CHAPTERFIFTEEN

Moral Epistemology and theBecause Constraint

Nick Zangruill

Metaethics and Explanation

Given some perplcx ing sub. iect -mat ler or mode of rhought , phi losophers typ ical ly askmetaphysical and epistemological quest ions. Thev ask about the nature ( i f any) of ' thephenomenon. and they ask about our k"wrecrge ( i f an-y l o f i t . when i t comes tomoral i tv , manv moral phi losophers ask metaphysical quest ions l ike the fb l lowing. Arethere moral facts or states of aflairs or property instantiations about which we areth ink ing when we make moral . iudgmcnts, and which (when we get i t r ightJ are thetruth-makers of those moral . judgments? 0r are there no such moral facts (or stateso1' aff airs or property instantiations)? Furthermore, if there are such moral facts (orstates of af la i rs or property instant ia t ions) . what are they l ike? Are they in some sense'mind-dependcnt '

or 'minc l - independent '? 'And how do moral facts (or s tates of 'a f la i rsor property instant ia t ions) re late to non-moral or "natura l " facts (or s tates of af fa i rsor property instant ia t ions)? Those are the usual metaphysical quest ions. The episte-mological quest ions tend be of the fo l lowing son. Assuming there are moral facts (orstates of af fa i rs or propeny instant ia t ions) , how ( i f a t a l l ) do we know abciur them?And what ( i f anvth ing) would make our bel ie fs about them. just i f iec l? These two epis-temolo$ical quest ions make cer ta in assumpt ions. One assumpt ion is that our moralbel ie fs succeed in possessing the posi t ive epistemic propert ies of being knowlecige orbeing just i f red. But perhaps our moral bel ie f .s fa i l to have these posi t ive epistemiccharacter is t ics. Another assumpt ion is thar moral juc lgments are bel ie fs . But perhapsmoral . iudgments are not bel ie fs at a l l , but are emot ions or desi res. r or , to make themental cate€{ories broader, maybe moral . iudgments are ,non-cognitive'

rather than'cogni t ive ' s tates. We need to ask: what k inc l of menta l s late is forming or holc l ing a

moral judgment? This is not real ly an epistemological quest ion, s i rce epistemolog.yis about a value that bel ie f ' .s can have, not about whether the juc lgments in quest ionare bel ie fs rather than some other k ind of menta l s tate. rhere is no standard label for

t h i s ques t i on . I sha l r ca i l i r t he ' ; r r r i l ud ina l ' ques r i on . (Th i s i s n01 p re t \ . . Ith ink r f ' noth ing ber ter . ) Thesc metaphysical , epis temorogicar , ancl at t i t . r i i rf ions are thc c lass ical quest ic lns to ask. ,

However, there is another sor t of issue thal has come to the fbre reccnr . .is not cxpl ic i t ly mctaphysical , cp is lemolr - rg ica l , or at t i tud inaJ. phi losophers ha. ,what besl es 'p la ins our m'ra l . iudgmcnts? ' l -hat is , what best expla ins our makir _any moral judgments at a l l or e lse the speci l rc moral . iudgm.nt , * . make? Ti r r .t ions have perhaps a more empir icar a i r to them. r t sccms that psycholog ' i i rsc ience might be re levant to them in a way that is not usuai ly ihnught a1, ; .1 . the mure c lass icar quest ions. r r mighr be thoughr thar the appeat to exr ,ra ises new and perhaps bet ler qucst ions. perhaps considerat ions of explanarus a new source of argumenlat ive lcverage on the c lass ical quest ions. Inc let , , :phi losophers havt- argucd f rom explanatory considera l ion to conclus ions a imetaphysics. cp is temolog.y, or at t i tud inolog.y of moral i tv .

Fo r cxamp le , exp lana t i< ln r rea rs on rhe me taphys i ca r ques r i on i n Joh . . , r"argumcnt f iom re lat iv i tv . " Mackie wr i tes: "people approve of monoganrr rthe.y par t ic ipare in a monogamous way of r i fe rather than. . . paf t ic ipale in a r :am.us way ' f ' l i f 'e because they appro.re of monogam.y" ( rg77: 36) . He cn, ] , ,that i t is no1 merc ly thc fact that moral crdes vary wi th societ ies rhat is s isrl lu t the lact that lh is var ia l ion can be cxpla inecl so le ly in socia l terms wi thoL'ing moral facts. l f so, Mackie takes i t to f . l low that thcre is nc l need to posi l . ,o f moral fhcts or an epistemorogical Iacur ty fbr cretect ing them. so, for r . .ques t i ons o f ' t he exp lana l i on o f m ' ra l . f udgmenrs I ead a t l eas f t o a meraJ ) :conclus ion.

Explanat ion a lso bears on the epis lernologicar issue - assurning that mo'rments are bel ie fs - in that to asser t that moral facts can n. aunnol be know, , .icn l / t ' is to assef t a v iew about how moral judgnrents are cxpla ined: the er 'about rnora l i ty rh inks that moral jucrgmcnls are expla inecl in par- t by the fac, .are about , whereas the a pr ior is t c ienies th is . This is because bel ie f - fact causalact ion is that which d is t inguishes empir ica l f r rm a pr ior i knowledge (McGinn r . rr 9 8 2 , 1 9 8 4 ) . r

Funhermore, cxplanat ion bears on the at t i tur i ina l quest ion in that asser t i . .moral . iudgments are not bel ic fs at a l l but desrres r l r emot ions a lso means thrr .are not expla ined by moral tacts. Explanat ions of ten f rgure in a more coor fo\ r .wav in the ar t i tud inal debate as a way of g iv ing meaning to r rebates between . _t iv is ts and thei r non-cogni t iv is t opponents. This need ar ises because of the p. , .jE of a sophist icatec l k ind of non-cogni t iv ism that aspi res 10 respect cer ta in .L rand general idcas that govern ord inary moral thought . orc l inary moral thouqr: .what we might ca l l ' fb lk

morai i ty ' , commits us to the lo l lowing i ieas: there are .t ruths; whether somerhi 'g is good or bad does not depencr on what we th ink; '"proposi l ions" can be unasser tec l ; ancl whether something is good or bad deputr r .how i t is in natura l respects. Simon Brackburn 's 'quasi - rear ism' is the pro. iect of f i . , :ways to show that non-cogni t iv ism can respect ord inary fbrk moral i ty by sh,r . .that we havc a r ight to thesc ideas. c iespi tc the non-cogni t iv is t account of r .t hough t (1984 , 1985 , l 99B ; see a rso Zangw i i l l 99J ) . r f non -cogn i r i v i s t s canmoral i ty as ser iously as cc lgni t iv is ts . by respect ing those ic leas, then a quest ion i r r . .

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about what d is t inguishes the posi t ions. The worry is that therc is no remain ing waylo character ize a genuine c iebate. I f quasi - real ism is succcssfu l , then perhaps thercremain only metaphors anr i images associated wi th the dcbale bctween cogni t iv ismand non-co$ni t iv ism (Blackburn 19BO;Zangwi l l 1992a). Qui te a few objecte6 ro Black-burn that i f h is quasi - real ism succeeds i1 undercurs i tse l f (e.g. Wr ight l9B5). But i t isat prec isely th is point in the d ia lect ic that Blackburn reaches fbr the explanat ion ofmoral . iudgments as that which gives sense to the debate, when conceptual f 'eaturesdo not . considerat ions of how moral . iudgments are expla ined may g ive scnse to theat t i tud inal debate wi thout those explanat ions being t ransparent ly avai lable to thoseengaging ' in mt i ra l thought . Why should that cxplanat ion be t ransparent to us? Knowl-edge of the nature of percept ion or pain, lbr example, is not g iven l - ree to those whohave percept ions and pains or even to those who have bel ic fs about percept ions an4pains. St i why should knowledge of the nature of moral - ludgments be g iven f ree tothose who make them? Perhaps ord inary nrora l th inkers have some k ind of re lat ive lyt ransparent access to the conceptual l 'eatures of moral th ink ing. But there is no reasonto th ink that they should have t ransparent access to that which expla ins the fact tharour thought has those conceptual features.' ' The surface conceptual features of moralthought may be expla ined by mechanisms of which we havc no knowledge. The inter-esting issue is about which attituciinal theory best explains the conceptual f 'eatures offolk morality.! '

Whi le i t is t rue that explanat ion may be able to g ive scnse to the at t i tud inal debate,when appeals to the not ions of moral t ruth ancl the l ike c lo not , i t is not c lear that i tis the ottl,tr possible way to give se nse to that clebate. It may be sufflcient but not nec-essary. we must be careful not to build in a prc.iudice against a priori knowledge.Where we have a priori knowledge, our.iurigments are not causally responsive [directlyor indirectlv) to their subject-matter (thcir truth-makersJ. one might want to be amathemat ica l real is t , for exampie, wi thout want ing to def lne the real ism debate overmathcmat ica l ent i t ies and propert ies in causal -explanatory terms. Fur thermore, i t ispossib le that a par t icu lar ly enthusiast ic k ind of quasi - real is t might go beyond t ry ing,to capture the conceptual features I mentionecl and also strive to capture the appar-ent efficacy of the projected properly (Zangwill r992a: sect. vllr); and if so, we wil llack the explanatory means of character iz ing the c lebate. Having , .pro jected, ,

a prop-er ty onto the wor ld, perhaps we arso come to th ink of i t as having causal ef f )cacy.( ,I suspect that at some point we must s imply concede that there is a very pr imevaland pr imi t ive not ion of ex is tence or f 'act which cannot be expl icated in other terms(see McGinn 2000). l f so, the not ions of cause ancl explanat ion rest on th is funda-mental not ion of ex is tence or fact , rather than the other way round; and we can useth is more fundamcntal not ion to preserwe the sense of the at t j tud inal issue even inthe face of the par l icu lar ly enthusiast ic quasi - real is t . Hence, the appeal to explana_t ion may not be the only way to prosecute metaphysicar , epis temologicar , and at t i -tudinal issues. Neverrheless, where there arc distinctive explanatory considerations,we should cer-tainly consider their conseouences.

