social capital and post-conflict reconstruction in burundi: the limits of community-based...

Social Capital and Post-Conflict Reconstructionin Burundi: The Limits of Community-basedReconstruction

Thomas Vervisch, Kristof Titeca, Koen Vlassenrootand Johan Braeckman

ABSTRACT

Using an examination of three NGO interventions in post-conflict Burundi,this article questions community-based reconstruction as a mechanism to re-build social capital after conflicts, particularly when direct livelihood supportis provided. The authors demonstrate a general shortcoming of the methodol-ogy employed in community-based development (CBD), namely its focus on‘technical procedural design’, which results in what may be termed ‘supply-driven demand-driven’ reconstruction. The findings suggest the need for apolitical economy perspective on social capital, which acknowledges thatthe effects on social capital are determined by the type of economic resourceCBD gives access to. Through the use of a resource typology, the case studiesshow that the CBD methodology and the potential effects on social capitaldiffer when applied to public and non-strategic versus private and strategicresources. This has particular consequences for post-conflict situations. Ageneralized application of CBD methodology to post-conflict reconstructionprogrammes fails to take adequate account of the nature of the interventionsand the challenges posed by the particular post-conflict setting. The arti-cle therefore questions the current popular ‘social engineering’ approach topost-conflict reconstruction.

INTRODUCTION

Social capital theory has recently been employed as a framework tostrengthen post-conflict reconstruction policies. ‘The norms and networksthat enable people to act collectively’ is a widely accepted definition ofsocial capital (Woolcock and Narayan, 2000: 226). The World Bank andother international development organizations have used the social capitalargument to justify ‘social engineering’ operations, alongside the usual phys-ical reconstruction and renewal efforts in post-conflict settings (Englebert,2001). It is argued that conflict damages and transforms a nation’s social

The authors would like to thank two anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments on thepaper.

Development and Change 44(1): 147–174. DOI: 10.1111/dech.12008C© 2013 International Institute of Social Studies.Published by Blackwell Publishing, 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK and350 Main St., Malden, MA 02148, USA

148 T. Vervisch, K. Titeca, K. Vlassenroot and J. Braeckman

capital; recovery therefore demands reconstruction, not only of a nation’sinfrastructure but also of its social fabric (Colletta and Cullen, 2000a).Community-driven reconstruction programmes, which are promoted by theWorld Bank, are designed to rebuild physical infrastructure and social capi-tal. They therefore present a popular means to implement recommendationsof a social capital approach during post-conflict reconstruction (Cliffe et al.,2003). These programmes rely on a community-based development (CBD)1

methodology, integrating local participatory structures into short-term re-construction programmes, thus enabling community cooperation and socialcohesion. The CBD methodology has become increasingly mainstream andwidely adopted in several sectors of post-conflict reconstruction, includinglivelihood interventions (e.g. Goovaerts et al., 2005; USAID, 2007).

This article challenges the appropriateness of CBD methodology in cre-ating social capital and cohesion when providing direct livelihood supportin post-conflict settings. It does so by examining three NGO interventionsthat employed the CBD approach in post-conflict Burundi. The article firstdemonstrates the main shortcoming of the methodology of CBD, namely its‘technical procedural design’ which results in what may be termed ‘supply-driven demand-driven’ reconstruction.2 It then shows that a generalized ap-plication of CBD methodology to post-conflict reconstruction programmesdoes not adequately take into account the specific nature of these inter-ventions.3 CBD was originally designed for development programmes de-livering public resources/services to entire communities. The case studiesillustrate that the methodology informing CBD is not easily tailored to post-conflict reconstruction programmes which also provide direct livelihoodsupport to households and individuals.

The first part of the article gives an overview of different viewpoints onthe relation between conflict, social capital and the methodology informingCBD. A theoretical framework is drawn up, contrasting a political economy(Bourdieu) and a communitarian (Putnam) perspective on social capitaland CBD. The next section briefly discusses the Burundian context, and

1. The concept of community-driven development (CDD) is bound up with the CDD pro-grammes of the World Bank, in which block grants are allocated to community councils tofund sub-projects. In this article, we refer to community-based development (CBD) whichis the broader participatory methodology that informs these and other programmes.

2. Cf. the ‘supply-driven demand-driven’ development concept of Mansuri and Rao (2004).3. In other words, we are interested in the impact of post-conflict interventions, rather than

categorizing particular situations as ‘post-conflict’ or ‘development’. Concepts like war,conflict and peace can be interpreted in multiple ways and are not always easily distinguish-able from one another. Post-conflict reconstruction is mostly confronted with a timeframethat can be characterized as ‘no peace, no war’ (Richards, 2005), and simple dichotomiesbetween ‘bad’ war and ‘good’ peace or development should be avoided. Thus, although theterm ‘post-conflict’ is used, it should be understood ‘as distinctive spaces that follow theirown logic, not just as an “in-between phase”’ (Lambach, 2007: 5).

Social Capital and Post-Conflict Reconstruction in Burundi 149

illustrates how a social capital approach to post-conflict reconstruction isput into practice. This is followed by a discussion of the three cases of NGOlivelihood intervention, each characterized by a participatory intermediationscheme which was established to give the projects a community-based char-acter. The final sections present general case study findings and conclusions.At a policy level, the article questions the appropriateness of CBD to providedirect livelihood support to conflict-ridden communities.

SOCIAL CAPITAL, POST-CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION AND CBD

Social Capital and Conflict

In the wake of the Cold War numerous civil wars and intra-state conflictsprompted the international development community to focus again on con-flict. Since then, an evolution can be discerned from national-level conflictanalysis, working with large cross-country data sets and delivering tech-nocratic approaches, to local-level analysis, introducing social structures,inter-group relations, state–society relations and social capital as new deter-mining factors in processes of conflict (Barron et al., 2007: 4–7). Gaininginsight into the local ‘micro-politics’ (King, 2004) of conflict illuminates thetwo-way process of how ‘states in transition shape local environments andhow local peoples can constrain, interpret and realize these changes, in turnshaping the transition itself and the nature of the new and reformed stateinstitutions and social structures which result’ (Barron et al., 2007: 7).

Social capital can thus function both as independent and dependent vari-able with regard to conflict (Coletta and Cullen, 2000b). As an independentvariable, social capital can have a range of effects. A first viewpoint is thatsocial capital reduces conflict and crime. Lederman et al. (2002: 510) high-light how it reduces social transaction costs, which allows for the peacefulresolution of conflicts. As Fukuyama (1995: 90) argues, ‘trust can dramati-cally reduce what economists call transaction costs — costs of negotiations,enforcement and the like — and makes possible certain efficient forms of eco-nomic organization that otherwise would be encumbered by extensive rules,contracts, litigations, and bureaucracy’. Communities with stronger ties aretherefore able to better manage free-rider problems related to collective ac-tion. As the potential for individual opportunistic behaviour declines, thepotential for social contention and conflict also decreases (Lederman et al.,2002: 514). Social capital therefore has the potential to provide a range ofeconomic benefits and reduce conflict and crime (Robison and Siles, 1999).As such, social capital is a ‘key institutional mechanism that is supposed toenhance the capacity of resource users to govern field-based developmentprograms’ (Ballet et al., 2007: 359), and also community-based developmentprogrammes. By implication, it is held that communities characterized bylow levels of social capital are more prone to conflict.


