naturalistic conceptions of morality: a question-answering approach

Naturalistic Conceptions of Morality:

A Cluestlon-Answerlng Approach

Robin A. CLuinn, Arthur C. Houts,and Arthur C. GraesserMemphis State University

ABSTRACT Psychological research on morality has been based on research-ers' definitions of morality or on philosophical theories. The present studyexamined naturally occurring conceptions of morality by using a knowledge-structure methodology borrowed from cognitive psychology. Subjects gener-ated statements in response to a question designed to expose generic knowledgeabout their concept of morality. Answer frequency and conceptual clusteringresults suggested that a variety of diverse concepts undergirded subjects' moralthinking and revealed a person-based rather than a philosophy-based patternfor commonly held conceptions of morality. A three-dimensional scaling solu-tion of the responses suggested that conceptions of morality were character-ized by individual-social, general-specific, and absolute-relative distinctions.These findings raise questions about assumptions underlying previous theoriesof morality. Moreover, the present methodology offers a basis for developing amore representative account of moral thought that depends less on the beliefsof researchers.

Psychologists have long attempted to assess how individuals vary intheir moral thinking. For instance, AUport and his colleagues (All-port, Vernon, & Lindzey, 1960; Vemon & AUport, 1931) exploredlinks between values and personality, examining how value systemsaffect behavior. Allport's early concem with the thoughts and beliefsthat underlie value systems has been shared by later researchers inves-tigating how moral thought influences judgment and behavior (Boyce

Portions of this work were presented at the annual meeting of the American Psycho-logical Association held in New Orleans, LA, in August 1989. The authors would liketo thank Jeffrey Berman and Darold Hemphill for their assistance on this manuscript.

Journal of PersonaUty 62:2, June 1994. Copyright © 1994 by Duke University Press.CCC 0022-3506/94/$!.50

240 Quinn et al.

& Jensen, 1978; Forsyth, 1980; Haan, Aerts, & Cooper, 1985; Hogan,1970; Kohlberg, 1971, 1976, 1981, 1984; Rest, 1979).

Previous research has examined a number of aspects of moral experi-ence, such as self-control, guilt, empathy, altruism, moral judgment,and moral reasoning, for what systematicity might exist both withinand across individuals. Perhaps the most direct individual differencemeasures of moral thought, derived from phUosophical distinctions,are those of Hogan and Forsyth. Hogan's Survey of Ethical Attitudes(SEA; 1970, 1973) has been used to examine how ethical orienta-tions are related to personality measures such as empathy (Johnson,Cheek, & Smither, 1983), the California F Scale, and scales on theCalifomia Psychological Inventory (Hogan, 1970). Similarly, researchusing Forsyth's (1980; Schlenker & Forsyth, 1977) Ethics PositionQuestionnaire (EPQ) has suggested that ethical positions are related toMachiavellianism (Leary, Knight, & Bames, 1986), Hogan's ethicalattitudes (Forsyth, 1980), and GiUigan's ethic of caring (Forsyth, Nye,& Kelley, 1988).

In addition, the cognitive-developmental measures of Kohlberg(1971,1976,1981,1984) and Rest (1979), which attempt to assess age-related pattems in moral judgment, have been used to examine Unksbetween moral development and personality. For example, research hasdemonstrated that scores from Kohlberg's moral reasoning scale differ-entiate sociopathic from normal children (Campagna & Harter, 1975)and have been related to scales on both the Minnesota Multiphasic Per-sonality Inventory and the Califomia Psychological Inventory (Lifton,1985). Moreover, studies using an altemative test of Kohlberg's moraljudgment theory. Rest's (1979) Defining Issues Test (DIT), have exam-ined how levels of moral reasoning are related to measures of empathy,socialization, and attitudes toward authority (Curtis, Billingslea, & Wil-son, 1988), as well as values (Wilson, 1983) and political conservatism(Lapsley, HarweU, Olson, Flannery, & Quintana, 1984).

Although such research supports the individual differences andcognitive-developmental approaches, critics have questioned the meth-ods and assumptions of previous research on moral thought. For ex-ample, the moral diletnmas used in the cognitive-developmental tradi-tion have been considered too hypothetical, unrealistic, and far removedfrom the average person's experience to be representative of real-lifemoral thinking (Blasi, 1980; Graziano, 1987; Jurkovic, 1980; Kurtines& Greif, 1974; Liebert, 1979; Sampson, 1977; Simpson, 1974; Sullivan,1977; Tappan, 1990). Not surprisingly, subsequent research examining

Conceptions of Morality 241

these moral dilemmas has demonstrated that a subject's moral reason-ing scores are affected not only by the type of dilemma (Gilligan &Belenky, 1980; Higgins, Power, & Kohlberg, 1984; Kohlberg, Scharf,& Hickey, 1972; Leming, 1976; Trevethan & Walker, 1989) but also bythe type of interview question (Hackett-Renner & DePue, 1989).

Evidence indicating weak and uncertain relationships between dif-ferent measures of moral experience has led many commentators tosuggest that researcher assumptions about the nature of morality havelimited progress in understanding moral thought (e.g., Blasi, 1980;Graziano, 1987; Pittel & Mendelsohn, 1966; Waterman, 1988; Wright,1971). In addition, GiUigan (1982) has claimed that Kohlberg's stagetheory better represents male than female moral experience, and Mee-han, Woll, and Abbott (1979) have suggested that Hogan's (1970,1973)characterization of moral thought could be improved by generating abroader representation of items. The following conclusion drawn byWaterman (1988) summarizes many concems about past research inthis area:

Each psychologist starts his or her analysis from different assump-tions about what constitutes morality. Apart from the psychologistsworking within a taxonomic framework who do not state a pref-erence, Hogan chose socially responsible rule following. Kohlbergselected formalized considerations of justice, Gilligan added an ethicof care and response, and Haan opted for equaUty as determinedby particular interactional procedures. Each could find support forhis or her choice in the arguments of different moral philosophers.Naturally, when these moral psychologists tum to empirical researchactivities, the studies that they design assess moral functioning interms of their own particular perspective on it. But the resultingunderstanding of morality is rather limited in scope and unpersuasiveto individuals adopting a different perspective, (p. 292)

Understanding the extent of the limitations of prior work on moralthought requires attention to two issues. First, Waterman's (1988) dis-tinction between taxonomic and other approaches reflects a larger ten-sion between descriptive and normative approaches that has traditionallydivided morality researchers. For example, the taxonomic approachesto which Waterman refers (i.e., Boyce & Jensen, 1978; Forsyth, 1980)are descriptive enterprises aimed at uncovering what differences can beobserved in people's orientations to moral problems. In contrast, theotber approaches outlined by Waterman (i.e., Haan et al., 1985; Hogan,

242 Quinn et al.

1970; Kohlberg, 1984; Rest, 1979) are largely prescriptive undertakingsconcerned with verifying an account of moral experience according topresupposed standards.

