International Relations II – International Political Economy

Shift in dynamics of African - European Trade Negotiations

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The Unfinished Business of Economic Partnership Agreements

Jasmin Marston

Friday the 11th of May, 2012

It has been a decade since the European Commission started negotiating Economic Partnership

Agreements (EPAs) with the African, Caribbean and Pacific Countries (ACP). There has been a

notable ‘cooling’ in the relationship between the European Union and African nations1 since the

signing of the Cotonou Partnership Agreement in 2000 (see Flint, 2008), and so far the African

nations have only agreed to interim agreements in a process which has been described with a

disappointing loss of dynamism and lack of progress.

This slow and turbulent negotiating process, which has not been easy or friendly, suggests that it

is indicative of a larger shift in dynamics between the two continents. During the same time the

Doha Development Round representing multilateral trade negotiations on a global level,

produced a stalemate, as the first push back from developing countries during such negotiations

has led to Western nation’s refusal to cooperate. Global power dynamics are undergoing a

cumulative reordering process, and Africa’s role seems to be shifting with this development.

Increasing engagement between the emerging powers such as BRIC nations with the African

continent, as well as the formation of transnational activists and movements of civil societies

have shown their solidarity especially with the Least Developed Countries (LCD), most of them

located on the African continent. Unsuspecting critic of the free market have emerged from the

rows of the World Bank, and the UNDP upon many others, have published alternative ways for

poor nations to develop, all over this past decade.

With the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) African leaders have stepped up

themselves, adapted to the global political arena, making use of organizations as the African

Union to make their opinions heard.

The focus of this research paper is the exploration and explanation for the rationale for African

countries opposition to singing an ‘alternative’ bilateral trade agreement (EPAs) with the

European Union. The common assumption about objectives and normative underpinnings of

changes in trade regime rely on material based explanations, this essay however will

furthermore draw attention to the constructivist theoretical framework to enrich and expand

our understanding of this shift in Africa’s role in trade negotiations.

The essay will start with a general overview of international relations theory in regards to trade

regime change, followed by the application of these theories in the formation and

operationalization of the hypothesis, before giving background information and a content

summary of EPAs and its critics. In the later parts the material based approach will be explored,

analyzing the relevant numbers and frameworks, before looking at the potential influential

1 The term African nations in this essay describe the nations usually revered to Sub-Saharan Africa.

history, new actors which have contributed to the shift in dynamics between African’s nations

and the European Union.

General introduction to IR theory in regards to trade regimes

As the Realist approach is dominated by competitive ‘power politics’, overshadowed by the

imminent threat of international anarchy, international cooperation is unlikely, unless a

(substantial) relative gain is involved while it furthermore argues that such cooperation is only

possible if a hegemonic state uses its power to create and enforce institutional rules necessary to

sustain cooperation between nations (Reus-Smit, 2009). The World Trade Organization (WTO),

known as GATT (General Agreement of Tariffs and Trade) until 1995, was indeed brought to life

by the United States of America in 19472, the most powerful state left after World War II (WWII).

Steinberg (2002) states that realists see legislative bargaining and outcomes in international

organizations as a function of interest and power, and adds that studies of political scientists3

suggest that powerful states (such as the United States or the European Union) can

simultaneously respect procedural rules while using various practices to escape the constraints

on power, intrinsic to those rules.

The Realist approach focuses on gaining an distinct advantage over rivals, including via trade

negotiations, to keep the balance of power, on occasion using coercion if need be to bring trading

partner into a bargaining relationship. It constitutes an isolate look at primarily hegemonic,

independent nation states, not considering ‘friendly’ relations or trading partner based on trust

in others, self-less intervention or cooperation, and would suggest that the US should be treating

Cuba the same as Canada, as long as the relative gains are certain. In addition his world view

does not allow for any interconnection and interdependence or reliance, which in reality would

make free trade negotiation enormously difficult, and certainly cannot explain the trust nations

have shown in each other forming trade blocks, e.g. through cooperation within the European

Union, or in case of Mercosur (Mercado común del Sur), where e.g. Venezuela is selling oil to

South American countries for a ‘favourable’ price.

In regards to the shift within the WTO over the last decades, the realist approach would most

likely attribute it to changing incentives or coercion from greater powers (Ford, 2003). The

spread of liberalization (in the 80s) would be explained by the debt crisis of the early 1980s

which forced many developing countries to gradually adopt policies to boost trade

competitiveness, often accompanied or caused by IMF (International Monetary Fund) and World

2 http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact4_e.htm 3 In example the work of Robert Cox and Harold Jacobson, eds. 1973, The Anatomy of Influence, New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press

Bank policies (Structural Adjustment Programs), to increase foreign exchange earnings (Ford,

2003).

A strict approach to explaining the shift in trade negotiation dynamics through the lens of

realism only makes limited sense, especially as African nations have not been in the position of

the powerful member in the room. Nevertheless, the idea of economic gains is certainly an

important one, even if the relative gains theory seems too limited to assert its explanatory

power on attitudes of developing nations in EPA negotiations.

Neo-liberals, similar to realists, also apply the logic of rationalist economic theory to

international relations, but see states as utility-maximizers, which will cooperated as long as it

promises absolute gains in their interest (Reus-Smit, 2009). Ford (2003) adds that while

Neoliberals also believe that regimes might be formed by a hegemonic state, largely as an

instrument of their own interest, they can continue to exist after that state’s decline if other

states perceive a continued benefit from the regime. This might be true of the decline of

America’s relative power by the end of the 1970s, yet the framework of institutions it has

sponsored after World War II persist. Furthermore Neoliberals advocate regional integration as

states attempt to survive and prosper in this anarchical environment, and form such to either:

reach a ‘critical size’ to confront an external economic competitor, to bandwagon (e.g.Nato), to

‘tie in’, or if a hegemony imposes cooperation to reduce the problem of relative gains (e.g. US

support for Western Europe post 1945). In general they are strong supporters of free trade and

believers of the theory of comparative advantage, seeing protectionisms as a pernicious

influence (Burchill, 2009).

Neoliberal Institutionalists predict an amalgamation of international cooperation as there is a

growing need to manage e.g. trade or environmental issues, by transnational institutions. While

Transactionalists believe that the volume and density of interactions between societies make

them objectively more similar, psychologically more positively disposed toward each other,

which creates a willingness to subject themselves to common institutions. Critically examined,

these interactions might cause ‘objective’ similarities, however, not necessarily produce shared

identities. In fact in some countries multinational corporations are viewed as intruders, and in a

reaffirmation of local identity and culture, symbols of western society are frowned upon

(especially in countries which are adversely effected by foreign ‘interventions’).

Nevertheless, Neo-liberals in general are strong supporter of free trade, and have been since it

has been first enunciated by Smith and Ricardo (Burchill, 2009), making them predestined

supporters of an organization such as the WTO and trade negotiations within this framework.

With their optimistic view of human nature, states can arrive at mutually beneficial international

cooperation, and interaction governed by institutions, conceding that at the same time there is a

multitude of state and actors, in which varying degrees of preference, e.g. in trading partners

based on e.g. culture or economic system, result in different relations.

