RepresentingNon-HumanInterests

AlfonsoDonosoInstitutodeCienciaPolíticaPonticiaUniversidadCatólicadeChile

ForthcominginEnvironmentalValuesAcceptedMarch2016

Abstract:

In environmental ethics, legal and political representation of non-humans is a widespread

aspiration. Its supporters see representative institutions that give voice to non-humans’

interests as a promising strategy to respond toworldwide illegitimate exploitation of non-

human beings. In this article I engage critically with those who support this form of

representationandaddresstwo issuescentral toanyaccountconcernedwiththe legaland

political representationofnon-human livingbeings:whatshouldberepresented?andwhat

aretheconditionsofsucharepresentation?TheanswersIprovidetothesequeriescountas

a first step towards a comprehensive account of the institutional representation of non-

humannature.

Keywords:

Environmental ethics, non-human interests, political representation, biocentrism,

individualism

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RepresentingNon-HumanInterests

1.Introduction

Representation of non-humans in court, parliament, and other institutions reflects the

(generally)recurrenthumantendencytoenlargeitslegalandpoliticalconstituencies.Thisis

an idea with some history in legal and political thought that theorists have defended by

appealing,amongotherthings,totherights,moralstanding,andnon-instrumentalvalueof

atleastsomenon-humans.Legalandpoliticalrepresentationofnon-humansalsostandsasa

response to environmental challenges that need to be addressed through new forms of

governance.Iftheyaregoingtobeeffectivelytackled,thedegradationofglobalcommons,

trans-boundarypollution,andvariouswidely sharednationalenvironmental threats require

collectiveactionthatchallengestraditionaldomesticandanthropocentricgovernance.

Christopher Stone’s “Should trees have standing?” (1972) is a seminal piece in the

recenthistoryofthelegalrepresentationofnon-humans.Itarguesthatforests,oceansand

othernaturalentitiescanhavelegalrights,shouldcountjurally,andcouldberepresentedin

court.AndrewDobson(1996)offersanotherexemplaryversionofthisidealbydefendingthe

representation by proxy of the interests of non-human animals’ constituencies. Robert

Goodin(1996), inturn,appealstoaprincipleofequalprotectionof intereststodefendthe

claim that natural objects are as deserving of protection and representation as are the

interests of humans. In a similar spirit, Robyn Eckersley (1999, 2004) has argued for the

recognition of nature’s interests and the constitutional entrenchment of an environmental

precautionaryprinciple,whilstTineStein (1998)hasproposed thecreationofanEcological

Council empowered todelay legislation if this is required toprotect theenvironment from

seriousharm.Thesearejustafewexamplesofthediversityofviewsfavouringtheexpansion

of legal andpolitical constituencies to includenon-humannature as a significant sourceof

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moralandpoliticalobligation.Theseare,inotherwords,attemptstouselegalandpolitical

representationasapowerfulmechanismagainsttheillegitimateexploitationanddepletionof

thenaturalworldandtheorganismsthatconstituteit.

Thesevariousvoices,however,donotspeakunivocally.Manytensionsexistbetween

these proposals and it is unclear towhat extent their various efforts can be articulated to

reachacoherentbasisfortheinstitutionalizationofthelegalandpoliticalrepresentationof

non-humanorganisms.InthisarticleIlookatsomeoftheseproposalsasafirststeptowards

themoregeneralprojectofofferingaunifiedviewoftherepresentationofthe interestsof

non-human beings. Thus, the primary purpose I pursue in this article is not to present a

defenceofnon-anthropocentriclegalandpoliticalrepresentationofthenaturalworldagainst

the standpoint of anthropocentric theory. My goal here is much humbler: this article

constitutesaninternalcritiqueofsomeaspectsofnon-anthropocentrictheory,andmyfinal

aimistoofferacoherentaccountofthelegalandpoliticalrepresentationoftheinterestsof

non-human organisms that may be persuasive to those who already recognise the moral

statusofnon-humanmembersofthenaturalworld.

The article has threemain parts. In section two I offer a summary account of the

interests of non-human organisms that follows Gary Varner’s psycho-biological theory of

interests. This is a non-anthropocentric approach which will lead me in the subsequent

sections to address two questions central to any account concerned with the legal and

politicalrepresentationoftheliving:whatshouldberepresentedandwhataretheconditions

ofsuchrepresentation.Thefirstquestionisaddressedinpartthree,whereIuseaBurkean

theory of representation to argue that the representation of non-human organisms is

adequatelyconceivedofastherepresentationofunattachedinterests,thatis,intereststhat

canbeidentifiedindependentlyofthementalstatesanddesiresoftheorganismsthathave

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them.Thesecondquestionisconsideredinpartfour,whereIexploreprinciplesthatprovide

guidance to resolve conflicts between human and non-human interestswithin a genuinely

non-anthropocentricframework.

2.TheInterestsoftheLiving

Let me start by unveiling a fundamental premise of my argument: legal and political

representationisowednotonlytohumanconstituenciesbutalsotonon-humanones.Thisis

notanewideaandforawhiletheoristsconcernedwiththewellbeingofnon-humananimals

havedevelopeditwithincreasingsophistication.1AsIdefendit,agroundingelementofthis

premise is thatat least somenon-humananimalshave interestsand these interestsareas

deservingof representationas the interestsofhumans. This assumption,of course, is not

self-evidentandsomedeemitdeeplyproblematicpartlybecauseitenlargesthenumberand

kindofinterestbearersinawaythatseemsmorallyinappropriate.

Thesedoubtsnotwithstanding,atthebasisofthisarticlethereisanevenstrongerand

thus more contentious idea. I not only maintain that individual non-human animals are

interestbearers,butthatindividualnon-humanlivingbeingshaveintereststhatdeservelegal

andpoliticalrepresentation.InwhatfollowsIadvanceaplausiblearticulationofthisradical

idea that will lead me later to address key questions on the institutionalisation of the

representationoftheinterestsoftheliving.

Legal and political representation is closely connected with the idea of relevant

interests,thatis,interestswhosedisrespectwrongstheindividualthathasthem;ifsomeone

demandslegalorpoliticalrepresentationitisbecauseshehasinterestswhoseprotectionor

advancement would be favoured by such representation. Indeed, because an important

1FortworecentexamplesseeGarner2013andDonaldsonandKymlicka2013.

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rationale forhaving legalandpolitical institutions is to institutionaliseappropriate formsof

respectforindividuals,relevantinterestsareatthebasisoflegalandpoliticalrepresentation.

As I shall show, with some adjustments this intimate link between representation and

relevantinterestscanalsoholdfornon-humans,whoareincapableofdemandingtheformer.

Theideathatnon-humansdeserverepresentationdependsonthefactthattheyhave

moralstanding,whichinturnhingesontherecognitionofnon-humansasbearersofrelevant

interests. More formally, the argument for the legal and political representation of non-

humanswouldstatethat:

i. xhasmoralstandingifandonlyifxhasrelevantinterests.

ii. Ifxhasrelevantinterests,thenxdeserveslegalandpoliticalrepresentation.

iii. Non-humanshaverelevantinterests.

