reevaluating d.t. suzuki's non-dualism

Draft—not for citation

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Reevaluating D.T. Suzuki’s Non-Dualism

BDG Presentation by Stefan Grace

April 9th

2016

This essay seeks to reevaluate D.T. Suzuki’s understanding of non-dualism, under

the assumption that his critique of such has become the defining aspect of his

religious philosophy from the perspective of Western scholarship. The essay will

demonstrate that while a critique of non-dualism is an important element of

Suzuki’s thought it is not the final goal of his soteriology. It will be shown that the

negation of dualism is the first step in two step process where this initial negation

must also be negated in order to reach the ultimate stage of reiseiteki seikatsu 霊

性的生活 , the “spiritual life.” As Suzuki frequently described the central

characteristic of Western society as dualistic and discriminatory, a refining of

Suzuki’s ideas on dualism and discrimination will also offer up a more nuanced

picture of his opinions on ethnic identity.

It appears that D.T. Suzuki has become the poster-child for nationalistic

reverse-orientalist apologetics. His crude stereotypes of “west” and “east” have

relegated his philosophical significance to a “what not to do” of cultural ethics. And,

when investigating Japanese scholarship on Suzuki, it is extremely difficult to separate

the wheat from the chaff in separating nihonron-esque apologetics and works with real

scholarly value—even more difficult is the fact that many works appear to be a mixture

of both. Locating a clear starting point from which to study Suzuki is difficult from the

perspective of political correctness. The value of saying anything positive about an

“apologist”1 like Suzuki is even harder to justify.

This essay will briefly describe scholarly critiques of Suzuki and then challenge the

view of his philosophy as being primarily rooted in the idea of the negation of dualism

and in his critiques of Western thought as dualistic. I will do this through an analysis of

one of his lesser known works, which I consider to be one of, if not the, most

representative example of Suzuki’s thought, 1946’s The Essence of Buddhism. There I

will outline and then apply the idea of a “super dichotomy” that I will use a tool to

reorder Suzuki’s narrative and draw out the relationship—governed by the sokuhi no

ronri 即非の論理 , “it is because it is not” logic—between the two poles of a

1 See for example Borup, 2004, p. 452 [?-confirm p. no.]


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dichotomy. This will challenge the finality of the negation of dualism by revealing a

further negation of the product of that first negation. This will arrive back at a new type

of “super dichotomy” dualism.

Arguably, the three works by Suzuki that did the most to lead to his nationalistic

reputation were 1896’s Shinshūkyōron (“A New Treatise on Religion”), 1938’s Zen

Buddhism and Its Influence on Japanese Culture and 1944’s Nihonteki reisei (translated

as “Japanese Spirituality” by Norman Waddell in 1972). In my doctoral thesis I discuss

the argument between Brian Victoria (1997 & 2010) and Sato Taira (2008 & 2010) over

the correct translation for key passages of Shinshūkyōron and I present the likelihood of

Shaku Sōen’s heavy involvement in the content of Shinshūkyōron—given for example

the clear discrepancies between the way in which the concept of karma is presented

therein and the way in which it is explained in Suzuki’s first English language

monograph Outlines of Mahayana Buddhism (1907). Based on this and other factors

relating to the publication of the 1896 book I argue that it is not a good reference to use

in examining Suzuki’s independent thought (Grace, 2015, pp. 38–42).

I also discuss the circumstances under which Zen Buddhism and Its Influence on

Japanese Culture was written and point out the likelihood that its content was decided

upon in consultation with the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This book, it

appears, was most influential in its 1959 revised and expanded form as Zen and

Japanese Culture. The book is filled with stereotypes of “Eastern” and “Western”

characteristics, often based on the idea of East as non-dualistic and the Western as

dualistic and discriminatory (e.g. pp. 96–97). It also contains frequent critiques of

dualism and/or discrimination (e.g. p. 412). The following is a typical quote on Western

intellectualism:

Logic starts from the division of subject and object, and belief distinguishes

between what is seen and what is not seen. The Western mode of thinking can

never do away with this eternal dilemma, this or that, reason or faith, man or God,

etc. With Zen, all these are swept aside as something veiling our insight into the

nature of life and reality. (Suzuki, 1938, 1959, 1970 pp. 360-61)

The political nature of the book’s creation is a significant factor in understanding

Suzuki’s philosophy but again, as I argue in my doctoral thesis, the book is not ideal as

an example for understanding his thought from a thoroughly idiomatic standpoint


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(Grace, 2015, pp. 113–22).