This view is challenged by another vision that argues that a number of fea-tures of social capital potentially lend themselves to fuelling conflict (Colettaand Cullen, 2000b). Unequal vertical relations characterized by an unequaldistribution of power and opportunity are one such feature. Putnam identifiesthese vertical relations as an ‘unresponsive’ or ‘exploitative’ (Putnam, 2004:669) form of linking social capital. Horizontal relations are another factor,defined by Stewart (2002: 3) as ‘the existence of severe inequalities betweenculturally defined groups’. Horizontal inequalities imply unequal access to arange of political/economic/social resources for particular groups. As such,they affect the individual welfare of the members of these groups, andtherefore are particularly dangerous. The members of these groups may becharacterized by high levels of social capital which helps the group (‘bond-ing’ social capital), but they might be excluded from other groups (i.e. theylack ‘bridging’ social capital) (Narayan, 1999: 1).4 Conflict is thus identifiedwith weak bridging and linking, and strong bonding social capital (Collettaand Cullen, 2000a). Social capital therefore cannot be assumed to alwaysact as a ‘glue’, since it can also function as a source of tension (Ballet et al.,2007: 367). As a consequence, ‘getting the social relations right’ is necessaryto avoid violent conflict (Coletta and Cullen, 2000a: 108).

A third perspective points out that social capital has the potential to bemobilized for enhancing the effectiveness of collective action carried outby rebels, armed groups, etc. (Collier and Hoeffler, 1999: 9). Social capitaltherefore has a ‘dark side’ (Portes and Landolt, 1996) which may harnessand prolong conflict, leading to the creation or maintenance of social capitalwith anti-social effects (Goodhand and Hulme, 1997). As McIlwaine andMoser (2001: 981) suggest, ‘perverse organisations’ are essentially part ofsocial capital.

In these perspectives social capital functions primarily as an independentvariable, but conflict also affects social capital. Given the importance oftrust and social cohesion for creating and maintaining social capital, war andconflict zones can be regarded as ‘zones of social capital deficiency’ (Good-hand et al., 2000: 390). Conflict ‘undermines trust and cooperation withinformal and informal social organizations’ (World Bank, 1999: ix). However,it can also be argued that conflict zones do not necessarily imply a completeabsence of social capital but rather that ‘different forms of social capitalhave been strengthened or weakened, leading to processes of exclusion andinclusion’ (Goodhand et al., 2000: 402). This observation points towards thedistinction drawn between weak bridging and linking, and strong bondingsocial capital (Colletta and Cullen, 2000b).

4. Bonding capital refers to exclusive intra-group solidarity based on ethnicity, religion, caste,class, etc., whereas bridging capital refers to an inclusive inter-group solidarity that unitespeople from different backgrounds.


Social Capital and Post-Conflict Reconstruction

A social capital approach to post-conflict reconstruction rapidly becamepopular in policy circles. The basic idea informing the approach is thatpost-conflict reconstruction needs to transform ‘exclusive’ bonding socialcapital into ‘inclusive’ bridging social capital. In other words, reconstructionpolicies will only be effective if they convert exclusive intra-group solidarityinto inclusive inter-group solidarity (Colletta and Cullen, 2000a).

Community-based development is considered an effective mechanism toachieve this transformation because of its participatory, and thus inclusive,methodology. CBD ‘relies on communities to use their social capital to or-ganize themselves and participate in development processes’ (Mansuri andRao, 2004: 6). In post-conflict settings, CBD mechanisms are expected to fa-cilitate community participation and cooperation, and thus promote inclusivecollective action and problem-solving with respect to concrete reconstruc-tion activities within communities. Community-based organizations (CBOs)in particular lend themselves to the utilization of CBD methodology and aresometimes portrayed as ‘agents of peace’ (Varshney, 2001: 363). By ad-dressing shared practical concerns, they unite groups that had previouslyopposed one another during conflict, and thus succeed in creating bridgingsocial capital. In sum, CBD in conflict-affected areas aims to address im-mediate community reconstruction needs (tangible ‘quick wins’ or ‘peacedividends’) while empowering the community and restoring communitycohesion and trust (e.g. Cliffe et al., 2003; USAID, 2007).

Social Capital and CBD: Putnam versus Bourdieu

The general social capital approach to post-conflict reconstruction and thespecific mechanisms employed by CBD are both grounded in a ‘Putnamian’or communitarian notion of social capital (cf. Mansuri and Rao, 2004).Communitarianism argues ‘that social capital is inherently good, that moreis better, and that its presence always has a positive effect on a community’swelfare’ (Woolcock and Narayan, 2000: 229). It equates social capital withvoluntary, horizontal, civic associations at community level, in accordancewith Putnam’s (1993) ideal notion of ‘networks of civic engagement’. Thepromotion of a social capital approach to post-conflict reconstruction reliesstrongly on these western ideas of community organization.

Elite capture has been identified as the core problem that hinders CBD inits efforts to create this communitarian ideal of community organization. As‘development gatekeepers’ or ‘development brokers’, local elites often actas mediators in the interaction between external actors and the communitiesat large (Bierschenk et al., 2002). As such, they often succeed in presentingtheir concerns as representative of the wider beneficiary group which hasa negative impact on the internal dynamics of groups and projects. As


Patterson (1998: 427) says, this ‘results in limited participation, skewedcommunication between members and leaders, and leaders who are notaccountable for their actions’. CBD projects cannot be successful withoutgenuine empowerment of the poor, as there is no real ‘ownership’ by thebeneficiary groups (Platteau, 2004: 228).5

To solve this problem of elite capture in CBD programmes most researchfocuses on procedural design factors. In line with Mansuri and Rao (2004),it seeks to identify ‘what types of checks and balances are most effectivein reducing [elite] capture and the systematic exclusion of the poor and ofdiscriminated-against minorities’ (ibid.: 30, emphasis added). This is whatwe refer to as ‘technical procedural design’: leadership elections, account-ability arrangements, leadership-disciplining mechanisms, representativecomposition of committees and boards, and conflict management facilities.These measures are all considered effective antidotes to elite capture, andthus predictors of successful CBD interventions (e.g. Mansuri and Rao,2004; Platteau, 2004; Platteau and Gaspart, 2003). This focus on ‘technicalprocedural design’ is based on a mixture of both liberal and communitarianassumptions about community organization (Chhotray, 2004: 329). Theliberal idea that public deliberation mechanisms, based on formal/legalisticprocedures, are able to overcome differences between rational individuals islinked to the communitarian idea that a shared deliberation process resultsin ‘perfect consensus’ within a community.

