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Speech and Nature: al-Jāḥiẓ, Kitāb al-Bayān wa-l-tabyīn, 2.175-207, Part 4James E. Montgomery

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Speech and Nature: al-J�ah˙iz˙, Kit�ab al-Bay�an

wa-l-taby�ın, 2.175–207, Part 41

JAMES E. MONTGOMERY

Some thinkers seem to feel no intellectual discomfort in interpreting such

concepts as responsibility, culpability, etc. in conformity with strict determin-

ism. I must own that while the notion of uncaused choice, which is nevertheless

not something out of the blue, is one of which I know no adequate analysis, its

opposite, a choice fully attributable to antecedent causes mental or physical,

and yet regarded as entailing responsibility and therefore subject to moral

praise or blame, seems to me even less intelligible. This difference, which has

so deeply divided opinion, is the crux of the matter.2

Interpretation, 2—Determinism

If, attempting to answer what al-J�ah˙iz˙

might want his speech–nature insight to do, within

his Mu‘tazil�ı system, we turn from the realm of God back to that of man, we encounter

another set of questions. What are we to make of the apparent determinism of the

speech–nature insight, especially in light of the purported Mu‘tazil�ı insistence on ‘free

will’? Does this not smack of predestination? How can a man exercise ‘free will’ in what

he says if what he says is determined by his innate disposition, itself determined in him

by God? Gimaret has controversially argued that the precursors of al-Jubb�a’�ı taught

varieties (maximalist and minimalist) of a doctrine of determinism according to which

God assumes complete responsibility for all human acts. Should al-J�ah˙iz˙, then, be

established as the philosophical precursor of the Basran Mu‘tazila? Was his version of the

speech–nature insight of profound importance for how Ab�u ‘Al�ı, Ab�u H�ashim and their

followers approached the issue of human autonomy? Is his concept of t˙ab‘ a precursor of

ilj�a’, compulsion? Or does he pave the way for the Ash‘ariyyah’s flirtation with the

possibility that God ‘willed other than what eternally He wills’?3 And anyway, does this

determinism not render suspect my insistence on the pedagogical significance of the

insight in the development of the man of reasoning intellect? For if one does not have an

appropriate nature or innate disposition, how can one learn to speak otherwise than one

does (naturally) already? Can one alter one’s nature?

Gimaret formulated this reading in his Theories de l’acte humaine en theologie

musulmane (Paris: Librairie Philosophique, 1980), 3–60 (especially pp. 34, 36,

49, and 57–60). In ‘The Autonomy’ (see Part 3, p. 124, n. 60 for full reference

James E. Montgomery, Trinity Hall, University of Cambridge, Trinity Lane, CB2 1TJ, UK.

E-mail: [email protected]

Middle Eastern Literatures, Vol. 12, No. 3, December 2009

ISSN 1475-262X print/ISSN 1475-2638 online/09/030213-20 � 2009 Taylor & Francis

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details), Frank has proposed some serious and significant challenges to this

conclusion. Much depends on whether we take ‘Abd al-Jabb�ar (in late 10th-

century and early 11th-century Rayy) to be slavishly representative of Ab�u ‘Al�ı

and Ab�u H�ashim (in late 9th-century and early 10th-century Basra) (as many

scholars such as Gimaret and Frank do), whether ‘Abd al-Jabb�ar’s formulation

of their doctrines is accurate, unimproved and unelaborated (in other words,

how optimistic we are at being able to denude the theses of their dialectical and

argumentative formulations, to say nothing of the fact that the Mughn�ı is a

massive product of iml�a’) and whether we can discern in al-J�ah˙iz˙’s notions of

t˙ab‘, khuluq and wus‘ the prehistory of the ‘axioms and principles’ that Frank

argues Gimaret has not established or explored for the psychological

determinism of the Basrans. Thus, it is not at all clear to me that for al-

J�ah˙iz˙, ‘ontological or causal entailment (al-’ıgab) is excluded from the function

of motivations’ (Frank, ‘The Autonomy’, 347) or that ‘motivations are not

causes in a formal sense, i.e., they are not determinant or ‘‘necessitating

causes’’ (‘ilal mujibah)’.4 Gimaret (Theories, 31–32) construes t˙ab‘ basically as a

precursor of ilj�a’: on ilj�a’; see the studies of D. Gimaret, ‘La notion d’impulsion

irresistible (ilg�a’) dans l’ethique mu‘tazilite,’ Journal Asiatique (1971): 25–62;

Gimaret, Theories, 56–60; M. Schwartz, ‘Some Notes on the Notion of Ilj�a’

(Constraint) in Mu‘tazilite Kal�am,’ Israel Oriental Studies 2 (1972): 413–427;

Frank, ‘The Autonomy,’ 340–343. Generally, and to anticipate somewhat,

Gimaret, along with most other scholars, fails to notice in his account of al-

J�ah˙iz˙’s theory of human autonomy the fact that a man’s nature can be improved

and he misses the radical elitism of his vision of takl�ıf.

In order to begin to formulate a response to these questions, we must investigate three

fundamental notions of the J�ah˙iz˙ian psychology and their filiations with some of the

theories of earlier scientist-theologians: (1) khuluq, (2) t˙ab‘ and (3) wus‘.5

1. Khuluq

One’s khuluq can be either good—Bay�an, 2.78.11–12, wa-h˙

usn al-khuluq khayr qar�ın

(Hish�am b. H˙

ass�an, a tradent of al-H˙

asan al-Bas˙r�ı, renowned for his memory);6

Bukhal�a’, 135.5, bi-karami-hi wa-h˙usn khuluqi-hi (of Muways b. ‘Imr�an)—or bad—

Bay�an, 2.115.8, al-Ah˙naf b. Qays declares that adw�a al-d�a’ al-lis�an al-badh�ı’ wa-al-khuluq

al-rad�ı’; Bay�an, 2.188.13, wa-man s�a’a khuluqu-hu qalla s˙ad�ıqu-hu (¼ anonymous, in x83

of the translation); Bay�an, 2.199.12, l�a wara‘ li-sayyi’ al-khuluq (¼ al-Ah˙naf b. Qays, in

x149); KH˙

(Jidd), 67.7 (wa-khuluqu-hu al-shar�arah wa-al-tas˙arru‘); it can be expansive—

Bukhal�a‘, 135.10, k�ana Ab�u al-Hudhayl aslam al-n�as s˙adran wa-awsa‘a-hum khuluqan wa-

as’hala-hum suh�ulatan; or lofty: Bay�an, 2.196.11, dh�ı al-khuluq al-‘�al�ı (¼ Sahl b. H�ar�un,

in x127 of the translation)—or mild, an unerring way to attain praiseworthiness (h˙amd bi-

l�a marzi’ah): Bay�an, 2.115.7, al-khuluq al-saj�ıh˙

wa-l-kaff ‘an al-qab�ıh˙

(al-Ah˙naf b. Qays).

Al-Khayy�at˙

uses sar�ırah as a cognate, of Ibn al-R�awand�ı’s contradictory statements:

wa-h�adh�a yadullu-ka ‘al�a h˙

ayrati-hi wa-s�u’ sar�ırati-hi,7 while for Ibn Qutaybah and Ibn

al-Washsh�a’ it guarantees muruwwah: wa-in k�ana la-ka khuluq fa-la-ka muruwwah (a

prophetic h˙

ad�ıth);8 muruwwatu-hu khuluqu-hu (‘Umar b. al-Khat˙t˙�ab).9 I have used

‘innate’ to try to indicate that, consonant with its etymology, one’s disposition or

character is created by God. In the Qur’�an (Q. 68.4), Prophet Muh˙ammad is reassured

214 J. E. Montgomery


by God that he is possessed of ‘a mighty character’ (wa-inna-ka la-‘al�a khuluqin ‘az˙�ımin);

whereas in S�urat al-Shu‘ar�a’ (26.137), the ‘Ad justify their unmindfulness of God’s

blessings by reminding H�ud that they are following the ‘character of the forebears’ (in

h�adh�a ill�a khuluqu al-awwal�ına). In a notable explication of the first of these �ayahs,

‘A’ishah equates the khuluq of Prophet Muh˙ammad with the Qur’�an: k�ana khuluqu-hu al-

qur’�an, his character was the Qur’�an, an intriguing equation of speech and behaviour.10 In

a poem by Ka‘b b. Zuhayr to his brother Bujayr, quoted by Ibn Hish�am (Ibn Ish˙�aq),

khuluq is tantamount to sunnah, a set of behavioural exemplars, a code of conduct,11 while

Ibn al-Muqaffa‘ in his Ris�alah f�ı al-s˙ah˙

�abah assures the Caliph that God has purified him

of the undesirable innate traits (khal�a’iq) he has been enumerating.12 According to al-

Sh�afi‘�ı, the khuluq of Prophet Muh˙ammad is exemplary, for ‘he is the most virtuous

of His creation in terms of soul and of them all combines the most numerous

5praiseworthy4 characteristics’.13 (The school of) al-Kind�ı, F�ı h˙ud�ud al-ashy�a’ wa-

rus�umi-h�a refers to the human virtues as khuluq: note also the contrast in this

definition between nature and convention or imposition, wad˙‘.14

It is surely as a result of these and similar usages that the early translators used the

plural, akhl�aq, to render the Greek �eth�e. Thus, for example, in his Ethics, Galen (J�al�ın�us)

observes how character (�ethos) is a psychological condition in humans that impels them

to act without choice and reflection (al-khuluq h˙

�al li-al-nafs d�a‘iyah il�a an yaf‘al af‘�al al-

nafs bi-l�a rawiyyah wa-l�a ikhtiy�ar) and discusses whether it should be located wholly in

the irrational soul or whether it has any link to the rational soul.15

2. T˙ab‘

T˙

ab‘ (literally ‘seal’, ‘stamp’, ‘impress’) and its cognates t˙ib�a‘ and t

˙ab�ı‘ah16 are central

concepts in J�ah˙iz˙ian anthropology.17 As such t

˙ab‘ can, synonymously with khuluq, be

bad—HR (Kitm�an), 1.143.2, s�u’ al-t˙ab‘ wa-al-jasha‘—or it can, like the humours

(akhl�at˙), be in equipoise—HR (Jidd), 64.1–2, mu‘tadil al-t

˙ib�a‘ wa-mu‘tadil al-akhl�at

˙wa-

mustaw�ı al-asb�ab. Ire (ghad˙ab) is ‘in the nature of the Shayt

˙�an’ (KH

˙[Jidd], 63.15);

zealotry has a nature that can lead to harsh behaviour (ghalabat t˙ib�a‘ al-h

˙amiyyah min

ba‘d˙

al-jafwah: KH˙

[Jidd], 66.13–14), as has the disease of hatred (bighd˙ah), which, when

it is a motive for a man’s actions (‘illah), must be resisted fiercely (KH˙

[Jidd], 67.6–7).

Therefore if the passions have natures (t˙ab�a’i‘, i.e. natural elements) and ‘one of these

natures should chance to mingle with your spirit, it can be more hostile than any enemy,

more cutting than any sword, more terrifying for you than a ferocious lion and a swift-

acting venom’ (KH˙

[Jidd], 92.18–93.2). On the other hand, men’s natures may be in

harmonious accord with one another and constitute a very strong bond of friendship

(KH˙

[Jidd], 93.15–17).

