NICHE CONSTRUCTION AND THE EVOLUTIONOF LEADERSHIP

BRIAN R. SPISAKVU University Amsterdam

MICHAEL J. O’BRIENUniversity of Missouri

NIGEL NICHOLSONLondon Business School

MARK VAN VUGTVU University Amsterdam and University of Oxford

We use the concept of niche construction—the process whereby individuals, throughtheir activities, interactions, and choices, modify their own and each other’s environ-ments—as an example of how biological evolution and cultural evolution interacted toform an integrative foundation of modern organizational leadership. Resulting adapta-tions are formal structures that facilitate coordination of large, postagrarian organiza-tional networks. We provide three propositions explaining how leadership processesevolve over time within and between organizations in order to solve specific coordinationproblems. We highlight the balancing act between self-interests and group interests inorganizations and show how leadership must regulate this tension to maintain organiza-tional fitness. We conclude with predictions about the future evolution of leadership inorganizations.

Leadership is an important factor contributingto organizational success, yet after centuries ofinquiry, leadership theory remains underdevel-oped. In response, scholars are generating agrowing body of literature on leadership in theirattempt to create a more unified theory by high-lighting evolutionary processes that are ger-mane to both the biological and cultural dimen-sions of human behavior (e.g., Nicholson, 2011;Spisak, Nicholson, & van Vugt, 2011; van Vugt,Hogan, & Kaiser, 2008). These initiatives fit com-fortably with Suddaby, Hardy, and Huy’s (2011:244) point that “it is now time for less consolida-tion and more provocation” in theory develop-ment in the organizational sciences. In this ar-ticle we combine insights derived frombiological science with existing organizationaltheory to model the evolution of leadership andits impact on organizational change.

Our contribution focuses on integrated theorybuilding, where multiple elements of the lead-ership phenomenon, such as individual agents,context, and dynamic interactions, are consid-ered simultaneously (e.g., Avolio, 2007; Lord,Brown, Harvey, & Hall, 2001). In existing theoriesscholars have been slow to adopt this approach.One problem is a focus on near-term “how”questions, as opposed to ultimate “why” ques-tions concerning leader-follower motives andinteractions. Instead of asking questions regard-ing “how transformational and transactionalleadership dimensions differ” (e.g., Judge & Pic-colo, 2004), we seek to analyze “why differentleadership behaviors emerge in the firstplace”—a question that requires a deeper con-sideration of leadership as an evolving process.A related issue is the scarcity of interdisciplin-ary treatments, where new concepts and ap-proaches are brought into the fold of traditionalperspectives. This deficit can promote signifi-cant miscalculations of organizational manage-ment. For example, previous theories focusingprimarily on rational agency overlook the non-economic complexities of the manager-subordi-

We thank former associate editor Neal Ashkanasy andthree anonymous reviewers for extremely helpful commentson various drafts. We also thank Richard Arvey, Daniel Bal-liet, Nancy Blaker, Joep Cornelissen, Allen Grabo, OmarSolinger, and Joshua Tybur for their insightful feedback.

� Academy of Management Review2015, Vol. 40, No. 2, 291–306.http://dx.doi.org/10.5465/amr.2013.0157

291Copyright of the Academy of Management, all rights reserved. Contents may not be copied, emailed, posted to a listserv, or otherwise transmitted without the copyrightholder’s express written permission. Users may print, download, or email articles for individual use only.

nate interaction (Davis, Schoorman, & Donald-son, 1997).

Integrated theory building also moves ana-lytic interest well past excessive “gap spotting”(Alvesson & Sandberg, 2011), which tends to gen-erate suboptimal theory because it underplaysthe dynamic nature of leadership in organiza-tions (Avolio, 2007; Whetten, 1989). As a conse-quence of this shortcoming, scholars often frameleadership more in person than in processterms, inviting fundamental attribution errors,such as emphasizing the causal effect of spe-cific leaders on coordination to the exclusion ofother situational factors like group size (see We-ber, Camerer, Rottenstreich, & Knez, 2001). Schol-ars also tend to focus attention more proxi-mately on how leadership operates in a givencontext, rather than on the complex dynamicslinking these individual observations (for an ex-ception see Uhl-Bien, Marion, & McKelvey, 2007).Thus, a static approach makes it difficult to ac-count for the changing nature of the organiza-tional environment.

Solving these problems requires us to con-sider how and why varying forms of leadershipdevelop across organizations over time. Weadopt the perspective that evolution has en-dowed humans with attributes and capabilitiesthat govern how we interact with one anotherin organizations (e.g., Pierce & White, 1999). Inthis view cultural evolution is an adaptiveextension of biological evolution (Boyd & Rich-erson, 1985; Durham, 1991; Laland & Brown, 2011;Mesoudi, 2011), with both being governed by thesame processes: variation, heritability, and se-lection. Over time, adaptations will encode bio-logically—such as an instinctive ability and de-sire to lead and to follow—if selective pressuresare strong, consistent, and persistent. Other evo-lutionary mechanisms will play out culturallyover a shorter time span—for example, manage-ment adopting hierarchical versus flat leader-ship structures to coordinate successfully.

This biology-culture connection provides uswith a clear set of evolutionary principles toanalyze simultaneously proximate, short-termleadership issues as well as longer-range dy-namics. This, in turn, takes us to the develop-ment of a recursive predictive model: specificleadership traits will be selected for in a partic-ular organizational niche, and the emergentleadership will, over time, modify that niche andcodirect organizational change. Leadership is

therefore a dual process that emerges fromand is the constructor of the organizationalenvironment.

Our model is based on the premise that lead-ership is a biologically and culturally adaptiveprocess that serves social systems by coordinat-ing and directing effort (van Vugt et al., 2008).The ability to form cohesive groups that effec-tively coordinate to achieve mutual goals canultimately enhance fitness (Couzin, Krause,Franks, & Levin, 2005; Flack, Girvan, de Waal, &Krakauer, 2006; Harcourt, Ang, Sweetman, John-stone, & Manica, 2009). However, organizing theefforts of groups—that is, interdependent indi-viduals who share social identities and havecommon interests—comes with costs and risks.For example, if “group” is defined at the organi-zational level, then transaction costs of coordi-nation are high because of the increased likeli-hood of divergent incentives and routinesamong individuals and subgroups (Ren, Kiesler,& Fussell, 2008). An example is the different“pulls” that emerge from competing agendaswithin some matrix-managed businesses. Firmsare continually under pressure to manage suchorganizational challenges (Gulati & Singh,1998). Should a firm, for instance, exploit a well-established niche or invest in exploration of anew market for fear of becoming obsolete(March 1991)? The risks associated with an in-creasing number of these coordination problemscan spark damaging conflicts over collective ac-tion decisions. It is the presence of such recur-rent dilemmas in the environment that selectsfor adaptive solutions (e.g., Nowak & Sig-mund, 2005).

Thus, leadership can be defined initially asan adaptive process where one or more individ-uals emerge as a focal point to influence andcoordinate behavior for solving social chal-lenges posed by dynamic physical and culturalenvironments (Hogan, Curphy, & Hogan, 1994;King, Johnson, & van Vugt, 2009; Nicholson, 2013;van Vugt, 2006; van Vugt et al., 2008). Indeed,over evolutionary time, environmental pres-sures facing human groups, such as intergroupconflict, appear to have selected for leadershipas one of the principal devices for achievingsocial coordination (e.g., Pearce, Conger, &Locke, 2007; van Vugt, 2006; Vaughn, Eerkens, &Kantner, 2010). In short, the interplay betweenleadership and followership is a distinctly so-cial process that addresses the critical issues of

292 AprilAcademy of Management Review

survival and reproduction (Kenrick, Li, & Butner,2003; Sober & Wilson, 1998).

This argument in its general form is neitherunique nor revolutionary. However, a particulardevelopmental process of leadership has lackedattention—the evolutionary shift from huntingand gathering to agriculture (Richerson, Boyd, &Bettinger, 2001; Rowley-Conwy & Layton, 2011)and the postagrarian organizational transfor-mations that resulted in a multiplicity of leader-ship structures. Investigating this evolutionarytrajectory helps to clarify the role of leadershipwithin the organizational processes of coevolu-tion and niche construction, both as an agent ofselection and change and as an object of theseprocesses. In lay terms, leaders make historyand history makes leaders (Nicholson, 2013).

