no to the nuclear warriors: the us bishops' pastoral

No to the Nuclear Warriors: The US Bishops‘ Pastoral Roger Ruston 0 P

The final version of the US bishops’ pastoral letter, The Challenge of Peace: God’s Promise and Our Response, although it is not without its disappointments, is still an extraordinary document which is going to have an irreversible effect on the way the Catholic Church thinks about nuclear war. It is not out of the blue however, having spent a long time in gestation - at least since the bishops’ 1976 statement on deterrence, “To Live in Christ Jesus”. And it is the fruit of at least two major developments of thinking about modern war: on the one hand Papal and Conciliar teaching on total war, which began with Pius XII’s broadcasts during World War 11; on the other hand modern American scholarship in the Just War tradition, which has been stimulated by the sense of res- ponsibility for Hiroshima and Vietnam. If the main moral thrust - their “No to nuclear war” - comes from the former, it is the latter which set up the possibility for intelligent open debate in the United States on the morality of modern weapons and strategy. But one must give due recognition to a third influence: the pro- found effect which a handful of Catholic pacifists such as Dorothy Day, Gordon Zahn and James Douglass have had on some of the American bishops.

The remarkable thing is the confidence with which the bishops have intervened in the debate in their own country: not merely with well-meaning generalities such as normally afflicts church documents, but with tough arguments on particular policies, many of which are clearly opposed to those of the US- Administration. The bishops state quite clearly what they conceive their role to be, both with regard to method and substance. Their method of exer- cising moral authority is not to lay down moral absolutes (unless it is occasionally to restate formal Catholic teaching) but to “help form public opinion” so that it can “through a series of measures indicate the limits beyond which a government should not pro- ceed” (paragraphs 139-141). So they are out to influence public opinion on specific policy issues, not merely on general moral principles: “We seek to encourage a public attitude which sets stringent limits on the kind of actions our own government and other governments will take on nuclear strategy. We believe religious leaders have a task in concert with public officials, analysts, 5 0 0

private organisations and the media to set limits beyond which our military policy should not move in word or action. ” (my empha- sis) The substance of their intervention in the political process is an effort to make it easier for public opinion to “resist resort to nuclear war as an instrument of national policy”. It is to “build a barrier against the concept of nuclear war as a viable strategy for defence”. Their target here is the “warfighting school” of strategists now come to power in the United States, which talks of “sur- viving” and even “winning” a “protracted nuclear war”. They have therefore said their “No”, not merely to something that everybody is already against, but to a particular direction of strategic thinking which goes deep in one form or another in current Wes- tern rhetoric and force planning.

The IJS bishops have in fact faced up to something which other episcopal conferences have been unable or unwilling to face up to for one reason or another: the evolution of nuclear strategy away from simple deterrence by threat of destroying cities in a war of mutual annihilation (MAD), to something quite different: deterrence through the threat - as in classical warfare - of destroying the warfighting potential of the enemy. This is a much more credible threat but it lends itself directly to plans for possible, controllable and even winnable nuclear wars. If - as most people suspect - a counter-force nuclear war would destroy every- thing else as well, we are in a much more dangerous situation than before. This is because the policy has a number of serious conse- quences which tend to undermine the stability of deterrence itself, notably: 1 Where MAD needs relatively few weapons to keep up the threat, counter-force deterrence needs a virtually unlimited number, since almost anything can become a military objective; 2 There will soon be a grievous temptation, in times of crisis, for the side which believes its forces to be vulnerable to attack, to strike first before it loses its weapons. So it is not just the “logic” of deterrence which needs attention from the moralists (as the French bishops apparently st i l l think) but the practice and the rhetoric even more so.

The bishops’ moral instrument is Just War doctrine, which is put to the new critical use which was already implicit in Papal and Conciliar teaching. That is, not as a method of legitimising particular wars, but as a moral foundation from which to oppose any preparations for total war. This has resulted in the convergence of some categories which were hitherto thought of as being quite distinct. In the first place, it is the jus in bello criteria (discrimination and proportionality) which must now determine jus ad bel- lum, i.e. whether it would be just to fight at all. Nuclear weapons

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have made the difference that we cannot wait until war has begun until we make judgments about their use. The fundamental choices are made now in “peace” time, when the weapons are designed, made and targeted and not - as hitherto -in the moment of battle itself. Therefore the point at which moral judgments are made has shifted back from strategy and tactics to security policies. (103) Secondly, there has been a practical convergence between Just War thinking and Pacifism, at least on the nuclear level. This has enabled the bishops to set the Christian pacifist (non- violent resistance) tradition side by side with the Just War tradition as “complementary”. This is a judgment which they declined to withdraw in the face of criticism from Cardinal Ratzinger and other bishops at the Vatican Consultation in January this year - though they did add “for individuals” to the final draft. (1 19)

