proposal for vertical and horizontal benefit sharing options for redd+ implementation in ghana

Ernest G. Foli & William K. Dumenu (CSIR-Forestry Research Institute of Ghana)

December, 2011

IUCN Pro-Poor REDD (PPR) PROJECT

Proposal for Vertical and Horizontal Benefit

Sharing Options for REDD+ Implementation in Ghana

Synthesis Report

Disclaimer

Information contained in this report was synthesized from various reports on REDD+ programme activities implemented in Ghana by IUCN under the IUCN Pro-Poor REDD (PP-R) Project. All other sources of information have been appropriately acknowledged and referenced. Observations, interpretations, and conclusions based on the synthesis expressed herein are those of the authors.

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Content

Executive Summary .......................................................................................................................... iii

1.0 Introduction ............................................................................................................................. 1

2.0 Types of Benefits under REDD+ Programmes ....................................................................... 2

3.0 Proposed Benefit Sharing Arrangement under Ghana’s REDD+ Implementation .............. 2

3.1 Community Managed Revolving Credit Scheme ............................................................ 3

3.2 Individual Payments Scheme .......................................................................................... 3

3.3 Hybrid/Combination of Community and Individual Payment schemes ........................ 4

4.0 Existing Benefit Sharing Arrangements ................................................................................. 4

4.1 Timber Revenue Benefit Sharing .................................................................................... 4

4.2 Modified Taungya System (MTS) Benefit Sharing Scheme ........................................... 6

4.3 ‘Abunu’ and ‘Abusa’ Benefit Sharing Arrangements ..................................................... 7

5.0 Some issues for Consideration ................................................................................................ 7

5.1 Land/Tree Tenure ............................................................................................................. 7

5.2 Carbon Rights ................................................................................................................... 8

5.3 Conditionality of benefit disbursement (Input or Performance) ............................... 10

5.4 Assessment of Benefit Sharing Options ....................................................................... 10

6.0 Benefit sharing Approaches: Some Case studies .................................................................. 11

6.1 Case study 1: Socio Bosque, Ecuador - National performance-based

BSM case study ............................................................................................................... 12

6.2 Case study 2: Bwindi Mgahinga Conservation Trust (BMCT) – Uganda

Sub-national input-based BSM ...................................................................................... 13

6.3 Case study 3: Carbon Projects in Uganda: The International Small

Group Tree Planting Programme (TIST) ...................................................................... 13

6.4 Case study 4: The Nile Basin Reforestation Project ...................................................... 14

6.5 Case study5: Trees for Global Benefit (TGB) Initiative - Bushenyi

District, Uganda - Payment for Ecosystem Services (PES) ......................................... 14

7.0 Gender and REDD+ ............................................................................................................... 15

7.1 Ghana’s Approach to REDD+ and Gender Considerations .......................................... 15

8.0 Lessons learnt from the IUCN Pro-Poor REDD+ Stakeholder consultations ....................... 17

9.0 Conclusion .............................................................................................................................. 18

10.0 Recommendations ................................................................................................................ 19

References ............................................................................................................................. 20

IUCN Pro-Poor REDD Project: Proposal for Benefit Sharing Options for REDD+ Implementation in Ghana

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E.G. Foli & W.K. Dumenu, CSIR-Forestry Research Institute of Ghana, Kumasi. Dec 2011

Abbreviations and Acronyms

BMCT Bwindi Mgahinga Conservation Trust BSM Benefit Sharing Mechanism CFM Collaborative Forest Management DA District Assembly DBH Diameter at Breast Height ECOTRUST Environmental Conservation Trust (Uganda) FC Forestry Commission FSD Forest Services Division IUCN International Union for the Conservation of Nature JFM Joint Forest Management LCSC Local Community Steering Committee MLNR Ministry of Lands and Natural Resources MTS Modified Taungya System NFA National Forest Authority (Uganda) NGOs Non-Governmental Organisations NTFP Non-Timber Forest Product OAF Options Assessment Framework OASL Office of the Administrator of Stool Lands PES Payment for Environmental Services PFM Participatory Forest Management PPR IUCN Pro-Poor REDD Project REDD+ Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (and fostering

conservation, sustainable management of forests, and enhancement of forest carbon stocks)

R-PP REDD+ Readiness Preparation Proposal TA Traditional Authority TAC Trust Administration Committee TAU Trust Administration Unit TC Traditional Council TGB Trees for Global Benefit TGP Tropenbos (Ghana) Programme TIST The International Small Groups Timber Planting Programme (Uganda) TMB Trust Management Board TRF Timber Rights Fee TS Taungya System USH Ugandan Shilling WEDO Women’s Environment and Development Programme

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Executive Summary

Global warming and its associated climate change have become global issues. Reduced Emissions

from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD+) is a globally acclaimed climate change

mitigation mechanism. For REDD+ to achieve the desired goals, it is important to know what

kinds or forms of benefits will accrue from REDD+ implementation, what benefit sharing

arrangements are implemented and the distributional mechanisms instituted for the flow of

these benefits. It is in this direction that the IUCN, within the framework of the DANIDA

supported Pro-Poor REDD Project, has embarked on several analytical studies and assessments,

in collaboration with various partners, to collate existing information and stakeholders’ view to

serve as inputs for the development of Ghana’s REDD+ strategy.

This report synthesizes all the outcomes, lessons learnt and information gathered so far on

Benefit Sharing, both through IUCN’s Pro-Poor REDD (PPR) Project and other relevant sources,

the different kinds of benefits envisaged by Ghana under REDD+ programme, benefit sharing

mechanisms being discussed so far by parties or actors as well as the distributional mechanisms.

It also examines Benefit Sharing examples drawn from other countries that could be adapted to

Ghana’s environmental, social and economic circumstances, with recommendations for the most

appropriate, effective and equitable Benefit Sharing option(s) that could be adopted for

successful REDD+ implementation in Ghana, based on available information. Also considered are

the implications of different benefit sharing arrangements on poor people and gender.

Benefit Sharing Options

Several Benefit Sharing mechanisms exist in Ghana. For example, Timber Stumpage fees,

Concession Rent, Timber Rights Fee (TRF), Social Responsibility Agreements (SRA),

Compensation payments, Modified Taungya System (MTS), and ‘Abusa/Abunu’ share-cropping

arrangements. However, while some are loosely applied without legal backing, others are

perceived as inequitable leading to their inefficiency and ineffectiveness. These existing benefit

sharing schemes provide vital information that could inform the design of any benefit sharing

scheme for successful implementation of REDD+ in the future.

Through a series of multi-stakeholder consultations and workshops, three (3) Benefit sharing

options were identified for the implementation of REDD+ in Ghana. The proposed options,

fashioned after the three REDD+ approaches (National, Sub-national and Nested) are: Community

Managed Revolving Credit Scheme, Individual Payments Scheme and a Hybrid/Combination of the

two schemes. Although the discussions are ongoing, stakeholders are yet to determine exact

percentages that should be assigned to identified beneficiary stakeholders (Government,

Communities, Farmers, and Traditional Authorities) involved in the REDD+ programme. The views

on percentage shares have been varied from one stakeholder consultation meeting to another.

The most preferred benefit sharing option is the ‘Hybrid/Combination of Community and Individual

Payment schemes’. Results of an analysis conducted at cluster meetings of communities showed

that the above mentioned scheme received 47 - 58% support among stakeholders. Of all the three

Benefit Sharing mechanisms, it scored the highest percentage preference. Considering the

different forms of land ownership/tenure regimes in Ghana as well as the socio-cultural values

(sense of community belongingness) of the people, the ‘Hybrid/Combination of Community and

Individual Payment schemes’ seems to be most appropriate for the Ghanaian context. This benefit

sharing option ensures secure benefits to individuals who contribute to REDD activities, whilst


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recognizing the role of the wider community. Under this option, a higher percentage of revenue

generated from REDD+ activities is paid to individuals and a smaller percentage to the revolving

fund for the community.