NICHE CONSTRUCTION THEORYIN ORGANIZATIONS

A framework for understanding the coevolu-tionary nature of leadership and organizationsis niche construction theory (NCT), a youngbranch of evolutionary biology that has becomea multidisciplinary movement involving evolu-tionary biologists, ecologists, psychologists, an-thropologists, archeologists, computer scien-tists, philosophers, and others (Kendal, Tehrani,& Odling-Smee, 2011; Laland & O’Brien, 2011).Proponents of NCT have a fundamentally differ-ent view of how niches are constructed from thattypically found in the social and biological sci-ences (e.g., Chase & Leibold, 2003). In contrast totraditional theories of evolution, in which re-searchers view organisms as molded by envi-ronmental pressures, NCT provides a secondroute to the adaptive fit between organism andenvironment by emphasizing the capacity ofspecies to modify environmental states. Nicheconstruction theorists propose that, in modifyingtheir own world, organisms frequently modifythe environments of other organisms that sharethose environments. When beavers build dams,for example, they affect considerably more thanthe probability that genes for dam building willspread. They also modify nutrient cycling anddecomposition dynamics, influence the charac-ter of water and materials transported down-stream, and ultimately influence plant and com-munity composition and diversity (Naiman,Johnston, & Kelley, 1988). Importantly, the con-structed niches also feedback on, and influence,

the behaviors of the niche-constructingorganisms.

In the human context, niche construction is aprocess by which we adjust our environment tosuch a degree that we create our own selectionpressures, resulting in distinct adaptations.Constructing niches that are focused on marketdefense versus prospecting, for example, canselect for a diverging set of organizationalnorms that emphasize the value of congruentbehaviors and styles, such as risk aversion atthe cost of exploratory innovation. From this per-spective, one can use evolutionary mechanismsto model how agents modify the organizationalenvironment and which adaptations are likelyto emerge.

The recursive process involves agents re-sponding to fitness-relevant problems posed bytheir environments and also setting themselvesnew problems through niche construction. Forinstance, niche orientations that emphasize theinterests of a singular shareholder group versusmultiple stakeholder groups can have down-stream consequences on the preferential selec-tion of organizational traits (e.g., Donaldson &Preston, 1995). Specifically, Campbell (2007) hasargued that constructing a shareholder-orientedniche can create coordination problems associ-ated with short-term horizons and unsustainablepractices. This, in turn, creates new selection pres-sures favoring perhaps a more sustainable, stake-holder-focused orientation. NCT thus treats evo-lutionary change as resulting in part fromagents codirecting their own evolution (Laland,Odling-Smee, & Feldman, 2000; Lewontin, 1983;Odling-Smee, Laland, & Feldman, 2003).

The logic of NCT has long figured in the orga-nizational behavior and management literature.Graen (1975), for example, noted proactive rolemaking as a missing element in role theory. Injob design, a similar idea—job crafting—hasdenoted the tendency of employees to activelyshape their jobs (Clegg & Spencer, 2007; Grant,2007; Nicholson, 2010). In the careers literature,Van Maanen and Schein (1979) coined the termrole innovation to capture a related concept,which later became a central element in theanalysis of role transitions and the reshaping ofwork environments (Nicholson, 1984). Sociolo-gists have also favored the idea of “structura-tion,” capturing the interaction between peopleand institutional structures (Orlikowski, 1992).Much organizational development can be

2015 293Spisak, O’Brien, Nicholson, and van Vugt

viewed through the NCT lens, such as firmsshifting gears in terms of technology, productinnovation, staffing criteria, and selectionprocesses.

NCT’s strength is in identifying how modifica-tions to a niche, such as a shift in managementorientation, lead to the emergence of adaptivetraits and strategies favored in the selective en-vironment over time (Laland, Odling-Smee, &Feldman, 2001; Laland, Odling-Smee, & Myles,2010; Odling-Smee, 1988; Rendell, Fogarty, & La-land, 2011). A primary factor contributing to theprogression of human niche construction is ourability to acquire and transmit informationquickly through culture (Laland et al., 2000). Rel-ative to genetic inheritance, cultural inheritancecan have a more immediate and profound influ-ence on the selective environment because cul-turally inherited information is not bound bypurely genetic pathways for transmission. Thismeans that leadership can rapidly construct aniche through cultural mechanisms.

Scholars have long argued that an essentialrole of leadership is to shape and oversee thedevelopment of organizational culture (e.g., Kai-ser, Hogan, & Craig, 2008; Schein, 1985). For ex-ample, formal leadership in an organizationmay decide to construct a flatter organizationalenvironment. This constructed niche will in-crease the fitness value and frequency of spe-cific organizational traits, such as democraticnormative beliefs and associated behaviors (seeHaley & Sidanius, 2005). Yet, to continue withthis example, a flatter structure with democraticnorms may not provide the most advantageousoutcome in markets that reward problem-solving speed over problem-solving quality,which tend to favor hierarchical networks (seeMihm, Loch, Wilkinson, & Huberman, 2010). Thissubsequently reintroduces pressure on formalleadership to enact further niche modifica-tions—in this example, restoring some hierar-chical processes—to remain adaptive. Accu-rately representing this feedback loop betweenleadership and the organizational niche helpsexpose the intended and unintended effectsof coordinated behavior on organizationaldevelopment.

Importantly, our model does not assume thatall coordinated behavior is caused by leader-ship. Operational rules, norms, and shared mo-tives—sometimes called “substitutes for leader-ship” (Howell & Dorfman, 1981)—are additional

sources of coordination. Yet the efficacy of lead-ership as a solution to coordination challengesderives from its ability to successfully promotethe execution of these alternatives. As an exam-ple, having a fraction of agents in a group will-ing to lead the enforcement of prosocial norms—even at a personal cost— can significantlyenhance the effectiveness of coordination(Bowles & Gintis, 2004; Gintis, 2000). In this man-ner some form of coercive leadership advocat-ing affiliative norms can reinforce the observedlink between prosocial behavior and organiza-tional commitment (Grant, Dutton, & Rosso,2008). Leadership is therefore a central principleof organization because it both initiates and fa-cilitates effective coordination.

COORDINATION AND THE FOUNDATIONSOF MODERN LEADERSHIP

To appreciate the role of leadership in nicheconstruction, we briefly consider the evolution-ary origins of the agricultural revolution. Under-standing the emergence of formal leadershipand how it has been applied to solve problemsin groups potentially increases our foresightabout future organizational evolution. The ori-gins of modern civilization were triggered byclimatic oscillations during the tail end of thePleistocene, circa 11,000 years ago, which de-pleted the resource base and intensified recur-rent coordination problems, such as decisionsabout group movement and intergroup and in-tragroup conflict (Richerson et al., 2001). Thesepressures demanded increasingly sophisticatedcoordination, and existing leadership tenden-cies were refined and expanded to solve thisproblem (Flannery, 1968).

Prior to agriculture, hunter-gatherers main-tained egalitarian leadership regimes, whichhave been referred to as “reversed dominancehierarchies” (Boehm, 1993), denoting a power-sharing model with flexible leadership and thecensoring of what Boehm calls “upstartism.”Postagricultural forms differed greatly, some re-taining low-power models of leadership, such asthe highly collectivist lifestyle of pastoralists(Nicholson, 2005), whereas others—precursors ofmodern corporate cultures—enabled elaborateresource-based stratification to evolve as a re-sponse to the new opportunity to accrue andinherit resources, power, and wealth (e.g., Kirch,1984; Service, 1975). This facility, in the context of

294 AprilAcademy of Management Review

fixed settlements, spawned larger and poten-tially more varied kinds of social networks. In-creasing social complexity ushered in a new setof adaptive challenges (O’Brien & Laland, 2012).Human niches that arose during the agriculturalrevolution required leadership that not onlycould manage such essential activities as re-source acquisition, distribution, and protectionbut also could resolve an increasing number ofcoordination dilemmas, such as managinglarge-scale conflict within groups and betweengroups. Table 1 shows the niche constructiontrajectory from the emergence of large-scale for-mal leadership in the agricultural revolution tothe global leadership of the modern era.