Therefore,

iv. Non-humanshavemoralstanding

and

v. Non-humansdeservelegalandpoliticalrepresentation.

Premises (i) and (ii) follow rather easily from shared understandings. Generally, wrongly

interfering with someone’s interests counts as a regrettable act calling for moral

condemnation,andadvancingsomeone’sinterestsor,lessdemandingly,notinterferingwith

those interests, isat thebasisofmorallypraiseworthyorpermissibleaction. Furthermore,

legalandpoliticalrepresentationoughttoservethoseentitieswerecogniseashavingmoral

standingbyprotecting(atleastsomeof)theirinterests.Thus,havingsomekindofinterests–

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relevantinterests–isbothanecessaryandasufficientconditionforanentity’shavingmoral

standing.2

Premise (iii) of theargument requires furtherelaboration. To substantiate the idea

that non-humanshave relevant interests, think about the link between interest in general,

moral standing, andwrongful action. Simplyput, you canonlywrongorganisms thathave

moralstandingandthemoralstandingofanorganismSentailsthatSismorallyconsiderable

anddeserves“themostbasicformsofpracticalrespect”(seeGoodpaster1978,309).Now,

towrongSistoproduceasetbackinaparticularclassofS’sinterests.Thisclassofinterestsis

whatIhavecalledrelevantinterests,thatis,interestswhosedisrespectwrongstheorganism

thathasthem.3Animplicationofthisisthatanentitywithnorelevantinterestsisanentity

thatcannotbewronged(seegenerallyFeinberg1987).Relevantinterestsarethuscrucialto

determinethetypeofentitiesthataremorallyconsiderable.

This reasoning makes it is easy to defend that non-human animals are morally

considerablebecausewecanidentifyactionsthatsetbacktheirinterestsandcanthuswrong

them. But notice that my non-anthropocentric position is a version of individualist

biocentrism, so I defend the view that not only conscious animals but also individual non-

2Thisisthecaseeventhoughthemoralstandingofanorganismcannotbealwaysreducedtoitshavingrelevant

interests.Suchisthecaseofhumanbeings,whosemoralstandingissometimesarticulatednotonlyintermsof

their having relevant interests but also, for example, on their acting virtuously or having an experience of

themselves.3Put differently, the adjective ‘relevant’marks the recognition, andunderlines theexistence, of non-relevant

interests,thatis,intereststhatifleftunsatisfieddonotwrongtheorganismthathasthem.Ausualexampleofa

non-relevantinterestistheinterestathiefhasinbreakingintoahouse.Anexampleofabiologically-basednon-

relevant interest is,perhaps,andassuggestedbyananonymousreviewerofthis journal,the interesthumans

haveinsatisfyingtheirreproductivefunctions.

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consciouslivingorganismsaremorallyconsiderable.4Thismeansthattheremustbeawayto

wrongnotonlyanimals,butalsoatreeinaforest,thecactiinthedesert,oranyothernon-

sentientorganismsofthelivingworld.Sincewehaveastrongdutynottowrongothers,and

wecanonlywrongentitiesthathaveinterests,myclaimthatnon-sentientorganismscanbe

wrongedrequiresprovidinganaccountoftheinterestsofthistypeoforganisms.

In my view, a relevant interest φ of x is an interest whose satisfaction generates

intrinsicvalue,thatis,generatesastateofaffairsthatisvaluableand,therefore,deservingof

respect,independentlyoftheinterestsothersdifferentfromxmayhaveinthesatisfactionof

φ. Thus,aninterestφ isarelevantinterestifandonlyifthesatisfactionofφbringsabouta

betterworld–becausemorevalueisactualised–thanonewhereφisnotsatisfiedevenifin

thatworldnooneelsehasaninterestinφ.Doesthisunderstandingofinterestapplytonon-

sentientorganisms?

Considerthefollowingscenario.Imaginethatyouareontheearthandthatmillions

oflightyearsawaytherearetwoplanets.Thefirstonehasnolifeinit(itresemblesahuge

asteroidinorbitaroundastar)andthesecondoneisthesameasthefirstoneexceptthatit

contains a forest, and nothing else. Additionally, imagine you were forced by a perverse

demon to eliminate one of these twoplanets through a powerful laser activated from the

earth.Theplanetsaremillionsoflightyearsaway,soneitheryounoranyoneelsecanmake

4Inmyview,theoriesthatendorseanarrowercriterionofmoralstandingdrawanarbitrarylinebetweenwhat

isandwhatisnotmorallyconsiderable.Istherereallysomethinginbeingrationalthatmakesirrationalbeings

(includingyounghumans,thementallyill,andmostnon-humananimals)notmorallyconsiderable?Or,isthere

something in being sentient that should lead us to conclude that non-sentient beings (including humans in

vegetative states and the vegetal kingdom)havenomoral standingat all? I thinknopositive answer canbe

provided to these questionswithout, at the same time, falling into undesirable forms of “chauvinist” (Sylvan

1973)or“monstrouslymegalomaniacal”formsofargumentation(Wood1998,203).Ofcourse,thisisnottosay

that any two morally considerable entities are always equally significant. For this crucial distinction see

Goodpaster1978.ForotherformsofbiocentrismseeSchweitzer1923,Attfield1983,Taylor1986.

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useoforbenefitfromanyofthetwoplanets.Moreover,theexplosionoftheplanet,youare

certain,willhavenoeffectwhatsoeverontheearthoronanyotherknownplanet.Indeed,

thedestructionofeitherofthemwon’tdiminishinanywaythewellbeingofpresentorfuture

generationsofhumans.Underthesecircumstances,whichoneofthesetwoplanetsshould

youdestroy?

The biocentric tradition takes it that there are moral reasons not to destroy the

secondplanetwhilewehavenoreasonnottodestroythefirstone.Accordingtotheformof

biocentrismIendorse,therightreasonsnottodestroythesecondplanetarerelatedtothe

recognitionofthemoralstandingofthetreesoftheforest,whichconstrainourdecisionand

determine what counts as a right action under the circumstances. In my view, such

recognition depends on the plausibility of assigning some form of relevant interest to the

trees of the forest. This is surely contentious; traditional theories associate interestswith

organismscapableofexperienceandcomplexmentalstates,nothingofwhichisrecognisable

inthetreesoftheforest(e.g.,Feinberg1974,52-3).HowcanIthengroundmyclaimabout

thereasonsnottodestroythesecondplanet?

Gary Varner has defended a non-conventional theory of interests that recognises

interests innon-consciousorganisms. Theconventionalposition–themental-statestheory

of interests – maintains that interests depend on the presence of mental states such as

desires;anentity’sdesire,actualorhypothetical,isinthisviewpivotaltothedetermination

of an interest. However, Varner has argued that this approach is problematic because in

identifying all interests with desires, it “leaves out a familiar but fundamentally biological

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senseofwhatone’sinterestsare”(Varner1998,58).Ithinkweshouldtakethissuggestion

seriously.5

Varner’s crucial contribution is the recognition that, unlike what the mental-states

theorycanexplaininvariouscases,anentityxcanhavearelevantinterestwithouthavingat

thesametimeadesire–orothermentalstate–tosatisfythis interest. Crucially, interests

extendbeyondmental states to includebiological needs and functions. Thus, in the same

wayasa19thcenturymarinerhadaninterestinadailydoseofascorbicacidtorecoverfrom

scurvywithoutknowingordesiringascorbicacid,anon-consciousorganism–e.g.,atree in

our second planet’s forest – has an interest in the fulfilment of its biological needs and

functionswithoutdesiringsuchthings(seeVarner1998,60).Thecrucialpointisthatthefull

setof relevant interests isnot reducible todesiresoranyothermentalorcognitive states,

andanorganismcanhavearelevantinterestφwithouthavingadesiretofulfilφ.

