shaping local-

level turnout. In particular, these studies demonstrate that city size and the form of

government are powerful predictors of turnout in local elections.

4.2. Reforming certain immigration policies could increase possible participation in the political process of Taiwan

The first biggest policy changes that would lead to attract more neutralized-immigrant

votes would be to loosen the stipulations when an immigrant qualifies to become

naturalized.

According to the enforcement Rules of the Nationality Act-Taiwan, Article 7, except that

she/he must have sufficient property or with professional skills to enable her/him to be

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self-reliant, she/he must be the spouse of a Taiwan citizen, and conform to multiple

conditions that most ‘stay-at-home’ spouses are unable to attain.

Except for the rules of stay, residence and naturalization, foreign spouses are allowed

to legally work in Taiwan if they conform to the rules of the Employment Service Act-

Taiwan, Chapter 5 of the Employment Service Act-Taiwan Article 46.

In the case of the death of the native spouse, the foreign spouse may lawfully apply to

continue to reside in Taiwan; only upon the discovery of an illegal situation shall their

resident permit and Alien Resident Certificate be cancelled. Thus the second policy that

would gather political support from foreign spouses is their status of residing in Taiwan

after the death of Taiwanese spouse, which is a great risk if the foreign spouse has not

lived in Taiwan the required time to attain Taiwanese citizenry or if she/he has no ‘real’

proof that she/he continuing residing in Taiwan would be of benefit to the nation or that

she/he has the means to support themselves.

In accordance with ROC law, foreign spouses have the same rights to inherit both

personal property and real estate as a Taiwanese spouse. If a spouse unhappily dies,

then the inheritance of property must be settled in accordance with the law, and

inheritance taxes must also be settled in accordance with the law. However, only if the

origin country of a foreign spouse has equal, reciprocal provisions as Taiwan on the

inheritance of real estate will a foreign spouse will be eligible to inherit real estate. An

inheritance application should be made to the local government office for the property

within six months of the death of a Taiwanese national. Applications made after the first

month will be subject to a fine. For further information see the website of the Land

Bureau, Ministry of the Interior.

The biggest shortcomings of Taiwanese immigration policies are the dependency on the

local Taiwanese citizen as sponsorship of residency and security. For example if you

get divorced and you get an unfavorable court ruling you will need to leave the country

and possibly unable to contact your children or if you are treated unfairly by your

employer and get dismissed you risk being deported, as you will be residing in Taiwan

illegally. Thus introducing more progressive and humane immigration policies will boost

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the motivation of foreign nationals to aim to better integrate into the Taiwanese society

and also possibly change the perspective from on the Taiwanese side that spouses or

workers from South East Asia are not disposable products that can be rejected when

they are not viewed as ‘useable’ anymore but that they are viewed as human being with

rights.

4.3. Current Political Views on Foreign Nationals, Spouses and Workers in Taiwan

The Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) legislative caucus has accused the Democratic

Progressive Party (DPP) and of double standards over regulations concerning Chinese

residents in Taiwan (Taipei Times, 2015).

A group of Chinese spouses protested and called for equal treatment as they can only

obtain national identification cards after six years of residency, while other foreign

spouses need only four. They also demanded a relaxation of restrictions on the time

their Chinese children can remain after coming to the nation as dependents. The

protesters demanded immediate action by the legislature, as the proposal, if not

passed, would have to go through another round of discussions in the next session,

adding that a proposal introduced by the Mainland Affairs Council in 2012 to shorten the

residency requirement for Chinese spouses has remained unreviewed.

Regulations say dependents of Chinese residents can apply for long-term residence if

they have stayed in the nation for at least 183 days each year for four consecutive

years, while it is 60 days per year for those aged under 16 and 18 per year for those

aged under 20. In contrast, the children of spouses of other foreign nationalities do not

face the same restrictions.

Both sides of the political spectrum have agreed to allow migrant workers and

disadvantaged foreign spouses to apply for government assistance for lawsuits or legal

counseling (Focus Taiwan, 2015). In a preliminary review of amendments to the Legal

Aids Act, lawmakers of the Judiciary and Organic Laws and Statutes Committee

reached a consensus on clauses that foreign fishery workers, caregivers and domestic

helpers will be allowed to apply to the government-funded Legal Aid Foundation for help

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with lawsuits or legal counseling. The amendments also apply to disadvantaged foreign

spouses who have not gained ROC citizenship or those who have been naturalized but

do not yet have household registrations. The act currently defines those who are

allowed to apply for aid as low-income households under the Public Assistance Act or

individuals whose monthly disposable income is below a level determined by the

foundation.