The third work that seems to have cemented Suzuki’s position as anti-West non-dualist

is Nihonteki reisei. Maraldo (1995) clearly demonstrates the fact that Dilworth (1978)

and Sharf (1995), et. al. have incorrectly understood the significance of the seishin 精

神 vs. reisei 霊性 debate in Nihonteki reisei. Both of these terms might be translated

into English as “spirituality,” but Suzuki critiques seishin as a quasi Shinto term

incompatible with a modern Japan while elevating reisei as Buddhism alternative for a

Japanese spiritual ideal rooted in compassion. While Dilworth and Sharf attack Suzuki

as providing an ideological backing for Japanese nationalism, Maraldo, through a

“relocating” of the philosophical argument shows how, despite the effect of the book

and Suzuki’s obvious nationalistic side, Suzuki’s intentions were actually focused

against a much more destructive nationalism.

It appears, however that Maraldo’s work failed to produce momentum for changing the

views that seem to be held by many in academia. The article seems to have been largely

ignored in favor of more aggressively worded pieces such as Sharf’s “Who’s Zen: Zen

Nationalism Revisited,” which makes strong claims about, for example, Suzuki’s

“egregiously inane” “nationalist leanings” (1995, p. 47). Maraldo’s calm analysis seems

to lack the same punch:

Although I think this criticism [of Suzuki’s reisei] is a valid one, the critical

process should not stop here. It must go on to consider why this new criticism

came to be possible. Relocating Suzuki’s original criticism and projected

alternative can bring to light the conditions of the contemporary critique that has,

at least momentarily, displaced the original criticism, forgetting its opponent, but

exposing its prejudices. (p. 339)

He continues to show how Suzuki’s “veiled cultural nationalism occurs as a critique of

state nationalism” (p. 346) and that “[t]he point of the criticism is not that Abe [Masao]

or Suzuki perpetrate some kind of sinister or underhanded crime. In fact they probably

would not recognize the nationalist undertones of their rhetoric, and their ideology is

not easily judged as pernicious.” (p. 347)

Sueki (in 鈴木; 1944, 2010) takes a similar but more direct stance. According to him,

“‘Nihonteki reisei’ was proposed as something to stand in opposition to ‘Nihon seishin.’


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It was an expression of Suzuki’s opposition to the war.” (1944, 2010: 458). Does this

mean, however, that Suzuki can and should be cleared of his own intellectual “crimes”

from the perspective of our modern sense of cultural ethics? Personally I would answer

with a solid “no.” However, accepting Maraldo’s stance open a wide gap in the

scholarly literature; i.e., with Suzuki as a critic of aggressive Japanese anti-Western

nationalism, what effect should this have, if any, on our understanding of his

metaphysics?

If Maraldo is correct (and I believe he is), this would mean that the idea of Suzuki as a

staunch critic of dualism becomes decoupled from his criticism of the “dualistic west.”

Both Suzuki’s soteriology of satori awakening and his ontology are based in the

relationship between duality and non-duality. If there is a decoupling of the ideas of (1)

“East” as typified by “non-dualism” (= the basis of spirituality) equaling an unqualified

objective “good” and (2) “West” as typified by “dualism” (= cold, calculating

intellectualism) equaling an unqualified objective “bad,” we are able to reevaluate the

duality/non-duality debate in a more nuanced way.

In actuality, in 1956, long before Maraldo’s important article, a similar argument was

made for a more nuanced view of Suzuki’s understanding of dualism in McCarthy’s

“Dewey, Suzuki, and the Elimination of Dichotomies.” He comments as follows:

“…we appear to have in the writings of Suzuki the rejection of the ultimacy of the

dichotomy between truth and falsity, and with all that this entails; the rejection of

the dichotomy between the natural and the supernatural…At no time, however,

does the rejection of these dichotomies mean with Suzuki a reduction to, or a

mechanical denial of, one of the original terms of the dichotomy. In each case, the

dichotomy itself is challenged by way of a return to the facts, and what emerges is

a dynamic and functional unity in difference.” (p. 48)

What this rejection of a “mechanical denial of one of the original terms of the

dichotomy” means is that dualism is not simply rejected outright. However, there is an

unstressed element of McCarthy’s argument that goes a great way in arguing against the

conception of Suzuki as “a relentless advocate of “non-duality”,” to use the words of

Faure (1993; p. 64, ft. 18).


