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Substance, attributes, and Spinoza'smonistic pluralismAmihud Gilead aa Department of Philosophy , University of Haifa , Mt. Carmel,Haifa, 31905, IsraelPublished online: 23 Jun 2008.

To cite this article: Amihud Gilead (1998) Substance, attributes, and Spinoza's monistic pluralism,The European Legacy: Toward New Paradigms, 3:6, 1-14, DOI: 10.1080/10848779808579926

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Substance, Attributes, and Spinoza's Monistic Pluralism

A M I H U D GILEAD

A NOTE ON THE CONTEXT OF THE MONISTIC-PLURALIST PROBLEM

This article is devoted to one of the crucial problems, if not the most crucial, inSpinoza's philosophy. Nevertheless, we should not ignore the obvious fact that the plural-ist-monistic problem can be found at the heart of the vital philosophical debates from thePost-Eleatics and Plato to the present. Parmenides, Zeno, Plato, Aristole, Hegel, Davidson,and Putnam, each emphatically and extensively treats it in his own way. It has a specialmanifestation in the psychophysical (mind-body) question, which many consider an un-solved, aporetic problem, as well as in that of the relationship among mind, knowledge, andobjective reality. Hence, the problem has much to do with the idealistic-realist debate,which is still very much alive. Nowadays, Davidson and Putnam, to name but two, play anintriguing part in these philosophical debates. Some commentators on Spinoza believe thatDavidson takes a Spinozistic monistic stance. As we shall soon see, Davidson himself re-cently characterized his stance as such, but this is not the case at all if my interpretation inthis paper is sound. Spinoza adopts a unique position on these problems, and his system-atic, coherent answer to the monistic-pluralist question is unique, at least in the Europeanlegacy, if not in any philosophical tradition, Western or Eastern. Spinoza should not be con-sidered an idealist, materialist, physicalist, or dual-aspect theorist. None of the ready-madelabels can serve us adequately in characterizing his unique stance. Spinoza is only Spinozist.

It has always been a real temptation to adopt a reductionist posture on the psycho-physical question as well as on that of mind, knowledge, and objective reality. However,reductionism cannot be an adequate solution, for it renders reality as well as our experi-ence and knowledge of it unbearably poor, shallow, and narrow or restricted. On the otherhand, nonreductionist views, especially dualism, have real difficulty in tackling these ques-tions. At least until now, dualist approaches have rendered them aporetic problems. Dual-ism does not provide adequate answers; it is problematic in itself and strengthens the prob-lematic, aporetic nature of the aforementioned problems.

Spinoza, rejecting almost any possible reductionism in most of the problems he dealswith, is therefore not idealist or materialist. If you accept my interpretation of Spinoza'sphilosophy, you will find that he would reject physicalism of any sort, and most, if not all,of today's philosophical views, including Davidson's. Spinoza thus contributes a uniqueview of some of the most crucial problems in philosophy in general, and in the Europeanlegacy in particular, problems that exercise us enormously nowadays. His stance lives withus as a vital, most real possibility, which no serious thinker may ignore.

Department of Philosophy, University of Haifa, Mt. Carmel, Haifa 31905, Israel

The European Legacy, Vol. 3, No. 6, pp. 1-14, 1998© 1999 by the International Society for the Study of European Ideas

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SPINOZA'S PROBLEM AND ITS CURRENT INTERPRETATIONS

The unity of Spinoza's substance appears problematic as soon as we assume the ob-jective interpretation of the attributes, according to which they are really distinct and nota subjective invention of an intellect. An objective interpretation of a certain kind misledDonagan, among others, to conclude that the real distinction of attributes discloses aSpinozistic "dualism."1 This conclusion, which renders Spinoza a sort of a Cartesian dual-ist, seems to me untenable. Curley, in a rival but similarly unpersuasive view, argues that"Spinoza is best regarded as a kind of materialist, more metaphysically sophisticatedHobbes, anxious to incorporate into his philosophy Cartesian insights."2 Bennett's attemptto fill the gap in "Spinoza's substance monism," which is supposed to be consistent with"property dualism,"3 does not seem to clear up the interpretive conundrum; rather thecontrary. It also seems that we may gain neither an adequate clarification nor a satisfactorysolution of Spinoza's monism/dualism dilemma from Bennett's and Curley's ongoing de-bate over related subjects.4 They both commit some grave inconsistencies regarding him.If eventually, as Bennett claims, extension and thought "are not really fundamental prop-erties, although they must be perceived as such by any intellect,"5 what is the difference be-tween the true knowledge of an intellect and the false cognition of imagination And if"there is something in the nature of an illusion or error . . . in taking an attribute to be abasic property,"6 then in the end one is again caught, like Wolfson and others, in the sub-jective trap, in which the differentiations made by an intellect are not those of reality as itis truly, qua in se est.

Such an interpretation manifestly contradicts Spinoza's way of thinking, for instanceat lp30d:7

A true idea must agree with its object (by a6); i.e. (as it is known through itself), what iscontained objectively in the intellect must necessarily be in nature [A] n actual intellect,whether finite or infinite, must comprehend God's attributes and God's affections andnothing more.

