Report No. 614a-LSO il

Lesotho rLE COPYReport of theMigrant Workers Re-Employment MissionApril 3, 1975

Eastern Africa RegionCountry Programs Department IINot for Public Use

Document of the International Bank for Reconstruction and DevelopmentInternational Development Association

This report was piepared for OffiLial use only by the Banik Group. It may notbe published, quoted or cited without Bank Group authorization. The Bank Group doesnot accept responsibility for the accuracy or completeness of the report.

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The Country: Lesotho

The People: Mosotho (singular)Basotho (plural)

CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS

US$1. Rand 0.69Rand 1 = US$1.45

WEIGHTS AND 14EASURES

1 Mile = 1.609 Kilometers1 Kilometer = 0.621 Miles1 Acre 0.405 Hectare1 Hectare = 2.47 Pcres

The Migrant lWorkers Re-employrnent Mission, which visitedLesotho in September 1974, was an inter-agency mission financedby UNDP and executed by IBRD.

The composition of the Mission was as follows:

Mr. Willem Maane, IBRD, ChiefMr. Willem Brakel, IBRD, Deputy Chief, Project AdvisorMr. Peter Reid, IBRD Consultant, AgriculturistMlr. Robert Hewlett, FAO, Agricultural EconomistMr. K.W.Co James, IERD Consultani;, Civil EngineerMiss Frida Johansen, IBRD, Transport EconomistMr. Sunil Guha, ILO, Employment ExpertMr. Roy Buxton, ILO Consultant, Training Expert

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page No.

MAP OF LESOTHO

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS .................................. i-v

I. INTRODUCTION ............................... 1............ 1

A. Purpose and Scope of the Mission .... ............ 1B. Economic Background . ....................... 3C. The Employment Problem ................................ 5

- Demographic Trends .................... , 5- Employment Trends .................................. 6

D. Preparing for an Emergency ............................. 9E. Actual and Shadow Wage Rates in Lesotho ....... ....... 10

II. RECOMMENDED NEW INSTITUTIONS ............................... 13

A. The National Employment Service ...................... 13B, The Labor-Intensive Construction Unit .... ............ 15C. The Coordinating Committee ........................... 23

III. THE SCOPE FOR EMPLOYING MORE PEOPLE ON LABOR-INTENSIVE WORKS 25

A. General .............................................. 25B. Identification of Employment Opportunities .... ....... 28

IV. DEALING WITH AN EMERGENCY .............. .. ................. 37

V. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE LONG TERM ................. .. ....... 43

'A. Introduction ...................................... .... 43

B. Agriculture .......................................... 45C. Industry and Tourism ................. . . ............... 53D. Other Sectors .......... . .. . . . ..... 55

E. Education and Training . ..... . .57

F. Family Planning ....... ...... ... ........ . 60

Table of Contents Continued

ANNEXES

I Summary and Conclusions of the IBRD Report No. 331a-LSO, June 25,1974, "The Economy of Lesotho"

II The Creation of Employment Opportunities by using more Labor-Intensive Methods in Civil Works

III National Employment Service, Estimated Annual Staffing Costs

IV Mobilization Program for the Labor-Intensive Construction Unit,including Training Requirements

V Estimated Costs of Setting Up and Operating the Labor-IntensiveConstruction Unit

VI Estimated Costs of Setting Up and Operating a typical Labor-IntensiveConstruction Group

VII Job Potential in Road Construction and Maintenance

VIII Labor Absorption in Airfield Construction and Maintenance

IX Labor Absorption in Agriculture

X Training of Staff by the Labor-Intensive Construction Unit duringan Emergency

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SUMKARY AND CONCLUSIONS

i. For several decades Lesotho has been overwhelmingly dependent onthe South African labor market for employment opportunities for its people.At present, an estimated 175,000 men (60 percent of the male labor force) and25,000 women are at any one time away as migrant workers. In the beginningof 1974, however, following disturbances in South African mines, between10,000 and 15,000 Basotho migrant workers returned suddenly to Lesotho. TheGovernment of Lesotho, fearing that serious unemployment problems might resultfrom this, asked UNDP for advice and assistance. Following subsequent dis-cussions between the Government, UNDP and the World Bank, it was decided thatthe Bank, as the executing agency, would arrange for an inter-agency missionto Lesotho which, in essence, would (a) make concrete proposals on how to dealbest with any immediate unemployment problems; (b) recommend a contingencyplan which would enable the Government to deal effectively with possible futureemergencies resulting from a massive return flow of Basotho workers fromSouth Africa, and (c) if time permitted, to identify broad strategies to befollowed in order to maximize long-term employment opportunities withinLesotho.

ii. At the time of the'Mission's visit in September 1974, the crisissituation of the first part of 1974 appeared to have eased considerably. Thismay partly be explained by the fact that 1973/74 was a good year in agri-culture, but also there was again a strong demand for Basotho labor in SouthAfrica, and many of the returned mine workers had apparently found new work inSouth Africa. Nevertheless, the country's extremely high degree of dependenceon employment opportunities and income creation outside its borders retainsits potential grave dangers.

iii. These dangers are two-fold. First, there is always the possibilityof a recurrence of an abrupt return of Basotho labor from South Africa becauseof disruptive developments there. For short periods of time the effect ofsuch sudden influxes may remain hidden as the returneed will initially tendto go back to their villages and family farms. If, however, for whateverreason they are unable to return to South Africa quickly, they are eventuallybound to start seeking work on the domestic labor market which, unlessemergency programs have been prepared in time, will be unable to absorb them.Second, in the long run the demand for Basotho labor in South Africa may welllevel off or even decline. There does not appear such danger over the nextfew years to come, but longer term developments such as large scale mechaniza-tioni of mining operations in South Africa could change this situation funda-mentally. Only the further development of Lesotho's domestic economy canprovide a cushion against this, but this development is more difficult toachieve as long as the great majority of Lesotho's able-bodied young men leavethe country to find employment abroad.

Preparing for an Emergency

iv. In view of its composition and terms of reference the Mission hasconcentrated its main efforts on how to prepare for and deal with anemergency situation in which economically useful work will have to be foundfor a sudden influx of labor. The quickest way of creating more employmentopportunities is by the use of more labor-intensive techniques in civil workswhich are being undertaken or planned to be undertaken within the frameworkof the country's overall development effort. In that way the work performedwill be for productive purposes; it will concern projects that have alreadybeen selected and formulated, and plans for their financing will presumablyalready exist.

v. The Mission has identified a number of possibilities for replacingequipment-intensive techniques by labor intensive-techniques in ongoing orplanned development projects, but starting labor-intensive works in asituation where there are no institutions to cope with the logistics ofrecruiting and deploying large gangs of workers and where there is no previousexperience with using labor-intensive techniques would inevitably lead toan ineffective and an expensive use of resources. The Mission, therefore, hasalso concentrated on the steps to be taken to create the institutional andorganizational framework that will be required (a) to cope with the logisticsof employing large numbers of workers, and (b) to gain the necessary experiencewith labor-intensive techniques in order to achieve the highest possibleproductivity of labor in public works.

vi. The Mission recommends that the Government take immediate steps toset up the following institutions: (a) a National Employment Service withinthe Ministry of Labor, as already envisaged in principle; (b) a Labor-Intensive Construction Unit within the Ministry of Works and Communications;and (c) a Coordinating Committee under the Prime Minister's office.

vii. A National Employment Service would closely monitor the employmentsituation in Lesotho; it would, through its district offices, register allpersons seeking employment in the country and would act as a recruitmentagency for government departments in the hiring of labor--a task which wouldassume crucial importance in an emergency situation.

viii. The Labor-Intensive Construction Unit (LCU) would be a relativelysmall unit (about 500 laborers) which would provide the basis for testinglabor-intensive methods. Its main functions would be (a) to gain experienceof the problems involved in carrying out construction work by labor-intensivetechniques by undertaking experimental projects in road building., soil con-servation, etc; (b) to devise and test alternative work methods, proceduresand tools aimed at improving the productivity of labor and minimizing theuse of powered equipment; (c) to make a comparison between the cost oflabor-intensive work and that currently carried out by equipment; (d) to

formulate administrative procedures and systems on which to base large-scaleadoption of labor-intensive techniques; and (e) to provide in-service trainingin labor-intensive techniques to supervisory staff in other ministries andagencies responsible for carrying out public works. In case of an emergencythe LCU would cease its experimental role and would instead concentrate on amassive training of supervisory staff needed to establish and put to workfurther large labor-intensive construction groups, and on working out detailedcontingency plans for labor-intensive works to be undertaken.

ix. The Coordinating Committee would coordinate and give policy guidanceto the work of the NES, the LCU and all ministries and agencies responsible forcarrying out public works. It would carry out a continuing review of theemployment situation, of the work of the LCU, as well as the state of planningand design of works suitable for labor-intensive techniques. In case of anemergency the Committee would review the contingency plans prepared by theLCU, determine the relative priorities and the strategy to be adopted in thedeployment of the labor force and retain overall control of the planningprocess.

x. In identifying possibilities for labor-intensive work that can bestarted relatively quickly, the Mission has reviewed the projects involvingcivil works that are likely to be carried out within the framework of thecountry's development program for 1975-1980. It has examined in some detail,the potential for new job opportunities if, to the extent practicable, labor-intensive techniques were used in carrying out these projects. The Missionhas concluded that, after proper preparation, some 12,000 people could findadditional employment on labor-intensive works, mainly in road constructionand maintenance, on soil conservation works and in the preparation of woodlots and fish ponds.

xi. This number is large in relation to the number of men presently inwage employment in Lesotho (about 16,000), but small in relation to thenumber of men working abroad who could conceivable be affected by an emergency.In case of a sudden influx larger than some 12,000 people, the Governmentwould have some flexibility by speeding up the execution of works which theMission has identified as suitable for labor-intensive techniques. For therest, however, the only solution would be to add purely "make-work" typeprojects to the program or to provide those for whom no useful work can befound with unemployment benefits.

xii. The Mission has assumed that under normal conditions, i.e., withoutan emergency situation, a daily wage rate of R1.00 would have to be paid inorder to attract a sufficient number of workers for the experimental Labor-Intensive Construction Unit. Tentative calculations suggest that at thiswage rate the use of labor-intensive techniques would lead to higher projectcosts, generally in the order of about 10 to 20 percent. At wage rates ofabout 70 to 80 cents per day there would be little difference in cost betweenlabor-intensive techniques and equipment-intensive techniques. This "break-even" wage rate is probably not significantly lower than the rate at whichlabor could be attracted in the event of an emergency.

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xiii. The cost of the preparatory action recommended by the Mission isnot high. The most costly item would be the establishment of the LCU andits operation for the first three years. This would cost about $2 million,including about $450,000 for expatriate technical assistance. The LCU, how-ever, will have a worthwhile construction role to play, even if there is noemergency, and the value of the works which will be completed during theperiod should be deducted, leaving a net cost of perhaps not much more than$1 million. This seems a modest price to pay as an insurance against theill effects of a possible unemployment emergency. Moreover, if the experimentalwork of the LCU indeed confirms that labor-intensive work is not much moreexpensive than equipment-intensive work. It would make good sense to adoptthe use of labor-intensive methods in civil construction as part of a long-term employment strategy irrespective of any emergency.

xiv. If an emergency occurs, additional funds are likely to be needed, buttheir magnitude cannot be predicted with any precision. Much will depend onthe size and duration of the emergency, and of the additional cost, if any,of the use of labor-intensive techniques. The latter will only be knownafter the LCU has done its experimental work and detailed cost comparisonsare available. The additional funds needed may not be very large, unless asubstantial speeding up of the development program would be desirable (andfeasible) or unless the emergency were so severe that labor would have to beemployed on projects of a purely "make-work" type outside of the developmentprogram.