It is noteworthy that, the design of Benefit Sharing mechanisms has been highly participatory

and built on the views and experiences of forest communities. For REDD+ projects to benefit

stakeholders, particularly the vulnerable, safeguards to improve transparency in decision making,

accountability of actors, and equitable distribution of benefits are critical.

Land/Tree Tenure Rights

Insecure land/tree tenure can be a major hindrance to the gains that REDD+ can offer. Ghana has

a complex regime of land and tree tenure. Rights (use, ownership) associated with land differ

from those exercised towards resources on it (timber trees). Although lands in Ghana, except

public lands, are held by various stools/skins (traditional authorities), or families or clans, timber

trees (naturally occurring) are owned by the State and if planted, owned by the planter. In view

of these, there should be a strive toward achieving greater clarity and reforms on land/tree

tenure to ensure successful implementation of the REDD+ programme.

The Ministry of Lands and natural resources (MLNR) in collaboration with IUCN and its other

partners have been swift about the matter by organizing a symposium on land/tree tenure rights

in order to understand the scope and complexity of the issues. It was acknowledged during the

symposium that, key step to achieving clarity in land/tree tenure rights is through the

establishment of clear and legally enforceable rules to back the allocation of different types of

rights (e.g., management rights, user rights, ownership rights, etc) to the various categories of

forest users. This would require effective stakeholder engagement and consultations which bring

on board the views and interests of all affected by land administration and land/tree tenure

issues.

Carbon Rights

Another issue that can be highly contentious and impede the implementation of REDD+ is carbon

rights definition and allocation. Carbon rights issues have been acknowledged at some

stakeholder consultations and meetings. Beyond the acknowledgement, definite actions are yet

to be taken to begin the process on ‘carbon rights’ definitions and its related issues of legality.

Issues concerning carbon rights definition, allocation of rights and legal framework support

should be properly and adequately handled, including possible conflict resolution mechanisms. It

is acknowledged that Carbon Rights issues are still been debated in the international REDD+

discourse arena; it will inure to the benefit of Ghana’s REDD+ preparation if the issues are

decisively dealt with barring postponement. Tackling the issue together with benefit sharing will

yield the most benefits since these the two issues (Carbon Rights and Benefit Sharing) are

intrinsically linked. This suggests that Carbon Rights and Benefit Sharing should be dealt with

concurrently. Tasking an organisation to look at Carbon Rights issues or engaging stakeholders

on the subject, as has been the case with the benefit sharing process, could be the way to go.

Gender and REDD+

Issues of gender are on the minds of Ghana’s REDD+ Secretariat and its implementation partners.

A clearly demonstrable action of intent is the two workshops organized for multiple stakeholders


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including women organizations, gender experts and policy level people working in forestry and

environment on ‘Mainstreaming Gender Considerations in REDD+ process’ in Accra, Ghana. A

notable outcome of these participatory stakeholder workshops were a situational analysis of

gender considerations in Ghana’s R-PP document and a draft ‘Road Map’ to support the

mainstreaming of gender in REDD+ Process’ in Ghana. The ‘Road Map’ represents a concrete step

toward the incorporation of issues of gender in REDD+ programme in Ghana.

Regardless of all these, of critical concern in gender issues in REDD+ are use, access and control

of land and forest resources. Women in particular face major governance issues that derive from

traditional or customary practices and laws instituted in certain regions of Ghana. As a result,

women have limited control of land, limited access and control over forest resources and limited

participation in decision-making. Therefore, addressing these will be a major leap toward

mainstreaming and incorporating gender issues in REDD+.

Transparency, Accountability and Pro-poor participation

There have been a lot of stakeholder consultations and meetings in an attempt to include

relevant stakeholders in the design and rolling out of the REDD+ programmes. Particularly

pronounced is the development of equitable benefit sharing options to be adopted for the

programme. Both experts and community representatives have been engaged in the process.

However, Ghana’s progress toward REDD+ implementation, should avoid elite capture. This

means that REDD+ benefit sharing approaches should incorporate greater household or group

level focus, including interventions to improve their representation in community forest

governance councils. Pro-poor approaches should be used in identifying poor groups typically

excluded or marginalized, and appropriate mechanisms should be developed to ensure their

participation in local forest governance.

The course toward achieving a successful REDD+ implementation in Ghana is challenging, given

the complexity and sensitivity of a plethora of issues to be addressed. Currently there has been

significant work done on benefit sharing mechanisms. Various stakeholder consultation meetings

and workshops have taken place in addressing issues of equity and transparency in REDD+

benefit sharing. However, much work needs to be done in the area of carbon rights definition,

allocation and legal framing. The process on gender considerations in REDD+ implementation has

started and surely will continue to be pursed to its logical end.

However, the IUCN Pro-poor REDD Team can learn from other programmes implemented

elsewhere. Besides, there is much to be learned from the various pilot projects currently taking

place in the country. Extensive consultation and representation, as well as clear and effective

communication are keys to better implementation of the REDD+ programme in Ghana.

Conclusion

The course toward achieving a successful REDD+ implementation in Ghana is challenging, given

the complexity and sensitivity of the plethora of issues to be addressed. Currently there has been

significant work done on benefit sharing mechanisms. Various stakeholder consultation meetings

and workshops have taken place and have addressed issues of equity and transparency in REDD+

benefit sharing. However, much work needs to be done in the area of carbon rights definition,

allocation and legal framing. The process on gender considerations in REDD+ implementation has

started and surely will continue to be pursed to its logical end, howbeit it slowly.


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The IUCN Pro-poor REDD Team can learn from other programmes implemented elsewhere.

Indeed, there is much to learn from the various pilot projects currently taking place in the

country. Extensive consultation and representation, as well as clear and effective communication

are critical to ensure better implementation of the REDD+ programme in Ghana.

Recommendations

The most preferred benefit sharing mechanism is the ‘Hybrid/Combination of Community and

Individual Payment schemes’, which received 47% - 58% support among stakeholders at cluster

meetings of communities. Of all the three BS mechanisms, this option scored the highest

percentage preference.

Considering the different forms of land ownership/tenure regimes in Ghana, as well as the socio-

cultural values (sense of community belongingness) of the people, the ‘Hybrid/Combination of

Community and Individual Payment schemes’ seems to be most appropriate for the Ghanaian

context. This benefit sharing option ensures secure benefits to individuals who contribute to

REDD activities, whilst recognising the role of the wider community. Under this option, a higher

percentage of revenue generated from REDD+ activities will accrue to individuals and a smaller

percentage to the revolving fund for the community.

It is worthy of note, however, that although the ‘Hybrid/Combination of Community and

Individual Payment schemes’ is favoured by stakeholders, a scientific assessment of the various

benefit sharing options will need to be undertaken using the ‘Options Assessment Framework

(OAF)’ to arrive at a more reliable, effective and efficient benefit sharing scheme for successful

REDD+ implementation. The Consultant will be available to undertake such an exercise.

Furthermore, there is much work to be done on ‘Carbon Rights’ issues. Issues concerning carbon

rights definition, allocation of rights and legal framing should be properly and adequately

handled including possible conflict resolution mechanisms. It is acknowledged that Carbon Rights

issues are still being debated in the international REDD+ discourse arena, and it will inure to the

benefit of Ghana’s REDD+ preparation if the issues are decisively dealt with. Tackling the issue

together with benefit sharing will yield the most benefits since these two issues (Carbon Rights

and Benefit Sharing) affect each other and must therefore be dealt with concurrently. Tasking an

organization to look at Carbon Rights issues or engaging stakeholders on the subject, as has been

the case with the benefit sharing process, could be the way to go.