Defining Formal Leadership

Leadership as an adaptive process for solvingthese dilemmas comprises active agents whomodify culture, initiate niche construction, andalter future environments—what scholars referto as “ecological inheritance” (Odling-Smee,1988; Odling-Smee & Laland, 2011). The key dif-ference between humans and other species,even the closest primates, is the self-consciousintentionality in our niche construction. It is hu-mans’ overwhelming sense of agency, purpose,expectation, and planning that forms the cogni-tive roots of the niche construction we call “cul-ture building” (Nicholson, 2011).

Leadership supports niche constructionthrough directed coordination of individual ac-tivities to support the pursuit of joint goals (Hol-lander, 1992; van Vugt et al., 2008), where “coor-dination” is defined as “joint interactions thatare ‘self-policing’ because payoffs are highest ifeveryone does the same thing” (Richerson, Boyd,

& Henrich, 2003: 358). However, as group sizeincreased across human evolutionary history,genetic relatedness among individuals’ de-creased, thus enlarging the need for formalleadership to maintain cohesion. The underly-ing reason for this increased formality is thenepotistic tendency to favor genetically relatedothers (Hamilton, 1964; Neyer & Lang, 2003). Thiscan hinder large-scale, loosely related coordina-tion as incentives splinter and resource compe-tition between organizational subgroups inten-sifies (Ren et al., 2008). Thus, formal leadershipis a mechanism for maintaining adaptive levelsof cohesion between increasingly unrelatedgroup members to enhance the relative fitnessof an organization. This makes large-scale for-mal leadership an essential component to coor-dinate the behavior of loosely related groups incompetitive organizational environments.

Prerequisite Adaptations

Adapting to complex and dynamic environ-ments in large-scale social groups requires aflexible coordination strategy that is not tunedto any specific environment (Bergstrom, 2002).Leadership, as an evolving process, offers thisflexibility across a varied organizational land-scape. It is able to serve equally the battle formarket share, the cultivation of prosocial hu-man resource management, and the explora-tion of entrepreneurial opportunities (Zahra &Pearce, 1990). In modern times, various styles,such as transformational, transactional, orstewardship paradigms, have emerged to en-act distinctive coordinating strategies to solvespecific group problems (Bass, 1997; Davis etal., 1997; Houghton & Yoho, 2005).

TABLE 1Leadership Evolution from the Agricultural Revolution to the Modern Era

Organizational Properties Agricultural Revolution Industrial Revolution Modern Era

Leadership milestones Formalized leadershipstabilizes

Industrialized leadershipindependent from traditionalruling class stabilizes

Transnational corporateleadership expands

Niche characteristics � Nested structure� Division of labor� Hierarchical� Centralized� Per capita subsistence

living

� Emergence of middle class� Emergence of modern unions� Per capita growth

� Globally diverse executives� Flatter� Decentralized� Global middle class growth

2015 295Spisak, O’Brien, Nicholson, and van Vugt

In addition to flexible large-scale coordina-tion, another component necessary for the devel-opment of postagrarian niches is rapid learning,to ensure that group members know and playtheir part. Humans, and to a limited degreeother primates, learn culturally—imitating oth-ers and transmitting knowledge within and be-tween generations (Tennie, Call, & Tomasello,2009). Because of this ability, we have been re-ferred to as “the ultimate niche constructors”(Odling-Smee et al., 2003: 28).

To execute large-scale niche construction incompetitive social environments, learning therules for coordination is paramount. Formalleadership addresses this concern by increasingthe pace of cultural transmission through di-rected social learning, rather than by relying onindividuals to separately adopt their own mod-els, which can decrease relative group cohesion.Specifically, formalized leadership interactswith culture to institutionalize norms and pro-mote uniform enculturation. This is an outcomethat is especially desired in modern organiza-tions, which typically comprise unrelated groupmembers who bring their own potentially divi-sive normative beliefs and practices into thecollective. Mentors, educators, and advisers areroles that support the leadership goals of encul-turation and niche construction.

THE MODEL: LEADERSHIP ANDNICHE CONSTRUCTION

Evidence for the importance of flexible lead-ership and cultural learning in human socialevolution is compelling. It is both fascinatingand helpful to understand what initially al-lowed us to cross the threshold from informalleadership into formal, less genetically relatedleadership, given that (1) natural selection fo-cuses primarily on the individual level (Wil-liams, 1966) yet (2) large-scale formalized lead-ership in loosely related social networkstypically involves an asymmetric payoff favor-ing the leader (i.e., a relative cost to the individ-ual follower; Hammerstein, 2003). A relatedquestion concerns why formal leadership wasable to stabilize in human culture, rather thanhumans simply resuming a hunter-gatherer life-style when environmental pressures eased,given the potential fitness costs associated withtransitioning to large-scale groups (Mummert,Esche, Robinson, & Armelagos, 2011)? Finally,

why did these increasingly formal leadershipstrategies evolve into the modern structures wecurrently observe, and what does this imply forfuture organizational evolution?

It is becoming increasingly clear that embed-ded in these decision-making processes are thebasic mechanisms of evolution, which tend towork on a subconscious level and fully accountfor apparently nonrational choice (Aktipis &Kurzban, 2004; Bentley, O’Brien, & Brock, 2014).Regardless of whether the pressure is comingfrom the natural environment or from an organi-zational niche constructed by leadership, therewill exist the same continuing and observablecycle of variation, inheritance, and selection. In-corporating this logic into the study of organiza-tional behavior generates a clear set of propo-sitions for analyzing and predicting changeover time.

Leadership Propositions

To construct our model, we first consider whyand when agents sacrifice immediate self-interest for the sake of the group, even whenpayoffs gained from the sacrifice asymmetri-cally favor the leader. Multilevel selection the-ory deals with the inherent dilemma betweenself and group when entering loosely related,post-hunter-gatherer niches. Quite simply, ifcompetition between groups is stronger thancompetition within groups, adaptations benefit-ing the group will emerge (e.g., Sober & Wilson,1998). A version relevant to the study of organi-zations is referred to as “cultural group selec-tion” (Henrich, 2004). The term followership in-vestment (Spisak et al., 2011) can then be used tocapture this self/group trade-off and the oppor-tunity it provides for formal large-scale organi-zational practices to evolve.

The act of following can be considered aninvestment of capital, energy, time, or anythingelse that is a potential cost to an individual inorder to accomplish organizational goals. Thisform of large-scale, asymmetric coordinated in-vestment is possible only if (1) there is a prevail-ing between-group pressure relative to within-group pressure, such as market competition,and (2) the perceived return on followership in-vestment is sufficient to increase the fitness ofboth the group and its individual members. Anyform of loosely related, large-scale coordinationwithout these basic rules of multilevel return on

296 AprilAcademy of Management Review

investment would revert to a more primitivedominance hierarchy where a leader’s powerwas absolute and coordination coerced, gener-ally with minimal benefit to other group mem-bers (Wilson, van Vugt, & O’Gorman, 2008).

The payoffs, however, are perceived, ofcourse. Therefore, individuals may suspend im-mediate self-interest, despite the absence of aclear long-term payoff. The general need to be-long (Baumeister & Leary, 1995), for example,can encourage followership investment in thegroup far beyond what appears to be rational.Withholding this fundamental need for social-ity would constitute a cost on followers suchthat going it alone would not be an option. TheMachiavellian tactic by some leaders of artifi-cially raising the level of perceived externalthreat to an organization is another approachthat can elicit an apparently irrational level offollowership investment. Finally, the presenceof actual market competition can also drive thisgroup-level participation. The central idea isthat multiple group-level pressures can encour-age followership investment, and studyingthese factors will add to our understanding oforganizational involvement and large-scalecoordination.

Proposition 1: Followers will be morelikely to pursue organizational goals,even at a personal cost to immediateself-interested goals, when within-group (i.e., individual-level) perceivedcompetition is relatively less than be-tween-group (i.e., group-level) per-ceived competition.