A man’s nature can be beguiled and led by the delight of the new—man . . . qallada

t˙ab�ı‘ata-hu al-istit

˙r�af (KH

˙[Jidd], 72.1); it can be refractory—taq�a‘asat al-t

˙ab�ı‘ah (KH

˙[Jidd], 75.10); or it can be solidly constructed—tatah

˙akkamu ‘alay-hi (KH

˙[Jidd], 72.9);

and psychologically secure—man k�anat t˙ab�ı‘atu-hu ma’m�unatan ‘alay-hi ‘inda nafsi-hi

(KH˙

[Jidd], 72.6). As a man’s nature can be subject to affects (athar: KH˙

[Jidd], 94.5), it

needs to be improved through study and habituation (shah˙dh al-t

˙ab�ı‘ah wa-tamk�ın h

˙usn

al-‘�adah: KH˙

[Jidd], 75.6–7)18 and neglected (ihm�al al-t˙ab�ı‘ah), and thus its ‘edge’

(h˙add) wearied (KH

˙[Jidd], 75.9–12). If this is achieved (and presumably maintained),

‘one’s reasoning intellect will engulf one’s learning (‘ilm) and one’s learning will

overcome one’s nature (t˙ab‘)’ (KH

˙[Jidd], 67.2–3).

al-J�ah_iz_, Kit�ab al-Bay�an wa-l-taby�ın, 2.175–207, Part 4 215


A ‘sound nature’ is a prerequisite for morally improving discourse. Thus, in

explication of ‘Al�ı b. Ab�ı T˙�alib’s famous dictum q�ımat kull imri’ m�a yuh

˙sin, the worth of

every man is that which he does well, al-J�ah˙iz˙

notes: fa-idh�a k�ana al-ma‘n�a shar�ıfan wa-al-

lafz˙

bal�ıghan wa-k�ana s˙ah˙�ıh˙

al-t˙ab‘ ba‘�ıdan min al-istikr�ah wa-munazzahan ‘an al-ikhtil�al

mas˙�unan ‘an al-takalluf s

˙ana‘a f�ı al-qul�ub s

˙an�ı‘ al-ghayth f�ı al-turbah al-kar�ımah (Bay�an,

1.83.11–13), a statement in which locutor and locution are virtually indistinguishable.19

So too, the t˙ab�ı‘ah of Muh

˙ammad b. ‘Abd al-Malik al-Zayy�at can be a dumbfounding

retort (muskitah) (KH˙

[Jidd]. 91.15).

Of course, t˙ab‘ and its cognates t

˙ab�ı‘ah and t

˙ib�a‘, are not confined to J�ah

˙iz˙ian

anthropology. The camel that is able to find its way back to its natal land is able to do so

‘by virtue of the nature which is proper and special to it’ (bi-al-t˙ab�ı‘ah al-makhs

˙�us˙

bi-h�a)

(HR [Turk], 1.64.14); regions have natures by which their inhabitants are characterized

(Bukhal�a’, 18.3, a khabar on the authority of Thum�amah b. al-Ashras) and natural

phenomena, such as hot and cold, have their own natures that determine certain patterns

of behaviour: li-anna bard al-layl wa-thiqala-hu min t˙ib�a‘i-him�a al-d

˙amm wa-al-qabd

˙wa-

al-tanw�ım wa-h˙

arr shams al-nah�ar min t˙ib�a‘i-hi al-idh�abah wa-al-nashr wa-al-bast

˙wa-al-

khiffah wa-al-�ıq�az˙

(H˙

ayaw�an, 5.104.3–4).

There are many types of t˙ab�ı‘ah—for mathematical astronomy (h

˙is�ab), for example, or

music, or poetry, prose, or speculative theology (kal�am)—and one man may have one

type but not another.20 The type of t˙ab�ı‘ah we have determines how we will act, as in the

celebrated tale in the H˙

ayaw�an (2.156.6–11) of how a boy is suckled by a bitch (t˙alabat

nafsu-hu wa-tilk al-t˙ab�ı‘ah f�ı-hi da‘at-hu al-t

˙ab�ı‘ah wa-tilk al-mat

˙rifah il�a al-t

˙alab wa-al-

dunuww), demonstrating that our t˙ab�ı‘ah is part of God’s order and governance of the

world (fa-subh˙

�an man dabbara h�adh�a wa-alhama-hu wa-saww�a-hu wa-dalla ‘alay-hi).

Controversially, according to al-J�ah˙iz˙, our t

˙ab‘ also determines our very epistemic

capacities.21

Natural causation was a fundamental issue for the Mutakallim�un of the first

‘Abbasid century. At one extreme was the pure, uncompromised omnipotence

of the Deity, as in the theories of Jahm b. S˙afw�an;22 at the other was the natural

agency of the Greek physicians, as, for example, Buqr�at˙

(Hippocrates) in his

tract On Nutriment: al-t˙ab�ı‘ah takf�ı al-ashy�a’ kulla-h�a and their disciples in

Arabic, the so-called as˙h˙

�ab al-t˙ab�a’i‘.23 Pierre Hadot has argued that in the

Corpus hippocraticum the term physis ‘often corresponds to the physical consti-

tution proper to a patient, or to what results from his or her birth’, a meaning

that was gradually extended ‘to include the peculiar characteristics of a being, or

its primary and original, and therefore normal, way of being’.24 As far as I can

discern, the proponents of natural agency writing in Arabic tended to under-

stand t˙ab�ı‘ah and its cognates as absolutes: therefore an appropriate translation

of the Hippocratic statement quoted above would be, ‘Nature [and not

‘‘5one’s4 nature’’] gives all existents a sufficiency 5of what they need to

exist4’.25

Thus, in his Meteorology, 14.14–17, Theophrastus (in the Arabic translation

by Ibn al-Khamm�ar) maintained that ‘it is not correct (to say) that God should

be the cause of disorder in the world; nay (He is) the cause of its arrangement

and order. And that is why we ascribe its arrangement and order to God . . . and

the disorder of the world to the nature of the world’ (nud˙�ıf . . . tashw�ısh al-‘�alam

il�a t˙ab�ı‘at al-‘�alam).26 In On Dispelling Sadness, al-Kind�ı notes that nature cannot



generate that which is not in nature (x1.15), and that sensory predilections

and aversions (al-makr�uh wa-al-mah˙b�ub al-h

˙iss�ı) are not necessary in nature

(shay’an f�ı al-t˙ab‘ l�aziman) but come about through habituation (al-‘�ad�at)

and frequent application (kathrat al-isti‘m�al) (xIII.14–15).27 It is for this

reason that, in one of his musicological treatises, ‘possibility (imk�an) is not

exterior but interior, it is that which is innate within nature’ (al-ghar�ız�ı f�ı al-

t˙ab�ı‘ah) (that which happens for the most part: al-akthar ka-majr�a al-

t˙ab�ı‘ah).28

One of the sayings put in the mouth of Suqr�at˙

is that ‘nature is a handmaid

for the soul’, according to which ‘nature’ is the fourth hypostasis in the

emanationist scheme developed in the Theology out of Plotinus, Ennead,

V.2.1;29 and in the Kind�ı-circle version of Alexander of Aphrodisias’s On

Providence, nature is called a heavenly power.30 In his Ris�ala f�ı anna-hu

5t�ujad4 jaw�ahir l�a ajs�am, al-Kind�ı argues cumbersomely that ‘the nature of

things which do not differ in their essences (a‘y�an) is one; therefore the thing

which describes the 5other4 thing by giving it its name and its definition is

of the nature of that which is described by it (huwa min t˙ab�ı‘at maws

˙�ufi-

hi) . . . the nature of that which does not describe, by means of its name and

its definition, that which is described by it is not the nature of that which is

described by it (t˙ab�ı‘at maws

˙�ufi-hi); that, the nature of which is not the

nature of that which is described by it, is foreign (ghar�ıb) in that which is

described by it; the 5thing4 which is foreign in that which is described by

it (al-ghar�ıb f�ı maws˙�ufi-hi) is that which we call an accident in that which is

described by it (‘arad˙an f�ı maws

˙�ufi-hi) because it is not of its essence (dh�at)

but is rather an accident in it’.31

A good sense of the kind of thinking on ‘nature’ available in the Syriac

Christian milieu and attributed to Aristotle can be acquired from Nicolaus

Damascenus, On the Philosophy of Aristotle.32 Indeed, several varieties of

Aristotelian physis were available for the Muslim scientists to consider,

elaborations of the Aristotelian observation that ‘each concrete individual has

within it a concrete nature that is proper to its species and is the principle of its

motion’.33

There were many attempts at negotiating this fundamental polarity and

many early mutakallim�un sought both to remain true to the nuanced

presentation of omnipotence and human responsibility revealed in the Qur’�an

without sacrificing their blend of stoicism and peripateticism, and to adapt

notions which were later (perhaps surprisingly?) to be rendered characteristic of

the metaphysics of Muslim Neoplatonists such as al-‘Amir�ı (according to

whom t˙ab‘ is a link between some of the levels of his emanationist cosmos:

‘every substance is obedient to the last one by natural disposition [t˙ab‘] and

receives influence from it’ and ‘it has a share of the nature of that thing being

created’)34—a move that reminds me of Mu‘ammar’s theory of t˙ab‘. Some

syntheses stand out as especially unpopular: take that of Thum�amah b. al-

Ashras, for example. Al-Khayy�at˙

notes that he had been informed by someone

who heard Thum�amah ‘claim that Allah made the world with His nature’

(yaz‘um anna All�ah fa‘ala al-‘�alam bi-t˙ib�a‘i-hi), which is roundly rejected as kufr

because of its violation of tawh˙�ıd.35 The followers of Mu‘ammar argued that

perception (idr�ak) ‘is not through choice but is the act of a nature (fi‘l t˙ib�a‘)’,



building on his concentration of causality through the God-given nature in any

individual body.36 In one of his surveys of the period, van Ess notes that ‘pas a

pas, l’omnipotence de Dieu, telle qu’elle avait ete defendue par �Gahm b.

S˙afw�an, fut demantelee, d’abord chez Bisr, par la causalite des actes humaines

et ensuite, chez al-Naz˙z˙�am, par la causalite de la nature’.37 Sabra proposes that

al-J�ah˙iz˙’s H

˙ayaw�an is an exercise in the refinement of al-Naz

˙z˙�am’s atomistic

theory of i‘tim�ad as assimilation to the Fal�asifah’s theory of t˙ab‘, while

according to Wolfson, both Mu‘ammar b. ‘Abb�ad and al-Naz˙z˙�am held that

‘there is a nature in every body, and this nature is the cause of all the changing

events in it’.38 Daiber (‘Mu‘ammar ibn ‘Abb�ad al-Sulam�ı,’ EI2, IX, 259–260)

argues that Mu‘ammar differs from al-Naz˙z˙�am in considering nature ‘as an

independent factor, as a determinating element which makes superfluous any

involvement of the transcendent deity in the world of phenomena’, whereas for

al-Naz˙z˙�am nature is ‘imposed on substances by God’ (p. 259): see the passage

on Mu‘ammar’s system in al-Ash‘ar�ı’s Maq�al�at, 405.3–406.5, and Frank’s ‘Al-

Ma‘na,’ p. 257. The passage from al-Khayy�at˙, Intis

˙�ar, pp. 45.22–24, x33

(translated below, p. 229, n. 64), reminds us that we should not be deceived by

the extant traces of Mu‘ammar’s system into presuming that he neglected

divine agency.

There is disagreement as to whether some early mutakallim�un adopted an

Aristotelian or a Stoic structure of nature. Frank (‘Al-Ma‘na’, 257, note 47),

arguing against Wolfson, precludes Aristotelianism in favour of Stoicism in

Mu‘ammar’s theory of nature (‘the function of t˙ab‘/ma‘na is rather Stoic in the

overall structure of the context’).39 Sabra, ‘Kal�am Atomism,’ argues that the

Mu‘tazilah and the Fal�asifah share common ground with regard to t˙ab�ı‘ah, and

that it was a prominent point of attack for the Ash‘arites: see his discussion of

Ibn F�urak’s Mujarrad (133–134), while Adamson, (Al-Kind�ı, 198), notes that

the philosopher ‘adopts a position that marries the determinism of the Stoics to

Alexander’s Aristotelian account of providence.’ Saliba plausibly connects this

general speculative activity with a Muslim engagement with the Aristotelian

concept of nature (see, for example, Physics II, 1, 192b, 9–23) as an

investigation of causality. Sabra (‘Kal�am Atomism,’ 217, 229, 244, 244–245,

and 255–256) provides translations of various early Kal�am positions and al-

Ash‘ar�ı’s rejections thereof, who, in the words of Ibn F�urak, ‘equally opposed

the Naturalists and the Mu‘tazila by denying their doctrine[s] of Engendering

and of Nature, saying that each of these [two doctrines] derives from the other,

and that whoever denies the action of Nature while accepting Engendering is

committing a contradiction’ (256).