Critics of the neo-liberal approach, especially from the realist camp, might consider such a

simple-hearted approach foolish in trade-negotiations, as trusting too much into other states by

focusing on relative gains only, would potentially allow ‘rivals’ to gain too much strength and

take over – e.g. militarily.

Notwithstanding this critic, the neo-liberal approach seems to bear efficacious explanatory

power when it comes to understanding the mechanisms that have lead to a shift in position of

African countries exemplified during EPA trade negotiations. As African nations have often been

lumped together (and in some cases even been called ONE country), it has made sense for them

to bond together (under difficulties) while trying to have a voice in negotiations. Generally the

neo-liberal focus on absolute gains is sensible as trade negotiations are build on the assumption

that trade is welfare enhancing when everyone participates. This material explanation will most

likely be of importance when trying to understand the shift of African nation’s willingness to

‘adhere’ to western trade rules.

Yet another approach is Critical theory which might be described as being on the other end of

the spectrum as it challenges the very foundation of the rationalist project and sees actors as

inherently social, with their identities and (interests socially) constructed, ultimately the

product of inter-subjective social structures (Reus-Smit, 2009). Critical theorist recognized the

“inherent subjectivity of all claims and the connection between knowledge and power”,

moreover calling for consensually grounded ethical principles to create emancipator political

action (Reus-Smit, 2009: 217). Neo-Marxists, a kind of critical theorists, see the trading regime

to be underpinned by the demands of the global capitalistic world economy, in which the

structure determines states’ roles and the trading regimes is merely helping to ensure that

industrialized countries have unlimited access to resources of the peripheral countries (Ford,

2003). Meanwhile gramscian neo-Marxist argue that trade regimes arise out of a historical

context, formed by capitalist states to benefit their bourgeois class, and other national

bourgeoisie, using hegemonic norms to penetrate foreign markets to maximize profits at the

expense of others under the guise of universal benefit (ibid).

This theory might be applied by some scholars to explain the European position, which has its

role to play as it takes two parties to negotiate; however, it lacks significance in relation to

explaining the African position in regards to Europe, as the capitalistic mindset is much more

advances in the north.

Finnmore (1996) describes constructivism as a general social theory (not a theory of politics),

which makes claims about the nature of social life and social change, leading to an interpretation

of the international system and all its parts being socially constructed rather than “natural”. This

approach includes international institutions such as the WTO, and the meaning attached to those

structures, which flow from human interaction, which shape, and in turn are shaped, by mutual

perceptions and expectations, ultimately becoming self-confirming. Furthermore the

constructivist argument states that a system of shared ideas, beliefs and values has structural

characteristics which exert a powerful influence on social and political action, while Reus-Smit

(2003) adds that there is a focus on social identities of individuals or states to explain interest

formation and therefore actions, which in turn is an important part to explain international

political phenomenon.

Wendt points out that “(i)nstitutions are fundamentally cognitive entities that do not exist apart

from actors’ ideas about how the world works”, (Wendt, 1992: 399), signifying that institutions

are nothing but beliefs.

“Identities and interests are constitutes by collective meanings that are always in process”

Alexander Wendt (1992: 407).

The constructivist approach can enhance our understanding of the determinants in trade regime

change and negotiation dynamics. Lang (2006) adds that international economic order has

historically varied according to changes in collective ideas about ‘legitimate social purpose’.

Moreover Ford (2003) claims that the process of interactions between ideas and material

factors, which produce meaning and change roles and regimes, depend on an interaction among

social rules or structures and agents.

On a state level the perceptions of the world, and the state’s role in it, are shaped by close

networks of transnational and international social relations they are embedded in (Finnemore,

1996). Furthermore states are socialized to desire certain things by the international society as

interests are constructed through social interaction (ibid).

Wendt (1992) adds that actors do not have a ‘self’ prior to interaction with one another, and

underlines that conceptions of self and interest tend to ‘mirror’ the practices of significant others

over time. His point remains that “identities and interests are constituted by collective meanings

that are always in process” (Wendt, 1992:407).

As Meyer et al. (1997:145) point out that “worldwide models define and legitimate agendas for

local action, shaping the structures and policies of nation-states and other national and local

actors in virtually all of the domains of rationalized social life”.

The constructivist camp deliver a surfeit of alternative approaches, and while not all of them can

be applied in this essay, certain aspects such as role of BRIC countries (‘significant others’) in

international trade negotiations, as well as shifting sense of identity visible through cooperation

within Africa, e.g. regional trade agreements, as well as involvement of the African Union, help to

explore alternative angles for reasons’ behind the new position of African countries.

Panke’s (2010) empirical analysis found that only if actors share a common ‘yardstick’, fitting to

the issues at stake, participants will consider and assess the quality of arguments made,

incrementally leading to the development of consensus. More concretely she specifies the need

for intersubjective validation, which means a common scientific paradigm in truth-related

arguments, or shared standard of appropriateness required in normative arguments etc.

Therefore implying that if actors talk at cross-purposes, as imaginably often the case at trade

negotiations, and issue specific reference standards are absent and dissent prevails.

Lastly, a more actor-oriented approach could also be included, as it can easily be imagined that

the efficacious, articulate and highly regarded person leading or participating in a negotiation

has an influence over the outcome. Mandelkern and Shalev (2010) therefore claim that actors

have to possess power resources – ‘capitals’, to use Pierre Bourdieu vocabulary - to successfully

shape negotiations, as well as consider group level sources of power – ‘advocacy coalitions’.

Unfortunately, due to time and resources constrains this approach, while important, cannot be

explored in detail, but it should be noted that the author is aware of the diverse and changing

trade and development ministers of the 49 nations negotiating with Europe over the past

decade, and would hope that discussion will go further on this issue in the future.

The reasons for the slow and turbulent negotiation processes, which have been ongoing since

2002 with no African nation agreeing to sign a final EPA yet, are multifaceted. This signals a shift

away from previous negotiations, as up to 2012 the EU was only able to have African nations

initial, sign, and in one case ratify INTERIM EPAs.

Hypothesis

Traditional analyses of changes in trade regimes in particular, have tended to adopt Neoliberal

or Neorealist (both in the category of material) approaches. While these approached are valid

this paper claims that our view should be expanded to understand the change in trade

negotiations dynamics of African nations and the EU. Seemingly political actors from the south

have formed coalitions and in joint action are slowly breaking down power asymmetries, with

the consequence of increasing their self-confidence that gives rise to the demand of equal

inclusion. This leads to the exploration of a constructivist idea based approach and the question

how the historical process, human awareness or consciousness, ideas, thoughts, norms and

perceptions might have influenced the change in negotiation patterns.

The hypothesis therefore is that material based AND idea based approaches together can explain

the change of trade negotiation dynamics between African Nations and Europe.