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1.0 Introduction

Global warming and its associated climate change have become global issues. Reduced Emissions

from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD+) is a globally acclaimed climate change

mitigation mechanism. However, the extent to which REDD+ potential is realized depends

strongly upon whether benefits accruing from it reach all segments of stakeholders involved in

its implementation. This need has been recognized in Ghana’s REDD+ Readiness Preparation

Proposal (R-PP). Benefit Sharing has become prominent in REDD+ because it is generally

understood to result in potentially substantial financial benefits which will need to be distributed

across the wide range of stakeholders linked to deforestation, degradation, and forest

regeneration. Payments are expected to consist of compensation for opportunity costs of land-

use changes plus a designated REDD rent. However, it is critical to understand how such benefits

should be shared nationally between different stakeholders, given its importance in REDD+

strategy design and implementation. Beyond this, there is a clear rationale for benefit sharing in

REDD+, including1:

Sharing of benefits is likely to build wider legitimacy and support for REDD+ mechanism: From

the perspective of affected communities, it allows them to become partners in projects and

potentially empowers them in decisions that affect them. From a government’s perspective

benefit sharing is a practical policy tool to achieve greater social inclusiveness and balance

between social, economic and environmental factors in planning, design, implementation and

operation of REDD+ projects. From an investor perspective, benefit sharing could help to

reduce risks associated with the project (e.g., non-permanence (IIED, 2009)).

Sharing of benefits could help to enhance sustainability: Benefit sharing in REDD+ could help to

turn ‘conflict into consensus’, if agreements are reached in a collaborative way and are

perceived as equitable. In many instances, careful attention to distributional impacts and the

encouragement of local level stewardship of natural resources has been essential to achieve

sustainable development objectives (Wells and Brandon, 1992; Fisher et al., 2005). Moreover,

lower levels of poverty in some contexts can actually lead to greater sustainability through

decreased pressure on forest ecosystems (Soriaga and Walpole, 2007).

Clear benefit sharing arrangements in REDD+ could help to address past shortcomings in

financial management linked to forests and increase trust. For example, there are frequent

cases surrounding the failure of investors and governments to honour financial commitments

over the long term (IIED, 2009).

For REDD+ to achieve the desired goals, it is important to know what kinds or forms of benefits

will accrue from REDD+ implementation, what benefit sharing arrangements are implemented

and distributional mechanisms instituted for the flow of these benefits. Although several BS

mechanisms already exist in Ghana deriving, for example, from timber stumpage fees, concession

rent, Timber Rights Fee (TRF), Social Responsibility Agreements (SRA), compensation payments,

Modified Taungya System (MTS), these still apply loosely without legal backing. This affects their

efficiency and effectiveness. Other BS sharing schemes are the “Abusa” and “Abunu” share-

cropping arrangements.

It is in this direction that the IUCN, within the framework of the DANIDA supported Pro-Poor

REDD (PPR) Project, has embarked on several analytical studies and assessments, in collaboration

1 See, Peskett, L. (2011).


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with various partners, to collate existing information and stakeholders’ views to serve as inputs

for the development of Ghana’s REDD+ strategy.

This report synthesizes all the outcomes, lessons learnt and information gathered so far on BS,

both through IUCN’s Pro-Poor REDD (PPR) Project and other relevant sources, the different kinds

of benefits envisaged by Ghana under REDD+ programme, benefit sharing mechanisms being

discussed so far by parties or actors as well as the distributional mechanisms. It also examines BS

examples drawn from other countries that could be adapted to Ghana’s environmental, social

and economic circumstances, with recommendations for the most appropriate, effective and

equitable BS option(s) that could be adopted for successful REDD+ implementation in Ghana,

based on available information. Also considered are the implications of different benefit sharing

arrangements on poor people and gender.

2.0 Types of Benefits under REDD+ Programmes

REDD+ activities are expected to generate various forms of benefits both monetary and non-

monetary. Non-monetary benefits may include additional economic/livelihood enhancement

schemes such as infrastructure development. This section describes some types of monetary

benefits (financial payments) associated with REDD+2.

2.1 Compensation for opportunity costs: Opportunity costs are equal to the value of the next

most profitable land use forgone. For example, in cases where forests are protected from

conversion to cultivation of agricultural crops, the opportunity cost per hectare is equal to

the value of the crops per hectare. Monies are expected to be paid to individuals,

communities and groups who change their land use in order to conserve forest, reduce

carbon emissions and store carbon.

2.2 Funding for productive activities: These are the funds used to support the implementation

of productive activities that store carbon. For example, they may include tree planting

activities that aim to relieve pressure on natural forests.

2.3 REDD+ ‘rent’: This represents the difference between the cost of implementing REDD+

(opportunity cost plus the funding needed to implement policies) and the average global

carbon price at which emissions reductions credits from REDD+ could be sold. i.e., the rent

is the profit that could be made from REDD+.

3.0 Proposed Benefit Sharing Arrangement under Ghana’s REDD+ Implementation

The Benefit Sharing arrangement for Ghana’s REDD+ programme is still being discussed by

various stakeholders. So far stakeholders have proposed three schemes of benefit sharing3,4

which are fashioned after the three REDD+ approaches (National, Sub-national and Nested),

given their peculiar individual characteristics. These benefit sharing schemes are the Community

Managed Revolving Credit Scheme, Individual Payments Scheme and a Hybrid/Combination of the

two schemes. Although the discussions are on-going, stakeholders are yet to determine exact

percentages that should be assigned to the identified beneficiary stakeholders (Government,

2 See, Peskett, 2011, p. 5 3 IUCN Ghana Pro-poor REDD+ Project Report, June 2011, p 7. 4 IUCN Ghana Pro-poor REDD+ Project Report, 11-12th October 2011, p 9.


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Communities, Farmers, and Traditional Authorities) involved in REDD+ programmes. The views on

percentage shares have been varied from one stakeholder consultation meeting to another.

Additionally, the stakeholder consultation processes have not been explicit on whether the

proposed benefit sharing schemes are horizontal or vertical in structure. It is acknowledged that

the schemes are still at the developmental stages; it is necessary that the structure of the

approach (horizontal or vertical) that will be pursued should be determined right from the outset

so that it does not become an afterthought. This is critical for proper planning, design and

implementation of the benefit sharing schemes.

3.1 Community Managed Revolving Credit Scheme

This form of benefit sharing arrangement was favoured by the traditional authorities and

community representatives. Under this scheme, revenues accruing from REDD+ activities will be

put in a fund and managed by trustees decided on by the communities themselves. It is argued

that the scheme has the potential to ensure the welfare of the wider community, and engender

wider support and ownership for projects/activities executed by communities.

Advantages5

The approach represents a more sustainable mechanism of ensuring that communities’

continuous/ long-term benefit from REDD-plus activity is secured even after REDD contracts

end.

It avoids instances where individual payments are not properly invested and thus less value is

added to the livelihoods of the beneficiaries, and their interest in sustaining REDD+ contracts

negatively affected.

It also presents an opportunity for communities to be weaned off total dependence on forest

resources as the revolving credit scheme would provide the needed financial support to

enable them engage in alternative economic activities.

Disadvantages

High tendencies of favouritism, nepotism, corruption and poor management of the fund

resulting from the interaction or dealings between community members and credit

managers.

High risk of non-payment of loans thereby leading to loss of credit funds. This could

counteract gains made by REDD+ programmes and result in the breaching of REDD+

contracts.

Free riders, i.e., some community members would want to enjoy what they have not worked

for.

3.2 Individual Payments Scheme

The Individual Payment scheme was endorsed by representatives of government agencies. In this

scheme, individuals are paid for the projects they undertake under the REDD-plus programme.

The arguments for this form of benefit sharing stems from the fact that, individuals involved in

REDD+ activities will receive direct benefits for the work done.

5 For advantages and disadvantages of the proposed benefit sharing mechanisms, see IUCN Ghana Pro-poor REDD+ Project Report, October 2011a, p 9.


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Advantages

Reduced tendencies of favoritism, nepotism, corruption and poor management of the funds.

No risk of non-payment of credits or loans as in the case of community managed revolving

credit scheme.

Benefits go to real people who take part in the REDD+ activities.

Individuals have control over the management of their own share of benefits.

Disadvantages

Community ownership and participation in REDD+ programmes is not harnessed and in some

cases could lead to sabotage.