This complex history of t˙ab‘ in al-J�ah

˙iz’s system and in the first ‘Abbasid

century urgently requires systematic and in-depth study.40

These scientific orientations should not blind us, however, to the most central and

fundamental work to which al-J�ah˙iz˙

constantly responds: the Qur’�an. The substantive t˙ab‘

and its cognates t˙ab�ı‘ah and t

˙ib�a‘ do not occur in the Qur’�an, although the verb t

˙aba‘a is

encountered in 11 �ayahs in variations on a basic formula, best represented in the following

�ayah: ka-dh�alika yat˙ba‘u All�ahu ‘al�a qul�ubi al-k�afir�ına, ‘thus does God set a seal on the

hearts of the unbelievers’ (Q. 7.101). This notion of the sealing of the hearts of wrong-

doers is twofold: it is the reason for God’s punishment of the wrong-doers



(Q. 7.101, 9.87, 10.74, 16.108, 30.59, 40.35, 47.16) and it is the punishment itself for

acts of wrong-doing (Q. 4.155, 9.93, 7.100).41 That these two senses are not exclusive is

indicated by the occurrence of both in Q. 7.100 and 101. This is precisely the

(theological) determinism we encounter in al-J�ah˙iz˙’s speech–nature insight and which

corresponds with the Qur’anic pronouncement on sh�akilah (Q. 17.84) discussed above.

The J�ah˙iz˙ian t

˙ab‘ is not, then, an appeal for man’s natural virtue,42 as we encounter it

in the work of Rousseau, for example, but a Qur’anic notion, the tafs�ır of which al-J�ah˙iz˙

provides in the form of this chapter in exposition of the speech–nature insight. It is his

faith in the beneficence of God that rescues him from the aporia with which Alexandre

Kojeve confronted Leo Strauss:

The task of philosophy is to resolve the fundamental question regarding

‘human nature’. And in that connection the question arises whether there is not

a contradiction between speaking about ‘ethics’ and ‘ought’ on the one hand,

and about conforming to a ‘given’ or ‘innate’ human nature on the other. For

animals, which unquestionably have such a nature, are not morally ‘good’ or

‘evil’, but at most healthy or sick and wild or trained. One might therefore

conclude that it is precisely ancient anthropology that would lead to mass-

training and eugenics.43

3. Wus‘

This important notion of ‘capacity’ or ‘ability’ is an elaboration of al-J�ah˙iz˙’s engagement

with the theory of nash�at˙

as established by Bishr b. al-Mu‘tamir (Bay�an 1.135.8–

140.6).44 It does not feature in the present chapter, but there are a few telling instances

in the J�ah˙iz˙ian corpus:

God . . . has made for every soul an extent of capacity which it is not possible

for it to exceed nor does it have the wherewithal for more than it 5is allotted4(wa-l�a tattasi‘ li-akthar min-hu) (KH

˙[Kitm�an], 48.11–13).45

Further in this Epistle, al-J�ah˙iz˙

presents a pessimistic vision of man’s intellectual

capabilities, in his analysis of the nafs, his discussion of its capacity (wus‘) and the

temporariness of s˙ifah (60.12–14). The concept is succinctly expressed in the description

of Ab�u al-Hudhayl in the Bukhal�a‘ (135.10, k�ana Ab�u al-Hudhayl aslam al-n�as s˙adran

wa-awsa‘a-hum khuluqan wa-as’hala-hum suh�ulatan): ‘Ab�u al-Hudhayl was the most

secure of people with regard to 5the secrets he kept in his4 breast, the most capacious

with regard to his innate disposition and the smoothest with regard to 5stylistic4smoothness.’ Whereas humans are limited in terms of their capacity, ‘knowledge is so

extensive that it will not be contained’ (KH˙

[Kitm�an], 50.13–14). It is this vision, arising

out of the notion of wus‘, which leads al-J�ah˙iz˙

to have recourse to his most famous

stylistic technique, the mixing of jidd with hazl, gravity with levity, and not some

broadly humanist impulse or a natural proclivity and predilection for frivolity or a

flibbertigibbet intellect.46 Instead, this is an attempt to realise, through writing, a

feature of God’s beneficence as outlined in the Qur’anic anthropology: l�a yukallifu

All�ahu nafsan ill�a wus‘a-h�a, ‘God does not burden a soul with 5aught4 but its

capacity’ (Q.2.286).47



In sum, the determinism of al-J�ah˙iz˙’s Mu‘tazil�ı psychology is his response to the

anthropology of the Qur’�an. So, is al-J�ah˙iz˙

a causal determinist?48

Peter Adamson49 has introduced the idea of compatibilism into our

discussions. For an assertion of the exclusive validities of divine determinism

and freedom of action, one which seems to be more a sceptical position than a

statement of compatibilism, see van Ess’s summary of the position of ‘Ubayd

All�ah b. al-H˙

asan al-‘Anbar�ı (d. 168/785), that ‘someone who defends free will

is just as right as someone who believes in predestination’.50 According to my

reading of the speech–nature insight in this chapter of the Bay�an, al-J�ah˙iz˙

would be a determinist when it comes to human agents generally, but, in

Adamson’s terms, a compatibilist only in the case of the man of reasoning

intellect, the ‘�aqil (he cannot be an incompatibilist because the ‘�aqil must

always, prior to exercising his freedom, manage his t˙ab‘); see further Bishr’s

distinction between acts of knowing that are necessitated and those that are the

result of choice (Maq�al�at, 393.9). Adamson’s conclusion (Al-Kind�ı and the

Mu‘tazila, 72) that ‘al-Kind�ı is definitely at odds with the Mu‘tazila, who were

equally consistent in defending an incompatibilist position’ is not borne out by

the evidence adduced in this article on the varieties and extent of compatibilist

positions taken by several thinkers usually identified as early Mu‘tazilah. Indeed,

in order to establish this opposition, he has recourse to ‘Abd al-Jabb�ar who he

thinks is ‘simply making more explicit the incompatibilism that was always

assumed in the Mu‘tazilite tradition’, thereby rendering his argument liable to the

misrepresentation of approach number (3) outlined in Part 3 (p. 115).

Now, as we have seen, there are, according to al-J�ah˙iz˙, many different natures and

men may differ in what these natures render them capable of achieving.51 Whilst what

every man says is determined by his nature, whatever that nature may be (and

presumably only the man of reasoning intellect is sufficiently trained and self-aware to be

able to reflect properly on his nature), the ‘�aqil is, of course, still able to exercise either

ikhtiy�ar, choice, or ir�adah, intention,52 in choosing and intending when to speak and

when to remain silent, in choosing and intending what to say and what not to say, in

choosing and intending whom to address and whom not to address.

For present purposes, I will leave unaccounted for al-Ash‘ari’s khabar

(Maq�al�at, 407.12–13) that al-J�ah˙iz˙

maintained that ‘what 5comes4 after

intention (ir�adah) 5is possible4 for man by means of his nature (t˙ab‘) and not

by means of choice (ikhtiy�ar). No act except intention occurs through him

(yaqa‘u min-hu) by means of choice.’ Cf. the phrase attributed to al-Naz˙z˙�am in

al-Khayy�at˙

(Intis˙�ar, 28.6, x14: al-q�adir ‘al�a shay’ ghayr muh

˙�al wuq�u‘u-hu min-hu,

it is not absurd that the occurrence of a thing 5is4 through him able to do it);

and to the disciples of Mu‘ammar by al-Ash‘ar�ı (Maq�al�at, 382.12–14): that

perception (idr�ak) ‘is not through choice but is the act of a nature (fi‘l t˙ib�a‘)’

(see above, p. 217). It is possible that al-J�ah˙iz˙

may have followed Mu‘ammar’s

integration of t˙ab‘ into the very atomistic structure of creation so as to hold that

‘the agent who produces one act in one instant necessarily produces along with

it an infinite 5number4 of acts’ (al-Khayy�at˙, Intis

˙�ar, 46.13–14, x34), on which

Frank (‘Al-Ma‘na,’ 258), comments: ‘the infinity of causal determinants exists



simultaneously in a single instant and a man, in a single act, effects an infinity

of acts simultaneously.’ Al-Khayy�at˙

informs us that Mu‘ammar’s position is a

rejection of al-Naz˙z˙�am’s, that ‘Allah produces in one state (h

˙�al) an infinite

5number4 of bodies (ajs�am)’ (46.14-15, x34).

Frank exposes how ‘Abd al-Jabb�ar argues that there is choice ‘even when the

agent does something for compelling motivations’ (352); Frank states (‘Two

Islamic Views,’ 47, note 3 [see p. 225, n. 3]): ‘volitions (intentions,

choices) . . . are actions realised by the agent through the ‘‘powers of acting’’

inherent in the heart’, which ‘powers’ (qudar) may have been conceptualised by al-

J�ah˙iz˙

as t˙ab‘, khuluq and wus‘. According to Bernand, al-J�ah

˙iz˙

seeks to establish,

contrary to al-Naz˙z˙�am, that there is no knowledge acquired through free choice

(e.g., Bernand, ‘Le Savoir,’ 45; see p. 226, n. 21) and that there is a direct

equivalence of cognition via nature and intuition, likening his position to

Spinoza’s scientia intuitiva (‘Le Savoir,’ 50); for her, in al-J�ah˙iz˙’s system predicated

upon that of Thum�amah, t˙ab‘ is tantamount to d

˙ar�urah (‘Le Savoir,’ 54–55). Cp.

the phrase of al-Sarakhs�ı, al-af‘�al al-tamy�ıziyyah w�aqi‘ah bi-ir�adat al-mukht�ar.53

The (limited) extent of al-J�ah˙iz˙’s determinism is evident from the

doctrines of Jahm b. S˙afw�an or D

˙ir�ar b. ‘Amr, himself identified in some

of the sources as an erstwhile Mu‘tazil�ı, which al-Ash‘ar�ı quotes: Maq�al�at,

279.7–8 (Allah creates the quwwah, ir�adah, and ikhtiy�ar that a man needs to

perform an act: Jahm); 383.10 (wa-q�ala D˙

ir�ar al-idr�ak kasb li-al-‘abd khalq li-

All�ah, D˙

ir�ar maintained that perception is an acquisition for the worshipper,

a creation for God); 408.4–6 (‘man acts beyond his own ambit [f�ı ghayr

h˙ayyizi-hi]; . . . such movement or rest as is generated from his act beyond

his own ambit is an acquisition [kasb] for him, a creation for God [Great

and Glorious!]’: D˙

ir�ar). It is tempting to see t˙ab‘ wa-khuluq as a J�ah

˙iz˙ian

response to the D˙

ir�arite slogan kasb wa-khalq (on which, see Gimaret,

Theories, 66–70).

A consequence of this is that the moral onus falls squarely and solely on the man of

reasoning intellect:

The first point I make concerning this is that God (Mighty is His mention)

does not oblige (yukallif) anyone to commit or omit anything (fi‘l shay’ wa-l�a

tarka-hu) unless he is without excuse (maqt˙�u‘ al-‘udhr) and has ceased 5to

require4 proof (z�a’il al-h˙ujjah).54 The human being (‘abd, literally, slave) will

only be in this condition when he is sound of body (s˙ah˙�ıh˙

al-binyah), his

mixture is in equipoise (mu‘tadil al-miz�aj), he has copious access to the means

(w�afir al-asb�ab), his heart is freed 5from perturbations4 (mukhall�a al-sirb), he

understands how agency functions (‘�alim bi-kayf�ıyyat al-fa‘l), his incitements

are present (h˙

�ad˙ir al-naw�azi‘) and his ideas are kept in balance (mu‘addal al-

khaw�at˙ir), and he is cognisant of what is 5incumbent4 upon him and what is

due to him.55 The human being will not actually have capacity without these

characteristics (khis˙�al) which have been enumerated and the stages which have

been identified, upon the basis of which actions occur (maj�ar�ı al-af‘�al), on

account of which choice comes into existence, because of which obligatedness

(takl�ıf) is good and the Ordinance (fard˙) is incumbent, punishment is

permissible and reward is seemly. So if a man were to have capacity 5simply4



when he is healthy, someone who did not have a ladder to climb with, would

have the capacity 5to climb that height4.56

Let us compare this (rich) notion of takl�ıf with the version attributed by al-Ash‘ar�ı

(Maq�al�at, 482.3–6) to Thum�amah b. al-Ashras:

Some 5doctors4 (q�a’il�un) hold: man only reaches maturity (b�aligh) through

being compelled to the sciences of religion (‘ul�um al-d�ın). Moral incumbency

(takl�ıf) is a duty (l�azim) and the Command is obligatory for those who are

compelled to knowledge of Allah, His messengers and His Books. Those who

are not so compelled are not bound by moral incumbency and they have the

status (manzila) of children. This is the doctrine of Thum�amah b. al-Ashras al-

Numayr�ı.57

Both scientists agree in their elitist restriction of moral incumbency, although al-J�ah˙iz˙

introduces a further series of conditions, thereby restricting the remit of this incumbency

even more.