The idea based approach will consider shifting roles within the international trade regime, with

the rise of emerging powers such as Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa – including their

south-south partnership agenda, as well as being role models within the Doha Development

Round leading the way against the old hegemons of Europe and the US. As Europe seems to push

their profit oriented agenda further, African motivations to stand up and push back on the lack

of development focus during EPA negotiations has been carried by a panafrican alliance agenda,

with the African Union leading the way, in part classifying this shift as a response of defiance

against previous colonial powers.

In addition the traditional material based approach shall receive equal consideration as, like in

any nation of our time, economic gains and monetary benefits matter. The dictate of the free

market economy, validated by the collapse of the Soviet Union, have ingrained capitalistic

paradigms into almost all leaders conscience, and deserve examination. Have African nations

found alternatives to trade with the European Union and have these new partnership lead to

material gains responsible for the lack of motivation within African lines to continue to submit to

Europe’s rule framework?

To operationalize this concept of an idea based approach, this essay will analyse the content of

statement the African Union and other African leaders/spokespersons to identify a common

threat of anti-European/pro-African unity among publications indicating the new role of African

nations in regard to Europe. Furthermore actions and rhetoric of the BRIC countries will be

analysed as they African countries might ‘mirror’ the practices of (these) significant others’. This

content analysis will have to be based on the background available, meaning the historic

development of an African solution (aware of the lack of analyses of specific cultural identities of

each nation), considering leaders within the continent (such as presidents of economically more

powerful states, such as South Africa’s previous president Mbeki), as well as a close look at other

influential supporters and motivators, such as the World Bank, UN, and civil societies,

considering their actions as well as words leading to a shift of social identities and therefore

actions in this global world order.

The material based approach will focus on Africa’s terms of trade, looking at imports and

exports between Europe and Africa, other trading partners of the continent, trade shares, GDP

per capita change, and economic growth in general as well as external debt as independent

variables. More concretely the list of imports and exports will be examined to identify interested

and potential dependencies. Structural issues with the EPAs that can be determined before the

implementation, such as conflict with regional trade unions, will be analysed.

The author expects to see an amalgamation of idea and material based approached to

understand Africa’s new role in economic negotiations.

A brief history of trade agreements leading up to the interim EPAs of 2012

The origins of the relationship between the European Union and the African Caribbean and

Pacific Countries (ACP) stretches back to the early days of the European Economic Community.

They were formalized in 1975 with the newly constituted ACP group by the signing of the first

major agreement – the Lomé I convention. Under this agreement products from the ACP

countries had preferential access based on a quota system (e.g. for sugar) and could enter the

European Community free of duty. The Lomé preference system underwent changes (Lomé I-

IV), but was ultimately reformed and replaced in 2000, with the signing of the Cotonou

Partnership Treaty.

On 23 June 2000 in Cotonou, Benin the Partnership Agreement was completed and designed to

be in effect for 20 years. This agreement established a framework for the European Union’s

cooperation relations for economic, social and cultural development of ACP states with its

main objectives centred around the reduction and eventual eradication of poverty and the

gradual integration of ACP states into the global economy, while adhering to the aims of

sustainable development, as well as contributing to the peace and security and the democratic

and political stability of the states (Cotonou Partnership Agreement, 2000). Cotonou rolled over

the existing unilateral trade preferences up to the end of 2007, but ‘in time’ they were to be

replaces by a WTO-compatible trade arrangement (United Nations Economic Commission for

Africa, 2007), as Article 14 of GATT requires non-discriminatory trade agreements among WTO

members. Under the Lomé convention ACP countries were not required to ‘reciprocate’ and for

the Cotonou Agreement the ACP countries and the EU had to seek a waiver from the WTO that

had been granted in Doha in November 2001 (United Nations Economic Commission for Africa,

2007).

4 http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/gatt47_01_e.htm#articleI

In 2002 the European Commission started negotiating the Economic Partnership Agreements

with seven groups of the African Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries (five of them in Africa)

on behalf of the EU, to negotiate an agreement compliant with WTO rules. In Africa the EPAs are

being negotiated with five different Regional Economic Communities (RECs): Central Africa

(CEMAC or Economic and Monetary Union of Central Africa)5, West Africa (ECOWAS6), Eastern

and Southern Africa (ESA)7, East African Community (EAC),8 and Southern African Development

Community (SADC )9 - with each of the five groups negotiating separately with the EC.

Article XXIV of the GATT/WTO calls for reciprocity and liberalization of ‘substantially all the

trade’, which would mean for African countries a reduction of their customs duties to zero on

(often suggested to do so within 15 years) at a minimum of (debated) 80% of imports from the

EU (African Union, 2006).

The trade negotiations were supposed to be concluded by 31 December 2007 (as the waiver

expired) with a new agreement in place to comply with the reciprocity clause of the WTO.

A surfeit of impact assessment studies on national, regional and continental level have been

carried out over the last decade, for example one by the Economic Commission for Africa which

has shown that the EPAs would have ‘serious adverse consequences such as job losses, closure

of industries or deindustrialization, loss of revenue, and the weakening of the economic

integration process underway in the ACP regions (African Union, 2006). Independent

organizations and authors have conducted studies highlighting similar concerns (see UNECA

200410; Meyn, 2004; Kaulem, 2006; Perez and Karingi, 2007;Karinig and Deotti, 2009;

Andriamananjara et al., 2009; UNECA, 2005; Garcia-Duran et al,. 2009; Qualmann and Trumm,

2009). It should be pointed out that these studies are based on predictions and estimates,

however, a strong overlap from authors of different sides (including supporters of liberalization

such as the World Bank) agree that there will be adverse effects if African countries open their

5 The following list of countries can be found online at: http://ec.europa.eu/trade/wider-agenda/development/economic-partnerships/negotiations-and-agreements/ Cameroon, Central African Republic (CAR), Chad, Congo, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Sao Tome and Principe 6 Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Ivory Coast, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo, Mauritania 7 Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Somalia and Sudan (Horn of Africa), Malawi, Zambia and Zimbabwe (southern Africa) Comoros, Mauritius, Madagascar and Seychelles (Indian Ocean islands) [All countries are members of COMESA] 8 Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, Uganda and Tanzania 9 Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Mozambique, Namibia, Swaziland and South Africa are negotiating their EPAs through the SADC EPA Group; The other six members of the broader SADC political region – Democratic Republic of the Congo, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Zambia and Zimbabwe - are negotiating EPAs within other regional groups. 10 http://www.uneca.org/era2004/

market without ample preparation in advance (notwithstanding issues of regional partnerships

which would be overturned).

Out of the 49 African countries negotiating only a few signed bilateral interim agreements with

the EU to avoid any disruption in trade, most of them not least developed countries, unlike the

large majority of African countries11 which can currently switch from ACP trade preferences to

the EU’s ‘Everything but Arms’ (EBA) Initiative (Busse, 2010)12.

“While the EPA does not provide any gain in market access for [most] ACP countries

(they already have free market access to EU in the framework of EBA (Everything

But Arms arrangement), it restricts their policy space further”.

Shafaeddin, 2011

Flint (2008) notes that relationships, especially in regards to trade agreement negotiations, have

been notably ‘cooling’ since the signing of the Cotonou Partnership Agreement in 2000, and adds

that the new Economic Partnership Agreement framework is perceived as a ‘diktat’ rather than a

true partnership by many.