Thismightseemtooquick.6Fromthepreviousparagraphsomeonecould infer that

the interestsorganismshaveare those that theywouldhave if theyhadmental statesand

wereawareoftheir interests:thesailorwouldhavehadthedesireforascorbicacidhadhe

knownaboutitsefficacyinfendingoffscurvy.Putdifferently,thesailorhasthatinterest‘all

thingsconsidered’.Thescepticalcriticcouldthenarguethatthefactthatanorganismhasno

5NoticethatVarnerhasdesistedfromhiscriticismofthementalstatetheory(seeVarner2003).Henowthinks

that an externalist account of individuals’ well-being can accommodate the interests of non-human animals

withouthavingto introducenon-conscious,biological interests. However,as itwillbeseen intheparagraphs

thatfollow,myargumentisnotconcernedwithwhetherornotthementalstatetheoryismistaken,butrather

with the plausibility of the idea of non-conscious living organisms (animals or not) having relevant interests.

Thus,whetherornotthementalstatetheoryerrsisnotespeciallyrelevantforthepointIammaking.Thanksto

ananonymousreviewerofEnvironmentalValuesformakingmetoaddressthisissue.6IamthankfultoAlejandraMancillaforputtingpressureonthispoint.

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mentalstatesisamorallyrelevantfactthatunderminestheclaimatthecentreofthepsycho-

biologicaltheory.

To respond to these doubts, consider an example adapted from one provided by

Varnerhimself(Varner1998,59-60). Islay,mydog,seemstohaveastrongdesiretochase

tennisballs,evenifchasingtheminvolvescrossingaverybusyhighway.Doesitmakesense

askingwhether shewould still have the desire to chase tennis ballswere she aware of or

understoodtherisksinvolvedinsuchanactivity?Wehavenowaytomakeherunderstand

thedangersinvolvedinthisactivitysowehavenowaytoknowwhethershewouldhavehad

the desire not to chase tennis balls in busy highways had she known about the dangers

involved. At thispointweeitherhave todeny that Islayhas interests–which isobviously

mistaken–orwetakeherdesiresandthedesiresofothernon-humanconsciousorganisms

atfacevalueandsaythatwhatevertheydesireisintheirinterest.

WithVarnerIthinkthatthesecondalternative–totakenon-humananimals’desires

at facevalue– ismistaken. Wecannotequate relevant interestswithdesiresbecause the

latter can on many occasions go against the former. Islay has a desire to chase her ball

irrespective of whether it is bouncing in themiddle of a dangerous highway. Playing this

gamewouldvery likelyhaveanegative impact inherbasic functionsand, thus, theywould

impedethesatisfactionofsomeofher relevant interests. As itwasalreadysuggested, the

bestwaytomakesenseofallthisisbyinterpretinginterests,atleastsomeclassofinterests,

ascloselyconnectedtoneeds.Ifneedswhichwearenotawareofandwhosesatisfactionis

essentialtomakeusthetypeofbeingsweareareunderstoodasrelevantinterests–whichis

what the cases of the sailor and Islay show – then the psycho-biological theory appears

equippedtorespondsatisfactorily tothedoubtsposedbythescepticand, thus,embracing

thistheoryofintereststurnsouttobeaplausiblealternative.

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Ofcourse,thescepticmayacceptmostofwhatIhavesaidsofarandstilldenythat

non-conscious living beings have relevant interests. My examples have included human

sailorsunawareoftheirneedsandadogunabletobecomeawareofherneedseventhough

shehasmentalstates. Whataboutthetreesofthesecondplanet?Whataboutanhumble

apple tree ina fieldoranenormoussequoia ina forest? Do theyhave relevant interests?

Again,ifthesatisfactionofcertainbasicbiologicalneedsandfunctionsareessentialtomake

appletreesandsequoiastheclassofbeingstheyare,weshouldnotdenythatthesatisfaction

of these needs and functions are relevant interests for these non-conscious organisms.

Althoughnon-consciouslivingbeingsaresimplynotequippedtounderstandwhatisintheir

interestsortotakeaninterestinthesatisfactionofwhatistheirowngood,therearethings

thatareintheirbestinterests,suchassatisfyingherbasicbiologicalneedsandfunctions.To

insist that there is a difference between conscious animals and non-conscious living

organismsregardingtheirhavingrelevant interests–that is, intereststhat if leftunsatisfied

may wrong the organisms that have them –makes us worryingly closer to some form of

speciesismand,thus,isaviewthatshouldbedeemedindefensible.

Inconclusion, thisapproachallowsustodistinguishbetweentwotypesof interests,

thosethatdependonthedesiresandothermentalstatesofanindividual,andthosethatare

independentfromthemandthataredefinedintermsofbiologicalneedsandfunctions.To

fulfiltheseneedsandfunctions–e.g.,theneedforfreshwaterandair–isinourinterestas

muchasitisintheinterestsofthosewhodonothavementalstatestofulfiltheirbiological

needsandfunctions:tonotbeburntorchoppeddownisintheinterestofalemontreeeven

though the lemon tree cannot desire or take an interest in not being burned or chopped

down(seeVarner1998,71-74).

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Ifwetakeseriouslythepsycho-biologicaltheoryofinterests,asIthinkweshould,an

important normative consequence follows:moral agents have an obligation to act inways

thatrecognise,andtherebytrack,therelevantinterestofbothconsciousandnon-conscious

living organisms, i.e., all those organisms whose existence generates intrinsic value. Such

recognitionistobeexpressedin(althoughnotnecessarilyreducedto)legalandpoliticalacts

and institutions thatare respectfulofand/orareacontribution to thesatisfactionof those

relevantinterests.Thenormativeclaim,then,demandsthatmoralagentsactinsuchaway

astorespect,legallyandpolitically,theinterestsofmorallyconsiderableorganisms.

3.Non-HumanInterestsandDemocraticRepresentation

The preceding section gave us reasons for believing that non-sentient living beings have

interests, but among political theorists it is not taken as a given that any conception of

interests should be represented in legal and political institutions and then incorporated in

democratic procedures. In this section I discuss some reasons that have been given for

restricting the range of interests represented in a democracy, and I respond to them in

defenceofincludinginstitutionalrepresentationoftheinterestsofnon-sentientbeings.