But although there are an increasing number of pacifists among the US bishops, it is the Just War criteria of discrimination and proportionality which make the common ground for judging any use of nuclear weapons. The first result is that discrimination in the form of non-combatant immunity simply rules out counter- population warfare. And this ‘‘applies even to the retaliatory use of weapons striking enemy cities after our own have already been struck”. (148). This means that “no Christian can rightfully carry out orders or policies deliberately aimed at killing non-comba- tants”. Deliberately? Does this mean that counter-force warfare might get some moral backing? What the bishops eventually say about this is crucial to the future course of the debate amongst Christians, as I shall explain.

Meanwhile, they come to the first practical consequence of their “No to nuclear war” axiom, that is to reject the NATO policy of fmt use of tactical nuclear weapons in reply to a Warsaw Pact conventional attack: “We do not perceive any situation in which the deliberate initiation of nuclear warfare on however restricted a scale can be morally justified. Non-nuclear attacks by another state must be resisted by other than nuclear means. Therefore, a serious moral obligation exists to develop non-nuclear defensive strategies as rapidly as possible” (150). The reason for this is the near-certainty of escalation to a nuclear exchange which would destroy civilians on an enormous scale. They have been deeply impressed by the opinions of such ex-Administration heavy-weights as Robert MacNamara, George Kennan and Harold Brown on the uncontrollability of tactical nuclear war. It is enough to make f i t use “an unacceptable risk”. So they call for the withdrawal of battlefield nuclear weapons in Europe and of any nuclear weapons from positions which might be overrun in the early stages of a war - and also for the rapid development of an alternative defence 6 0 2

against conventional attack. This lands them in what we may call the “conventional arms dilemma”: would not reliance on a conventional defence mean (1) devoting even more scarce resources to military preparations and (2) making war much more of a possibility? Their answer to this comes later in the argument.

But what of the limited retaliatory use of nuclear weapons, i.e. in reply to a nuclear attack? In considering this question they show their admirable preference - which they keep up throughout the letter with only few lapses - for real as opposed to theoretical possibilities (1 57). They know that, whatever war-games may be projected, the reality of crossing the nuclear threshold is most likely to be chaos, both military and moral. There will be breakdown of contact between governments and between them and their own forces (cf the KAL 007 disaster), failure of computers, overtarget- ing, loss of control . . . and the consequent death of millions. (See Desmond Ball, “Can Nuclear War Be Controlled?” Adelphi Papers, No 169, IISS, Autumn, 1981). So “The burden of proof remains on those who assert that meaningful limitation is possible” (1 59). “To cross this divide is to enter a world where we have no experi- ence of control, much testimony against its possibility and therefore no moral justification for submitting the human community to this risk” (161). The bishops actually come very close to saying that any type of nuclear retaliation would be unjustified, since it would go far beyond “legitimate defence” (1 60).

Armed with these judgments about weapons-use, the bishops come to the controversial heart of the letter: the section on deterrence (162-199). At the outset, they adopt the crucial distinction, to be found in recent strategic literature, between “declaratory policy” and “action policy”. The former refers to the public expla- nation of strategic intentions and capabilities and the latter to the actual planning and targeting policies to be followed in a nuclear attack. Basically, decZuratory policy says what the bombs are aimed at and what it is intended to do with them, whilst action policy determines where they are going to fall and what the likely result will be. Declaratory policy expresses current strategic theory. But this theory - to which government agencies usually try to re- strict the moral debate, if there is one - is insufficient to explain what will happen if deterrence breaks down. There have been a number of dramatic changes in declaratory policy over the years: Massive Retaliation , Count er-force, Mu t ual Assured Destruction , Flexible Response and Countervailing strategies have succeeded one another in response to changes in the E/W nuclear balance and the fashions of the academic strategists (in so far as they manage to influence the Pentagon). But there has been substantial continu- ity in US action policy throughout the nuclear epoch: Soviet cities

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have always been liable to destruction by US strategic weapons, and tactical weapons have always been ready for early use against Soviet conventional attack. What is morally objectionable in the present situation is the combination of a declaratory policy which speaks of prevailing in a nuclear exchange and an action policy which would still make sure that the human slaughter would be enormous, even if only military targets were aimed at and escalation to all-out war were avoided. The bishops’ discovery of the distinction, which seems to have happened between the second and third drafts of the letter, has allowed them to avoid innocent acceptance of government propaganda, to which bishops are often prone.