The Long-Term

xv. The Government of Lesotho considers it a matter of life or death toaccelerate the creation of productive employment opportunities within thecountry. It wishes to diminish the country's present overwhelming dependenceon the South African labor market, and prepare for a possible situation inwhich South Africa is no longer able (or willing) to absorb most of theincrease in Lesotho's labor force. There is undoubtedly scope for this, butthere are also limitations and constraints. One general constraint is thatit will be difficult to offer prospects of incomes in Lesotho that comparefavorably enough to wages in South Africa. As long as demand for Basotholabor remains strong there, Basotho men may well remain to prefer more remu-nerative work in South Africa to work in Lesotho. The Government might wishto consider the use of general policy tools, such as a migration tax or anincome tax on wages earned abroad, to make work in Lesotho relatively moreremunerative.

xvi. The agricultural sector appears to have the greatest labor-absorptivepotential. Agricultural development will also create a much stronger domesticeconomic basis to fall back on in times of employment crisis in South Africa.The Mission, therefore, strongly recommends that the Government press forwardwith the soil conservation program which is now beginning to get underway.Conservation works must be accompanied by supporting services which ensurethe full cooperation of farmers in adopLivg apprupriatca land use change-s and

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improved farming practices. These conditions are best met in integratedrural development projects such as the Thaba Bosiu, Leribe/Khomokhoana andSenqu River projects. Perhaps some of the ongoing soil conservation projectsof the Ministry of Agriculture could be used as nuclei for further ruraldevelopment projects of a similar nature.

xvii. The ongoing rural development projects demonstrate that yieldsof subsistence crops can be increased substantially. A sufficient amount offood crops for domestic consumption can be grown on less land, which willmake land available for the introduction of labor-intensive cash crops on awide scale. The Mission recommends that a special crop intensification taskforce be established to review existing work in this field, coordinate technicaland marketing studies and initiate studies in depth of market prospects andmarketing mechanisms for selected crops.

xviii. It is also recommended that a special section be established withinthe Ministry of Agriculture for irrigation development. Irrigation appearsto hold considerable potential for labor absorption. At present an ad-hoc anduncoordinated approach is being taken towards its development, and insufficientattention is being given to matching the size of irrigated holdings with laborrequirements and availabilities.

xix. It would be unrealistic to attempt to put precise numbers on futurelabor absorptive capacity through the intensification of agricultural produc-tion. Apart from other variables, the question of labor absorption cannot bedivorced from that of profitability. Policy should in the first place bedirected toward making farming more profitable rather than encouraging certaincrops because they are labor-intensive. Often, however, the two aims willcoincide, and under reasonably favorable conditions, an increase of perhaps50 percent in the labor absorptive capacity of the agricultural sector is inthe realm of what can be expected, say 15 years hence.

xx. The possibility of increasing employment opportunities in manufactur-ing (including small-scale business), mining and tourism is limited, butnevertheless the recent reports "Lesotho: Increasing Manufacturing Output,Exports and Employment" and "Development Plan for Tourism for the Kingdom ofLesotho" (para. 1.08) show worthwhile investment opportunities which theGovernment should pursue. The first priority will be to strengthen and revampthe existing institutions that deal with industrial and tourism promotion. Ifthese institutions follow an active and imaginative promotional program, itmight well be possible within the next decade to create some 25,000 to 30,000new openings for Batosho labor in manufacturing, mining, tourism and ancillaryservices of which perhaps 10,000 in manufacturing alone. This would amount tosome 25 percent of the natural increase in the labor force over that period.

xxi. Looking beyond the agricultural intensification process, Lesotho'sfundamental employment problems are likely to re-emerge. They may even becomemore severe owing to the progress the mechanization in the South Africanmines will probably have made by that time. The only way to meet this futurechallenge satisfactorily, the Mission believes, is to start an effective,Government-sponsored family planning program now. The Mission recommends thatLesotho get in touch with appropriate international agencies to help it setup such a program.

I. INTRODUCTION

A. Purpose and Scope of the Mission

1.01 For several decades Lesotho has had to rely on the earnings of itsmigrant workers in South Africa to supplement the livelihood of its people.Although the Government of Lesotho has always been concerned about the possi-bility that employment opportunities for Basotho in South Africa might leveloff, in fact, until very recently, the South African labor market has exerteda strong pull, providing job opportunities for all able-bodied Basotho men whowere willing to accept work away from home and family for contract periodsof up to 24 months.

1.02 At present, an estimated'200,000 Basotho (175,000 men and 25,000women), or almost half the total labor force are at one time away in SouthAfrica. This situation has made the stability of Lesotho economy and societyhighly vulnerable to conditions in South Africa over which Lesotho's Govern-ment has no control. This was brought home sharply in the first four monthsof 1974, when because of as yet unexplained tribal clashes on South Africanmines between 10,000 and 15,000 migrant workers returned to Lesotho, many ofthem out of sheer panic. The Government seemed suddenly faced with task ofproviding relief for thousands of unemployed, a task for which it was ill-prepared. It therefore requested IBRD to organize a mission with the fol-lowing objectives:

(a) to prepare a program for immediate employment of 15,000 people;

(b) to prepare a contingency plan for employment following a massiveincrease in the number of workers repatriated;

(c) if time permitted, to identify longer-term issues requiring in-depthstudy for the purpose of preparing a long-term employment strategy.

1.03 At the time the Mission was in Lesotho, however, the emergency situa-tion seemed to have redressed itself. This may partly be explained by thefact that 1973/74 was a good year in agriculture, but also many of the mineworkers who had repatriated in the beginning of 1974 appeared to have returnedto South Africa, and in several sectors of Lesotho's economy a shortage ofmale labor was again apparent. However, for reasons beyond the control of thegovernments of Lesotho and South Africa, another sudden exodus of migrantworkers from South Africa might well happen again. The problem may not resolveitself as quickly as last time, in which case the Government of Lesotho wouldhave to be prepared as well as is reasonably possible to provide meaningfulemployment for large numbers of people in a relatively short time.

1.04 In drawing up a first emergency program for the returned mine work-ers, the Government had realized -- and the Mission agrees -- that large-scale labor intensive public works, such as construction and maintenance of

roads and soil conservation, offer the best possibilities for absorbing sur-plus labor quickly. With respect to the implementation of such a program,however, the Government had clearly underestimated the practical difficultiesinvolved in employing large numbers of workers on labor-intensive publicworks. Starting such works in a situation where there are no institutions tocope with the sheer logistics of recruiting and deploying large gangs ofworkers, where there is no previous experience with using labor-intensivetechniques, and where properly prepared projects are lacking would inevitablylead to an ineffective, and therefore expensive use of resources.

1.05 Had the emergency situation continued, the Government would have hadlittle option but to embark on its program of make-work projects however in-efficient the execution of it might have been. With the easing of the imme-diate problem, however, the Government has now the opportunity to prepareitself properly for the eventuality of a future emergency, an eventuality which,given the uncertain political and social conditions in Southern Africa, is byno means imaginary. In agreement with the Government, the Mission has there-fore decided to focus on the preparation of a detailed contingency plan thatcould realistically be commenced on a restricted scale, and rapidly expandedin the case of a future emergency.

1.06 The Mission has concentrated on the steps to be taken to create theinstitutional and organizational framework that will be required (a) to copewith the logistics of employing large numbers of workers, and (b) to gain thenecessary experience with labor intensive techniques in order to achieve thehighest possible labor productivity in public works with a view to minimizingtheir cost. The Mission has also identified a program of labor-intensivepublic works which can be carried out in case of an emergency by selectingthose activities in ongoing or planned "normal" development programs whichoffer the best possibilities for substituting labor for equipment.

1.07 The Mission has concluded that, after proper preparation, the on-going and planned development programs could absorb some 12,000 unemployedin labor-intensive public works (Chapter III). This number is large inrelation to the number of men who presently find wage employment withinLesotho (about 16,000, para. 1.20), but very small in relation to the totalnumber of men working abroad. It is impossible to foretell the nature andduration of any future emergency, or the number of people that will thenbe affected. If the influx is larger than 12,000, the Government wouldhave some flexibility by speeding up the program of public works which themission has identified as suitable for labor-intensive methods. If, however,the number of returning migrant workers then still exceeds the number ofpeople that can be so accommodated the Government 's only options in theshort run would be to let the remainder return to their farm householdsand provide them with unemployment benefits, or to employ them on additionalmake-work projects. In the latter case, the experience gained with labor-intensive techniques in the contingency program recommended by the Missionmay prove valuable in minimizing the net cost of such a make-work program.

1.08 The Mission's main task and expertise was to identify a labor-intensive public works program in civil construction and agriculture, toidentify the additional training and technical assistance needed for such

a program, and to make recommendations as to the required institutionalframework. Nevertheless, as was requested in the terms-of-reference, theMission has made an attempt to point the way towards policies and investmentstrategies which in the long term would widen the scope for productive em-ployment within Lesotho itself. As the Mission's expertise covered onlypart of this broad field, much of this does not represent the Missiont's ownoriginal thinking. In particular for long-term strategies for such poten-tially important sectors as industry and tourism the Mission has drawn onrecent sector surveys carried out by others resulting in reports such as(a) "Lesotho: Increasing Manufacturing Output, Exports and Employment;Stockholm 1974," which was commissioned by Swedish SIDA and carried out bySwedish consultants, and (b) "Development Plan for Tourism for the Kingdomof Lesotho; Maseru 1974," commissioned by the Commonwealth Fund for TechnicalCooperation, and carried out by Kenyan consultants.

B. Economic Background 1/

1.09 The Kingdom of Lesotho is a small, over-populated country, surroundedby the Republic of South Africa on all sides. When it gained independence in1966, it was considered one of the conomically least viable countries in theworld. In spite of the fact that the country is an enclave within highly in-dustrialized South Africa, and belongs with that country and Botswana andSwaziland to the rand monetary area and the Southern African Customs Union,it was virtually untouched by modern economic development. Rapid populationgrowth resulting in extreme pressure on the land, deteriorating soil and de-clining agricultural yields led to a situation in which the country was nolonger able to produce enough food for its people. Many able-bodied men leftthe land in search of means to support their families, but virtually the onlyemployment opportunities available were in neighboring South Africa.

1.10 There are several reasons why Lesotho has remained at such a lowstage of economic development. One reason is that former colonial rule wasmainly geared to administering the country and did not really attempt to in-troduce any development, expecting that the country would be more or less auto-matically developed as an indirect result of the strong expansionary forcesin South Africa. But even when thoughts of incorporation were abandoned afterthe rise of apartheid policies in South Africa, the previous administrationseems to have remained resigned to a low level stagnation of Lesotho's ruraleconomy. Apart from its eroding soil, the country had few other known naturalresources that could be developed, and the prevailing system of land tenurewas seen to stand in the way of agricultural progress. Migrant labor wastherefore seen as an inevitable necessity.

1/ A comprehensive overview of Lesotho's economy, its dcvelopment potential,the Government's policies and efforts, and the constraints to developmentare contained in the IBRD report "The Economy of Lesotho" (Report No.331a-LSO, June 25, 1974). The "Summary and Conclusions" of that reportare attached as Annex 1 to the present report.

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1.11 It seems fair to conclude, however, that, in turn, the rapid increasein migrant labor itself has contributed to the neglect and decline of agri-culture, the country's most important economic sector. As more and more able-bodied men left their farms, most of the agricultural work was left to women,children and old men. The shortage of male labor often prevents proper andtimely preparation of the fields, and continuing primitive farming practiceshave further led to a steady decline in soil fertility, progressing erosion,and hence in declining yields.