4.4. Economic activity and possible contribution which foreign spouses can make in Taiwan

Since 1989, hundreds of thousands of foreign workers have come to Taiwan seeking

higher-paying jobs, far away from their homelands. Around 520,000 foreign workers

(excluding the white collar and high skilled workers working in Taiwan) are currently

working on the island, either as caregivers, household helpers, or factory workers,

according to the Ministry of Labor. They take on occupations that most local Taiwanese

people are reluctant to engage in, and yet their contributions are rarely recognized and

easily forgotten. At times, they may even be discriminated against.

A seminar on conducting teacher development programs in Southeast Asian languages

was held for the first time on May 6, 2016 by the Ministry of Education, underscoring the

commitment of the government to strengthening the country’s ties with Southeast Asia.

Conducted under the MOE’s New Inhabitants Talent-Developing Project launched in

December last year, the seminar aimed to help schools provide courses in Southeast

Asian languages for Taiwan’s elementary and high schoolers by 2018. It is expected

that students, especially the nation’s 250,000 children of immigrants from Southeast

Asia, will develop language skills enabling them to play a key role in growing Taiwan’s

economic footprint in Southeast Asia.

In this era of globalization, Taiwan’s younger generations should engage more with the

world, especially nations in Southeast Asia where economic growth and demand for

talent are high.

As mainland China lowers in luster as a manufacturing center due to increasing labor

costs and a high employee turnover rate, more and more Taiwan businesses are

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channeling their overseas investment toward Southeast Asia. Taiwan's investment in its

top five Southeast Asian trading partners was 14.8 percent of the nation’s outbound

total in 2015, up from 5.8 percent the year before. This compares to 50.4 percent for

mainland China, down from 58.2 percent.

The shift of Taiwan businesses’ attention from mainland China to Southeast Asia is

largely due to the region’s affordable labor, optimal location and public sector support.

The efforts taken by the MOE and other public sector entities are key to meeting the

demand of Taiwan companies for talent familiar with Southeast Asian languages and

cultures.

Therefore harvesting the cultural and language input that these thousands of Southeast

Asian spouse can bring to Taiwan other than just being views as second class citizens

or ‘baby-makers’ they and their children can play a key role in strengthening bilateral

trade and –diplomatic ties between Taiwan and its newly found business venture

destination.

5. Interviews with Foreign Spouses in Taiwan

Of the foreign spouses which were interviewed 63 percent of them originated from

South East Asia, 25 percent came from Mainland China and 12 percent originated from

other regions of the world. Their ages varied between 26 – 47 years old. From the

group of participants there was a higher number of them that had a university education

(63 percent) compared to just having a high school diploma (37 percent – which was

mainly of a vocational high school). Of the group 63 percent of them have already

neutralized and the other 37 percent either chose not to neutralized or have not been

living in Taiwan long enough to qualify to be able to neutralize.

When the participants were questioned about their political affiliation (which will play a

role regarding their involvement or possible interaction with Taiwanese political parties)

75 percent indicated to have liberal views and the 25 percent which all originally come

from Mainland Chinese had ‘no’ preference or rather did not answer regarding political

viewpoints.

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Based on interviews the participants from South East Asian and South America was

much more responsive compared to the spouses from Mainland China. This could be a

political-culture issue not to interfere or be to outspoken about Cross-Strait matters.

The Southeast Asian spouses reiterated that policies to ensure job safety and public

safety were of concern for them. Most of the participants believed that immigration is a

good thing for a country but that language and cultural differences if the biggest

obstacle to build stronger bridges. Furthermore I believe due to their liberal background

or more open political experience from their birth country, to be more vocal is to be

expected.

Mixed reactions where received about how locals and family members in contact with

the foreign spouses treat them. One observation that can be made where there was a

language barrier the response was not very positive and the family believed that the

spouse will be unable to take care of the children and also unable to communicate or

integrate into society. Another observation was that the older the spouse and the longer

she has been in living in Taiwan the more positive the treatment from family members,

this can be due to South East Asian countries and Taiwan previously had more in

common before it modernized and became an industrialized country.

In summary overall these participants of the interviews expressed a positive attitude

towards Taiwan and believes that most immigration policies in Taiwan has assisted

them to integrate better into Taiwan and the most important provided them with a better

life.

6. Citizenship in the Globalization Era

Several writers claim that national citizenship has lost its importance in the present era

of globalization (e.g., Soysal, 1994; Sassen, 1996), suggesting that citizenship rights

have been overtaken by labor rights and human rights (Harris, 1995; Soysal, 1994).