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The Essence of Buddhism

Before continuing on to a fuller explanation of the idea of negation of dualism in

Suzuki’s work, I want to discuss the background to the monograph I personally consider

to most clearly reflect Suzuki’s matured philosophy: 1946’s The Essence of Buddhism.

What makes this book significant is that, as far as I been able to confirm, it is the only

work where he essentially wrote both the English and Japanese versions himself. The

content of the work comes from two lectures that were delivered to the Emperor of

Japan on April 23–24, 1946 in the interest of “making the Japanese Imperium more

democratic.” President of the Buddhist Society, London, Christmas Humphreys,

happened to be in Japan at the time and he requested that Suzuki might dictate the

content of the lectures to him so he could publish it. Suzuki consented, went over the

typed transcription, and satisfied himself that what was published was “what he meant

to say.” He also noted that had more time been available he would have revised the text

more thoroughly. (Suzuki, 1946, p. 2)

Two years after the 1946 publication, Suzuki released a revised edition through the

publisher Hozokan in which he stated that he “was not quite satisfied with the [earlier]

translation” and had therefore decided to “amplify” this version by adding some new

materials, among which was a “far more detailed exposition” of “the Buddhist doctrine

of distinction and non-distinction, or of discrimination and non-discrimination” (Suzuki,

1948, p. 1).

In between these two English versions, however, in what seems to have been a unique

move for Suzuki, he translated the already finished 1948 version into Japanese. The

Japanese was then published earlier—despite being completed later—in 1947 (1947,

1968, p. 3). With this work being his only translation into Japanese from his own

English work (to my knowledge), it is the arguably the most important resource

available for comparing his work in the two different languages.

Another of its merits is that it is one of the few works that takes as its topic “Buddhism”

as a whole. This allows Suzuki to freely draw on any number of ideas from different

sects to build up his own, overall understanding at a time, around the age of 75–76 years

old, when his own philosophy had arguably reached its peak after the majority of his

most influential works had already been published. Additionally, the content was


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intended for a Japanese audience presumable not well-read in Buddhism (i.e. the

Japanese Emperor) to which (judging from the content) Suzuki apparently wanted to

express an ethical, lived version of Buddhism rather than a merely devotional or

ideological version. This gives us important clues as to how Suzuki saw Buddhism’s

role in a new Japan that was born out of the ashes of WWII.

The Essence of Buddhism and dissolving the contradicting poles of logical dichotomies

As Ogawa 2015 shows, Suzuki has a preponderance for drawing ideas from diverse

thought systems and time periods and boiling them down to simple dichotomies. Some

of the examples that Ogawa gives are individual (個) vs. supra-individual (超個),

discrimination (分別) vs. non-discrimination (無分別), and (relative) particulars (個多)

vs. (absolute) unity (唯一). Ogawa explains that, for Suzuki, the two poles of each of

these dichotomies interact with each other in the same way as they do in the relationship

between tai 体 (Ch. ti “essence”) vs. yū 用 (Ch. yong, “function”). (2015, p. 218)

In The Essence of Buddhism one can identify several other such dichotomies, for

example: Great Compassion2 (大悲) vs. Great Wisdom (大智) (p. 50), thinking vs. not

thinking (p. 15), intellectual vs. spiritual (p. 15), Karma vs. no-Karma (p. 33), bondage

vs. freedom (31), and Sunyatā vs. Rūpam. (p. 52)

In most cases, Suzuki directly equates the dichotomies with one another, for example in

the case of equating “the spirit world” with “non-distinction and non-discrimination”

and “the sense world” with “distinction and discrimination” (p. 9). He also explains the

idea of (1) solving “the intellectual contradiction” through entering “the realm of

non-distinction” has a counterpart in (2) solving “the Karma contradiction” “by entering

the realm of no-Karma” (p. 33). Thus one can see that most of these dichotomies,

despite surface differences, operate in the same way.