1.12 The Government of Lesotho is firmly committed to development, butit faces the tremendous challenge of achieving anything substantial in asituation where the previous administration seemed to have accepted that allthe odds were against it. In 1971, the Government published its First-Five-YearDevelopment Plan 1970/71-1974/75 with the main objective to "lay the founda-tions for economic development and economic independence". The Plan's maindevelopment targets may be summarized as follows:

(a) to achieve a marked increase in productivity in the main agri-cultural sector;

(b) to create 10,000-15,000 new employment opportunities by promotingas far as possible non-agricultural productive activities, puttingspecial emphasis on small-scale indigenous industries, and onforeign private investment in industry, mining and tourism;

(c) to accomplish a radical and government-controlled developmentin education and post-school training related to the needs foreconomic and social advancement.

1.13 The emphasis on the development of the country's own productiveresources is basically sound, but at the time of the Plan's inception therewas a severe lack of knowledge of the development potential of the country.In the last three or four years, however, substantial progress has been madewith identifying investment opportunities. In the agricultural sector, theUNDP Leribe Pilot Agricultural Scheme is providing a mine of technical, eco-nomic and sociological information which greatly enhances the preparation offurther agricultural projects. Implementation of a substantive rural develop-ment project (Thaba Bosiu) has already started. Outside agriculture, themost important studies that have been completed include comprehensive surveyson transportation, tourism and the industrial sector, a telecommunicationsdevelopment plan, a reconnaissance study for the development of electric power,and comprehensive surveys for the exploration of mineral and water resources.

1.14 The target for the First Five-Year Plan period was to create 10,000-15,000 new jobs. Compared to an actual increase of the total labor force ofabout 50,000 over the same period this was a modest goal. Given the state ofpreparation of the plan at its inception, however, it is not surprising thateven this modest goal could not be achieved. In fact, only a few thousand newjobs have been created so far. Lesotho's dependence on the South African

labor market has therefore increased rather than declined in recent years(para 1.21). At the beginning of the next five-year plan (April 1975), how-ever, the Government will in many respects be much better prepared to embarkon an ambitious development program than it was five years ago. With the abovementioned pre-investment studies and sector surveys, and with the experiencegained with large-scale agricultural projects started since 1970, it shouldbe possible to put together a sizeable and realistic investment program.

C. The mployment Problem

Demographic Trends

1.15 Owing to the lack of reliable data on labor movements across theborder, the size of Lesotho's de jure population is not precisely known. In1966, the latest census year, the country had a resident population of 852,000persons, 850,000 of whom were Africans. In addition, 117,000 people werereported to be temporarily absent, most of them employed in South Africa. Thelatter figure, however, is thought to be too low as it would not include thoseconsidered to be illegally in South Africa. Fragmentary information on employ-ment of Basotho in South Africa suggests a figure of at least 150,000 absenteesin 1966, which would mean a total de jure African population of 1 million in1966.

1.16 According to previous censuses, Lesotho's resident population grewat an annual rate of only 0.7 percent between 1936 and 1956, but the rate ofincrease was much higher between 1956 and 1966; namely 2.9 percent a year.Although the results of earlier censuses should be used with caution 1/, thedifference in growth rates in the two periods is striking. It seems evidentthat in the earlier period a substantial portion of Lesotho's populationincrease -- perhaps 150,000 to 200,000 people in total -- was permanentlyabsorbed by South Africa. The much faster population growth between 1956 and1966 can partly be explained by the fact that since the early 1950's movementsof migrant labor have increasingly become subject to South African control,which made permanent Basotho settlement in South Africa difficult.

1.17 There are no reliable estimates of birth and death rates. A recentstudy in Lesotho 2/ based on a sample of rural households suggests a natural

1/ There is, for instance, some evidence of underenumeration in 1956, sothat the actual growth rate between 1956 and 1966 might have been lowerthan the implied rate of 2.9 percent.

2/ Report on the Demographic Component of the Rural Household Consumptionand Expenditure Survey 1967-1968. Bureau of Statics, May 1973.

population growth rate of 2.2 percent a year. Lesotho's de jure Africanpopulation may therefore have grown to about 1,165,000 in 1973. Assumingthat the results of previous censuses are reasonably reliable, Lesotho'spopulation has grown as follows over the last six decades.

Table 1.1 AFRICAN POPULATION

(thousand persons)

Resident Absent Total

1911 403 25 4281921 497 47 5441936 561 101 6621956 640 154 7941966 850 150 1,0001973 965 200 1,165

1.18 The population growth has brought increasing pressure on the limitedland resources. The 1970 agricultural census reveals how seriously the situa-tion has deteriorated over the last two decades. The number of people peracre of arable land has increased from 0.7 to 1.2 between 1950 and 1970. Overthe same period, the average family holding of cropland has decreased from 6.2acres to 4.9 acres.

Employment Trends

1.19 Comprehensive statistics on size, distribution and growth of Lesotho'slabor force are not available. Extrapolating information gathered through the1966 population census, the total labor force in 1973 may be estimated at some450,000 persons, 290,000 men and 160,000 women. Lesotho's economy is unableto absorb this labor force. In 1973, more than 110,000 Basotho men wereregistered as employed in South African mines on 6 to 24 months contracts. Inaddition, a substantial number of men, variously estimated between 40,000 to90,000--say 65,000--are in other temporary employment in South Africa, on farmsand in commerce and industry. This means that between 50 and 70 percent--say60 percent--of Lesotho's active male labor force is employed in South Africa.The migrant female labor force is estimated at 25,000 persons, most of themworking in domestic services.

1.20 Statistics on Lesotho's present resident labor force are scarce.Rough estimates indicate that about 21,000 persons (16,000 men and 5,000 women)find wage employment within Lesotho. The Government employs about 7,500 ofthem. About 3,000 to 3,500 persons are employed in manufacturing, construction,public utilities and tourism. The rest would be employed in other servicessectors. About 130,000 women (80 percent of the female labor force) and 100,000men (35 percent of the male labor force) would then be available for work inthe traditional sector. It should be noted, however, that the 100,000 men donot represent a permanent core of available labor, as at any one time a sub-stantial proportion of them are just home for a few months in between contractsin South Africa.

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1.21 Over the last six years the number of Basotho men employed by SouthAfrican mines has increased by 40,000 or by 7.5 to 8 percent a year on theaverage. Over the same period, wage employment for men within Lesotho mighthave increased by some 2,000 jobs. Assuming that Lesotho's labor force growsat the same rate as the de lure population (2.2 percent a year), and thatemployment for Basotho men in South Africa outside the mines has increased byanother 10,000, the following picture of the development of Lesotho's malelabor force may be derived.

Table 1.2: BASOTHO MALE LABOR FORCE, 1967 and 1973(persons)

1967 1973 ChangeTotal labor force 255,000 290,000 +35,000

Employed in South Africa 125,000 175,000 +50,000Wage employment within

Lesotho 14,000 16,000 + 2,000Available for work in the

traditional sector 116,000 99,000 -17,000

1.22 Even in absolute terms employment in South Africa has increasedmore than Lesotho's male labor force. This high and still increasing degreeof dependence on employment and income creation abroad makes Lesotho's eco-nomy and the welfare of its people extremely vulnerable to economic, socialand political developments outside the country's borders over which theGovernment of Lesotho has no control. Unfortunately, this also is a situa-tion which tends to be self-perpetuating since Lesotho's own long-term devel-opment tends to be held back as long as virtually every able-bodied youngmale with some initiative seeks work abroad rather than to become a sub-sistence farmer or find employment in the narrow domestic labor market wherewages are low.

1.23 This vulnerability expresses itself in two ways. As the recent pasthas shown, a sudden unpredictable reduction in Basotho labor working in SouthAfrican mines can occur. Whether riots or similar disturbances, natural disas-ters or other unexpected developments are the cause, the repercussions onLesotho are the same. If only 10 percent of all Basotho employed in SouthAfrican mines are affected, the result is a sudden influx of some 11,000 maleworkers; if 25 percent are affected, the stream rises to a deluge of almost30,000. In fact, as mentioned before, in the beginning of 1974, a streamvariously estimated at 10,000 to 15,000 miners returned suddenly home, anumber-almost as large as the total number of male Basotho wage earnersemployed within Lesotho itself. This time most of them have since gone backto the mines, but there is no guarantee that another sudden influx of migrantworkers will not happen again.

1.24 For short periods of time the effects of such sudden influxes mayremain hidden as the returnees will initially tend to go back to their villages

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and family farms, using up whatever savings they might have brought with them.However, if for whatever reason they are unable to return to South Africa again,they are eventually bound to start seeking work on the domestic labor marketwhich, unless emergency programs have been prepared in time, will be unable toabsorb them.

1.25 In the second place, there is the vulnerability to long-term develop-ments of the South African labor market. The possibility always exists thatin the long run South Africa will no longer be able, or willing, to absorbadditional labor from Lesotho. Although the Mission was not in a position toexamine likely trends in the South African labor market first-hand, it is themission's informed judgment that there will continue to be a strong demand foradditional Basotho labor over the next few years or so, but that in the longerrun employment opportunities for Basotho may level off or even decline. Twofactors are likely to cause a continued strong demand in the short term.Firstly, triggered by the high world prices for gold and oil, the South Africangold and coal mines are likely to expand significantly. Secondly, other im-portant traditional sources of migrant labor have recently become less reli-able. Following an aircrash in April 1974 in which 77 returning Malawianminers were killed, the Government of Malawi has suspended all recruitmentfor South African mines, and the recent developments in Mozambique make anuninterrupted future supply of migrant labor from that country uncertain.All this is likely to create greater demand for Basotho labor in the immediatefuture.

1.26 In the longer run, however, the prospects appear not so bright. Atpresent, about 75 percent of the more than half a million African mine workersin South Africa are migrant workers from abroad. After the Malawian Government'sdecision to suspend recruitment- and following a number of disturbances on themines in which foreign workers were involved, the South African Chamber ofMines and several miniing houses have announced that determined efforts will bemade to reduce what is called the industry's "dangerous" dependence on foreignlabor. Mechanization in the mines will be stepped up, and minimum wages in themines have been increased sharply in the past year in order to make mine labormore attractive for South Africa's own African workers. It will take no doubtsome years for these measures to take effect, but in the long run they arelikely to affect the employment opportunities for Basotho.

1.27 But even if one assumes a continued strong demand for Basotho laborin South Africa, the "bleeding" of labor from Lesotho would lead to an un-tenable situation. Between 1967 and 1973, the percentage of Lesotho's malelabor force working in South Africa increased from less than 50 to 60. If thistrend were to continue, almost every male Basotho would by 1985 be workingoutside his own country and, for long periods of time, be separated from hisfamily. Lesotho's vulnerability to what happens in the Republic of SouthAfrica would become unbearable, both economically because of the risks in-volved and socially because of the disrupting effects of migrant labor onfamily life and social structure.

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1.28 The recent events referred to in paragraph 1.02 have brought homethis alarming truth perhaps more clearly than ever before. It has been theMission's task to see whether it could help the Government devise the righttype of counter measures. As stated before, the Mission's main task was toprepare a detailed contingency plan that can realistically be carried out inthe case of a future emergency. In addition the Mission has made an attemptto point the way towards policies which in the long run would enable Lesothoto absorb within its own borders considerably more of its own labor force inproductive employment than it is in a position to do now, thus enabling it tocontribute to the country's own development rather than thk- ef a foreign land.

D. Preparing for anEmergency

1.29 The quickest way of creating more employment opportunities in Lesotho(and elsewhere) is by the use of more labor-intensive techniques in civilworks 1/ which are being undertaken or planned to be undertaken within theframework of the country's overall economic and social development efforts.In that way the work performed will be for productive purposes; it will con-cern projects that have already been selected and formulated be it not alwaysin the same detail, and plans for its financing presumably will already exist.