This adds a worthwhile multilevel dimensionto existing motivational theories, such as expec-tancy theory (Vroom, 1964). Specifically, by in-cluding the group-level variable, Proposition 1predicts that employee motivation can remainhigh, even when the valence of the expected(individual-level) outcome is negative, providedthat the costs and benefits associated with per-ceived between-group competition are ofgreater value than the costs and benefits as-signed to within-group competition.

Although Proposition 1 provides the rationalefor large-scale niche construction, it does littleto explain how various leadership processesstabilize (i.e., sustain followership investmentand become resistant to change). Research hasshown that firms battling for market share in

highly competitive markets can sustain a highlevel of performance with weak “dictatorship”governance, whereas firms not facing intensemarket competition perform better with good“democratic” governance (Giroud & Mueller,2011). Similarly, as Pierce and White (1999, 2006)noted in nonhuman primate and human studies,status-based dominance hierarchies stabilize inecologies where resources are highly contested(i.e., clustered, predictable, and visible), butegalitarian structures emerge where resourcesare less contested (i.e., dispersed, unpredict-able, and concealed).

We know that followers hold implicit leadershipprototypes based on a variety of these evolution-arily consistent group dynamics (e.g., Spisak et al.,2011). Such fitness-relevant coordination prob-lems can include not only the battle for marketshare but the need for effective intragroup coor-dination (e.g., through human resource manage-ment practices), intergroup coordination (e.g.,the management of postmerger integration), andthe recurrent dilemma between exploration andexploitation. The main point is that specific co-ordination problems need to be solved in orderto maintain a relative level of organizationalfitness. Moreover, as we noted in relation to theadaptive strategies of preagricultural groups,context-specific leadership processes are se-lected and stabilized in order to address diverg-ing coordination problems. One of the differ-ences with modern organizational nicheconstruction, however, is that coordination chal-lenges intensify when group members are unre-lated and diverse. This spurs the evolution andstabilization of more formalized leadership pro-cesses with the capacity to facilitate large-scaleniche construction.

Specifically, the personal cost associated withfollowership investment in unrelated groups,combined with a tendency to be self-interested,creates a high level of investment risk (e.g.,cheaters may shirk group-level responsibility orleaders may attempt to exploit followers). Com-mon to all coordination problems and subse-quent niche construction in loosely relatedgroups is the need to find an adaptive balancebetween individual-level investment and group-level payoff. Low relative payoffs in competitiveenvironments can threaten organizational fit-ness. This places a premium on the ability toconstruct a niche that can stabilize adaptivecoordination at a higher level than in competitor

2015 297Spisak, O’Brien, Nicholson, and van Vugt

organizations. Understanding how leadershipprocesses stabilize and facilitate fitness-en-hancing niche construction is the next step inexplaining the evolution of leadership.

The logic of what have been called the threeRs of human cooperation—reciprocation, retri-bution, and reputation (e.g., Boyd & Richerson,1992, 2009; Fehr & Gächter, 2002; Trivers, 1971)—can be used to help explain how various formsof formal leadership can occur. Once niche con-struction begins in an organization, formal lead-ership must emerge and deploy control mecha-nisms capable of eliciting the desired normconformity. A basic requirement for achievingstability is ensuring that the perceived cost ofnot following a norm is greater than the cost offollowing it. This we define as “organizationalniche equilibrium.” It is a situation where thecosts of followers switching to available alter-natives are too great and the benefits too little,so the niche stabilizes. This can be achievedthrough various forms of the three Rs.

Take, for instance, the construction of hierar-chical versus flat organizational structures toaddress coordination problems. Management,working to construct a flatter, cooperative niche,needs to maintain reciprocal relationships withmultiple subgroups and individuals across theorganization. This will likely select for a proso-cial leadership process consisting of emotionalempathy and other affiliative traits to supportmultiple streams of reciprocity. The constructionof a hierarchical niche, in contrast, creates arank order of agents where breaches of reciproc-ity with those lower in rank, such as frontlineemployees, are likely to occur. Here costly retri-bution for not following the hierarchical normmay be used to achieve niche stability. Typi-cally, this happens because payoffs asymmetri-cally favor those at the apex of hierarchies,rather than reciprocity governing exchanges atall levels (Hammerstein, 2003). A constructedniche of this kind will arguably select for a dom-inance leadership process that encourages vig-orous methods of status acquisition and mainte-nance, such as aggressive behavior andMachiavellian tactics. In this example we see thebeginnings of niche construction, where influen-tial stakeholders such as executives and ownersmodify the environment in an attempt to increasethe likelihood of success. The changed contextsubsequently selects for niche-specific leadershipprocesses to sustain niche equilibrium.

Once established, organizational niches se-lect for relevant and valued characteristicsamong agents that confer on them reputationaland material benefits. For example, a companydefending markets compared to one with a pros-pector orientation (Miles & Snow, 1978) will ac-cord different value to risk-taking behaviors. Ad-hering to these niche-specific norms associatedwith success can consequently add to a positivereputation, increase status, attract cooperation,and ultimately enhance fitness.

Proposition 2: Given group-level invest-ment (Proposition 1), organizationalniche construction will stabilize underthe following conditions: (a) niche con-struction selects for niche-specific for-mal leadership processes that favorvarying degrees of reciprocity versusretribution to sustain followership in-vestment; (b) the selected process is con-tingent on the level of asymmetric pay-off between agents embedded in theniche (e.g., low asymmetry � increasedreciprocal strategies); and (c) niche-spe-cific leadership receives higher reputa-tional value (e.g., flat niche � prosocialleadership � high reputation).

We argue that this underlying logic for sustain-ing followership investment and managing self/group payoffs applies to all forms of organiza-tional niche construction.

What the stabilization process identified inProposition 2 does not do, however, is accountfor the actual modification and evolution oflarge-scale formalized leadership over time. Anadditional step is required to explain the widevariety of leadership processes and niche typesvisible in the organizational landscape. As withall evolutionary mechanisms, stable variation ofmultiple competing equilibria, such as hierar-chical versus flat structures, is required for se-lection (Boyd & Richerson, 2009). “Multiple equi-libria” means that diverging niche constructiongives rise to diverse leadership processes thatcan become sufficiently stable (i.e., resistant tochange) to engage in competitive between-group selection. It is at this point where NCT,with its emphasis on downstream behavioralconsequences, is perhaps most analyticallyuseful.

Machiavellian-type leaders, for instance, as aresult of self-interest, may attempt to sustain

298 AprilAcademy of Management Review

asymmetric payoffs by exploiting followers’bounded rationality and emotions. Managementcan signal high levels of explicit concern forcorporate social responsibility, in order to ap-pear prosocial, while internal business prac-tices remain nonreciprocating and “easily de-coupled,” continuing to serve the implicitfinancial and strategic goals of executives anddominant shareholders (e.g., Weaver, Treviño, &Cochran, 1999). Indeed, managing followers’emotions is an essential part of the leadershipprocess (Antonakis, Ashkanasy, & Dasborough,2009), which can potentially include the use ofprosocial “window dressing” as a means to cre-ate positive affect. However, we also predict thatmost forms of asymmetric payoff will have lim-its and will self-regulate to more symmetricalequilibria because of the cumulative nature ofcultural learning. Agents will come to recognizethe harmful downstream consequences of theirexcessive self-interested behaviors and attemptto initiate and stabilize fitness-enhancing alter-natives. Gross asymmetries embedded in aniche can quickly become unstable, requiringmodifications to the niche for it to remain viable.

Organizations are continually developingthese alternative leadership strategies and pit-ting them against each other in pursuit of mar-ket viability. The capacity for innovation, forexample, is highly advantageous in many mar-kets. Proposition 1 dictates that a sustainedlevel of between-group competition will elicitgroup-level investment. This implies that inno-vation is one organizational phenomenon thatcreates the need for coordination. Further, Prop-osition 2 indicates that a particular leadershipprocess will be needed to stabilize the require-ments of the situation. Thus, an intense level ofmarket share competition would imply the con-tingent selection of dominant, hierarchical lead-ership to quickly establish innovative suprem-acy. It is important to note that this kind ofcompetition aligns with the primate universal ofdominance hierarchy as a mechanism forachieving individual-level success (Nichol-son, 2013).