In The Essence of Buddhism the relationships between the two poles of each dichotomy

are discussed most clearly through an explanation of the relationship between Ri

(“principle”) and Ji (“particular”), where the poles interact with one another according

to the sokuhi no ronri logic, which Suzuki famously describes through the formula “A is

2 I follow the same capitalization rules as Suzuki in The Essence of Buddhism for the sake of

consistency.


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A because A is not A” (p. 15).3 The fact that the poles Ri and Ji are related through

sokuhi no ronri is not explicitly stated in The Essence of Buddhism, but as I will show,

the context does prove this to be the case.4

Sueki Takehiro (1978) takes Suzuki’s simple formula of “A is A because A is not A” and

unpacks it into the sort of formula that one might imagine that McCarthy had in mind

when he commented that Suzuki was opposed to simple dichotomies. I will return to a

discussion of the meaning of Sueki’s formula after an explanation of its implications.

Sueki Takehiro (1978, p. 133)

Returning back to McCarthy and his discussion of Suzuki’s views on non-dualism, the

“dichotomy” to which McCarthy refers is composed of two poles: (1) a non-dual

(/infinitude) aspect and (2) a pluralist aspect (finitude). However, thinking about this

dichotomy as a whole (i.e. a unified grouping of two elements) as a simple non-duality

(or identification) confuses the issue enormously. With dichotomies being at the center

of Suzuki’s philosophy, McCarthy makes an extremely important point in noting that

what emerges when the dichotomy is “challenged” is a “dynamic and functional unity in

difference” (48). Just as Maraldo shows that there is more complex shading to Suzuki’s

stance on the East/West dichotomy in terms of cultural ethics, what we can infer from

3 For discussions of Suzuki's sokuhi no ronri see, for example, Sueki Takehiro (1978) pp. 126–134,

esp. p. 128; Akizuki (1978) pp. 8–9; Sueki Fumihiko (1996) p. 175; and, Ogawa (2011) pp. 411–414.

Sokuhi no ronri is often discussed in the context of its explanation in Suzuki's 1944 Kongōkyō no

Zen 金剛経の論理 (published as a fifth chapter to Nihonteki reisei 日本的霊性 but omitted from

some later versions) (see for example Ogawa, 2011, p. 412) but the thought process is already

evident as early as 1917 in “Illogical Zen” (New East. Vol. 1, No.2 pp. 72–74) as can be seen in this

comment: “The meaning of the preposition “A is A” is realized only when “A is not A”.” (Quoting

from An Introduction to Zen Buddhism, 1934, 1964, p. 60). 4 In Living by Zen (1949, 1972), Suzuki also equates Ri and Ji with “byodo” and “sabetsu” and

states that satori is realized when byodo and shabetsu “interpenetrate each other.” (p. 53)


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McCarthy’s “unity” is that superiority is not clearly awarded to one or other of the two

poles of Suzuki’s metaphysics. That is to say, even in a state of non-duality, itself,

non-duality does not clearly take any position of superiority. What could this possibly

mean?

Take for example of Suzuki’s discussion, in The Essence of Buddhism, of the ideas of Ji

事 and Ri 理, with which “we must be well acquainted” in order to “understand

Kegon.” Suzuki explains that Ji means “the individual (個),” “the particular (特殊),”

etc., and that Ri means “totality (全)” and “universal (一般)” (amongst other things).5

Linking these ideas of the individual vs. the universal with the concept of discrimination

vs. non-discrimination, Suzuki continues that “Ji is distinction and discrimination, and

Ri is non-distinction and non-discrimination.” (p. 51 / SDZ 7, p. 45)

The relationship between the two poles of Ri and Ji is characterized not in its “statical or

spatial aspect” but rather its “movement aspect.” That is to say, the relationship is

governed by the sokuhi no ronri logic. I like to paraphrase this sokuhi “identity in

difference” logic as “the logic of it is because it is not,” which we can just as easily

rephrase to say that “duality is non-duality precisely due to the fact that duality is

non-dual.” Suzuki paraphrases this relationship with several different Chinese

compounds that he explains as “various modes” of the same relationship. One example

is soku-nō soku-sho 即能即所, which Suzuki translates as “self-identity of the acting

and being acted upon.” (55)