Second, questions about the scope of past research on moral thoughtare applicable to both descriptive and prescriptive research practices.Like Waterman, many reviewers have been primarily concerned withthe generaUty of prescriptive research. However, no empirical evidencehas demonstrated that previous descriptive approaches, including thosecited by Waterman (i.e., Boyce & Jensen, 1978; Forsyth, 1980), ac-count for a broader, more representative sample of everyday moralthinking than prescriptive approaches. Significantly, Allport's researchon values is limited to Spranger's philosophical types of men (AUportet al., 1960; Vemon & AUport, 1931), just as Kohlberg's prescrip-tive classification is limited to Rawls's (1971) justice principles, andthe taxonomies of Hogan, Forsyth, and Boyce and Jensen are limitedto certain philosophical distinctions. Thus, previous work related tomoral thought has been aimed at ordering people according to a re-stricted set of prescriptive standards or classifying people in line withcertain philosophical considerations, although neither practice has beendemonstrated to represent aU aspects of moral thought that might bepsychologically significant.

The extent to which any of a variety of standards (e.g., justice,caring, responsibility, equality, or relativism) serve to organize every-day, spontaneous moral knowledge has never been assessed. That at-tention should be given to this matter, however, has been generallysuggested (Blasi, 1980; Graziano, 1987; Liebert, 1979; Meehan et al.,1979; Simpson, 1974; Snarey, 1985; Trainer, 1977). For example, Pitteland Mendelsohn (1966) reviewed measures of moral values and con-cluded that most tests have assessed the moral standards of society andof the investigators rather than the individuals being tested. More re-cently. Stein and Trabasso's (1982) work on story comprehension hassuggested that it is misleading to assess moral reasoning abilities with-out controlling for differences in moral knowledge. Thus, conceptionsof morality in previous work represent only a subset of the potentialmoral knowledge people might hold, and the classification systems usedrepresent only a few of the ways in which moral principles might beorganized.

How might a descriptive analysis of the important contents of moralthought be accomplished without being constrained by a priori assump-tions about morality? A common way that psychologists have examined


spontaneous or naturalistic knowledge has been the use of open-endedself-report tasks. For example, Jones and Rosenberg (1974) used anopen-ended questionnaire with clustering and multidimensional scalinganalyses to uncover the properties that organized coUege students'ideas about personality. Similarly, knowledge-structure methodologiesfrom cognitive psychology have been used to examine the contentand structure of different knowledge domains without applying presup-posed standards. For example, the social schemata research of Cantor,Mischel, and Schwartz (1982) used free-description tasks to examineagreement among everyday perceivers in their knowledge of the per-sonality types associated with different situations.

Graesser's question-answering method (Graesser & Black, 1984;Graesser & Clark, 1985; Graesser & Franklin, 1990; Graesser & Good-man, 1985) is another approach to examining knowledge structures,in which people first generate everything they know about some con-cept and then answer questions based on their world knowledge andexperience. The aim of Graesser's work, grounded in artificial intelli-gence and cognitive psychology, has been to develop a psychologicallyplausible model of question-answering directed toward specifying theknowledge structures that are tapped when people are asked questions.

Graesser and his colleagues (Graesser & Black, 1984; Graesser &Clark, 1985; Graesser & Franklin, 1990; Graesser & Goodman, 1985)have collected and analyzed the answers most frequently generated inresponse to a variety of questions. On the basis of such work, Graesserhas noted that a significant portion of answers cannot be accountedfor by previous models of cognition that ignore the everyday, generalknowledge people have about the world. Thus, Graesser has exam-ined knowledge by observing the mles and pattems found in meaningspeople share rather than testing how human understanding departs froma formal system such as mathematical, philosophical, or grammaticalrules. In this respect, Graesser's assumptions about knowledge are con-sistent with criticisms levied at rationalistic views of moral thought.For example, Blasi (1980) has suggested that rationalist accounts ofmoral reasoning, in which human reasoners are measured against ratio-nal rather than personally held standards, have separated moral thoughtfrom the context of psychological experience, resulting in unilluminat-ing explanations of moral functioning.

Assessing the knowledge and experience of subjects calls for method-ological and statistical procedures that identify and relate observationsaccording to differences determined by the data rather than presupposed

244 Quinn et al.

classifications. Combining Graesser's free-generation techniques withcluster and multidimensional scaling analyses would be useful to theinvestigation of subject-based moral thought in several important ways.First, subjects could generate their own ideas about morality withoutbeing evaluated against some prescribed standard. Second, by sortingfor the common meaning of small idea units rather than larger cate-gories, the variety of potential features associated with conceptions ofmorality are more likely to be kept intact. Third, deliberate samplingof a wide variety of moral thoughts should yield the greatest amountof relevant knowledge subjects are capable of articulating. Fourth, theextent to which findings based on a subject-based approach are simi-lar to organizing principles previously considered important for moralthought could be examined. Finally, results based on free-response dataand exploratory analyses might identify psychologically important con-ceptions of morality missed by previous studies that limited the stimulusmaterials, the type of responses that could be given, or how responseswere interpreted.

The aim of the present studies was to uncover a consensually baseddescription of what morality means. In these studies, a knowledge-structure methodology was used to generate and analyze a wide rangeof everyday thoughts about morality. In the first study, subjects wereasked to generate their concepts of morality in response to a questiondesigned to elicit generic knowledge about morality. Responses werethen coded to develop a consensus description of everyday, naturallyoccurring conceptions of morality. In the second study, designed toassess the content and structure of these moral conceptions, a secondset of subjects sorted the responses according to similarity. The simi-larity judgments were then analyzed with multidimensional scaling andclustering techniques to reveal the content and stmcture of the subjects'everyday moral knowledge.

Study 1METHOD

Subjects

Subjects were 16 undergraduate psychology students at Memphis State Univer-sity participating for credit in introductory psychology courses. These subjectsconsisted of 11 (69%) females and 5 (31%) males. The mean age ofthe subjectswas 23 years, with a range of 18 to 46 years. Participants had the follow-


ing ethnic backgrounds: 11 (69%) Caucasian, 4 (25%) African-American, and1 (6%) Asian-American.