But the bishops cannot get straight to the point on deterrence without having to take account of some recent pronouncements of higher church authorities, namely Pope and Council. Neither of these delivers a final verdict on deterrence. The statement on deterrence which found its way into the Vatican I1 document Gaudium et Spes ( 8 1) is particularly non-committal on deterrence, reflecting the deep divisions within the council (and probably also the deep ignorance of nuclear matters on the part of almost everybody at the time). The much-quoted passage from an address of Pope John Paul I1 to the UN Second Session on Disarmament in 1982, however, seems to be saying something more definite:

“In current conditions “deterrence” based on balance, certainly not as an end in itself but as a step on the way towards a pro- gressive disarmament, may still be judged morally acceptable. Nonetheless in order to ensure peace, it is indispensable not to be satisfied with this minimum, which is always susceptible to the real danger of explosion.”

All.episcopal conferences have since made it their starting point for statements on deterrence. But then so - a week after it was spoken - did Mr John Nott, then UK Secretary of Defence, to demonstrate that Papal thinking was identical with that of HM Government on this point. But clearly, not anything is compatible with it, since it can only be properly interpreted in accordance with generally accepted principles of Catholic moral reasoning. This is a vital point, which Cardinal Casaroli (who was the Pope’s mouthpiece at the UN) made at the Vatican consultation in Jan- uary. These principles, he said, were to include those “regarding the use of nuclear arms, in so far as deterrence consists essentially in the threat (or in the declared intention) ultimately to have eventual recourse to the use of nuclear arms in one form or another (e.g. anti-cities, first use, etc.), or else in the simple possession of the arms themselves, with the consequent possibility therefore of

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using them.” (Quoted from an official report of the meeting, em- phasis in the original.) In other words, some attempt at ordinary moral reasoning must be made along the lines of Just War criteria - about what is being threatened and what would happen if the threat were to be carried out. This is exactly what the American bishops have done.

It must be stressed that the Pope’s statement does not amount to (1) a simple endorsement of nuclear deterrence as it is practised; (2) an acceptance of “multilateral disarmament” as it is presently conceived; (3) a lesser-of-two-evils doctrine with regard to nuclear deterrence versus Communist domination. The bishops have interpreted the Papal toleration as strictly conditional upon evidence that fundamental moral principles regarding the targeting and eventual use of the weapons are being observed - and upon evidence of sincere intentions with regard to disarmament. Clearly there is a very big difference between accepting a certain settled policy as necessary because it is the “lesser of two evils”, leaving it to the “technicians” to get on with putting it into practice in the most efficient way, and tolerating the “least bad” version,of it (to be determined by normal moral criteria) while active steps are being taken to cease from reliance upon it. It is a matter of the direction in which one is travelling. The direction in which governments are travelling is the opposite to the one in which the Pope and the bishops desire them to travel if deterrence is to be toler- ated as an interim state.

So the American bishops go on from the Papal starting p,oint to distinguish between deterrence doctrines which are morally acceptable and those which are not: “specifically, it is not morally acceptable to intend to kill the innocent as part of a strategy of deterring nuclear war” (1 78). So it is relevant to the moral status of deterrence to ask what would be done if it were to break down and the weapons fired at their targets. There is no attempt here to set up a theory of “moral paradox” by which it somehow becomes legitimate to intend to do wicked things in order to prevent them being done. The bishops demand that the targeting policy itself should be the object of moral scrutiny.

Questions addressed to the US government brought forth the reply from Mr William Clark, national security adviser, that “For moral, political and military reasons, the United States does not target the Soviet civilian population as such . . . We do not threaten the existence of Soviet civilisation by threatening Soviet cities. Rather, we hold at risk the war-making capability of the Soviet Union - its armed forces, the industrial capacity to sustain war ...” (note 81). However, the bishops did some homework on targeting and discovered that the Single Integrated Operational Plan has 60

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military targets within the city of Moscow alone and that 40,000 military targets for nuclear weapons have been identified in the whole of the Soviet Union. Clearly, the stage has already been reached when almost anything is considered to be a military target. Administration officials admitted that “even with attacks limited to “military” targets the number of deaths in a substantial exchange would be almost indistinguishable from what might occur if civilian centres had been deliberately and directly struck”.

For the Just War moralist, it becomes a matter of choice here whether he expands the notion of discrimination to cover the characteristics of the weapons as well as the intentions of their users, or whether he confines it t o intentions and uses the criterion of proportionality t o judge the effects of bombing military targets within cities. The bishops take the latter alternative:

“We cannot be satisfied that the assertion of an intention not t o strike civilians directly or even the most honest effort to implement that intention by itself constitutes a ‘moral policy’ for the use of nuclear weapons” ( 18 1 ).