This brings us back the educational component of the chapter of the Bay�an devoted

to the speech–nature insight. To a certain extent, of course, al-J�ah˙iz˙

must perforce

limit the role of adab as education: a man cannot properly be taught eloquence if his

native disposition does not fully admit of eloquence—he can hide his true nature by

keeping quiet; and he can improve it, but it has to be energized through adab and to be

fully consonant with the psychopathic aspects of occasion,58 so that he is able to realise

man’s full potential, to respond fully to what it means for a believer to be mukallaf,

placed under a moral obligation by God. Thus al-J�ah˙iz˙

exhorts the Caliph (al-

Mu‘tas˙im) in his S

˙in�a‘�at al-quww�ad, to instruct his children in all sorts of wisdom,

since teaching them one thing only will render them like the quww�ad.59 This is the

significance of the portrait of al-Wal�ıd b. ‘Abd al-Malik in the chapter: intelligent

readers must follow their ‘aql in order to make a proper inference from his speech to

his nature on the basis of the inherent moral elitism of al-J�ah˙iz˙’s brand of i‘tiz�al. And

so too, ‘Abd al-Jabb�ar, who seems to have followed al-J�ah˙iz˙

in accepting the speech–

nature insight (if not his psychological mechanics and apparatus for accounting for

human agency), can inform us, in the words of al-J�ah˙iz˙, how al-Naz

˙z˙�am was able to

force his opponent Ab�u Shamir to depart from his nature and speak (argue

dialectically) contrary to his nature.60 Even if one is blessed with the capacity and

the disposition to be capable of bay�an, one can still be made to lose one’s control over

it. The man of reason, the ‘�aqil, must be ever vigilant in maintaining (through

performance) his equanimity.

The Physics of Morality as Enunciation

Al-J�ah˙iz˙

studied with al-Naz˙z˙�am,61 whose scientific theories are characterized by some

astonishing conceptual sallies, among them his elaboration of the notion of t˙ab‘ by means

of the notion of khilqah:

He used to maintain that that which happens beyond the ambit of man62 is the

acting (fa‘l) of God (the Almighty!) through a compunction (�ıj�ab) which He

creates for the entity (shay’), as in the case of the projection of the stone when



given impetus (daf‘ah) by someone who pushes it, its descent when cast by

someone who casts it and its ascent upwards when hurled by someone who

hurls it. So too perception (idr�ak) is 5part of4 of the acting (fa‘l) of God (the

Almighty!) through the compunction of His creation (bi-�ıj�ab al-khilqah). The

meaning of this is that God (the Almighty!) impresses the stone with a nature

(t˙aba‘a al-h

˙ajar t

˙ab‘an) when someone gives it the impetus to move by pushing

it. The same holds for all generated entities (al-ashy�a’ al-mutawallidah).63

Al-Naz˙z˙�am seems to have been engaged in a contestation of a theory of Mu‘ammar:

When the parts 5atoms4 (ajz�a’) are gathered together, the accidents are

necessary and they 5the atoms4 produce them through the compunction of

nature (bi-�ıj�ab al-t˙ab‘), for every part 5atom4 produces (yaf‘al) in itself such

accidents as inhere in it.64

Al-J�ah˙iz˙

thus can be said to have appropriated from al-Naz˙z˙�am this physical notion of

khilqah and its enlargement of Mu‘ammar’s cognate t˙ab‘, adapted it to the concept of

khuluq and applied it to the realm of human ethics, subsequently redefining and

maintaining man’s moral obligation to the proper exercise of intent and choice in the

manner suggested above.65 In so doing, he perpetuated the ideas of Bishr b. al-Mu‘tamir

concerning the role of divine omnipotence in the causality of human acts66 and

transformed physics into ethics: for him, as for al-Naz˙z˙�am, nature, t

˙ab‘, was ‘the invisible

tool of God’.67 At the same time, I think, al-J�ah˙iz˙

distanced himself from the teaching of

Bishr (remember J�ah˙iz˙ian wus‘ is a development of Bishrian nash�at

˙) and the as

˙h˙

�ab al-

as˙lah

˙, deflecting necessity away from God and back to man, while it is possible to detect

some Galenic, as well as Qur’anic, overtones in his psychologizing of khuluq.68

It is thus important to be cautious in determining the force of the following khabar

given by al-Ash‘ar�ı:

Al-Naz˙z˙�am and his disciples, and ‘Al�ı al-Usw�ar�ı and al-J�ah

˙iz˙

among others

maintained that God (the Almighty!) is not described (y�us˙af ) with 5the

attribute4 of the ability (qudrah) over wrong-doing and lying and over the

abandonment of those acts which are the best (al-as˙lah

˙) in favour of those

which are not the best, even though he is able (wa-qad yaqdir) to abandon that

5i.e., the best4 for similar 5creations4 which are infinite and which will

take its place. They held it absurd (ah˙

�al�u) that the Creator (al-b�ari’) should be

described (y�us˙af ) with 5the attribute4 of the ability (qudrah) to punish

believers and children and to cast them into Jahannam (Maq�al�at, 555.1–5).

What seems basically to be at issue is the importance of ‘choice’ (ikhtiy�ar) in the overall

conceptualization of ‘ability’ (qudrah). Viewed from the class of acts over which an agent

has the power to act, and from the self-sufficiency of God (i.e. that He has no defect

or need), what seems not to be at issue is a declaration that God must act for the best

and so has the ability only to enact the best.69 It would be absurd to maintain that God

would ever command, and subsequently punish, a believer to do those acts that are

ethically reprehensible in and of themselves: ‘actions which are ethically bad in

themselves are excluded as such from those which are (potential) objects of God’s ability

to act’.70



Al-J�ah˙iz˙

may not present us with a fully expounded philosophy of language such

as that, for example, elaborated by ‘Abd al-Q�ahir al-Jurj�an�ı in the 11th century or

by Gottlob Frege in the 20th century, or with a statement or assessment of beliefs

about reality through the scrutiny and examination of language, such as that

attempted by Bertrand Russell, or with a theory of how language is acquired and

produced. Rather, his is an attempt to explain why we say what we say, to exhort

us to live the Mu‘tazilite life and to provide a way of knowing God through the

Qur’�an.

Conclusion71

Thus far, the spiritual and (meta)physical implications of the speech–nature insight have

been explored, and yet I am convinced that al-J�ah˙iz˙

was a thinker for whom the

Mu‘tazilite man of reasoning did not exist independently of, did not live in spite of, his

society. For all the similarities which his vision of the complete man might seem to share

with the Stoic sage, his equanimity was not intended to be aloof from the community,

the jam�a‘ah. Rather, in the Bay�an, al-J�ah˙iz˙’s theorizings are nourished by and directed at

legal speculation (as I have also argued for his engagement with al-Sh�afi‘�ı’s system of

bay�an).72 Perhaps, then, the last question we may ask of the speech–nature insight is

whether it too has some juridical purport.

In his Maq�al�at, al-Ash‘ar�ı notes of D˙

ir�ar b. ‘Amr:

That he used to allege that he did not know whether the secrets (sar�a’ir) of all

the commonalty might possibly be unbelief (kufr) and rejection of the truth

5of the Qur’�an4 (takdh�ıb). He would say, ‘If they brought a man before me, I

would have the capacity (wasi‘a-n�ı) to say that maybe he was concealing

(yud˙mir) unbelief. In the same way, 5however4, when I am asked about them

all, I say that I do not know whether they are possibly keeping their unbelief

concealed (Maq�al�at, 282.2–5).

At issue here is the niyyah, the intent, of a believer, an agent or the perpetrator of a

wrong. Of the 2nd-century scholar-judges such as al-Sha‘b�ı and Iy�as b. Mu‘�awiyah (see

akhb�ar, xx150 and 121 of the translation, respectively), van Ess notes that they had

‘dazzled the masses with their wisdom and subtlety . . . These men had a gift for judging

a situation intuitively, by fir�asa, with perspicacity’.73 Systematic, however, they were not.

Al-J�ah˙iz˙’s version of the speech–nature insight seems to be a response to the quandary

and aporia in which D˙

ir�ar and the judiciary found themselves and would also have been

of use to the s˙�ah˙ib al-mas�a’il (the ‘witness examiner’, in Hallaq’s terms), who by the end

of the 2nd century AH had been a standard feature of the cadi’s court and was charged

with the assessing of the probity of witnesses.74 At the same time, along with the notion

of personal integrity (‘ad�alah), it may have promised a means for discerning the truth

content of the testimony of a solitary witness75. At the basis of much of this is the

observation that the honest and upright man is he who is in faultless command of the

‘arabiyyah.76

The Bay�an was (re)written for the chief cadi, Ah˙mad b. Ab�ı Du’�ad. What could be

more appropriate for such a patron than a natural physics of speech (and hence of

morality), so forensically meaningful and so significant of the social and juridical benefits

of Mu‘tazilite physics?



Appendix 1. Al-J�ah˙iz˙

and al-Mad�a’in�ı

Ab�u al-H˙

asan al-Mad�a’in�ı is the authority for akhb�ar xx7, 32, 40, 42 and 164.77

According to the H˙

ayaw�an, 3.357.11–14, al-Mad�a’in�ı was one of a group of

mutakallim�un who (in a manner reminiscent of Pythagoras and his followers?) shared

an aversion to b�aqill�a’, a kind of broad-bean.78 Al-J�ah˙iz˙’s engagement with al-Mad�a’in�ı in

his writings is extensive and complex, often distancing himself through the use of the

verb za‘ama from the burden of the khabar, as in x32, with which compare Bay�an,

2.216.10–11, Bukhal�a’, 57.15–17 (on the thar�ıdah of M�alik b. Mundhir) and H˙

ayaw�an,

6.261.1–4 and 5–7; see further Bay�an, 1.353.6–354.4, where al-J�ah˙iz˙

corrects a list of

khut˙ab�a’ compiled by him. On one occasion, in an important passage, Bay�an 3.366.15–

17, al-J�ah˙iz˙

comments unfavourably on the collections of ah˙

�ad�ıth and akhb�ar by Ab�u

‘Ubaydah al-Nah˙w�ı, al-Mad�a’in�ı, Hish�am b. al-Kalb�ı and al-Haytham b. ‘Ad�ı, noting

that ‘they have gathered but little out of much and but what is mingled rather than what

is pure.’ When al-J�ah˙iz˙

pronounces his verdict, 3.367.5–6, al-Mad�a’in�ı escapes outright

condemnation, unlike al-Haytham and Ibn al-Kalb�ı. See further the excursus on

transmitting H˙

ad�ıth: HR (Bigh�al), 2.223.12–228.2 and his inclusion alongside the

‘ulam�a’ of the Basrans in H˙

ayaw�an, 2.155.7–156.5.