From a broader political economy perspective on social capital, theassumed ‘neutrality’ and ‘strength’ of such formal procedures in CBDmethodology, and their role in changing the communities in which they areintroduced, is surprising. In contrast to the communitarian view, a politicaleconomy view emphasizes the context-dependent nature of social capital(e.g. Bebbington, 2007; Cleaver, 2005; Edwards and Foley, 1997). Drawingon the original work of Bourdieu (1986), social capital and its ‘use value’(Edwards and Foley, 1997: 677) is regarded as inextricably bound up withother forms of cultural capital (e.g. educational qualifications) and economiccapital (e.g. resources directly convertible into money). Social capital isalso seen as reinforcing social differentiation: people and groups of peopleuse their social networks (social capital) to reproduce their social positionswithin society, thus reinforcing existing boundaries between groups.According to this contextualized approach, the optimistic communitarianidea of social capital should be qualified by the fact that social capital cansupport both ‘patterns of inclusion and exclusion’ (Bebbington, 2002: 801).

This article seeks to demonstrate that a more context-specific reading ofsocial capital and the methodology informing CBD is appropriate. The find-ings presented here reinforce a central argument of the political economy

5. Often, particular groups seek to link themselves with particular elites (Prinsen and Titeca,2008).


perspective, namely that the functioning of social capital can never be di-vorced from its economic counterpart. For Bourdieu (1986) the outcomes ofsocial capital are reducible to economic capital because ultimately people’sinvestment and participation in social networks (social capital) provides ac-cess to economic resources (economic capital). The article presents empiricalevidence of the manner in which economic capital influences social capital inthe context of NGO interventions. It demonstrates how economic resources(economic capital) distributed by NGOs clearly determine the ‘exclusive’ or‘inclusive’ functioning of social capital. The nature of the economic capitalprovided through livelihood interventions in post-conflict situations illus-trates why CBD is an unsuitable mechanism for strengthening social capitalin conflict-affected communities.

BURUNDI: A SOCIAL CAPITAL APPROACH TO POST-CONFLICTRECONSTRUCTION

Burundi is slowly emerging from a civil war that lasted over ten years.6

After three decades (1960s–1990s) of authoritarian and military rule by theethnic Tutsi minority, the first democratically elected Hutu president wasmurdered soon after his appointment in 1993. In the civil war that followed,some 300,000 people lost their lives (Lemarchand, 2009). Recent figuresindicate that 52 per cent of the population have fled their homes at leastonce since 1993 (Uvin, 2009: 29). After a transition period leading to the2005 elections, Burundi currently finds itself in a phase of post-conflictreconstruction.

Burundi presents us with a concrete case study of how social capitaldiscourse has influenced post-conflict reconstruction policies. The ethniccharacter of the Burundian conflict was rapidly translated into social capitalterms. At the end of the twentieth century Burundi was a divided country, thecapital Bujumbura was split into Hutu and Tutsi quartiers, the countrysideinto Tutsi Internally Displaced Person (IDP) camps and Hutu regroupmentcamps, or Hutu and Tutsi ‘enclaves’ or ‘colonies’ (Laely, 1997: 695). Insocial capital terms, Burundi was identified as a country of ‘weak bridges,strong bonds’, which led to an exclusive ‘us versus them’ rhetoric due tothe destruction of multi-ethnic bridging social capital (Brachet and Wolpe,2005: 6).7 One of the core questions for Burundi was therefore how toconvert exclusive ethnic bonding social capital into multi-ethnic bridgingsocial capital. A recent survey of 133 peace-building programmes in Burundi

6. For the history of conflict in Burundi, see for, example, Daley (2006); Lemarchand (2009);Reyntjens (2000); Uvin (2009).

7. Although the ethnic component cannot be denied, these analyses are prone to ethnic regres-sion, by which a complex of social divisions (regional, rural–urban, etc.) are reinterpretedin terms of the ethnic divide (Reyntjens, 2000: 19).


by Sebundandi et al. (2008) further confirms the dominance of the ‘socialcapital’ approach vis-a-vis the ‘root cause’ approach described by Morfit(2002). The survey reveals that most programmes focused on dialogue andconflict management and resolution, while specific attention was paid toemotional and attitudinal change and healing of individuals and groups.It concludes that these efforts, in which ‘the promotion of shared spacesof expression and communication seems to be the point of convergence’,played a key reconciliatory role between ethnic groups. However, the surveyalso emphasizes the need to go beyond ethnic tensions and look for the ‘rootcause’, as the conflict is characterized as a struggle ‘about the control of thecountry’s limited resources, and the social and economic marginalizationthat has been occasioned by it’ (Sebundandi et al., 2008: 40–41).

At community level, the social capital approach to post-conflict recon-struction was implemented via ‘bricks-and-mortar projects’. These projectswere seen as a ‘vehicle to address social issues by strengthening inter-grouptrust and the capacity of communities to collaborate effectively and manageconflict without resort to violence’ (Brachet and Wolpe, 2005: 4). There wasa strong belief that when development agencies work on ‘modes of reconcil-iation and cooperation between groups at the local level . . . , then this createspeace constituencies which can impact on the national level negotiations aswell’ (Oketch and Polzer, 2002: 117). Many international actors and NGOscombined economic and social reconstruction and employed CBD method-ology to implement their reconstruction projects and programmes (Brachetand Wolpe, 2005; Cliffe et al., 2003; ICG, 2003; USAID, 2007; Uvin, 2007).Below, three NGO livelihood interventions are presented as case studies.

CASE STUDIES

Four American-based international NGOs introduced livelihood interven-tions under the umbrella of the Livelihood Security Initiative Consortium(LSIC), funded by the United States Agency for International Development(USAID). The projects were implemented in four provinces in northern andcentral Burundi (Kirundo, Muyinga, Gitega, Karuzi) between 2005 and 2007(LSIC, 2004). Three projects were selected for detailed study. For the sakeof discretion the names of the NGOs are replaced here with pseudonyms:the Consortium Initiative Burara (CIBA), Livelihoods Tangara (LITA), andCumba Livelihood Consortium (CLC). We use the correct names of thecollines (hillsides, administrative units) where the projects and our researchwere carried out. The case selection was done in two successive stages. Inthe first phase, specific NGO projects were identified. The criteria for select-ing livelihood interventions were their representativeness for post-conflictreconstruction in general, and reconstruction activities in Burundi in particu-lar, and the fact that CBD methodology has been mainstreamed and adoptedin these programmes.


In the second stage, a maximum variation strategy was used to select threeconcrete NGO projects. The objective was to select cases rich in information,facilitating in-depth analysis of each particular case, but also to maximizevariance among NGO projects so as to facilitate interesting comparisonsbetween the cases. Variance among NGO projects was observed along twocriteria: the presence of activities distinguishing the project from the otherinterventions; and variance in their intervention approach.

Data and analysis are based on ten months’ fieldwork on three collines in2006 and 2007. Each of the collines presented a ‘typical case’ (Patton, 2002:236) of the interventions of the three development agencies: CIBA (Buraracolline), LITA (Tangara colline) and CLC (Cumba colline). The fieldworkconsisted of focus group discussions and semi-structured interviews andwas carried out in cooperation with a team of local research assistants.8

Below, the general context of the colline is presented, followed by adiscussion of the community-based methodology of the interventions withreference to the participatory intermediation schemes that they established.