Soysal (1994:1) argues that “a new and more universal concept of citizenship has

unfolded in the post-war era, one whose organizing and legitimating principles are

based on universal personhood rather than national belonging.” With personhood rather

than citizenship as basis for social membership, she proposes the ascendance of post-

19 | P a g e

national social membership (Soysal, 1994:44). Soysal is right to highlight the need to

decouple citizenship from its traditional link with the nation-state and to recognize the

growing importance of human rights in world politics, her thesis has been criticized for

the following problems. First, while many guest workers might increasingly enjoy social

and civic rights, they do not possess political rights as of the situation of all blue and

white collar workers in Taiwan. This problem is considered crucial since participation is

one of the major defining characteristics of “thick” citizenship (Faulks, 2000). Though

some immigrant groups have been able to organize themselves politically in the context

of civil society, without formal rights to vote or stand for office, immigrants can take little

part in the formulation and implementation of policies that may impact negatively on

their social entitlements and civil liberties. Non-citizens are therefore objects, rather than

active participants, of state policy. Faulks (2000) maintains that human rights by

themselves do not ensure the development of participatory networks that are necessary

to sustain institutions that promote governance and those that are crucial in building

bridges between immigrant groups and the dominant culture within the polity. Since

membership in a polity involves responsibilities as well as rights, a healthy democracy

cannot deprive large groups of individuals from participating in decisions that affect their

community’s future.

Also, there can be a backlash if minorities are perceived to benefit from the social

aspects of citizens without playing their part in the community. For instance, the

dominant discourse in Taiwan sees marriage migrants, or the so-called foreign spouses,

as public charges, who not only take advantage of the citizens’ tax money but also

cause social problems that citizens are forced to suffer. Since citizenship involves

participation and responsibilities, Faulks believes that human rights cannot simply

supersede citizenship as Soysal suggests. Critics have also argued that the shift to

post-Multicultural citizenship is an alternative proposed by scholars cognizant of both

the importance and limits of citizenship based on the idea that the nation-state contains

a degree of plurality that allows migrants to retain their cultural identity provided they

adhere to the state’s political norms. This pluralism does not negate the existence of a

dominant culture.

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Since individuals are products of cultural and social structures, rather than abstract

rational creatures, they fall short of meeting the objective viewpoint that liberal

citizenship demands. Liberal concepts of citizenship represent not equality between

different individuals but the domination of the ideal of equality over difference, and

therefore she maintains that group identities must be incorporated into the decision-

making institution of the community. This approach to citizenship is central to theories of

cosmopolitan democracy that seeks to theorize citizenship that has a global orientation

and involves not just the protection of rights but also the extension of responsibilities

beyond the state and the development of global institutions of governance. It is only by

extending responsibilities beyond the state that diverse cultures come to respect each

other’s’ rights, and to work together in the construction of more participatory institutions

for global governance to sustain the promotion and protection of rights. In view of the

urgent risks faced by the global community, proponents of multiple citizenship argue

that an important step towards a more global citizenship is the greater willingness of

states to exercise global obligations and to build stronger links with other countries

(Faulks, 2000).

7. Possible outcomes of this new ‘foreign’ based demography to Taiwan’s benefit

7.1 Political Contribution

The KMT is the political party that can best make use of this new voters block the best.

After their defeat in the Local Municipal Elections in 2014 and lost of the presidency and

legislature in January 2016 they need to do some soul searching if they want to survive

these losses. And with the rise of the New Power Party, the KMT need to start

changing their strategies by creating a need for these current neutralized spouses and

their offspring as future voters to want to become part of the election process of Taiwan.

By pushing and developing policies that would help these foreign spouse integrate

better into the Taiwanese society and make a contribution that Taiwanese citizen will

value rather than feeling threaten by their presence in Taiwan. This threat is a threat

21 | P a g e

that can be observed very vividly with this new Taiwanese Identity/Nationalism from

young people fearing to allow more foreign workers in Taiwan will affect their job

security and income. The older generation fearing that the Southeast Asian spouse will

distort the Taiwanese bloodlines and create a less ‘pure’ Taiwanese society.

On the more Pan-green side their motive should be to develop policies for this foreign

demography that will be of economic benefit to Taiwan, thus creating a positive

response from their newly gained younger Taiwanese voters. Backlash and criticism

have already been received by DPP lawmakers trying to introduce a new law

amendment for foreign workers to stay longer in Taiwan, to increase wages and to

lessen the involvement of labor brokers. One of the reasons for criticism is the possible

profit losses these companies might encounter, but in the long run if these law

amendments are not make these companies will lose bigger profit margins than a wage

increase now.