I suppose I should ment ion that there are sone phi l 'sophers who deny that weshould seek ro expla in moral judgmenrs (Dwork in 1996, 1997). This somewhat Luddi teview says that all we can do is describe our moral practice; we cannot e,rploin it. (Theview has a wi t tgenste in ian r ing to i t . ) we cannol ask what i t is to make moral . iudg_

Moral Epistemotogy and the Because Constraint lZoS I

ments and whether those. judgments arc bel ie f .s about the wor ld or are exprc-sr i r ,a t t i tudes. We s imply walk the moral walk and ta lk the noral ta lk . But th is is osrrphi losophy. [ t is a refusal to see that there arc quest ions that can be askecl . l ' iabout the holocaust . Some theor is ts have c la imed that thc holocausr cannolexp la ined . I ag ree w i th Dan ie l Go ldhagen tha t t h i s v i ew i s l l o th obscu ran t i s t i , 'i r r espons ib le ' [ see Go ldhagen 1996 ; t he pape rs t r . y Go ldhagen i n Shand ley 19 ,Zangwi l l 19s6b,2003). l 'he holocaust is a h is tor ica l event and wc c i ln inqr , r i re li ts causes l ike any other h is tor ica l evenl . S imi lar ly . the making of moral . judgnt t , 'by human beings is a phenomenon in the wor ld l ike nan.y others. We can sure lv . , . .wha t mr l ra l . i udgmen ts a re and abou l wha t exp la ins t hem. A re mora l j udgmenrs I .a l ien beins.s { ' rom ot l ter space? The rcal quesl ion is about what k inr l o f 'explanai ,nrora l - ludgmett ts have and whether thcy resul t i iom a causal sensi t iv i ty to thc i r r rLr 'makers ( the moral tacts i or whelhcr they are wel l expla ined wi thout posi l ing, sLrcrcausal route.

I t has seemed 1o man.v phi losophers in rhe last f 'ew decadcs thar rhe pro. jcc iexpla in ing moral thought is no1 rnere l .y one way 1o prosecute thc c lass ical issue. .is a lso the best way to prosecute rhem ( l larman 1977). They th ink that explanarr rissues have a cer la in phi losophical pr imacy. And a long wi th th is goes thc idea r i rthe mr- ' taeth ics should have more o1 'an empir ica l componenl than is t rac l i t ion l renvisaged. l 'hestr c la ints for what explanat ion can do may go t r io far . Never- thel t , -the qutst ion of what expla ins moral . judgrnents is cer la in iy in tercst ing anci inponr,and something we should consider , so long as we are caut ious about the exact upsi lo f such inqui r ies. 0n the one hand, i t is 1rue that meraphysical , epis temological , l , :a t l i tud inal qt test ions about moral . judgments can turn on e xplanatory considerat io i .For example, i l is t rue that i f there are moral facts crr r i moral judgments are bc l i r ' .and are cmpir ica l f f ter r thcy have a par t icu lar fact - to- . judgment explanat ion. 0n r rother hand, i f moral judgmenrs are not erp la ined in th is way, i t is not c lear wharshows. What i t shows is probably a d is junct ion: e i ther there are no ntora l t i t r .(Mackie) , or moral . judgments are n01 bel ie ls (Blackburn) , or nora l - juc lgments : , :non-empir ica l (Mor i re) . Ipar t icu lar ly wt i r ry abour thc quest ion being begged agair .a pr ior i forms of knowledg'e when explanatory considera l ions are d iscusscd. \ { i 'these warnings in rn ind, le t us now t l l rn to the cxplanatorv issue.

Sturgeon's Examples of Causally EfficaciousMoral Properties

Many phi losophers have thought that rnora l i ty is not empir ica l ly knowable. This nrgcis agreed betweetr non-cogni t iv is ts ( l ike Blackburn) . who deny that moral th ink ins l : .a mat ter of any k ind of bel ie f or knowledge, and cognir iv is ts ( l ike Moore) , who rcacrfbr a non-empir ica l epis temology. However, th is consensus has been chal lenged l r .t hose known as 'Co rne l l r ea l i s t s . N i cho las S tu rgeon [1988 ) and Dav i c i B r i r - r k (19s9fbr example, have sought ro show that moral i ty is af ter a l l known (and thus knouable) on empir ica l grounds. And thcv have sought to show th is by establ ish ing cerra i rc la ims about the explanat ion of mr l ra l judgments. /

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s ince these examplcs are lxa( lc t r l do a lo t o l - c l ia lect ica l work ' ln h is l laper "Moral

cxplanat ions," ancl in other p iaces, Sturgeon g iv t 's var ious erample 's of which aspi re

1o be common-sensc cases o1 'morn r l exp lana t j ons (1988 ; see a l so S tu rp ,eon 1986 , 199 I '

1996. l99Bl . Mv v icw is thar rhr :se examples ia l l in to twi t k inds. Lc '1 us cal l these r /o-r -

o.s l ic and non-do-rasf i ( 'exantp lcs. A c loxast ic cxamplc is r lne in wl . r ie l l whal a n lgra i

fact is s ' . rpposed to cxpla in is n nrr l ra l bel ic f - . A nc ln-d<txast ic examplc is one in which

lh is is pot so. l t is usual ly prcsume( l that one c i th t r accepts both or nt ' i ther . But th is

is d isputable. Ihe v iew ol ' r .nora l propenies ani l our co$ni t ion of them to which I

inc l ine aCccpts notr - r loxast ic cxat t r l t les but not doxast ic cases. Ianl not against moral

t .xp lanat ions in gcneral : I ant only against moral explanat io l ts of nr t l ra l bc l ie fs . Wi th

rh i s i n m ind , l e t l l s l u rn 1o S tu rgeon ' s cxamp ies ' Hc wr i t es :

rnany t l ic r l lvh6 nr ighl havc becn savcr l f i r tcaust l . . . Passct i I \ { idshipnlan Wortdswort l r

1 1 ; 1 r j r l s l n r , ( l i u l l t l l t l g , r r r r l . { l 9 B B : / 4 4 )

lThc l2ct of Hi t l r r 's i r l rprav i ty is re lcvarr t to an explanal ion o l 'what he d i t l . ( lb id. 2a9)

f i rcsr arc ngtr -doxasl ic exenlp les, and theY are ( lK bV mc. I -heV are n l i ' ra l ex i l lana-

r i i . rps 6f patura l lacrs, not ntora i ex1) lanat ions of moral bel ie f .s . I would ac ld that thr .

i r rs ta l l ia t io l 61 s6mc ynorai propcr t ies car t cause o lher i t rs lant ia t ion t l l 'moral pro l l -

cr t ics. Ihe Lrs i la l account o1 'how th is causal et f lcacY is pt lss ib le would appeal to supcr-

vcnience and c()nst i tu t i r - rn re lat ions that hold bc lwt :en l l l t ) ra i and natura l propert ics

tsrr . K int 1991 Ibr d iscussjon) . Perhaps therc arc t l i f f rcu l t ies wi th such accoul l ts ' l ru t

i f moral lacts arc c lc l inp l as wcl l r , rn th is score as psychological ' c l remical , and l l io log-

ica l facts, then they arc not doing too badly.

Str - r rgeon a lso g ivcs cxaurples ot '1h is sot t :

of h is rca l l y hav in f l l l ecn mora l l v depraved - { i r rn ts' rvhV

wc bc l ieve he r t ras d t 'p raved ' ( lb id . 2 la )

l l ' l a r t ( )1 ' thc e rp la r ra t i0n o1 ' [DcVoro 's ] l l c l iev ing tha l Woods lvor lh was no dantned good

is ius t tha t Woodst r r r t r th l l ' l r -s no damncc l $or ld . { lh iL l 244)

[V l iguroqs a l t l r t ' aso t rab lv w idesprca t l n lo ra l oppos i t ion to s lavc t ' y a rose lb r the f l rs t t in te

in the c igh te t -n th anr . i n ine tec t l th cc t r t t t r ies , cvcn though s lavcry w i ls a verV o ld i t l s l i t t t -

t i o n . . . a n r i . . . r h i s o p p r - r s i r i o n : l r o s c p r i n r a r i l y i n B r i t a i n , F r a n c c , a n r l i n I r r e n t h - a t r r l

[ng l i sh-s l teak ing Nor th Anrcr ica , even though s laverv ex is ted th rou$hout the N i 'w Wor ld

. . . l i recause] chat t t . l : iaven, in Br i t i sh anr l F rench Anrer ica . a t t r l l l r cn in the I jn i ted S ia tcs ,

was ntuch i t ,or-sc than prcvir: tus lbrms o1'slavcry. and nluch worse than slavt 'ry in Lati t- t

Amcr ica . ( lb id . 2451

I '1cse are c loxas t ic cx l r lana l ions" a r r r i they are r lo l OK b .y mc. Th is chapter w i l l focus

on cases o f th is k ind . My v icw is lha t mora l be l ie l ' s a re nevcr causa l l y respons ive to

n tora l 1ac ts . So I anr comt t t i t ted to c l tny ing a l l S tu rgeon 's cxamples o f such exp lana-

r ions . However , I th ink tha t fb lk mora l i t y l s conmi t ted t0 the causa l ro le o f mora l

ihc ts . r ' s tu rgeon is impor tan t ly r igh t a l lou t th is . For example , thc fac t tha t an ac t i s

ev i l m igh t cxp la in why peop le su f l 'e rcd as a conscquence o f i t . That ' s an example o f

n to ra l - to -non-n tora l causa i in te rac l ion . An example c l f a commi tmen l to non-mora l -

Moral Epistemology and the Because Constraint @

i l i t i e r ' s t r o r a l d e p r i t v i l \ ' - t h c i a c t

par t o f 'a reasot tab le cxp lanat ion o l

to-morai caLlsal i l l teract ion wouir l be lhe accusat ion that Socrates corrupt td thc \

f i r r thc ic lea r ,vas that what Socrates d id c l tuse thc Youth to become corr l lp l . He l ( :

i n t hc Apo loq r , t ha l he wou l< l bc i r r a t i ona l t o do tha r s i nce i f he madc them c r , r .

t he i r co r rup l i on wou l c l i n t u rn co r rup t h im . l ' h i s w t l u l d be an examp le o l ' l l l

to-mrt r i i l causal in lcrac l ion. ' l

hesc are la i r lv common-sel lsc sor ls t l t ' cxanl l r l , '

n ro ra l causa l i n t c rac t i on . I l n t t he I ac l t ha t o rd i r t a r y mora l t hough t i s c r l n tn l i r t r

moral gxplapal ions in r rorr - t loxast ic cases does nr l l n tcan that i1 is commit te( l to l l l

ex l ) lanat ions in do-rn-s l lc cascs. l 'hcre is a lo t to bc said f i l r t l rc idea that I

doxast ic cxplanat iot rs are common sei lSC - l lar t o t ' fo lk nrora l i ty . But the i r l t ' ,

c l gxas r i c exp lana l i ons i s no t obv ious l v pa r t o l ' l o l k mora l i t y . E i t he r f b l k mora l i r '

ncu t ra l on t h i s qucs l i on . o r a t l eas r 'wha t t he l i r l k t h i nk a l t ou t t h i s i s con t rovc rs l , ,

An amb igug i l s casc i s t h i s : " l l . j us t i ce caused r cvo lu t i on R" (S tu rgeon l 99B : u '

1 'h is mi i lh t be a r loxast ic explanat ion. I f bc l ie / i about i r t iLrst ice arc \ l lpposed t " I

a m(d i l l i uq causa i r o l c l l e lwcen i n j us t i cc an ( l r cvo lu t i ons , t hen we a re assun l i l l q '

i n i gs t i cc ca l l ses l t c l i c f i abou t i n j us t i cc . I ha t ' s l i o t OK l l v me , even thoug ,h I an l l l l r l

1o accepl that t te l ie f ! about in just ice cause revol t t t ic l t rs . But i l ' i t is thought that t i l ,

is some col l lec l io l t l re t rveen in jus l icc and revr t l t t t i t tn which is r lor n lediatec l by t l l ,

be l ie f .s , thcn i t wogld he a l ton-doxast ic cxplanat ion, and i1 n. rav be acccptable. l r l

ant l t igr . rous case, we must d isanlb igt rate. and sc l laratc (acccpta l l le) non-doxat .

c lenre nts f iom (unacccpta l l le) doxast ic e lcments.