Bearing in mind that "attribute" is "what the intellect perceives concerning a substance"(lplOd), Spinoza clearly combines "necessity," "eternity," and "reality" with "attribute"( lplOs). He has no doubt that an attribute's (and substance's) intelligibility is real and thatit has nothing illusory in it. Moreover, he believes that the better of his two demonstrationsfor the plurality of the attributes of a substance is as follows: "the more attributes I at-tribute to a being, the more I am compelled to attribute existence to it; that is, the more Iconceive it as true. It would be quite the contrary if I had feigned a Chimera, or somethinglike that" (Letter 9, GIV, p. 45; Curley's translation, p. 195). Perceiving a thing by an intel-lect means perceiving it adequately and truly, namely "as it is in itself" {qua in se est, Letter12, G IV, p. 56; Curley's translation, p. 203). The intelligibility of the attributes guaranteesthat they are not subjective but real, objective, and distinct. An intellect, whether finite orinfinite, neither invents nor feigns something but rather conceives and displays the real dis-tinctions or differentiations qua in se sunt, as they are in reality, which consists in them.

If Spinoza is not a materialist, or a dualist, or a reductionist of various sorts (e.g.,Davidson's ontological reductionism),8 and if indeed the subjective interpretation does notdo justice to the text, one should look for a different interpretation from, mutatis tnutan-

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Substance, Attributes, and Spinoza's Monistic Pluralism

dis, Donagan's, Bennett's, Curley's, and Davidson's. One must tackle in a different way themind-body problem,9 and that of the infinite real attributes of the one and the same sub-stance in Spinoza's philosophy.

SPINOZA'S UNIQUE MONISM: A POSTERIORI NECESSITY AND A PRIORI PRINCIPLES

In my view, Spinoza forms a unique type of monism that is neither reductive norEleatic, namely a monistic pluralism.10 This monistic pluralism deals with the one coher-ent system of reality as infinitely differentiated in total differentiations, which are the at-tributes, and these totalities are infinitely differentiated in finite differentiations, namely,the finite modes.

It is neither coincidental nor a matter of some carelessness that both in Letter 9 andat 2p7s Spinoza refers to effects or modes while attempting to demonstrate the unity ofattributes in the single substance. Spinoza points out this way of viewing our problem: notonly from the a priori, general point of view concerning natura naturans, but also and con-junctively from the particular a posteriori point of view concerning natura naturata,namely effects and modes. Indeed, he prefers the a priori procedure of argumentation tothe a posteriori one (Iplld3s); however, this does not diminish the legitimacy of the lat-ter. Actually, at 2pl0c,s (and also at lpl Id3s) Spinoza warns us against the wrong order ofknowledge, which begins with "the objects of the senses" (2pl0c,s), or with "things thatfollow from external causes" (Iplld3s), and which assumes them to be substances. How-ever, his own a posteriori procedure (or point of view) is conducted by a priori principlesaccording to which God is the only substance, "prior both in knowledge and in nature"(2pl0c,s), and particular things are finite modes.

Yet, there seems to be a good reason to diminish the a posteriori point of view, sinceone may think that it involves contingency contrary to the general, a priori one that is ab-solutely necessary. However, Spinoza also ascribes necessity of another kind to effects andfinite modes, even though their essences do not involve existence: he explicitly says that

the modes of the divine nature have also followed from it necessarily, not contingently....

[A] 11 things have been determined from the necessity of the divine nature, not only to ex-

ist, but to exist in a certain way, and to produce effects in a certain way. There is nothing

contingent" (Ip29d).

Relying upon Ip29, Spinoza points out that "the mind understands all things to be neces-sary (by Ip29)" (5p6d), and actually deals with the necessity of "singular things" (5p6s). Asfor "all particular things are contingent" (2p31c; cf. Ip29), they are contingent for us be-cause we have "no adequate knowledge of their duration (by p31)," and such inadequacyhas to do with our ignorance only, and not with the real existence, ut in se est, of the par-ticular things themselves. Indeed, according to 2p45s, their existence is not "duration, i.e.,existence insofar as it is conceived abstractly.... I am speaking of the very nature of exist-ence, which is attributed to singular things . . . the force by which each one perseveres inexisting follows from the eternal necessity of God's nature." In a similar manner, one caninterpret 2al (and 2pl0d), according to which a particular person does not necessarily ex-ist. However, according to 2p30d (which relies on 2al), such a contingency is a product of

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4 o ~ AMIHUD GlLEAD

our inadequate knowledge concerning the dependence of the duration of our body on thecommon order of nature. Yet, obviously, the necessity of a finite thing is different from thatof the infinite one, whose essence involves existence. Only the latter can be known a priori.

Indeed, Spinoza employs an a posteriori procedure of knowledge—arguing from thefinite modes to God's attribute, from the effects to the causa sui—when stating that "themore we understand singular things, the more we understand God" (5p24), which isproved thus: "this is evident from Ip25c" (5p24d). Ip25c itself deals with particular thingsas "modes by which God's attributes are expressed in a certain and determinate way."Hence, Spinoza employs, in addition to the a priori procedure and relying on it, an a pos-teriori procedure that instantiates the general necessity of God over finite modes, particu-lar effects, and singular things, which in themselves are not contingent but necessary, eventhough their essence does not involve existence. Moreover, we must not rely only onSpinoza's references in Ethics 5 in order to recognize the necessary contribution of the aposteriori procedure to his argumentation. Careful attention to the first part alone is suf-ficient: it is not coincidental that Idef2, considering res in suo genera finita, comes after thefirst definition, which is of the causa sui. The first draws our attention to an a priori pointof view concerning the most general aspect of reality; the second to finite beings such asbodies and thoughts, which are not deduced from the comprehensive causa sui, but whichare displayed from an a posteriori point of view.