Thus both sides of the political spectrum in Taiwan will need to ensure that the policies

they introduce to the public will benefit Taiwan and are in line with international human

right standards and Taiwanese public education on the current situation is of great

importance to fight off xenophobic nationalism and greedy profit seekers.

7.2 Economic and Human Capital Contribution

Using and training the people from within would create a longer lasting effect on the

Taiwanese society and -economy than increasing the importing of foreign expertise and

skills which in return creates more hostile response from nationalists. The MOFA, MOE

and MOI needs to constructively seek and develop foreign spouses to act as

translation- and culture exchange agents as most of them already speak one of the

local dialects the waiting period of foreign nationals to do these jobs would be lessen

and therefore speed up building ties between Taiwan and Southeast Asia.

Through the creation of a more direct connection between Taiwan and South East

Asian investment prospective it will increase Taiwan’s chances to build economic ties

with these countries which are not based on a ‘political’ environment like China and

would allow Taiwan to build on a more stable economic development strategy.

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Through the relaxing of immigration policies and the introduction of more inclusive

policies Taiwan could progress with the rest of the industrialized world and would

possibly raise its international status and approachability by the industrialized world and

international human rights bodies.

8. Concluding Remarks

This paper touched on various issues that have and can impact the foreign spouses or

foreign nationals which have or will call Taiwan their new home. In less than 10 years

(2025) Taiwan will become a ‘super aged’ country and it will have a dire effect on the

island’s economy and directly affect the Taiwanese society. Furthermore Taiwan has

entered a new political era with since its democratization in 1996 it is the first time that

the presidency and the legislative Yuan are controlled by the opposition (DPP) to the

previous 6 decade partial dominance of the KMT. President Tsai Ing-Wen and her pan-

Green legislature are faced with a slowing global economy, a shirking workforce in

Taiwan and a very complicated diplomatic state of affairs. For her and the pro-

independence-nationalistic movement to ignore the strength of this foreign spouse and

long-term stay worker demography that has already been part of a ‘Taiwanization’

process would create an opportunity for the KMT or other political rivals to gain ground

again. With the first election of ex-president Ma Ying-Jeou his campaign success was

largely due to the economic benefits he promised bring to Taiwan (deLisle, 2008). This

could be a viable political campaign the KMT can run if the newly pan-Green

government is unable to bring.

Given the diverse stages of demographic transition across the region, lessons can be

drawn from the experience of richer East Asian and Pacific economies. Their

experiences, as well as those of high-income countries in other regions, highlight that

this policy agenda will be challenging for developing East Asian and Pacific countries

that are already experiencing or are about to experience rapid aging. In the meantime,

countries with younger populations will need to prepare now for rapid aging in the future

by setting up sustainable health and pension systems while maximizing the

demographic dividend from their still-expanding labor forces. As we have seen in the

richer economies in East Asia and Pacific and elsewhere in the world, the political

23 | P a g e

economy of reform in aging societies can be difficult. Societal expectations change

rapidly, but demography is not destiny. Through the right mix of policies, governments

can help societies adapt to rapid aging and improve the well-being of citizens.

The current Taiwanese government can and should implement a couple of policies that

would not just help the Taiwanese society in general but would create more social

cohesion and prevent a possible economic crisis.

The implementing fertility incentives due to the high costs of raising children today could

raise the incentive to have a family more as it will lighten the burden on young couples

in Taiwan. In recent decades, multiple initiatives have been undertaken in East Asian

and Pacific countries with aged populations to reverse very low fertility rates and to

increase the participation of women in the labor force. The richer economies have

experienced very low fertility rates for some time, and their earlier trajectories of fertility

decline are seemingly being followed by a number of middle-income countries in the

region, including China, Thailand, and Vietnam. In addition, although East Asia and

Pacific generally has relatively high female labor force participation by global standards,

a number of countries, including Fiji, Japan, Malaysia, and the Republic of Korea, face

major challenges getting women to reenter the workforce after childbirth (World Bank

2012).