African countries have called for enhanced support capacities and financing if EPAs were to be

implemented, the EU however argues that such tools already exist and that the discussions

concerning their improvement are independent of EPA negotiations (United Nations Economic

Commission for Africa, 2007). The overlapping of memberships of African countries in various

RECs further complicates the negotiation process (ibid).

Tensions started crystallising in 2007 as the deadline approached, however, by November none

of the African regions were in a position to conclude a full EPA, so to safeguard market access

from 2008 onwards the European Commission requested interim agreements which could be

signed at regional, sub-regional or national level (Bilal et al., 2011).

State of Play by region:

West African nations, besides Ghana and Ivory Coast, are still in negotiations with the EU, lead

by ECOWAS13 and UEMOA (Union Economique et Monétaire Uest Africaine) with most

remaining countries being least-developed (expect Nigeria, as well as Cape Verde which is in a

transitional phase). Cameroon is the only country which signed (but not ratified) an interim EPA

out of the Central Africa region, which again is mainly composed of least-developed countries

11 39 of the world’s 49 least-developed countries (LDCs) are ACP countries, most of them in Africa. 12 In his article Busse also lists Ghana as one country which signed an interim EPA, the EC website however informs otherwise (simply initialled interim EPA, see: http://ec.europa.eu/trade/wider-agenda/development/economic-partnerships/negotiations-and-agreements/#_west-africa 13 Economic Community of West African States - ECOWAS http://www.ecowas.int/

benefiting from the EBA scheme, while countries like Gabon and Congo have not signed an

interim EPA as they are trading with the EU under its Generalised System of Preferences (GSP)14.

Six out of twelve countries in the Eastern and Southern region agreed to interim EPAs (all of

them members of COMESA), but only Mauritus, Seychelles, Zimbabwe and Madagascar signed

(not ratified). The members of the East African Community have only initialled a “framework”

or interim EPA, which still has not been signed or ratified. In the South African Development

Community (SADC) Botswana, Letotho, Swaziland and Mozambique have signed in 2009 while

Namibia has indicated that it is not ready to sign (non of the agreements have been ratified)15.

This overview demonstrates the difficulties the EC is facing trying to find agreements with

African nations as out of 49 only one country, the Seychelles, has signed and ratified an interim

EPA (up to 2012). No full EPA has been signed with any African nation, and most likely will not

be signed in the near future.

Sir John Kaputin, ACP Secretary General, notes “… I can describe the process towards initialing

[interim EPAs] as one fraught with panic, confusion and disagreements at the national and

regional level” (Trade Negotiations Insights, 2008).

“the meeting deplored the pressure being exerted by the European Commission on the

countries of West Africa region, especially the non-LDC countries, which is capable of

dividing the region and jeopardizing the regional integration process”

(Ministerial Committee of ECOWAS, 2007)

The reasons leading up to this difficult and turbulent singing of interim EPAs are many,

therefore the following section will provide a background and brief overview of most prominent

issues to set the stage of further analysis.

Alternative policy suggestions from developing countries have been regularly dismissed and

requests to examine alternatives to EPAs have not been taken seriously despite the EU’s legal

obligation to provide such Cotonou-equivalent alternatives under Article 37.6 of the Cotonou

Agreement (Curtis, 2010).

14 GSP exists since 1971 and allows exporters from developing countries to pay lower duties on some or all of exports into the EU, see: http://ec.europa.eu/trade/wider-agenda/development/generalised-system-of-preferences/ 15 The most up-to-date data on EPAs can be found http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2009/september/tradoc_144912.pdf and http://ec.europa.eu/trade/wider-agenda/development/economic-partnerships/negotiations-and-agreements/ Accessed [2012-05-09]

Meyn (2008) claims that in fact the EPA’s are not a ‘historic step’ or a ’partnership of equals’

between the EU and ACP countries, but instead describes this changing relationship as an

outcome of ‘asymmetric power relations’ in which the EU is using its coercive power and

displays its increasing neglect of ACP development concerns.

Originally the principal instrument of EU foreign policy was trade preferences, mostly aimed at

African former colonies – starting with the ex-colonies of founding members, France and

Belgium – extended to cover 77 countries under the ‘ACP arrangement’ with the entry of the UK

and Portugal in particular (Lamy, 2002). One of the reasons for this EPA driven retrogressive

development seems to be the expansion of the European Union, in which new member states

have no colonial ties and similar to the ACP countries, face development challenges themselves

while the ‘old guard’ is increasingly unwilling to promote ACP development (Meyn, 2008). The

financial crisis exacerbated the lack of monetary commitment towards development as Europe

struggles economically. The EU’s attitude towards the ACP is changing, with European

companies having only limited interested in the ACP, while the agricultural lobbies continue to

be strong and the preferences continue to erode (see CAP 2003) Meyn (2008).

Although EPAs were intended to create a WTO-compatible system of trade preferences between

the EU and ACP states, it is worthwhile to point out that all of the EPAs require ACP signatories

to make commitments which go beyond WTO disciplines (Matthews 2010).

Langan (2009) argues that the alleged novelties in the European Union’s agenda – the

prominent role of normative discourses and moralized concessions in the pursuit of ‘deep’

liberalization, cannot be seen as a change in any meaningful sense but rather must be seen as a

continuity with previous phases of the ACP-EU relationship and adds that recent EPA

negotiations have sought to complete the reforms begun by structural adjustment and to

consolidate market-opening in the few areas left to the policy discretion of the ACP states. In

fact, Langan calls the EU’s current claims as to having established a novel, progressive marriage

of markets and morals a hyperbole, and suggests that it is a left-over rhetorical staple from

relationship with their former colonies.

Gathii (2011) claims that bilateral trade agreements, such as the EPAs, are primary means to

greater investor protections, commodification of social services, guaranteed rights to investor

access to investment opportunities, privatization of public service goods, and generally the

diminution of sovereign control.

Other critics of the EU’s negotiating stance vis-à-vis the EPAs where listed by Storey (2011) as:

Allowing EU firms to bid for public works contracts by liberalization of public

procurement in the ACP countries, as well as prohibiting ACP governments to support or

priorities local contractors;

A push towards liberalization of all service sectors;

As well as ensuring ‘as favorable treatment’ to European firms as granted to local ACP

firms.

The European Commission itself published its communication on Trade, growth and

development – Tailoring trade and investment policy for those countries most in need in January,

2012, in which they propose concrete ways to enhance synergies between trade and

development policies to boost growth and jobs ‘in Europe and abroad’ and in ‘projecting EU

values and interests in the world’ (European Commission, 2012).

Borrmann and Busse (2007) are concerned with the precondition of institutional quality (e.g. in

form of good government regulations) to ensure that EPA’s are a tool for development, as the

vast majority of African countries have excessive regulation that hinders them from taking

advantage of trade, and reforms of such regulations pose an enormous policy challenge. They

fear that there will not be enough time to cope with the reforms, even if the aid delivery system

is improved (which is vital), given the low institutional quality in many APC countries, leading to

some countries being ready to sign an EPA while other within the same grouping are not (ibid).