Bcl i r re Igo on 10 arp,ue that moral lacts and propcr t ies do t rot crp la in our l . l lo f

bel ie l 's . I rvant to say sontc lh ing neg,aLive, . j l ls t to P,et i t o t l l o f the way. Otherwist '

w i l l c l i s t r ac t us . ' I h i s i s t ha t we shou ld no l ap l l ea l t o coun te r fhc tua l s , a t l eas t i n a r '

s imple \ ,va.y. For example. Slurgeon wr i tcs: " t t I is not l p lausib le that we would a] l ha" ,

bel icver l l t l i t ler l was nrora l l l c lepravcd i f he hadn' t l tccn" ( l9BB: 246) . l t is not at r ,

c lear whether sucl i con( l i t ionals are t r l le . I t dcpends on pcople 's background mor l ,

commitntenls .0ne ccr la in ly wonders who Str - r rgeon's "wc" ref 'crs to. Does i t inc l t t r l ,

Gcrmaps of thc pre-war years? I f l ro t , wi ry not? We t l l ight lament : " l f on ly Slurgcr ' l

wrre r ight about th is counter factual ! " " But cven i l '1he counter f t rc tual is t rue, i t is l l ( ' '

c lcar whal i t shows about thc explanat ion of c lur moral bel ie fs . Not cvery count( ' l

Iactual s ig,n i l tcs a r . :ausal rc lat ionship. anr l the lact that th is cor- tnter factual obta ins. i

i t c loes. c locs ngr show rhat thr : moral propertv is causal lY ef f lcac ious wi th respe' t '

to o l l r n tgra l l te l ie f is . We do l te t ter to avoid a l )peal ing to such coul l ter factuals j r

t h i s 6eba tc . ' l ' he i r i n re rp rc la t i on i s t oo con t rove rs ia l . (See a l so ' I homson 1998 : 220

n . l . )

The Realization Argument

Rccal l thar ly ing behinc l th is cxplanatory del )ate is fhe issue of the epistemic status

6f moral bel ic f .s . l l moral bel ie fs are, as Sturgcot . t says, the causal upshot of moral

lacts. we havt . rhe makir . rgs of a re la l ive ly unproblemat ic moral epis temology. Moral

. juc lg,mtnts turn out to be empir ica l . This is what I want tc l res is t . However, the idel r

lhat wc shol lc l take a c l i l rcnt v icw about ( loxast ic and a l tout non-c loxast ic expla-

nar lo l . ls may appcar odd. I f 'nrora l fhcts can cause o lhcr th i l . lP,s besides moral bel ic fs .

whv can l t hey cause tno ra l be l i c t s t oo?

@ Moral Epistemology and the Because Constraint

Moral rL r ,

l r t i ons ) a rervhere ' rea l i .

some l la l t l l lneutra l i t l i r i

r r tora l propt

c rp lana ton

. judgments r ,

0ne arg.L lr-rralisnt sar '

natura l PfoIt ion whcthr 'X 's being u

c legree. Bt t t

no natltra I

t ive. Enr l t i r rrepresenl i l l

o f t he na tL t

izes good r '

X is g,ootl ,

I t l s l \ a l l . lUnlbr tLt l

some un ( ( r '

pa ra l l e i a r t

fbr watcr I r

chai rs . Ni i t .

urat ions ( ) I

The sante !

about t t l l l l t 'w i l l be en t t ,ments a l loL

surely do r

a s n a i l ' . r , l

causal lv s t '

p E i n s o l .

real ized i r lTh i s i s :

gether. Fol

cases. Thct

is conseqt t

emp i r i ca l l ri f w a t e r u ,

examp le . r

and wc comake sct l r

r ema ins l )

;*{:ll

tr:n|l

sfi:r i l"

r'|f's

l ; t . +

\ lora l real is ts typ ical lv say that nrora l lacts (sra lcs of af fa i rs of propert .y instant i -' :o t tsJ are " real ized" in natura l lacts (s tates o l 'a tTai rs or l ) rc lper tv instant ia t ions) -' ' I t c r c ' r ea l i zcd 'means , ve rv ro l l gh i v . t ha l cvc rv r l o ra l f hc t ( c t c . ) ob ta ins hccause o f

' , l l l ( ' l l a tu ra l f ac t ( e t c . ) . ( l use the won l ' r ca i i za t i on ' i n r t r d r : r t o r c l a i n a c l cg ree o f' r ' t l i ra l i tV aboul the exact re lat ion between nrora l and natura i propert ies. ) Given thal' : lora l prc lper t ics arc real izcd in p la in natura l propcr l ics. about which there is no grcal, \ l ) lanatory (or epis lemological ) d isprr te. how can we c lenv thal nrora l fhc ls cause our. idqments about thcnt , espccia l ly whcn i1 is cor . rccdcr l thar thcv causc othel ' th ings?

0ne argumenl aqainst Sturgeon and Br ink woulr l go as l i t l lows. N4t taphysical nat-: r a l i sn t says t ha l i ns tan t i : r t i ons o1 'mora l l l r opc r t i es a re rea l i zed i n i ns tan t i a l i ons o1 'r r t t t t ra l propert ies. A sr . rbstant ivc f i rs t -order ntora l r luesl i r )n takcs the fbrm of thc ques-' :o t t whether X 's having the (possib ly conjunct ive) natura l pro l )cr ty N real izes c i ther|s bc ing good to a cef ia in r legrec or . on lhe other hand, X 's bc ing ev i l tc l a ccr ta inicgree. But there is no natura l d i l - lerence betwecn thesc possib i l i t ies. Ancl i1 ' th t re isr lo natura l d i t - fcrencc, then there is no causai d i f lcrence to which we can be scnsi -' i t ' e . Emp i r i ca i cogn i t i on imp l i es t ha l ou r cop .n i r i on i s causa l l v sens i t i v c t 11 wha t we:cpresent in i ts content , d i rect ly or ind i rect lv IMcGinn lgTr-6) . But the instant ia t ion' )1 the nalura l property N has the causal ro lc i t docs i r respcct ive of 'whether i t rca l -izcs good or ev i l . Hencc there is no cansal d i t ' f 'erence bv which wc coulc l tc l l whcther\ is good or ev i i . The theory that something is N. and that i t is N and evi l , ar . rd rhari t is N and good. are i i l l empir i i :a l ly cquival r . .n t .

Unfbr tunatc ly . th is argument wi l l not do. because a paral le l argumenl w6uld label\ome uncontrovers i : t l examplcs of a poster ior i knowledge as u pr ior i . Fr l r cxampic, apa ra l l c i a rgumcn t sec l r s t o sh t t r v t ha l we canno t have en tp i r i ca l know ledge o f 'wa te r ;l i r r watcr has t ro causal r< l le over arrd abovc H,U. The sarxe p,oes fbr r<tcks. snai ls . anr icha i r s . Mac ro -phys i ca l , b i o l og i ca l , and an i {ac lua l t h i ngs a re a l so rea l i zcc l i n cgn f rg -urat ions of micro-physical mat ter . Rocks, sn:r i ls , and chai rs arc a l l physical ob. jects.The samc goes fbr psychological s tates i f matcr ia l ism is r rue. [ t looks as i1 'anv thcoryabout upper- lcvel propert ies, p lus a physical theory of thc samc sector of space- t ime,rv i l l be empir ica l ly ind iscr iminable f rom thc physical theory considered a lone. So. jur lg-ments about water , rocks, snai ls , chai rs , and pains wi l l come oLl t as a pr ior i . Bnt wesu re l y do have pe rcep tua l con len ts sL rch as . 'Tha t ' s wa te r ' . ' Tha t ' s a rock ' . o r 'Tha t ' sa snai l ' . or 'That 's a chai r ' , and mavbe " l -hal persotr is i r r pain. Ancl we arc sure lycal tsa l ly sensi t ivc t<t these th ings. tsc l ie f i aboul water , rocks, snai ls , chai rs , ancl t l repains of o lhcrs arc empir i i :a l . 11 looks as i f bc l ie f .s a l tout sonrc propert ics rhat arereal ized in other propcr t ies are empir ica l . So lvh.y not moral pro l )er t ies too?' l 'h is

is indccd a problem. But i t should not lcad us to abandon thc arqumenl a l to-g,ether. For there sli l l .scort-s to be a dif l 'erc'ncc ltetweor the nroral case ancl these other.cascs. Therc is surc ly some di f l 'erence that wc can bc empir ica l ly scnsi t ivc to. whichis consequcnt ia l on whether or not water is I l ,0 . This is why thc ic lent i tv c la int iscmpir ica l ly knowablc. A problem might be ra iscc l herc. Perhaps we cannol say thati f water werc not H,0 then i t wor-r ld make an r : r rp i r ica l ly c l isc ' r inr i t rable d i f ' f 'erencc ( forexample, i f water were not H,O then i t wor"r ld not boi l a t 100"C i l t normal pressLl re.and we could perceive that) . For there are some phi losophcrs who say tnar we cannolmake sense o1 'what would be the case i1 'an in tpossih i l i t -y obta ins. Nevertheless i tremains p lausib le that thc ident i ty of water and H,O is sonreth ing we know about

Moral Epistemology and the Because Constraint I ZOg I

empir ica l lv . onc su$$est ion wor-r l t l i lc ' that we arr ive at the idcnt i tv bel ie f 'bv ' r

cnclc l iom thc bel ic f thal water and H,O unic luelv shar t 's t tme cont ingt ' r l t 1 l t ' r I

(presunably somc causal proper lyJ" \^ Ie then ht tve i in uncontrovcls ia l ly accel r t

counter l 'ac lual : i f 'waler and H,O hacl nr- r1 sharer l lh is propcr tv . there wrnt ld havt ' r

ar . r empir ica l ly c l iscr iminable c i j l l t rcncc. Now compare lGoor lncss is wl tat 1 l r i l ' t

happinessl and [G()odncss is not what prr lc luces happiness] ; thcre seens to be no t ' i l '

f l iUerence between thcsc two i ryp0thcses t r l which wc ct lu ld l le sensi t ive ' I1 set- t t ts ' '

t he re i s no obsc rvab l c c l i l f e rence tha t i s consequen l i a l on whe the r - { ) r no1 goo r l t l t ' -

what produces happiness. Ancl i f Someone Worr ies that the 'se c la ims abol t t grror l '

are necessary i f t rue, then thc c la im we need is that i t is not possib le for us 1() :

S o m e C o n t i n g e n t p r o p e r t y t h a t g o o d n c s s a n d W h a t p r o d t t c e s h a p p i n e s s u n i q u e h , \ l ]rhat r ,vould supply in fcrent ia l . just i l icat i0n to tht bel ic f that goodness is what 1r '

c luces happiness" sO our knowlecl$e of ' the re lat ion l le tween moral and natura l pr '

cr l ies at least seenr.s to be verv d i f fercnt i iom our knorv ledge o1 ' the re lat jon betn '

natura l k ind l r roper-r res ancl micro-physical prc lper t ics. But - the problem l5 - l i l t :

s / ro i r r th is?The argumenl t rom rcal iza l ion needs repai r ing or at least supplement in$ ' we t l '

t o S a v W t l v \ , V e C a l l l l 0 l k n o w m o r a l p r o p e f i i c s e m p i r i c a l l y i n t h e w a v t h a t w e c a t l l , lc lo know these othcr rca i ized propef i ies.