Moreover, Spinoza actually involves the a posteriori aspect of his philosophy not onlyby the example of Idef2, but also at Idef4, in which he explicitly mentions an intellect,whether finite or infinite, which according to Ip31d is "a certain mode of thinking" that"must be referred to natura naturata, not to natura naturansT

It is a matter of importance that Spinoza also refers to the a posteriori point of vieweven in regard to the causa sui: "God must be called the cause of all things in the same sensein which he is called the cause of himself [causa sui]" (Ip25s). It is the same causa sui, as itis considered, however, from the a priori point of view at ldefl, and from the a posteriorione at 1 p25s and c. The a posteriori point of view concerning the body as it relates to God'sessence is emphasized by 2defl, also referring to Ip25c[!]: "By body I understand a modethat in a certain and determinate way expresses God's essence insofar as he is consideredas an extended thing (see Ip25c)." Speaking of singular thoughts and God's essence at2pld, Spinoza again refers to Ip25c. Consequently, our attention is drawn to the a poste-riori aspect (i.e., natura naturata) of the causa sui (by Ip25s). Indeed, it appears that sin-gular bodies and thoughts are no less indispensable for Spinoza's metaphysics than thecausa sui; however, the latter, as a first principle, precedes the former and conducts it.

THE LIMITATION OF DEDUCTION OR APRIORISM

The a priori procedure of argumentation has an obvious priority in the eyes ofSpinoza (as he himself mentions at Iplld3s) and the general, a priori principles are priorto any particular detail or fact of experience. Yet, despite its posteriority the a posterioripoint of view is indispensable because no finite mode can be deduced or inferred (i.e., byan a priori manner) from any of the attributes alone:

What is infinite and has a determinate existence could not have been produced by the ab-solute nature of an attribute of God; for whatever follows from the absolute nature of an

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Substance, Attributes, and Spinoza's Monistic Pluralism

attribute of God is eternal and infinite (by p21) It had, therefore, to follow from, or be

determined to exist and produced an effect by God or an attribute of God insofar as it is

modified by a modification which is finite and has a determinate existence (Ip28d).

Indeed, "a modification which is finite and has a determinate existence" is known a poste-riori alone, and not in any a priori manner. The existence of any particular thing cannotbe deduced from the natura naturans alone, apart from specific, finite differentiations. Anyintellect, finite and infinite alike,11 requires given facts in order to deduce some particularknowledge from that of the general principles of reality, concerning the causa sui, sub-stance, attributes, and also infinite modes. Spinoza is certainly entitled to rely on givenfacts in his argumentation (for instance, in 2a5, 2pl3d), as long as it proceeds under theguidance of the a priori, general principles.12

Consequently, we should not ask how Spinoza can deduce (by the a priori procedurealone) a particular finite mode from any attribute as such, since he does not intend to per-form such an impossible enterprise. Instead, we may and should ask whether all finitemodes can be combined together into one attribute, and, moreover, whether all the reallydistinct attributes constitute one coherent total reality, namely one substance.

In order to prove that such is the case, Spinoza must employ, in addition to the apriori argumentation, an a posteriori one that is conducted according to the general prin-ciples of the former.

SPINOZA'S MONISTIC PLURALISM:

THE IRREDUCIBILITY OF DIFFERENTIATIONS AS WELL AS THEIR UNITY

Stating the problem in this way, we can consider Spinoza's metaphysics as a monisticpluralism, according to which all finite modes of the same kind pertain to one of the realdistinct attributes, all of which together constitute the (essence of) one substance. None ofthese attributes is reducible to the other, nor is it caused by it, nor does it cause it. Spinozastates this in the following way:

[I]t is evident that although two attributes may be conceived to be really distinct (i.e., one

may be conceived without the aid of the other), we still cannot infer from that that they

constitute two beings, or [sive, "namely"] different substances. For it is of the nature of a

substance that each of its attributes is conceived through itself, since all the attributes it has

have always been in it together, and one could not be produced by another, but each ex-

presses the reality, or [namely] being of substance. So it is far from absurd to attribute many

attributes to one substance. Indeed, nothing in nature is clearer than that each being must

be conceived under some attribute, and the more reality, or being it has, the more it has at-

tributes which express necessity, or eternity, and infinity. . . . [A] being absolutely infinite

must be defined... as a being that consists of infinite attributes... [In] nature there exists

only one substance, and . . . it is absolutely infinite (lplOs).

This scholium is important for three reasons: (1) it points out the real distinction and irre-ducible nature of the attributes; (2) this distinction does not foil the unity of substance; (3)Spinoza's one substance is not like "das eleatische Sein" as Hegel, in the Science of Logic, putsit.13 On the contrary, it contains or encompasses an infinity of infinite (total) differentia-tions, namely attributes. Substance is a unity of infinite plurality, it is a coherent system that

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is a monistic plurality. Its totality is real, since it contains any possible fact and also becauseany of its true total (infinite) conceptions is not abstract but concrete; namely, it is not ageneral being, like a night in which all cows are black. It is not an undifferentiated whole,but it is necessarily qualified, expressing itself in specific ways.14 Substance is not an emptysubstratum to which some attributes are assigned. Substance is each of "its" attributes to-gether constituting one infinite reality. Although this reality is indivisible, all its infinite dif-ferentiations are real. Spinoza insists that the unity of substance is well kept, even though it"has" an infinity of attributes, and he also insists that "no attribute of a substance can betruly conceived from which it follows that the substance can be divided" (Ipl2). The modaldistinction of the finite modes is real, even though it is not substantial (Ipl5s). Spinozapoints out the necessity of all God's finite differentiations or modes (consult Ipl6, as it isinterpreted by Ip25s,c and 2p45s; Ip29d, Ip33d, Ip36d, 1 appendix 83/27-32,2p3d, 2p4).