Mateiials and Pioceduie

Each subject was issued a booklet with instructions to write anything that cameto mind in response to the following five questions: (a) Write down everythingyou know about the concept of morality, (b) What does morality mean? (c)What are the typical properties of morality? (d) What use is usually made ofmorality? (e) What factors affect morality?

Graziano (1987) has reconmtiended that morality researchers address howsubjects originally interpret or identify the tasks they are asked to perform intheir research. Attention to this matter, according to Graziano, would enableresearchers to assess what information will be selected and what informationwill be brought to bear on experimental tasks. Graziano's goal that researchin the moral domain be sensitive to the information selection constraints oftasks can be facilitated by the use of Graesser's question-answering approach,which specifies the information sources used when people answer questions(Graesser & Franklin, 1990).

Graesser (Graesser & Clark, 1985) has indicated that the type of questionrespondents are asked contains prompts that guide subjects toward differenttypes of information. In addition, questions have a question focus that con-strains or limits the types of answers people give to different types of questions.For example, answers to general questions such as "What does X mean?"pose few limits on the types of answers people give, whereas more specificquestions such as "What are the typical properties of X?" elicit a narrowerrange of answers. Moreover, "What does X mean?" questions generate ananswer pool that includes answer sets from a number of other, more specificquestions. Thus, given our goal to sample the greatest amount of relevant in-formation regarding what people thitik morality means, the question "Whatdoes morality mean?" was selected for the analyses undertaken and reportedhere. By selecting this question, we specifically designed our study to samplethe greatest amount of moral thought possible, including those ideas aboutmorality that may not have been capttired in previous research.

The free-generation data were handled in two phases. First, two raterswere trained to segment the written responses into statement nodes. Statementnodes are the basic unit of analysis in Graesser's question-answering method(Graesser & Black, 1984; Graesser & Goodman, 1985). Statement nodes aredeclarative statements that contain a predicate plus one or more arguments. Forexample, the foUowing subject-generated statements, "Morality is associatedwith conflict," "Society sets norms for moral behavior," and "Morality is de-fined by the individual," each represent one statement node. These units aredesigned to represent one unique idea based on psychological meaning rather

246 Quinn et al.

than on gratnmatical, mathematical, or philosophical rules. The segmentationof written answers into statement nodes is referred to as parsing.

The second phase of data treatment consisted of a series of proceduresto establish a final composite list of consensually generated statement nodesand to assess interrater reliability. In general, these procedures for deriving acomposite list of statements across subjects were based on Graesser's previ-ous research (Graesser & Black, 1984; Graesser & Clark, 1985; Graesser &Goodman, 1985).

Two judges first identified the statement nodes in all 16 protocols and as-sessed the extent to which judges agreed in their identification of the statementnodes to determine interrater reliability. Next, working from the pool of state-ment nodes identified in the parsing procedure, two judges located three typesof statement node matches. All three types of matches were methods for as-sessing similarity among statements. However, the match types varied in theamount of inference necessary to judge similarity. The following matchingcategories were applied within each subject's statements first and then be-tween all 16 subjects' statements. Verbatim matches were statement nodes thatwere literally the same statement (e.g., "Morality is right and wrong" lit-erally matched "Morality is right and wrong"). Grammatical matches werestatement nodes that were the same except for word order (e.g., "Morality isright and wrong" matched "Right and wrong is morality"). Finally, seman-tic matches were statement nodes with essentially the same meaning (e.g.,"Morality determines how people view abortion" matched "Morality is asso-ciated with opinions on abortion"). A conservative strategy, complete agree-ment of both judges, was employed in the identification of the three types ofmeaning matches among statements such that interrater agreement for whatconstituted a match was always 100% irrespective of the type of match (i.e.,verbatim, gratnmatical, or semantic).

During the matching procedure, judges identified two types of statementnodes considered to be problematic for compiling a composite list of state-ments. For example, Graesser (1981) has noted that if redundant statementnodes were included in the composite statement list, the concepts associatedwith those redundant nodes would be overrepresented relative to other, uniquestatement nodes. Therefore, when a subject repeated a statement, only onestatement was retained for that subject. Next, in the matching process across allsubjects, only one statement from each match was kept in the final statementlist when subjects repeated one another.

A second type of statement node that could undermine the generality of thecomposite statement node list was idiosyncratic statements. Graesser (1981)has noted that subjects occasionally respond with sarcasm or humor whengenerating answers to questions. In the present study, statements that werequite unusual yet loosely associated with the question were not discarded,whereas severely dissociated (i.e., bizarre) statements were eliminated fromthe statement node list.


Concem over subjective preconceptions blurring objective descriptions inprevious research on moral thought was translated into conservative evaluationstrategies intended to guard against the potential biases judges might imposeon the final set of statements in this study. For example, three specific typesof meaning similarity were used to identify statement matches. The first twotypes, verbatim and gratnmatical matches, were designed to be minimally af-fected by the subjective views of judges, whereas the third, semantic matches,essentially required judges to use previous knowledge and biases to evaluatethis type of similarity. Therefore, only the less subjective similarity matches,verbatim and grammatical, were considered as similar for the purposes ofeliminating redundant statements in this study. Statements considered as simi-lar in the semantic sense were kept to ensure that the final list of statementswould not be restricted by the judges' evaluations of meaning similarity. In thepresent investigation of moral thought, the threat posed by judges restrictingthe range of ideas contributing to the final statement list was a greater concernthan the threat of retaining one type of similar statement.

These procedures served the overall goal to compile a list of consensuallynominated, prototypical statement nodes whUe guarding for potential biases.The statement node matching procedures resulted in a final list of 92 items.

RESULTS

Interrater agreement for the two parsing raters was assessed using per-centage agreement/(percentage agreement -I- disagreement). Acrossthe 16 subjects, the interrater agreement on what constituted a state-ment node was .70. The conservative method applied to the evaluationof the meaning similarity among statements required that the agree-ment of both judges was necessary for all meaning matches. Thus,interrater agreement for what constituted a meaning match was always100% regardless ofthe type of match (i.e., verbatim, grammatical, orsemantic).

The mean number of items an individual subject contributed to thefinal set of 92 items was 6. Overall, the distribution of the number ofcontributions to the final list was skewed, with a median of 4.