1.30 The technical and economic feasibility of using labor-intensive tech-niques in civil construction has been the subject of much detailed study bythe World Bank 2/ and other international organizations. Annex II contains areview of some of the problems involved. One of the major conclusions by thisstudy was:

"Labor-intensive methods should not be attempted withoutcareful advance planning, organization and training,particularly in regions where these methods have not beencommonly practiced."

1.31 There are severe limitations to employing, efficiently and produc-tively, additional labor in the short-run by shifting to more labor-intensiveconstruction methods. In Lesotho, the main constraints include:

1/ In particular road construction and soil conservation and relatedactivities; the construction of buildings offers little practicalscope for additional job creation for unskilled labor because itsexisting techniques are already labor intensive.

2/ C. G. Harral, et. al., Study of the Substitution of Labor andEquipment in Civil Construction: Phase II Final Report - IBRDStaff Working Paper No. 172 (January 1974).

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(a) Lack of knowledge and experience of labor-intensive methods,including lack of managers and supervisors trained in organiz-ing and handling large labor forces and absence of the infra-structure needed to recruit, administer and support largelabor forces.

(b) Shortage of fully-planned labor-intensive projects onwhich work could start immediately.

(c) General shortages of planning and design staff who couldproperly prepare suitable projects at short notice.

1.32 Large labor forces cannot be productively employed in these circum-stances unless adequate time is allowed for proper preparations. These mustinclude a substantial training input, a period spent in small-scale experimenta-tion to gain experience of the problems involved in labor-intensive techniquesand, concurrently, the establishment of the organizational framework neededfor labor recruitment, project preparation and administration. If adequatetime is not available, large labor forces can be employed only in a "make-work"sense.

1.33 To overcome these constraints, the Mission recommends that immediateaction be taken to set up the following institutions:

(a) A National Employment Service within the Ministry of Laboras already envisaged in principle by the Government of Lesotho.

(b) A small-scale Labor-Intensive Construction Unit within theexisting organization of the Ministry of Works and Communi-cations.

(c) A Co-Ordinating Committee under the Prime Minister's office.

1.34 The structure and functions of these institutions are described inChapter II. In addition, there is a need to identify the works suitable forconstruction by labor-intensive techniques in advance, so that they could beproperly planned and designed and to estimate the number of laborers whichthey can absorp. This is the subject of Chapter III. Chapter IV then followswith a discussion of what action to take in order to cope with an emergencysituation. Chapter V, finally, gives the Mission's ideas with respect tothe strategy and policies to be followed to provide additional long-termproductive opportunities in Lesotho through appropriate investments in agri-culture, manufacturing industry and other sectors.

E. Actual and Shadow Wage Rates in Lesotho

1.35 More than in any other projects, in labor-intensive projects thefinancial costs are to a great extent determined by the wage level of un-skilled labor. The actual wage rate at which unskilled labor can be attracted

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is relevant for the financial cost. In establishing the true economic costof a project, however, it is appropriate to use a shadow price of labor whichis determined by the level of earnings that can be expected from alternativeemployment (opportunity cost).

1.36 Published information on wage levels for manual labor in Lesothoare scanty. A daily rate of R 0.60 (R 13 a month) has long been officiallyregarded as the minimum wage. At present, however, it appears to be verydifficult to obtain any labor at that rate. The Ministry of Works and Com-munications, which in Government is the largest employer of unskilled labor,now pays R 0.72 a day (R 15.50 a month) for casual unskilled labor andup to R 1.44 a day (R 31 a month) for permanent unskilled labor. In theprivate sector in Lesotho, casual laborers are paid about R 15 a month. Un-skilled but trained laborers earn from R 25 to R 30 a month in private indus-tries, and skilled workers earn from R 40 to R 50 a month, although for parti-cular skills, such as masons and carpenters, wages of R 60 to R 70 a monthare no exceptions.

1.37 Wages for Basotho working in South Africa are generally consider-ably higher than those in Lesotho. Also, they have increased rapidly in re-cent years and are now exerting a strong upward pressure on wage levels inLesotho. In the South African mines new, unskilled laborers ("novices") whoonly two years ago earned R 0.80 a day (R 20.80 a month) now receive aguaranteed minimum wage of R 1.60 a day (R 41.60 a month). In addition,the mines provide free food and accommodation. Wages of experienced mineworkers can go up to about R 80 a month.

1.38 It is difficult to determine with any precision what wage levelin Lesotho would be just high enough to attract a sufficient number of un-skilled, casual laborers to staff the proposed Labor-Intensive ConstructionUnit (LCU). 1/ Assuming that no emergency arises in the near future, laborerswill presumably have to be attracted who would otherwise seek employmentin South Africa. It does, however, not appear necessary to offer wagesclose to those paid by the mines in South Africa. Despite the personalprestige often attached to working in the mines, there is the value of nothaving to live away from home and family; moreover, there are additionalcosts associated with living abroad. It is generally believed in Lesothothat if jobs were available a daily wage of about R 1 a day (R 22 a month)would be high enough for a sufficient number of casual, unskilled laborersto stay in Lesotho rather than to seek employment in the mines. Whetherthis is true or not, however, will have to be established through trialand error. It would be an important by-product of the LCU's experimentalwork to shed more light on the question of what wage rate would be justhigh enough to keep unskilled laborers in Lesotho in a situation of strongSouth African demand. For the financial costing of the proposed labor-intensive projects which the LCU would carry out, the Mission has for thetime being assumed a daily wage of R 1 for unskilled labor.

1/ About 500 unskilled laborers would be needed; see Chapter IIB.

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1.39 The question of what would be an appropriate shadow wage forLesotho will remain a rather academic one as long as the demand for Basotholabor in South Africa remains as strong as it is n-ow, and Basotho who cannotfind jobs within Lesotho are willing to accept work in S'outh Africa. Theore-tically, the shadow rate of labor in Lesotho would then be the South Africanwage rate minus the value that migrant workers attach to not having to workabroad. 1/ However, should because of a decrease of employment opportunitiesin South Africa a situation of severe unemployment arise in Lesotho, theshadow rate of labor will be very much lower. In such a situation virtuallythe only alternative the unemployed returnees have is to return to theirfarm households and add marginally to the productivity of their farms. Theaverage farm income in Lesotho (subsistence plus cash income) is estimatedat almost R 90 a year. 2/ It is difficult to tell how m'uch a returned mineworker will be abre to increase his farm income, but even if he manages toincrease it by 50 percent, it would be equivalent to a daily wage of lessthan R 0.20, which is only of about one-fifth of the present going rate forunskilled labor in Lesotho. If the returnees were to be employed on publicworks away from thei-r home, this shadow wage rate would then have to beincreased by the cost of relocation and transportation.

1/ In these circumstances the shadow rate of labor in Lesotho might wellbe higher than the going-.wage rate.

2/ IBRi) Report No. 331a-LSO "The Economy of Lesotho", Table No. 17.

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II. RECOMMENDED NEW INSTITUTIONS

A. The National Employment Service

2.01 To meet employment emergencies effectively it is essential to gainadvance warning of their timing and size, to know where surplus labor will belocated, how many will seek work within the country, what their skills areand to help unemployed labor find work quickly. Even under normal conditions,with no special inflow of surplus labor from the mines, it would be desirableto have an organization to act as a clearing house and bring together job op-portunities and labor of various skills in both the public and the privatesectors. In an emergency, however, an organization to fulfill this role ona large scale becomes indispensable.

2.02 At the moment there is a serious gap in Lesotho in this respect.During the Mission's field work very little firm information was available onthe employment situation. There were no statistical data relating to the mineworkers who were still in the country after having left the South Africanmines following disturbances there, about their geographical distribution ortheir interest in obtaining alternative work in Lesotho itself. The difficul-ties which on-going agricultural development projects are experiencing infinding sufficient labor to carry out land development and road constructionactivities seemed to indicate clearly that many of the mine workers hadreturned to South Africa. It would have been helpful if this impression couldhave been confirmed with clear and indisputable data.

2.03 The Mission therefore was pleased to learn that the Government isconsidering the establishment, under the second five-year plan, of a nation-wide employment service with a network of district and local employment offices.As tentatively planned, this service would compile statistical information onmanpower, its composition and volume and the demand/supply position, deal withregistration, placement, vocational guidance and assistance in internal migra-tion, particularly with respect to Lesotho's industrial labor market. Further-more, it would acquaint the Basotho migrant workers with conditions of serviceand living in South Africa.

2.04 The Mission considers that under present conditions the main require-ment is for an organization to monitor the employment position in Lesotho asclosely as possible and to help, particularly in times of emergency, surpluslabor to find suitable jobs within Lesotho. Such organization should not beover-burdened by having to provide information-to Basotho on South Africanlabor conditions and to supervise the recruiting and labor agents from SouthAfrica. These functions could best be carried out by a separate bureau orsection under the Commissioner of Labor. The National Employment Service(NES) recommended by the Mission could then confine itself fully to theplacement of Basotho labor within Lesotho itself.

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2.05 The NES, as broadly conceived by the Mission, would consist of acentral office located in Maseru which would work under the direct supervisionof the Commissioner of Labor and would have branch offices in each of the ninedistricts in Lesotho. The branch offices would be under the functional controlof the central office, but administratively under the District Administratorswith whom they should maintain close liaison.

2.06 The central office of the NES would have a two-fold task. Firstly,it would keep itself fully informed at all times on the current employmentsituation as it changes with the movement of labor to and from South Africa.Secondly, it would, in close cooperation with employers, keep an up-to-daterecord of all labor requirements in the public sector and, where feasible, inthe private sector as well.

2.07 To enable the central office to perform the first task it will benecessary (a) that the South African recruiting agencies fully cooperate andbe required to submit regular returns of the number of workers recruited bythem from each district in Lesotho and the type of jobs for which they havebeen recruited; (b) that the immigration personnel at the six land borderposts of Lesotho as well as at the relevant airfields be required to report,also on a regular basis, the number of workers which have returned from SouthAfrica; and (c) that the district offices of the NES provide regular returnsof the number of workers that are registered with them as seeking employment.On the basis of the data thus received, the central office would report re-gularly on the overall employment situation in Lesotho to the CoordinatingCommittee discussed under section C of this Chapter. Each district officewould also receive a copy of this report.

2.08 To perform the second task all government departments and agenciesemploying labor should be required to regularly inform the central office ofthe NES of their projected labor requirements (say for the next month), in-cluding the type of work involved, duration, location, etc. They should alsobe required to hire all their labor (as distinct from civil servants who wouldcontinue to be appointed as presently) through the NES. Industrial and otherenterprises in the private sector should be encouraged to use the NES's servicesas well to help them find the workers they need. The central office wouldtransmit all job requirements to the district offices concerned who would beprimarily responsible for finding suitable candidates within their areas anddirecting them to potential employers.

2.09 In the longer term when the NES is fully established, the centraloffice would provide vocational guidance to school leavers and others seekingwork inside Lesotho. The officer or officers concerned would have to makeregular visits to the district offices to perform this function effectively.

2.10 The district offices of the NES also would have a two-fold function.Firstly, they would register each person who is seeking employment within thecountry, recording information as to the applicant's age, sex, place of

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residence, education, special skills, previous employment history 1/ and detailsof the type of work, location, etc. which the applicant prefers. Secondly, itwould direct suitable registered workers to those employers who have registeredvacancies with the central office. In the course of their work the branchoffices would be required, as already indicated, to submit regular returns tothe central office; they would also keep employers regularly informed of thevolume and type of available workers.