Spinoza's idea about the total qualified differentiations of the whole reality is one ofthe most original and important contributions to monistic thought. Spinoza's totality isentirely different from Parmenides's undifferentiated whole, and his monistic pluralismrejects any kind of reduction that ignores the plurality and distinctness of reality's differ-entiations, infinite or finite (except the reduction of the will [2p49c and s]). Consequently,Spinoza is neither a materialist nor an idealist, and, according to him, the mind is not re-ducible to the body or vice versa. His comprehensive reality is not abstract but concrete. Itis the "richest," "fullest" being.

This leads us back to the a posteriori argumentation (as indicated by Idef2), whichconfirms and exemplifies the general, a priori principles of reality. Being concrete, theseprinciples must always be capable of particular instantiating. Consequently, the unity ofthe two known attributes, extension and thought, must be exemplified and instantiated bythe so-called "unity of mind and body." Even though they are irreducible, mind and bodyare the same particular thing, distinctly modified as two real, different finite modes of thetwo known attributes.

THE SAME ORDER AND CONNECTION

It is in the a posteriori argumentation that Spinoza considers nature thus: "The or-der and connection of ideas is the same as the order and connection of things" (2p7; em-phasis mine). And the demonstration also proceeds from the effect to its cause, that is, inan a posteriori manner. I shall now turn to 2p7s, emphasizing what is of greater concern:

Whatever can be perceived by an infinite intellect as constituting [the] essence of substance

pertains to one substance only, and consequently . . . the thinking substance and the ex-

tended substance are one and the same substance, which is now comprehended under this

attribute, now under that. So also a mode of extension and the idea of that mode are one

and the same thing, but expressed in two ways

For example, a circle existing in nature and the idea of the existing circle, which is also

in God, are one and the same thing, which is explained through different attributes. Therefore,

whether we conceive nature under the attribute of extension, or under the attribute of

thought, or under any other attribute, we shall find one and the same order, that is [sive] one

and the same connection of causes, i.e., that the same things follow one another.

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Substance, Attributes, and Spinoza's Monistic Pluralism t v 7

When I said that God is the cause of the idea, say of a circle, only insofar as he is a

thinking thing, and [the cause] of the circle, only insofar as he is an extended thing, this was

for no other reason than because the formal being of the idea of the circle can be perceived

only through another mode of thinking, as its proximate cause, and that mode again

through another, and so on, to infinity. Hence, so long as things are considered as modes of

thinking, we must explain the order of the whole of nature, that is [sive] the connection of

causes, through the attribute of thought alone. And insofar as they are considered as modes

of extension, the order of the whole of nature must be explained through the attribute of ex-

tension alone. I understand the same concerning the other attributes.

So of things as they are in themselves [ut in se sunt], God is really the cause insofar as

he consists of infinite attributes (all emphasis mine).

2p7 points out two aspects of unity or identity: (1) the unity or identity of the sub-stance, which is really and differently conceived under each one of the attributes; (2) theunity or identity of a particular thing (i.e., a circle), conceived as different modes undereach one of the attributes. 2p21s shows that a particular thing is concerned at this point in2p7s, as follows: "there [in 2p7s] we have shown that the idea of the body and the body, i.e.,. . . the mind and the body, are one and the same individual, which is conceived now underthe attribute of thought, now under the attribute of extension" (2p21s, emphasis mine).15

Both substance and attribute have the same scope, i.e., "the order of the whole of na-ture," and that order is, in other words (sive), the total causal chain which is the causa sui,the independent, unconditioned cause. Each particular thing, each individual, is a link inthe total causal chain, since "nothing exists from whose nature some effect does not follow"(Ip36; the demonstration of which mentions God's essence and God as the "cause of allthings"). However, the (absolutely) total causal chain is necessarily expressed or manifestedas an attribute, as a certain total causal chain, as a causa sui, a total kind of existence inwhich the absolute chain necessarily operates and manifests itself.

Two SENSES OF CAUSA SUI

It seems to me that Letters 35 and 36 also support and do not foil my interpretationconcerning causa sui. Indeed, Spinoza thinks that, on the one hand,

. . . [I]f we assume that something which is only unlimited [indeterminati] and perfect of its

kind exists by its own sufficiency, then we must also admit the existence of a being that is ab-

solutely unlimited and perfect; which Being I shall call God (Letter 36, G IV, p. 185/11-15)."

On the other hand, he writes that

God is a Being that is not only in a certain respect but absolutely unlimited in essence . . . I

conclude, therefore, as in my former letter, that nothing besides God, but only God, subsists

by His own sufficiency (Letter 36, G IV, p. 186/3-8).17

A c c o r d i n g t o L e t t e r 3 5 ( p . 1 8 1 / 1 1 - 1 3 ) , Ens, quod suâ sufficientiâ [ . . . ] subsistit i s t h e s a m eas [ens] quod ejus natura necessariam involvit existentiam, and, according to Ethics laxl,such a being is causa sui. However, the two quotations cited above do not contradict oneanother. Spinoza helps us to understand this by using the Greek definite article for "the

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AMIHUD GILEAD

Being" (TÖ esse, 185/31; TG) esse, 184/32) as characterizing God's perfect essence. Conse-quently, I interpret both Letters 35 and 36 as follows: God's attribute is causa sui, like Godhimself; however, it is not the causa sui, the absolute total Being. Actually Spinoza explainsto De Hudde that extensio and cognitio are not substances but God's attributes, and as suchonly each one of them is suâ suffïcientiâ existere, although not as substance, not absolutely,but in a certain way. Each attribute, as expressing (or constituting) God's essence in a cer-tain way, is a causa sui, and in a certain way its essence involves existence!