Table 1 presents the 10 most frequent answers subjects generatedacross all three indexes of similarity along with the percentage ofthe 16subjects who gave each answer. As can be seen in Table 1, high con-sensual percentages for answers to the question "What does moralitymean?" were obtained using question-answering techniques. It shouldbe noted that the answers with the highest percentages are articulatedin terms of people, whereas answers articulated in philosophical, reli-gious, or legal terms are relatively rare.

248 Quinn et al.

Table 1Percentage of Subjects Generating the 10 Most Frequent Answers to

the Question "What Does Morality Mean?"

Answer % subjects generating answer

1. People are able to determine/know whatis moral. 100

2. Morality is having beliefs/values/standards/views/ideals. 75

3. Morality determines how people live theirlives/lifestyle. 56

4. Morality means a person's innermostfeelings/how a person feels inside. 44

5. Morality is associated with choice/free will/deciding. 44

6. Morality determines right and wrong/there isa distinction between right and wrong. 38

7. Morality is associated with thinking/conscience/subconscious mind. 38

8. Morality changes over time/from society tosociety/is developed. 38

9. Morality is associated with specific issues(e.g., sex, abortion, nuclear arms, prison,etiquette, electric chair, and drinking beer). 38

10. There is a distinction between good and bad(good and evil)/morality determinesgood vs. bad morals. 31

Study 2

The aim of the second study was to determine whether there was aninterpretable stmcture to students' conceptions of morality. Therefore,a second set of college students was asked to categorize the itemsgenerated by the participants in the first study according to simUarity.The similarity ratings were then analyzed with clustering and multi-dimensional scaling techniques to reveal the content and stmcture ofthe students' conceptions of morality.

Certain limitations to Study 1 were also addressed by Study 2. First,in Study 1 the researcher judges compiled the most frequent answersbased on the composite 92-item free-generation list. For example, inTable 1 statements could have been combined differently if more or dif-


ferent judges performed the categorization. The goal for both studies,however, was to allow the subjects, rather than the researcher, to definewhat morality means; the goal for the second study was to general-ize findings about moral thought to college students other than the 16subjects who participated in the first study. Therefore, in the secondstudy limitations potentially posed by researchers' bias were addressedby having 50 undergraduate subjects rather than two researcher judgescategorize the 92 items. Moreover, the method used to categorize thestatements left subjects free to organize similar statements according toany scheme they desired and to use as many categories as they felt wererequired to account for the data. The idea was to increase the numberand type of categorizers, to employ a different categorization method,and to use different analysis techniques to examine subject-based moralthought in more detail.

METHOD

Subjects

A second set of 50 tmdergraduate psychology students at Memphis State Uni-versity participated in Study 2 for course credit. This set of 50 participantsconsisted of 30 (60%) females and 19 (38%) males, with 1 subject failing toindicate gender. The mean age of the subjects was 22 years, with a range of18 to 42 years. Participants had the foUowing ethnic backgrounds: 37 (76%)Caucasian, 11 (22%) African-American, and 1 (2%) Hispanic, with 1 subjectfaUing to indicate ethnic background.

Materials and Procedure

Each of the 50 subjects was presented with a set of 92 index cards contain-ing the 92 items generated in the first study. Participants were informed thatthey would be asked to make judgments about the similarity of a series ofstatements that a previous group of subjects had generated in response to thequestion "What does morality mean?" Subjects were instructed to sort the 92statement node cards into groups such that similar statements were placed inthe same group. Subjects were told to create as many groups as they neededto complete the sorting task.

Young and Harris (1990) have discussed two empirical means of answeringquestions about people's internal "scales." The first, used in personality re-search, involves applying factor analysis to multivariate data to assess whetherimportant individual differences are suggested by the factors obtained. Thesecond method, used in this research, involves obtaining dissimilarity data

250 Quinn et al.

and using multidimensional scaling to construct objective scales of subjectiveattributes. Young and Harris have noted, however, that neither of these pro-cedures pennits researchers to draw conclusions about how the factors or thedimensional structures which emerge from these analyses affect any other vari-ables. Despite this limitation, results from scaling analyses would be useful forexamining what pattems emerged from the subject-determined organizationsof free-response statements about morality.

Previous research supports the use of clustering and multidimensional scal-ing techniques for examining free-response data. For example, findings fromthe studies of Jones, Morris, Ries, Morrow, and Wekstein (1989) supportedthe use of multidimensional scaling techniques and interpretive proceduresto extract stable structures from free-response data. Moreover, this researchindicated that multidimensional structures based on free-response data wereessentially the same across different experimental procedures. In their study ofthe retrieval of words from natural categories, Graesser and Mandler (1978)demonstrated that the free-emissions task can yield reliable clusters of subject-generated information. Such studies have dismantled many previously heldobjections to the use and analysis of open-ended data.

A hierarchical clustering procedure and a multidimensional scaling tech-nique were used to analyze the similarity judgment data. Both analyses werebased on an original 92 x 92 similarity matrix corresponding to the num-ber of subjects who sorted each pair of the 92 statements into the same pile.The similarity matrix was converted to a dissimilarity matrix, and, finally, thedissimilarity scores were converted to squared Euclidean distance scores.

The CLUSTER program was used for the hierarchical clustering procedure(SPSS, Inc., 1988, chap. 23). This procedure contains an agglomerative algo-rithm, and the clustering method was based on Ward's sum of the squaredwithin-cluster distances (Norusis, 1988). No standard interpretational proce-dure exists for summarizing the different levels of clusters produced by theclustering program. Moreover, our goal to limit intrusions on the subjects'definition of morality meant that using analyses based on preconceived clustercategories was not appropriate. Therefore, in the present study the hierarchi-cal clusters that Ward's method produced were cautiously interpreted by twojudges who used the following interpretational rules. First, a preliminary iden-tification of which statements were most similar within clusters was identifiedon the basis of the clustering results alone. Second, the judges determinedwhich clusters were consensual by setting the criterion that at least 4 out of the16 subjects (i.e., 25%) had to contribute to a cluster. Finally, having isolatedthe consensually valid clusters, judges performed several rounds of substan-tive interpretation and labeling based on the meaning of the statements withinconsensually valid clusters to determine at what similarity level the clustersmade sense.

The multidimensional scaling solution was derived using ALSCAL (SPSS,


Stand on socialissues (A)

What does morality mean?