' l 'hc l ine of argument musl be rev iset l ' I

we should nol g ive i t up a l togethcr . Tht : re is something inru i t ive iv r ight about t i : :

wc have no1 yct lnear thcc l . we necr : l to 1ry aqain to say exacl ly how knowledgr '

moral i ty is d i f ferent l iom knowlecige of wa1cr , rot :ks. snai ls , chai rs , ancl pains '

The Because Constraint

Suppose I say that Barry is bad. You ask whv' I rcp lv that Barry is had becausc I

has b lue eycs. You mig l t t wi th. ius l icc cr i t ic ize th is explanat ion on thc $rounds t l l

b e i n g b l u c _ e y e c l i s n o t t h e k i n c l o f p r o p e r t y t h a t c a n ( b y i r s e l f ' ) m a k e s o m e o n e t l i lThe i4ea is pre judiced because being b lue-eyed is not by i1sel l ' re levanl to delernr i r

ing a moral propertv . Now suppose instead that Isav that Bi l l r r is had. You ask t { l

t replv . , .No reason; hc 's . just bad, that 's a l l . " This is ut ter ly i r responsib le and wejr

This is l ike pre- judice, except worse ' ln the case of pre- iudice ' a person takes an i r r t

evant E{rounr i to bc re levanl , but at lcast he has some ground, a lbc i t a bad one u '

i n rhe case o f 'B i l l y . I havc no g round a t a l l . ' f h i s i s ba rk ing mac l ' Fo r i l 'B i l l v i s t r i '

rhcre musr be somcthing that n lnkes Bi l ly bacl . wc ml ts t th ink that I l i l ly is bad becni i '

or in y i r ly t , ry ' ' the way he is i r t o ther respccts.0r 1o takc a renl examplc ' i f isabcl

was bacl in 1492. i r was in v i r tuc c l l 'b igotry , in lo lerance" tor t l t re . or whatevcr ' FLi r

thermore. i f I . iudge that lsabel la was bad in 1492, I n lust judgi ' that shc was bad I

virtue ot big'o11./, ttttolerancc, lorture, or whatever. Ioo abhrcviatc: she is M becalt ' '

she is N; ancl i f I judge her to be M i t nrust be because I . iur lge her to be M becat t ' '

r he i s N .t t is wic le lV acceptcd fhat John Mackic 's mctapl iys ica l qt lecrncs\ l ) rove\ very l l t l

because of the possib i l i tV of 'a nalura l is t metaphvsics (Br ink 19t ]9: 171-80) ' Br ' r r Mack '

was r ight t0 menr ion, i f on lv in passinf l . the pro l l lcm ol ' th is he(uuse [ " 'Just what t ;

t l te u,or l t l is s igni f red by th is 'because'? ' (Mackie 1977: a l ) \ . Di f l 'c rent theor ies ar '

lzzol Moral Epistemology and the Because Constraint

possib le here. ( r ' : . '

s i ty . K i t F ine (20t '

has h i s non - rea l l \ '

a l l concePtual r t ' l '

s i b l e comb ina t i t ' l : '

and centra l i tv t t t

straint on Propfro f t hem) . Thc s l ' '

something is i laL l I

a pr ior i tha l t t l " :

something is Nl t ' '

Three comnlc: .

should Put to o l l r

moral lY on the b. '

anY th ing .sPec i l r 'authoritY, antl i l ' '

what Zak savs t "

except that thcr

secondary cast t

ed$e wherc oLtr I

gain thei r k t lo t " '

as ide cases l r l l r :

o{' the Prcctsc tl '

induct ive l l r t iL t l 'on Evi l St reet i r ' '

we might i t l i t ' r

induct ive jude. t l :

inductive .lu(lo-l l 'ntoral . judg,nlctl"

Propef l ies 01-11 '

er t ies: thcv a1(

proPerlies l ike '

Second (bJ. '

A dePcnds tlt l l l

enc ies dePent l

exPlanat io l l t r t

someone th i t lk '

that s teal ine r '

encY dePent i t

might agree t r l

is bad becaLt"

steal ing is i l i r r l '

to suggest lo l l '

th ink that th ' '

o f some o th t ' :

dePendencr '

:f'I.d

:l'Eiaqm

: ,oss ib le hr : re. Cornel l rca l rs ts th ink that i t is fami l iar Kr ipkean melaphysical neces-

, r r r , . K i t F ine (2002) rh inks rhat i r is a d is t inct ive ly moral necessi ty . B lackburn (1985)

rras h is non-real is t surrop,ate, rvh ich looks superf rc ia l ly l ikc metaphysical neccssi tv for

. i l l conceptual re l lect ion can te l l , but in fact der ives f rom the constra ints on respon-

. jb le combinat ions of at t i tudes. Nevertheless, everyone should agree on the ex is tence

.r r r r l centra l i tv of th is because. Mr l reover , th is becca.se is not . just metaphysical con-

, l ra int on proper l ies but a lso a constra int on our . iudgments (a "conceptual" feature

,r f rhem). The s logan might be: not . iust bcr l , l lu l bad because: we. judge not that

\ontething is bad perioci, but that it is l lad because o1- cenain natural properties. It is

l pr ior i tha l moral propct- t ies depend. Let us cal l the requi rement to judge that

\omething is M because i t is N the 'Because Constra int . ' "

Three comments: F l rs t (a) , there are two specia l cases of moral . iudgment that we

should pu1 to one s i r le as der ivat ive : author i ty and induct ion. In cases where we judge

rnoral ly on the basis of author i ty or on induct ive grounds, we. judge wi thout knowing

anyrhing.speci f ic about a th ing 's natura l propert ies. Suppose l take Zak to bt 'a moral

author i tv , and he- juc lges Zorro to be a man of impeccable v i r tue. I may wel l bel ieve

ivhar Zak says even though I know noth ing speci f ic about Zorro 's natura l propert ies

cxcepl that they are what Zak. judges to be v inuous. However. i f there are to be some

sccondary cases of knowlecige by author i ty , there must be cases ot 'pr imary knowl-

cdge where our knowledgc does not depend in th is way on other people. Thclse who

g'ain their knclwledg,e by aulhority are parasitic on those who do not. Stl we can put

as ide cases where one makes a . ludgment about someone on author i ty , in ignorance

of thc prec isc natura l propert ies of the th ing being . judged. We also fbrm bel ie f 's on

inr iuct ive grounds. I t could be that so far evcryone we have encountered who l ives

on Evi l St reet has turned out to have natura l propert ies that real ize badness. And so

we might in fer that Cruel la , who l ives there, is probably bad as wel l . But such

inr luct ive. ju{gments are possib le only because of non- induct ive judgments. The non-

induct ive. judgmenrs are rhe basis tbr the induct ion. So we can a lso ignore induct ive

nroral . juclgments. ln authority a ncl in ductive cases, we do n ot know the speciJic n atura I

proper l ies c l f the th ing . juc iged, but lvc do know somefhinq about thei r natura l prop-

er t ies: they are what Zak. judges to be v i r tuous, or they are somehow bad-making

propenies l ike the natura l propcnies o1- the gthers who l ive on Evi l St reet .

Seconcl (b), some clependencies depencl on others. Pi'rhaps A depends on C becausc

A depends on B and B depencls on C. Moreover, perhaps we th ink that some depend-

encies depend on others. l 'hus, we might th ink that there is sone more fundamental

explanat ion of t t , ! t j , i t is that a th ing is M because i t is N. Fr- r r cxantp le. perhaps

someone th inks that an act is bacl because i t is a case of s teal ing, but he a lso th inks

that s teal ing is bad because i t produces d isut i l i ty . l 'hus he th inks that ont depend-

ency depends on another ; one becnuse because of another because. A second persun

rnighr agree that the act is bad because i t is s teal ing, but instead th ink that s teal ing

is bad because ir transgresses rights. A third person might have no view abclut whY

steal ing is bad. a l though he th inks that there is some such reason. He might be open

to suggest ion concerning thc- explanat ion of i ts wrongncss. And a four th person might

th ink that the bar iness o l s teai ing is tundamental and not to be expla ined in terms

of ' some other depenr iency. Explanat ion has to come to an end, and perhaps the

ciependency of baclness on stealing is one such bedrock dependency. Nevertheless, the

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Moral Epistemology and the Because Constraint trl

Bccause Constra int s tands, because to make a moral . fudgment is to th ink that thcris some nalura l leature that a moral proper ly depends on. Whether or not that depenler lcy re lat ion is held to be u l t imate or der ived f rom another dependency re lat ion .another mat ter . To take another example, we may th ink that cut t ing up one healrh .pat ienl to save f rve is wrong. One person may th ink that i t is bacl because i t proc lucr .d isut i l i ty ; a second because i t t ransgresses r ights; a th i rc l person might never harret lccted on exact ly why i t is wrong in the sense of th ink ing rhat there is some rru,moral theory that would expla in i t ; and a fbur th might th ink that the baclncss ,cutting up one to save frve is a bedrock depenclency. All agree, however, that sonrt.th ing makes the ac1 of 'cut t ing up one to save f rve wrong.