3.3 Hybrid/Combination of Community and Individual Payment schemes

The hybrid scheme is supported by resource users (farmers, landowners) and civil society groups.

Under this scheme, a higher percentage of revenue generated from REDD+ activities is paid to

individuals and a smaller percentage to the revolving fund for the community. It is argued that

the scheme takes into consideration the fact that there are different forms of land ownership in

Ghana. Lands could be either communally owned, family owned or individually owned. Therefore,

the best approach to benefit sharing would be to ensure secured benefits to individuals who

contribute to REDD activities, whilst recognizing the role of the wider community.

4.0 Existing Benefit Sharing Arrangements6

Although stakeholders have proposed benefit sharing schemes for REDD+ implementation, it is

important that REDD+ programmes take into account the several benefit sharing arrangements

currently operating in the country. These may provide vital information that could inform the

design of any benefit sharing scheme for successful implementation of REDD+ in the future.

Generally, the following benefit sharing arrangement can be identified: Timber revenue benefit

sharing, Modified Taungya System and other traditional benefit sharing schemes such as Abunu

and Abusa.

4.1 Timber Revenue Benefit Sharing

The 1992 constitution of Republic of Ghana guides the benefit sharing of timber revenue accruing

from both reserve and off-reserve forest areas. Various percentages are allocated to the

following stakeholders or actors: Forestry Commission (FC), Office Administrator of Stool Lands

(OASL), Traditional Council (TC), Stools and District Assemblies (DA).

The constitution states:

“Ten per cent of the revenue accruing from Stool lands shall be paid into the

office of the Administrator of Stool Lands to cover administrative expenses,

and the remaining revenue shall be distributed in the following proportions:

twenty five percent to the Stool through the Traditional Authority for the

maintenance of the Stool in keeping with its status; twenty percent to the

Traditional Authority; fifty‐five per cent to the District Assembly, within the

6 IUCN Ghana Pro-poor REDD+ Project Report, October 2011c, p 3-7.


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area of authority of which the Stool lands are situated“ (Constitution of

Ghana, 1992; 267 (6)).

The above constitutional statement translates to the following schedule of benefit payments,

after a 10% administrative charge has been levied by the Administrator of Stool Lands:

District Assemblies: 55%

Stool Chief: 25%

Traditional council: 20%

However in August 2002, the Government increased the off-reserve benefit share of landowners

to 60%, while maintaining the on-reserve benefit share of landowners at 40% of revenue

consequent to the higher costs associated with on-reserve management (Agyeman et al. 2010).

What this means is that whatever percentage share the stakeholders receive as stipulated in the

Constitution will be subsequently shared based on this directive. The existing benefit sharing for

forest reserves and areas outside forest reserves is as summarized in Table 1.

Table 1: Timber Revenue Benefit Sharing Scheme

Stakeholders Forest Reserve (%) Off-Reserve Areas (%)

Forestry Commission 60.0 40.0

District Assemblies 19.8 29.7

Traditional Council 7.2 10.8

Stools 9.0 13.5

Office Administrator of Stool Lands 4.0 6.0

Source: Agyeman et al. 2010.

4.1.1 Basis for Timber Revenue Benefit Sharing Arrangement

This section explains the basis for assigning the various percentage shares under the timber

revenue benefit sharing arrangement.

Forestry Commission: Responsible for the provision of technical support services, demarcation

and mapping of sites, monitoring, quality control and forest management.

District Assemblies: Community development (presumable, since it is not stated).

Traditional Council: Land owners (presumably, since it was not stated).

Stools: Maintenance of the Stool in keeping with its status.

Office Administrator of Stool Lands: To cover administrative expenses.

Several authors have critiqued the equity of the present benefit sharing arrangement with

varying perspectives (e.g., Hansen & Treue, 2009; Appiah & Taabazuing, 2004). What stands out

clear in their commentary is the fact that the present benefit sharing arrangement is not

equitable. The inequitable nature of the scheme stems from the fact that the farmers who work

hard to nurture and maintain timber trees on their farm and fallow lands have been left out.

Additionally, the basis for constituting the benefit sharing is unclear. Marfo (2009) contends that

the inclusion of stakeholders on the scheme, negotiation and prescription of the percentages

assigned to the various stakeholders is based on stakeholder influence, power and proximity to


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politicians responsible for enacting natural resources governance-related policies. As a result

there have been several calls for a revised benefit sharing scheme that recognizes the input of

farmers and rewards them accordingly. Studies conducted show that an acceptable basis for an

equitable benefit sharing is that based on stakeholders’ roles, rights and responsibilities

(Dumenu, 2010; TBI, 2005, 2009; Owubah et al, 2001).

4.2 Modified Taungya System (MTS)7 Benefit Sharing Scheme

The Taungya system (TS) is an establishment method for reforestation where farmers are given

parcels of poorly stocked forest to produce food crops and help replant the degraded forest

areas. The TS was, however, suspended in 1984 primarily because of policy and legislative failures

on benefit sharing, poor security of tenure and resource use rights, and abuse of the system by

farmers and inability of the Forest Services Division (FSD) of the Forestry Commission (FC) to

effectively supervise the programme.

To address the difficulties associated with the earlier Taungya System, a Modified Taungya

System (MTS) was introduced to fully involve farmers, the FC, Traditional Authorities and

resource owning communities in the establishment and maintenance of the plantations and as

such entitled them to the benefits accruing. The MTS confers strong ‘ownership rights’, including

stronger property rights and tenurial empowerment to farmers, especially migrants and

disadvantaged groups. In addition, the MTS is expected to be self-financing based on the

incorporation of an equitable benefit-sharing framework derived from the level of input of the

participants and stakeholder consultations.

It is also expected that the modification would to lead to greater local community incomes while

contributing to poverty alleviation of forest fringe communities. The revised benefit sharing

framework under the Modified Taungya System is presented in Table 2.

Table 2: Benefit Sharing schedule underthe Modified Taungya System (MTS)

Stakeholder Percentage (%) Share of Benefits

Forestry Commission 40

Stool 8

Traditional Authority 7

Farmers 40

Local Community 5

Source: Agyeman et al., 2010

4.2.1 Basis of MTS Benefit Sharing Arrangement

The underlying basis for assigning the various percentage shares on the benefit sharing

arrangement are these:

Forestry Commission: Responsible for the provision of technical support services, demarcation

and mapping of sites, site-species matching, monitoring, quality control and plantation

management.

7 See, Agyeman et al. (2010).


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Landowners (Traditional Authority and Stools Landowners): Responsible for providing land,

community mobilisation and conflict resolution.

Forest Fringe Communities: The communities are responsible for protection against encroachers,

wildfire prevention and control.

Farmers: The farmers are responsible for seedling production, land preparation, planting and

maintenance of the plantation areas.

4.3 ‘Abunu’ and ‘Abusa’ Benefit Sharing Arrangements8

The ‘Abunu’ and ‘Abusa’ are traditional forms of benefit sharing arrangement between a

landowner and tenant farmer or tenant resources user. This form of benefit sharing is exercised

in relation to land ownership, and sharing of agricultural produce cultivated on a given piece of

land (sharecropping) where the tenant tills the land and at harvest, gives a specified portion of

the produce to the landlord or landowner (Robertson 1982; Boadu 1992).

The ‘Abunu’ is a half share (50:50) agricultural share-cropping system in which a piece of land is

given to a farmer and either the farm produce (or proceeds from its sale), or the farm land

containing the standing crops are shared equally between the farmer and landowner. In cases

where farm produce is shared, the tenant remains in charge of maintenance of the entire farm

for as long as the farm is productive. The ‘Abusa’ on the other hand is a third-share (30:30:30)

share-cropping system in which land is given to a farmer and the crops are divided into three

parts; the farmer takes two-thirds of the crops while the landowner takes the remaining one-

third. This practice exists in various forms or arrangements in the farming communities and is

gaining importance as a way of gaining access to scarce land.