2.11 The suggested composition of the NES is contained in Annex IIItogether with details of its staffing costs. The organization is headed bya director or chief employment officer. Under him are two units, one formonitoring the unemployment situation in Lesotho and one for registeringfuture labor requirements. Each unit is headed by an employment officer.At a later stage a vocational guidance officer might be added to the staffof the central office. There is ainemployment officer in each of the dis-tricts. The clerical assistance needed is also shown. It will no doubt benecessary to increase this staff in the event of an emergency.

2.12 In the initial stage the annual personnel costs of the NES will beabout R25,000 to R30,000. For the first one or two years, however, the LaborDepartment is likely to need the services of an expert in the organization ofemployment offices to help set up the NES and to assist in formulating proce-dures, which would add another R20,OOO-25,000 to the total cost. The necessaryaccommodation is not likely to be very costly since it is assumed that thecentral office will be located within the present premises of the Labor Depart-ment and the district branches within the District Administrator's offices.

B. The Labor-Intensive Construction Unit

2.13 The Labor-Intensive Construction Unit (LCU) would provide a basisfor testing labor-intensive methods and for obtaining realistic comparativecost figures and a training ground for supervisory personnel in the organizationand handling of large labor forces. The main functions of the LCU thus would be:

1/ Former workers in South African mines hold work record cards which in-clude in code information on their test results, their training and theirwork records. -It might be useful to explore, perhaps through the re-cruitment agencies of the South African mines in Maseru whether theNES could obtain the key to the code system and thus be given access tovaluable information for reemployment of mine workers in Lesotho itself.The *tests given apply to ability, dexterity and leadership qualitiesand help the South African mines to decide who should go into the un-skilled labor group (normally apparently some 60%), who should be trainedin craftsmen groups (some 30%) and who should be trained for super-visory function (some 10%).

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(a) To gain experience of the problems involved in carrying outconstruction work by labor-intensive techniques by undertakingexperimental projects in road construction, soil conservation,etc.

(b) To devise and test alternative work methods, procedures, tools,etc. aimed at improving the productivity of labor and minimizingthe use of powered equipment.

(c) To make a realistic comparison between the true costs of labor-intensive work and that currently carried out in Lesotho byequipment.

(d) To formulate sound administrative procedures and systems on whichto base large-scale adoption of labor-intensive techniques.

(e) To provide training at all levels within the unit with aview to making available sufficient supervisory stafftrained in labor-intensive techniques who could be rapidlydeployed in case an emergency occurred.

2.14 It is envisaged that initially the LCU would be a relatively small(about 500 men) organization that would be added to the three existingequipment-intensive construction units in the Ministry of Works. There wouldbe three possible phases in its work:

(a) The mobilization phase during which it would provide in-service training for its own local staff;

(b) The experimental phase during which it would act as amobile labor-intensive construction unit whose performancewould be evaluated against existing equipment-intensivework. During this phase it would train staff of ministriesand agencies responsible for carrying out labor-intensivepublic works. It would also make plans for the establishmentof one or two large labor-intensive construction groups andshould it be confirmed that in certain types of works labor-intensive techniques are sufficiently competitive with theuse of equipment at the going wage rate, it should implementthese plans even if there is no emergency.

(c) The emergency phase during which its paramount role would beplanning for and implementing a massive training program forthe supervisory staff of further large labor-intensive con-struction groups as well as a number of individual labor gangs.

') 1< 7 'ission believes it may be useful to provide its thinking on theorganizational structure and the program of work of the proposed LCU in somedetail to guide those who would have to implement its suggestions in this

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new field. However, it realizes that some adaptation may be necessary in thelight of the realities of the Lesotho scene as it unfolds during the comingyears.

2.16 The proposed organization of the LCU is illustrated in Figure 11.1.The unit, headed by a senior engineer, consists of an operations unit withfour supporting sections responsible for administration, methods study, trainingand equipment.

2.17 The structure of the operations unit is based on the concept of50-man gangs. In bulk earthworks a trained foreman can easily supervise oneor more gangs depending on the nature of the site. However, soil conservationwork is frequently more scattered and it would be more economic to use smallergroups of labor which in turn need more supervision. For maximum flexibilityas well as to facilitate rapid expansion and dissemination of experience, theforeman of each gang is provided with two assistant foremen.

2.18 The gangs are organized in groups of three, each group under a sec-tidn leader, and the three sections come under a senior technical officer, who,in turn, is responsible to the Engineer (Operations) for the technical super-vision of the nine gangs. Within the operations unit are sections responsiblefor technical support and cost control.

2.19 Apart from its normal routine duties of providing office servicesto the LCU, the administration section will be responsible for all labor mattersand the organization and running of the camp. A major task will be the develop-ment of simple standard administrative procedures to handle the logistics ofemploying large numbers of labor.

2.20 The methods study section will be responsible for critically studyingand reviewing on-going operations and (making use of modern management tech-niques) devising, testing and implementing improvements. The work will covera wide range of aspects, including organization, methods, hand tools, use ofanimals and, of particular importance, studying ways in which powered equipmentcan be used efficiently in conjunction with labor. It will also be responsiblefor determining the productivity norms for labor. This section will work veryclosely with the training section so that the results of studies can be dis-seminated rapidly.

2.21 The training section will be responsible for identifying trainingneeds in relation to the staff and labor available. It will prepare trainingliterature and aids both for in-service training within the unit of all super-visory personnel already working on road maintenance and construction, soilconservation and rural development works 1/ and for training new supervisorystaff in the event of an emergency.

1/ The first priority would presumably be to train supervisors alreadyemployed on labor-intensive projects such as road maintenance staff,to be followed by selected staff from various ministries and agenciesresponsible for carrying out public works who appear suitable to

become foremen and assistant foremen.

SFNIOR ENGINEER

Administration Nethods Study Operations Training Fquii-oent

Administrator Assistant Engineer | Seniocr Trainiirn Su,)ervi sorLabor officer Junior Teclnical Engineer Of'ficer Werators/Cl,-rks (2) Officers (2) Trainiing Officers (2; 4versr

T-yists (2) Technical Assistants (-c MG anicStores assisllant ':'ooi renair

ad4io ooerator 'acillt LosCamo labor

FTcfchni(uai -la,.port Cost Control

Assistant Engineer SurveyorQu.arPt-, it4 veoC'hainlnen (2) Senior Tchanical Gf'iccr Quanities clerks (2)-,raughtsman

Soil testlng,facilities

Section SectionLeader teader .eader

NlineC sepai'at garn,g coo oOi -oft oea'

_ Fore .can Acssi stanrtocemen

CRGAP\IZAPIC2~ CU' T li r-;F , R-, if(I SIVT CTP 'I",'r-JC Iugrr, .Ir (A-TPtAIL ,)

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2.22 The need for equipment will vary from time to time depending on thenature of the work in hand. This will be hired from the Government Plant Poolas needed. Basic requirements will be landrovers, tractors, trailers, watertrailers and tractor-drawn rollers. A mechanic will be needed on site forp;esentative maintenance and minor repairs, and provision may be required inthe longer term for maintenance of hand tools.

2.23 In view of the current work load of the Ministry of Works and Com-munications (particularly the Roads Division) and general staff shortages, allsenior members of the unit will have to be recruited from overseas. It willbe difficult to obtain staff of the necessary caliber who would work togetheras a fully integrated team. Consequently it may prove desirable to employ ateam of consultants to provide the necessary senior staff and to take respon-sibility for the operation of the unit during its early stages.

2.24 A detailed program for the mobilization of the unit, including thetraining requirements involved, is given in Annex IV and the chart attachedto that Annex. The program falls into eight distinct stages, namely therecruitment of senior supervisors, the planning and development of basictraining material, the recruitment of junior supervisors, basic classroomtraining, the selection and design of a work program, the recruitment of semi-permanent labor, the establishment of camp and finally, the recruitment ofcasual labor.

2.25 The unit would become fully operational at the end of month 9 but afurther period of at least six months would be needed for on-the-job trainingand for the unit to gain sufficient experience to become fully effective. How-ever, the unit could cope with its emergency function of facilitating rapidexpansion of labor-intensive techniques, albeit with some difficulty, by theend of month 12, i.e. after three months of full field operations.

2.26 Assuming that the decision is taken in early 1975 to set up the NESand the LCU, the NES could start effective work by mid-1975 and the LCU wouldbecome operational towards the end of that year and fully effective by thebeginning of fiscal year 1976/77. By this time the unit would be completelymobilized and all the training material for a large scale training programnecessary to cope with an emergency would have been developed.

2.27 By the beginning of 1976, assuming that no emergency would havearisen by that time, the LCU could embark on its role of gaining experience,on an experimental basis, of the problems involved in labor-intensive work,devising and testing improved methods and tools, generally developing labor-intensive techniques pertinent to the physical, managerial and social environ-ment of Lesotho and collecting detailed cost data. All of this would be doneby carrying out, on an experimental basis, a number of public work projects.

2.28 Factors which should be taken into account in selecting such projectsare the following:

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(a) To ease initial administrative problems and to facilitateits possible emergency function, the unit should be locatednear MIaseru; this would also have the advantage that adequateable-bodied male labor would be more readily available locally(at full strength 450 unskilled laborers are needed) who wouldhave a minimum of home to work travel, thus easing logisticdifficulties;

(b) the work should embrace a variety of different operations; itshould involve the minimal use of equipment; it should bewithin an on-going project or projects, for which designs havebeen or can be prepared rapidly with existing staff and,preferably, for which funding is already available and itshould be concentrated in a relatively small area so as togain maximum training benefit and to permit easy supervision;

(c) to avoid the disruptions that would be associated with movingthe unit, there should be continuity of work for at least 12months.

2.29 In considering the projects on which the LCU should be engaged duringthis period account must be taken of the criteria just mentioned and the projectsavailable to be carried out with more labor-intensive techniques as identifiedin Chapter III. Of the latter, the projects initially offering the greatestpotential are the agricultural development schemes at Thaba Bosiu and Khomokhoanawhere both soil conservation and road construction work will be available in theimmediate future. At a somewhat later date, the Senqu River project is alsolikely to offer a wide range of construction opportunities.

2.30 The Thaba Bosiu project is considered to be preferable to Khomokhoana,one reason being its close proximity to Maseru. However, a firm decision onchoice of the first project and the detailed work content can be deferred untilthe LCU is set up. The initial concentration of work in one area suffers fromthe disadvantage that other senior supervisors will not gain first-hand knowledgeand experience of the use of labor-intensive techniques. This can be partiallyovercome by arranging for frequent study visits to the on-going work.

2.31 The LCIJ would spread the experience gained in the use of labor-intensive techniques among all the staff that is likely to become involved.This could be accomplished, for example, by

(a) rotation of its supervisory staff at all levels with theircolleagues in various Ministries likely to employ LCU gangsfor periods of six months and to be phased in such a manneras not to reduce unduly the operational efficiency of theunit; and

(b) by holding a series of seminars for the instructors at theHlinistry of Works and Communications' Technicians TrainingSchool which should include training in the use of labor-intensive techniques in its syllabus.

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2.32 Once some initial experience is gained, the LCU should decide whetherto begin work on the formation of one or two larger labor-intensive constructiongroups to be used on labor-intensive works irrespective of whether an emergencywill arise or not. 1/ The Mission believes, as will be made clear in ChapterIII, that there is a strong likelihood that certain types of work can be doneat about the same cost with labor-intensive as with equipment-intensive tech-niques. If this view is confirmed it would make good economic and socialsense to begin with the use of the labor-intensive techniques as soon as pos-sible. This would have the additional advantage that the LCU would thus obtainexperience in the actual formation of labor-intensive construction groups whichwould be of immense value in the event of a later emergency. It would alsoprovide the LCU with a specific purpose which would provide motivation for allthe staff concerned. Also, the training work involved and the recruitment andemployment of the laborers concerned could be carried out in a more orderlyand efficient manher than would be the case in an emergency when time wouldbe a major constraint.