Each attribute is a total causal chain independent of any of the other attributes andhas no causal-logical relation to it. Yet, each one of the total causal chains, as total, encom-passes or "contains" the same reality, "the whole of nature," in the'same order in which thesame particular things, as links, occupy the same "locations." Each particular thing is ex-pressed or manifested as a different mode of each attribute. Each particular thing, consid-ered under the attributes of extension and thought, is both a physical being and a think-ing (or mental) one. There is neither causal relation nor logical entailment between athinking being and a physical one. In other words, "a body is not limited by a thought nora thought by a body" (Idef2). There are causal connections among thinking beings, all ofwhich together are the coherent, one thinking nature, which is "infinite in its own kind"(following Idef6e). The same holds for all extended (physical) beings and the whole ex-tended nature. Extended nature and thinking nature are one and the same substance.

At 2p7s (from G II, p. 90/8 on) Spinoza refers to a mode of extension (e.g., a circle)and the idea ofthat mode. Actually, he employs an a posteriori order of presentation: fromone idea, as an effect, to another, "as its proximate cause . . . and so on, to infinity" (ininfinitum; 90/22); from a circle to its physical cause, and so on, to infinity. In infinitum heredoes not indicate an inadequate aggregate, "the common order of nature" (e.g., at 2p30d,GII, p. 115/5; 2p31d, p. 115/21-22), but a total adequate causal chain, which is a coherent,unified system (like the in infinitum at 5p40s, p. 306/23). This system is "the order of thewhole of nature, that is [sive] the connection of causes" (90/24).

"So also (sic etiam [90/8]) a mode" implies that Spinoza does not deduce what fol-lows from the substance's unity (as it was correctly interpreted by Bennett and Wilson);whereas what follows "therefore, whether we conceive" (90/14) is a consequence inferredfrom, or based on, the example of the circle explained through different attributes. It seemsto me, therefore, that at this point Spinoza employs an a posteriori kind of argumentationthat is, however, conducted according to a priori, general principles (for instance, thatthere are neither causal nor logical relations among modes of different attributes).

ADEQUATE CAUSALITY: SPINOZA'S PRINCIPLE OF INDIVIDUATION AND IDENTITY

Spinoza's philosophy may satisfactorily justify the two aspects of unity in question,if we can reconstruct from it a principle of individuation and personal identity that mayequally guarantee both aspects of unity or identity, i.e., that of a particular thing on onehand, and that of substance on the other. I think that, following inter alia 3defl and 2def7,we can reconstruct such a principle. My suggestion is that Spinoza's principle of individu-ation and personal identity is actually adequate causality. In a previous article, I elaborateda reconstruction of this principle,18 and now I would like to apply it as a solution to theproblem in question. Let us begin with two quotes:

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(a) I call that cause adequate whose effect can be clearly and distinctly perceived through

[per] it. But I call it partial, namely [sive] inadequate, if its effect cannot be understood

through it alone (3defl).

(b) By singular things I understand things that are finite and have a determinate existence.

And if a number of individuals so concur in one action that together they are all the cause

of one effect, I consider them all, to that extent, as one singular thing (2def7).

The identity and individuation of a particular thing is maintained, because this thing aloneis an adequate cause of a certain effect. Namely, following 3defl, this thing is, sufficientlyand necessarily, the only cause of a certain effect (or effects) that itself is another link in thetotal causal chain. Being such an adequate cause points out the uniqueness and indispens-ability of that particular thing in the whole of nature and "locates" it (not by terms of placeand time) as a necessary link in the total causal chain.

The uniqueness of a particular thing is its essence, which "characterizes" it alone. Ac-cording to 2p37, "what is common to all things . . . and is equally in the part and in thewhole, does not constitute the essence of any singular thing." Essence, whether of a singu-lar thing or of an infinite one, is defined as follows:

I say that to the essence of any thing belongs that which, being given, the thing is necessar-

ily posited and which, being taken away, the thing is necessarily taken away; or that with-

out which the thing can neither be nor be conceived, and which can neither be nor be con-

ceived without the thing (2def2).

According to 2pl0c,s, which refers to 2def2 and explains it, God does not pertain to the

essence of singular things. Consequently, essence is an individuating factor,19 and God's es-sence individuates God only. Each attribute, as an adequate total causal chain, individuatesGod-substance in a certain manner. Namely, each adequate total causal chain constitutesGod's essence, God's identity and uniqueness, in a certain manner as a thinking substance,extended substance, etc. However, all the attributes together exhaustively, completely, con-stitute the individuating factor of substance, without which it would have been an abstract,empty whole. Moreover, since, according to 2def2, taking away the essence of a thingmeans that the thing is necessarily taken away, substance without an exhaustive individu-ating factor, constituted by all the attributes together, is therefore entirely "taken away."However, substance's essence as such a factor must be conceived by means of the completea posteriori procedure. On the other hand, the general concept of God's essence (e.g., in2p45 or 2p46d: the knowledge of God's essence is "common to all and is equally in the partand in the whole"), namely, the general laws and common properties of finite beings andof the totality as well, is conceived by the a priori procedure. Such God's essence is a com-mon property of all things and not an individuating factor, whereas, in Letter 50 (G IV, p.240) Spinoza refers to God's essence as that which cannot be generally, universally con-ceived.