Al-Mad�a’in�ı is cited by al-J�ah˙iz˙

preponderantly as authority for akhb�ar on the following

subjects (although this categorization is not exhaustive or comprehensive): (i) early Muslims

and the Umayyads (rarely Prophet Muh˙ammad); (ii) the spiritual fathers of Basra (in so far

as this category is distinct from the preceding); (iii) formal declamations, khut˙bahs and

ris�alahs; (iv) craftsmen, artisans, workfolk and criminals; (v) linguistic peculiarities,

especially peccadilloes and witty retorts (this latter category is often cognate with the

previous category; important subsets are [v.a] witticisms uttered upon undignified

treatment at the hands of the h˙

�ajib) [v.b] the A‘r�ab; and (vi) zoological lore. Presumably

al-J�ah˙iz˙

audited some of al-Mad�a’in�ı’s lecture courses on these subjects, just as he elsewhere

refers to his use of material by Ab�u ‘Ubaydah and al-As˙ma‘�ı.

(i) Early Muslims and the Umayyads (rarely prophetic h˙

ad�ıth): Bayan, 1.60.2–7,

1.133.9–10, 2.87.16–88.4, 2.156.1–5, 2.302.16–303.1, 2.341.1–3, 4.61.6–9;

H˙

ayaw�an, 1.177.8–11, 3.427.6–428.4 (Mu‘�awiyah); B�ay�an, 1.128.11–129.1

(Shab�ıb b. Yaz�ıd al-Kh�arij�ı); 1.260.10–13 (Ab�u Dharr ‘Umar b. Dharr al-K�uf�ı,

a Murji’ite); 1.275.8–10, 1.358.14–386.7, 2.303.14–16, 3.210.3–5, 4.18.2–4,

59.7–60.3, H˙

ayaw�an, 6.170.1–3 (al-H˙

ajj�aj); Bay�an, 1.305.9–13, 2.321.3–6 and 7–

9, 4.89.4–13 (‘Abd al-Malik); 1.353.1–3 (Zayd b. ‘Al�ı b. al-H˙

usayn); 1.354.5–7

(Hish�am b. ‘Abd al-Malik); 1.393.5–13 (N�afi‘ b. ‘Alqamah, maternal uncle of

Marw�an); 1.395.12–18 (Sulaym�an b. ‘Abd al-Malik); 1.404.5–10 (‘Umar b. ‘Abd

al-‘Az�ız); 2.29.13–15 (prophetic h˙ad�ıth); 2.78.9–10, 2.82.3–6 (Yaz�ıd b. al-

Muhallab); 2.98.3–7 (al-Wal�ıd b. Yaz�ıd); 2.230.5–7; HR (H˙

ij�ab), 2.53.5–10 (al-

Farazdaq); Bay�an, 2.292.17–293.17 (‘Umar b. Muj�ashi‘); 2.295.6–296.9

(‘A’ishah); 2.300.8–301.7 (Ibn ‘Abb�as); 2.323.2–4 (al-T˙irimm�ah

˙); 2.339.15–17

(‘Umar b. al-Khat˙t˙�ab); 2.349.7–9 (‘Amir b. ‘Abd Allah al-Zubayr�ı); 3.147.9–10

(Qat�adah); 3.257.7–10 (‘Abd al-Malik b. Bishr b. Marw�an); 3.277.10–278.2 (Sa‘d

b. Ab�ı Waqq�as˙); 3.301.3–5 (‘Amr b. al-‘As

˙); H

˙ayaw�an, 2.83.6–84.1 (‘Umar b. Ab�ı

Rab�ı‘ah); 5.450.4–451.9 (‘Al�ı b. al-H˙

usayn, H˙

asan b. H˙

asan b. ‘Al�ı and al-

Mukht�ar). See also Bay�an, 2.320.6–7, the Umayyad predilection for mar�ath�ı.

(ii) Spiritual fathers of Basra (particularly cadis): Bay�an, 1.99.7–9 (Iy�as b.

Mu‘�awiyah); 1.120.1–4 and 1.295.1–6 (‘Ubayd Allah b. al-H˙

asan al-‘Anbar�ı);



cf. Pseudo-J�ah˙iz˙

HR (H˙

an�ın), 4.139.10–11, on the founding of Basra and al-K�ufah

and H˙

ayaw�an, 5.196.8–9 and 196.10, on the Tigris and Euphrates.

(iii) Formal declamations, khut˙bahs and ris�alahs: Bay�an, 1.172.1–3 (al-H

˙asan al-Bas

˙r�ı)

(this khabar may also be entered under category 2); 1.353.4–5 (Kh�alid b. S˙afw�an);

1.353.6–354.4 (al-Mad�a’in�ı’s list of khut˙ab�a’); 1.387.6–12 and 2.298.10–13 (al-

H˙

ajj�aj); 2.61.10–66.3 (Ziy�ad, in Basra); 2.117.8–120.5 (‘Abd Allah b. ‘Abd Allah

b. al-Ahtam); 2.120.6–121.10 (‘Umar b. ‘Abd al-‘Az�ız); 2.174.2–10 (‘Abd Allah b.

al-H˙

asan) (this khabar is also given at Bay�an, 1.332.6–13, without attribution to

al-Mad�a’in�ı); 4.73.14–21 (al-Mundhir’s was˙iyyah to his son al-Num‘�an); 4.88.4–

89.2 (‘Umar b. ‘Abd al-‘Az�ız’s kit�ab to ‘Umar b. al-Wal�ıd); 4.93.5–1 (was˙iyyah of

‘Abd al-Malik b. S˙�alih

˙); H

˙ayaw�an, 5.189.7–190.2 (was

˙iyyah of al-‘Abb�as b. ‘Abd

al-Mut˙t˙alib to his son ‘Abd Allah).

(iv) Craftsmen, artisans, workfolk and criminals: Bay�an, 2.320.12–321.2 (Shiz˙�az˙, a

lis˙s˙); 3.85.12–86.3 (Shab�ıb b. Kar�ıb al-T

˙�a’�ı, a lis

˙s˙); 4.5.8–11 (a s

˙ayraf�ı); 4.6.1–3 (an

Ib�ad˙�ı as a money-changer); Bukhal�a’ 133.1–4 (a date-merchant); H

˙ayaw�an,

6.261.1–4, 5–7 and 7.237.1–239.9 (a j�ariyah).

(v) Linguistic peculiarities, especially peccadilloes and defects: Bay�an, 1.165.1–3

(Ziy�ad’s mawl�a on the penises of donkeys: see x32); 1.379.2–12 (Ab�u al-Aswad al-

Du’al�ı: taq‘�ır); 1.379.13–380.1 and 380.2–5 (two khabars concerning ‘Alqamah al-

Nah˙w�ı: taq‘�ır); 2.210.6–9 (‘Ubayd Allah b. Ziy�ad and Mu‘�awiyah: luknah);

2.216.10–11 (Kh�alid al-Qasr�ı: lah˙n); 2.217.14 (al-H

˙ajj�aj: lah

˙n); 2.219.5–8 (S�abiq

al-A‘m�a and Ibn J�ab�an: lah˙n); 2.231.10–12 (two lunatics: ‘iyy); 2.238.8–239.1

(Sulaym�an b. ‘Abd al-Malik and Ab�u l-Sar�ay�a: ‘iyy); 2.241.9–12 and 241.15–16

(‘iyy); 2.245.8–9 (Kardam al-Sad�us�ı and Bil�al b. Ab�ı Burdah: ‘iyy); 2.247.1–4

(‘�alim: khat˙a’); 2.249.11–12 (‘Ad�ı b. Art

˙�ah: khat

˙a’); 2.250.6–8 (Mus

˙‘ab b.

H˙

ayy�an: khat˙a’); 2.256.17–257.4 (al-Mahd�ı and Shab�ıb b. Shaybah: khat

˙a’);

2.258.5–11 (al-Mahd�ı and one of ‘Abd al-Rah˙m�an b. Samurah’s family: khat

˙a’);

2.260.11–15 (Rab�ı‘ah b. ‘Isl [?] and Mu‘�awiyah: khat˙a’); 2.264.4–8 (Mu‘�awiyah

and ‘Abd al-Rah˙m�an b. Kh�alid b. al-Wal�ıd b. al-Mugh�ırah: khat

˙a’); 2.310.5–11 (a

kit�ab by al-H˙

ajj�aj); 3.240.6–10 (Ziy�ad and a Yemeni’s solecism); 3.282.1–5

(uncustomary prayers); 4.6.4–6, 6.7 and 6.8–9 (witty pronouncements before or

by emirs); 4.6.12–13 (a lunatic gives witness in a case of adultery); 4.6.14–16;

4.7.9–11 (Sa‘�ıd b. al-As˙

proposes to ‘A’ishah bint ‘Uthm�an); 4.7.12–13 (al-H˙

ajj�aj

and al-Mugh�ırah b. al-Muhallab); 4.7.15–8.5 (al-Muhallab and his wife); 4.11.6–

9; 4.98.1–4 (Bil�al b. Ab�ı Burdah); HR (Bigh�al), 2.239.13–240.3 (Juh˙�a); H

˙ayaw�an,

2.170.7–171.4 (al-Saff�ah˙

and Ab�u Dul�amah).

(v.a) Witticisms upon chamberlainly treatment: HR (H˙

ij�ab), 2.35.15–36.4,

71.1–8, 71.9–72.2, 77.3–9, 77.10–16, 80.7–81.3, 83.6–8.

(v.b) The A‘r�ab: Bay�an, 2.332.10–13 (Hish�am and an A‘r�ab�ı); 2.339.11–12;

3.281.1–3 (unusual words of an A‘r�abiyyah); 4.6.10–11 (an emir and an

A‘r�ab�ı); 4.65.4–7 (an A‘r�ab�ı at prayer); 4.89.15–90.3 (‘Utbah b. Ab�ı

Sufy�an and an A‘r�ab�ı); 4.91.9–11 (an A‘r�abiyyah’s aphorism); 4.98.12–

99.3 (al-H˙

ajj�aj is outwitted by an A‘r�ab�ı); H˙

ayaw�an 2.357.6–359.2 (an

A‘r�ab�ı divides a hen); 7.24.7–13 (aphorism).

(vi) Zoological lore: Bay�an, 3.141.20–142.3 (an ascetic, his slave and his ewe); 4.7.3–5

(a man and a lion); HR (Bigh�al), 2.355.10–356.16 (on the mating of horses and



mules);79 H˙

ayaw�an, 2.13.11–13 (Ziy�ad promulgates a canine remedy); 2.152.8–

11 (a cockerel); 2.155.7–156.5 (a boy is suckled by a bitch); 2.171.5–172.3 (a man

feigns mental illness by barking to avoid his creditors); 2.172.14–173.8 (the

Byzantine emperor, basing his decision on the proverbial enmity of hound and fox,

decides not to attack the Muslims during the internecine war between ‘Abd al-

Malik and Mus˙‘ab b. al-Zubayr); 2.217.1–6 (wolves); 2.278.6–279.8 (Iy�as b.

Mu‘�awiyah likens himself to a ring-dove, his brother to a hen); 2.353.5.–354.3 (a

Turkic chieftain boasts ten abilities, each taken from the animal kingdom);

3.431.8–432.8 (the crow); 7.90.6–9 (the elephant).

Notes

1. This article is in four parts. Part 1, containing the introduction and the translation, appeared in

Middle Eastern Literatures 11, no. 2 (2008): 169–191; Part 2, containing the commentary, appeared in

Middle Eastern Literatures 12, no. 1 (2009): 1–25; and Part 3, containing the first half of the

Interpretation, appeared in Middle Eastern Literatures 12, no. 2 (2009):107–125. All are dedicated to

Roger Allen.

I have tried, wherever possible, to restrict the endnotes to the provision of references and

bibliographical materials. However, the discussion in the sections entitled ‘The Divine’ (in Part 3),

‘Determinism’, and ‘The Physics of Morality as Enunciation’ has required of me that I supplement

my argument with discussions of a substantive (and at times substantial) nature. I have indented such

discussions to set them apart from the body of the article. The reader uninterested in the foundations

of my reasoning or more interested in al-J�ah˙iz˙

than in why I read him as I do can profitably read the

article without paying them the slightest attention.