The consensus among scholars that ‘institutions matter’ for development has led inexorable to

the conclusion that ‘history matters’ (as institutions form and evolve over time), yet (economic)

historians have not been involved enough in contemporary development of policies (Woolcock

et al., 2011). Rather philosophically Woolcock et al. (2011). describe the historians view of the

past as a flowing river of fluid and swirling potential with undercurrents, and compare a policy

intervention to pouring a dye into the flowing stream which joins, diffuses, gets diluted and may

or may not change the color of the water in its intended fashion, concluding that realistic policies

should start from the premise that the receiving society and its historical momentum are much

more powerful and important than the applied policies, as the latter only really have a chance to

succeed if they work with the flow and the momentum of the society’s history to encourage the

kinds of selective adaptations (ibid).

“If the study of history does nothing more than teach us humility, skepticism, and awareness

of ourselves, then it has done something useful”

Margaret Macmillan, 2009

Material based approach – show me the numbers

As discussed the EPAs were supposed to ‘pave the way’ for trade liberalization, with the benefit

to the consumers in developing countries as well as a chance for their companies to integrate in

the global supply chain.

“The problem is that life is messier and more complicated than economic theory”

Pascal Lamy (2002:1400)

As we are currently four and a half years behind schedule in regards to singing EPAs the

question remains why? Have the powers shifted between the African Nations and the European

Union, as the seeming lack of motivation of the former indicated? Africa’s real GPD per capita has

grown almost 4 % on average over this past decade, yet clearly the continent is still far far

behind Europe with a Gross Domestic Product of less than €1,040 compared to over €23,000

per capita in 2009 in the EU.

Per capita Gross Domestic Product at current prices in 2007, 2008 and 2009 (in EUR)

Source: European Commission; eurostat16

As Africa is a long way from being a hegemon the realist answer (which quite easily might be

applied to the European position) seems to be unusable to explain their shift in attitude. Yet the

neo-liberal focus on absolute gains might be useful. Has the previous dependence lost its

strength, either through the growth of Africa, or the growth of other international player that

have made alternatives more lucrative?

In fact Africa has been the world’s fastest growing region, averaging around 5 percent from

2000-2010 (IMF, 2011), enjoying sustained growth since the turn of the century, largely due to

the demand for its energy, mineral and other resources – BRIC countries such as China and India

16 Available: http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/statistics_explained/index.php?title=File:Per_capita_Gross_Domestic_Product_at_current_prices_in_2007,_2008_and_2009_%28in_EUR%29.PNG&filetimestamp=20110107131829 Accessed [2012-05-02]

contributing, as well as demand of land (also known as land grabs) especially from Gulf states

(Bilal et al., 2011).

“During the past decade, sub-Saharan African countries have increasingly started

exploiting new markets, marking what seems to be a historic reorientation of their trade

and investment toward new partners, including those within the region”

IMF, Regional Economic Outlook 2011

In 2007 Goodison wrote that Europe was more important for the African continent, and nearly

every single country in it, than any other international economic link. In 2008 China was already

the number one country of origin for imports into Africa (NB this is the case only because the

European nations are listed separately, rather than including Europe as a whole):

Source: African Statistical Yearbook (2010: 58)

The main export destination for 2008 was the United States with 20.3%, closely followed by

China with 9.7%.

Source: African Statistical Yearbook (2010: 58)

An aggregated look at trade between Africa with the US, EU and China over the past decade

exposes the growing influence of China, while the shares of the EU and US have been declining:

Share of ACO trade with main partners

Original Source: ITC Trade Map in Bilal et al. 2011: 59 (modified to see China in red

instead of white)

A more detailed overview of trading partners and shares is provided by the EC.

ACP countries (excluding South Africa) Main Trading Partners in 2010:

Source: European Commission17

Source: European Commission

Source: European Commission

The preeminence of Europe has prevailed as the top trading partner, but clearly options have

been extending as China has gained significantly in influence, while other BRICS such as India,

Brazil and South Africa are catching up as well.

17All statistics of bilateral relations are available: http://ec.europa.eu/trade/creating-opportunities/bilateral-relations/statistics/regions/#esa Accessed [2012-05-05]

A closer look at what makes up imports into the EU from APC countries reveals that the largest

share by far are mineral fuels , lubricants and related materials for 2011 (a total of 59.6%). Yet it

should be noted that from the EU view point these imports only constitute 8.4 percent.

Source: European Commission

Graphically displayed the imports (as coded in the table above) are the following:

Source: European Commission

The raw material initiative, launched in 2008 by the European Commission has been trying to

hone in on strategic important raw materials (e.g. ‘high tech’ metals like cobalt, rare earths,

platinum and titanium). In this context the EU has attempted to secure developing countries’

agreement to curb or ban the use of export taxes, restricting yet another resource for raising

revenue, develop and protect the environment (Curtis, 2010). A potential source of discontent?

The table below displays the exports of the EU into African countries

Source: European Commission

While the EU continues to be interested in Africa’s raw materials, especially mineral fuels, Africa

imports mostly machinery. Clearly many African countries continue to rely on export-led growth

focusing on extracting national resource rather than value addition and diversification, mirrored

in 80 percent of export earnings coming from primary, generally unprocessed commodities

(Africa Progress Report, 2011). It should be pointed out that the sustained growth of Africa has

been buoyed be the region’s oil exporting countries (such as Nigeria, Angola, Gabon, etc.),

leading to an unequal distribution of benefits from the improved terms of trade. With the

notable exceptions of Egypt, Tunisia and South Africa, where manufacturing and services

account for 83 per cent of combined GDP, non-extractive sectors and competitive industries

remain heavily under-developed in most African countries (ibid). Africa’s need for machinery

and transport equipment, so far is still mainly supplied by Europe, but with the financial crisis,

which slummed many European nations in recession, causing a European crisis on its own,

Africa might have more reason and need to reorientate themselves.

In sum, the trade numbers reveal Europe is still Africa’s most important trading partner, with

the US leading in terms of export destination, while China’s increasing importance is undeniable.

China’s activity on the continent dramatically increased over the past decade. Mohan and Power

(2008) caution against viewing China’s role in the context of competing and intensifying energy

politics only, but rather as opening up new choices for African development for the first time

since the neo-liberal turn of the 1980’s. A long term perspective is helpful, as the authors claim

that China-Africa relations are long standing and recent intervention builds on cold war

solidarities-in polemic at least (ibid).

Clearly, China’s involvement had not just benevolent but strategic qualities. In a more recent

efforts China constructed a series of official economic cooperation zones in Africa, officially

coined as a strategy of engagement in Africa as ‘mutual benefit’, in which market-based decision

and investment by Chinese companies are combined with support and subsidies from an Asian

‘development state’ (Bräutigam and Xiaoyang, 2011). China also concluded a large scale

investment of a $200m building (the tallest in the Ethiopian capital) evidently the new

headquarters of the African Union (AU). However, voices across the continent have seeped

through criticising the quality of work and at increased completion to local suppliers (for work

and products).