Thi rd (c) , suppose we th ink that we should save a baby rather than an animal f i . r .a burn ing bui ld ing. I t might be objccted that we might be surer of ' that verd icr th i r ,we are of what made i t the r ight verd ic t . We might be less sure of the natura l bas,of the r ightness than we arc of the r ightness. B.y way of reply , rwo th ings can be sai r :A harsh reply would be to say that i f a person makes a judgment wi thout havi r -in mind some natura l base. then he is i r responsib le. So he real ly shouldn ' t hol r l th ,comparat ive judgment about the baby and the animal unless he has some reosor . l t . .ho ld ing i t . So he should ret ract the or ig inal judg'ment . on the other hand, I suspet .that in th is case, the person r /ocs th ink that bc ing-a-human-rather_than_a_nor,_human-animal is moral ly s igni f icant , even i f she has noth ing ; fur ther to say aboL; .why that natura l feature is moral s igni f rcant . So th is case turns out to be l ike r l t ,s teal ing case in (b) . One might conr lemn tak ing being-a-human-rarher- than_a-nor lhuman-animal as the natura l basis fbr the moral propef iy . But fbr bet ter or worse r l r .is cer ta in lv what much fo lk moral i ty is l ike. Simi lar ly a fami ly isr , nat ional is t , or rac i . ,might say that someone's being f rom my fami ly , nar ion, or race is moral s igni f rcar .and can mark a moral d is t inct ion f iom someone who is not . Ancl he might e i ther har ,noth ing lur thcr to say abclut why that natura l propefy is moral ly s igni f rcant , or h,might th ink that explanal ion stops there, and the moral s igni f rcance of the natur ,properfv is fundamental and not expla inable in terms of some other dependeno.Ei ther way, the Because Constra int holds.

Hence, the Because Constra int is fundamental to fo lk nora l i ty . lndeed i t is necr . r -sary and essent ia l to i t . But the Because Constra int v indicates, I bel ieve, a c la im th i , -is fundamental to Moore 's moral phi losophy. Moore c la ims that i t is a pr ior i tharcer ta in modal pr inc ip le holds, which today we would cal l ,moral

supervenienc.Al though th is wasn' t Moore 's phrase i t c lear ly is the idea he had in mincl . For exampl tMoore wr i tes: "supposing a g iven th ing possesses [ in t r ins ic value] in a cer ta in degretanvth ing exact ly l ike that th ing nrusr possess i t in exact ly rhe same degree' , (192,r269). I would recast this slightly by saying that for every moral properly instantirit ion therc is some natural property instantiation that sufflces for it (see Kim l9B-+Moore 's c la im is that we know a pr ior i that moral supervenicnce is of the essence ( , -a l l moral propert ies (1922:27o- l ) . Thc Bccause Constra int is the idea that in morai -iz ing we are commit ted to a cer ta in k ind of t ight connect ion between moral arr r :natura l propert ies: the moral propert ies hold because of , in v i r tue of , as a consequenrtof natura l propert ics. A pr ior i moral supervenience is the idea that i t is const i tur i r ,o f moral thought that there is a cer ta in modal connect ion between moral and natun,propenies: every moral property instant ia t ion is such that there is some natura l prorr -

@ Moral Epistemology and the Because Constraint

crty the i l lslThe Becausr

that moral s ,

that it is a rfundamenta ljudgments. tthought , thrhold ing in ts r r f f l c i n o f , ' r

commitmenlZangwi l l 2O{

The No

How does th

temic statusI t might i

venience domight bc l ik 'wel l descr i l r ruals) we opc

necessarilr :

a natura l k isa r i l y ; and i rt i ty holds thr

There is rfor proper n

a priori. Br

necessita t csturned out t rfundament a,that somethrmust makeconceptual rknowablc l rproperties. r ',

ta ted by sonrhe c i tes unptasserts the i 'c i p l es (1 9BO:disanalogr I

Even so.both thc er,embedded rtltto consic lcr :

e n y t h e i n s t a n t i a t i o n o | w h i c h s u f f r c e s f o r t h e i n s t a n t i a t i o n o f t h e m o r a l p r o p e f t V .TheBecauseCons t ra in te i t he r i s ' o rexp la ins ' *o tn l ' up t *en ience ' l tm igh tbe though tthat moral supervenience is l ike a rather complex' erutl ite

l l f im; so it is not obvious

,n,i ,, is an everydnYr 'o'Tln ::::^:":*[T"l;;:"i:'J#il'ii?; 'll'ii'",i'1

Hlffi l"lll",ig$:T;: ti J,li:l'Jroir o, n, a constitutiv. p,in.ip t. o r m oral

t h o u g h t , t h e s a m e l S t r u e o f m o r a l s u p e r v e n i e n c e . W e c o n c e i v e o f m o r a l p r o p e r t i e s a sholding in virtue

"f " '* '"f properties' und ' 'n we conceive of natural properties as

su f f l c i ng fb r them.The in -v i r t ue -o f re la t i onexp la ins thesu i f l c i en ry re la t i on .Andou rcommitment to the former explains or, . lo"r1rni,ment to the latter' (See further

Zanqwi l l 2005.)

The No-lndependent Access Argument

H o w d o e s t h i s b e a r o n t h e i s s u e s r a i s e d a t t h e b e $ i n n i n g o | t h i s c h a p t e r - t h e e p t s _i..,. *",u, and explanation of moral beliefs?

It might be argued that the Because Constraint and th,e lt-:,11y

of moral super-

venience do not 'n.un'inu,-ourticular moral judgments are a priori ' For the situation

might be l ike the.r r . " ; ; ; ;1 ,

norn. , tnr , ino iu iouuls) . As Nathan Salmon [1981) has

well describeo, in rrotr-, in. case of natural kind terms and proper names (of individ-

uals) we operate with a i*..*ort principle to ttre effect that if a claim holds it holds

necessarily: in tfre naturui t,nO caie the f.nn-'.*nrt principle is that if something is

a narural kind then ii-rr", "

cefiain molecular composition and it does so neces-

sarily; and in the proper name case the tiamtwutk principle is t]ra1 if an ob'iect iden-

t i t yho l t l s t hen i t oo . , , . on . . . , , u , i t y .Amoda l f rameworkp r i nc ip leho lds inbo thcases .T h e r e i s a n i m p o n a n t d i f f e r e n c e ' h o w e v e r ' w h i c h i s t h a t t h e p r i n c r p l e i s a p r t o r t

for proper names f]ut nnt ?ot nutu'ul kind terms' As we saw' moral superuenience ts

a p r i o r i . B y c o n t r a s t , i t i s c l e a r l y n o r a p r i o r i t h a t t h e r e i s s o m e m o l e c u l a r S t a t e t h a tnecessitates w^ter. lor aii *. i(n.* a few hundred years ago, water might easily have

turned out to have no molecular structure ,a ,i i . w".t might have been a pre-socratic

fundamen ta l s tu f fw i t hnocompos i t i on .Tha lesm igh thavebeen r i gh t ! l t i sno tap r l o r lthat something makes water water' gut toJ 'u[t-tnltnce is^ a priori - somethin$

must make good things goocl' Moral supervenienc-e it 1"fY:du*ental

a prtort

conceptual .on,ttnt' ' t t^g"jut?nlng all m,oral,?ought (Zangwill 1996a)' That is' i t is

knowab leap r i o r i o fmora lp rope r t i es tha t theya resomehow.necess i t a tedbyna tu ra lp r o p e r t i e s ' w h e r e a s i t i s n o t k n o w n a p r i o r i t h a t n a t u r a l k i n d p r o p e r t i e s a r e n e C e S S l .t a t e c l b y r o , n . t o l t t ' f u " t * t t " " ' ( S e e S a l m o n l g B l : c h s ' 5 ' 6 ' a n d a p p e n d i x l l ' w h e r ehe cites unpublished ;,rk ;y Donnellan; Putnam 1992; and Soames 2OO2: 271') Kripke

asserts the a priority claim fbr both proper name and natural kind framework prtn-

c i p l e s ( 1 9 8 0 : l o s ) , b u t a t t h i s r a r e p o i n t l t h i n k K r i p k e e r r s . T h i s i s a v e r y i m p o r t a n tclisanalogy between moral properties ancl natural kinds'

E v e n s o , * u o O U * t n t m i $ h t c o n c e d e t f ' ' i ' p o l n t a n d c o n t i n u e b y r e p l y i n g t h a t i nboth the cases of proper names untf n"u'"i kincl terms' the knowledge of the

embeddeilobject identity or composltion ,eLal,ons is empirical'-Tht sug$estion we need

t o c o n s i d e r i s t h a t " u " n t t , ' o u g i , m o r a l s u p e r u e n i e n c e i s a n a p r i o r i m o d a l f i a m e w o r k

Moraf Epistemotogy and the Because Constraint W

pr inc ip le , t he know lcdge o l ' pa r t i cu la r mora l -na tu ra l connec t i ons r s emnr r i c l r .examp le ' pe rhaps we know tha t pa in i s l l ad emp i r i ca r i . y , anc l we then a , j r r t he , , ,f ianewr l rk pr inc ip le that i1 'pain is bad i t is so nccessar i l .y . Howevcr . lshai l arg i r tthc moral case is r r . t l ike the proper name casc. Even thouqh the mr l ra l case i ,thc proper l . lame casc in that th i ' i r respect ive mocla l f iamework pr inc ip ies arc a i ) land i n t h i s respec t l l o l h a re un l i ke na tu ra l k i n r l l e rms , t he n ro ra l case i s un i i k t . ,t he p rope r namc casc und the na tu ra l k i nd t e rm case i n t ha t know ledge o f pan i rt rora l -nat l t ra l connect ions is a pr ior i whercas the knowlcdgt . o f both objcct i r i , ,t i es and o1 'na tu ra l k i nd -mo lecu la r con rpos i l i ona l r e l a t i ons i s emp i r i ca l . 0n l v i r :moral casc are hoth the f iamework pr inc ip le nrr r i ernbecldecl c . la ims a pr igr i .' fhe

Because Constra int is to b lame. As we shai l sce, i t is the Because Cons' .thal expla ins the fact rhat we cannot be causal iy sensi t ive ro moral propert ies .as badncss) or lo t l rc connecl ion between noral propcf t ies ant l natura l propert ies t .as that pain is bad or that causing pain fbr fun is bacl ) . [ ]y contrast , we can be caLr .sensi t ive 1o natura l k inds (such as rvater) and to natura l k inc l composi t ional rc la i{such as the re lat ion thar obta ins between warer and H,Ol ; ancl we can be carnsensi l ive to th ings (such as l l iccro) anr . i to the facr that ident i ty re lat ions holc. l berr . ,th ings {such as between Cicero ancl ' Iu l ly) . Crucia l ly , rh is is because wc have g.rica l knowledge of lvater and we havc empir ica l knowleclge of H,0 and we then i :the c 'mposi t ional re lat ion; and we have empir ica l knowledge of 'c icero and we i :cmpir ica l knowledp,e o1-T 'u l ly , and we then inf 'er the ic lent i ty re lat ion. Bur , as we : ;see, the t rouble - the f i rndanrenta l t rouble - wi th thc moral case is rhal u:e cou tno independcnt knout lcdge o.J ' rnora l und naturo l proper l ies. ,