There are limits t o calculations of proportion then. The bishops will never agree that there could be some extreme justifying cause for unleashing a nuclear war which would destroy cities with their in habit ants :

“It would be a perverted political or moral casuistry which tried to justify using a weapon which ‘indirectly’ or ‘uninten- tionally’ killed a million innocent people because they happened t o live near a ‘militarily significant target’.’’ Their verdict is then “a strictly conditioned moral acceptance

of nuclear deterrence” ( 186). This is said to yield criteria for morally assessing the elements of deterrence strategy. The bare assertion by government that such and such a policy initiative will strengthen deterrence will not be sufficient for their moral support. These criteria are (1 ) opposition to all plans for fighting and ‘prevailing’ in a nuclear war; (2) opposition to any quest for nuclear superiority; ( 3 ) the demand that “each proposed addition to our strategic system or change in strategic doctrine must be assessed precisely in the light of whether i t will render steps towards ‘pro- gressive disarmament’ more or less likely” (1 88). The bishops now take the risk - although they were warned against it in the Vati- can consultation - of making some specific judgments based on their understanding of technical matters. They condemn (1) all de- ployment of apparent first strike weapons (MX and Pershing I1 missiles are mentioned by name); (2) all nuclear war-fighting strategies (NATO’s Flexible Response fits this description); (3) all

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lowering of the nuclear threshold and blurring of the difference between nuclear and conventional weapons (i.e. battlefield nuclear weapons and perhaps the ambivalent cruise missiles, though these are not named). Then follow a number of positive recommenda- tions designed to bring present policy into line with these demands. The gist of them is a return to “sufficiency” and the removal of dangerous ‘warfighting’ systems. It would not however be true to say that they hanker after a return to a simple anti-city minimum deterrent such as the Frefich bishops appear to do in their recent statement. Their strictures about targeting would not support it, at least, not as a permanent policy. Their intentions are limited to setting up firm moral barriers against “resort to nuclear weapons” (194). It is a fmt step, not a final position. So, although they cannot bring themselves to condemn nuclear deterrence outright, they speak very warmly of those in the Catholic community who do so by way of a prophetic challenge (1 97-198).

It is particularly significant that the bishops leave the question open in this way and resist all temptations to come up with a moral theory - a casuistry - which would justify deterrence in some pure, acceptable form. Nuclear deterrence is, after all, a manifesta- tion of radical moral disorder. To attempt to make something out of it - even with a “lesser-of-two-evils” casuistry - is trying to square the circle, or dress the devil in cassock and surplice. Their position is instead one of deep scepticism about any form of nuclear deterrence.

But what of alternative defence? Having come out strongly against first-use policies and in favour of pushing up the nuclear threshold as far as possible, the bishops know they have to say something about alternatives. They have to face the “conventional arms dilemma” (2 1 5-2 19). They say cautiously:

“We cannot judge the strength of these arguments (for strength- ening conventional defence) in particular cases. It may well be that some strengthenhg of conventional defence would be a proportionate price to pay, if this wil l reduce the possibility of a nuclear war.”

On the other hand, is it not true that the nuclear arms race is only the most deadly part of a much larger arms race, consisting - most expensively - of a vast development of. conventional weapons? It is the strong and permanent position of the Roman Church that the arms race is a crime against the poor of the world. So the bishops do not want to encourage it, even as an interim policy. More- over “making the world safe for conventional war” is not something they want to encourage either. They come to the conclusion that nuclear disarmament depends upon a simultaneous effort to

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“reduce tensions and to work for the balanced reduction of conventional forces”. They rightly believe that the conventional arms race is as much a danger to world peace as the nuclear arms race. So they hope for:

“ongoing negotiations for mutual balanced force reductions, the prospects for which are certainly not dim and would be enhanced by agreements on strategic weapons, and in the confidence-building measures still envisaged under the Helsinki agreement and review conference” (2 18).

In this third part of the letter, “Promotion of Peace: Proposals and Policies”, the bishops often appear to be voicing the lost cause of dgtente in the midst of the new cold war. In that sense also they are swimming against the current of contemporary American poli- tics, which cannot be altogether a bad thing. Moral realism cannot be content with simply opposing the worst features of the present super-power confrontation, it must oppose the confrontation in some deeper sense.