The IMF (2011) highlights that this increased reorientation of Africa towards new markets has

been fuelled through trade creation rather than trade diversion, as engagement with traditional

partners had continued to grow in recent years, however, slower than with new partners such

as Brazil, India and China have, as well as a substantial increase which occurred with partners of

Sub-Saharan Africa.

Another noteworthy variable is government debt, which seemingly was responsible for African

leaders folding under international pressures in the 80’s. For the region as a whole government

debt as a percentage of GDP has improved dramatically within this last decade, decreasing from

a median of 55 percent (in 2004) to 35 percent in 2010 (IMF, 2011). In the African Statistical

Yearbook of 2011 external debt is listed to have decreased from 55 percent (in 2000) to 20

percent in 2010. Either way, the numbers confirm a ‘freeing’ (or at least loosening) of the

continent from the tied grip of debt burden.

Another material aspect of potential discontent in EPA negotiations is the lack of consideration

and coordination toward existing regional trade zones, accompanied with the European

expectation of EPA’s taking precedent over previously established ties.

Lesotho and South Africa for example are part of SACU (Southern African Customs Union) with

Botswana and Swaziland. Lesotho signed the IEPA18 particularly because it stood to benefit from

the rules of origin for clothing, textiles, and sugar that are more favourable in the IEPA than what

they have as alternative trade arrangement, while South Africa already has a free trade

agreement with the EU since 1999 (acting as a monitoring country throughout negotiations),

feels no compulsion to conclude a new one (Draper and Khumalo, 2009). Countries such as

18 Interim Economic Partnership Agreement

Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland (BLS) are keen on diversifying trade away from the

dependence of South Africa’s embrace, requiring a liberalisation of trade, while South Africa

favours a sector-based industrial policy incorporating potential tariff increases, a renewed

emphasis on state-owned enterprises in network services sectors, and a retention of policy

space (ibid).

“The signing of the IEPA by three out of the five SACU members threatens the functioning

and, possibly, the very existence of the SACU”

Le Roux, 2009

Considering that 60% of Lesotho’s state revenue is earned through the SACU revenue-sharing

arrangement economists in the region estimate this already poor country could lose up to 25

percent of its GDP overnight in case the EPA is implemented (Le Roux, 2009).

The same region is known as the Southern African Development Community (SADC) for the

purpose of EPA negotiations with the EU19, which leads to what Goodison calls a “fragmentation

of existing regional integration schemes” (Goodison, 2005: 172), and the memberships of SADC,

whose roots go back as far as 1980, have been split be the EPA negotiation process (ibid).

Agreeing upon a common exclusion list20 within regional grouping is difficult since ACP

countries have different priorities and sectors they wish to protect from import competition and

to preserve for the generation of tariff revenues (Karinig and Deotti, 2009). If Kenya for example

does not liberalize flour while Ethiopia removes all duties, traders may circumvent Kenya’s

restrictions by transporting cheap goods imported from the EU across the border from Ethiopia,

leading to the requirement of rigorous boarder controls which would have to differentiate

between goods originating regionally and goods originating from the EU (ibid).

Clearly this lack of coherence between EPA agendas and the regional integration processes in

Africa poses large obstacles, exacerbated by the difference in membership of the EPA groups to

that of the regional economic communities, causing difficulties in the harmonization of

liberalization schedules21 and product exclusions lists.

While free trade agreements with regional organizations of developing countries reflect a

concept of integration into the world economy for the EU, who simply regards these as means of

19 For a complete list of countries see: http://ec.europa.eu/trade/wider-agenda/development/economic-partnerships/negotiations-and-agreements/#_sadc 20 List of imports from the EU which are excluded from the liberalization commitments under the EPA 21 Liberalization schedules clarify from when one and over what time period tariffs have to be reduced to zero.

trade liberalization under the WTO rules, their partners have a different conceptions (as it

involves increasing industrial production and exports of manufactures products (Robles, 2008).

As Shaw et al. (2009) point out global power dynamics are undergoing a reordering process,

with China, India, Brazil and Russia increasingly taking prominent roles, including their

approach to Africa. The BRICS mix of soft power, public diplomacy, direct investment and

private sector partnership of south-south cooperation cannot be explained by strict macro-

economic explanations, but apparently by shared common goals to advance their respective

national economies and enhancing their diplomatic status (ibid).

The material based explanation deliver one piece of the puzzle, yet as Europe is still the most

important trading partner the shifting attitudes of African nations seem to be influences by more

complex developments. Is Europe’s old power abating, and are African leaders using their

chance to re-define their role directly through the EPA negotiations?

Idea based approach – a role replacement for African nations

Over the decades GATT/WTO has furnished various ‘negotiation rounds’ to achieve multilateral

trade liberalization and while the first seven of these negotiation rounds (lasting from 1947-

1979) were mostly about tariffs developing countries, especially African nations, only played a

marginal role to the extent that they participated and campaigned for special treatment, e.g.

preferential access to the rich countries’ markets at tariff rates below those applied to other

countries (Stiglitz and Charlton, 2005). GATT was promoted and supported by the United States,

and its willing quasi-hegemonic allies in Western Europe, because under the GATT’s consensus

rule its own power was maximized (Bilal et al., 2011)22. Powerful players like the European

Union could better absorb the cost of denying consensus and find more ways to exert pressure

in order to reach consensus (ibid). As the developing nations had asked for preferential

treatment, evading obligations based on Article XVIII, and were not unified in their claims,

bargaining power was meagre and developing countries were marginalized within the

substantive negotiations (Stiglitz and Charlton, 2005). African nations were relegated to a

passive or defensive role within the trade negotiations, refraining from significant engagement,

if they where members in the first place and had representation in Geneva.

In the Lagos plan of action for economic development of Africa (LPA) in 1980 the Organization of

African Unity (OAU) was already dissatisfied with the development of their continent over the

past 20 years up to 1980 and determined “to adopt a far-reaching regional approach based

22 GATT members operated on the basis of a negative consensus rule, which means that unless a member objected decision consensus was assumed (Bilal et al., 2011)

primarily on collective self-reliance” (OAU, 1980:4). The overdependence of African economies

on the export of raw material and minerals with detrimental effects on the continent’s interest

was established. Debate, and often disagreement, between African leaders and international

financial institutions, which had a hold on the continent due to its high ineptness23 caused

conflict over the causes of underdevelopment and solutions to the crisis –the latter usually

prevailed. The International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank and other neoliberals, were

of the conviction that the extant political and economic arrangements in Africa were responsible

for the slow rate of development (Owusu, 2003). Opposition to neoliberal policies by African

leaders gradually eroded over the years, evident by the widespread adoption of structural

adjustment programs24 (SAPs) in the 1980’s, mostly due to the desperation for funds by African

leaders as debt servicing began taking heavy tolls, which lead to an abandonment of LAP and the

adaptation of SAPs (which were a prerequisite for receiving further loans and aid). By the end of

the 80’s Africa’s role seemed to have been relegated to a mere receiver – of loans and instruction

on how to run their economies.