The proper name case dt les not involve thc idea of real izat ion, so le t us lbcus nron our knowlcdgc o l -non-moral propenies that are phvsical ly real ized. How r l r rknow that an instancc t t f 'a natura l k ind has a ccf ia in composi t ion? Or to take sr , .o ther cases of real ized propcr t ics that are probably no1 natura l k inds, r l r a t Ieaslnot nalura l k inds in the way thal lvater is : how c lo we know that soneth ine.r . ,cer ta in p l rys ica l propert ies is a rock, snai l , r l r c lock? Answer: not l )y coqni t ion ot .connect ion between these upper* level propert ies and Iower- level p"nyr l .o t properr : .Instead we stan wi th rndepender i t knowleclge that her t - wc have a rock. snai l . or c l r . .Next we invcst igatc rhc physical propenies that c ,mpclse them. Ancl we then in lcr , ,connect ion. (As wi th natura l k inds, th is may be r lonc in rhe l ight o1-a t iamework, l . r :c ip le to the e lTect that t ruths about composi t ion are neccssar i ly t rue.) Bul - cmc' ,- i t is not l ike th is in the mrt ra l case. For our or ih , access 10 the upper- level nr . rpropert ies is t ' ia the lower- level natura l propert i r .s p lus knowleclge of thei r co1. tl ion ' Hence the moral case is tundanrenta l ly d i l l 'erent f ic lm the water , rock, snai l . i r rc lock cases. rhe cruc ia l asymmelry is thal in those cases wr have independent k ' . r . .edge r - r f thc upper- and lower- level propert ies, and we rhen inf i , r thc composi t io ,ident i t .v re lat ions. whercas in the moral case, wc have knowredge c l1 ' the lower-rcr ,natura l propcr t ies and of moral -natura l connect ions, and we then in l 'er the up,r :level moral propert ies. Ih is is because moral ascr ipt ic lns are sutr jcct t< l the BecaLi ,Constra int , unl ike water , rock, snai l , ar . rd c lock ascr ipt ions. proper name ic lent i t ies r ,a lso unl ike moral i ty . ' rhcre is no a pr ior i constra lnt on properuames accorc l ing.which whenever we asser t a c la im about someonc, such as Cicero, to the ef lect rh, ,he has a propcr ty , such as wisc lom, then i t must be because we th ink that ther t ,

Z! Moral Epistemology and the Because Constraint

S0lTleOl le. s i l t

wisdom. Sult hat rvhe nt ' r rhecause o i ' s ,i s w i se o r t l r rsar i l .v on t l r ,pr ior i corrst r r ,ve l low. thenf 'erent f ronr , ,cases we ha' .the re lat io t r r ,dent Acccss I'Ihesis.

To !. i 'You havc io ,upper deck. 1

Sturgeon r ,propert les ( l i rt ies that g,enLi s a rock . sn l ,menta l et ror .i g n o r a n t o f r i

i nc red ib l c . Fumcn ts aboL i li t i s no t a l r i , r rna tu ra l p ro l rL

I t is easrpa in . j udgn rL ' :peop l c ac tu i i l .a l i t y imp l i t ' s rdr,r in f 'act nrr,t han th i s c t ' rl le f i r re: to nr ; ,t ies is to i reonc has t . to l ' ' .o f pre. judic i ' .Mo ra l p re j t r las hav ing i r i L . ,t han on th t ' :Bu t i 1 ' t ha t i 't h i n g m o r a i i .water / rock, 's lMoreover, u,s i h l e no t t o t .a posi f i t 'e L l tmeans tha t . , ,

w e t h i n k t l r ; '

sol l lcone. such as 1ul ly . whcl is ic lent ica l lv i th Ciccro ' and hc has the pro l lcr tv of '

wisdom. Si rn i lar ly , there is no a pr ior i constra int o11 psVcholog ' ica l ascr ipt ions srrc i r

l ha t wheneve r we asse r t r ha t someOnr i s i n pa in , t hcn wc th ink t ha t hc i s a pa in

becausc of some Physical s tatc ( t l r even bccat tse of -sotnc soui s ta le) ' We th ink Cicer t l

i s w i s c O r t h a t M a n h a i s i n p a i n . o n t h e b a s i s o f ' t v i d e n c t ' , l o b e s u r e . b u t n o l n e c e s -sar i lv on the basis o1 an i t lcnt i tv or cunlposi t ion c la im' And s imi lar lY ' thcre is nc l a

l l r i o r i c t l n s t r a l n t 0 l l c r l l o r a s c r i p t i < l n s s u c l r t h a l w h C n c v e r W C a S s e r t t h a t s o m t t h i n g t svel low, thcn wc th ink that i t is Yelk lw l lcc i iuse o l s t lmc phvsical s tate ' Moral i tv is r l i l -

i t rent f rom 01/ these c 'ascs. (Yes, goodt less r l i t tcrs f ic lm yel lowness!) In a l l the other

cases we havc inc iepenclcnt access lo the pro l )e i l ies or o l l j t 'c ts re la led and we inter

thc re lat ion bcrwecn them. Moral i tY is not l ike th is . Lt t us cal l th is the No lndepen-

dent Access l 'hesis. Thc Because constraint leacls directlv io thc N0 Independent Access

. l h e s i s . T o { i v e a h o m e l y i l l u s t r a t i o n : m o r a l i t y i s l i k e a L o n c l o n r l . o u b } e - d e c k e r b r " r s .

Y c l u h a v e t o e n l e r o n t h e g r r l u n r l l l o o r . f r r r l m t h e r e V o u c a n c l i m b t h e s t a i r c a s c t r l l h euppcr c lcck. Ancl there is no other way 1t l gct t lp therr '

Sturgeon ancl Br ink scem to be comn.r i l ted to nra inta in ing that knowledgc of moral

p r o p e r t i e s c a n b c h a r l c o m p l e t e l y i n d e p e n t i e n t l y o f o u r k n o w l t . d g e o l . n a t u r a l p r o p e r _

t ics that gcnerate the moral profer t i ts ' in thc wav that we can know that something

i s a r o c k . s n a i l , o r c l o c k w i t h o u t k n o w i n g , a b o u t i t s c t l n s t i t u t i o n . B r t t t h i s i s a f l n d a _menral error . l 'he ic lea that we cor . i l t l know the moral propcr l ies of a th ing whi le being

ignorant ot ' the natura l propenies in v i r tue o1 ' which is has those moral propert tes ts

incredib lc . Fur- thcrmore, i t is a l r ight to makc r r lck. snai l ' c lock ' water ' and pain ' iudg-

m e n l s a b o u t t h i n g s w i t h c l u l a j u c l g m e n t a b o u t t h e i r m i c r o p h y s i c a l c o m p o s i l i o r r , b u ti t is r io t a l r ip ,hr to make moral !uc lgments a l )ou1 th ings wi thoul a . iudgment about ihr"

natura l propert ies t l ia t determine the moral pro l le f i ies '

I t i s e a s y t o s h o w t h a t i t i s p o s s i b l e f b r u s t o n r a k e r o c k , s r r a i l , c l o c k , w a t e r . a n dp a i n . j u d g n r e n t S a b o u t t h i n $ s i n i g n o r a n c e o f . t h e i r m i c r o p h y s i c a l c o m p o s i t i o n , s l n C epeople actual ly r lo make thcse- iuc lgments in ignt l rance o1-rhei r composi t io t l ;and actu-

a l i t y imp l i espc l ss ib i l i t v .By .on t . . . , . . apa r t f i o r r ra t l t ho r i tYanc l i nduc t i vecaSCs ,peop l cdo in fact make moral . luc igments only g iven nalura l bel ie l .s . What is more lmportanl

t h a n t h i s g e n c r a l t r u t h a b o u t p e o p l e i s t h e n o r m a t i r ' e p o i n t t h a t W e e n c ( ) u n l e r e db e f b r c : t t l m a k e a m o r a l . j u c l g m e r l t a b o t l t a t h i r r g i n i g n o r a n c e o f ' i t s n a t u r a i p r o p t r _t ics is to l te r r responsib/e. Surelv i t is a common and L lncol l t rovers ia i thought that

o n e h a s n o r i g h r t o . l u r l g , c i f . o n e i s i g n o r a n t o | t h c t h i n g . j u c t g e r l , T h i s s i n i s l i k e t h a tof 'pre. iudice, unty *n. , . i ' Pre juc l ice in . iur tgment is something that we should avoi t l '

Moral prc. !udice is tak ing some i r re lcvant natura l teaturc o l '1hc person judged - such

a s h a v i n g , b l u e e y e s u , , . d h n i , _ a n r l l e t t i n g < l n e . s n r o r i i l . j u c l p , m e n t t u r n o n t h a t r a l h e rt h a n o n t h e r e l e v a n t n a t u r a l p r o p e r l i e s I q u a l i t i c s o f a c t i r l n ' n r o t i v c , a n d c h a r a c t e r ) .l lu l i t ' that is something *e shouid avoid. then how t ruch l rore so is judgin$ some-

th ing moral ty in complete igncl rance o1. i ts natura l features. Bv contrast , i l r the

wa te r / rock / sna i l / c l c l ckcase , . j udg ing in igno rance< l | ' compos i t i on i sno t i r r esp r l ns i l l l e .M o r e o v e r , v v e c a n m a k e a S t r o n g e r p c l i n t t h a n t l r c n e g a t i v e p o i n t t h a l i l i s t r r e s p r t l _s ib lc uot to have bel ie ls about natura l proper l ies. The posi t ive poin l is that we have

a p o s i t i u e t l u t \ l l o m a k e m o r a l . j u d g m e n t s < l n a n a t u r a l b a s i s . . | h e B e c a u s e C o n s t r a i n tr l reans that we take moral propert ies to be cor t 'se4uer l t io l or de1tent lent propert ies ' l f

w e t h i n k t h a t s o m e t h i n g h a s a m r l r a l p r o p c . r t y . W e a r c r l u t y b o u n d f o t h i n k t h a t i t h a s

Moral Epistemology and the Because Constraint V3

the moral propeny as a consequence ofcer ta in natura l propert ies. Onr ' . ,a mora l . j udgmen t w i l hou t t ha t i dea . And happ i l y t h i s i s a no rn t r ha r i ' . . ,But the natura l k ind model cannot respcct th is ic lea.r r

So f ar we have secn an important d isanalc lgy between moral th ink i r t raboul water , rocks, snai ls , chai rs , and pains. The Because Constra inr i r ,

. judgments bul not of thesc other . judgments.