The CIBA Project: A Complex of ‘Brokerage Chains’

The CIBA project focused on the rehabilitation of the Muhembuzi wetlandand the surrounding hillsides constituting its basin. A first component ofthe project, a cash-for-work programme, was designed to inject cash intothe local rural economy through labour-intensive infrastructure works (anirrigation system in the wetland, road maintenance, water infrastructure).A second project component was the ‘solidarity chain’, a livestock creditrotation scheme to restore livestock and boost social cohesion via the creationof a chain of beneficiaries (i.e. neighbours). This was closely linked to theintroduction of a veterinary pharmacy and the training of local veterinarians.A third cluster of activities focused on the sustainable use of natural resources(soil protection and agro-forestry). There was also major development of thewetland and its basin with the introduction of rice growing and severalother improved crops. Finally, the project improved access to potable waterthrough infrastructure works.

This mediation project can be typified as a collection of ‘brokerage chains’(Bierschenk et al., 2002: 25). Each chain vertically connects a small groupof brokers with a specific local NGO staff member (see Figure 1). Thisresults in a decentralized participatory structure, as each project componenthas its particular chain. Local CIBA staff were integrated into the scheme,

8. To determine the number of focus groups, we used the theoretical concepts of redundancyand theoretical saturation (Krueger and Casey, 2001). Generally between six and ten peo-ple took part in the focus groups, which conforms to the rule of thumb (Patton, 2002:385). In total, eighty-one focus groups were conducted with a total of 693 participants. Afurther seventy-seven interviews were also conducted with key actors (NGO staff, localadministration, etc.).


Figure 1. Intermediation Scheme, CIBA Project, Burara Colline

CIBA

POPULATION

CIBA staff(constructional

engineer)

captains

CIBA staff(veterinarian)

livestockcommittees

veterinary pharmacy

CIBA staff(forester)

anti-erosionassociations

tree nurseryassociations

CIBA staff(agronomists, social workers)

wetlandcommittee

riceproducergroups

CIBA staff(engineer)

water users committees

cash-for-work programme

(infrastructure rehabilitation)

solidarity chain(livestock credit

scheme)

development of the wetland

access potable water

soil protection & reforestation

Local administration

Source: own research.

which is remarkable since NGO workers are not generally considered to bemediators — they are not trained for that purpose and it is assumed that theyrepresent the external NGO (D’Exelle, 2004; de Sardan, 2005). The otherelements of the structure can be divided into three sub-categories: individuals(captains or foremen, veterinarians), group-based structures (committees andassociations), and local administration. CIBA opted for individuals in caseswhere technical capacities constituted an important selection criterion (e.g.foremen following infrastructure works); notably, these individuals wereapproved by the wider community during public meetings. Committees andassociations were mostly introduced to handle collective action problems(e.g. maintenance of the irrigation system or water infrastructure); the localadministration played a facilitating (e.g. mobilization) or more operationalrole (e.g. taking up positions in the wetland committee).

The LITA Project: Le Club d’Hangar

While the three NGO interventions involved many similar activities, someactivities were particular to each project. For CIBA (above), this was thedevelopment of the wetland; for LITA, it was the construction of le hangar, astorage facility for agricultural products, which also functioned as the corner-stone of the seed credit system with local agricultural producer groups. A


Figure 2. Intermediation Scheme, LITA Project, Tangara Colline

LITA

POPULATIONstorehouse

(storage facility)

seed credits scheme

solidarity chain(livestock credit

scheme)

soil protection & reforestation

chef de colline(= president comité

d’hangar)

mister tanzania(= president LITA

sub-hill committees, veterinarian LITA

project)

comité d’hangar(storehousecommittee)

localadministration(chefs de sous-

colline)

LITA sub-hillcommittees

(livestockfollow-up)

presidents(of LITA

beneficiaryassociations)

‘le club d’hangar’


‘solidarity chain’ — a livestock credit scheme — was introduced by LITAto restock cattle, with access to veterinary drugs dispensed by a pharmacyand care provided by one trained veterinarian, ‘Mister Tanzania’9 (com-pared to several veterinarians employed in the CIBA project). Anti-erosionmeasures (contour berms) and reforestation activities (agro-forestry) werealso implemented by the LITA project.

Unlike the CIBA project, the LITA intermediation scheme had a ‘brokers’club’ instead of a series of independent ‘brokerage chains’ (see Figure 2)(Bierschenk et al., 2002: 25). This led to strongly centralized intermediationand, in turn, more elite capture. The scheme was controlled by the clubd’hangar, made up of the local administration and members of the localelite, headed by the chef de colline and ‘Mister Tanzania’ (as president of theLITA sub-hill committees). Thus, behind the institutional facade of variousintermediaries (comite d’hangar, LITA sub-hill committees, associations,pharmacy, etc.), there was a powerful group who populated and controlledmost of these structures, centralizing intermediation in the hands of a few.The local population repeatedly referred to the ‘secret society’ character ofthe club d’hangar and its clear links to the local administration, which willbe discussed in greater detail below.

9. Pseudonyms are used for all individuals mentioned in the article.


Figure 3. Intermediation Scheme, CLC Project, Cumba Colline

CLC

POPULATION

public health training

reforestationsolidarity chain(livestock credit

scheme)

Improved agricultural

methods

provincialhealth agents

Deo(encadreur de base)

Magare(veterinarian)

tree nurserygroups livestock

committees

veterinaryassociations lead farmers

Source: based on own research.

The CLC Project: A Single ‘Brokerage Chain’

The project intervention on Cumba hill, by CLC, represents a rather more dis-persed project. Whereas CIBA focused on the wetland and LITA targeted thecollines near their storehouses, CLC identified the vulnerable (orphans, theelderly, widows, people living with HIV/AIDS, etc.) as their primary targetgroup, but included all collines of the commune. In line with this target-ing, CLC used a household approach rather than working with associationsor other group-based structures. Most radically, CLC switched from a re-lief logic to a developmental logic, minimizing the distribution of materialsupport and focusing on capacity building. For example, seed distributionwas kept to a minimum, while training in modern agricultural methods wasmade central (compost bin, contour berms, sowing techniques). Thus, noinfrastructure works (cf. CIBA) or extensive seed credit scheme (cf. LITA)were undertaken. The livestock credit scheme (the ‘solidarity chain’) wastherefore identified as the project’s main activity. In contrast to CIBA andLITA, CLC also engaged in health training and awareness-raising activities.