The identity and individuation of a particular thing is similarly maintained by anadequate cause—manifested as a particular body in the attribute of extension and as a par-ticular idea in the attribute of thought, which is a link in the total causal chain. The sameperson is the same adequate cause, which is both a thinking mode and an extended modein the same order of nature, the same connection of causes, considered as two different at-

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tributes. For instance, Tolstoy's mind is the mental author, the adequate cause, of AnnaKarenina as an idea or thought, and Tolstoy's body is the adequate cause of the physicalbook entitled Anna Karenina. Yet, the mental author of the book as an idea and the physi-cal writer of the physical book are the same author, Tolstoy. The adequate cause, namelythe only and indispensable cause, of Anna Karenina is Tolstoy, who is identified as a mindin the total causal chain of adequate ideas (which encompasses the total reality), and whois also identified as a body in the total adequate causal chain of bodies (which encompassesthe same reality). There is one reality, substance or Deus sive natura, the universal powerexpressing itself in different total expressions, each including the finite, particular powerthat is Tolstoy, the author of Anna Karenina. "So also a mode of extension," e.g., Tolstoy'sbody, the extended Tolstoy, "and the idea of that mode," e.g., Tolstoy's mind, the thinkingTolstoy, "are one and the same" individual person, Tolstoy, "but expressed in two ways."

Adequate causality is the principle of identity and unity of substance too. Naturanaturans—God as the free cause, as the causa sut—maintains his unity and identity, since heis the same adequate cause of all particular things together and because they all "are in him."

INTELLIGIBILITY AND OBJECTIVITY

An intellect conceives both substance's unity (or the concept of substance; Idef3) andthe distinctness of each one of its attributes (Idef4). Substance's unity and all its finite andinfinite differentiations (expressions, manifestations, explications, considerations, etc.) areentirely and exhaustively intelligible, and that is what infinite intellect is all about. Adequatecausality (which maintains that unity and differentiation) is phrased in terms of clear anddistinct perception (3defl), which is typical for an intellect alone. Furthermore, in additionto its intelligibility, adequate causality equally guarantees both aspects of the unity consid-ered at 2p7s. Hence, each real particular thing, consisting united in "its" modes, is an effectof the total cause, i.e., God consisting of all "his" attributes united: "so of things as they arein themselves [ut in se sunt], God is really the cause insofar as he consists of infinite at-tributes" (2p7s, 90/28-29).

Spinoza describes an attribute as "conceived through itself" (lplO), and this alsocharacterizes substance (Idef3). Moreover, natura naturans, which is "such attributes ofsubstance as express an [the] eternal and infinite essence" (Ip29s), is understood as "whatis in itself and is conceived through itself" (Ip29s), as much as substance is (Idef3). AtIp29s Spinoza refers to Ipl4cl, which points out God's uniqueness (or singularity), as in-dicated by lplOs. In this manner, Spinoza points out what is common to substance and at-tribute (cf. Letter 9, GIV, p. 46; Curley's translation, p. 195). But what is the difference be-tween them, since they both are total (infinite), unconditioned, and independent (each ofwhich is causa sui)l Spinoza characterizes this difference in the following manner: Sub-stance or God is "absolutely infinite" (Idef6, lplOs, Ipl4d and cl, Ip32d), whereas an at-tribute is "infinite in its own kind" (ldefóe, Letter 4, G IV, p. 13; Curley's translation, p.171) or "supremely perfect in its kind" (GIV, p. 14; Curley, p. 172). God alone is absolutelyperfect (Letter 36, G IV, p. 185; Iplld3s: "the existence of an absolutely infinite, or [sive]perfect, Being—i.e., God"), and "the divine nature has absolutely infinite attributes (byIdef6)" (Ipl6d). We must also bear in mind that each of the attributes, although perfectand infinite, negates the others (according to Letter 36, G IV, p. 184; cf. ldefóe: "if some-

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Substance, Attributes, and Spinoza's Monistic Pluralism C^J 11

thing is only infinite in its own kind, we can deny infinite attributes of it"), whereas, con-cerning God-substance, "whatever expresses essence and involves no negation pertains toits essence" (Idef6e). Each attribute is different from all the others and negates them all,e.g., the attribute of extension is not that of thought, even though it expresses each particu-lar thing, which is a finite thinking mode in the attribute of thought, as an extended modein the attribute of extension. Such negation refers to the specific nature of each one of theattributes as it is in itself. As a specific infinite differentiation, an attribute negates all theothers. Spinoza, unlike Parmenides, is not deterred from differentiations that are negationsin reality; on the contrary, all the infinite negations together constitute the absolute full-ness of reality. In other words, expressing together the absolutely infinite substance, all theattributes do not negate anything. Rather, each one makes its own specific contribution tothe absolute totality of substance. Hence, in the absolutely infinite substance, "whateverexpresses essence and involves no negation pertains to its essence" (Idef6e). In substance,all attributes together are complementary and absolutely affirm its existence. Spinoza syn-onymously mentions "God" and "all God's attributes" (Deus, sive omnia Dei attributa atIpl9 and lp20c2).