It is noteworthy that in some regions of Ghana land ownership is shared rather than the output.

Asenso-Okyere, et al., (1993) indicated that such phenomenon is prevalent in cocoa growing

areas where tenant farmers are requested to plant cocoa trees usually on bushland and manage

cocoa trees until the whole field is planted to cocoa, and at maturation land ownership, rather

than output, is usually divided between the tenant farmer and landowner. The major reason for

dividing land rather than sharing output lies in the difficulty for the owner to check cocoa output

accurately. If output cannot be measured accurately, the tenant may be able to cheat the owner

(Quisumbing et al., 1999).

Although ‘Abunu’ and ‘Abusa’ are innovative ways to get access to land, it is important that there

is proper documentation, regulation and legal backing for such traditional arrangements since

there have been several cases of breach of benefit sharing terms and cheating due to lack of

legal documentation.

5.0 Some issues for Consideration

5.1 Land/Tree Tenure9

8 For recent surveys of share tenancy literature, see Quisumbing et al. (1999); Hayami & Otsuka (1993); Otsuka, Chuma, & Hayami (1992). 9 See, Dumenu (2010).


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In Ghana, rights (use, ownership) associated with land differ from those exercised towards

resources on it. Concerning land, Klutse (1973) observed that interest in land is distinct from the

interest in things on it (for example trees) or attached to it. This shows that land ownership does

not necessarily imply tree ownership. Although lands in Ghana, except public lands, are held by

various stools/skins (traditional authorities)10, or families or clans, timber trees are owned by

persons other than the traditional authorities.

With regard to planted trees, the planter holds exclusive rights over the trees (access/use,

management, alienation, exclusion) as espoused in the Timber Resources Management

(Amendment) Act, 2002. Unlike planted trees, tenural rights over naturally occurring trees

whether in reserves or areas outside reserves are vested in the President (central government)

on behalf of the stools as established by section 16 of the Concession Act, 1962.

In view of these, the proposed benefit sharing arrangements should take cognizance of these

factors as it strives to achieve equity and minimize conflicts. Greater clarity and reforms on

land/tree tenure and land administration are essential for this course since these will enhance

tenure security.

Furthermore, there are various land tenure regimes in terms of acquisition in Ghana. Basically,

these can be categorized as: (i) allocated family land, (ii) inherited family land, (iii) land received

as gift, (iv) purchased land and (v) rented land. Each of these regimes defines the kinds of rights

exercised over land and what resources can be accessed on the land. It also determines who can

be a beneficiary to any forms of benefits accruing from the land and how such benefits can be

shared. With regard to these, it is important that any benefit sharing arrangement under REDD+

implementation takes into account how an equitable benefit sharing will play out in this complex

land tenure structure. The way to go in this matter is to ensure clarity in land and tree tenure

rights.

A key step to achieving clarity in land and tree tenure rights is the establishment of clear and

legally enforceable rules to back the allocation of different types of rights (e.g., management

rights, user rights, ownership rights, etc., to the various categories of forest users. This can only

be achieved through effective stakeholder engagement and consultations which bring on board

the views and interests of all affected by land administration and land/tree tenure issues.11

5.2 Carbon Rights

Another issue that can be highly contentious in the development of benefit sharing schemes

under REDD+ is carbon rights allocation. Although stakeholders enjoy various ownership and

usufruct rights in relation to forest resources, it is not known which of the stakeholders

(landowners, tree owners or resource users such as farmers and communities) wields carbon

rights. This is echoed by Constenbader, (2011; p. 45) who asserts that ‘carbon right typically does

not constitute a ‘right’ in the traditional sense of a claim to do or receive an actual activity, good,

10 A stool means the seat of a chief of an indigenous state (sometimes of a head of family) which represents the source of authority of the chief (or head of family). It is a symbol of unity and its responsibilities devolve on its living representatives, the chief and his councilors. Land owned by such a state is referred to as stool land (National Land Policy, Ministry of Lands, Accra, 1999). The equivalent of stool in northern Ghana is the skin. 11 IUCN Ghana Pro-poor REDD+ Project Report, August 4, 2011, p 1.


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or service, but rather an indicator of who should receive an incentive due for a given carbon

sequestration or maintenance service (here, in a tree)’.

Currently, there is no single operational definition of ‘carbon rights’ at the international level, and

very few countries have adopted definitions in their national legal systems.

The interpretation of carbon rights, whether it is in national legislation or in contracts, will need

to define exactly what is being owned. Regulation or contracts may distinguish between the

following (Takas, 2009):

1. Sequestered carbon: this is the commodity, carbon, itself. It is important to determine if the

sequestered carbon is a property separable from the tree or biomass in which it is stored. The

owner of the tree, forest, soil or land will not necessarily own the sequestered carbon.

2. Carbon sinks: these are the reservoirs in which the carbon is stored. They may be regulated by

property rights that regulate trees or below ground biomass.

3. Carbon sequestration potential: refers to the bundle of rights allowing an entity to explore

and exploit the potential that land and forests have to store carbon. These would normally

include certain rights to manage land and trees in a way which reduces emissions or enhances

removals of carbon.

Thus far, ‘carbon rights’ can be viewed as property rights to sequestered carbon (where rights

are tied to tangible units that store carbon such as land, soil and tree/forest biomass) and

tradable rights (emissions traded regulated by legislative and/or contractual arrangements)12.

Hence, it is critical that carbon rights issues are decided on early enough to avoid any negative

repercussion on the smooth implementation of REDD+.

So far, Carbon rights issues have been acknowledged at some stakeholder consultations and

meetings13. Beyond the acknowledgement, no definite actions have been taken to begin the

process on ‘carbon rights’ definitions and its related issues of legality. A key step to achieving

clarity in carbon rights is the establishment of clear and legally enforceable rules to back the

definition and allocation of ownership rights to all categories of relevant stakeholders. This

requires effective stakeholder engagement and consultations which bring on board the views

and interests of all affected by ‘carbon rights’ issues.

5.2.1 Approaches to Carbon Ownership/Rights in Ghana14

In relation to the two fundamental concepts of ‘carbon rights’ definition, there are a number of

approaches that Ghana can use in determining whom to vest the right to carbon in. First, the

State could choose to define carbon as a natural resource given its naturally occurring nature;

thus it would decouple carbon from its host, in this case trees, and thereby treat it as a separate

commodity. In this case, constitutionally, the State would be vested with the rights to carbon.

Alternatively, the State could recognize the ecosystem services provided by the trees acting as

sinks as being responsible for the carbon credits generated and vest the right to the benefits in

the owners of the trees. Using the latter approach, the implications regarding whom the benefits

from the carbon will accrue to will then depend on whether the trees are naturally-occurring or

planted.

12 TCG UN-REDD 2009; Streck and Sullivan (2007). 13 IUCN Ghana Pro-poor REDD+ Project Report, August 4, 2011. 14 Osafo (2010).


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Whichever option Ghana chooses, it may be necessary to consider the differences between

situations in which carbon rights are tied to land or tied to trees, and the differences between

naturally occurring forests and planted trees.

If carbon rights are tied to the land, officially they should belong to the traditional authority,

landowner, farmer or sharecropper in off-reserve areas. However, the government has the right

to issue timber utilisation licences (through the traditional authority) in such areas, causing a

conflict of interest between the rights of communities and the interests of government. This

could affect the success of REDD+ interventions and the ability of communities to engage

without significant risks.

Conversely, if carbon rights are tied to trees in Forest Reserves, carbon rights will sit with

government. Without adequate benefit sharing arrangements, communities would not be able to

benefit from REDD+ in such areas. This not only has equity implications for REDD+ but would also

increase risks, as incentives would not be aligned to threats resulting from encroachment into

forest reserves (Asare, 2010).

5.3 Conditionality of benefit disbursement (Input or Performance)15

The conditionality of benefit disbursement relates to the question ‘what should be rewarded’ i.e.

input or performance. Defining conditionality is essential in developing benefit sharing schemes.