Innovation, however, is an example where aleadership process based on dominance to en-act “business warfare” can come to hinder com-petitive viability. Agents in a hierarchically or-ganized niche may have restricted input and/ormay not perceive a reciprocal return on theirfollowership investment (recall that asymmetric

payoffs typically favor those at the top) and,therefore, may withhold a percentage of theirinnovative output. Dhanaraj and Parkhe (2006)use the phrase “shadow of the future” whendiscussing concerns of reciprocity over time andits impact on innovative performance. Con-versely, for subgroups tasked with innovation,we suspect an advantageous alternative is foran organization to construct a niche of coopera-tion, rather than one of competition, by means ofa prosocial, affiliative leadership process. Thiscreates a flatter niche, which increases informa-tion flow, perceived reciprocity, and ultimatelyinnovative output. Simply stated, constructingan organizational niche that stabilizes around“how well we work together,” rather than “howwell we do against other groups,” can have aprofound evolutionary effect. Proposition 2 holdsthat in order to construct such a niche, organi-zations can work to (1) ensure a sense of reci-procity, (2) enhance the reputation of coopera-tors, and (3) apply retribution to cheaters.

What priority is assigned to various organiza-tional goals, such as innovation, postmerger in-tegration, and various organizational hurdles,depends on the importance of the challenge.Additionally, how the organization coordinatesbehavior in pursuit of these goals depends onthe type of niche construction established bykey stakeholders (e.g., decisions about hierar-chy, division of labor, centralization, and otherpillars of organizational design; Rivkin & Sig-gelkow, 2003). Continuing with the innovationexample, assigning priority to innovation mayinduce management to construct flat structureswith a multidisciplinary division of labor in or-der to stimulate and coordinate the processes ofinvention. Leadership emerging from this ori-entation consequently sustains the nichethrough application of the three Rs, which ad-vances niche construction in the intended di-rection of flat and reciprocal. Again, the lead-ership process is both a driver and product oforganizational evolution, and cultural learn-ing rapidly transmits and stabilizes subse-quent adaptations.

Crossing the threshold into large-scalegroups was human evolution’s “big bang.” Theability to niche construct on a large and com-plex scale, through the initiation and facilitationof leadership, afforded humans the opportunityto create more than enough stable variation tofuel continuous organizational evolution. How

2015 299Spisak, O’Brien, Nicholson, and van Vugt

an organization chooses to prioritize and coordi-nate its actions relative to those of its competi-tors forms the foundation of organizationalniche construction.

Proposition 3: Given group-level invest-ment (Proposition 1) and the mechanismsfor constructing a stable niche (Proposi-tion 2), large-scale formalized leadershipdynamics will evolve under the followingconditions: (a) organizations face multi-ple coordination problems with varyingpayoffs; (b) strategic alternatives are pri-oritized to maintain relative fitness be-tween organizations (e.g., high priorityassigned to innovation); (c) niche con-struction trajectories (e.g., hierarchalversus flat orientations) set by influentialstakeholders select for multiple equi-libria of niche-specific leadership pro-cesses (e.g., dominance versus prosocial),which stabilize between organizations(variation); (d) fitness-enhancing leader-ship processes increase in frequencyby means of cultural learning (inheri-tance), and processes with higher relativepayoffs between organizations persist(selection); (e) group success decreasesgroup-level competition and increasesindividual-level competition; and (f)individual-level competition decreasesgroup-level fitness, which creates a feed-back loop requiring further niche con-struction to maintain a relative level oforganizational success (see Figure 1).

One testable prediction that can be derivedfrom Proposition 3 is that as group-level compe-tition increases globally—the rise of Asianfirms, for example— group-level investmentwithin competing firms will increase to sustainrelative fitness. This means that asymmetricpayoffs within an organization will decreaseand prosocial leadership processes will in-crease in frequency to secure increased levels ofreciprocity and group-level investment acrossthe organization. This prosocial switch will havea cascading effect on other processes, such asleadership emergence. Research has shown, forinstance, that followers tend to favor femaleleaders in a prosocial context (e.g., van Vugt &Spisak, 2008). Likewise, as we previously dis-cussed, the increase in reciprocity should alsohave a positive impact on the quality of innova-

tive output. Consequently, groups that success-fully work together by enacting relatively moreadaptive leadership processes will increase theoverall fitness of each member (Sober & Wilson,1998; Williams, 1966). Those groups, and ulti-mately individuals, maintaining larger andmore integrated networks are likely to havegreater intragroup stability, access to scarce re-sources, and success during intergroup compe-

FIGURE 1An Evolutionary Cycle of OrganizationalLeadership Resulting from Coordinated

Human Niche Construction

300 AprilAcademy of Management Review

tition. They are also more likely to pass on theiracquired knowledge through cultural learning.Hence, large-scale formal leadership is funda-mentally a mechanism for expanding theseadaptive organizational networks.

Implications for Leadership andOrganizational Evolution

As groups become larger and more complex,formalized leadership maximizes the benefit ofsociality by regulating tensions between indi-vidual- and group-level interests to ensure ahealthy level of group investment. This fitness-enhancing advantage of formal leadershipstructures then spreads throughout large-scalesocieties. The reason for such ubiquity is thatformal leadership is versatile enough to providethe global institutional foundation required tocooperate on a large scale (e.g., maintainingrelatively equitable payoffs), as well as the localorganization necessary to prioritize and managespecific tasks. Leadership both defines organi-zational strategies and initiates collective ac-tion to achieve objectives.

The Coevolution of Formal Leadership andCultural Niches

What we observe in the postagrarian era, notseen before, is a compounding effect of adapta-tion passing through larger, more complex so-cial networks, which encourages the pathwaysto increase in complexity as further niche con-struction occurs. For example, as a result ofniche construction, the level of sustainablegroup density rises and formal leadership rolesemerge with greater refinement. These are thedownstream consequences. A larger population,as a result of niche construction, creates in-creasingly complex networks, and subsequentsocial stratification imposes structural con-straints (i.e., formalized hierarchy)—furtherdownstream consequences. We suggest thesefactors lead to exceptionally influential leader-ship opportunities, such as many CEO positions.These leadership hubs have greater access andcontrol over resources and, thus, become focalpoints of networks.

We argue that formalized leadership in itsmany forms can exercise an unprecedented de-gree of control over network behavior and nicheconstruction. In essence, formal leadership pro-

vides a degree of “direction” to organizationalevolution. As social complexity increases, thepossible directions to drive niche constructiondiversify (Proposition 3). Leadership’s construc-tion of relatively more successful niches willtypically increase a group’s status, causing oth-ers to adopt its fitness-enhancing cultural adap-tations to remain competitive (e.g., Mesoudi,2008). This involves cultural knowledge sweep-ing across social networks containing multipleorganizations. In these networks various alter-natives undergo selection and adaptive infor-mation is transmitted. The communications sup-porting this diffusion can range from simpleproximity, such as familial transmission inhighly related groups (e.g., Henrich & Henrich,2010), to complex interorganizational transmis-sion via interlocking directorates (e.g., Carpen-ter & Westphal, 2001).

Research on firms, however, indicates that im-itation is not costless (Lieberman & Asaba, 2006).A formalized leadership structure creates morecentralized power, which potentially influencesthe trajectory of cultural evolution toward insti-tutionalized norms that reinforce those in cen-tralized positions—dominant shareholders, forinstance. This presumably results from the ten-dency to enhance individual-level success (Wil-liams, 1966). Thus, niche construction activitieswill likely include architecture designed toasymmetrically channel benefits toward the top.If centralized leadership in other groups beginsto adopt this self-interested strategy, then theindividual- and group-level balance necessaryto maintain formal structures is jeopardized. Theimbalance is likely to grow until the group,including the leaders benefiting from suchasymmetry, fails. Proposition 3 states that animportant deterrent against such failure ismaintained by between-group competition (Fig-ure 1). Thus, laws preventing monopolies andother competition-reducing practices potentiallyensure equitable group investment and long-term organizational fitness, even for the monop-olizing organization.