Thus rather than the relative status of the poles it is the relationship between them that

is of central importance. That is to say, it is not the poles in terms of their existence as

“nouns” that is important, it is the “verb” that shapes the “event” that is their

mutually-complementing relationship. Thus we see Suzuki commenting that Kegon

philosophy, which he declares to be “climax of Buddhist thought,” sees objects “as an

event and not as a thing or substance” (p. 59) and that, “the central idea of Kegon is to

grasp the universe dynamically” (p. 57). Because non-duality only achieves its perfected

form in relationship with duality, the argument for non-dualism as a “superior” concept

in Suzuki’s thought is significantly weakened. In fact, one can see that the very concept

of an ontological hierarchy that prioritizes non-dualism actually fundamentally violates

the formula that underlies what McCarthy calls “dynamic and functional unity in

difference.”

5 See SDZ 7, p. 45 for the Japanese version


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As Ogawa points out, these dichotomies of Suzuki’s often come from different thought

systems and time periods and thus one can easily image the resistance that many

scholars would feel in Suzuki’s oversimplifying approach. However, Faure (1993) does

not clearly outline his rationale for positing Suzuki as “a relentless advocate of

“non-duality”“ (p. 64, ft. 18)—although, one can assume that he based his comments on

the many dichotomies seen in Suzuki’s work, such as those above.

I would argue that while dichotomies do take a lot of space in Suzuki’s books, that

doesn’t necessarily mean that the dissolution of such is the single most important part of

his philosophy. Although, this is, of course, not what Faure is explicitly saying. What

one needs to take account of, though, is that referring to Suzuki as an anti-dualist has

the effect—intended or not—of implying that the dissolution of opposites is a simple

process and/or that it leads to an unqualified “oneness.” Sueki’s formula above, looking

at its basic shape alone would appear to argue against such an implication.

The complexity of identifying dichotomy poles

Now that I have pointed out the more complex than immediately obvious relationship

between poles of a given dichotomy, I want dive into a deeper explanation of this

complexity. As pointed out above, the dichotomy of Ri and Ji is used to here to explain

Suzuki’s philosophy of the relationship between the spiritual world and the sense world

(a relationship governed by sokuhi no ronri).

Sueki (Fumihiko; in Suzuki; 1944, 2010) describes Suzuki’s sokuhi-no-ronri from the

perspective of the simple dichotomy of “A” and “not-A,” and points out the important

difference between (a) the traditional understanding of the text on which Suzuki

proposes to base his logic and (b) Suzuki’s own unique interpretation. In the classical

text, the Vajracchedikā-prajñāpāramitā sūtra (金剛般若経; Jp. Kongō hannya-kyō;

“The Diamond Sutra”), the concept simply describes how reality understood from the

perspective of the un-enlightened is not the way in which reality is understood by the

Tathāgata. In contrast, Suzuki’s understanding requires that one reality is paradoxically

identified with another (1944, 2010: 470–71).

In the simple dissolution of a dichotomy such as the Ri and Ji of The Essence of


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Buddhism through the conceptual framework identifiable in The Diamond Sutra, one

might be able to say something like “Ri is not Ji because Ji is not Ri.” In contrast,

Suzuki’s logic would result in something like “Ri is Ri because Ri is Ji; Ji is Ji because

Ji is Ri.” However, Suzuki’s deeper level identification of the two surface-level poles

(i.e. Ri and Ji) makes his formula appear much simpler than it actually is. Here Ji and Ri

are dissolved before meaning is assigned to the symbols and the formula ends up as

something like “Ji is Ji because Ji is not Ji” or “Ri is Ri because Ri is not Ri,” i.e. the

iconic “A is A because A is not A.” I need to depart from The Essence of Buddhism for a

moment to attempt to make this a little clearer.

In Zen no shisō 禅の思想 (1943, 1969; SDZ 12, p. 27), Suzuki outlines yet another

dichotomy in which the relationship is governed by sokuhi, mind and no-mind.