2. This is a long addition to the proofs of Four Essays on Liberty, which was not incorporated into the

final book: Isaiah Berlin, Liberty, ed. Henry Hardy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), xix.

3. Richard M. Frank, ‘Two Islamic Views of Human Agency’, in La notion de liberte au moyen age: Islam,

Byzance, Occident (Penn-Paris-Dumbarton Oaks Colloquia, 4, session des 12–15 octobre 1982), ed.

G. Makdisi, D. Sourdel, and J. Sourdel-Thomine (Paris: Societe d’Edition ‘‘Les Belles Lettres’’,

1985), 45. I do not propose to answer this last series of questions in this article. Al-J�ah˙iz˙’s importance

for the Basran Mu‘tazilah is a subject that requires urgent attention.

4. Frank, ‘Two Islamic Views’, 37–49, especially pp. 38–39 and 47 (note 5) (the quotation is taken from

p. 41).

5. A more concise version of this survey has appeared in Montgomery, ‘Al-J�ah˙iz˙

on Jest and Earnest’, in

Humor in der arabischen welt, ed. Georges Tamer (Berlin: de Gruyter, 2009), 209–239, at pp. 227–229.

6. See Michael Cook, ‘The Opponents of the Writing of Tradition in Early Islam’, Arabica 49 (1997):

453 (x23).

7. Al-Khayy�at˙, Kit�ab al-Intis

˙�ar, ed. H.S. Nyberg and trans. Albert N. Nader (Beirut: Les Lettres

Orientales, 1957), 24.14, x10.

8. Ibn Qutaybah, Kit�ab ‘Uy�un al-akhb�ar (Cairo: Maktabat D�ar al-kutub al-mis˙riyyah, 1925), 1.295.3–4.

See also Ibn Qutaybah, Fad˙l al-‘Arab wa-al-tanb�ıh ‘al�a ‘ul�umi-h�a, ed. Wal�ıd Mah

˙m�ud Kh�alis

˙(Abu

Dhabi: Mansh�ur�at al-mujtama‘ al-thaq�af�ı, 1998), 113.14–15: wa-in k�ana la-ka khuluq fa-la-ka

mur�u’ah; 113.16–17: wa-mur�u’atu-hu khuluqu-hu; 115.7–8: mur�u’at al-rajul khuluqu-hu li-anna al-

mur�u’ah ijtin�ab al-qab�a’ih˙

wa-al-sayyi’�at; 115.14–15: and fa-khuluq al-rajul mur�u’atu-hu li-anna-hu

q�ama maq�am al-mur�u’ah ka-m�a q�ama al-m�al maq�am al-h˙

asab. On this most-J�ah˙iz˙ian of Ibn

Qutaybah’s epistles, see Jose Ignacio Sanchez Sanchez, ‘Ibn Qutayba and the Su‘�ubiyya’

(unpublished MPhil thesis, University of Cambridge, 2007).

9. Ibn al-Washsh�a’, al-Muwashsh�a, 31.25–32.1.

10. Al-T˙abar�ı, Tafs�ır, 11, 104–105, xx20298–20304 (Q. 26.137). The gloss attributed to Ibn ‘Abb�as is

representative: d�ın al-awwal�ın wa-‘�ad�atu-hum wa-akhl�aqu-hum; some authorities connect it with

‘creation’ in the sense of ‘fabrication’: thus, ikhtil�aq, as�at˙�ır and kadhib, again suggesting an equation

of khuluq with the verbal act; al-T˙abar�ı, Tafs�ır, 14, 20–21, xx26781–26786 (Q. 68.4): other

equivalents proposed for khuluq are adab, d�ın and amr.

11. See Michael Zwettler, ‘The Poet and the Prophet: Towards Understanding the Evolution of a

Narrative,’ Jerusalem Studies in Arabic and Islam 5 (1984): 313–387, at p. 323.



12. Conseilleur, 21.9, x8 (see Part 3, p. 121, n. 18, for the full reference).

13. Al-Sh�afi‘�ı, Ris�alah, ed. Ah˙mad Muh

˙ammad Sh�akir (Beirut: al-Maktabah al-‘ilmiyyah, n.d.), 13.1,

x27: afd˙al khalqi-hi nafsan wa-ajma‘u-hum li-kull khuluq.

14. Ras�a’il, AR, 1.177.4 (al-fad˙

�a’il al-ins�aniyyah hiya al-khuluq al-ins�an�ı al-mah˙

m�ud). This opposition is

itself a Greek inheritance: Adamson, Al-Kind�ı and the Mu‘tazila, 235, note 30 (see Part 3, p. 124,

n. 59, for the full reference); M. Pohlenz, Review of Ritter and Walzer, Gottingische Gelehrte Anzeigen

200, no. 10 (1938): 415–416.

15. P. Kraus, ‘Kit�ab al-Akhl�aq li-J�al�ın�us’, Bulletin of the Faculty of Arts of the University of Egypt 5 (1937):

1–51, at p. 25.4; J.N. Mattock, ‘A translation of the Arabic Epitome of Galen’s Book Peri �Ethon’, in

Islamic Philosophy and the Classical Tradition, ed. S.M. Stern, A. Hourani, and V. Brown (Oxford:

Cassirer, 1972), 235–260; F. Rosenthal, The Classical Heritage in Islam, trans. E. Marmorstein and J.

Marmorstein (London: Routledge, 1992), 85–94; and R. Walzer, Greek into Arabic (Oxford:

Cassirer, 1962), 142–163. It is not possible for me in this article to explore the significance for the

Kal�am discussions of bul�ugh and ma‘rifah of the translation of this work, probably prior to 842, by

H˙

unayn b. Ish˙�aq. Walzer (Greek into Arabic, 151–153) discusses Galen’s observations of the �ethos of

the animal kingdom and it is tempting to discern in the Arabic J�al�ın�us one of the many inspirations

for al-J�ah˙iz˙’s Kit�ab al-h

˙ayaw�an, especially in view of the interest that its patron, Muh

˙ammad b. ‘Abd

al-Malik, took in the Hellenistic medical tradition.

See generally Richard Walzer, ‘Akhl�ak˙’, EI2, I, 327; and the interesting take on Platonic

psychology by Qust˙�a b. L�uq�a in Ikhtil�af al-n�as f�ı akhl�aqi-him: P. Sbath, ‘Le Livre des caracteres de

Qost˙�a Ibn Louq�a’, Bulletin de l’Institut d’Egypte 22 (1940): 103–169.

16. Gimaret (Theories, 33–34) would discern a distinction in J�ah˙iz˙ian usage between t

˙ab‘/t

˙ib�a‘ and t

˙ab�ı‘ah/

t˙ab�a’i‘. In J�ah

˙iz˙ian usage, as in the early Kal�am generally, the plural t

˙ab�a’i‘ is predominantly used in

its scientific sense of ‘natural elements’: see, for example, Mu‘ammar in al-Ash‘ar�ı, Maq�al�at, 548.12;

al-J�ah˙iz˙, KH

˙(Jidd), 92.5, al-t

˙ab�a’i‘ al-mu‘tadilah, where t

˙ab�a’i‘ has its meaning, familiar in medical

texts, of ‘natural elements’; cf. KH˙

(Jidd) 93.17–18, sabab al-ta‘�ad�ı ‘arad˙

f�ı t˙ab�a’i‘ al-ghurab�a’ wa-

jawhar f�ı t˙ab�a’i‘ al-aqrib�a’; al-J�ah

˙iz˙

often uses t˙ab�ı‘ah in the sense attested by al-Ash‘ar�ı of Muh

˙ammad

b. H˙

arb (Maq�al�at, 383.1), i.e. as an equivalent of t˙ab‘. S. Nomanul Haq (‘T

˙ab�ı‘a’, EI2, X, 26) notes

that the mutakallim�un tended to view t˙ab�ı‘ah as virtually synonymous with al-Naz

˙z˙�am’s notion of

khilqah; that is, ‘as a special case of t˙ab’, ‘a natural causal agency which brings about the real

phenomena of the world’. He suggests ‘that they sometimes do not bother to keep the two terms

distinct from each other’, although I suspect that al-J�ah˙iz˙

is appropriating al-Naz˙z˙�am’s khilqah, not as

t˙ab�ı‘ah but as t

˙ab‘.

17. See James E. Montgomery, ‘Of Models and Amanuenses: The Remarks on the Qas˙�ıda in Ibn

Qutaybah’s Kit�ab al-Shi‘r wa-l-Shu‘ar�a’, in Islamic Reflections, Arabic Musings. Studies in Honour of

Alan Jones, ed. R. Hoyland and P. Kennedy (Oxford: Gibb Trust, 2004), 1–47, at pp. 9–22. In that

work, I fluctuated between the translation of t˙ab‘ as ‘nature’ and as ‘innate propensity’. I have

persisted with the translation ‘nature’ in the present article, because of the relevance of Kal�am physics

for understanding the dynamics of the speech–nature insight. On physis, of which t˙ab‘ and t

˙ab�ı‘ah are

standard translations, see Gerard Naddaf, The Greek Concept of Nature (Albany: SUNY, 2005); and

Hadot, The Veil of Isis (see Part 1, p. 189, n. 2, for full reference details).

18. See Part 3, p., on the importance of studying books to this end; and Sebastian Gunther, ‘Advice for

Teachers: The 9th Century Muslim Scholars Ibn S˙ah

˙n�un and al-J�ah

˙iz˙

on Pedagogy and Didactics’, in

Ideas, Images and Methods of Portrayal. Insights into Classical Arabic Literature and Islam, ed. Sebastian

Gunther (Leiden: Brill, 2005), 89–128, at p. 119.

19. On istikr�ah and taghl�ıq as faults of a composition, see HR (Turk), 1.36.5–7.

20. See the discussion in Montgomery, ‘Of Models’, 18–21.

21. This matter has been extensively discussed in the following works: Georges Vajda, ‘La Connaissance

naturelle de Dieu selon al-G�ah˙iz˙

critiquee par les Mu‘tazilites’, Studia Islamica 24 (1967): 19–34;

Josef van Ess, ‘G�ah˙iz˙

und die as˙h˙

�ab al-ma‘�arif ’, Der Islam 41 (1966): 169–178; Marie Bernand, ‘Le

Savoir entre la volonte et la spontaneite selon al-Naz˙z˙�am et al-G�ah

˙iz˙’, Studia Islamica 39 (1974): 25–

57; Gimaret, Theories, 30–36; and van Ess, Theologie 4: 96–118, especially pp. 102–108 (see Part 3,

p. 123, n. 55, for full reference details). The issue of epistemology is, in the case of al-J�ah˙iz˙, and

inexplicably in my opinion, considered in isolation of his theory of bay�an, which comprises his notion

of the khabar and his basic anthropology of communication.

22. Al-Ash‘ar�ı, Maq�al�at, 279.1–280.5; Richard M. Frank, ‘The Neoplatonism of �Gahm ibn S˙afwan’, Le

Museon 78 (1965): 395–424; Gimaret, Theories, 64–66; van Ess, Theologie 2: 493–508; van Ess,



Flowering, 86 (on D˙

ir�ar and al-As˙amm: ‘if God is the Other par excellence, he is beyond our reason

just as he is beyond our senses’) (see Part 3, p. 124, n. 57, for full reference details).

23. Kit�ab al-ghidh�a’ li-Buqr�at˙, ed. John N. Mattock (Cambridge: Heffers, 1971), 5.3–4.

24. Hadot, The Veil of Isis, 18–19.

25. Hadot, The Veil of Isis, 23.

26. Hans Daiber, ‘The Meteorology of Theophrastus in Syriac and Arabic Translation’, in Theophrastus:

His Psychological, Doxographical and Scientific Writings, ed. W. Fortenbaugh and Dimitri Gutas (New

Brunswick and London: Rutgers University Press, 1992), 242–243¼p. 270; see also pp. 280–281;

and Jaap Mansfeld, ‘A Theophrastean Excursus on God and Nature and its Aftermath in Hellenistic

Thought’, Phronesis 37 (1992): 314–335.