50%

Learning

standards (B)

31%Makingdistinctions (C) 56%

Choice ot corevalues (D)

38%Acting-ttiini(ing-

feeiing good (E)

50%Judging rigtitvs. wrong (F)

nguie 1Branching Diagram Representing the Siz Consensually Valid

Clusters Based on the Rescaled Distances at whichClusters Were Combined

Note. Percentage of subjects contributing to each cluster is given above the clus-ter name.

Inc., 1988, chap. 19). The best multidimensional scaling solution was deter-mined by the level of stress for solutions of different dimensions.

RESULTS

The interpretational procedure applied to the clustering data revealedsix consensual hierarchical clusters. Figure 1 depicts clusters which metthe 25% contribution from subjects and the similarity criteria. Clusters(rectangles) are depicted from left to right with the percentage of sub-jects contributing to each cluster above the cluster name. Cluster lettersfollowing the cluster names in parentheses serve to identify the clusters.

Examples of cluster membership for the six-cluster solution fol-low. Cluster S, Stand on Social Issues, contained statements such as"Morality means having some stand on abortion" and "Morality meanshow people view the electric chair." Statements within the LeamingStandards cluster included "Moral standards are developed through ex-perience" and "People sometimes do not behave according to a goodstandard." Making Distinctions, Cluster M, included the items "Thereis a distinction between good and bad" and "There is a distinction be-tween right and wrong." The statements "MoraUty is associated with

252 Quinn et al.

choice" and "Morality is associated with a person's set of centralvalues" contributed to Cluster C, Choice of Core Values. Cluster A,Acting-Thinking-Feeling Good, included the items "Morality is doingright things," "MoraUty means thinking good thoughts," and "Moralityis the guilty feeUng." Lastly, Judging Right vs. Wrong, Cluster J, con-tained the statements "Morality is the way people judge good and bad"and "Morality is viewing how others do wrong and then not doing thatbehavior yourself."

The branching diagram shown in Figure 1 is based on rescaled dis-tances produced by the CLUSTER procedure which maintains the ratioofthe distances between the steps in the hierarchical clustering solution(Norusis, 1988). The vertical lines on the graph represent joined clus-ters; the position of a line on the scale denotes the distance at whichclusters were joined. For example. Cluster L, represented in Figure 1as the cluster with the lowest joining distance on the vertical scale to theleft of the graph, contains statements with the highest within-clustersimilarity. Cluster L has the highest within-cluster similarity level ofthe six clusters because pairs of statements within this cluster had thelowest dissimilarity scores. In contrast. Cluster S, highest in relativeposition on the vertical distance scale on Figure 1, contained statementswith the least within-cluster similarity (i.e., the greatest dissimilaritybetween pairs of statements within the cluster).

In addition to depicting the distance at which clusters are joined, thebranching diagram in Figure 1 indicates which clusters are joined. Thus,the hierarchical organization between the clusters can be seen, for ex-ample, in the basic division between Clusters S, L, and M and ClustersC, A, and J. It should be noted that this division roughly correspondsto a distinction between social definitions of morality (Clusters S, L,and M) and individual definitions of morality (Clusters C, A, and J).At the next level of similarity between clusters depicted in Figure 1,Clusters L and M are more similar to each other than either cluster isto Cluster S. A similar pattern is shown between Clusters C, A, and J,with Cluster C being the most different cluster relative to the other two.Ofthe six hierarchical clusters. Cluster C contained the largest consen-sual contribution, as well as the second greatest conceptual simUarity.

In examining the multidimensional scaling data, Kruskal's stress for-mula, a measure of fit, was generated for scaling solutions of one to sixdimensions (Young & Harris, 1990). As Figure 2 indicates, the level ofstress in the three-dimensional solution is far less than that observed ineither the one- or two-dimensional solutions. Moreover, the reduction

Conceptions of Morality

0.4

253

05

0.3

0.2

0.1

0.37

0.18

0.110.09

0.07 0.06

1 2 3 4 5

Number of Dimensions

Figure 2Stress of Scaling Solutions as a Function of the

Number of Dimensions

in stress is minimal beyond the three-dimensional solution. The three-dimensional scaling solution accounted for a substantial proportion ofthe variance in the data, R^ = .87.

The three-dimensional scaling solution with representative itemshighlighted for each dimension can be seen in Figure 3. The rotationshown in the figure depicts all three dimensions. However, the use ofone view of the three-dimensional space necessarily compromised, tosome extent, the view of individual dimensions. The first dimensionbegins in the upper right of the figure (i.e., absolute) and extends tothe lower left of the figure (i.e., relative) with the items (i.e.. Items1, 2, 7, and 8) identified on this dimension listed below the figureunder the heading "Relativism." This dimension indicated that whensubjects organized the individual moral statements into groups, ideasabout morality that were expressed in relative or subjective terms werecontrasted with ideas that were expressed in absolute or objective terms.The second dimension in the three-dimensional scaling solution sug-gested that one way subjects conceptually structure statements aboutmorality is to use a distinction between the individual and society. Thesecond dimension is located approximately where the horizontal axis

254 Quinn et al.

SpecificAbsolute

Social

Relative

Relativism

1 Acting moral is beingnice and polite toothers.

2 Morality determineswhat is right and wrong.

7 People should formtheir own morals.

8 There is no exactdefinition of morality.

• 3 Individual• 4

Abstract

Individualism

3 Morality is the values aperson holds.

4 Morality is associatedwith a person's set ofcentral values.

9 Society sets norms formoral behavior.

Specificity

5 There is a distinctionbetween moral andimmoral.

6 A person s conceptionof right and wrongdetermines how theyreact to certain things.

10 How people view pre-marital sex haschanged over time.

11 Morality determineshow people view prison.

12 Morality means beingagainst nuclear arms.

Figure 3Three-Dimensional Solution from Multidimensional Scaling

Analysis with Items Identified on Each DimensionListed below the Figure

would faU in Figure 3. Items representative of this dimension (i.e..Items 3, 4, 9, and 10) are listed under the heading "Individualism"below the figure. The last dimension begins in the upper left of thefigure (i.e., specific) and continues to the lower right of the figure(i.e., abstract). This dimension contained statements suggesting thatpeople understand morality by separating general principles from spe-cific issues, and therefore it was labeled the specificity dimension. Theitems identified on this dimension (i.e.. Items 5, 6, 11, and 12) arelisted below the figure under the heading "Specificity."