SUBSTANCE AND ATTRIBUTES: UNITY AND ITS DIFFERENTIATIONS

We are now in a position to clarify and conclude in what way substance and attributeare the same and what the difference is between them. Substance is the total (infinite), in-dependent, unconditioned {causa sui), and exhaustive (absolute, infinite in all respects,absolutely perfect) reality that systematically and coherently encompasses (includes in it-self) all particular existing things. Each particular existing thing, as included in substance,exhaustively expresses itself in all respects, that is, each such thing participates as a link inall possible total causal chains that share the same order and connection of things, whichis the same total causal chain. Each particular thing is considered a necessary link, i.e., a fi-nite mode, in a total causal chain, and so it is considered a participant in every attribute.Such participation in all the attributes together exhaustively expresses the individuality,uniqueness, and particularity of each particular thing, and does not split its unity andidentity. The same particular thing participates as different modes in different attributes,and yet it is the same particular thing.

The essence of God, i.e., God's individuating factor or God's identity, is exhaustivelyconstituted by the total adequate causal chain consisting of all the attributes together,whereas it is constituted in a certain manner by each attribute as an adequate total causalchain (or as it "expresses a certain eternal and infinite essence" [lplOs], "an essence infinitein its own kind" [Ipl6d]). God "has" one, single essence. It means that God is the most con-crete, "fullest," systematically (not aggregatively) comprehensive being that lacks nothing.Substance is the whole of nature as one coherent system (according to Letters 30 and 32).What appears to be discrepancy, contrariety, and conflict in the heterogeneity of the particu-lar things existing in nature, eventually turns out to be accommodation, unification, and co-herence, as far as nature as a whole is concerned (Letter 32, GIV, pp. 171-73).

Spinoza mentions intellect's perception not only at Idef4, but implicitly at Idef3,since this definition of substance explicitly mentions substance's concept (conceptus) andthat substance "is conceived through itself." It should be conceived by an intellect, the same

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intellect that perceives the attributes of substance. The intelligibility of nature, differenti-ated in infinite differentiations, is clearly indicated at 2p7s. The complete, comprehensive,and exhaustive conception of reality as a coherent whole is actually its conception as sub-stance, the only substance. Such a conception refers to any particular existing thing as thesame finite being that is expressed in each one of all the attributes.

An attribute is an expression, explication ("explanation;" lp20d, 2p5,3p2d) or mani-festation "of" the total reality. It is total reality, which, including all particular things, is infi-nite, independent, and unconditioned {causa sui), like substance itself. Yet, each attribute isnot absolutely infinite but infinite "in its own kind," namely it is not the exhaustive expres-sion of reality, even though it expresses entirely or includes in it, in a certain specific man-ner, all of reality's particular differentiations. From the point of view of an intellect, or froman epistemological point of view, an attribute is a total, unconditioned, yet inexhaustive, per-ception of reality as a whole. It is a perception that inexhaustively perceives all particular ex-isting things. It is an incomplete knowledge of everything, whereas substance is the absolute,complete, and exhaustive expression, manifestation and explication of the entire reality asthe coherent whole. From the point of view of an intellect, or from an epistemological pointof view, substance is the absolute, exhaustive knowledge of the entire reality.

ATTRIBUTES' EXTENSION AND INTENSION

Considering their extension or amplitude, there is no difference whatsoever betweensubstance and each of its attributes, or between substance and all the attributes together,or among the attributes themselves. The difference is in their intension or "force." Each at-tribute shares the same extension or amplitude, which is the range or scope of substance.The complete, full, or absolute intension of the content of this scope is substance,'which isthe exhaustive identity and unity of all the attributes.

The really distinct attributes actually constitute one, coherent total reality, namely,one substance. To that extent, at least, Spinoza's metaphysics is a monistic pluralism.

NOTES

1. Alan Donagan, "Spinoza's Dualism," in Richard Kennington, ed., The Philosophy of Baruch Spinoza(Washington: Catholic University of America Press, 1980), 89-102. Following Gueroult, Donaganpoints out the possibility that "a substance may possess a plurality of really distinct attributes entailsthat such a substance must in some sense have a plurality of really distinct essences." (p. 93). This must puttoo heavy a burden on the unity of the one substance. I prefer Donagan's 1973 interpretation to that of1980. See his "Essence and the Distinction of Attributes in Spinoza's Metaphysics," in M. Grene, ed.,Spinoza: A Collection of Critical Essays (New York: Anchor/Doubleday, 1973), 164-81. It is more plau-sible to argue that "two attributes might on the one hand be really distinct, and on the other constituteor express the same essence" (p. 180). Nevertheless, Donagan did not clarify this somewhat paradoxi-cal stance. Neither did he sufficiently clarify it in his most recent view, published in 1991. See "Sub-stance, Essence and Attribute in Spinoza, Ethics I," in Yirmiyahu Yovel, ed., God and Nature: Spinoza'sMetaphysics, volume 1 of Spinoza by 2000: The Jerusalem Conferences (Leiden: Brill, 1991), 1-21.

2. Edwin Curley, Behind the Geometrical Method: A Reading of Spinoza's Ethics (Princeton: PrincetonUniversity Press, 1988), xiv; cf. 74, 82 ("the fundamental thrust of Spinoza's system is anti-dualistic,that is, a form of materialistic monism").

3. Jonathan Bennett, A Study of Spinoza's Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 147.

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Substance, Attributes, and Spinoza's Monistic Pluralism f^j 13

4. See Edwin Curley, "On Bennett's Interpretation of Spinoza's Monism;" and Jonathan Bennett,"Spinoza's Monism: A Reply to Curley," In Yovel, ed., God and Nature, 35-59.