27. Uno scritto morale inedito di al-Kind�ı, ed. H. Ritter and R. Walzer (Rome: Accademia nazionale dei

Lincei, 1938); and Adamson, Al-Kind�ı, 151 and 154.

28. Mukhtas˙ar al-m�us�ıq�ı f�ı ta’l�ıf al-naghm wa-s

˙an‘at al-‘�ud, in Mu’allaf�at al-Kind�ı al-m�us�ıqiyyah, ed.

Zakariyy�a Y�usuf (Baghdad: Mat˙ba‘at shaf�ıq, 1962), 116.3–4; and Adamson, al-Kind�ı, 201.

29. Fakhry, al-Kind�ı wa-Suqr�at˙, 30.18, x39; and Adamson, Al-Kind�ı, p. 149.

30. Adamson, Al-Kind�ı, 245, note 50; see R.W. Sharples, ‘Alexander of Aphrodisias on Divine

Providence: Two Problems’, Classical Quarterly 32 (1982): 198–211.

31. Ras�a’il, AR, 1.267.2–9 (and 1.267.19–268.1).

32. Nicolaus Damascenus, On the Philosophy of Aristotle, ed. H.J. Drossaart Lulofs (Leiden: Brill, 1965),

66–67 (Book 1, F. 9, xx1–9); and 114–118.

33. See further, for example, George Saliba, ‘The Ash‘arites and the Science of the Stars’, in Religion and

Culture in Medieval Islam, ed. Richard G. Hovanissian and Georges Sabbah (Cambridge: Cambridge

University Press, 1999), 79–92 (a discussion of the Ash‘arite rejection of astrological natural

determinism); and Jon McGuinnis, ‘Occasionalism, Natural Causation and Science in al-Ghaz�al�ı’, in

Montgomery, Arabic Theology, 441–463 (see p. 445, note 11 and p. 460, note 30 for active and

passive powers) (see Part 3, p. 122, n. 42, for full reference details).

34. Elvira Wakelnig, ‘Metaphysics in al-‘Amir�ı: The Hierarchy of Being and the Concept of Creation’, in

Medioevo 32 (2007): 39–59.

35. Al-Khayy�at˙, al-Intis

˙�ar, 25.4–17, x12. In terms of their understanding of intention (ir�adah), al-J�ah

˙iz˙

is associated with Thumamah by Ab�u al-Q�asim al-Balkh�ı, al-Maq�al�at, in Fad˙l al-i‘tiz�al wa-t

˙abaq�at

al-mu‘tazilah, ed. F. Sayyid (Tunis: al-D�ar al-t�unisiyyah li-al-nashr, 1974), 73.8–15; and Gimaret,

Theories, 30–31. See Part 3 for my side-stepping of the issue of whether al-J�ah˙iz˙

may have thought

that God had a t˙ab‘, and below (p. 222 and 228, n. 57) for the indebtedness of al-J�ah

˙iz˙

to

Thum�amah.

36. See Al-Ash‘ar�ı, Maq�al�at, 382.12–14; Richard M. Frank, ‘Al-Ma‘na: Some Reflections on the

Technical Meanings of the Term in the Kalam and its Use in the Physics of Mu‘ammar’, Journal of

the American Oriental Society 87 (1967): 248–259; and ‘Remarks on the Early Development of the

Kalam’, Atti del terzo Congresso di Studi Arabici e Islamici, Ravello 1–6 settembre 1966 (Naples: Istituto

Universitario Orientale, 1967): 315–329, especially p. 319. Note that Frank’s observation that ‘the

movement arises in a body through the nature (t˙ab‘) of the body as such, whether its origin be simply

nature as such or the act of a conscious, willing agent (t˙ab‘an ’aw ih

˘tiyaran)’ is not borne out by the

passage of al-Ash‘ar�ı, Maq�al�at, 405.3–406.5, to which he refers.

37. ‘Une lecture’, 233–234 (see Part 3, p. 123, n. 53 for full reference details).

38. Sabra, ‘Kal�am Atomism’, 215, note 19 (see Part 3, p. 122, n. 42 for full reference details); and Harry

A. Wolfson, The Philosophy of the Kal�am (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1976), 565 (on

which, see the review by R.M. Frank, Orientalistische Literaturzeitung 76.6 (1981): col. 571–572).

39. Saliba, ‘The Ash‘arites’, 90–91, note 5; and Frank, ‘Al-Ma‘na’, 257, note 47.

40. Relevant are the studies of Marie Bernand, ‘Le Critique de la notion de nature (t˙ab‘) par le Kal�am’,

Studia Islamica 51 (1980): 59–108; Richard M. Frank, ‘Notes and Remarks on the T˙

aba’i‘ in the

Teaching of al-Maturıdı’, Melanges d’Islamologie. Volume dedie a la memoire de Armand Abel par ses

collegues, ses eleves et ses amis, ed. Pierre Salmon (Leiden: Brill, 1974), 137–149; and Nomanul Haq,

‘T˙ab�ı‘a’, 25–28. Emma Ganage presented some very interesting findings of her study of the t

˙ab�a’i‘ in

the work of J�abir b. H˙

ayy�an (‘The Concept of T˙

ab�a’i‘ in the Jabirian Corpus and in Early Kal�am’) at

The Medieval Alchemy Workshop held on 25–26 October 2007 at The Warburg Institute, London.

Van Ess (Theologie 4: 104 and note 55) refers to an opposition between reason and nature in the 9th-

century S˙�uf�ı Ah

˙mad b. ‘As

˙im al-Ant

˙�ak�ı’s Kit�ab al-khalwah, al-Mashriq 49 (1955); see 52.25, 52.26–

53.1 (li-anna-h�a [al-nafs] mat˙b�u‘ah ‘al�a al-kadhib) and 53.7 (t

˙ib�a‘).



41. I find it impossible to determine from the context whether the passive in Q. 63.3 is the cause of, or

the punishment for, the duplicity of the hypocrites.

42. There are other concepts in early ‘Abbasid intellectual activity with which al-J�ah˙iz˙’s notion of t

˙ab‘

might be thought to intersect. For example, the notion of the philosophus autodidacticus and, in

Gutas’s words, ‘the natural knowledge of God and the universe’ (‘Ibn T˙ufayl’, 235): see further

Georges Vajda, ‘D’une attestation peu connue du theme du ‘‘philosophe autodidacte’’’, al-Andalus

31 (1966): 379–383; Reinhart, Before Revelation, 34–37, 70–75, 162–167 and 170–171 (see Part 3,

p. 122, n. 42, for full reference details); and van Ess, Flowering, 182–184. On the notion of wad˙‘, that

language, and therefore meaning, are rooted in thesis rather than physis: see Bernard Weiss,

‘Medieval Muslim Discussions of the Origin of Language’, Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenlandischen

Gesellschaft 124 (1974): 33–41.

43. Leo Strauss, On Tyranny, Including the Strauss-Kojeve Correspondence, ed. V. Gourevitch and M. Roth

(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000), 262. See further Steven B. Smith, Reading Leo Strauss;

Politics, Philosophy, Judaism (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002), 145–155.

44. See the discussion in Montgomery, ‘Of Models’, 9–22.

45. See also KH˙

(Kitm�an), 49.1–2; and Bay�an, 1.114.19–115.2.

46. See also Bay�an, 3.366.1–367.6 (wajh al-tadb�ır f�ı al-kit�ab idh�a t˙�ala). The idea is taken up by al-Mas‘�ud�ı

in his Mur�uj al-Dhahab, 2.378.9–15, x1369 (¼ Prairies, II, 521), who argues that, as men’s wishes

vary according to the variations in their natures, a book must contain a variety of materials in order to

avoid the descent of ennui on a man’s soul.

47. See also Q. 2.233, 6.152, 7.42, 23.62; Ibn al-Muqaffa‘, S˙

ah˙

�abah, 31.7–8, x19 (la-k�an�u qad kullif�u

ghayr wus‘i-him); al-Sh�afi‘�ı, Ris�alah, 17.9–10, x40: wa-bayyana f�ı-hi m�a ah˙

alla mannan bi-al-tawsi‘ah

‘al�a khalqi-hi wa-m�a h˙

arrama; Themistius, F�ı al-nafs, ed. Malcolm C. Lyons (London: Cassirer,

1973), 1.1 (kull m�a f�ı wus‘i-n�a tan�awulu-hu min al-‘ilm bi-h�a ‘al�a madhhab Arist˙�ut˙�al�ıs); al-Ash‘ar�ı,

Maq�al�at, 282.3–4 (la-wasi‘a-n�ı an aq�ul, of D˙

ir�ar b. ‘Amr); Montgomery, ‘Of Models’, 14–15 (on

takalluf); and the passage from al-B�aqill�an�ı quoted by Frank, ‘Moral Obligation’, 212. Ah˙mad b.

H˙

anbal may have entertained a similar notion: see Reinhart, Before Revelation, 34 and 195 (note 16),

a passage taken from Ab�u Ya‘l�a b. al-Farr�a’’s Al-‘Uddah f�ı us˙�ul al-fiqh. This notion may have a

Patristic background: see Michael Frede, ‘John of Damascus on Human Action, the Will, and

Human Freedom’, in Byzantine Philosophy and its Ancient Sources, ed. Katerina Ierodiakonou

(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2002), 63–95, especially p. 77: ‘the soul is created without knowledge,

let alone wisdom and virtue, but rather given the mere capacity to know and to will or to choose.’

48. See van Ess, Theologie 4: 108–109; and Wilferd Madelung, ‘The Late Mu‘tazilah and Determinism.

The Philosopher’s Trap’, in Y�ad-N�ama. In memoria di A. Bausani, ed. B. Scarcia Amoretti and

L. Rostagno, I (Rome: Bardi, 1991), 245–257.

49. ‘Al-Kind�ı and the Mu‘tazila: Divine Attributes, Creation and Freedom’, Arabic Sciences and

Philosophy 13 (2003), pp. 45–77; see further his ‘Ab�u Ma‘shar, al-Kind�ı and the Philosophical

Defence of Astrology’, Recherches de theologie et philosophie medievales 69 (2002), pp. 245–270; ‘A

Note on Freedom in the Circle of al-Kind�ı’, in ‘Abbasid Studies. Occasional Papers of the School of

‘Abbasid Studies, Cambridge 6–10 July, 2002, ed. J.E. Montgomery (Leuven: Peeters, 2004), pp. 199–

207; Al-Kind�ı, pp. 181–206. On compatibilism, see Tomis Kapitan, ‘Free Will Problem’, in The

Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, ed. Robert Audi (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006),

pp. 326–328; Thomas Pink, Free Will. A Very Short Introduction (Oxford: Oxford University Press,

2004). For a discussion of cognate notions in the thought of John of Damascus, who may have been

one of the Kind�ı-school’s sources on this issue, see Frede, ‘John of Damascus’.

50. Van Ess, Flowering, 174–175; see further Theologie 4: 117–119.

51. Montgomery, ‘Of Models’, 18–20.

52. On ikhtiy�ar, see Frank, ‘The Autonomy’, 330 and 352–353. I have generally endeavoured not to

equate ‘choice’ or ‘decision’ with ‘freedom’ or ‘free will’. Normore explores the distinction

between picking and choosing, and whether the former invariably involves the latter: see Calvin G.

Normore, ‘Goodness and Rational Choice in the Early Middle Ages’, in Emotions and Choice

from Boethius to Descartes, ed. Henrik Lagerlund and Mikko Yrjonsuuri (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 2002), 29–

47. Any discussion of ikhtiy�ar would have to take account of the important distinction made between

freedom of choice and freedom in choice by Michael Frede: see Frede, ‘John of Damascus’, 83.

53. F. Rosenthal, Ah˙

mad b. at˙-T˙

ayyib as-Sarah˘sı (New Haven, CT: American Oriental Society, 1943),

134, x4 (¼ p. 58) and compare it with al-Kind�ı’s account of habit in On sadness, III.6–7 (above,

pp. 216–217).



54. I take this to mean that his ‘aql has progressed beyond the stage of acquaintance with the dictates of

Revelation: see the phrase used by al-Baghd�adi of Ab�u al-Hudhayl’s theory, translated in Part 3

(p. 116), h˙

ujjah q�at˙i‘ah li-al-‘udhr.