However, in order to show that these two poles are nothing more than two perspectives

of one reality he uses the same single character shin 心 to refer to both poles. To avoid

the narrative falling into complete non-sense he does place a solid black mark next to

the shin that is “ordinary mind” and a hollow black mark next to the shin that is the

“no-mind” of satori. Thus one can see that Suzuki’s “A is A...” masks a deeper level that

goes beyond a simplistically conceived identification of opposites.

Suzuki explains that “shin1” is the relative mind of the world of delusion (迷), shinsō

心相, and that shin2 is the Mind of true reality (真実体), the shintai 心体 (1943, 1969;

SDZ 12, p. 27). In doing so Suzuki sets up a counterpart in the concepts of sō 相 and

tai 体 that one also sees clearly reflected in the relationship between Ji and Ri in The

Essence of Buddhism.6

What is most important to note about Sueki’s formula is the existence of three

compositional elements of sokuhi no ronri at the third layer of the formula. This reflects

the foundation of what I refer to as a “super dichotomy.” In this third layer we have two

compositional poles—one pole itself composed of a dichotomy of affirmation and

negation placed in a relationship with another pole symbolizing absolute unity. From a

simplistic perspective, Suzuki’s “non-dualism” appears as a joining of the two elements

comprising one of the many dichotomies mentioned above, such as bondage vs.

freedom, discrimination vs. non-discrimination, etc. However, Suzuki makes it clear in

The Essence of Buddhism that the attainment of satori is not the final goal in seeking to

6 In his English translation of the Xìnxīnmíng, Suzuki gives “mind” for the intellectual heart and

“Mind” for the absolute mind. See Suzuki (1935), p. 91, footnote 1.


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attain the reiseiteki seikatsu spiritual life, as is evidenced in claims to the effect that:

This [finding “the one” in “the two”] is not the denial of the intellect or the

stoppage of reasoning, but it attempts to reach the foundation of it by means of

negation-affirmation. It is by this double process only that the intellect can

transcend itself…” (p. 22)

That is to say, the reiseiteki life is not fully achieved through the experience of satori,

where plurality is negated in favor of oneness. The reiseiteki life comes about when this

negation is further affirmed, and this is why Suzuki refers to it as a “double process.”

This fact is further affirmed in Suzuki’s insistence that:

[Satori] is not all, for here takes place another most startling event along with it,

which is that these negations or contradictions, in spite of their all-smashing blow,

do not at all annihilate this sense-intellect world of our everyday experience; for

water continues to flow and the mountains remain towering about us. (p. 5)

The event of satori is brought on by realizing the negation of dualism, but the other

“most startling event” in the “double process” of satori is a return to affirmation. While

epistemologically the enlightened one returns back to affirmation, ethically he or she

returns back to world of moral consequence from one of antinomianism. Thus:

But here is the one thing we must not forget—which is that the heart identifying

itself with no-Karma never remains in that state: for the heart that is no-Karma is

not the human heart. (p. 35)

Thus, with Ji as an ontological counterpart to the epistemological “discrimination” and

the ethical “Karma”—and with Ri as the ontological counterpart to the epistemological

“non-discrimination” and the ethical “non-Karma” (i.e. antinomianism)—an initial-level

identification of opposite poles in the double process of dissolving Ri and Ji would

involve Ji being identified with Ri (and vice versa). However, Suzuki points out that

“Most philosophers and religious thinkers may reach the stage of the Riji Muge 理事無

礙, [“A world of Ri and Ji perfectly interfused…” {p. 66}] but not that of the Jiji Muge

事事無礙 [“A world of Ji where each individual Ji is seen as interfused with every

other individual Ji {p. 66}].” (p. 67)


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That is to say, in the first step (satori/attaining non-dualism) Ri and Ji are merged,

become one pole of what will become (what I call) a “super dichotomy,” and are

symbolized by the simple “A” of “A is A, because A is not A.” What is of the utmost

importance is realizing that this first step only takes us to “A is not A” (man is God;

being is not being; truth is falsity; etc) and has not yet taken the second step in the

double process to attain “A is A because...” (man is man because man is not God; being

is being because it is not non-being; true is true because it is not false, etc.).