I undertake this task by looking at Hanna Pitkin’s interpretation of Edward Burke’s

theoryof representation. Her view is that theobjectofBurke’s theory is a special kindof

interest, namely, unattached interests. 7 These are interests that are “objective and

independent of anyone’s thoughts and wishes” and are the kind of interests that appear

“where there are no relevant wishes to consult” (Pitkin 1967, 159 and 161). Unattached

interests,Ishallargue,adequatelydepictthekindofrelevantinterestsofnon-humananimals7Although Pitkin’s reading of Burke is highly influential, whether her account of Burke’s views is really an

accountofBurke’sviews iscontestable(seeforexampleConniff1994,138). ForanoppositeviewseeDustin

2000,71).IdonotaddressthiscontroversyandsimplytakePitkin’sinterpretationatfacevalue.

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and non-conscious living organisms, interests whose representation expresses adequate

respect for these organisms even though such representation may seem in tension with

standarddemocratictenets.

It is clear, however, that neither Pitkin nor Burke was thinking about the

representation of non-human interests. Rather, their focus of concernwas on the idea of

political representation. InBurke’sconservativeview,a representativeparliament isnot to

representthe interestsofpeoplewithinthepoliticalcommunity,butratherthe interestsof

the nation. These interests have an objective and unattached reality and, thus, are

recognisableby the right sortofpeople–anaturalaristocracy–withouthaving toconsult

anyoneelse,noteventhepeoplecomprisingthenation.8Inthisview,todemocraticallyelect

parliamentary representatives is unnecessary because what really matters is the

representation of objective unattached interests, which can be done without introducing

democraticprinciplesandpractices.

Despite itsoriginalpurpose,Burke’s theoryof representation ishelpful to articulate

the representation of the interests of non-human beings. As it was seen in the previous

section,theseinterestspossessarealitythatcanbegraspedandrecognisedindependentlyof

theorganismsthathavethem.Considerthecaseofplants–akintothecaseofthetreesof

theforestinplanettwo.Accordingtothepsycho-biologicaltheory,theinterestsplantshave

depend on their etiology. Thismeans that a precise knowledge of their interests requires

complexevolutionaryresearchwhich,ultimately,hasanobjective,non-arbitrary,nature(see,

for example, Neander 1991; Dretzke 1995; Varner 1998). Indeed, we do not need to

8In oneof his famous speeches to the electors of Bristol Burke says “if the local constituent should have an

interestorshould formahastyopinionevidentlyopposedto therealgoodof therestof thecommunity, the

member for that place ought to be as far as any other fromany endeavour to give it effect” (quoted inThe

AmericanQuarterlyReview1829volV,nº9,p.43fromBurke’s1774speechtotheElectorsofBristol).

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speculateorevenconsiderwhattheinterestsofplantsarehadtheythecapacitytoexplainor

takeaninterest inthem. Instead,andpreciselybecausetheyhaveunattachedinterests,all

weneed todo is focuson their evolutionaryhistory and seewhy theyhave come tohave

theirbiologicalfunctions.Thisindependenceofnon-humaninterestsisaptlycapturedbythe

idea of unattached interests and I use this term to refer to the kinds of interests that

representativesoftheinterestsofnaturewouldhavetorepresent.

Tosomeeyes,however,thischaracterisationoftherelevant interestsofnon-human

animals and non-conscious living organisms may be problematic. The legal and political

representation of unattached interests takes place in the context of a democratic state

requiring institutions whose norms and procedures comply with fundamental democratic

principles.9ThisseemstoraiseaproblemformyproposaltotheextentthatBurke’stheoryof

representation,which I propose as the right conception of interestwhen dealingwith the

representationofnon-humanorganisms,hasdubiousdemocratic credentials. Determining

the interests of those who will be represented by legal and political institutions without

consultingtheinterestsbearersdoesnotfitourideaofdemocraticandrepresentativestate

institutions. Moreover,my proposal seems to privilege scientific knowledge as theway of

understanding the interestsof non-humanorganisms,whichmightbe thought to render it

elitist, neo-imperialistic and, ultimately, at odds with fundamental democratic values. To

some,thismayrepresentanirremediabletensionbetweentherepresentationofunattached

interestsanddemocraticpractice.YetIwouldliketoshowthatwhatlookslikeanunsolvable

9Ofcourse,thisisdifferentfromaffirmingthatonlydemocraciesaretorecognisetheinterestsofnature.Iam

simplystatingthatrepresentationofnon-humanindividuals’interestisinthisarticleexploredwithindemocratic

contexts. Howtheseinterestsoughttoberepresentedinnon-democraticcontextsisnotsomethingIaddress

here.

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contradictionbetweenthesetwoideascanbeavoided ifweadequatelyspecifyacoupleof

centraltenetsofdemocratictheory.

Oneofthemostbasicquestionsindemocratictheoryiswhoshouldbeenfranchised

and,consequently,whoseinterestswillberecognisedandrepresentedinthepolity. Thisis

theso-calledboundaryproblem,whosemostcommontheoreticalsolutionistheall-affected-

interests thesis: all those whose interests are affected by a political decision ought to be

enfranchisedandrepresented.Thisissomuchsothatithasbeenarguedthattheessenceof

democratic legitimacy is the capacity of those affected by a decision to deliberate in the

production of that decision (see Dryzek and List 2003).10Is this thesis correct? Does

democracyreallyhingeontheenfranchisementofallthosewhoseinterestsareaffectedby

state institutions’ practice? Theplausibilityof an affirmative answerderives from the idea

thatthepointandjustificationofdemocracyistoadvanceandprotecttheinterestsofthose

whoarepartof the constituency. If this is true, then it also seems tobe the case that all

thosewhoseinterestsareaffectedbyademocraticdecisionoughttobeenfranchised.11

Endorsing these theses raises problems for non-anthropocentrism. If non-

anthropocentrictheoristsholdthatdemocracydependsontheenfranchisementofallthose

whose interests are affected by state policies – as both their democratic and non-

anthropocentriccommitmentsseemtorequire–theywillhavetoexplainhowtoenfranchise

orangetrees,cacti,andbees. Asaconsequence, thenon-anthropocentricperspective falls

intoareductio. Instead,weretheytoanswerthatdemocracy isnottoprotectnon-human

10ForthispointseegenerallyHeld1995.SeealsoDahl1979;Beitz1990;Goodin2007;Saunders2011.11Thisisofcourseasimplification.Onecouldargue,forexample,thatpoliticalparticipationdoesnothavetobe

conceptualisedasanabsolutecategoryandcanbeunderstoodinscalarterms(youcanhaveitmoreorless).In

thatcase, thepoweronehas todecide in thepolityought tobeproportional toone’s interestsat stake (see

BrighouseandFleurbaey2010).

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interests, theirpositionwouldseemtofallshortof itsnon-anthropocentriccharacter,since

theprotectionoftheinterestsofnaturewouldbelefttothegoodwillofwhoevervotesand

makespoliticaldecisions.

Yet non-anthropocentric theorists can avoid the reductio if they argue that the

enfranchisementofnon-humansshouldbedoneindirectly.RobertGoodinhasarguedalong

theselineswhendefendingtheclaimthatdemocracyrequiresstrategiesofinternalisationof

others’ interests (Goodin 1996; Goodin 2000). In his view, genuine democracy entails the

education and transformation of those who actively participate in the deliberative

community, so in this process we all come to make ours the interests of those who are

aroundus.Theoutcomeofthisinternalisationistherepresentationofnon-humans’interests

inthedemocraticprocess.