An unexpectedly strong and frank critic emerged when James Wolfensohn, then president of the

World Bank, addressed the Board of Governors, to admit that the Bank’s policies had

contributed to the (financial) crisis25, but also pointed to The Other Crisis, which created “dark,

searing images of desperation, hopelessness and decline”(Wolfensohn, 1998:2). He added that

“Development is not about adjustment … Development is about putting all26 the component

parts in place – together and in harmony (Wolfenshohn, 1998: 11), and charged the Bank to

include social, political, environmental, and cultural aspects of society to create a more balances

development. A few months later the World Bank adopted a new approach which was called the

Comprehensive Development Framework (CDF) and signaled a shift away from the donor-led

development assistance strategy to the development of strategies led by countries themselves

(Owusu, 2003). Could the admission of mistakes from within ‘their’ rows have been an

inspiration and rejuvenation of African self-confidence?

23 Africa’s foreign debts rose from $9.02 billion in 1970 to $49.6 billion in 1978 and ballooning for $140 billion by 1982, fondad, 1992, Available: http://www.fondad.org/uploaded/African%20Debt%20Revisited/African%20Debt%20Revisited-Chapter%20I.pdf Accessed [2012-05-03] 24 Structural adjustment policies were largely based on the report published by the World Bank’s, written by Elliot Berg, titled “Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan Africa: an agenda for action” (also known as the Berg report, 1981), in which he outlined the need for market-orientated policies, reduce the role of the state as. corruption, mismanagement and failed domestic policies (among others) were identified as issues that need to be resolved. Berg’s diagnosis of Africa’s problems and solutions were in direct opposition to the LPA. 25 The crisis he referred to during the time was mainly the financial crisis in East Asia. 26 The paragraph above all read: “ … building the orads, empowering the people, writing the laws, recognizing the women, eliminating the corruption, educating the girls, building the banking systems, protecting the environment, inoculating the children” (Wolfensohn, 1998:11)

The passage from the GATT to the WTO (in 1995) marked the turning point in participation and

representation of developing countries in general, but consensus became harder to reach among

the growing number of nations with less accepting views, and interests of their own (Bilal et al.,

2011). However, for developing countries it was an opportunity to come out of the fringes, shed

their mostly defensive pre-Uruguay round position and become new willing participatories

(ibid).

Other critical voices continued to accumulate also from large, established international

organization such as the United Nations, which stated in their 1999 Human Development Report

(HDR):

“When the market goes too far in dominating social and political outcomes, the

opportunities and rewards of globalization spread unequally and inequitably -

concentrating power and wealth in a select group of people, nations and corporations,

marginalizing the others.”

Human Development Report (1999: 16)

The HDR of 1999 also called for a focus on people, not profits, and was selected for a noteworthy

speech by the South African President Thabo Mbeki, who chose to highlight ‘ethics, equity,

inclusion, human security, sustainability and development’ during the 35th Ordinary session of

the OAU in 1999, while mentioning the need for regional and continental as well as global co-

operation and integration (Mbeki, 1999).

1999 was also the year that exposed many in developed countries to the injustices intensified by

globalization, as well as the first global showing of support and solidarity to the people in

developing countries who carry the heaviest burden of the ‘free market’ system, when

protesters on the street of Seattle (also known as the ‘Battle in Seattle’) greeted the participating

member of the World Trade Organization ministerial conference.

African leaders worked on a new strategy themselves, the New Partnership for Africa’s

Development (NEPAD) which was adopted unanimously by the OAU at its summit in 2001,

however, promoted by African leaders sympathetic to Western ideas27 as it represented an

endorsement of neoliberalism (Owusu, 2003). An important step nonetheless.

This was also the end of the cold war, giving African nations time to focus on themselves,

accompanied by a gradual decline of French support for selected African rulers and a rise of

multi-party democracy.

27 Supporters included former Presidents Thabo Mbeki of South Africa, Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria ,Abdelaziz Bouteflika of Algeria and President Abdoulaye Wade of Senegal.

African leader such as President Wade of Senegal, Obasanjo of Nigeria, and Bouteflika of Algeria,

who were strongly supported the NEPAD were even invited to speak in 2002 at the G8 Summit,

traditional reserved for member states.

The amalgamation of support for African nations from various actors around the globe must

have had a strong influence of their perception of their role and understand of power when

united. The Doha Development Round with in Ministerial Conference in 2001 is widely seen as

the turning point for LDC participation, which has steadily grown with very limited

participation under the GATT rule (almost no submission of official statements) towards

preparation of statements by nearly all attending members (especially since the Seattle

Ministerial) (Dicaprio and Trommer, 2009).

Based on the aforementioned authors the following table was compiled to displace attendance

and official submission to ministerial meetings (1973-2005):

Total LDC

Memebers*28

LDC Member Attending Ministerial

LDC Memebers Sumbitting a

Statement

Tokyo (1973) 34 20 2

Uruguay (1986) 34 21 5

Singapore (1996) 30 28 16

Geneva (1998) 30 29 12

Seattle (1999) 30 28 21

Doha (2001) 30 29 29

Cancun (2003) 30 29 24

Hong Kong (2005) 32 31 27

Source: based on Dicaprio and Trommer, 2009: 1611; Table 2

Dicaprio and Trommer (2009) focus on the role of Least Developed Countries (LCD)29 in the

EPA negotiations, of which 33 are in Africa, and point out that the LDCs that have not yet

completed EPAs may be able to influence the institutional design in a way that favors their

interests, since solidarity among the LCD’s has made great strides in the international trade

regime.

28 *Membership is defined for the GATT era as those who apply the rules for the institution. 29 Updated list of LDC available: http://www.unohrlls.org/en/ldc/25/ Accessed [2012-05-05]

With this overview of potential development as a background, the next section will examine

statements from the African nations in regards to the EPAs.

The African Union’s expressed their ‘profound disappointment at the stance taken’ by the

European Commission negotiators in regards to the lack of development content in the proposed

agreement in the Nairobi Declaration on Economic Partnership Agreements in 2006. The AU

‘urged’ the negotiating partners to adequately address supply side constraints, infrastructure

bottlenecks, and adjustment costs in the agreement, while bearing in mind that trade

liberalization may not lead to economic development. Furthermore it was noted that market

access opening initiatives (e.g. through the Everything but Arms initiative)30 have been

significantly undermined by health, sanitary and phytosanitary, technical and market standards

maintained by the EU partners, where many of the EU standards go beyond what would

legitimately be appropriate (therefore urging the EU to introduce appropriate control over

standard setting undertaken by market-based non-governmental organizations).

Complying with EU market standards is one of the biggest challenges for least developing

countries’

Prudence Sebahizi, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation31

quoted by the European Commission (2011)

The Nairobi Declaration also stresses that the EPA agreements should be consistent with the

objectives and process of economic integration in Africa (in accordance with the Constitutive

Act of the African Union and the Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community).