This approach was reflected in a less extensive intermediation scheme (seeFigure 3), presenting only one main vertical ‘brokerage chain’ personifiedby Deo, the encadreur de base (comparable to a community worker) of


CLC, and to a lesser extent by Magare, the local veterinarian of the project.They both represented CLC at the local level. As employees of CLC, theywere paid a salary and received a bicycle. In addition, livestock committees,temporary tree nursery groups, a system of lead farmers (with demonstrationplots), and one veterinary pharmacy association were introduced, but theactivities of these social structures were minimal, rendering them moreor less ‘invisible’. Because of their status as paid employees of CLC, theencadreur de base and the vet controlled all intermediation between CLCand the local population (their central position is also illustrated in theabsence of local administration in the intermediation scheme). As such, theCLC intermediation scheme combines characteristics of the CIBA and LITAproject: the centralization of intermediation (cf. LITA), and the centrality oflocal NGO staff in the brokerage chain (cf. CIBA). However, one componentwas carried out independently from the encadreur de base: the health trainingcourses, implemented by agents from the provincial health department.

GENERAL FINDINGS

Participation, Elite Capture, Technical Procedural Design and Logicsof Intervention

A first general finding was that the case studies confirmed the technocraticnature of the methodology informing participatory, or community-based,development. According to Chhotray (2004: 328–9) this is reflected in astrategy which divides participation into ‘accountable segments which canbe itemized and recorded on paper along with the project’s physical andfinancial targets’. And indeed, in all three case studies, participation wastranslated into Excel sheets listing, among other things, legal identity, eth-nic composition, participation of women, membership of committees, andfrequency of meetings. Without going into too much detail, all three NGOspaid much attention to standard procedures regarding the identification andcomposition of committees, associations and their intermediaries, and to theformal procedures guiding their participatory, accountable and transparentfunctioning. All three NGOs used democratic elections as the standard pro-cedure to identify capable community leaders. In addition, concerns aboutequal representation of both sexes and all ethnicities — endorsing the impor-tance of inclusiveness and creating bridging social capital — further guidedthe composition of the intermediary bodies. For individual intermediation,joint decision-making mechanisms with more ‘representative’ bodies wereset up; where local administration was involved, their collaboration wassubject to similar procedures.

A first set of criticisms of this technocratic approach and itemization ofparticipation is that it ignores local politics (Chhotray, 2004), underestimatesthe ‘endogenous community imperfections’ (Platteau and Abraham, 2002),


and overestimates the homogeneity of communities (Williams, 2004). Assuch it does not avoid the problems of elite capture. All three NGO inter-ventions illustrated these shortcomings. In the CIBA project, for example,the foremen or captains who were responsible for the selection of casualworkers for the cash-for-work component used this to access sex. Morespecifically, they used their position to obtain ‘girlfriends’ in exchange forcasual work. The issue was discussed in a focus group, and women in par-ticular were afraid that the problem would expand to other girls and theirown daughters.10 As a number of women at the focus group commented:

For the captains the girls are important. Even when you have the money to find the job, hehas to give the job to a young girl. She can get the job without even paying. Even if she is onthe list, she does not have to work all days, but then she has to date with the captain. Whenshe refuses she is excluded from the work. . . . You have captains who rent a house togetherwith the girl. Others have abandoned their wife. . . . The problem will even worsen. A lot ofgirls who are still at home see the girls of the captains, they have money and they even donot have to work for that. A lot of girls want to follow these girls of the captains.11

The functioning of the wetland committee, combined with the (at the time)upcoming 2005 elections, further illustrates the impact of elite capture in theCIBA project. This committee was elected by the community to oversee therehabilitation works in the wetland and the (re)distribution of plots withinit. Despite the fact that some ‘ordinary’ community members were elected,the committee was dominated by the most influential members of the localelite who used the CIBA project to appropriate large parts of the wetlandfor themselves. In view of the upcoming elections, however, provincial andcommunal authorities (the wetland is the property of the latter) were reluctantto address the problem. The wetland committee consisted of a number ofpowerful members of the newly formed CNDD-FDD political party; as itwas clear that the CNDD-FDD would win the elections, the governor and theadministrator, in particular, were anticipating their own defeat, and awarethat they would have to coexist with these powerful politicians after theelections. Moreover, the elections installed the son of one of the wetlandcommittee members as the new governor of the province for the CNDD-FDD, which of course further derailed the programme. As one individualobserved during a focus group discussion, ‘And now we can’t do anything,because the son of [a powerful committee member] is the governor. Can hegive the order to redistribute the land of his father?’.12

In the LITA project, participation was completely shaped by the militantand omnipresent character of the CNDD-FDD, which also became the new

10. This example also shows that there is more at stake than elite capture as such: these elitesdo not only use and strengthen their position through domination and corruption, but alsouse their privileged status to engage in exploitation of a specific kind (i.e. sexual) towardsa specific group (i.e. young women).

11. Focus group, 19 March 2007, Burara.12. Focus group, 31 May 2007, Tangara.


ruling party of Tangara colline after the 2005 elections. Behind the institu-tional facade of various intermediary participatory structures, the small clubd’hangar controlled the entire project. During focus group discussions andin individual interviews, the participants repeatedly and explicitly referredto the ‘secret society’ character of the club d’hangar and the clear link withthe ruling party, and identified the chef de colline as the leader of the club:

‘It is the club, they work together, they are friends, they share a lot of secrets’.13

‘In the comite [d‘hangar] there is not one who is not from the party [CNDD-FDD]. . . . Thesecrets of the comite [d‘hangar] are the same as those of the party’.14

The CLC case paints a very different picture: participatory structures withinthe project were ineffective because of the strong and particular position ofDeo, the encadreur de base. He used his brokerage function within the CLCproject to divert resources, particularly many of the distributed livestock, tohimself.

A second point of criticism which can be levelled against the three NGOinterventions is that a technocratic methodology employs participation as ameans to an end; participation is not an end in itself, but is instrumentalizedto efficiently deliver project outputs (Parfitt, 2004). This was illustrated bythe broader intervention approach of the NGOs and the manner in whichthey shaped the establishment of participatory intermediation schemes (cf.Figures 1, 2 and 3). For example, the top-down yet decentralized nature ofCIBA’s intermediation scheme, which resulted in a complex of ‘brokeragechains’, can be traced back to CIBA’s focus on technical end results. Thiswas reflected in staff policy, as technical staff (agronomists, veterinarians,engineers) outnumbered social workers. This ‘technical’ focus gave rise toa more top-down approach to match the community-based character of theproject with the achievement of particular technical end results. It createda number of relatively independent ‘brokerage chains’; for each specifictechnical end result, one particular technical staff member was connected toa participatory community structure.

By contrast, LITA’s more ‘social’ focus on participatory processes re-sulted in a more bottom-up and laissez-faire approach. This led to thecentralized intermediation function of the club d’hangar. LITA’s focus ongroup-oriented participatory processes was, for example, illustrated by theirchoice to work almost exclusively with local associations (and not with indi-viduals or households) and the centrality of the storehouses as opportunitiesfor community participation and cooperation. As a consequence, the com-position of staff was the opposite of CIBA’s: social workers outnumberedtechnical staff. Because of a management style that was less top-down, LITAleft more space for existing social structures to provide intermediary roles.

13. Focus group, 31 May 2007, Tangara.14. Focus group, 1 June 2007, Tangara.


This led to the strong presence of the local administration, and ultimately tothe centralized intermediation function of the club d’hangar.