Unfortunately,thisargumentwillnotdo.BenSaunders(2011)hasrightlypointedout

thatGoodin isconfusingwhoshouldbeenfranchisedwithhowthosewhoareenfranchised

shouldvote.Thus,thefactthatweshouldseriouslyconsidertheinterestsofthosewhoare

disenfranchiseddoesnotmeanthatthosewhoaredisenfranchisedshouldhavetherightto

vote.ForSaunders,behindthismistakethereisafaultyconceptionofdemocracythatputs

interests and their protection at the centre of democratic governance: “Democracy is not

simply about the equal satisfaction of different parties’ interests, but about giving people

equal (andpositive) inputs intowhat thedecisionsare” (Saunders2011,287).12Indifferent

words,democracyismainlyandprimarilyaboutagency,notaboutinterests.

The implication of Saunders’ argument is that the exclusion ofmoral patients from

democraticpractice,evenifwerecognisetheirrelevantinterests,doesnotimpingeuponthe

qualityofdemocracy–thisiswhywecanlegitimatelydisenfranchisechildrenandtheinsane

12ForamoreelaboratedaccountofthisviewseeEstlund2008.

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without compromising our commitment for democracy. Indeed, democracy should be

concerned with empowering all and only those who can participate as agents in the

democraticprocess. Thus, ifademocracyexcludes from itsdemocraticprocess thosewho

areincapableofparticipating,itisnotforthatreasonlessdemocratic.Thisexplainswhythe

democraticdeficitoftheBurkeantheoryofrepresentationisirrelevantwhenconsideringthe

interestsofnon-humanorganismsandthisiswhywedonotneedtoexplainwhynon-human

animals and plants are disenfranchised even thoughwe recognise they have interests that

oughttoberepresented.

Ultimately,therepresentationofunattachedinterestsIamproposingisnotaconcern

fordemocratic theory. Instead,what isatstake is thepractical respectowedtoorganisms

witharecognisablemoralstanding,which,Icontend,maybeadequatelyexpressedthrough

legalandpoliticalrepresentation. Tobesure,thisdoesnotmeanthatthequestionofhow

theenfranchisedshouldexercisetheirrighttovoteisnotafundamentalquestionorthatitis

irrelevant in this context. Quite theopposite: preciselybecause some interestbearers are

legitimatelyexcludedfromthedemocraticprocess(children,the insane,andallnon-human

livingorganisms)weshouldcarefullydeterminehowweoughttoexerciseourrighttovoteso

thatwedonotwronglyaffect the interestsof thedisenfranchised. This is requiredby the

respectweowetoallnon-humanlivingorganisms.

Atthisjuncturedoubtsmayariseregardingmyclaimthattheinternalisationthesisis

not adequate to advance the case of non-human interests. Why not promote the

internalisationof the interestsofnon-humannature toadvance the respectowedto these

organisms? To provide an answer it might be useful to consider the following analogy

regarding the respect owed to basic human rights and the respect owed to morally

considerable non-human organisms. It would be a good thing that no institution had to

18

impose limits upon democratic rules and decisions through, for example, constitutional

principlesandcourtsbecausecitizensknewthatdemocratic rulinganddecisionswouldnot

contravene basic human rights. In that context, through processes of education and

participation,humanbeingswouldhave internalised the tenetsof the fundamental respect

owedtotheirfellowhumanbeingsandhumanrights. Similarly, itwouldbeagoodthing if

each of us had come fully to internalise the interests of non-human nature so that our

practicesanddecisionsrecognisedandrespectedthoseinterests.Unfortunately,suchisnot

thecase. Althoughweshouldnotdeny thatwehaveprogressed in the satisfactionofour

obligationtonon-humannature,thetruthisthatnatureandthenon-humanindividualsthat

arepartofitarelargelyseenasresourcesforthesatisfactionofhumaninterests.Weexploit

naturetosatisfyourneedsanddesiresandifwesometimesconservenaturewedoitforthe

sakeof futuregenerationsofhumanssotheycanalsohavetheopportunitytosatisfytheir

ownneedsanddesires.

Thus,inaworldlikeours,theinternalisationoftheinterestsofnatureisanaspiration

towhichweshouldmoveincrementally.Myproposal–onethatdefendstherepresentation

of the interests of non-human nature not through internalisation of these interests but

throughaninstitutionalstructure–shouldbeunderstoodasafirststepinthatdirection.

4.WhatAreTheConditionsOfRepresentation?

InthissectionIconsideranadditionalkeyquestionconcerningtheinstitutionalisationofthe

representation of non-human nature, namely, what are the limits and constraints of

legitimaterepresentation.Thisisimportantbecauseournormativerequirements–andthus,

the normative requirements of those who would represent the interests of non-human

organisms – are not reduced to legal and political representation of the interests of non-

19

humanindividuals.Thismeansthatonmanyoccasions,legalandpoliticalrepresentationof

theseinterestswillbeincompetition,andsometimesindeepconflict,withothernormative

principlesandvalues.Inansweringthequestionontheconditionsofrepresentationweare

thuslookingforprincipledguidancetoresolvetheseconflicts.

A helpful way to frame this discussion is in terms of the dispute between

anthropocentric and non-anthropocentric principles and norms. While the latter set of

principlesembracessomeformofmoralequalitybetweenhumanandnon-humaninterests–

let us call this the equality claim – the former does not. To be sure, the term

‘anthropocentrism’ and, by extension, ‘non-anthropocentrism’, is used in various senses in

various contexts, but in the context of evaluating legal and political institutions I intend it

thus: non-anthropocentrism embraces some form of moral equality between human and

non-human interests and the equality it embraces does not take a form that makes the

resultingviewindefensiblebecauseitistoodemandingofhumanagents.13

Considerthefollowingcase:adevelopingcountryindireneedofnaturalresourcesto

meet the basic needs of a large part of its population has within its territory natural gas

reserves whose exploitation would solve most problems related to the provision of basic

goods in the country. However, the exploitation of this resource would require the

destructionoflargepatchesofatropicalrainforest,which,inturn,wouldhaveadevastating

impact on the animal species living in the rainforest as well as on the capacity of the

rainforest to captureCO2emissions producedbothwithin andoutside the country. Losing

thiscarbonsink,wearecertain,wouldhavesomeconsequencesforbothhumansandnon-

13IthankananonymousreviewerofEnvironmentalValuesforinvitingmetoclarifythispoint.

20

humans alike, even though itwould solve the problemof providing for the basic needs of

significantpartsofpresentandfuturegenerationsofcitizensofthatcountry.14

Fromadefensibleanthropocentricperspective,andprovidedthatnootheravenueof

actionwas reasonablyopen to satisfy their needs andnooneelsewas responsible for the

state of affairs that led the country to these circumstances, what the government of the

developing country should do is to exploit the natural resources to fulfil its obligation to

provide for the basic needs of themembers of the political community. Given themoral

asymmetryanthropocentrismassignstohumansovernon-humans,thisconclusionwouldbe

reachedwithoutmuchcontroversyamongthosewhoembraceanthropocentrism.