2.33 The LCU would have to prepare detailed plans for the establishmentof the first labor-intensive construction group(s) in advance. However, afirm decision as to whether to proceed and on the works to be undertaken bythe group(s) could be deferred until the beginning of fiscal year 1976/77 whenthe experience of the LCU would make possible a more accurate estimate of thecosts involved.

2.34 The Mission believes that, initially; the LCU should not undertakemore sophisticated and complex work such as the building of structures (cul-verts and bridges) and higher standard black-topped roads which should remainto be carried out by the existing equipment intensive construction units.Consequently, it may be necessary for the LCU to seek assistance from timeto time from these agencies to carry out parts of work entrusted to it whichare beyond its owni capacity. However, as time goes on, consideration shouldbe given to widening the range of expertise of the unit by including smalliabor-oriented teams trained to undertake a wider range of complete projects(including bridges and culverts) from its own resources.

2.35 The estimated costs 2/ bf setting up the unit and of its annualoperations are detailed in Arinex V and summarized below:

1/ The desirability of such groups and the LCU's role in their establish-

ment is described in Chapter IV where the formation of labor-intensiveconstruction groups in the case of an emereencv is heine dealt with.

2/ Based on a wage rate of R1.00 per day for unskilled labor.

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Set Up Costs

Accommodation R145,150Equipment 18,350Hand Tools _ 4,140

R167,640

Say R168,000

Operating Costs for First Year (month 4 through month 15)

Expatriate staff R146,400Local staff 47,564Equipment and fuel 59,580Labor 75,240Miscellaneous _ 5)00

R333,784

Say R335,000

Annual Operating Costs for Subsequent Years (month 16 onwards)

Expatriate staff R146,400Local staff 58,104Equipment and fuel 85,060Labor 121,440Miscellaneous 71000

R418,004

Say R420,000

2.36 In the USAID Land and Water Resource Development Project commencingin 1975, there is provision of US$125,000 (R87,000) for studies of labor-intensive vs. mechanized construction of soil conservation works and theprocurement of heavy equipment under that project is to be deferred pendingthe outcome of these studies. Since much of the experimental work to be carriedout by the LCU will be concerned with soil conservation work, it is suggestedthat the Conservation Division cooperate with the LCU in these studies. Someof the funds might be used to finance the unit's operating costs in undertakingthe study. The Conservation Division has expressed considerable interest inthe possibility of using more lahor-intensive techniques in their work.

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C. T ordinatipj Committee

2.37 If the Mission's proposals are accepted, several government organiza-tions will be concerned with employment problems. They include in particularthe proposed National Employment Service and the Labor-Intensive ConstructionUnit, as well as the Ministries of Works and Communications, of Agriculture,of Commerce and Industry (Labor) and the Central Planning and DevelopmentOffice, To insure the necessary coordination among them and to provideguidance on policy issues, it is recommended that a Coordinating Committeebe set up under the chairmanship of the Senior Permanent Secretary in thePrime Minister's office. Membership should include senior representativesfrom the Ministries just mentioned as well as the Director of the NES and theEngineer in charge of the LCU.

2.38 Before an emergency arises the chief functions of the Committeewould be:

(a) to carry out a continued review of the prevailing employmentsituation on the basis of the data provided by the NES;

(b) to insure that the work of the LCU, including the trainingof staff of other Ministries, is proceeding well, that theresults of its exper-imental work are. properly disseminated,and that timely decisions are taken and properly implementedwith respect to the formation of the first one or two largelabor-intensive construction groups, and

(c) to review regularly the state of planning and design of workssuitable for labor-intensive techniques.

2.39 The last function is particularly important. As will be discussedin Chapter III (paragraph 3.11). there is in the Mission's view, a need tostrengthen the planning and design capabilities in areas offering the greatestprospects for labor-intensive works. In addition, there is the problem thatthe identification of job opportunities in Chapter III assumes constructionby force account throughout. All construction work in agriculture is cur-rently scheduled to be carried out by force account, but there are a numberof projects within the road development plan for which construction by con-tract is currently envisaged. The Mission suggests that work for which equip-ment-intensive methods remain essential (such as high standards bitumenisedroads) generally be carried out by the existing construction units of the RoadsDivision and only be let to contract when it is beyond their capacity. Workwhich in principle is suited for labor-intensive methods should similarly bedone by force account, but if it is beyond the capacity of the constructionunits it should be let to contract only after a careful review of the employ-ment situation by the Coordinating Committee. In certain circumstances theCommittee may find it desirable to defer the construction of such projects.This would mean some rescheduling of the road development program to insure

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that there is continuity for both equipment and labor to provide an even workload for both techniques, but without any basic changes in existing priorities.

2.40 Once an emergency situation arises, the role of the CoordinatingCommittee would be (a) a continued review of the actual surplus labor situa-tion; (b) the overseeing of the mobilization, training and deployment ofstaff and labor forces and determining an appropriate wage rate; and (c)the review, on a regular basis, of the detailed contingency plans preparedby the LCU to deal with the emergency and the implementation of these plansin the light of actual developments in the unemployment position. In ChapterIV the role of the NES, the LCU and the Coordinating Committee during anemergency are discussed further.

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III. THE SCOPE FOR EMPLOYING MORE PEOPLE ON LABOR-INTENSIVE WORKS

A. General

3.01 The Mission was presented with three contingency plans for theimmediate creation of additional employment in civil works:

(a) A labor-intensive road betterment project.

(b) A scheme for maintenance and improvement ofairfields using intensive labor.

(c) Soil and water conservation proposals.

Brief details of these proposals are contained in Annexes VII, VIII andIX, respectively.

3.02 These projects were identified at short notice at a time when itwas believed that a iarge unemployment problem was imminent; consequentlythere was insufficient time to design and plan the projects properly, totrain adequate supervisors and to create the infrastructure needed for theefficient employment of such la'rge labor forces.

3.03 The current employment situation is such that there is no immediateneed to take action on an inefficient and expensive make-work basis. Besides,even if an emergency arose before the recommended preparatory steps have beentaken, a job creation through the use of more labor-intensive methods would befar easier on on-going or planned projects within the framework of the overalldevelopment plan. For such projects the organizations to implement them nor-mally already exist and for new projects some planning is already in progress,so that the need for additional time and resources for the detailed preparationof suitable projects for construction by labor-intensive methods would be mi-nimized.

3.04 The Mission therefore concentrated its efforts on those projectslikely to be implemented during 1975/80 and examined in some detail the poten-tial for new job opportunities within the various sectors. In doing so, itwas necessary to make certain assumptions regarding work methods, the futurerole of Food Aid labor, the productivity and cost of labor and the availabilityof other resources required, and these are briefly described below.

Work Methods

3.05 In view of the absence of small contractors in Lesotho and the prac-tical difficulties experienced elsewhere in inducing larger contractors toadopt labor-intensive construction techniques, it has been assumed that con-struction would be by force account (see also paragraph 2.39).

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3.06 As indicated in Annex II, the optimal mix of equipment and laborto minimize financial or economic cost varies from country to country and fromproject to project within each country. One of the functions of the LCU whenit becomes operational will be to determine from its own experience what mixis best suited to Lesotho. In the meantime it has been necessary to make apreliminary assessment of the extent to which labor should replace equipment.

3.07 The main construction activities in road building and maintenanceand in soil conservation and related projects are those concerned with theexcavation, loading, hauling, unloading, spreading and compacting of materialsand tree and grass planting. Experience elsewhere indicates that the limit ofefficient haul by labor (using wheelbarrows) is about 100 meters. Beyond thisand up to 5 km, tractor/trailer units have been assumed, with several trailersto each tractor. Other operations which it is assumed will still be mechanizedare the loading (by pump), hauling (by tractor) and spreading of water on roadsand the construction of contour banks, terraces and grass strips.

Role of Food Aid Labor

3.08 The scope of creating paid employment opportunities, both immediatelyand in the longer term, will be substantially affected by the future role ofFood Aid labor. In Annex II, paragraphs 23 and 24, reference is made to theextremely low productivity of this labor, which is so inherent to the way thesystem has so far been used in Lesotho as to make the Mission believe thatmuch of its present work could be better done in other ways. In addition,it would clearly be impossible to employ paid labor effectively on the sametype of work or in close proximity to Food Aid labor.

3.09 The Mission suggests therefore that the role of Food Aid laborshould be more oriented towards community and rural development. Suitableprojects would include the construction of village roads and surface workdrainage schemes, village gardens and social or recreational facilities.The labor should be controlled locally by the District Community DevelopmentOfficers and not centrally from Maseru and it should not be used on largedevelopment works which are the proper concern of the various Ministries.The work programs should be determined locally by the District CommunityDevelopment Committees in association with the District Administrators.This arrangement should provide greater motivation for the workers andshould result in a substantial acceleration in much needed village improve-ments. The change in role should be gradual unless an emergency arises.The estimates of employment possibilities assume that this suggestion willbe implemented.

Productivity and Cost of Labor and Equipment

3.10 The factors affecting the productivity of labor, which can varybetween wide extremes depending on the environment in which work takes place,are also described in Annex II. One of the main functions of the LCU will beto ascertain the norms for labor productivity in Lesotho and to devise andtest ways in which they can be increased. The rates assumed in assessing the

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unskilled labor context of work are conservative and are below those observedin similar work elsewhere. A few examples are:

Cubic metersper man day

Excavating in hard rock 0.25Excavating in soft rock 1.00Excavating in normal soils 2.00Loading into trailers 4.00Spreading soil and gravel 8.00

It should be noted that these rates apply to properly supervised and organizedlabor. They have been used in estimating the potential for job creation inboth the short and medium terms. If large labor forces are deployed beforetrained supervisors become available, the actual productivity achieved willinevitably be much lower.

3.11 Estimates of cost of unskilled labor have been based on a daily wagerate of R1.00, which in the present situation is thought to be a rate just highenough to attract sufficient labor for the experimental phase (para. 1.38).Estimates of costs of foremen and assistant foremen have been based on a dailywage of R3.00 and R2.00 respectively. In the event of an emergency, however,it might well turn out to be possible to attract sufficient labor at a lowerrate. Actual rates would then need to be determined by the Coordinating Com-mittee in the light of circumstances pertaining at the time.

3.12 Equipment has been costed at the going hire rates charged by thePlant Pool of the Ministry of Works and Communications, which rates includeservicing and repairs.

Other Action Required

3.13 To achieve the full potential for job creation, certain additionalresources and actions are required and these are summarized below:

(a) The vacant senior posts in the establishment of the RoadsDivision of the Ministry of Works and Communicationsshould be filled as soon as possible.

(b) Action should be taken now to review on-going designs forequipment-intensive road work to ascertain whether, inthe light of present knowledge, any changes in designshould be made to facilitate labor-intensive techniques.

(c) The planning capacity of soil conservation teams for theThaba Bosiu, Khomokhoana and Senqu River projects shouldbe expanded.

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(d) Steps should be taken, as outlined in Annex IX, paragraph110 to increase the rate of woodlot establishment.

B. Identification of Employment Opportunities

3.14 Table 3.1 summarizes the potential for job creation in the variousprojects in the following sectors:

(a) Road construction and maintenance

(b) Airfied construction and maintenance

(c) Agriculture.

Details of the various projects are contained in Annexes VII, VIII and IX,respectively.

3.15 The tentative nature of the Mission's estimates must be emphasizedsince full details of the work content of the various projects are not availa-ble and the data on which they are based are far from precise. However, theyare sufficiently accurate to form a basis for the contingency planning des-cribed in Chapter IV.