Epistemological Consequences

Given the above, what fo l lows for the epistemology of mrt ra l . judgmenrs i r l , .dindiv iduals, such as the- judgment that Queen Isabel la o1 'Spain d id ntanr ,i n 1 4 9 2 ? T h e s t r u c t u r e o f t h e a r g u m e n t s o f h r c a n b e p u t l i k e t h i s : ( l ) I l ] .Constra int holds. The Because Constra int means that knowled{e c l f morai Idepends on knowledge of natura l propert ies p lus knowledge of moral -na ' .ne t ' t i ons . So . g i vcn know ledgc o l ' na ru ra l p ropc r t i c s . we ( ' anno l a r r i vc i r r '

o f moral propert ies wi thout knowledge of moral -natura l connecr ions. ( l

lndependent Access Thesis holds. The No Independent Access l -hesis nt , . ,knowledge of moral -natura l connect ions cannot be der ived f iom knowler le( .propert ics p lus knowledge of natura l propert ies. [And obviously , i t cannot bt ,so le ly l iom ei ther of these.) l t fb l lows that knowledgc of moral -natura l cor lis su i gener i .s . I t must havc an independent source. (Schemat ica l ly : ( l ) knou. ,A depends on know ledge o f B and know ledgc o f -C ; (2 ) know ledge o1 'B r idepend on knowledge of A and knowledge of C (and obviously not f iom kn, , ,o f A or C a lonc) . [ t fb l ]ows that knowledge of B must be sui qener is . )

Now Moore steps in at th is point and says that th is indepencient source is . , :The argument thus far , however, only shows that knowledgc of moral - r?rL l r i rnect ions has some independent source. But is i t perhaps an independent o l lsource? No, for the fb l lowing reason. Add the uncontrovcrs ia l c la im that u rempir ica l knowledge of natura l propert ies (by causal ly in teract ing wi th rhernr .is , we are causal ly sensi t ive to natura l propert ies. From the No Independetr r \ .Thesis we know that however i t is thal we come by our knowledge of moral -nr , 'connect ions. i t is nof by combin ing independc.nt knowledge of moral pro l r r 'and knowledge of natura l propert ies. How then could we be causal ly sensi r i rmoral -natura l connect ions? Being causal ly sensi t ive to the natura l propert ies r .enough. So how, s taf t ing f iom empir ica l knowledge of natura l propert ies, rv i r rindependent knowledge of moral propert ies, arc we to conclude that there is a ,nect io l t between those natura l propert ies and one moral property rather than ar t r , ,

moral property? There is nowhere e lse to look. Moreover - i f we are worr ied a l ,counter tactuals wi th impossib le antecedents - the No Independent Access Thesis l , .te l ls us that we have no independent access to cont ingent causal propert ies of nt ,or natura l propert ies, f rom which we could in f 'er moral -natura l connect ions. Hcrknowledge of moral -natura l connect ions is non-empir ica l .

From th is point i t is easy to show that par t icu lar moral bel ic f 's about ind iv idLr ,have a cruc ia l a pr i r i r i component . (Of course, we know that lsabel la d id what shc lempir ica l ly , but our knowledge that she was evi l because of what she d id is a pr ior

Wd Moral Epistemotogy and the Because Constraint

-f

-:il- - *

. ( ) r ecap : l l l (. ( ) nnec l l o1 l \, l speci f rc t r

i ) r openY a l l (

cre l t t mr l r l l i'hcm to

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l rd$mett ls r r

\ now ledgc .Wi th t h i .

i rcg, inning. r ,

na l ques t i o r t

: -ernains t r t t ,

iacy wi th I , '

eat tsa l ly rc : '

n ro ra l be l i e lof epis tent i , 'nr r l ra l pro l t r

are not sc l l 'judgmett ts r

What I r t ' je rnrents. I l t i r ' 'propenics. \

nb11u1 fhosc

mora l be i i c lsa id . Bu t t hpar t icu lar . \

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physical l r r

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ancl thc in t 'about Gr. r t i .sensi t ivc t r ,

t o God a t t r lbeliefis a rt '

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moral ju t l l r

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no such l t r twater l tect t lth ing is r r '

erties. Wt' .

To recap: moral supen' renience is a pr ior i . Anr l the cogni t ion or speci f rc moraj -natura lconnect ions is arso a pr ior i . But i1 . moral , rp. - "n i .n , , . , i r 'o pr io . r ard our .ognr t ;o lof speci f ic moral -natura l connect i ,ns is a pr ior i , i t mcans that having some natura lproperty and some morar propeny, and having,r rn, rur f nuturut prop.r ty and a c l i f_ferent morai propcrtv, are empiricall.y inri istinguishable. Th.; I no ciifference berweenrhem 10 wh ich we cou rd be causa r i y sens i r i vc . Anc r t h i s , . r n , t ha t pa r t i cu ra r mora r. judgmenrs ahout . ind iv i r lua ls , assuming that they are t r . t i . i r , ' inu, , lvc a pr ior i moralknowledgc. This is rhc fu l l_b lown Vu,r r . rn conclus ion.wi th th is in hand' l t t us return to the issue of 'expranat ion that I ra isecr at thebeginning of ' th is chapter . How croes the Moorean .p i r , . r r " i "gu impact on the or ig i -t la l quesl i 'n o1-whcther m'ra l - iuc lgmenrs are caused b.y mo.ai racts? consic lerabry l I trelratns rruc thar moral lacts have causal efflcac.y. g,rt ih.;.aon.t havc causal cffr_cac 'y wi th rcspect to our moral bei ie f .s such that rhe fbrmat ion-ot our moral bel ie fs iscausall.y rcsponsive 1o mclral facts. Moral facts have a .qhost).v qu:t))ty a.g fat- a.s <tztrtttoraJ h<'/le/>'(tIC c()n(crn('cl"t 'his means thal rhe irira

"rarrrai etflcacv and the issueof epis temic sratus come apart , a t least in .moral phi iosophy. Whi le i t nray be t rue that'roral properties have. causar effrcac.y wirh respecl ,u ,nny tr., ingr, our morar beriefsare not sensi l ive 10 thal ef f icar ' .y . Note that I am n.1 re. iect ing the idea that morar' juc lgments necd 1o be expla ined' only rhe obscurant is l ost r ich phi losopher does that .what I re ject is ' ius1 t .hc par t icu lar . " i ianar i rn rhat is characte. i r t i . o f empir ica l judg-ntents. I have argued that moral bel ic fs should not be.rpto in.a by appeal 1o moralproper l les ' what expla ins moral bel ie f 's is the naturar facts, p lus 'ur natura l ber ic f .sabout those nalura l facts, p lus our bel ie ls about moral -nalura l connect ions. Hencentora l bel ie f is can be expla ined wi thout moral fhcts, n, pr . , i lnrof r r . .s I ike Mackie r ight lysaid ' But th is negat ive cxpianalory cra im can be sharecl by unr iker .y bedf .e l rows. Inpar t icu lar , Moore should be happy to get inro bed wi th Mackie.Consider an example ' which i i para l lc l except that i r involves objects insteacl ofpropert ies ' Imagine someone wi th a st rangc theological bel ie f ; paul bel ieves that EIv isPresley is G" ' suppose that the inca.nat i , rn of Gocr i , no, .nn. .ptuary or mcta_, ph 'ys ica l ly inrpossib lc ; and supp'se, anazingly 'enoug-h, that God is in fact incarnatein the person of 'Erv is pres ley. 'The overai l s i tuat ion is then th is : therc is Elv is , Goci ,and the incarnat ion rc lat ion. Ancl thcn there is paul 's bel ic f 's about Elv is , h is bel ie f .sabout God' anr l h is bc ' l ie fs abour the incarnat ion re lat ion. Quest ion; is paul causal lyscnsi t ive to the presence,of

.Goc. l? 0bviousr .y notr For paur has no inc lepenr. lent accessto God and to Erv is . So the incarnat ion re lat ion is empir ica i ly inscrutable. paul ,s Goc' ,bel ie fs are arr ived at in f -erent ia l l -y f iom his ord inary nu,urn l bel ie f .s p lus h is bel ie fabout the incarnat ion rerat ion. So even i f God is incarnate i , Er ; ; , Gocr p la.ys no rorewi th respect to pau|s Gocl ber ic fs . The s i tuat ion wi th morar propert ies is para i le l .In sum' th i 'Because consl ra int makcs a great d i f ference t . the content of ord inarymoral judgme nrs ' when wc judge that so ieth ing has ,nr . n . ,o.u, property , we areconstra incd to. iudge that the th ing has that morar propeny because i t has some natura lproperty ' By conl rast , in the case of naturar k inds, corour , , " , i ; r ;0 . . names, there isno such pr inc ip lc at work. wc can judgc s imply that rhc th ing is warer , not that i t iswater because i t has such and , r .h mnl . , , r l ,thing is verow, not that it is ycrow 0..,",i::[:iTJi; Hr..:l.,n,i:illiliil. li,"X,r:enies ' we can . iuctge that someone is in pain, not that ht , is in pain becausc he has

Moral Epistemology and the Because Constraint E? |

such a l td such bra in or lunct io l ta l s lates. And we iudge that someone is Cicero.

rhat he is Cicero bccause he is f r - r l ly . Yct in nrora i i ty we cannr) t . iust . judge that sot '

t h i ng i s ba r l ;we mus t . i udge tha t i t i s bad becausc i t i s such and s t t ch . Th i s i s f i r r l '

menta l , anr i i t has profbr- rnd ( -o l lsequenccs fbr the cpis temology and explanat io l l

moral judgmcnts. Moral thought is vcry d i f ferent f ' ront sc icnce or ord inary empi l lj r , r t lgment . Moral . j r - rdgnle l l ts , i f lhev are bc l ic l .s . arc a pr ior i . Moore was r ight a l r

t ha1 . '

Notes

I I n s e l h c \ v o r r l ' j t r d g r n t n t ' s o : l s 1 o b t ' n e u t r a l l r c t i ' v e e n d i f l i r c n t k i n d s o l m e n t a l a c t .

Z ln a l )as t ( ' ra ph i losopht , rs wor . r ld havc ra is t 'd scnrant ic qucs t ions about what wc n tea t l

n rora l r i ' o ra tJ o r \c l l re l ( ' f .5 , l lu t such issues are t l c r tva t ivc f ronr lhe a l t t l vc metaphys ica l . r l

t cnro ic tg ica l , a r rd a l t i tud ina l i ssues . Moreover . i t i s c ruc ia l no t to cas t thcse th rcc i ss t t r '

I t ' rn r r o f murn l t rL t t l t , s i t rce tha t rcsu l ts c i th t ' r in t l r t tu i lu rc to address any o1- these t r

i ssucs o l in a g r ; t t t c l con l r - ts ion r - r f th t 'n r a l l .