5. Bennett, Study, 147.6. Bennett, Study, 146. Bennett's interpretation as to the perception of the attributes by an intellect is

entirely incompatible with Spinoza's understanding of intelligibility (e.g., at 1p16 and d, or at the endof 1 Appendix). Cf. Margaret D. Wilson, "Infinite Understanding, Scientia Intuitiva, and Ethics I.16,"Midwest Studies in Philosophy 8 (1983): 181-82; Wilson, "Notes on Modes and Attributes," The Jour-nal of Philosophy 78 (1981): 585.

7. I.e., Ethics I, proposition 30, demonstration. The following abbreviations are used hereafter: a axiom,c corollary, d demonstration, def definition, e explication, p proposition, s scholium. The paginationfollows the relevant volume of Gebhardt's edition of Spinoza Opera (Heidelberg: Carl Winter, 1925).I quote from Curley's translation. See The Collected Works of Spinoza, volume 1, ed. and trans. EdwinCurley (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985), 434.

8. See Donald Davidson, "Spinoza's Causal Theory of the Attributes," in Yovel, ed., Desire and Affect:Spinoza as Psychologist, volume 3 of Spinoza by 2000) (Leiden: Brill, forthcoming). Davidson ascribesontological monism and a multiplicity of conceptual systems, i.e., the attributes, to Spinoza. Thismust render the attributes subjective and even inadequate, because their epistemological multiplic-ity is not compatible with their "ontological monism." Spinoza's attributes, having an objective on-tological status, must be more than just "systems of explanation." Still, Davidson's view depends onontological reductionism. Finally, in contrast with what Davidson ascribes to 3p2, 2p7s as I interpretit below does explicitly rule out "what we would call the causal interaction of particular physicalevents with particular mental events."

9. Which is not Bennett's "identity of properties" (Study, 141). Neither attributes nor modes are prop-erties. There is no way to explain how an attribute as "a property" can constitute an essence withoutmaking Spinoza's essence/properties distinction meaningless. He mentions this distinction at 1p16d,according to which properties must be inferred from the very essence of a thing (and not vice versa,according to TdIE, sect. 95, 97). Moreover, what belongs to a thing's essence "can neither be nor con-ceived without the thing" (2def2). Hence, at 2pl0c,s Spinoza, referring to the definition of essence(2def2), explicitly remarks that God does not pertain to the essence of singular things. Consequently,finite modes are not properties of God's essence, even though God is their cause. God's propertiesare not finite modes at all, but rather characterizations such as infinity, indivisibility, immutability,etc., (2pl0s). In the Short Treatise Spinoza clearly distinguishes God's attributes from his properties(Part 1, ch. 7, sect. 6). The possessive form ("substance has attributes" [e.g., at 1p10s]) does not re-flect Spinoza's own understanding of the relation between substance and its attribute. (Cf. Curley'stranslation, p. 416, note 24.) Curley is correct in taking "constitute" quite literally and in rejecting, asDonagan did, Bennett's suggestion to render constituere by "characterize," which is essential forBennett's interpretation.

10. I found that term in M. W. Calkins, The Persistent Problems of Philosophy, 5th ed. (New York:Macmillan, 1929), 277-306 (Ch. 7: "Monistic Pluralism: The System is Spinoza"). However, I under-stand it quite differently and use it in my own way.

11. Cf. E. M. Curley, Spinoza's Metaphysics: An Essay in Interpretation (Cambridge: Harvard UniversityPress, 1969), 74: "Deducing the finite solely from the infinite, in . . . [Spinoza's] philosophy, is inprinciple impossible. Even an infinite intellect could not do it."

12. About the two procedures, cf. H. F. Hallett, Creation, Emanation, and Salvation (The Hague:Martinus Nijhoff, 1962), 17-21. My elaboration of the issue is different.

13. Wissenschaft der Logik, Part 1, ed. G. Lasson (Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1971), 151. Some of the sub-jective interpretations of the attributes rely on Hegel (e.g., J. E. Erdmann's).

14. Cf. H. F. Hallett, Aeternitas: A Spinozistic Study (London: Oxford University Press, 1930), 145, 157,324-25; E. E. Harris, Salvation from Despair: A Reappraisal of Spinoza's Philosophy (The Hague:Martinus Nijhoff, 1973), 64-65.

15. Cf. this particular point with M. D. Wilson, "Notes on Modes and Attributes," p. 585. Unfortunately,Donagan, Bennett, and Curley all blur or ignore the crucial difference between modes of the two at-

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tributes and the same individuum or particular thing. Hence, Bennett, interpreting 3p2s, writes that"my mind is the same mode as my body" (Study, 141); Curley, referring to 2p21s, mentions "the iden-tity of the modes" (Beyond, 70); and, finally, Donagan, mentioning 2p7s, writes that "correspondingmodes are . . . one and the same" ("Substance, Essence and Attribute," 18). Mind and body are differ-ent modes of the one and the same individuum or particular thing.

16. The Correspondence of Spinoza, trans. and ed. A. Wolf (London: Frank Cass & Co., 1966), 224.17. Correspondence of Spinoza, 225.18. See my "Spinoza's Principium Individuationis and Personal Identity," International Studies in Philoso-

phy 15 (1983): 41-57.19. Cf. Robert Brandom, "Adequacy and the Individuation of Ideas in Spinoza's Ethics," Journal of the

History of Philosophy 14 (1976): 161.

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