3.16 The total potential for immediate employment in the short term isaround 100 gangs. However, since in the short term the LCU will not yet beoperational, it is highly unlikely that this potential can be fully realized(see Chapter IV, B). The maximum potential occurs in i976/77 when just over230 gangs (altogether about 12,000 people), according to the Mission's tenta-tive calculations, could be employed. The drop in potential in later yearsis entirely due to the nature of the projects in the five-year road develop-ment program. A mor& even work load for labor could be achieved by bringingforward work more suited to labor-intensive methods. 1/ The geographicaldistribution of job potential is fairly wide and corresponds generally withthe distribution of the population.

3.17 A general acceleration of all sections of the road development pro-gram would also increase job potential but the Mission has not consideredthis aspect in detail. The non-availability of fully designed projectsready for implementation at short notice is invariably a major constrainton job creation. It would be prudent to strengthen design and planningcapacity in the areas offering the greatest prospects for labor intensivework so that a reservoir of prepared projects could be built up on which

1/ Several of such projects have been identified in the ten-year roaddevelopment program which is contained in the Final Report of theLesotho Transportation Study. The second five-year development planfor road development is based on this study.

Table 3.1(page i) T ?.YL7P. TC--.,,S

_Sector/Pro.-i-ct Number of Garcz -

Term 'unf T.;___

Road Construction 1975/76 1976/77 19_77/73 l /7` 7/?_ __.

Betterment and improve- 14 __ __ __ __ Increase in costs R43,000 (11 per cent)ment of Southern, Break even wage rate 78 cents per dayNorthern and Lowlands/Foothills Roads

Butha-Buthe to Joel's __ 3 __ _ Increase in costs R7,000 (6 per cent)Drift Road Break even wage rate 85 cents per day

Lala to Letseng-la- 28 14 __ __ __ Increase in costs R174,000 (19 per cent)Terai Road Break even wage rate 71 cents per day

St. Michael's to __ 38 __ __ __ Increase in costs R118,000 (15 per cent)Mantsonyane Road Break even wage rate 78 cents per day M

Mantsonyane to __ 5 40 10 __ Increase in costs R210,000 (19 per cent)Thaba Tseka Road Break even wage rate 74 cents per day

Thaba Tseka to __ _ __ 16 __ Increase in costs R52,000 (15 per cent)Taung Road Break even wage rate 78 cents per day

Roma to Semon- __ 54 72 54 __ Increase in costs R615,000 (19 per cent)kong Road Break even wage rate 76 cents per day

Mafeteng to VanRooyen's Gate Road __ -_ __ __ Upgrading to Bitumen 1 standards and

hence not suitable to labor-intensivetechniques

Leribe to Cale- __ __ __ __ __ As abovedon's Poort Road

Mafeteng to Mohale's __ __ __ __ __ As aboveHoek Road

Community and Rural __ __ __ - __ No opportunitiesDevelopment OfficeNew Roads

Table 3.1

(page ii) E CL? o0- _T:,A

Set tor /Projc t Number of Gan2s ______Short t - -Term 7-9rdium Trn r__

Road Construction 1975/76 1976/77 1977/73 9°3/79 197c/&/ __ __ _ _

Thhba Bosiu agricul- 8 7 __ __ __ Total cost approximately R300,000. Worktural development assumed to be required in 1975/77. If thisscheme scheme is extended there will be further job

opportunities in road construction inlater years.

Khomokhoana 3 __ __ __ __ Total cost about R57,000 and work assumedagricultural develop- in 1975/76. Further roads will be requiredment scheme if scheme is expanded.

Senqu River agricul- 24 24 24 __ __ Total costs estimated at R1,642,000. Furthertural development __ _ roads will be required if the scheme isscheme extended

0Sub-totals per sector 77 145 136 80 __

Road Maintenance

Routine

Taking over of ac- 4 9 13 19 23cess tracks from theCommunity and RuralDevelopment Office

Periodic

Regravelling 5 5 5 7 11 Increase in costs about 14 per cent. Breakprogram even wage rate 74 cents per day.

Sub-totals per sector 9 14 18 26 34

Airfield Constructiorand Maintenance - Excluded due to lack of project definition.

Sub-total per sector __ _ - _ __

Table 3.1(page lii) £ t*?;J OP: 0??oj ;1 -3

rectoe/______t Nuarer of Gan,- R_-arks

Term. __ _edium. T

Agriculture 1975/76 1976/77 1977/78 1973/79 1979/80 . . . .__

Thaba Bosiu 3-4 22 22 22 22 Assumes that two planning teams operateSoil Conservation and that follow-up'project commences about

1978.

Khomokhoana 4 8 8 11 22 Assumes two planning teams and an ex-Soil Conservation panded-follow-up project commencing 1978/79.

Senqu River Nil 22 22 22 22 Assumes two planning teams, additional finan-Soil Conservation cing in 1976/77 and a follow-up project com-

mencing 1977.Ministry of Agri- 3 11 9 1 __ CD planning teams will probably widenculture Schemes employment opportunities in later years.Soil Conservation

Woodlots 2 4 6 8 8 Assumes expansion of financing and staffingForestry of existing program.

Fish Ponds 3 6 6 6 6 Medium term expansion assumes additionalFishing financing.

Sub-totals per sector 15-16 73 73 7P 80

GRAND TOTAL 101- 232 227 176 114102

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to draw in an emergency. The work involved would not be wasted and it wouldpermit rapid acceleration of the development program should this be desir-able or necessary.

3.18 The Mission's tentative calculations suggest that at the assumeddaily wage rate of R 1.00 for unskilled labor, the use of labor-intensivetechniques in road works would lead to higher costs, generally of the orderof about 10 to 20 percent. However, at rates of about 70 to 80 cents perday, there would be little difference in cost between labor-intensive andequipment-intensive techniques. This "break-even" wage rate is probablynot significantly lower than the rate at which labor could be attractedin case of an emergency. In soil conservation, the difference in costbetween labor-intensive and equipment intensive techniques might even beless than in road works.

3.19 If it is indeed confirmed by the experimental work of the LCU that(a) labor-intensive works are not more than 10 to 20 percent more expensivethan similar equipment-intensive works, and (b) a daily wage of A 1.00 ishigh enough to induce a sufficient number of unskilled laborers to stay inLesotho rather than seek employment in South Africa, the Government mightwish to consider adopting the use of labor-intensive techniques in publicworks as part of its long-term strategy to provide additional productiveemployment opportunities within Lesotho. The social benefits of creatingmore employment within Lesotho may well outweigh the somewhat higher fi-nancial costs involved. It should be borne in mind, however, that suchpolicy would diminish the stock of labor-intensive contingency projectswhich could then still be carried out if and when another emergency occurred.

Job Creation in Road Construction and Maintenance

3.20 Details of the individual projects within the road development pro-gram are contained in Annex VII. This sector offers the greatest scope fornew employment opportunities in the short and medium term.

3.21 In the short term (1975/76) some 77 gangs could as a maximum bedeployed on road construction and betterment in the lowlands/foothills area.Employment would rise to a peak of about 145 gangs during 1976/77 and dropoff thereafter. As was just mentioned, it would be possible to maintain thehigher levels of employment by bringing forward other projects more suitedto labor-intensive techniques which have been identified in the Final Reportof the Lesotho Transportation Study.

3.22 Road maintenance, both routine and periodic, offers much scope fornew job creation. Routine maintenance, the day-to-day work of patching pot-holes, correcting wheel tracking of gravel surfaces, grass cutting and thelike can be conveniently carried out by small groups of labor located at shortintervals along the road, particularly on gravel roads carrying low trafficvolumes. This would offer employment to about four gangs in the short termrising gradually to 23 gangs by 1979/80. These jobs are permanent in thatthere is a continuing need for the work.

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3.23 The periodic maintenance work of resurfacing gravelled roads canalso be carried out by hand labor. though at grpater rost than by Pequ4pment.

This would provide jobs for about five gangs in 1975/76, rising to 11 gangsin 1979/80. Here, the lnatinn of the wnrk ic enntinually varvina and labormust be fully mobile or be offered only short term employment. A mixture ofmnohile permnent and casaill emnlnueAd locPal lanlir f gives the best results.

'A - ?ZL O.n.e grAAt advAntaoge nf don.ir road mn4nf-r.nnca wonr by handA loabor 4i

that it spreads employment opportunities evenly over a wide area. However,the proYiSion of thAce Jobs is contingent on t setng up of the districtorganizations within the Ministry of Works and Communications--otherwiseeffective 4 supervis4n would be almost ImprssIble to ach4eve.

AS. *LUC _*l - - - - - - L- - - -..- - -C- -L A- -M0- fl^-P-------

32.2 Thi Iue Mission has cor.cluded that there are r.o imm Adiate prospects

for new job creation in this sector, and details of the reasoning behind thisco ..n .LlL A~..LLmE~. L £&~l4 * ~ * fA V T . L&~1 1-C.LJ L.__CCI. 4 J.UiC a. ULJ norcluir are- no.are ir.Ane.x VI. W hlotafc vo'lume at most

airstrips, there is little need or justification for high standards of main-L. IviL. u LLLWI VCL W.JN .LO LVUJ.LU LOU UL. Ur OL *.LU L.U Uy IILU KW

Division staff employed on road maintenance. It is recognized that the pre-sent arrangements are fLar fLrom satLiactor but wLitL the settiLng -up ofJ thle

district organizations of the Roads Division there should be a substantialIulprovement. The 'Mission sup-ports the measures now in ha-ndu Lo properlyidentify maintenance/betterment requirements.

3.26 The proposals under consideration for the development of new airportsare also summarized in Annex Viii. While these could, if implemented, offerconsiderable scope for new job creation, they have not been included sincethey are insufficiently firm or detailed at this stage.

JOb Creation in Agricuiture

3.27 Over the short and mid term, the main scope for absorbing additionallabor in agriculture is in soil conservation works. Construction of the worksmust be associated with supporting services which ensure the collaboration offarmers in their adoption of appropriate changes in land use and improved farmmanagement and techniques. These conditions are best.met in the integratedconservation and development projects described in some detail in Annex IX,!!Labor Absorption in Agriculture."

3.28 Some conservation work such as the establishment of terraces, con-tour banks and grass strips, can be undertaken much more effectively with equip-ment and should continue to be mechanized. However, most of the work could bedone labor intensive, covering construction of grassed water or drainage-ways,diversion ditches and miscellaneous works mainly relating to gully (t!donga-)stabilization. Labor requirements for these works are estimated at one gang(50 men) for 1 2/3 years (of 200 days) for 1,000 hectares of arable land. This

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norm of 1.67 gang years per 1,000 hectares of arable land is tentative and mustbe regarded as no more than indicative of the order of magnitude of labor re-quirements until accurate data become available from the field use of LCU gangs.

3.29 An equally tentative estimate of the cost of labor-intensive conser-vation works is R25 per hectare of arable land. Estimates for the Thaba Bosiuand Khomokhoana projects of the costs of comparable but mainly mechanized workare respectively R39 and R21 per hectare of arable land.

3.30 The physical planning of soil conservation systems must be accompa-nied by discussions and negotiations with the local Chief and farmers to obtaintheir final agreement to proposed works and changes in land-use practices beforeconstruction proceeds. All of this requires a team of five men plus part-timeexperts, and such a team can complete planning and farmer agreement at an annualrate of 16,000 hectares. On the average, about 40 percent of the gross areasurveyed would be arable land and the annual rate is therefore about 6,400 hec-tares.

3.31 The rate of planning sets a major limit to labor absorption in con-servation works. At present, there is one planning team for each of the ThabaBosiu, Khomokhoana and Senqu River projects. In all cases a second team isplanned or could be established with relatively few additional staff, and thesesecond teams should be set up as a matter of urgency.