GENERAL DISCUSSION

These studies helped to identify the content and structure of subject-based conceptions of morality. In the first study, a pattem of person-based responding was revealed for the question, "What does moralitymean?" Ofthe 10 most frequent answers, the top 5 defined morality interms of qualities or capacities of people. For example, all subjects gen-erated the answer, "People are able to determine/know what is moral."In contrast, answers reflecting philosophical or reUgious principles wereless frequent. Questions might therefore be raised about measures ofmoral thought which rely on philosophical distinctions to explain moralthought (e.g., Boyce & Jensen, 1978; Forsyth, 1980; Haan et al., 1985;Hogan, 1970; Kohlberg, 1971, 1984; Rest, 1979) as these may fail torepresent commonly held conceptions of morality.

In the second study, a cluster analysis suggested that responses wereorganized into the following six clusters: (a) taking a stand on socialissues; (b) learning standards; (c) making distinctions; (d) choosingcore values; (e) acting, thinking, and feeUng good; and (/) judging rightversus wrong. The present identification of six distinct yet consensuallyagreed-upon clusters may indicate that a number of different concep-tions of moraUty are common to spontaneous moral thinking. Moreover,like the answer-generation results, the content of the clusters reflectsquaUties of people more than philosophical principles. FinaUy, usingmultidimensional scaling analyses, we identified a three-dimensionalstmcture underlying subjects' conceptions of morality that contrasted(a) general principles with specific issues, (b) individual and social con-cerns, and (c) relative versus absolute orientations. That no previousaccount has incorporated all of the dimensions identified in our studysuggests that no single measure has fully sampled all aspects of moralthinking.

A diverse set of studies relevant to moral thinking supports the con-ceptions and structures revealed in our analyses. The individual-socialdistinction, the basic distinction in the organization of our hierarchi-cal cluster analysis and one of our three multidimensional scaling di-mensions, seems to parallel a number of theoretical and empiricalundertakings associated with moral experience. For example, researchusing an approach similar to our own (Jones, Sensenig, & Ashmore,1978) found that a dimension of self versus society structured sponta-neously generated values when the multidimensional stmcture of sub-jects' values was compared with those outlined by Rokeach (1973).

256 Quinn et al.

SimUarly, findings from a sociological field study (Bellah, Madsen,Sullivan, Swidler, & Tipton, 1985) have indicated that, like the concep-tions of morality of the college students we sampled, adult Americansdescribe the important dilemmas in their lives in terms of individualismversus commitment to others.

Significantly, several previous accounts of moral experience (e.g.,Gilligan, 1982; Hogan, 1970, 1973; Kohlberg 1971, 1976, 1981, 1984)have included something resembling an individual-social distinction intheir theories and measures. Our findings, together with these previousefforts, suggest the importance of distinguishing between individual,or intemal, and social, or extemal, beliefs about morality in futureresearch. For example, studies could use the question-answering ap-proach to test whether public versus private settings elicit more socialor individual conceptions of morality. However, it is important to notethat most prior approaches included presuppositions about the appropri-ateness or desirability of individual versus social moral orientations thatwere not founded on empirical observations. For example, claims aboutthe merits of individual versus social moral positions have been in-cluded in the measures and classification schemes of Kohlberg, Hogan,and Gilligan. Although future research should clarify the role of theindividual-social distinction in moral thinking, it is difficult to see howany empirical efforts could determine whether one moral orientation is"better" than another.

Important connections exist between the general-specific dimensionfound in the present study and previous research. The general-specificdimension observed in our subjects' moral thinking is consistent withcognitive research. For instance, research has outlined people's ten-dency to use specific examples to form the basis for more general ideaswhen organizing information about a concept (e.g., Anderson, 1976;Bower, Black, & Tumer, 1979). Evidence that our subjects organizedmoral information in line with common patterns may suggest that moralthought can be understood and examined in much tbe same way asother types of knowledge. This claim is supported by research on tmst,a concept often linked with moral experience, which has been shownto contain a general-specific dimension similar to the distinction in ouranalysis of moral thought. For example, Chun and Campbell's (1975)study of the dimensionality of tmst indicated that global and specific di-mensions underlie Wrightsman's measure of Tmstworthiness (Wrights-man, 1974). Thus, future research comparing moral with other infor-mation domains could prove informative. For example, the parameters


of moral knowledge could be outlined by comparing its content andstmcture with knowledge about philosophical principles such as jus-tice, nonmoral concepts such as beauty, or interpersonal events such asempathy and betrayal.

Of special interest is the correspondence between this research andstudies of individual differences in moral thought (Forsyth, 1980,1981;Hogan, 1970, 1973). As with these studies, our multidimensional scal-ing results indicated that moral thinking was stmctured by an absolute-relative dimension. For example, Forsyth (Forsyth, 1980,1981; Forsyth& Berger, 1982; Schlenker & Forsyth, 1977; Singh & Forsyth, 1989)included a relativism factor in his measure of individual ethical ori-entations. Moreover, studies have related Forsyth's relativism factor toother measures of moral thought such as Hogan's (1970, 1973) ethicsof responsibUity (Forsyth, 1980) and GUligan's (1982) ethic of caring(Forsyth etal., 1988).

In light of the methodological differences between our work and thatof Forsyth and others, the correspondence between our findings andsuch research suggests that an absolute-relative dimension may be cen-tral to moral thinking and provides avenues for further investigation.Generally, the person-based methods in our work could be used toexamine the degree to which different types of people might be differ-entially represented on the three moral thought dimensions identified inthe present study. SimUarly, future research could compare the variancein people's moral thinking accounted for by Forsyth's taxonomy withthat accounted for by our three-factor solution. Moreover, determiningwhether research wiU support our three-dimensional solution or an ex-pansion of Forsyth's taxonomy based on this solution could strengthenboth approaches.

The viability of the question-answering approach for understandingmoral thought depends in part on whether future studies support thefindings revealed in the present work. In the main, research shouldestablish whether our findings generalize to different populations, ques-tions, and settings. However, future studies could improve on ourapproach. For example, although the question-answering techniquessampled a wide variety of subject-based conceptions of moraUty, someor all of the conceptions and stmctures identified could be specific tothe college students sampled. Thus, future studies should secure larger,more representative samples of subjects and randomly select only amanageable subset of items for the detailed parsing and rating proce-dures. This would ensure representative sampling without sacrificing

258 Quinn et al.

the gains in realism and comprehensiveness afforded by the question-answering techniques.