Whichever conditionality is chosen will determine which approach should be adopted for sharing

of benefits, what organizational institution or structure should be set up for administration and

distribution of benefits and what percentage shares are assigned beneficiaries. Disbursement

conditionality also determines the stage or phase at which certain benefit sharing options may be

most practical. For instance, input-based Benefit Sharing Mechanisms (BSM) are likely to be more

prominent during the earlier phases of REDD+ (Phase 1 - Readiness and capacity building, and

Phase 2 - Implementation of policies and measures). Performance-based BSMs are likely to be

more prominent in Phase 3 - Payment for performance.

Input based: Beneficiaries agree with the Benefit Sharing management body to carry out

specified actions, or refrain from certain actions, in return for up-front monetary or non-

monetary inputs. No link is provided between the distribution of benefits and future measurable

performance in forest management.

Performance based: Distribute benefits on the condition that the partners receiving the benefits

(e.g. community groups) have achieved a pre-defined, measurable and verifiable standard of

performance against a baseline (e.g. have restored or protected X hectares of forest).

PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP, (2011 p. 17) asserts that these types of Benefit Sharing Mechanisms

(input or performance based) are not mutually exclusive and may be implemented

simultaneously within REDD+ nations. For example it may allow for the transfer of input-based

benefits to communities with lower monitoring capacity and performance based benefits to

communities where monitoring capacity is higher.

5.4 Assessment of Benefit Sharing Options

Although efforts are on-going in the development of benefit sharing mechanisms, it is equally

important to assess the practicality and viability of options being tabled by stakeholders.

15 See, PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP, 2011. (P.17-23)


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Performing these assessments concurrently with the development of the options will help

prevent spending time and energy on options that look great on paper but offer little for

practice. Besides the avoidance of pursuit of an exercise in futility, assessing proposed benefit

sharing options against the ‘Options Assessment Framework’16 will lead to careful aiming of

efforts at developing workable options.

Options Assessment Framework (OAF) is designed to help forest sector policymakers and

development partners identify which Benefit Sharing models are most appropriate to their

country context and what needs to be done in order to implement these BSM models

successfully. OAF can be used as a starting point, prior to embarking on the key activities needed

to establish REDD+ benefit sharing mechanisms in a country.

The output of the OAF process is a comparative score for the feasibility of establishing ‘input

based’ or ‘performance based’ REDD+ Benefit Sharing Mechanism being considered. These

scores are used to make an initial decision on the type of REDD+ Benefit Sharing Mechanism to

move forward with, accompanied by a list of collated ‘enabling actions’ in order of priority. A

thorough consideration of these enabling actions will be crucial so as to successfully establish the

chosen REDD+ Benefit Sharing Mechanism option(s). This list can be used to create the

‘roadmap’ needed to deliver the Benefit Sharing Mechanism option(s) that has (have) been

selected. As each ‘enabling action’ is completed, the desired BSM type becomes more feasible.

The OAF should be used by the country REDD+ working group of designated REDD+ secretariat.

This could be done by a technical group or sub-committee within the REDD+ working

group/secretariat, potentially alongside relevant development partners.

In order to complete the OAF successfully the group or committee tasked with completing the

framework should have access to up-to date and objective information regarding the following:

Government, civil society and private sector institutional capacity

The national or sub-national legal framework relevant to REDD+

Fund management capacity and experience

Monitoring capacity and experience

6.0 Benefit sharing Approaches: Some Case studies

There are generally three approaches to REDD+ benefit sharing implementation. These are (i)

Payment for Ecosystem Services approach, (ii) Participatory Forest Management Approach and

(iii) Forest Concession Management Approach. The last two of these approaches are current

forest management models practiced in Ghana.

Under Participatory Forest Management (PFM) two systems that are most commonly practiced

are Community Forest Management (CFM) and Joint/Collaborative Forest Management (JFM).

Under CFM, forestry activities occur on land that has been devolved to communities or continues

to be community owned and managed. In contrast, under Joint Forest Management (JFM),

governments retain ownership of forest land but share management responsibilities with

community members while they benefit from forest resources. Depending on the scenario

chosen, PFM can provide a range of benefits in addition to carbon financing to communities

involved, including eco-tourism revenue and sustainable sales of commercially valuable timber

16

See, See, PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP, 2011. (P.41-121)


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species, access to and use of firewood, fodder, and non-timber forest products (NTFP) such as

fruits and nuts (Murdiyao & Skutsch, 2006).

Having considered these it is relevant to consider some case studies of how countries operating

these forest management models have proceeded in developing REDD+ benefit sharing

mechanisms. Examples of the case studies are from Ecuador, Uganda, Vietnam and Indonesia.

6.1 Case study 1: Socio Bosque, Ecuador - National performance-based BSM case study17

The Socio Bosque case study bears semblance with the proposed hybrid benefit sharing

mechanism. It is a national incentive based conservation programme in Ecuador. Its objective is to

preserve native forests and other native ecosystems, and to increase the well-being of the forest

dependent population. The mechanism aims to protect four million hectares of native forest and

other native ecosystems, significantly reducing greenhouse gas emissions caused by

deforestation and improving the living conditions of one million of the country’s rural population.

Nearly USD 9.6 million has been invested under the programme to date.

Benefits distributed

The benefits include per hectare monetary payments (USD 30 per hectare per year for plots up to

50 hectares; per hectare payments decrease for larger plots) and capacity building in

development of (i) community investment plans, (ii) forest management practices and (iii)

monitoring techniques.

Processes and Structure of the Scheme

The administration team of the Socio Bosque programme in Ecuador made an agreement

with a national bank to streamline the process for establishment of beneficiary bank

accounts. The scheme enabled participants to establish a bank account in the community’s

name upon presentation of legal documents without the usual requirement of an upfront

deposit, and with reduced transaction costs incurred on incoming performance based

payments.

Communities have to submit an investment plan to the Ministry of Environment. This helps

to ensure that funds are used for locally appropriate economic and poverty alleviation

activities.

Payments are made by the Ministry of Finance directly to individual or community bank

accounts. Legal documentation is required to set up a bank account. Agreements with the

National Bank have streamlined the process of setting up community bank accounts, e.g.

lifting the requirement for an upfront deposit.

NGOs such as NCI help Socio Bosque create a ‘communication bridge’ between local

community groups and the Ministry of Environment. This allows for the effective

communication of community concerns and helps communities comply with the

government’s due diligence procedures.

6.2 Case study 2: Bwindi Mgahinga Conservation Trust (BMCT) – Uganda Sub-national input-

based BSM18

17 See, See, PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP, 2011. (P.27-29) 18 See, PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP, 2011. (P.33-35)


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The BMCT is a USD 6.7 million Conservation Endowment Trust Fund set up in 1994 under the

Uganda Trust Act operating with autonomy from government. The BMCT was established to

support the conservation of biodiversity in two national parks in south-west Uganda. The scope

of activities supported by the fund fall under three categories:

1. Support to community livelihoods and public infrastructure projects in the parishes (local

administrative areas) surrounding the two parks (60% of funds);

2. Support to park management through the Uganda Wildlife Authority (20% of funds); and

3. Support for socio-economic and ecological research activities linked to conservation efforts

(20% of funds).

The BMCT functions around an autonomous institutional structure. Overall decision making

authority lies with a Trust Management Board (TMB) with representatives from government,

private sector, local communities, NGOs, and research institutes. The TMB is supported by a Local

Community Steering Committee (LCSC), Trust Administrative Unit (TAU), and Trust Advisory

Committee (TAC).

Benefits distributed

The benefits distributed to beneficiaries/communities include livelihood grants, livelihood

training activities, public infrastructure development and organisational capacity building.


The representation of non-governmental stakeholder groups at decision making level

provides an effective safeguard against the mismanagement of funds and inequitable

benefit allocation.

Proportional allocation of benefits to be disbursed through BMCT agreed by stakeholders

from local interest groups during a three day workshop (researchers – 20% of funding, local

communities – 60% of funding, park management- 20% of funding).