55. Van Ess (Theologie 6: 323) countenances the antecedent of the pronominal suffix as fa‘l. Brunschvig

notes that it is a conventional legal paraphrase (especially among H˙

anaf�ıs?) for ahliyyat al-wuj�ub and

‘englobe la consideration aussi bien des obligations que des droits’: see Brunschvig, ‘La Capacite’, 41

(see Part 3, p. 125, n. 75, for full reference details).

56. HR (Mas�a’il), 4.57.6–7 (alternative translations in Pellat, Life, 35; and van Ess, Theologie 6: 322–

323). On the naw�azi‘ (which seems to be a J�ah˙iz˙ian variant of daw�a‘�ı) and the khaw�at

˙ir, see van Ess,

Theologie 4: 106–107.

57. Bernand, ‘Le Savoir’. 55—following van Ess, ‘G�ah˙iz˙

und die as˙h˙�ab’, 174—misses the elitism of al-

J�ah˙iz˙’s and Thum�amah’s thinking on takl�ıf (van Ess, ‘Early Islamic Theologians’,72–73 (see Part 3,

p. 123, n. 53, for full reference details) on the social and political dynamic of Thum�amah’s version of

takl�ıf, and 73–74), where he seems to consider al-J�ah˙iz˙’s elitism as ultimately chancy; see van Ess,

Theologie 4: 99–102 and 115, where he misconstrues the fundamental elitism of al-J�ah˙iz˙’s approach as

somehow a sort of intellectualism. See also the sub-section on takl�ıf and sam‘ in Part 3 (pp. 118–120).

58. As outlined by Bishr b. al-Mu‘tamir in his s˙ah˙�ıfah, pamphlet, on eloquence: see Montgomery, ‘Of

Models’, 9–13.

59. HR (S˙

in�a‘�at), 1.381.8–9.

60. ‘Abd al-Jabb�ar, Fad˙l al-i‘tiz�al, 268.5–13 (akhraja-hu ‘an t

˙ab‘i-hi); and Marie Bernand, ‘Le Savoir’,

30, footnote 3. Al-J�ah˙iz˙

describes Ab�u Shamir in Bay�an, 1.91.8–92.4; on him, see van Ess, Theologie

2: 174–183.

61. For al-J�ah˙iz˙’s assessment of al-Naz

˙z˙�am’s achievements and shortcomings, see the Kit�ab al-H

˙ayaw�an

2.229.9–230.7 (¼ Pellat, Life, 144–145).

62. Reading f�ı ghayr h˙

ayyiz al-ins�an for the f�ı ghayri-hi of the text.

63. Al-Ash‘ar�ı, Maq�al�at, 404.4–9; cp. the formulation of D˙

ir�ar b. ‘Amr: al-Ash‘ar�ı, Maq�al�at, 281.11–12.

According to van Ess (‘al-Naz˙z˙�am’, EI2, VII, 1057–1058), for al-Naz

˙z˙�am there was a ‘sharp difference

between the realm of man, which is dominated by free will, and the realm of nature where everything

acts and reacts bi-�ıdj�ab al-khilk˙

a, (i.e. according to an inherent mechanical impetus which was added

to it by creation).’ This physical theory was an integral part of his theology: ‘the ingredients contained

in the physical bodies do not mix by themselves but through an independent force which brings them

together . . . God. Therefore he called the element which guarantees the identity of acting bodies

khilk˙

a and not only t˙ab�ı‘a.’ The notion of t

˙ab‘ was used by al-Naz

˙z˙�am and al-J�ah

˙iz˙

to replace Ab�u al-

Hudhayl’s doctrine of tawallud (generation). Al-Kind�ı, according to the encyclopaedist al-Nad�ım, is

said to have written a Kit�ab f�ı bah˙

th qawl al-mudda‘�ı anna al-ashy�a’ al-t˙ab�ı‘iyyah taf‘al fi‘lan w�ah

˙idan bi-

�ıj�ab al-khilqah (Treatise in investigation of the doctrine of the one who alleges that natural things

produce a single act through the compunction of creation), which would seem to be a inquiry into the

doctrine of al-Naz˙z˙�am (note that it is a bah

˙th and not a radd): see al-Nad�ım, Fihrist, ed. G. Flugel

(Leipzig: Brockhaus, 1871–1872), 256.8–9; and Adamson, Al-Kind�ı, 47, note 9.

64. Al-Ash‘ar�ı, Maq�al�at, 303.10–11; Frank, ‘Al-Ma‘na’, 257 and note 46; and Sabra, ‘Kal�am Atomism’,

225 and 233. In al-J�ah˙iz˙’s anthropology of speech, he may intend khuluq as a Mu‘ammarian ma‘n�a,

which, according to Frank, through inhering in atomic matter, functions as a ‘causal

determinant . . . in the material being of things’ ‘entirely intrinsic to the individual subject’ (255),

‘determinant causes in the actualisation of the variable possibilities of the nature of the particular

body’ with the result that ‘the ‘nature’ and the intrinsic causal determinants’ are so ‘linked that,

in the real order, each is in fact a function of the other’ (258). Remember, however, that

Mu‘ammar attributes ultimate agency to God: ‘‘‘the structures (hay’�at) of bodies are an act of the

bodies through nature (t˙ib�a‘an)’’ in the sense that God endowed them with a structure (hayya’a-

h�a hay’�at) which produces (taf‘al) their structures through nature’ (al-Khayy�at˙, Intis

˙�ar, 45.22–24,

x33).

65. Al-J�ah˙iz˙

would surely also have taken issue with al-Naz˙z˙�am’s notion that ‘the truth itself is

completely independent of the person pronouncing it. Therefore an isolated saying of the Prophet

may well be true.’ Al-J�ah˙iz˙’s arguments for the validity of tradition centre on consensus in

conditions in which collusion is inconceivable. Furthermore, the utterance would be dependent

upon the character of the utterer and could not be independent thereof. In this regard, the speech–

nature insight is a useful index of the thiqah of a tradent. He presumably would have taken further

issue with al-Naz˙z˙�am’s contention that God’s miracles, produced to prove the veracity of His



Prophet Muh˙ammad, did not consist of ‘the rhetorical insuperability of the K

˙ur’�an but through the

predictions contained in it’ (van Ess, ‘al-Naz˙z˙�am’, 1058). These suggestions are impressionistic,

and the question of al-J�ah˙iz˙’s engagement with al-Naz

˙z˙�am needs to be studied more fully, as does

his theory of the khabar. On al-J�ah˙iz˙’s adaptation of Naz

˙z˙�amian physics in the H

˙ayaw�an, see Sabra,

‘Kal�am Atomism’, 217.

66. Van Ess, ‘Une Lecture’, 233–234 (see Part 3, p. 123, n. 53, for full reference details). As the present

discussion centres on the importance of t˙ab‘ in these systems, I have not discussed al-J�ah

˙iz˙’s

engagement with Thum�amah’s valorization of ir�adah: see Marie Bernand, ‘La Notion de ‘ilm chez les

premiers mu‘tazilites’, Studia Islamica 37 (1973): 43–44; Bernand, ‘Le Savoir’, 45, footnote 5, 49–50;

and van Ess, Theologie 4: 99, 100, and 109.

67. M. Fakhry, A History of Islamic Philosophy (London: Columbia University Press, 1983), 52.

68. See Frank, ‘Ma‘d�um’, 210 and note 76 (see Part 1, p. 190, n. 11 for full reference details): ‘the as˙h˙

�ab

al-as˙lah

˙. . . hold that God must and can only do that which is absolutely ‘for the best’ in respect of his

creatures, in whose doctrines the Bas˙rians see not merely a restriction of God’s power but the

implication of his inherent necessity and determinism in His action;’ see generally, Robert

Brunschvig, ‘Mu‘tazilisme et optimum (al-as˙lah

˙)’, Studia Islamica 39 (1974): 5–24.

69. This is how Gimaret understands the force of the passage (Theories, 36).

70. I have been guided by Richard M. Frank, ‘Can God Do What is Wrong?’, in Divine Omniscience and

Omnipotence in Medieval Philosophy. Islamic, Jewish and Christian Perspectives, ed. Tamar Rudavsky

(Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1985), 69–79.

71. In this section, I have generally been influenced by van Ess’s many observations concerning the

juridical consequences of many early Kal�am positions.

72. See now Joseph E. Lowry, Early Islamic Legal Theory. The Ris�ala of Muh˙

ammad ibn Idr�ıs al-Sh�afi‘�ı

(Leiden: Brill, 2007).

73. Flowering, 173; see also Josef van Ess, ‘La Liberte du juge dans le milieu basrien du VIIIe siecle’, in

La Notion de liberte, 25–35 (see p. 225, n. 3, above, for full reference); and Robert Hoyland,

‘Physiognomy in Islam’, Jerusalem Studies in Arabic and Islam 30 (2005): 361–402, especially pp. 372–

376, who discusses accounts of fir�asah as practised by Iy�as recorded by Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyyah. I

would like to thank Dr A. Akasoy of Oxford University for this reference. On intent, see Paul R.

Powers, Intent in Islamic Law. Motive and Meaning in Medieval Sunn�ı Fiqh (Leiden: Brill, 2005); and

the review by Ch. Melchert, Islamic Law and Society 14 (2007): 425–427. Brinkley Messick explores

the significance of how intent and the creation of meaning are effectively beyond human observation

in ‘Written Identities: Legal Subjects in an Islamic State’, History of Religions 38 (1998): 25–51. See

also R. Peters, Crime and Punishment in Islamic Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005),

13–15 (on oaths). I have not consulted Dispensing Justice in Islam. Qadis and their Judgements, ed.

Muhammad Khalid Masud, Rudolph Peters and David Powers (Leiden: Brill, 2005).

74. Wael Hallaq, The Origins and Evolution of Islamic law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,

2004).

75. See van Ess, Flowering, p. 163, on the khabar al-w�ah˙id, which could also conceivably be assessed on

the basis of the speech–nature insight.

76. I would like to record my gratitude to Dr Ch. Melchert of Oxford University, who generously

discussed these issues with me.

77. See al-H˙

�ajir�ı, Bukhal�a’, 332–333; U. Sezgin, ‘Al-Mad�a’in�ı’, EI2, V, 946–948; Gautier Juynboll,

Muslim Tradition. Studies in Chronology, Provenance and Authorship of Early H˙

ad�ıth (Cambridge:

Cambridge University Press, 1983), 41; G. Rotter, ‘Die historischen Werke Mad�a’in�ıs in T˙abar�ıs

Annalen’, Oriens 23–24 (1974): 103–133; Schoeler, Oral and Written, 177–179 et passim (see Part 1,

p. 190, n. 11, for full reference details); Gregor Schoeler, Ecrire et transmettre dans les debuts de l’Islam

(Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 2002), 114 and 116; and Steven C. Judd, ‘Narratives and

Character Development: al-T˙abar�ı and al-Bal�adhur�ı on Late Umayyad History’, in Gunther, ed.,

Ideas, Images and Methods, 209–226.

78. Al-J�ah˙iz˙

lists: Ab�u Shamir, following the example of his teacher Ma‘mar Ab�u al-Ash‘ath, ‘Abd Allah

b. Maslamah b. Muh˙�arib, al-Wak�ı‘�ı, and Mu‘ammar b. ‘Abb�ad.

79. This seemingly unwonted topic is used as a test case as to whether the H˙

ad�ıth can be accorded

priority over the Qur’�an, and prophetic disapproval of the practice is recorded on the authority of al-

Mad�a’in�ı and al-W�aqid�ı. See also Joseph E. Lowry, ‘Ibn Qutayba: The Earliest Witness to al-Sh�afi‘�ı

and his Legal Doctrines’, in ‘Abbasid Studies: 303–319 (see p. 228, n. 49, above, for full reference),

for debates concerning horses in the teaching of al-Sh�afi‘�ı (309–312).



speech and nature: al-jāḥiẒ, kitāb al-bayān wa-l-tabyīn, 2.175

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