By contrast, in the same circumstances, non-anthropocentrists could argue that the

developing country is under an indirect obligation not to exploit the reserves insofar as

exploiting them would violate its direct obligation not to aggress against the non-human

nature affected by the destruction of the rainforest.15 This view would demand the

representativesoftheinterestsofnaturetopreventthedevelopingcountryfromexploiting

thesourcesofnaturalgas. Inotherwords,thisviewwouldrequirerepresentativesofnon-

humanintereststopreventsomehumansfromsatisfyingtheirbasicneedsbecausetosatisfy

themwouldaggressagainstthebasicneedsofnon-humans.

14ForarealworldscenarioconsidertheYasuniNationalParkinEcuador.Theparkcontainsaround800million

barrelsworthofcrudeoil,whichrepresentafifthofEcuadoreanreserves.15Ithasbeenpointedouttomethatthisexampleplausiblytreatsnon-humannature inawaythat isatodds

with the individualistic tenets Ihavepresentedthroughout thearticle. This requiressomeclarificationonmy

part: individualism in environmental ethics, as I understand it, is the view that individual organisms are the

fundamentalsourceofvalue.Thisdoesnotentailthatcollectivesorecosystemshavenovalue.Itonlyentails

thatthevaluetheyhave isderivativeonthevaluetheyhavefor individuals. It is forthisreasonthat Idonot

deny the existence of duties toward collective realities or complex ecosystems. Instead, I conceive of these

dutiesashavinganindirectnature.ThankstoKerriWoodsforforcingmetoaddressthispoint.

21

Unfortunately, if what we look for is a morally defensible non-anthropocentric

perspective, this conclusion does not seem to fit the bill. It is unreasonable to require

someone to prevent any other human from satisfying his or her basic needs. The over-

demandingness of this request can be explained by the fact that representatives of non-

humaninterestsarehumansand,thus,theynaturallyandlegitimatelywouldtendtofavour

othermembers of their species. Let us call this the over-demandingness objection,which

states that to require representatives of non-human interests to act in every circumstance

followingtheinterestsofnon-humanbeings,sometimesactingevenagainstthesatisfaction

ofbasicneedsofhumans, isunreasonablydemanding.16Thisobjection isaseriousproblem

for non-anthropocentrism and forces anyone interested in advancing a morally defensible

versionofsucha theory to look forguidingprinciples that,without fallingshortofgenuine

non-anthropocentrism,avoidover-demandingness. Ifnoadequateprinciplescanbe found,

non-anthropocentrismshouldbedeemedunreasonableand,thus,wewouldhaveconclusive

reasonsnottoembraceit.

Is it then possible to come up with conditions of representation which are neither

anthropocentricnoroverly-demanding?17Ina seriesofarticles, JamesSterbahasanswered

thesequestionsintheaffirmative(Sterba1994;Sterba2005).Hisargumentativestrategyhas

16Notethatthisobjectionisexclusivelydirectedtotherelationshipbetweenhumansandnon-humans,where

thebasicinterestsofthelatterarenotsatisfiedforthesakeofsatisfyingthebasicinterestsoftheformer.Thus,

thisobjectionsaysnothingabouttherelationshipbetweenhumans,wherethebasicinterestsofsomehumans

aresatisfiedfortheinterestsofotherhumans.Insuchkindofrelationshipitisunlikelythatwewouldagreethat

itisalwaysunreasonabletoallowthatsomehumanssatisfytheirbasicneedsevenifthispreventsotherhuman

beingsfromsatisfyingtheirownbasicneeds.17Environmentalethicistshaveformulateddifferentversionsofthiscrucialquestion:“Canandoughtweenforce

environmentalethicsifthisbenefitsnatureoveragainsthumans?”(HolmesRolstonIII2001,360);“Isitpossible

todefendageneralisednon-anthropocentricperspectivewhilealsoagreeingwith the ‘humanist’ response to

theirparticularkillingscenario,oristhiscontradictory?”(Eckersley1998,166).

22

changedovertheyears,andhereIonlyfocusonthemostrecentandpersuasiveofthem.His

central claim is that a morally defensible non-anthropocentrism can be reconciled with

reasonableanthropocentrismonceaseriesoffourprinciplesarespecified. Thefirstoneof

theseprinciples,aPrincipleofHumanPreservation(PHP),statesthat

Actionsthatarenecessaryformeetingone’sbasicneedsorthebasicneedsofother

human beings are permissible evenwhen they require aggressing against the basic

needsofindividualanimalsandplants,orevenofwholespeciesorecosystems(Sterba

2005,292).

Asecondprincipleforbidsaggressingagainstnon-humanbasicneedswhenhumannon-basic

needsareatstake.ThisisaPrincipleofDisproportionality(PD)accordingtowhich“[a]ctions

thatmeetnonbasicorluxuryneedsofhumansareprohibitedwhentheyaggressagainstthe

basicneedsofindividualanimalsandplants,orevenofwholespeciesorecosystems”(Sterba

2005,294).AthirdelementinSterba’stheoryisaPrincipleofHumanDefence(PHD),anon-

controversialruleanalogoustoself-defenceinethicsandlegalpractice.Thefourthandlast

principle is one of redress of violations against PHP, PD, and PHD. This is a Principle of

Rectification(PR),accordingtowhich“[c]ompensationandreparationarerequiredwhenthe

otherprincipleshavebeenviolated”(Sterba2005,297).

Takenaltogether,PHP,PD,PHDandPRaccountforSterba’snon-dominationproposal,

which constitutes, or so Sterba believes, an adequate combination of principles to resolve

conflict between the anthropocentric and non-anthropocentric perspectives. On the one

hand, thisproposalavoids theover-demandingnessobjection (or satisfieswhatSterbacalls

the‘ought’implies‘can’principle)becauseitdoesnotpermitordemandhumanstoaggress

against thebasicneedsofotherhumansforthesakeofprotectingthebasicneedsofnon-

humans(byPHP).Ontheotherhand,Sterbamakesclearthatifnon-humanscountmorally,

23

thenwecannotaggresstheirbasicneedswheneverthisservesournon-basicorluxuryneeds

(by PD). The kernel of Sterba’s non-anthropocentric perspective is that “countingmorally

rulesoutdomination,wheredominationmeansaggressingagainstthebasicneedsofsome

forthesakeofsatisfyingthenonbasicneedsofothers”(Sterba2005,295).

IthinkSterbaisontherighttrack.Inmyview,theseprinciplesrepresentanadequate

generaldeterminationoftheconditionsofrepresentation,especiallyinthefaceoftheover-

demandingnessobjection.However,Ihavedoubtsaboutthenon-anthropocentricnatureof

hisproposal.Moreprecisely,IdonotthinkSterba’sarticulationoftheseprinciplesprovides

adequategroundforthecorenon-anthropocentricclaimthatallspeciescountmorally. Let

meexplainwhy.