An international asset management company was identified with responsibility for the

investment of BMCT endowment capital.

6.3 Case study 3: Carbon Projects in Uganda: The International Small Group Tree Planting

Programme (TIST)19

TIST is about empowering small groups of subsistence farmers to engage in activities which

accomplish local sustainable development goals. Activities include tree planting and sustainable

agriculture, and working under TIST creates a structure of small groups who work together to

implement these activities. TIST also expects to provide long-term revenue for the small group

participants through the sale of greenhouse gas credits. Under this system farmers get paid 35

USH per tree every year, in two instalments of 17.5 USH per year. Assuming a farmer plants 400

trees on one hectare under TIST and that the TIST farmer re-negotiates their contract after 20

and 40 years at the same price the farmer under TIST will gain 400 trees x 30 payments x 35 USH=

420,000 USH per ha. In addition to this, TIST provides the network of small groups and farmers

also benefit from the capacity which is built from this.

19 See the TIST website for more information.


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6.4 Case study 4: The Nile Basin Reforestation Project20

The Nile Basin Reforestation Project in Uganda is being implemented by Uganda’s National

Forestry Authority (NFA) in association with local community organizations. The growing trees

absorb carbon dioxide from the atmosphere, and carbon credits are purchased by the World

Bank BioCarbon Fund and paid to NFA and the communities.

The NFA has an agreement with community groups to pay them for the carbon for trees grown

on National Forest Reserve land that they manage through a Collaborative Forest Management

agreement. This will amount to about 15% of the total carbon income, though this is dependent

on the trees being maintained on the land. The issues that arise in these benefit sharing

arrangements are that carbon benefits only go to a limited number of community members

involved in the community association, so access depends on meeting criteria to join the

association, and there is little understanding about the scale of benefits among the community

association, which could result in risks for them and the NFA as the project progresses.

6.5 Case study 5: Trees for Global Benefit (TGB) Initiative - Bushenyi District, Uganda -

Payment for Ecosystem Services (PES)21

Trees for Global Benefit initiative is one of Plan Vivo’s projects implemented by The

Environmental Conservation Trust of Uganda (ECOTRUST) in the Bushenyi District, South-West

Uganda since May 2003. The initiative has been designed as a cooperative, community-based

carbon offset scheme which emphasizes sustainable land-use practices and also contains

livelihood components.

It is driven by the concept of Payment for Ecosystem Services (PES) targeted at developing

countries. Key participants in Plan Vivo projects are small-scale farmers and forest dependent

communities, who create sustainable land management or ‘living plans’ (plan vivos) that combine

existing land uses with additional activities and practices aimed at the creation, restoration and

protection of indigenous forests and woodlands, as well as agroforestry practices.

The project is aimed at producing long-term, verifiable voluntary emission reductions by

combining carbon sequestration with rural livelihood improvements through small-scale, farmer-

led, forestry/agroforestry, while reducing pressure on natural resources in national parks and

forest reserves.

Payments for ecosystem services in a Plan Vivo project also perform much the same incentive

function as micro-loans in a microfinance scheme. The farmers use their contract and payments

as collateral to get small loans so when the carbon finance is sent to the farmers account, the

loan will be deducted by the bank.


The programme is targeting all people who are part of the community group and those that have

land and are willing and able to plant trees. Their Plan Vivo’s are verified by farmers’ coordinators

and ECOTRUST technical staff. Farmers’ carbon finance in the project are divided in five

instalments as follows: 30% of farmers total computed payment after planting, 50% of expected

20 See World Bank Carbon Finance Unit website for information on the project and ODI’s Climate Change, Environment and Forests page for a forthcoming review of the project. 21 David Mwayafu & Richard Kimbowa, 2011.


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trees in the year farmer begins planting (year 0), followed by 20% payment in the following year

(1) after planting all the expected trees as in the carbon sale contract. Thereafter, farmers are

paid another 20% if the surviving trees are 85% in year 3, then 10% and 20% payments if the average

DBH of the trees in year 5 and 10 is 10 cm and 20 cm, respectively. Subsequently, no payments are

given to farmers; however, ECOTRUST introduces nature based enterprises at an early stage so

that the participating farmers keep earning income without tampering with the trees. This also

ensures sustainability of the project. Furthermore, to ensure sustainability, farmers are

encouraged to use farming systems such as agroforestry where they can intercrop trees with

coffee. Coffee is a perennial crop where farmers keep harvesting the coffee beans and sell to get

income.

7.0 Gender and REDD+

REDD+ initiatives have the potential to become a conservation, poverty reduction and climate mitigation strategy. Men and Women have varying interests/priorities as well as roles in the

management and use of forest resources and as a result, this has impact on the scope and level

of interest and support for REDD+ actions.

If REDD+ projects are not designed and implemented with a gender perspective, they will not be

as effective and, at worse, could contribute to an increase in the gender gap. So far, gender

equality and equity in access to resources, opportunities and benefits, as well as women’s rights

issues have been less pronounced in this fast-moving debate. This underscores the need for

gender considerations in REDD+ implementation programmes, particularly those pertaining to

women.

7.1 Ghana’s Approach to REDD+ and Gender Considerations22

The National REDD+ Secretariat, which is responsible for preparing Ghana for REDD+

programmes acknowledges the importance of ensuring gender equity at all levels in the REDD+

process (planning, decision making, implementation, monitoring and benefit sharing)23. As a

result, the International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN), in collaboration with The

Women’s Environment and Development Organisation (WEDO) facilitated two (2) workshops for

multiple stakeholders including women organisations, gender experts and policy level people

working in forestry and environment on ‘Mainstreaming Gender Considerations in REDD+

process’ in Accra, Ghana.

The outcome of these participatory stakeholder workshops were a situational analysis of gender

considerations in Ghana’s R-PP document and a draft ‘Road Map’24 to support the mainstreaming

of gender in REDD+ processes in Ghana.

On the issue of the presence of gender considerations in Ghana’s R-PP document, the

IUCN/WEDO/PDA, (2011 p. 19) report has this to say:

‘Although current discussions on social impacts of REDD+ in Ghana’s R-PP

mention that gender issues will be considered, it is not explicit how this

would be achieved. For example, the R-PP report briefly mentioned gender

22 See, IUCN/WEDO/PDA, 2011. 23 IUCN Ghana Pro-poor REDD+ Project Report, March 2, 2011, p 3. 24

See, IUCN/WEDO/PDA, 2011 (p. 21-35).


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in the statement that “In accordance with FCPC guidance, special

consideration should be given to livelihoods, rights, cultural heritage,

gender, vulnerable groups, governance, capacity building and biodiversity.

The only other Section in which gender is mentioned is in relation to Social

Impact Assessment: “...a three member multi-disciplinary Impact

Assessment Team will be constituted to undertake social impact

assessment and that one of the team members will be experienced in social

impact assessment, including gender issues...””.

With regard to the ‘Road Map’, its objective is to mainstream gender considerations into the

forestry sector, paying special attention to REDD+ processes so that both men and women can

have equal opportunity to access, to participate in, contribute to, and benefit from various

forestry policies, programmes and funds. In this way, they would contribute to environmental

and social sustainability.

The road map has been divided into the phases by which the REDD+ processes are being

conducted, notably Readiness (Phase 1) and Implementation and management (Phase 2). Some

of the main considerations in the ‘Road Map’ are:

Phase 1

Support the establishment of a women and forest task force in Ghana.

Support the mainstreaming of gender considerations in current revisions of environment and

natural resource with special attention to land policies in Ghana.

Build and strengthen the capacity of women and women’s organisations on REDD+.

Guarantee women’s participation in REDD+ demonstration activities (pilot projects).

Build and strengthen institutional capacities on gender and REDD+ issues.

Develop gender-sensitive benefit sharing schemes.

Enhance capacity of women to engage in Monitoring Reporting and Verification (MRV).

Phase 2

Support the mainstreaming of gender considerations in information and communication

systems.