In the context of the leadership literature, thisbalancing act between individual and group in-terests is the basis of leader-member exchangeand path-goal theories (e.g., Dienesch & Liden,1986; House, 1971), which seek to explain whycertain maladaptive leadership traits do notnecessarily drive groups to extinction. In fact,they rarely do (Laland & Brown, 2006). Any dis-

2015 301Spisak, O’Brien, Nicholson, and van Vugt

parity in individual within-group fitness willhave a threshold based on perceived and actualpayoffs in competitive between-group environ-ments so that overall group fitness cannot dropbelow levels of other groups without negativeconsequences for all individuals within thegroup (Proposition 1). Formal leadership canevolve to create stable hierarchical structures tobenefit group members unequally (Proposi-tion 2), although this will be curtailed by adap-tations for group-level investments that enableorganizations to meet the challenge of between-group competition (Proposition 3). For example,training and development programs are group-level initiatives that restrict the ability of lead-ers to pursue cronyism by increasing expertpower across the organization through knowl-edge sharing.

The human ability to learn at a rapid pace,togetherwithastableandcumulativetransgenera-tional culture (Tennie et al., 2009), allows culturalknowledge to spread through social networks.This modifies the cultural niche and generates acountervailing feedback pressure on formalleadership. Thus, we observe a coevolution be-tween leadership and niches in the pursuit oforganizational success. In this cultural space,contrasting niche construction activities battlefor supremacy. By adjusting perceptions of costsand benefits, competing leadership initiativescan work to secure investments and stabilizeadaptations. Some groups might construct a hi-erarchical niche to encourage innovation,whereas others might stabilize a flatter struc-ture. The goal is to focus investment and to se-cure fitness in a competitive environment. Thisdrives the niche-constructing activities ob-served across organizations.

Limitations and Future Research

Although it is clear that formal leadership canhave a significant impact on success, we con-tinue the search to improve our model. A numberof limitations and boundary conditions exist. Forinstance, as an introduction to niche construc-tion and formal leadership emergence, the cur-rent model would become too complex to coverall aspects of the leadership process in onestroke. Future versions will need to account foremotions, personality, and other individual dif-ferences, as well as specific cultural and ecolog-ical variations. Such advances will increase the

accuracy of modeling the coevolutionary rela-tionship between leadership and organizationalniches.

To encourage continued model development,our work has a number of implications for thedirection of research in leadership and organi-zational behavior. We have offered a frameworkthat connects both the social and biological per-spectives on leadership by means of niche con-struction. It is valuable to consider a broaderunderstanding of human behavior, given the in-timate connection between biology and culturein our species. The biological sciences, for in-stance, provide insights into fundamental hu-man tendencies, which help to clarify what ad-aptations are likely to occur under differentorganizational pressures, whereas the socialsciences provide information about specific or-ganizational environments. The main point isthat incorporating niche construction into theorganizational and management sciences un-locks a wealth of multidisciplinary research toyield future insights.

Future work could also investigate other mod-ifications of formal leadership resulting fromthe multilevel tension embedded within posta-grarian niches. It would be beneficial to under-stand how pressures in the environment, suchas the rise of market competition in developingeconomies, influence the evolution of institu-tions and their leadership manifestations. Wesuspect that management practices will need tobecome significantly less hierarchical, domi-nant, and homogeneous to remain successful inan increasingly connected, informed, diverse,and alternative-rich environment (e.g., Bentleyet al., 2014). Digital communities provide em-ployees with an ability to maintain highly net-worked, decentralized social links, enablingrapid information sharing and the exploration ofopportunities on a global scale. Likewise, theshift from nonrenewable to renewable energysources, as a result of an overly exploited niche,is moving societies toward exploratory goals,which implies a need for flatter, innovation-friendly leadership structures.

CONCLUSIONS

In preagricultural society, dramatic shifts inthe Pleistocene natural environment selected bi-ologically for cultural learning and leadership(Richerson & Boyd, 2000). We propose that in-

302 AprilAcademy of Management Review

creased stable transgenerational knowledge in-tensified social competition among groups andactivated group-level pressures that selectedculturally for the formalization of leadership.This, in turn, facilitated the emergence of large-scale organization. Niche construction in thiscomplex network created countless varieties oforganizational behaviors and leadership adap-tations, which were, and continue to be, pittedagainst one another in a seemingly endlessstruggle. Cultural adaptations for formal lead-ership then modified niches, adjusting culturalpractices to secure an adaptive balance be-tween individual- and group-level benefits.

History has witnessed huge variation in lead-ership forms, including despotic rule, transfor-mational agents, industry bureaucrats, anddemocratic representatives. We feel violatedwhen despots place too much emphasis on in-dividual-level advantage, and we experience asense of security when our representatives workto protect us from external threats and internalpower abuses. There is no doubt that consider-able variation in formal leadership will persistin the extreme diversity of modern institutionalniches. Under what circumstances is an unreg-ulated for-profit model sustainable? Can ahighly centralized system compete with flatterstructures in the face of globalized competition?How will cultural differences be leavened by theshrinking geospatial effect of cyberconnectiv-ity? Ultimately, it will be the quality of leader-ship and the willingness and ability of followersto execute niche construction strategies that willdictate the success and failure of future organi-zational forms.

REFERENCES

Aktipis, C. A., & Kurzban, R. 2004. Is homo economicus ex-tinct?: Vernon Smith, Daniel Kahneman and the evolu-tionary perspective. In R. Koppl (Ed.), Advances in Aus-trian economics: 135–153. Amsterdam: Elsevier.

Alvesson, M., & Sandberg, J. 2011. Generating research ques-tions through problematization. Academy of Manage-ment Review, 36: 247–271.

Antonakis, J., Ashkanasy, N. M., & Dasborough, M. T. 2009.Does leadership need emotional intelligence? Leader-ship Quarterly, 20: 247–261.

Avolio, B. J. 2007. Promoting more integrative strategies forleadership theory-building. American Psychologist, 62:25–33.

Bass, B. M. 1997. Does the transactional-ransformational par-

adigm transcend organizational and national boundar-ies? American Psychologist, 52: 130–139.

Baumeister, R. F., & Leary, M. R. 1995. The need to belong:Desire for interpersonal attachments as a fundamentalhuman motivation. Psychological Bulletin, 117: 497–529.

Bentley, R. A., O’Brien, M. J., & Brock, W. A. 2014. Mappingcollective behavior in the big-data era. Behavioral andBrain Sciences, 37: 63–119.

Bergstrom, T. C. 2002. Evolution of social behavior: Individ-ual and group selection. Journal of Economic Perspec-tives, 16(4): 67–88.

Boehm, C. 1993. Egalitarian behavior and reverse domi-nance hierarchy. Current Anthropology, 34: 227–254.

Bowles, S., & Gintis, H. 2004. The evolution of strong reciproc-ity: Cooperation in heterogeneous populations. Theoret-ical Population Biology, 65: 17–28.

Boyd, R., & Richerson, P. J. 1985. Culture and the evolutionaryprocess. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Boyd, R., & Richerson, P. J. 1992. Punishment allows theevolution of cooperation (or of anything else) in sizablegroups. Ethology and Sociobiology, 13: 171–195.

Boyd, R., & Richerson, P. J. 2009. Culture and the evolution ofhuman cooperation. Philosophical Transactions of theRoyal Society B: Biological Sciences, 364: 3281–3288.

Campbell, J. L. 2007. Why would corporations behave insocially responsible ways? An institutional theory ofcorporate social responsibility. Academy of Manage-ment Review, 32: 946–967.

Carpenter, M. A., & Westphal, J. D. 2001. The strategic contextof external network ties: Examining the impact of direc-tor appointments on board involvement in strategic de-cision making. Academy of Management Journal, 44:639–660.

Chase, J. M., & Leibold, M. A. 2003. Ecological niches: Linkingclassical and contemporary approaches. Chicago: Uni-versity of Chicago Press.

Clegg, C., & Spencer, C. 2007. A circular and dynamic modelof the process of job design. Journal of Organizationaland Occupational Psychology, 80: 321–339.