On the one hand, Sterba argues that the claim that members of all species count

morallyrequiresembracingPD:“ifsayingthatspeciescountmorally is tomeananything, it

mustbethecasethatthebasicneedsofthemembersofnon-humanspeciesareprotected

against aggressive actions that only serve to meet the non-basic needs of humans […]”

(Sterba2005,295).Thismustberight.Wecouldnotmakesenseofinter-speciesequalityif

somespeciescouldbesacrificedforthesakeoftheluxuriousorsuperfluousneedsofother

species. On the other hand, canwemake sense of this fundamental non-anthropocentric

claimwhilesimultaneouslyaffirmingthemoraladequacyofPHP?Sterbaanswers‘yes’,and

thegistofhisanswer is that itwouldbeunreasonable toaskand/or requireanywould-be

human guardian of nature’s interests (or, more generally, any human) to prevent other

humansfrommeetingtheirbasicneeds. This, inSterba’sterms,wouldnotaccordwiththe

‘ought’implies‘can’principle(seeSterba2005,286).

Ihavealreadyconcededthat it isunreasonablydemandingtorequireanyhumanto

prevent other humans from satisfying their basic needs for the sake of non-humans. This

24

idea,however, is sodominant in Sterba’s view thatheultimately falls shortof its allegedly

non-anthropocentricspirit.Toadvanceaformofnon-anthropocentrismconsistentwiththe

equalityclaimoneshouldrecognisethatalthoughitmightbeunreasonablydemandingtoask

orrequiresomehumanstopreventotherhumansfromsatisfyingtheirbasicneeds,actsthat

aggressagainstthebasicneedsofanymorallyconsiderablebeing(humanornot)arealways

wrongandcall for redress. Thebasisof thisprinciple is the idea thateven ifonoccasions

actingoncertainmoralprinciplesmaybetoodifficultordemanding,anyonewhodoesnot

complywiththeseprinciplesshouldbeheldaccountableforheractionandmayberequired

toperformactsofredressforthewrongofaggressingagainstthebasicneedsofnon-human

organisms.Itisonlyunderthisdifferentperspectivethattheequalityclaimcanbegenuinely

honoured.

Thus, in order to both avoid the over-demandingness objection and honour the

equality claim, I propose a different version of PHP, which I call a Principle of Human

PreservationasDefence(PHPD).Itstatesthat

Actionsthataggressagainstthebasicneedsofindividualanimalsandplantsare

wrongand call for redresswithout exception, even though the aggressormay

have a justification for his action if performed tomeet his basic needs or the

basicneedsofotherhumans.

PHPDincorporatesajustificationclause,that is,aspecialkindofdefencethatanaggressor

mayadvance toexplainhisorheraggressionagainstnon-humanorganisms. Thisdefence

mayreducehowblameworthyanagent’sactionisand,forexample,mayprecludeorreduce

state retribution as the required response against the agentwho performed thewrongful

action.

25

Adefenceclauselikethismaypromptthefollowingobjection.Sinceajustificationis

adefenceforone’sactionxsothatxistoleratedeventhoughunderanyothercircumstances

xwouldbeintolerable,itisthenthecasethateventhoughPHPDjustifiesaggressionsagainst

non-humansongroundsdifferentfromPHP,theconclusionsreachedbybothprinciplesare

thesame:accordingtoPHPD,whenhumanbasicneedsareatstake,wecanjustifiablygive

preference to our own species. Therefore, the objection goes, both principles reach the

samepracticalconclusions–wecangiveprioritytohumansovernon-humansandsacrifice

the latter for the sake of the former – and, thus, they arematerially indifferent from the

pointofviewofnon-anthropocentrism.

Thisobjection,however,misunderstands thenatureof thedefenceclause inPHPD.

From a non-anthropocentric view, even in if an individual can justify why she aggressed

againstthebasicneedsofnon-humans,sheisnotexcusedforhavingsoacted–asifinthose

circumstances thewrongwas cancelled – and is still obliged tomake redress. What is at

stake here is the distinction between exculpatory and non-exculpatory defences.18Unlike

non-exculpatory defences, exculpatory defences “describe those general defences which

negativecriminalculpabilitydespitethepresenceofthedefinitionalelementsofanoffence.

Culpabilitymaybenegativedbecauseof theactus reusoccurred inaspecialcontext,as in

defenceslikeself-defenceorduress”(Colvin1990,381).Thisdistinctionhelpstodistinguish

genuinenon-anthropocentrismfromalternativesandconstitutesthekeydifferencebetween

Sterba’sPHPandmyPHPD.Moreimportantly,itgeneratesarealdifferencefortheequality

claimandthesatisfactionoftheinterestsofnature.

To explain why this distinction is consequential, let us contrast PHPD and PHP.

According to Sterba’s Principle of Rectification, when any of the principles he proposes is

18SeeFletcher1978,ch.10.MorerecentlyseeColvin1990;Gardner2007;Duff2007.

26

violated, compensation and reparation are required.19This means that compensation and

reparationare requiredany time (i) ahumanbeing isprevented fromsatisfyinghisorher

basicneedsforthesakeofnon-humans–byPHP–and/or(ii)ahumansatisfieshisorher

non-basic needs by aggressing against the basic needs of non-humans – by PD.20Whilst a

violationofPHPwouldentailreparationinfavourofsomehumans,aviolationofPDwould

involvereparationinfavourofsomenon-humans.

As it stands, however, this set of principles says nothing about reparation or

compensation in favour of non-humans when humans aggress against the basic needs of

non-humanstosatisfyhumanbasicneeds.RectificationisnotcontemplatedbyPHPinthese

circumstances,whichsuggeststhatthewrongofaggressingagainstthebasicneedsofnon-

humans isnullified–andthusexculpated–by the fact that theaggression isdone for the

sakeofsatisfyingthebasicneedsofhumans.Thoseformsofaggressionagainstnon-humans

arethusleftunrecognisedandunaddressed.

In contrast, PHPDwouldnever condoneaggressionagainst thebasicneedsofnon-

humannature,evenifdoneforthesakeofsatisfyinghumanbasicneeds.Althoughhuman

aggressors may have a defence that explains their actions to other humans, a successful

defencewouldnotexculpatethemfortheiraggressionand,therefore,redresswouldstillbe

inorder. Thepoint is thatagenuinelynon-anthropocentricprincipleofhumanprotection

hasamerelyjustificatorynature,notanexculpatoryone;itjustifiesawrong,itdoesnotdeny

it.

19WhatSterbareallysaysisthatwhenaviolationoftheotherprinciplesofhistheoryoccursthencompensation

and reparationare required (seeSterba2005,297). However, toworkasa feasibleprincipleof rectification,

Sterbamustmeanthatwhenanyoftheseprinciplesisviolated,rectificationfollows.HencemyreadingofPR.20ForpresentpurposesIleaveasidetheratheruncontroversialPrincipleofHumanDefence.