Ensure that women representation and participation at various levels are enhanced and

effective.



traditional or customary practices and laws instituted in certain regions of Ghana. For instance,

traditional practices prevent women from inheriting land in the northern regions of Ghana.

Inequitable socio-cultural norms also deny or limit women’s access to and control over forest

resources as well as benefits that accrue. As a result, women have limited control of land, limited

access and control over forest resources and limited participation in decision making. Therefore

addressing these will be a major leap toward mainstreaming and incorporating gender issues in

REDD+.


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8.0 Lessons learnt from the IUCN Pro-Poor REDD+ Stakeholder consultations

Benefit Sharing Mechanisms

Through a series of multi-stakeholder consultations and workshops, three (3) Benefit sharing

options were identified for REDD+ Implementation in Ghana. The proposed options fashioned

after the three REDD+ approaches (National, Sub-national and Nested) are: Community Managed

Revolving Credit Scheme, Individual Payments Scheme and a Hybrid/Combination of the two

schemes. Although the discussions are ongoing, stakeholders are yet to determine exact

percentages that should be assigned to identified beneficiary stakeholders (Government,

Communities, Farmers, and Traditional Authorities) involved in REDD+ programme. The views on

percentage shares have been varied from one stakeholder consultation meeting to another.

It is noteworthy that, the design of Benefit Sharing mechanisms has been highly participatory

and built on the views and experiences of forest communities. For REDD+ projects to benefit

stakeholders particularly the vulnerable, safeguards to improve transparency of decision making,

accountability of actors, and equitable distribution of benefits are critical.

Land/Tree Tenure Rights

Insecure land/tree tenure can be a major hindrance to the gains that REDD+ can offer. The

Ministry of Lands and Natural Resources (MLNR) has been swift about the matter by organizing a

symposium on land/tree tenure rights, in collaboration with its partners, in order to understand

the scope and complexity of the issues. It was acknowledged during the symposium that, a key

step to achieving clarity in land/tree tenure rights is through the establishment of clear and

legally enforceable rules to back the allocation of different types of rights (e.g., management

rights, user rights, ownership rights, etc.), to the various categories of forest users. This would

require effective stakeholder engagement and consultations which bring on board the views and

interests of all affected by land administration and land/tree tenure issues.

Carbon Rights

Carbon rights issues have been acknowledged at some stakeholder consultations and meetings.

Beyond the acknowledgement, definite actions are yet to be taken to begin the process on

‘carbon rights’ definitions and its related issues of legality.

Issues concerning carbon rights definition, allocation of rights and legal framework support

should be properly and adequately handled, including possible conflict resolution mechanisms. It

is acknowledged that Carbon Rights issues are still being debated in the international REDD+

discourse arena; it will inure to the benefit of Ghana’s REDD+ preparation if the issues are

decisively dealt with barring postponement. Tackling the issue together with benefit sharing will

yield the most benefits since these the two issues (Carbon Rights and Benefit Sharing) affect each

other and should therefore be dealt with concurrently.


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Gender and REDD+

Issues of gender are on the minds of Ghana’s REDD+ implementation team. A clearly

demonstrable action of commitment is the organisation of two workshops for multiple

stakeholders including women organizations, gender experts and policy level people working in

forestry and environment on ‘Mainstreaming Gender Considerations in REDD+ process’ in Accra,

Ghana. A notable outcome of these participatory stakeholder workshops were a situational

analysis of gender considerations in Ghana’s R-PP document and a draft ‘Road Map’ to support

the mainstreaming of gender in REDD+ processes in Ghana. The ‘Road Map’ represents a

concrete step toward incorporation of issues of gender in REDD+ programme in Ghana.



traditional or customary practices and laws instituted in certain regions of Ghana. As a result,

women have limited control of land, limited access and control over forest resources and limited

participation in decision making. Therefore addressing these will be a major leap toward

mainstreaming and incorporating gender issues in REDD+.

Transparency, Accountability and Pro-poor participation

So far, there have been a lot of stakeholder consultations and meetings in attempt to include

relevant stakeholders in the design and rolling out of the REDD+ programmes. Particularly

pronounced is the development of equitable benefit sharing options to be adopted for the

programme. Both experts and community representatives have been engaged in the process.

However, Ghana’s progress toward REDD+ implementation, should avoid elite capture. This

means that REDD+ benefit sharing approaches should incorporate greater household or group

level focus, including interventions to improve their representation in community forest

governance councils. Pro-poor approaches should be used in identifying poor groups typically

excluded or marginalized, and appropriate mechanisms should be developed to ensure their

participation in local forest governance.

9.0 Conclusion

Ghana can look forward to a successful REDD+ implementation if issues of land/tree tenure,

carbon rights, equitable benefit sharing, transparency, accountability and gender are addressed

adequately before fully rolling out REDD+. Currently there has been significant work done on

benefit sharing mechanisms. Various stakeholder consultation meetings and workshops have

taken place in addressing issues of equity and transparency in REDD+ benefit sharing. However,

much work needs to be done in the area of carbon rights definition, allocation and legal framing.

The process on gender considerations in REDD+ implementation has started and will continue to

be pursed to its logical end.

The course is a difficult one to take, especially, looking at the complexity and sensitivity of a

plethora of issues to be addressed. However, the Ghanaian team can learn from other

programmes elsewhere. Besides, there is much to be learned from the various pilot projects

currently taking place in the country. Extensive consultation and representation as well as clear

and effective communication are keys to better implementation of the REDD+ programme in

Ghana.


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10.0 Recommendations

Most appropriate Benefit Sharing options for REDD+ implementation in Ghana

The most preferred benefit sharing mechanism is the ‘Hybrid/Combination of Community and

Individual Payment schemes’, which received 47% - 58% support among stakeholders at cluster

meetings of communities. Of all the three BS mechanisms, this option scored the highest

percentage preference. (REDD+ Report, 2011 p9)25. Considering the different forms of land

ownership/tenure regimes in Ghana as well as the socio-cultural values (sense of community

belongingness) of the people, the ‘Hybrid/Combination of Community and Individual Payment

schemes’ seems to be most appropriate for the Ghanaian context.

This benefit sharing option ensures secure benefits to individuals who contribute to REDD

activities, whilst recognizing the role of the wider community. Under this option, a higher

percentage of revenue generated from REDD+ activities is paid to individuals and a smaller

percentage to the revolving fund for the community.

It is worthy of note, however, that although the ‘Hybrid/Combination of Community and Individual

Payment schemes’ is favoured by stakeholders, a scientific analysis of the various benefit sharing

options will need to be undertaken using the ‘Options Assessment Framework (OAF)’ to arrive at

a more reliable, effective and efficient benefit sharing scheme for successful REDD+

implementation. The Consultant will be available to undertake such an exercise.

Engaging a consultant seems appropriate owing to the level of work involved and the reliability

that can be associated with the output. For instance, in order to complete the ‘OAF’ successfully

up-to date and objective information on the following are required:

Government, civil society and private sector institutional capacity;

The national or sub-national legal framework relevant to REDD+;

Fund management capacity and experience;

Monitoring capacity and experience.

Carbon Rights Administration

As has been noted already, there is much work to be done on ‘Carbon Rights’ issues. Issues

concerning carbon rights definition, allocation of rights and legal framing should be properly and

adequately handled, including possible conflict resolution mechanisms. It is acknowledged that

Carbon Rights issues are still being debated in the international REDD+ discourse arena, it will

inure to the benefit of Ghana’s REDD+ preparation if the issues are decisively dealt with at this

time. Tackling the issue together with benefit sharing will yield the most benefits since these two

issues (Carbon Rights and Benefit Sharing) affect each other and should therefore be dealt with

concurrently. Tasking an organization to look at Carbon Rights issues or engaging stakeholders on

the subject, as has been the case with the benefit sharing process, could be the way to go.

25 IUCN Ghana Pro-poor REDD+ Project Report, October 2011b, p 9.


Page | - 20 -

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