True practical realism is an absolute requirement. But - if it is to be understood in the Thomist sense of prudence or practical wisdom - it needs an overall sense of ultimate goals and of the direction in which we really desire to move - as opposed to the one we are moving in at the moment. All other technical judgments should be subordinate to this. So there is no good reason to accept that realism always means pressing on with the policies of the Gov- ernment - which will always claim that “there is no alternative”. There is no reason why realism should dictate that we work through established structures only, when these structures (like those of “multilateral disarmament”) have been shown to be powerless to bring about a change of direction. There is no reason either why only those policies which might be expected to win the next elec- tion should be considered to be the realistic ones. Christian realism cannot be tied down to what is here and now politically acceptable. The latter might be taking us to headlong destruction, body and soul. In which case, the so-called realism which is content with a “lesser-of-two-evils” casuistry may simply amount to keeping things on an even keel as we sail towards disaster. It may be the case then, that some stronger form of Christian witness is more truly realistic than the common-sense, politically-plausible pathways which Christians in public service are naturally drawn to. It may be the function of Christian realism to indicate other, seem- ingly impossible pathways. The Dutch bishops say something in their Pastoral letter on nuclear weapons which is much to the point:

“One should not underestimate the force of moral and religious conviction. To recognise evil for what it is, and to define it as

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such, are important things in themselves. But by doing so at the same time a direction is pointed, and an obligation indi- cated. What seemed inconceivable before a moral standpoint had been resolutely taken, may become possible after that. It has an influence on points of view and political options. It can also lend new impetus to a process . . . which otherwise would stagnate or come t o nothing, lacking moral clarity and conviction. A moral judgment can also increasingly guide the political decision process to the essential interest in the longer run. The world-wide condemnation of racism may elucidate what we mean.

This condemnation has not yet caused racism to disappear, or all concomitant problems to come to an end. But with it a norm has been set, which ever since has grown stronber in the world conscience. In the same way a world-wide refusal to consider the use of nuclear weapons morally acceptable might be an enormous stimulus t o the disarmament process.

Such a refusal might also lead to extrication from the ide- ology of deterrence.”

(“Peace and Justice”, May 1983, Ch 1 Par 2) They seem to be speaking here of what some Protestant chur-

ches would call a status confessionis, in the form of a refusal of service to earthly powers on some crucial matter, which Christians may always be liable to. A resolute minority may have a wide and lasting influence on the moral climate. The way in which a handful of American pacifists have influenced the bishops themselves is a case in point. What else could have led the entire Conference to give such favourable treatment to the notion of non-violent resistance? (231-233) They even give some support to the notion that it may form the most realistic kind of defence in the nuclear era. As an answer to the conventional arms dilemma, it is perhaps the rational course but not the politically viable one at present. Unless a very large number of ordinary people are convinced that an alternative type of security system gives real security, they will not be persuaded t o vote against nuclear deterrence, even when they think it will bring nuclear war in their lifetime. What is needed is something like a complete re-education in the meaning of security in the modern world, to convince people - as the bishops put it - that “it is wrong to equate arms with security” (270). Present governments, East, West, North and South are very ill-disposed to such a thing. But this document is a major contribution from one of the only organised opinion-making bodies which have the resources for it: the churches. It is - as the bishops clearly mean it t o be - an instrument in the required re-education.

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Even if the Pastoral Letter does not give an unequivocal verdict on nuclear deterrence it has implications which could have very far-reaching effects on the way Catholics and many other Christians see things. For instance, if it would be unjustifiable to start a nuclear exchange, as the bishops say it is, then Catholics in the chain of command must be considered unreliable. There must be many thousands of thein and it ought t o make them useless for the purpose of deterrence. This is especially true of those who are involved with strategic nuclear weapons and the new destabilising systems such as Pershing 11. N o one following the bishops’ reasoning could think that they could be used in a morally acceptable way. This is perhaps the most far-reaching (though unexpressed) implication of the letter. It could bring about a major, long-term shift in the attitude of Catholics t o nuclear weapons - if there is any time left for long-term shifts. I t should be the most important instance of the limits set by the gospel to Christian obedience to the State.

We have to thank the American bishops for many things in this pastoral letter. Aniong them 1 would mention: giving the lie to the idea that bishops can never become expert enough in technical strategic matters t o make sound moral judgments about them; being serious about setting up the long, common process of education and consultation which was necessary before the letter could be produced; setting their faces against their own government in the matter of planning for nuclear war; avoiding the temptations to justify deterrence with a moral casuistry, even when they cannot condemn it outright: and lastly, attending always t o the mate- rial events and not merely t o the theories which are devised to make them palatable: something which all Christian moralists could learn from.

The Challenge of Peace: God’s Promise and Our Response, CTS/SPCK, 1983, pp 94. €1.50.

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no to the nuclear warriors: the us bishops' pastoral

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