The above shows yet again that Suzuki’s goal of religious life, reiseiteki sekatsu, does

not simply culminate in an antinomian non-dualism (which is summed up in the idea of

Ri and Ji being perfectly interfused). There is a higher ideal which involves the world of

particulars, duty, necessity, and morals. Indeed, Suzuki notes that, “leading a spiritual

life does not mean abandoning the so-called worldly life” (p. 74) and that “[a]s long as

we live in the dual world of distinction, we must obey its laws.” And, again, that, “[t]he

law [of cause-effect] uniformly operates for all, enlightened and unenlightened; for it is

the nature of the law that it should govern alike the moral and physical world” (p. 43).

This is because:

The doctrine of Karma is, according to Buddhism, the doctrine of the moral law of

causation [因果の義], meaning a moral order in human society. The physical

world collapses [世間は闇] when causation is taken away [因果を撥無]. So with

the moral world, it requires that good deeds add to the happiness of the whole

community, including the individual agent himself, whereas bad deeds detract so

much from it, and hurt the other people in every possible way... When this is

denied there will be no Buddhism left in spite of its logic of self-identity [即非の

論理]. (p. 38) (Kanji from SDZ 7 p. 34)7

Suzuki is fond of summarizing this double process from 1. affirmation (dualism), to 2.

negation (non-dualism), and to 3. (super-) affirmation (renewed dualism) through the

Zen story that mentions to waters and mountains “once again becoming waters and

mountains” after one has experienced waters and mountains as “not waters and not

mountains” (as alluded to on p. 5, 18, and 30 of The Essence of Buddhism).8 What is

needed for the Ri/Ji (as simple non-dualism) to become the more complex Ji of Jiji

7 There are major differences between the English and the Japanese but the narratives allign for the

key points. 8 For a more detailed discussion from Suzuki on the idea of mountains being “once more mountains,”

and waters once again being waters see Essays in Zen Buddhism: First Series 1927, 1958, p. 24.


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Muge is for this Ri/Ji combination to enter into a new relationship with yet another pole

to create a new, more complex dichotomy—what I like to think of as an “absolute

non-dualism.”

In Zen no shisō (1943, 1969), the pair of (1) relative dualism and relative non-dualism

and (2) absolute non-dualism, as a super dichotomy that symbolizes the second part of

the “double process,” are discussed through the idea of a (1) “being mind” (有心○

) and

“no mind” (無心○

) as one combined pole further paired with that of (2) a “Mind that

neither is, nor is not” (非有非無の心●

) (p. 27). Thus, one can see that an identification

of is and is not is of a lower kind of dichotomy. The reiseiteki life lies somewhere

beyond this. Returning to The Essence of Buddhism one sees Suzuki explaining that

non-dualism should not be understood as a simple concept:

The world of non-discrimination may be considered as having two senses: the one

is relative as distinguished from the world of distinction, and the other is absolute,

where distinctions of all kind are excluded, and in this sense it is One, the

Absolute. (p. 12)

This is to say, the concept “non-discrimination” can be understood in either a relative or

an absolute sense, as is the case with (1) the combination of mind and no-mind being

contrasted with (2) the combination of no-mind and not-no-mind above. I believe that

Suzuki’s constant shifting from a relative to an absolute perspective in his texts is the

reason for the focus that has been given to his alleged unqualified criticism of

“non-duality.”

Explaining how this ties back to Sueki’s formula is rather difficult, but things are made

easier when we further examine the poles of the third layer from the perspective of my

idea of a super dichotomy. Sueki describes Suzuki’s “Buddhist experience” (仏教体験)

as being composed of three elements (要因): 1. an illogical element (非合理的要因), 2.

a logical element(合理的要因), and 3. an element that combines both the logical and

the illogical. Sueki describes “illogical” as the experience of no-mind (無心) (=satori)

and “logical” the logic of the formula of sokuhi itself, and the combination of the two as

the human-like activity (人格的行為) of the Boddhisattva (1972, p. 127).

Ogawa (2015) uses a similar logic in his “0, 180, 360 degree” approach to Suzuki’s

philosophy (/soteriology). 0 degrees symbolizes the (logical) world of “being” (有)


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before encountering the 180 degree world of the (illogical) world of “true emptiness”

(真空), before returning 360 degrees to the world of being, which is now expressed as

“mysterious functioning” (妙用). (p. 426)

Conclusion

(Talking points—to be written up into full conclusion later)

Are people really unclear of the complexity of the dualities?