A certain amount of discretion is necessary in interpreting the find-ings based on our work. Given the descriptive nature of our methodsand analyses, interpretations ofthe results can and will vary. Moreover,advocates of different approaches might argue that the present findingsmay not be useful for their line of research since previous approacheswere interested in examining certain theoretical contents and stmcturesof moral thought rather than the actual contents and stmctures of moralthought. Admittedly, the naturalistic content and organization revealedin our work may be of Umited value to researchers interested solely inverifying theoretical stmctures.

Many insights into everyday moral thinking have been achieved withour subject-based approach. The results from the present research dem-onstrate that a knowledge-stmcture methodology can provide a consen-sus description of what people think morality means. Using question-answering techniques, we observed a sizable amount of consensus fordiverse conceptions and stmctures of moral thought. For example, gen-eration contributions for the 10 most frequent answers ranged from 31 %to 100% of subjects and contributions to the six-cluster solution rangedfrom 31% to 56% of the subjects. Finding both variety and consensusin the content and stmcture of moral thought lends support to the claimthat moral thinking might be better assessed with a varied rather thanlimited sampling of moral conceptions.

Our approach, being less restricted and more realistic, might relatemoral thought to a wider variety of relevant personality, cognitive, andbehavioral phenomena than past research. Concerns over the generalityof the principles and categories used in previous studies, which stemin part from the uncertain relations observed between different mea-sures of moral experience (for reviews see Blasi, 1980; Graziano, 1987;Waterman, 1988; Wright, 1971), can be addressed with our subject-based approach. For example, free-generation techniques lend them-selves well to determining the behaviors, settings, and interpersonalcontexts considered by subjects to be morally relevant. Thus, the presentapproach could be used to establish more realistic tests of different typesof moral experience, including the consistency between moral thoughtand moral behavior.

Surprisingly little research has been directed toward identifying andrepresenting an exhaustive sample of the moral knowledge people pos-sess. Although we do not claim that respondent-based conceptions of


morality should replace social scientists' conceptions of moraUty, toooifen rtiirdnrren(5rr assumptlumr ddmit wiW lk raurai' or liortmurai' iVdvebeen the basis for measures whose representativeness has gone largelyuntested. The present approach, by not requiring reference to a Umitednumber of presupposed classifications, may offer a more representativepsychological account of moral thought.

REFERENCES

AUport, G. W., Vernon, P. E., & Lindzey, G. (1960). A study of values (3rd ed.).Boston: Houghton Mifflin.

Anderson, J. R. (1976). Language, memory, and thought. Hillsdale, NJ: LawrenceEribaum.

Bellah, R. N., Madsen, R., Sullivan, W. M., Swidler, A., & Tipton, S. M. (1985).Habits ofthe heart: Individualism and commitment in American life. Berkeley: Uni-versity of California Press.

Blasi, A. (1980). Bridging moral cognition and moral action: A critical review oftheliterature. Psychological Bulletin, 88, 1-45.

Bower, G. H., Black, J. B., & Turner, T. J. (1979). Scripts in memory for text.Cognitive Psychology, 11, 177-220.

Boyce, W. D., & Jensen, L. C. (1978). Moral reasoning: A psychological-philosophicalintegration. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press.

Campagna, A. R, & Harter, S. (1975). Moral judgment in sociopathic and normalchildren. Joumal of PersonaUty and Social Psychology, 31, 199-205.

Cantor, N., Mischel, W., &Schwartz, H. (1982). A prototype analysis of psychologicalsituations. Cognitive Psychology, 14, 45-77.

Chun, K. T., & Campbell, J. B. (1975). Notes on the intemal structure of Wrightsman'smeasure of trustworthiness. Psychological Reports, 37, 323-330.

Curtis, J., Billingslea, R., & Wilson, J. P. (1988). Personality correlates of moralreasoning and attitudes toward authority. Psychological Reports, 63, 947-954.

Forsyth, D. R. (1980). A taxonomy of ethical ideologies. Journal of Personality andSocial Psychology, 19, 175-184.

Forsyth, D. R. (1981). Moral judgment: The influence of ethical ideology. PersonaUtyand Social Psychology Bulletin, 7, 218-223.

Forsyth, D. R., & Berger, R. E. (1982). The effects of ethical ideology on moralbehavior. Journal of Social Psychology, 117, 53-56.

Forsyth, D. R., Nye, J. L., & Kelley, K. (1988). Idealism, relativism, and the ethic ofcaring. Journal of Social Psychology, 122, 243-248.

Gilligan, C. (1982). In a different voice: Psychological theory and women's development.Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Gilligan, C , & Belenky, M. (1980). A naturalistic study of abortion decisions. InR. Selman & R. Yando (Eds.), Clinical-developmental psychology (pp. 69-90). SanFrancisco: Jossey-Bass.

Graesser, A.C. (1981). Prose comprehension beyond the word. New York: Springer-Verlag.

260 Quinn et a l .

Graesser, A. C , & Black, J. B. (Eds.). (1984). The psychology of questions. Hillsdale,NJ: Lawrence Eribaum.

Graesser, A . C , & Clark, L. F. (1985). Structures and procedures of implicit knowledge.Norwood, NJ: Ablex.

Graesser, A. C , & Franklin, S. P. (1990). QUEST: A cognitive model of questionanswering. Discourse Processes, 13, 279-303.

Graesser, A. C , & Goodman, S. M. (1985). Implicit knowledge, question answering,and the representation of expository text. In B. K. Britton & J. B. Black (Eds.),Understanding expository text: A theoretical and practical handbook for analyzingexplanatory text (pp. 109-171). Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Eribaum.

Graesser, A. C , & Mandler, G. (1978). Limited processing capacity constrains thestorage of unrelated sets of words and retrieval from natural categories. Joumal ofExperimental Psychology: Human Leaming and Memory, 4, 86-100.

Graziano, W. G. (1987). Lost in thought at the choice point: Cognition, context, andequity. In J. C. Masters & W. P. Smith (Eds.), Social comparison, social justice.and relative deprivation (pp. 265-294). Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Eribaum.

Haan, N., Aerts, E., & Cooper, A. B. (1985). On moral grounds. New York: NewYork University Press.

Hackett-Renner, C , & DePue, K. J. (1989). The effect of situational relevance in amoral reasoning task. Manuscript submitted for publication.

Higgins, A., Power, C , & Kohlberg, L. (1984). The relationship of moral atmosphereto judgments of responsibility. In W. M. Kurtines & J. L. Gewirtz (Eds.), Morality,moral behavior, and moral development (pp. 74-108). New York: John Wiley.