Couzin, I. D., Krause, J., Franks, N. R., & Levin, S. A. 2005.Effective leadership and decision-making in animalgroups on the move. Nature, 434: 513–516.

Davis, J. H., Schoorman, F. D., & Donaldson, L. 1997. Towarda stewardship theory of management. Academy of Man-agement Review, 22: 20–47.

Dhanaraj, C., & Parkhe, A. 2006. Orchestrating innovationnetworks. Academy of Management Review, 31: 659–669.

Dienesch, R. M., & Liden, R. C. 1986. Leader-member ex-change model of leadership: A critique and further de-velopment. Academy of Management Review, 11: 618–634.

Donaldson, T., & Preston, L. E. 1995. The stakeholder theory ofthe corporation: Concepts, evidence, and implications.Academy of Management Review, 20: 65–91.

Durham, W. H. 1991. Coevolution: Genes, culture, and humandiversity. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

2015 303Spisak, O’Brien, Nicholson, and van Vugt

Fehr, E., & Gächter, S. 2002. Altruistic punishment in humans.Nature, 415: 137–140.

Flack, J. C., Girvan, M., de Waal, F. B., & Krakauer, D. C. 2006.Policing stabilizes construction of social niches in pri-mates. Nature, 439: 426–429.

Flannery, K. V. 1968. Archaeological systems theory andearly Mesoamerica. In B. J. Meggers (Ed.), Anthropolog-ical archaeology in the Americas: 67–87. Washington,DC: Anthropological Society of Washington.

Gintis, H. 2000. Strong reciprocity and human sociality. Jour-nal of Theoretical Biology, 206: 169–179.

Giroud, X., & Mueller, H. M. 2011. Corporate governance,product market competition, and equity prices. Journalof Finance, 66: 563–600.

Graen, G. 1975. Role-making processes within complex or-ganizations. In M. D. Dunnette (Ed.), Handbook of indus-trial and organizational psychology: 1202–1245. Chicago:Rand McNally.

Grant, A. M. 2007. Relational job design and the motivationto make a prosocial difference. Academy of Manage-ment Review, 32: 393–417.

Grant, A. M., Dutton, J. E., & Rosso, B. D. 2008. Giving com-mitment: Employee support programs and the prosocialsensemaking process. Academy of Management Jour-nal, 51: 898–918.

Gulati, R., & Singh, H. 1998. The architecture of cooperation:Managing coordination costs and appropriation con-cerns in strategic alliances. Administrative ScienceQuarterly, 43: 781–814.

Haley, H., & Sidanius, J. 2005. Person-organization congru-ence and the maintenance of group-based social hier-archy: A social dominance perspective. Group Processes& Intergroup Relations, 8: 187–203.

Hamilton, W. D. 1964. The genetical evolution of social be-haviour. I. Journal of Theoretical Biology, 7: 1–16.

Hammerstein, P. (Ed.). 2003. Genetic and cultural evolution ofcooperation. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Harcourt, J. L., Ang, T. Z., Sweetman, G., Johnstone, R. A., &Manica, A. 2009. Social feedback and the emergence ofleaders and followers. Current Biology, 19: 248–252.

Henrich, J. 2004. Cultural group selection, coevolutionaryprocesses and large-scale cooperation. Journal of Eco-nomic Behavior & Organization, 53: 3–35.

Henrich, J., & Henrich, N. 2010. The evolution of culturaladaptations: Fijian food taboos protect against danger-ous marine toxins. Proceedings of the Royal Society B:Biological Sciences, 277: 3715–3724.

Hogan, R., Curphy, G. J., & Hogan, J. 1994. What we knowabout leadership. American Psychologist, 49: 493–504.

Hollander, E. P. 1992. The essential interdependence of lead-ership and followership. Current Directions in Psycho-logical Science, 1: 71–75.

Houghton, J. D., & Yoho, S. K. 2005. Toward a contingencymodel of leadership and psychological empowerment:When should self-leadership be encouraged? Journal ofLeadership and Organizational Studies, 11(4): 65–83.

House, R. J. 1971. A path goal theory of leader effectiveness.Administrative Science Quarterly, 16: 321–339.

Howell, J. P., & Dorfman, P. W. 1981. Substitutes for leader-ship: Test of a construct. Academy of Management Jour-nal, 24: 714–728.

Judge, T. A., & Piccolo, R. F. 2004. Transformational andtransactional leadership: A meta-analytic test of theirrelative validity. Journal of Applied Psychology, 89: 755–768.

Kaiser, R. B., Hogan, R., & Craig, S. B. 2008. Leadership andthe fate of organizations. American Psychologist, 63: 96–110.

Kendal, J., Tehrani, J. J., & Odling-Smee, J. 2011. Human nicheconstruction in interdisciplinary focus. PhilosophicalTransactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences,366: 785–792.

Kenrick, D. T., Li, N. P., & Butner, J. 2003. Dynamical evolu-tionary psychology: Individual decision rules and emer-gent social norms. Psychological Review, 110: 3–28.

King, A. J., Johnson, D. D., & van Vugt, M. 2009. The originsand evolution of leadership. Current Biology, 19: R911–R916.

Kirch, P. V. 1984. The evolution of the Polynesian chiefdoms.Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Laland, K. N., & Brown, G. R. 2006. Niche construction, humanbehavior, and the adaptive-lag hypothesis. EvolutionaryAnthropology, 15(3): 95–104.

Laland, K. N., & Brown, G. R. 2011. Sense and nonsense:Evolutionary perspectives on human behaviour (2nded.). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Laland, K. N., & O’Brien, M. J. 2011. Cultural niche construc-tion: An introduction. Biological Theory, 6: 191–202.

Laland, K. N., Odling-Smee, F. J., & Feldman, M. W. 2000.Niche construction, biological evolution, and culturalchange. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 23: 131–175.

Laland, K. N., Odling-Smee, F. J., & Feldman, M. W. 2001.Cultural niche construction and human evolution. Jour-nal of Evolutionary Biology, 14: 22–33.

Laland, K. N., Odling-Smee, J., & Myles, S. 2010. How cultureshaped the human genome: Bringing genetics and thehuman sciences together. Nature Reviews Genetics, 11:137–148.

Lewontin, R. C. 1983. Gene, organism, and environment. InD. S. Bendall (Ed.), Evolution from molecules to men:273–285. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Lieberman, M. B., & Asaba, S. 2006. Why do firms imitateeach other? Academy of Management Review, 31: 366–385.

Lord, R. G., Brown, D. J., Harvey, J. L., & Hall, R. J. 2001.Contextual constraints on prototype generation andtheir multilevel consequences for leadership percep-tions. Leadership Quarterly, 12: 311–338.

March, J. G. 1991. Exploration and exploitation in organiza-tional learning. Organization Science, 2: 71–87.

Mesoudi, A. 2008. An experimental simulation of the “copy-successful-individuals” cultural learning strategy:

304 AprilAcademy of Management Review

Adaptive landscapes, producer-scrounger dynamicsand informational access costs. Evolution and HumanBehavior, 29: 350–363.

Mesoudi, A. 2011. Cultural evolution: How Darwinian theorycan explain human culture & synthesize the social sci-ences. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Mihm, J., Loch, C. H., Wilkinson, D., & Huberman, B. A. 2010.Hierarchical structure and search in complex organiza-tions. Management Science, 56: 831–848.

Miles, R. E., & Snow, C. C. 1978. Organizational strategy,structure and process. New York: McGraw-Hill.

Mummert, A., Esche, E., Robinson, J., & Armelagos, G. J. 2011.Stature and robusticity during the agricultural transi-tion: Evidence from the bioarchaeological record. Eco-nomics & Human Biology, 9: 284–301.

Naiman, R. J., Johnston, C. A., & Kelley, J. C. 1988. Alterationsof North American streams by beaver. Bioscience, 38:753–762.

Neyer, F. J., & Lang, F. R. 2003. Blood is thicker than water:Kinship orientation across adulthood. Journal of Person-ality and Social Psychology, 84: 310–321.

Nicholson, N. 1984. A theory of work role transitions. Admin-istrative Science Quarterly, 29: 172–191.