Is it fair to imply that Faure sees non-duality in a more simplistic way than Sueki?

Is it really okay to draw from Zen sources when we are supposed to be talking about

“Buddhism in general.” I think that the logical compatibility of my argument makes it

okay.

Abbreviations

SDZ = Suzuki Daisetsu Zenshū (“The Full Works of D.T. Suzuki”) (The first edition has

been consulted in this case)

References:

秋月龍珉. 「鈴木大拙の「即非の論理」とその展開」. 『現代のエスプリ』（特

集：鈴木大拙）, 編集: 秋月龍珉., 第 133 （1978）: 5–23.

Borup, Jørn. “Zen and the Art of Inverting Orientalism: Religious Studies and

Genealogical Networks.” In: New Approaches to the Study of Religion, eds. Peter Antes,

Armin W. Geertz, and Randi R. Warne, Berlin: Verlag de Gruyter, 2004, Volume 1,

Regional, Critical, and Historical Approaches, pp. 451–87.

Dilworth, David. “Suzuki Daisetz as Regional Ontologist: Critical Remarks on Reading

Suzuki’s ‘Japanese Spirituality’.” Philosophy East and West 28, no. 1 (January 1978):

99–110.

Maraldo, John C. “Questioning Nationalism Now and Then: A Critical Approach to Zen

and the Kyoto School.” In Rude Awakenings: Zen, the Kyoto School, & the Question of

Nationalism, by James W Heisig and John C Maraldo, 333–62. Honolulu: University of

Hawaiʿi Press, 1994.

McCarthy, Harold E. “Dewey, Suzuki, and the Elimination of Dichotomies.” Philosophy

East and West, 6, no. 1 (April 1956): 35–48.

小川隆.『語録の思想史』. 東京: 岩波書店, 2011.

———. 『禅思想史講義』. 東京春秋社, 2015.


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Satō, Taira. “D. T. Suzuki and the Question of War.” The Eastern Buddhist 39, no. 1

(2008): 61–120.

Sato, Taira, and Thomas Kirshner. “Brian Victoria and the Question of Scholarship.”

The Eastern Buddhist 41/2 (2010): 139–166.

Sharf, Robert. “Whose Zen?: Zen Nationalism Revisited.” In Rude Awakenings: Zen,

the Kyoto School and the Question of Nationalism, by James Heisig and John Maraldo,

40–51. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1995.

末木剛博. 「鈴木大拙の非大拙的理解」. 『現代のエスプリ』（特集：鈴木大拙）,

編集: 秋月龍珉. 第 133 （1978）: 118–42.

末木文美士. 『仏教：言葉の思想史』. 東京: 岩波書店, 1996.

Suzuki, D.T. Outlines of Mahayana Buddhism. London: Luzac and Company, 1907.

———. Essays in Zen Buddhism: First Series. London: Rider & Company, 1927, 1958.

———. An Introduction to Zen Buddhism. New York: Grove Press, 1934, 1964.

———. Manual of Zen Buddhism. Kyoto: Eastern Buddhist Society, 1935.

———. Zen Buddhism and Its Influence on Japanese Culture. Kyoto: Eastern Buddhist

Society, 1938.

———. 「禅の思想」. 『鈴木大拙全集』第十三巻：1–206. 東京: 岩波書店, 1943,

1969.

———. 「日本的霊性」. 編集: 末木文美士. 東京: 角川学芸, 1944, 2010.

———. (Norman Waddell trans.). Japanese Spirituality. Tokyo: Yushodo, 1944, 1972.

———. Bukkyō no tai’i 仏教の大意. SDZ 7 1947, 1968.

———. The Essence of Buddhism. Kyoto: Hozokan, 1948.

———. Living by Zen. York Beach: Samuel Weisner, 1949, 1972.

———. Zen and Japanese Culture. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1938, 1959,

1993.

———. (Edited by Richard Jaffe). Selected Works of D.T. Suzuki, Volume I: Zen.

University of California Press, 2014.

Victoria, Brian. “The Negative Side of D.T. Suzuki’s Relationship to War.” The Eastern

Buddhist 41/2 (2010): 97–138.

———. Zen at War. New York: Weatherhill, 1997.

reevaluating d.t. suzuki's non-dualism

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