CLC’s ‘individual change’ philosophy, by contrast, explained their choiceof working with encadreurs de base. CLC did not believe in the associationalmodel of LITA, for example, and used a more personal approach, focusingon changing individual behaviour and attitudes, and enhancing personalknowledge, capacities and skills. As such, CLC opted for a close and con-stant follow-up of individual households by its encadreurs de base. Theirintervention approach gave rise to the functioning of one main brokeragechain around the central position of the encadreur de base: all participationof the local population in the project was linked, supervised and controlledby the encadreur.

The findings illustrate that participation was not only conceived of in isola-tion from the local context; it was largely shaped by the intervention approachof the particular NGOs in order to efficiently deliver project outputs. Inthese cases, the implementation of community participation followed supply-driven demand (Mansuri and Rao, 2004: 1). From a theoretical point of view,the findings underscore that mainstream CBD methodology is still based ona communitarian view of social capital. This view equates social capital withparticipation in social networks without drawing a distinction between thenature and effects of different networks, or the concomitant effects of partic-ipation. The popularity of the communitarian view on social capital in CBDmethodology can largely be attributed to the fact that it aligns well with tech-nocratic project planning. For policy makers, Putnam’s (1993) communitar-ian view provides a simple solution — building community organizationsmeans building social capital. It is an easy way to measure ‘technically’ theprogress and success of such policies, simply predicated on ‘how many neworganizations were built or strengthened’ (Woolcock and Narayan, 2000).

The case study findings demonstrate that a broader political economyperspective on social capital presents a more realistic view of the negativeand positive effects of CBD methodology. Social capital is also a catalystfor social differentiation: people and groups of people use their social capitalto reproduce their social positions within society, thus reinforcing existingboundaries and hierarchies between groups. The way in which communityparticipation in the projects was structured along local political and personalpower relations confirms that social capital can structure both ‘patterns ofinclusion and exclusion’ (Bebbington, 2002: 801).

Resources and Social Cohesion: An Underexposed but Crucial Factor

A second general finding was that the type of resources delivered throughNGO interventions proved to be a strong predictor of the failure or successof CBD to improve social cohesion and rebuild local stocks of social capital.It is well known that the timing and conditions for channelling resources


to local communities are crucial to the analysis of elite capture in CBDprogrammes. Several studies argue that offering too much too soon attractswealthier individuals, and substantially increases the risk of elite capture(Platteau, 2004; Platteau and Gaspart, 2003; Titeca and Vervisch, 2008).However, most significant in our case studies was not the timing or theconditions, but the type of resources involved. A typology of resources wascreated in order to further analyse the case study findings.

This typology is based on two axes: public/private goods andstrategic/non-strategic livelihood assets. Private and public goods have dif-ferent characteristics. Bastiaensen et al. (2002) distinguish between sub-tractability and excludability: private (or market), common pool, club (ortoll), and public goods. Private goods are rival and excludable; for example,the consumption of food diminishes its availability to others (abstractibil-ity) and it is easy to deny others access to your food (excludability). Publicgoods are non-rival and non-excludable; for example, individual use of arural road does not diminish its availability to others and it is difficult todeny access. In between we find common pool (rival but non-excludable,e.g. irrigation water) and club goods (non-rival but excludable, e.g. millfacilities). The strategic/non-strategic axis distinguishes between assets thatdeliver a strategic individual advantage to cope with short-term needs, stressand shock situations (strategic assets), and assets that provide opportunitiesfor long-term livelihood strategies (non-strategic). Both, however, are keyto sustainable livelihoods (Davies, 1993; Scoones, 1998).

This enables a classification of project components along these two axes(see Figure 4). By way of illustration, two very different project componentscan be compared. On the one hand, a developed plot in the wetland is pri-vately used, it is excludable (tenure rights), causes extreme rivalry (becauseof general land scarcity), and presents a strategic asset (an additional highlyvalued rice season). On the other hand, road works in the countryside area clear public good (non-rival and non-excludable), and a non-strategic as-set (e.g. more trade in the long term). In between, the goods of clubs (e.g.storehouse facilities) and common pool resources (irrigation water in thewetland) may differ along the strategic/non-strategic axis.

Based on this typology, three categories of project components and theirassociated participatory intermediation structures could be distinguished ac-cording to their impact on social cohesion and local social capital stocks (seeFigure 5). A first category, delivering private/strategic goods, had a negativeimpact. These components were characterized by serious information barri-ers between mediators and the local population (labelling them as ‘secret’activities), while sparking new conflicts because of unfair distribution or ac-cess (frustrating bonding and bridging social capital), which also decreasedlevels of trust in local administration (undermining linking social capital).

One of the most clear-cut examples was the (re)distribution of plots by thewetland committee in Burara. These wetland plots were the most strategicprivate resource which could be accessed through any of the three projects.


Figure 4. Project Components According to Resource Typology

Strategicasset

Non-strategicasset

Private good Public good

Private Goods Club Goods Common Pool Goods

Public Goods

RivalExcludable

Non-RivalExcludable

RivalNon-Excludable

Non-RivalNon-Excludable

Wetland plotsCash-for-workLivestockSeed credits

Individual training

Agroforestry plants

Vegetable seed

Veterinary facilities

Storehouse facilities

Irrigation water

Potable water

Public training

Rural Roads

Note: for convenience, not all project components are indicated.Source: own research, based on Bastiaensen et al. 2002.

Accessing additional land which could also be irrigated during the dry seasonwas of extreme strategic value for any household in this country where fertileland is becoming increasingly scarce. However, as ‘people are dangerouswhen it comes to their land,’15 and because of elite capture, (re)distributionby the wetland committee led to serious tensions within the community, witha near outbreak of violence (the governor had to come to calm down thesituation). This became very clear during the focus group discussions:

‘There is no trust anymore between the rich and the poor. The rich received the plots whilethe poor need the plots. They even took our plots. . . . They [the administration] did nothingwhen they took the wetland. They were there, they have seen it, but they kept silent about it’.

‘On the hill we trusted Rutayikire, the judge, but he took a lot of bands in the wetland. Before,he was the friend of everybody, but that’s finished now. He took 60 plots in the wetland,how could our confidence increase? . . . He had good contacts with the administration andthe committee of CIBA. . . . He used the works of CIBA to take away our plots’.16

A second category, delivering public/non-strategic resources, presents theopposite picture. These components were characterized by effective infor-mation flows and the reduction of existing conflicts as a positive outcome

15. Focus group, 12 April 2007, Burara.16. Focus group, 18 April 2007, Burara.


Figure 5. Impact of Project Components on Community Cohesion Accordingto Resource Typology

Strategicasset

Non-strategic

asset

Private good Public good

Information flows

Conflict-diminishing

Extending bonds and bridges

Improved linkages

Information barriers

Conflict-increasing

Frustrating bonds

Weakened linkages

Information flows

Conflict-neutral

No impact on bonds,

bridges and linkages


(improving bonding and bridging social capital of community members),while offering opportunities to improve relations between the communityand their local administration (improving linking social capital). Significantexamples were road works in the countryside (reduction of traffic accidents,increased mobility); repairing or replacing water taps (reduction of waitingtime, new informal meeting places); the construction of the hangar (less theftof harvest stored at home); and public health training (informal meetings,reduction of sorcery conflicts because of correct information about certaindiseases). Focus group discussions were particularly positive about theseinterventions:

‘It was the administration who has asked to rehabilitate the road. Now we see taxis going toKirundo or even Bujumbura. They have done well, they have sensitized’.17

‘In the past, we slid as a snake. Now, there are less conflicts, because less accidentshappened’.18

‘This creates a lot of confidence. Now, people come from far away to fetch water. Before,you didn’t know them, but now we talk and we trust them’.19

17. ‘Road works’ focus group, 18 April 2007, Burara.18. ‘Road works’ focus group, 2 May 2007, Burara.19. ‘Water taps’ focus group, 18 April 2007, Burara.