Through the enhancement a female labor force (as there are more than 180 000 plus

foreign spouses not working in Taiwan.) The first step would be to introduce more

constructive and inclusive paid parental leave. It has been spreading across the region,

although for developing East Asian and Pacific countries, it is mostly restricted to the

formal sector and thus excludes the majority of families. A study of 13 East Asian and

Pacific countries finds maternity leave in all of them, most often employer financed

(World Bank 2012). For example, maternity leave in Japan is for up to one year and

paid at 50 percent of salary, which is around the OECD average. In developing East

Asian and Pacific countries, however, maternity leave is typically only for those within

formal social security schemes (a minority in nearly all cases) and tends to be shorter:

98 days in China, three months in Thailand at 50 percent of salary, and up to six months

24 | P a g e

in Vietnam3. Leave for fathers is limited but also increasing across the region, although

it remains modest, where available, in developing East Asian and Pacific countries (for

example, five to seven days in Vietnam), and take-up tends to be low. In Japan, fewer

than 2 percent of men took their parental leave in 2012, similar to the 2 percent who

avail themselves of such leave in France and Germany but much lower than the 70

percent take up rate in Sweden (Steinberg and Nakane 2012)4.

To extending productive working lives of native Taiwanese can serve more than one

purpose. First of all once they reach age of possible limitation of productivity they can

serve as training personnel for locals and for the foreign nationals. These older people

will still feel valuable as they will be contributing to their nation and helping with the

social cohesion of this new demography shift. As societies in East Asia and Pacific age,

urbanize, and formalize, the challenge of ensuring long and productive working lives

becomes ever more pressing. As East Asia and Pacific continues its rapid urbanization,

coverage of pension systems grows, and rising incomes provide new opportunities for

people to retire before they are no longer physically capable of work, thereby creating a

significant risk that average lengths of working lives will fall. Although the potential trend

of falling retirement ages for rural and informal sector workers is in one sense a boon

and an indicator of rising prosperity and welfare, the experience of richer East Asian

and Pacific economies already points to a need for strengthening policies to increase

the working lives of existing urban and formal sector workers and to ensure that any

future fall in rural and informal working lives is not unduly precipitous.

The potential for migration to mitigate the labor force impacts of aging across East Asia

and Pacific is significant and would present a “win-win” for both sending and host

countries5. As in other parts of the world, immigration policy is a sensitive issue and one

that requires careful brokering of consensus in countries potentially involved to ensure

its sustainability and good outcomes for both migrants and their hosts. Rapid aging,

3 U.S. Social Security Administration (2015) provides a comprehensive summary of maternity and other insurance benefits in Asia4 See Hegewisch and Gornick (2011) on slow take-up of paternity leave in OECD countries. For Japan, see Basic Survey of Gender Equality in Employment Management, MHLW (2013).5 This section draws from a background paper by Özden and Testaverde (2014) and the World Bank regional migration report for East Asia and Pacific (Ahsan et al. 2014).

25 | P a g e

however, may provide increased impetus for migration policies that can be beneficial for

both sending and host countries. China has benefited from this economic phenomenon

in a different way with the mass internal migration of young rural workers to higher-

productivity work in urban areas. The necessity of immigration for East Asian and

Pacific economies with older populations is reflected in the words of the late

Singaporean Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew (2012), according to whom “in the future we

will have to depend on immigrants to make up our numbers, for without them Singapore

will face the prospect of a shrinking workforce and a stagnant economy.”

Policy effects on the labor force. Even if sensible policy responses raise participation

rates, the question remains whether they will be sufficient to compensate for the

declining share of working-age population. For both the upper- and middle-income

countries shown, the biggest impact on labor force participation is from increasing

female labor force supply; for China and Thailand, increasing the participation of older

people also has significant potential. For China, in particular, increasing both elderly and

female labor force participation has significant potential to stave off what is otherwise a

significant decline in labor force size. Thailand also has potential from both channels,

although less so for elderly participation. Permanent or temporary migration also has

potential to mitigate the decline in working-age population in richer East Asian and

Pacific economies. Globally, education, skill, and labor systems are aiming to evolve

from a traditional pattern of study, work, and retirement to one where skill upgrading and

work lives blend more seamlessly and the work-retirement divide becomes more

blurred.

The declining birth rate of Taiwan is a double sided sword which needs to be addressed

in the Tsai presumably ‘first’ administration term, if progress is not made from both sides

of the political spectrum to first utilized the current ‘domestic’ foreign talent pool it will

contribute to Taiwan’s economic decline and it would threaten the stability of Taiwan’s

democracy. It will increase the chances of the government implementing policies to

import more foreign labors and thus locals will feel threaten by the increase ‘foreign

presence and the already fragile Taiwanese Identity/Nationalism will spark unrest inside

of Taiwan and across the Taiwan Strait.

26 | P a g e

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