I I ap , ree w i ih ( -o l in McGinn th l t causa l accoun ls o l ' th t 'u rp i r i ca l ia p r io r i r l i sT inc t to t r

super io r t0 cxper icn t ia l ac t ou t r ts .' fhc

o l l j cc t ion tha l succcss l l . r l r luas i - rca l i s r .n r . rn r lcnn ines i t sc l f i s l i ke lv to seen l pers t l l t \

on lv lo thosc who th ink tha t ph i losop l i v i s l in r i ted to co l l ccp l l ta l a t ta lvs is .

Icor r l lqurc [o r reccn f rgur r ) rhc dcbate over un : lsser lc r l tn r r ra ] p ropos i t ions [ ' thc [ ' r ' t ' .

t i each po in t ' ) in these exp lanatory tc rn ts in lang, rv i l l 1992b. I bc l i cve tha t th i .

B lackburn 's apprurach. Th is i s missrd bv rnanv o l 'h is commt ' t t ta {o rs . The issu t i s n r t l : i l t t r

9ne g l f rnd ing a f i rnna l i za t ion o1 the non-cogn i l i v is t cons l rua l o l c r tmp lex contex ts I

v ic lds ihe cor rcc l in l ' c renccs , i luL o f ' cxp la i r r ing . on a non- ( 'ogn i t i v is l l )as is , whv or r i j r r

thoughr d isp iavs conrp i tx p ropos i l iona l cons t ruc t ions , a t td L ' t tn tp lcx p rop t ts i t io r la l t ,

s t l rc t i6ps g1 'sp t .c i i rc surTs . T I re task is to sho lv l vhv they n t ig l r t l te cxpcc led and r ' .

t h c v n r i g h t b e a n c c r l c r l d r v c i o p r n c n t o l n r u l u l r h i r r k i n g . g i v c n t h t ' f L n c t i o n ( o r f u n c t i , , '

o 1 ' n r o l t r l r h i n k i n g . A t o r o l l a r v o f t l t i s a p p r r i a c h i s t h ; r t l h c r e u r t ' n o t t o n - c r t m p i c x t l l l

c o n L c r t s . B y t h i s I n t c a n t h a t c v e n t h e s t c p f r o n r u s i n r p l c a l t i t L r d c 0 1 ' a p p r o v a l o f a t l r

to r r . judgnte i l t tha l i1 i s good [o r 1 { ) lho l i l ]g ,u is l i c e r l r rcss ion o1 's t tch a j r tdgnt t 'n tJ i s i t . '

tha t imp l ica tes o lhcr a l l i l L ldcs and thc svs tcmiz l t io l r o f a t t i tu r l cs . A i l con te x ts a re co l l l l ) .

cor ) tox ts , l i r r the t luas i - r t 'a l i s t -- l h g

I a d n e w s t i r r s u c h a n e n l h u s i a s t i c q n a s i - r c a l i s t w i ] l h t ' t h a t a J o n g w i t h t h t ' b c n c l r t '

cap tur ing the common sense idea o f ' thc causa l e fT tcac .v o f n to ra l l l roper l ies . the q t t r l

rea l i s t w i l l s lso in tu r th t cos l o1 'u r t ' r ro r ther , r r -v about the i r spa t ia l loca l ion . Mora l p r ,

e r l i t ' s a rc no t r ta l l y in the ob jcc ts , b r r l wc th ink o f thcnr as i l thev arc . Hurne dcscr i l .

our sens ib i l i t i cs "g i ld ing and s ra in ing , a l l na tura l o l r . j cc ls w i th t f t c co lours , l to r rowed t r ' ,

in te rna l scn l iment , ra iscs in a rnan l te r a I tew ( ' r ( 'a t io r l " (Hume 197\ : 294) . But i f we th j :

o l 'wro l lp ,ncss as i r t l i te ob . j t c ts . we makc a mis tak t ' . However . {haT t tews is no l t ' c t ' \ ' i l r ,

l \h j l c i r n r : ry be t r l l r lha l thc c luas i rca l i s t has to swa l low an er ro r theory abou l th is as l tL .

o l 'n to ra i thor - rgh t , he can s t i l l ho ld a non-e l ro r . o r v ind ica t ion is l . lheo t -v aboLt t a g f r '

n ranv o l l r ( ' r i l s l ) r ' c1s o f 'our t r t r t ra l tho t lP ,h t .

Isha l l nor f l i scuss Br ink and S lurgeon 's idca l l ; r r t mora l c la in r -s p lus aux i l ia ry hyp t . r thc . ,

log ica l l v cn ta i l obsen,ah lc s ta tes a f t i i r s (S t t r rgeon igBB: 212: Br ink l9B9: 184) . Thc 1r , .

rha l mora l c la ims cn ta i l observab le c la ims whur combincd lv i th aux i l ia rv hypothescs '

mgre shows mora l c la ims to l t c cmpi r i ca l than "The ahso lu te i s lazV" i s showt r to bc cn tpr :

i ca l becausc , in cont l t ina t ion lv i th the "aux i l ia rv ' ' c ia i rn " l f ' the abso ln te i s lazv i t w i l l r l i

@ Moral Epistemology and the Because Constraint

1 0

tomorro\\.

ro r , r , " [B t l l i 'H e n c c t h t l r

t h c i d e a t i r , , '

See Go ldhr , -

Gcrn tan 1r t " :I n t h i s c l l r , r

be t'n u-st'.

C o n s i d c r l l .

b o t h l t t r t l L ' :

ret.narktr l ;

o { ' h i s b i t ' '

6 5 ) .

I t i s r e l i t -

C O n n e c l l ( ) l '

This ma. j r ,

Eng l ish i ' ,

a w a r e o l I '

cep t t t a l l i L '

we hav t ' '

n e c d l i r r ! '

M o r a l t l t t r '

1 0 t h e k l l l .

l 1 l t l S t l L i t ' l i r ' l

, , .r , . , . , , . t i r r r . .

r id ing ' i '

is th( 'r t i l ' l

l l

l 2

l l

1 4 M a l e r t a i

bridge. . '"

Wtlt lgt o'

B c r l i n , l . { 1 9 ' , '

S i m o n B i a c f ' t '

199 '1 .

B lackburn . S

Blackburn . S

Blackburn . \ '

B lackbur t t . \ '

B r i n k , I l . I l "

l i n i v e r s i t " :( h r " r rch i l l . \ \

Casse l l .

Drvork in . R .

Dwork i r r . R

Se rt ' ict ' . , ' r

t le : r rs /h t t t t ' ,

tomor row, ' i t log ica l l y en ta i l s the ernp i r i ca l l y knowab lc conc lus ion " l t w i i l ra in lo rnor -r o r v " ( B c r l i n 1 9 5 0 : l 9 ) .

B Hcnce thcrc i s a rca50n lb r t l t c quas i - rea l i s t 1o have thc exr r : r rn rb iT io r r o l serk ing lo sccurethc idea tha l n r r t ra l p ropcn ics a rc causa l lv c l . l l cac ious .

9 sec Go ldhagen (1996) an( l Zangwi l l (2003) fu r a rgunr rnrs ro rh r , r f tec r rhar n ranv o [ ' theGcrn tan perpc l ra lo rs n to ra l l v cndorser j l l i r le r ' s po l i c ics .

10 [n th is c i lap tc r , I rcn la in ncr t t ra l : rbour var ious d i i ] l cu l r i ssues ahor r l thc rnoda l i t v o f rh is/ ) { ' r ' r l i / \ ( .

I I Cons idcr the cx l raor r l inary near -cn( .ountc r b r r t , , ve f l_ . ( 'h t r rch i l l anr l f l i r le r in l9 l l2 . l .hc .yl lo lh l t r l -ncd ou f to i rc s tav ing jn lhc same hOte i , and lhev ar rangc( l to mcet . Ihurch i i lr c tnarkcd lo the in le rn l i ' d ia ry ' "What i s l l i c sense r , l l r c rng aga insr a r r ran s i rnp lv 5egaus.o l h is b i r rh? ' l fh is was repor le ( l to H i r l c r , r , vho cancc l l c t l rhc n recr ing (Churc l i l l l 948 ;6 5 ) .

) ) l t i s re la l i v r . l l uncon l rovers ia l tha t lmths ahoL i i p . l r t i cLr la r n l { ) ra l ,na tura l p roper tYconnect ions arc nor c0nccp lua l Or ana lv t i c Lmrhs {Z : rngwi l l 20001.

l l 1 'h is l ra io r l la lv in S turgeon 's anc i t l r ink 's acco i lnT is shr r rc r l i r sp ; i r i cs l r1 , those s1 ' l i reF .ng l i sh [ ,c rceJr lu : r l Schoo l (c .g . Mc i )o r ,ve l ] 1998) . Ih t . i r v i rw is thaT !v ( ,a re p t . rce ] ) fua l l vaware o l mora l p roper t ies {pcrhaps " r l i rec tJ .y " ) . Br - r t rhe i r lea o l a l i i r r r r o t imnrcd ia tc per ,ccp lua l a tccss o f the n t ind t0 mora l l ) ropcn ies ts ( ,x t raor ( l i l l a r i l v imp iaus ib ic . I1 rneans lharwe l tavc sern tc k ind o1- t l i rec t c r tn l ion la t ion lv i th a th rng 's mora l p rope i - f l cs , w i i i rou t an .vnecr l lb r knowler lqe o l i t s na tura l p roper l i c i . ' l h is i s l ro rh inc r t , r l ib l t ' anr l r r respons ib l r . .Mora l th i r rk i r rg . as descr ihcd h .v thos t 'o l rhe I :ng l i sh Pcrccprua l Sch,o l . i s r . r 'o r ry ing ak into the k ind o l ' th ink ing invo lvcd in t rad i t iona l Enq l ish c lass sno i rber r , , a r rd p r r . ju r l i ce . Whatmas( l t l c radcs as the percept ion o l ' in tPor t i tn t sub t le l rua l l ( 'es i s in f : rc t r s . !s lgn e f 'base lcssr l i s t i n c t i o n s . S e e N a n c y M i t l o r c l ( r 9 5 9 j o n t j ' a n d . N o n - U .

F o r e r a r r i p l c , s a v i n g , h o r s e _r i d i n g ' i s ' n o n - [ i ' w h e r e a s

s a v i n g ' r i r l i n g i s ' t j ' , s i n c e , a l l e r a l l . w h a t o r l i r r k i n 4 9 f ' r i 6 i n gi s t h c r c I R o s s 1 9 5 9 ) ?

14 l \4a lc r ia l in th is chapter was I ) rescn l r r l in ta lks a t ihe un iv ( ' rs i t i cs o1 '0x{ i r r t l anr j cam-br idge ' where thcre was so lne in te r ( ' s l ing r l i scuss ion . Thanks ro Janr ic t ) re ic r and Ra lphWedgwood 1br writ tcn comments.

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