These answers also reveal, although indirectly, local people’s understand-ing of social cohesion and what kind of social networks they value in dailylife. The main positive side effects of activities related to enhancing socialcohesion were their inclusiveness (equal access), the restoration of social life(informal meeting places and mobility), and the fact that they tackled veryconcrete social conflicts within the community. These aspects confirm someobservations Uvin (2009: 43–56) made when he asked what ‘peace’ meansto Burundians. Mobility — the ability to visit one’s family and friends —was a surprising but important dimension of peace for many respondentsin his study. Second, when people defined peace negatively (i.e. as the ab-sence of violence), it was not politically or ethnically motivated violencebut mostly criminality and theft they were referring to. The priority given toaddressing sexual violence (in particular in Cumba) and the fact that theftwas the single most important factor threatening people’s safety, confirmsthat this observation applies to all three collines. Furthermore, what Uvin(2009: 48) refers to as ‘social peace’ was also invoked during focus groups:a community is in peace when there are strong social ties, and neighbourscohabit in harmony. The need for informal social contact and concrete placesto meet fellow community members illustrated this social aspect of peace(water taps and public health training). In sum, Uvin concludes that few peo-ple refer to major political issues (democracy, human rights, ethnicity, etc.)when talking about peace. Instead, they refer to concrete problems related tosecurity, development and social cohesion. The observations made duringinterviews illustrate that people particularly appreciate those interventionsthat, although mostly indirectly, address these concrete social conflicts: quar-rels when fetching water (water taps), traffic accidents and transport costs(road works), theft of harvests at home (storehouse), sexual violence anddisease (health training).

A third category of project components, delivering private but non-strategic resources, had a neutral impact on social cohesion. An examplewhich applies to all three projects was the distribution of agro-forestry plants.Although privately distributed, they did not yield a substantial strategic ad-vantage in the short term. This was clearly illustrated during the focus-groupdiscussions:

‘It is impossible to have conflicts because everybody could receive a plant. The problemwas that a lot of plants died because of the drought, but that is not the fault of CIBA. . . .Everybody can go and plant, and everybody can benefit some trees’.20

‘Everybody was informed, and everybody could cooperate, and there were enough trees. So,if you didn’t join, it was your own choice’.21

As shown in Figure 5, the nature of the goods provided determinesthe impact on the different kinds of social capital. The provision of a

20. Focus group, 18 April 2007, Burara.21. Focus group, 15 May 2007, Cumba.


private/strategic good (e.g. the redistribution of wetlands) had a negativeimpact on bonding, bridging and linking capital, as both horizontal andvertical interaction between different groups of people were negatively af-fected. The delivery of public/non-strategic goods had a very different effect:bonding and bridging capital improved, as ‘horizontal’ interaction betweendifferent groups of people increased. The local administration also benefittedfrom this intervention, as its engagement with the local population improvedsignificantly. In other words, linking capital was strengthened through thisintervention. Lastly, private but non-strategic resources did not have anysignificant effect on different kinds of social capital.

The resource typology illustrates different effects on social cohesion be-cause private goods pose substantially different management problems vis-a-vis public, common and, to a lesser extent, club goods (Bastiaensen et al.,2002; D’Exelle, 2004). Public goods, in particular common pool resources,contend with collective action and free-rider problems. Private goods posemanagement problems in terms of bargaining processes, that is, a lack ofagreement on the distribution of the benefits (D’Exelle, 2004: 7–8). Thestrategic/non-strategic axis was also significant, as the following quotes il-lustrate:

‘The activities with which something can be earned, are done in secret. . . . It [vegetableseeds] hasn’t changed anything about the confidence among the population. It concerns littlemoney. Everybody who wants can buy it on the market’.22

‘The water tap is for everybody, you cannot exclude people, you cannot make the choicewho will draw water from the dwell. In the wetland, not everybody is present. There you cangive something to receive the water you need to irrigate your plot of land. But for drawingwater you cannot ask money, because it is for everybody’.23

The two quotes present an interesting comparison. The distribution of veg-etable seeds (CLC) did not create distributional problems when comparedto the seed credit scheme of LITA. This is because the latter distributedstrategic seeds (e.g. beans), while the former delivered non-strategic seeds(e.g. carrots or tomatoes). Similar reasoning explains the distinct effect ofthe distribution of potable and irrigation water in the second quote. Potablewater is a public and less strategic resource compared to irrigation water,which is a common pool resource, and a strategic asset in the livelihoodstrategies of the farmers in the wetland.

From a theoretical point of view the findings indicate that the ‘use value’(Edwards and Foley, 1997: 677) of social capital is clearly determinedby the economic resources that are distributed. This again illustrates anadvantage of the political economy perspective on social capital vis-a-visthe mainstream communitarian view. Social capital is context dependent,bound up with a broader capital portfolio, interacting with and shaped by

22. Focus group, 21 May 2007, CLC project, Cumba.23. Focus group, 17 April 2007, CIBA project, Burara.


cultural and economic forms of capital (Bebbington, 2007). The provision ofprivate/strategic resources created a higher risk of community participationbecoming enmeshed in power relations. By contrast, the distribution of lessstrategic/public resources led to more equal and inclusive resource access,potentially downplaying existing power relations. If the design of CBDinterventions is such that it does not take into account the nature of theresources which are being distributed — and therefore the interdependencebetween social, cultural and economic capital — the likelihood is high thatthe potential negative effects of community participation on social capitalwill be overlooked.

CONCLUSIONS

This article has discussed community-based reconstruction as a mechanismto rebuild social capital in post-conflict settings with reference to a number ofcase studies of NGO interventions in post-conflict Burundi. It has providedgeneral theoretical insights into the concept of social capital and the method-ology employed in CBD, and particular insights into its application in post-conflict situations. From a theoretical point of view, the findings provide em-pirical evidence of the limitations of the concept of social capital, and exposethe narrow and normative ‘Putnamian’ or communitarian notion of socialcapital in which CBD methodology is still grounded (cf. Mansuri and Rao,2004). This methodology is characterized by a strong adherence to a ‘tech-nical procedural design’ to enhance social capital and community cohesion.The case studies illustrated this through the range of procedures which wasset up to guide community participation. Their failure to prevent elite capturebears further testimony to the fact that procedural design departs from inac-curate assumptions: formalized and legalistic procedures could not overcomecommunity discord (liberal assumption), and perfect community consensuscould not be reached (communitarian assumption) (cf. Chhotray, 2004).