In its Short Background Brief on Economic Partnership Agreement the African Union stated in

2007 that their concerns, which were clearly set out in both the Cairo (2005) and Nairobi (2006)

Declarations on EPAs, have not been adequately addressed including: the lack of development

focus of the negotiations, the imbalance in the negotiations towards trade liberalization, as well

as the lack of appreciation of the major adjustment challenges that African economies would face

when implementing EPAs. Furthermore the African Union mentions that the pace of negations

have been greatly slowed down by the time it takes for the EU to respond to issues that are

formally presented to it. 30 The Everything But Arms (EBA) initiative was started in 2001 to ‚fully open‘ the EU market to LDCs without any tariffs or quotas . 31 In European Commission Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs), African, Caribbean and Pacific Voices

Speak up for Trade and Development, 2011: available at

http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2011/october/tradoc_148327.pdf

In their more recent Declaration (Kigali Declaration on Economic Partnership Agreement

Negotiations, November 2010) based on the meeting of Ministers of Trade of the Member States

of the African Union, they recall the objectives set for EPAs in the Cotonou Partnership

Agreement (CPA) highlighting the goal of achieving sustainable development and eradication of

poverty, reinforcement of ACP countries’ regional integration initiatives, and the gradual

integration of the countries into the global economy. Moreover they point to the significant

amount of resources (human and financial, time) the EPA negotiations have cost, yet there is a

disappointing loss of dynamism and lack of progress in resolving the differences on a number of

contentious issues. Deep concern is expressed about the pressure exerted by the European

Commission on some countries and regions to sign the interim EPAs, undermining the progress

made in the negotiation process, and ultimately the African Union requests to consider other

alternative trade regimes to EPAs that will provide equivalent market access conditions to

African non-LDCs, as has always been the understanding in the Cotonou Partnership Agreement,

if the EU Party is unable to give further concessions to African countries on the contentious

issues that would make EPAs an acceptable instruments of development (AU, 2010).

Andrew Kumbatira, MEJN32 Executive Director, was quoted saying the following in regard to

signing an EPA in 2011: "It is likely to have significantly negative effects on Malawi's trade with

other countries in the region and undermine ongoing regional integration processes. An EPA

also threatens to lead to the loss of tariff revenue and to cause significant adjustment costs,"

(Ngozo 2011).

ECOWAS and the EU met in November of 2011 in Accra, Ghana to continue EPA negotiations,

which resulted yet in more disappointment due to ‘divergent views’33 on the development

dimension, while Deputy Chairperson of the African Union (AU) Commission, Erastus Jarnalese

Onkundi Mwencha said:

‘Our advantage is regional integration. Can EPA help us to integrate our markets? If

anything it will stall us. I don’t think EPA is a priority for Africa’34

(Ghana Business News, December 5 2011, Economic Partnership Agreement not a priority for

Africa – AU)35

Furthermore the article in the Ghana Business News states that:

32 Malawi Economic Justice Network 33 ECOWAS Meets On Economic Partnership Agreement 35 http://www.ghanabusinessnews.com/2011/12/05/economic-partnership-agreement-not-a-priority-for-africa-%E2%80%93-au/

‘The goals of cooperation and integration have been highly sought-after by African nations

since their independence, and high hopes have been evoked that African countries will

enlarge their economic space for production and trading among themselves, quite apart

from enabling them to rise to the challenge of an increasingly competitive global economy

that includes powerful regional economic blocs’,

and further notes African economies have been structured under the intention to produce and

export raw materials – only. The African Union seems to be stern on developing added value and

pursue industrialization, if need be among themselves.

The African Unions 18th Ordinary Session in January 2012 in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia was hence

appropriately titled: Boosting Intra-African Trade.

Meanwhile the MEP (Member of the European Parliament) and MP from the ACP states met in

November 2011 in Togo, in which the Commission emphasized that proposed amendments were

not an ‘attempt to bully our partners into signing EPAs’ and that they were trying to avoid that

the proposal becomes a ‘gun to the head’ to pressure ACP countries into ratifying imperfect

EPAs’ (Dalleau, 2011).

Bayart (2004: 454) provides a counter-argument, claiming that the enlargement of the EU (to

Central and Eastern Europe) caused the ‘devaluation’ of Africa, and adds that African states had

often been a source of great frustration to Brussels, therefore bearing their own share of

responsibility for Europe’s loss of enthusiasm. However, he also warns about the ‘dangers of

decay’ as political revolutions, that would have transformed African nations to productive

textured societies, were blocked by an EU recommended neoliberal economic revolution as they

tolerated the perpetuation or restoration of authoritarian regimes. Bayart (2004) concludes that

Europeans problem is of philosophical and cultural nature, as they continue to relegate Africa to

the classic categories of barbarism ‘or to the Newspeak of ‘development’, ‘the elimination of

poverty’ or humanitarian aid’ (2004: 458).

And while the EU likes to see itself as the biggest aid donor and trading partner for LCDs, they

seem to be viewed in a much more critical light. Fioramonti and Poletti (2008) conducted a

comprehensive study on how the societies of the emerging powers of Brazil, India and South

Africa perceive the European Union, which offers important insight into how the EU is perceived

in the developing world, and found (across the three countries) that issues such as free trade,

non-tariff barriers and agricultural subsidies produce an image of ‘an actor that perpetuates

Western domination’ (2008: 178). The authors see a significant gap between how the EU

perceives and portrays itself (i.e. ‘a different global actor’, ‘a global normative power’, permeated

by values such as solidarity, sustainable development, human rights promotion – all very

common in the its rhetoric), and warn that the actual international image has the potential to

challenge its ‘legitimacy’ as a political system. More importantly their article raises serious

questions about the consistency and credibility of the EU as a ‘different’ global actor (ibid).

“...the European Commission negotiators don’t seem to have shared the same

understanding as the African negotiators on key issues”.

Karinig and Deotti, 2009:6, on negotiations of interim EPAs

The EU and ACP countries have seemingly arrived at the negotiation tables with differing

interpretations of the development component of the EPAs (see also Karinig and Deotti, 2009;

Katjavivi, 2007; Meyn, 2008)

Conclusion

As this paper attempted to show, Africa’s role is changing, as the actions of the developing

countries as a whole are slowly breaking down power asymmetries, with the consequence of

increasing their self-confidence that gives rise to the demand of equal inclusion.

The disappointing loss of dynamism and lack of progress during the EPA negotiations have a

plethora of reasons. Material based explanations, as well as idea based approaches can enrich

and expand our understanding of this shift.

Increasing engagement between the emerging powers such as BRIC nations with the African

continent, providing new choices, the increasing unwillingness of the ‘old guard’ to promote ACP

development, the lack of monetary commitment towards development exacerbated by the

financial crisis, as well as increasing international support from civil societies, and surprising

critics from the World Bank all have contributed to the new role of Africa. To be more certain

what the precise causal variables are, and understanding the mechanism behind changing roles

in trade negotiations, further research will be necessary.

Yet, it has become clear that business as usual is no longer an option.

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