Hogan, R. (1970). A dimension of moral judgment. Journal of Clinical and CounselingPsychology, 35, 205-212.

Hogan, R. (1973). Moral conduct and moral character: A psychological perspective.Psychological Bulletin, 79, 217-232.

Johnson, J. A., Cheek, J. M., & Smither, R. (1983). The structure of empathy. Journalof Personality and Social Psychology, 45, 1299-1312.

Jones, R. A., Morris, B. R., Ries, J. B., Morrow, G. D., & Wekstein, D. R. (1989).Variation in initial procedures and the stability of dimensions extracted from free-response data. Multivariate Behavioral Research, 24, 431-443.

Jones, R. A., & Rosenberg, S. (1974). Structural representations of naturalistic de-scriptions of personality. Multivariate Behavioral Research, 9, 217-230.

Jones, R. A., Sensenig, J., & Ashmore, R. D. (1978). Systems of values and theirmultidimensional representations. Multivariate Behavioral Research, 13, 255-270.

Jurkovic, G. J. (1980). The juvenile delinquent as a moral philosopher: A structural-developmental perspective. Psychological Bulletin, 88, 709-727.

Kohlberg, L. (1971). From is to ought: How to commit the naturalistic fallacy andget away with it in the study of moral development. In T. Mischel (Ed.), Cognitivedevelopment and epistemology (pp. 151-236). New York: Academic Press.

Kohlberg, L. (1976). Moral stages and moralization: The cognitive-developmental ap-proach. In T. Lickona (Ed.), Moral development and behavior (pp. 31-53). NewYork: Holt, Rinehart & Winston.

Kohlberg, L. (1981). The philosophy of moral development. San Francisco: Harper &Row.

Kohlberg, L. (1984). Essays on moral development: Vol. II. The psychology of moraldevelopment. San Francisco: Harper & Row


Kohlberg, L., Scharf, P., & Hickey, J. (1972). The justice structure of the prison: Atheory and intervention. Prison Journal, 51, 3-14.

Kurtines, W., & Greif, E. B. (1974). The development of moral thought: Review andevaluation of Kohlberg's approach. Psychological Bulletin, 81, 453-470.

Lapsley, D. K., Harwell, M. R., Olson, L. M., Rannery, D., & Quintana, S. M.(1984). Moral judgment, personality, and attitude to authority in early and lateadolescence. Joumal of Youth and Adolescence, 13, 527-542.

Leary, M. R., Knight, P. D., & Barnes, B. D. (1986). Ethical ideologies of theMachiavellian. PersonaUty and Social Psychology Bulletin, 12, 75—80.

Leming, J. S. (1976). An exploratory inquiry into the multi-factor theory of moralbehavior. Joumal qf Moral Education, 5,179-188.

Liebert, R. M. (1979). Moral development: A theoretical and empirical analysis. InG. J.Whitehurst&B. J. Zimmerman (Eds.), The functions cf language and cognition(pp. 229-264). New York: Academic Press.

Lifton, P. D. (1985). Individual differences in moral development: The relation of sex,gender, and personality to morality. Journal of Personality, 53, 306-334.

Meehan, K. A., Woll, S. B., & Abbott, R. D. (1979). The role of dissimulation andsocial desirability in the measurement of moral reasoning. Journal of Research inPersonality, 13, 25-38.

Norusis, M. J. (1988). SPSS-X advanced statistics guide (2nd ed.). Chicago: SPSS, Inc.Pittel, S. M., & Mendelsohn, G. A. (1966). Measurement of moral values: A review

and critique. Psychological Bulletin, 66, 22-35.Rawls, J. (1971). A theory of justice. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.Rest, J. R. (1979). Development in judging moral issues. Minneapolis: University of

Minnesota Press.Rokeach, M. (1973). The nature of human values. Riverside, NJ: Free Press.Sampson, E. E. (1977). Psychology and the American ideal. Journal of Personality and

Social Psychology, 35, 767-782.Schlenker, B. R., & Forsyth, D. R. (1977). On the ethics of psychological research.

Joumal cf Experimental Social Psychology, 13, 369-396.Simpson, E. L. (1974). Moral development research: A case study of scientific cultural

bias. Human Development, 17, 81-106.Singh, B., & Forsyth, D. R. (1989). Sexual attitudes and moral values: The importance

of idealism and relativism. Bulletin ofthe Psychonomic Society, 27, 160-162.Snarey, J. R. (1985). Cross-cultural universality of social-moral development: Acritical

review of Kohlbergian research. Psychological Bulletin, 97, 202-232.SPSS, Inc. (1988). SPSS-X user's guide (3rd ed.). Chicago: Author.Stein, N. L., & Trabasso, T. (1982). Children's understanding of stories: A basis for

moral judgment and dilemma resolution. In C. J. Brainerd & M. Pressley (Eds.),Verbal processes in children: Progress in cognitive development research (pp. 161-188). New York: Springer-Verlag.

Sullivan, E. V. (1977). A study of Kohlberg's structural theory of moral development:A critique of liberal social science ideology. Human Development, 20, 352-376.

Tappan, M. B. (1990). Hermeneutics and moral development: Interpreting narrativerepresentations of moral experience. Developmental Review, 10, 239-265.

Trainer, F. E. (1977). A critical analysis of Kohlberg's contributions to the study ofmoral thought. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour, 7, 41-63.

Trevethan, S. D., & Walker, L. J. (1989). Hypothetical versus real-life moral reasoning

262 Quinn et al.

among psychopathic and delinquent youth. Development and Psychopathology, 1,91-103.

Vernon, P. E., & AUport, G. W. (1931). A test for personal values. Journal of AbnormalSocial Psychology, 26, 231-248.

Waterman, A. S. (1988). On the uses of psychological theory and research in theprocess of ethical inquiry. Psychological Bulletin, 103, 283-298.

Wilson, J. P. (1983). Motives, values and moral judgments. Journal cf PersonaUtyAssessment, 47, 414-426.

Wright, D. (1971). The psychology of moral behavior. Baltimore: Penguin Books.Wrightsman, L. S. (1974). Assumptions about human nature: A social-psychological

approach. Monterey, CA: Brooks/Cole.Young, F. W., & Harris, D. F. (1990). Multidimensional scaling: Procedure ALSCAL.

In M. J. Norusis (Ed.), SPSS base system user's guide (pp. 397-461). Chicago:SPSS, Inc.

Manuscript received January 15, 1991; revised March 18, 1993.

naturalistic conceptions of morality: a question-answering approach

Documents