27

Inlightoftheseconclusions,letuscomebacktothecaseofthedevelopingcountryin

urgent need of natural resources to satisfy the basic needs of its population. Aswe saw

before,Sterba’sviewwouldlegitimatetheinterventionofthestatetoexploittheresources

becausethisactionwouldallowthesatisfactionofthebasicneedsoftheinhabitantsofthe

country. NothinginSterba’sformulationofPHPsuggeststhattheaggressorwouldhaveto

justify her action and compensate or rectify for the consequences of it. By contrast, a

genuinely non-anthropocentric perspective would maintain as non-negotiable its

commitmenttotheequalityclaimand,therefore,wouldalwaysdemandactionsofredress

whenaggressionsagainstthebasicneedsofnon-humannatureoccur,evenifdoneforthe

sakeofthebasicneedsofhumans.Indeed,PHPDwouldnotcondonetheaggressor’saction

even though itwould recognise theexistenceofa justificatorydefence,whichmay reduce

howblameworthyhisaggressiveactionis.

Asthepreviousanalysisshows,althoughPHPDtakestheequalityprincipleseriously,

itmayseemnotto farewell inthefaceof theover-demandingnessobjection. Such is the

casebecausePHPD states that actions that aggress against thebasicneedsofnon-human

individuals are without exception wrong and always call for redress. This objection,

however,canbeneutralisedifwenoticethatPHPDleavesopenthequestionofwhatkindof

redress is called for in a given circumstance. Although exploring the precise contours of

redresscalled forbyPHPD is something that I cannot fullyaddresshere, it is important to

precise that theview Iendorse states thatmoralagentsought toatone for theirwrongful

actionsagainstnon-humanlivingorganismsasamatterofthemoralrespectowedtoliving

organisms.

My account of PHPD, in other words, advances a moral conception of redress for

aggressionsagainstthebasicneedsofnon-humannature.Thisconceptionofredressmust

28

involve some concern for thewell-being of non-human living organisms. Thismeans that

relevant forms of redress should be consequential regarding the satisfaction of the basic

interests of those organisms that have been aggressed against. In some circumstances,

redressmay entail full restoration of the state of affairs prior to the aggression. Inmany

othercasesthismaynotbepossiblebecausetheorganismsaggressedagainsthaveceased

toexist. Thisisanalogoustowhathappensinthecriminallawwhenawrongdoermurders

hisvictim. Inthosecircumstanceswestillholdthewrongdoeraccountableandpunishhim

forthewrongcommitted,evenifthevictimcannotexperienceanyformofreparationatall.

Similarly, PHPD requires redress even if the organisms aggressed against no longer exists.

Thisiswhatrespectfornon-humannaturedemands.Incaseslikethesevariousactionsof

redressareavailable,includingfurtheringthegoodofothermembersofthesamespecies,or

facilitating the well-being of organisms belonging to other species and even other

ecosystems.21Thegreatvarietyofresponsesavailableforaggressionsagainstorganismsthat

nolongerexistisafunctionofthemultiplewaysinwhichmoralagentscanexpressrespect

forthevictimsoftheirwrongdoings.Thespecificcontentofthesevariousformsofredressis

21An anonymous reviewer of this journal has cast doubts onwhether this kind of redress is consistent with

biocentricindividualismor,rather,representsaformofholism.TherearethreeaspectsofthisproposalthatI

believemakes itconsistentwithbiocentric individualism. First,redressviafurtheringthegoodofmembersof

thewrongedindividual’sspecies(orofmembersofotherspecies)isalegitimatealternativeonlywhenredress

directedtotheindividualwrongedisnotpossible. Inotherwords,furtheringthegoodof individualsdifferent

from thewronged organism conveys the required respect for the latter only if furthering its own good is no

longerfeasible.Second,inthecasesconsideredhere,favoringthegoodofotherorganismsisdoneinthename

ofthewrongedindividual.Eventhoughallmembersofthebioticcommunityoftheearthhavemoralstanding,

actsofredressviafurtheringthegoodofindividualsthathavenotbeenwrongedisawaytoexpresstherespect

owedtothewrongedindividual.Third,evenwhenactsofredressfurtherthegoodofmembersofotherorthe

same species as thewronged individual, these acts are performed to further the good of individuals, not of

species or ecosystems, which is consistentwith the basic tenets of the biocentric individualist stance of this

article.

29

notamatterforphilosophy,butforscience,andwhatthesespecificformsofredressmust

notdisregard,andthereforemustconvey,istherespectowedtonon-humannature.22

In sum, the developing countrymay decide to exploit the rainforest to satisfy the

basicneedsofalargepartofitspopulation.However,inasystemthatrecognisesthemoral

considerabilityofnature,therepresentativesofthestatewouldhavetobecalledtoanswer

for thisaggressionagainst the treescomposing the rainforest (andagainstanyother living

organisms that inhabit it). Since ex-hypothesi the developing country aggressed against

naturetosatisfybasicneedsincircumstancesthatnootheravenueofactionwasreasonably

opentosatisfythoseneedsandnoonewasresponsibleforthestateofaffairsthatledthe

countrytothesecircumstances,PHPDwouldmakeavailableadefenceforthecountry,even

thoughitwouldstillrequirethatthewrongcommittedberedressed.

5.Conclusion

The aspiration that institutions represent non-humans is worth exploring and pursuing.

Followingthisideal,inthisarticleIhavedefendedtheclaimthatnon-humanindividualshave

intereststhatoughttobeinstitutionallyrepresentedandarguedthattheseinterestshavean

unattached nature: they can be determined without appealing to the desires and other

mentalstatesof theorganismsthathavethem. Indeed, theycouldbedeterminedeven if

thesebeingshadnomentalstatesatall.

Moreover,Ihaveofferedanaccountofthelimitsoflegitimaterepresentationofnon-

humaninterests:aggressionsagainstthebasicneedsandfunctionsofnon-humanindividuals

are always wrong, even if these aggressions are done for the sake of satisfying the basic

needsofotherhumanbeings.Intheseregrettablebutcommoncasesofconflictofinterests,

22ThankstoananonymousreviewerofEnvironmentalValuesformakingmeaddressthisimportantissue.

30

redress is always necessary, although the existence of non-exculpatory defences may

considerablyreducehowblameworthytheseaggressionsare.

ItshouldbeclearthattheideasIhavepresentedherearebynomeansconclusive.I

havesaidnothing,forexample,abouttheconstitutionoftheinstitutionsthatshallrepresent

the interests of non-human nature. Will they be local, national or global? Would the

representatives comprising these institutions be democratically elected or appointed?

Would they represent some non-human individuals before other non-human individuals?

Theseareonlyafewoftheimportantanddifficultissuesstilltobeexplored.

Beall thisas itmay, theargumentsof thisarticlepoint toanurgentandpromising

lineofinvestigationwithinenvironmentalethics,ingeneral,andbiocentrism,inparticular.

Acknowledgments

Thanks to Tomás Chuaqui, AlejandraMancilla, Cristian Perez, and KerriWoods for helpfulcomments and suggestions on early versions of this paper, as well as to an anonymousreferee of Environmental Values. I would also like to acknowledge the support of theMillenniumNucleusfortheStudyofStatenessandDemocracyinLatinAmerica(RS130002),supportedby theMillenniumScientific Initiativeof theMinistryofEconomy,DevelopmentandTourismofChile.

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