By contrast, a broader political economy perspective on social capitalproved useful to present a more realistic analysis of CBD mechanisms.More specifically, two broad conclusions can be drawn from a critical andcontextualized perspective (e.g. Bebbington, 2002, 2007; Cleaver, 2005).First, social capital is enmeshed in broader socio-economic power relations,and could have negative effects if it strengthens existing hierarchies. Fromthis point of view, social capital has the potential to reproduce the powerrelations within which it is already situated (Cleaver, 2005) and can poten-tially strengthen, rather than weaken, elite capture within community-basedprojects. Elite capture may therefore be seen as the ‘dark side’ (Portes andLandolt, 1996) of social capital. Second, the case studies showed that the‘use value’ (Edwards and Foley, 1997: 677) of social capital was mainlyshaped by the resources distributed. The provision of private/strategicresources through livelihood support programmes has a higher risk of


community participation being negatively affected by power relations.Under these circumstances, social capital facilitates elite capture. Bycontrast, the distribution of less strategic/public resources leads to moreequal and inclusive resource access, potentially downplaying existing powerrelations. Once more, this reflects the double-edged character of socialcapital as social networks structuring both inclusion and exclusion. Thesefindings emphasize the importance of adopting a broader contextualizedpolitical economy perspective on social capital. The case studies illustratethat the ‘exclusive’ or ‘inclusive’ effects of social capital are determined bythe nature of economic capital to which social capital gives access.

These general conclusions also offer insights relevant to post-conflict sit-uations, especially the application of community-based reconstruction as amechanism to rebuild social capital after conflict. First, a ‘technical pro-cedural design’ is particularly inappropriate in post-conflict settings whichare even more politicized than ‘normal’ CBD situations. This is due to theprevalence of fragmented, contested or opposing national and local lead-ership, and fiercer competition for post-war reconstruction resources. Thecommunitarian notion of social capital is therefore an erroneous theoreticalpoint of departure to inform CBD aimed at rebuilding social capital throughpost-conflict interventions.

Second, the type of resources delivered by NGO interventions has provento be a strong predictor of the success or failure of CBD to enhance socialcohesion and rebuild local stocks of social capital. It has to be noted that post-conflict reconstruction programmes differ from ‘original’ CBD programmesprecisely with regard to the types of resources that are distributed. Originally,CBD programmes were designed to improve the delivery of public goodsand services (Mansuri and Rao, 2004). Social funds, widespread WorldBank programmes based on CBD methodology, are exemplary in this regard(e.g. de Silva and Sum, 2008). In contrast, many post-conflict reconstructionprogrammes ‘provide direct livelihood support, often in the form of financialresources, to individuals or individual groups rather than providing resourcesor services that benefit the community as a whole’ (Goovaerts et al., 2005:13). Applying CBD methodology to distribute this direct livelihood supportin communities that have suffered from serious stress and have been dividedcarries a high risk of achieving an opposite effect. Instead of promotingsocial cohesion, this approach combined with the type of resources providedis vulnerable to elite capture — which only exacerbates existing conflictand tensions within communities. The case studies further explain why thetype of resources plays such an important role by introducing the distinctionbetween public/non-strategic and private/strategic goods.

These findings offer empirical insights into the limitations of the broader‘social engineering’ approach to post-conflict reconstruction that attemptsto combine economic reconstruction with ‘engineering’ social cohesion inpost-conflict communities (cf. Goodhand, 2006). Two more practical policyconclusions can be drawn from this. First, the findings support the argument


that civic engagement and participation cannot replace sound (re)distributivepolicies from a neutral third party or development state (Bebbington, 2007).The case studies show how, particularly in a post-conflict reconstructionsetting, the (re)distribution of scarce reconstruction resources cannot be leftto society alone. The distribution of these resources through CBD carries ahigh risk of leading to more conflict and tensions within communities. Thesefindings therefore do not question the ability of communities to participatein their own reconstruction efforts, but highlight the dangers of applyingCBD methodologies to implement (re)distributive policies in post-conflictsettings. In other words, they underline the difficulty of ‘engineering’ socialcohesion through outside interventions — which are then implemented bycommunities — and highlight the need for continued engagement of a neutralthird party or developmental state.

Second, and in line with the preceding observation, the findings suggestthat it is more important and potentially more effective to create an enablingenvironment for an endogenous process of social capital building, insteadof trying to ‘engineer’ social cohesion from the outside. The case studieshighlight the value of ‘ordinary’ infrastructure works and public serviceprovision as project activities which positively influence the social fabricof community life. Road works in the CIBA project illustrate the impor-tance of mobility, showing how visiting friends and family is a clear ‘peacedividend’ in Burundi (cf. Uvin, 2009: 49–50). The value placed on the re-pair or replacement of water taps (CIBA project) and public training (CLCproject), which created new meeting places, reflects Burundians’ preferencefor informal daily interactions rather than formal community associations orcommittees. In addition, public training on sexual violence (CLC project)addressed another negative consequence of the conflict, as rape and sexualharassment constantly fuelled feelings of insecurity and pitted householdsagainst each other because of insinuations and forced marriages. The con-struction of better and safer storage facilities by the LITA project, on theother hand, reduced theft of harvests at home and consequently also reducedconflicts and distrust among neighbours. To conclude, instead of creatingsocial cohesion in a top-down process (‘social engineering’), the examplesdrawn on in this article show the importance of creating the necessary ma-terial or physical preconditions from which a truly bottom-up and organicprocess of locally embedded social engineering can emerge over time.

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At the time of writing, Thomas Vervisch was an assistant at the Departmentof Philosophy and Moral Science, and associate member of the ConflictResearch Group, both at Ghent University. His research focus was on post-conflict reconstruction, in particular the case of Burundi. He currently worksat VLIR-UOS. He can be contacted at e-mail: [email protected]

Kristof Titeca is a postdoctoral fellow of the Research Foundation – Flan-ders (FWO), based at the Institute of Development Policy and Management,University of Antwerp, Prinsstraat 13, 2000 Antwerp, Belgium (e-mail:[email protected]); and of the Conflict Research Group, Ghent Univer-sity. His interests are informal institutions, informal economy, state buildingand conflict.

Koen Vlassenroot is a professor at the Department of Political Scienceand director of the Conflict Research Group at Ghent University, Univer-siteitstraat 8, 9000 Ghent, Belgium (e-mail: [email protected]).He specializes on conflict dynamics in Central Africa. He has published onmilitias, land issues, rebel governance and state building.

Johan Braeckman is a professor at the Department of Philosophy andMoral Science, Ghent University, Blandijnberg 2, 9000 Ghent, Belgium(e-mail: [email protected]). His research interests include moral-ity, ethics and the philosophical debates concerning evolutionary theory andthe neurosciences.

social capital and post-conflict reconstruction in burundi: the limits of community-based...

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