Nicholson, N. 2005. Meeting the Maasai: Messages for man-agement. Journal of Management Inquiry, 14: 255–267.

Nicholson, N. 2010. The design of work: An evolutionaryperspective. Journal of Organizational Behavior, 31: 422–431.

Nicholson, N. 2011. The evolved self, coevolutionary pro-cesses and the self-regulation of leadership. BiologicalTheory, 6: 12–44.

Nicholson, N. 2013. The “I” of leadership: Strategies for see-ing, being and doing. Chichester, UK: Jossey-Bass.

Nowak, M. A., & Sigmund, K. 2005. Evolution of indirect rec-iprocity. Nature, 437: 1291–1298.

O’Brien, M. J., & Laland, K. N. 2012. Genes, culture and agri-culture: An example of human niche construction. Cur-rent Anthropology, 53: 434–470.

Odling-Smee, F. J. 1988. Niche constructing phenotypes. InH. C. Plotkin (Ed.), The role of behavior in evolution:73–132. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Odling-Smee, F. J., & Laland, K. N. 2011. Ecological inheri-tance and cultural inheritance: What are they and howdo they differ? Biological Theory, 6: 220–230.

Odling-Smee, F. J., Laland, K. N., & Feldman, M. W. 2003.Niche construction: The neglected process in evolution.Monographs in Population Biology: 37. Princeton, NJ:Princeton University Press.

Orlikowski, W. J. 1992. The duality of technology: Rethinkingthe concept of technology in organizations. Organiza-tion Science, 3: 398–427.

Pearce, C. L., Conger, J. A., & Locke, E. A. 2007. Shared lead-ership theory. Leadership Quarterly, 18: 281–288.

Pierce, B. D., & White, R. 1999. The evolution of social struc-ture: Why biology matters. Academy of ManagementReview, 24: 843–853.

Pierce, B. D., & White, R. 2006. Resource context contestabilityand emergent social structure: An empirical investiga-tion of an evolutionary theory. Journal of OrganizationalBehavior, 27: 221–240.

Ren, Y., Kiesler, S., & Fussell, S. R. 2008. Multiple groupcoordination in complex and dynamic task environ-ments: Interruptions, coping mechanisms, and technol-ogy recommendations. Journal of Management Informa-tion Systems, 25(1): 105–130.

Rendell, L., Fogarty, L., & Laland, K. N. 2011. Runaway cul-tural niche construction. Philosophical Transactions ofthe Royal Society B: Biological Sciences, 366: 823–835.

Richerson, P. J., & Boyd, R. 2000. The Pleistocene climate vari-ation and the origin of human culture: Built for speed. In F.Tonneau & N. S. Thompson (Eds.), Evolution, culture, andbehavior: 1–45. New York: Kluwer Academic/Plenum.

Richerson, P. J., Boyd, R., & Bettinger, R. 2001. Was agricultureimpossible during the Pleistocene but mandatory dur-ing the Holocene? American Antiquity, 66: 387–411.

Richerson, P. J., Boyd, R., & Henrich, J. 2003. Cultural evolu-tion of human cooperation. In P. Hammerstein (Ed.), Ge-netic and cultural evolution of cooperation: 357–388.Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Rivkin, J. W., & Siggelkow, N. 2003. Balancing search andstability: Interdependencies among elements of organi-zational design. Management Science, 49: 290–311.

Rowley-Conwy, P., & Layton, R. 2011. Foraging and farmingas niche construction: Stable and unstable adaptations.Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Bio-logical Sciences, 366: 849–862.

Schein, E. H. 1985. Organizational culture and leadership.San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.

Service, E. R. 1975. Origins of the state and civilization: Theprocess of cultural evolution. New York: Norton.

Sober, E., & Wilson, D. S. 1998. Unto others: The evolution andpsychology of unselfish behavior. Cambridge, MA: Har-vard University Press.

Spisak, B. R., Nicholson, N., & van Vugt, M. 2011. Leadershipin organizations: An evolutionary perspective. In G.Saad (Ed.), Evolutionary psychology in the business sci-ences: 165–190. New York: Springer.

Suddaby, R., Hardy, C., & Huy, Q. N. 2011. Introduction tospecial topic forum: Where are the new theories of or-ganization? Academy of Management Review, 36: 236–246.

Tennie, C., Call, J., & Tomasello, M. 2009. Ratcheting up theratchet: On the evolution of cumulative culture. Philo-sophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: BiologicalSciences, 364: 2405–2415.

Trivers, R. L. 1971. The evolution of reciprocal altruism. Quar-terly Review of Biology, 46: 35–57.

Uhl-Bien, M., Marion, R., & McKelvey, B. 2007. Complexityleadership theory: Shifting leadership from the indus-trial age to the knowledge era. Leadership Quarterly, 18:298–318.

2015 305Spisak, O’Brien, Nicholson, and van Vugt

Van Maanen, J., & Schein, E. H. 1979. Towards a theory oforganizational socialization. Research in Organiza-tional Behavior, 1: 209–264.

van Vugt, M. 2006. Evolutionary origin of leadership andfollowership. Personality and Social Psychology Review,10: 354–371.

van Vugt, M., Hogan, R., & Kaiser, R. B. 2008. Leadership,followership, and evolution: Some lessons from the past.American Psychologist, 63: 182–196.

van Vugt, M., & Spisak, B. R. 2008. Sex differences in theemergence of leadership during competitions withinand between groups. Psychological Science, 19: 854–858.

Vaughn, K. J., Eerkens, J. W., & Kantner, J. (Eds.). 2010. Theevolution of leadership transitions in decision makingfrom small-scale to middle-range societies. Santa Fe,NM: School for Advanced Research Press.

Vroom, V. H. 1964. Work and motivation. New York: Wiley.

Weaver, G. R., Treviño, L. K., & Cochran, P. L. 1999. Integratedand decoupled corporate social performance: Manage-

ment commitments, external pressures, and corporateethics practices. Academy of Management Journal, 42:539–552.

Weber, R., Camerer, C., Rottenstreich, Y., & Knez, M. 2001.The illusion of leadership: Misattribution of cause incoordination games. Organization Science, 12: 582–598.

Whetten, D. A. 1989. What constitutes a theoretical contribu-tion? Academy of Management Review, 14: 490–495.

Williams, G. C. 1966. Adaptation and natural selection: Acritique of some current evolutionary thought. Princeton,NJ: Princeton University Press.

Wilson, D. S., van Vugt, M., & O’Gorman, R. 2008. Multilevelselection theory and major evolutionary transitions: Im-plications for psychological science. Current Directionsin Psychological Science, 17: 6–9.

Zahra, S. A., & Pearce, J. A. 1990. Research evidence on theMiles-Snow typology. Journal of Management, 16: 751–768.

Brian R. Spisak (b.r.spisak@vu.nl) is an assistant professor in the Department ofManagement and Organization at the VU University Amsterdam. He received his Ph.D.from the VU University Amsterdam. His research and applied work focuses on theevolution of leadership and how insights derived from this perspective can be used toinfluence processes such as innovation, intergroup conflict, and sustainability.

Michael J O’Brien (ObrienM@missouri.edu) is professor of anthropology and dean ofthe College of Arts and Science at the University of Missouri. He received his Ph.D.from the University of Texas at Austin. His work involves applying evolutionary theoryand method to the study of cultural phenomena.

Nigel Nicholson (nnicholson@london.edu) is professor of organizational behavior atLondon Business School. He received his Ph.D. from the University of Wales. Throughhis research, writing, and executive teaching he has sought to bring the ideas ofevolutionary science to bear on the field of business and management, with particularreference to leadership, family business, risk in financial markets, and biography.

Mark van Vugt (m.van.vugt@vu.nl) is professor of evolutionary and organizationalpsychology at the VU University Amsterdam and research associate at the Universityof Oxford. He received his Ph.D. from the University of Maastricht. He studies leader-ship, group, and organizational processes from an evolutionary perspective andapplies evolutionary thinking to understand problems related to sustainability, eco-nomics, management, and war and peace.

306 AprilAcademy of Management Review