3.32 The potential employment opportunities offered by the various proj-jects are described in detail in Annex IX and summarized in Table 3.1. Eachconservation project follows an integrated approach and combines provisionof services, inputs and some infrastructure, including minor access roads,with soil conservation works following agreement with farmers concerningfuture land use.

3.33 Thaba Bosiu. This project, financed by IDA and USAID, covers 300,000acres of which 75,000 acres are arable. Farmer response to extension servicesand input supplies has been excellent and conservation works on 5,000 acresare commencing with the full agreement of farmers. During the short term (fis-cal year 1975/76) there would be employment opportunities on conservation workfor three to four gangs. For the medium term, there would be employment oppor-tunity for 22 gangs. This assumes that the recommended second conservationplanning team commences operations in 1975. An expanded follow up projectwould have to be commenced in about 1977/78 to maintain this rate of construc-tion.

3.34 Khomokhoana. This SIDA/UNDP/FAO project includes completion of thesuccessful Leribe pilot project and covers a total of 48,000 acres. The soilconservation team is well experienced and planning has been completed for37,000 acres. The Mission recommends that a second planning team should bemanned to plan ahead for a larger follow-up project to commence about 1978/79.

- 35 -

3.35 The planned annual rate of construction is about 2,200 hectaresarable. This would provide employment opportunities for about four gangsduring a short term emergency. In a medium term emergency the rate of con-struction could be doubled, requiring eight gangs. This rate could be main-tained for about two years which would give time for a larger follow-up proj-ect to be planned to commence about 1978/79. Allowing for lost time for change-over it is assumed that there could be work for about 11 gangs during that year.

3.36 Senqu River. This UNDP/FAO project is designed to improve the diffi-cult conditions for agriculture in the two Southern Districts with a combinedarea of 1.6 million acres of which more than half is mountainous. The aim ofthe project is to strengthen existing agricultural services to intensify andimprove production, to initiate soil conservation measures, and to plan andprepare a comprehensive rural development project to commence in 1977. Assist-ance from foreign agencies has yet to be obtained for the preparation and fi-nancing of the follow-up project.

3.37 One conservation planning team has recently begun operating but plansare not sufficiently advanced for any significant employment for labor duringa short term emergency. A second planning team should be established and thiswould permit employment of about 22 gangs in the medium term. The project doesnot at present command the extra funds needed for this rate of construction.

3.38 Ministry of Agriculture Schemes. Most of these numerous relativelysmall schemes are the responsibility of the Soil Conservation Division (CD),which will be greatly strengthened by a USAID project commencing in 1975.(Annex IX, paragraph 64). Proposals submitted to the Mission is a "Requestfor Assistance in a Labor Intensive Pilot Project" together with supportingpapers from CD have been carefully reviewed and it was found that four projectscould make significant use of labor during an unemployment emergency. Theseprojects--Mount Moorosi, Kolonyama, Thaba Phats'oa and Matsieng-Morija--wouldprovide employment opportunities for three gangs in the short term and up to11 gangs in the medium term. The total employment would be 24 gang years.

3.39 Woodlots. Woodlot establishment is important because conditions areunfavorable for wide-scale afforestation and woodlots will be the main localsource of fuel and forest products. The present program, which is financedlargely by the Anglo-American Group, is proceeding well and at about twice theplanned rate of establishment. In a short term emergency two gangs--one fornursery work and one for field work--could be employed; and four gangs couldbe employed during a medium term emergency to increase the annual establishmentrate from 1,200 to 1,700 acres. Assuming that the steps recommended in para-graph 110 of Annex IX are taken, the annual rate could be doubled within twoor three years, giving employment opportunities for eight gangs. Additionalfinancing would be required.

3.40 Fish Ponds. Conditions are very favorable for production of thecommon carp and ample suitable sites, not required for agriculture, are availa-ble for village fish ponds, or larger fish farms. The fish pond program,

- 36 -

which is financed by ODM, is proceeding well and about 120 fish ponds covering20 hectares have been built. Yields of up to two tons of carp per hectare areobtainable from well managed ponds.

3.41 Three gangs could be employed under the regular program in a shortterm emergency. About six gangs could be employed in the medium term butadditional finance would be required.

3.42 Prospects for commercial scale fish farming also appear good andproposals for the four phased development of 350 hectares at Tsakholo arebeing considered by UK interests. The outcome is too uncertain for possibleemployment opportunities to be taken into account at this stage.

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IV. DEALING WITH AN EMERGENCY

A Basic Action Program

4.01 In case of an emergency the LCU would cease its experimental roleand would instead concentrate on the large scale training of supervisorystaff, the provision of assistance in mobilizing labor and the preparationof detailed contingency plans for all this work. The NES would provide thecandidates for the training program as well as subsequently the unskilledlabor. The Coordinating Committee would review the contingency plans, deter-mine the relative priorities and the overall strategy to be adopted in thedeployment of the labor force and would retain overall control of the planningprocess.

4.02 There will, of course, be significant problems of logistics to besolved when large labor forces have to be quickly deployed. The recruitmentof thousands and the training of hundreds of people will be required. Arrange-ments will have to be made for accommodation, timely payment of wages, healthand welfare facilities and food supplies. There will be the necessity tomonitor the supply position of items needed specifically for labor-intensivework (for example, tools and tents) and to hold some reserves--perhaps evenbefore a possible emergency--if delivery dates are unduly long.

4.03 The way to deal with problems of this kind, of which the previousparagraph gives only a few examples, would, of course, be much simpler if theLCU at the time of the emergency would already have formed one or two largerlabor-intensive construction groups. However, even if this were not so, theMission believes that there is no reason to be unduly concerned about thelogistical complexities provided maximum use would be made of the "lead time"which would normally be available. If an emergency arose it is unlikelythat returning miners would wish to take up new employment in Lesothoimmediately. There may well be a "gestation period" lasting possibly threeto six months before returnees would be actively seeking work. The role ofthe NES in providing an early warning in case of a threatening emergencysituation is of course crucial in this context.

4.04 From the analysis of job opportunities in the previous Chapter itfollows that, on the basis of present programs of civil works lending them-selves to being carried out with more labor-intensive techniques, some 12,000people could as a maximum be employed on labor-intensive public works (in1976/77). There are two basic ways in which this can be done. In some casessingle gangs or small groups of gangs are appropriate, for example, on roadmaintenance or the establishment of woodlots. In such cases, the existingproject infrastructure and management would be able to cope with the practicalproblems of employing the labor-and providing technical supervision. The mainrequirement would be the provision of properly trained foremen and theirassistants. Taking the situation in 1976/77, there would be scope for some35 individual gangs.

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4.05 However, for the majority of works (such as road betterment and

construction and soil conservation work) large groups of gangs will have to

be engaged in order to do an effective job. In such cases the organizationalstructure for technical supervision and administration will have to be created

first. The Mission believes that it is essential that this be done inde-

pendently from the existing infrastructure responsible for the execution of

public works so as to avoid an undesirably heavy load on existing organizations.

The labor groups, in other words, will have to be self-contained. This applies

specifically to roads. A somewhat different approach may be necessary for

soil conservation. The on-going projects have professional soil conserva-

tionists, engineers, etc. responsible for planning, layout and execution of

conservation works. They should, it would appear, retain at least final

responsibility for layout and supervision of construction.

4.06 In total, there would, on the basis of the situation in 1976/77, be

a need for seven construction groups of 27 gangs each. Assuming that two of

such groups would already exist at-the time of the emergency this would mean

the need for the quick mobilization of five additional groups.

4.07 By way of illustration--the work of the LCU will of course providefurther insights in this matter--the Mission has provided an outline for the

organization of a typical labor-intensive construction group in Chart IV.1.

As in the LCU, the structure of the organization is based on the concept of

50-men gangs. However, on some types of work, such as large-scale earthmoving

operations, the gang size could probably be increased without detrimental

effects whereas closer supervision may be essential for other work. The exact

composition of a group would thus need to be determined in relation to thework it would carry out and would vary from time to time, but the general

structure would remain unchanged.

4.08 In the typical organization illustrated the gangs are grouped in

threes under a section leader, with three sections within each unit, and three

units forming the group. Hence each group would contain about 1,350 unskilled

labor, 54 assistant foremen, 27 foremen, 9 section leaders, 3 junior technical

officers and be headed by a senior technical officer.

4.09 The foremen and assistant foremen would be recruited mainly from

returning miners, particularly those already experienced in the supervision

of the work of others and those showing potential leadership qualities. Section

leaders should have had some past experience of construction work and be more

mature individuals; a useful source of candidates might be plant operators.

The junior technical officers should, ideally, have completed the training

course at the Technicians Training School but such individuals are presently

in extremely short supply. In all cases it may prove necessary to utilize

staff with less than ideal past experience and training, and to accept the

resulting inefficiencies that will occur until they become more experienced.

4.10 In view of the above, the post of senior technical officer in charge

of operations is particularly critical and, wherever possible, it should be

filled by a Mosotho. However, owing to the shortage of suitably trained and

experienced Basotho it may be necessary to rely on an expatriate. The same

would be true, even more strongly, for the posts of resident engineer in charge

RESIDENT ENGINE

Administration Technical Support Operations Measurement and RquipmentCoat Control

Office manager Senior Technical Officer SupervisorLabor officer Assistant Engineer Quantity Surveyor Operators!

Clerks (3) Survey assistant Quantities clerks (3) drivers

Stores assistant Chainmen (4t) MechanicsTypist Draughtsman -Tool repair

Radio operators Soil testing facilities facilities

Camp labor

Three separate unite each consistingof

Operations GroupJunior Technical Officer

Senior Technical Officer 1| Junior Technical Officers `3

r - - H Section Leaders 9Three separate sections each consisting Foremen 27

of Assistant Foremen 541 lUnakilied Labor 1350

Section Leader

1- --IThree separate gans each consisting

of cl

1 Foreman2 Assistant Foremen

50 Unskilled labor

ORGANIZATION OF A TYPICAL LABOR-ITENSTIVE CONSTRUCTION GROUP

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of the group, the assistant engineer in the technical support section and thequantity surveyor responsible for measurement and cost control.

4.11 The group would be self-contained in an administrative and technicalsense. The administration section would be responsible for the ordering ofmaterials, payment of wages, etc. but they would still need support from theappropriate government departments and contingency plans for the necessaryback-up must be prepared. No design capacity is included in the group struc-ture apart from the technical support section which would be responsible forthe more detailed aspects of road design and setting out work. The measurementand cost control section would monitor the costs of work, not in a "record-keeping" sense but in a way which would enable the group to identify and correctits own inadequacies and to improve its performance as rapidly as possible.Equipment would be hired from the Government Plant Pool which would beresponsible for maintenance and repairs--a minor change to existing proceduresis envisaged in that staff for routine preventative maintenance and minorrepairs should be included in the unit. There would also be a need for toolrepair facilities on site.

4.12 The costs of setting up and operating a typical labor-intensiveconstruction group are detailed in Annex VI and summarized below: 1/

Set Up Costs

Accommodation R84,300Equipment 13,000Hand Tools 12,420

R109,720

Say R110,000

Operating Costs for One Year

Expatriate staff R 49,800Local staff 110,180Equipment and labor 83,440Labor 360,624Miscellaneous 11,500

R615,544

Say R620,000

4.13 Assuming that set up costs are distributed over a three-year period,the costs of maintaining a typical group for a year would be R653,300. Thegroup would contain 27 gangs so that the annual cost per gang would be about

1/ These costs are based on a daily wage rate for unskilled labor of R1.00.

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R24,200. In practice, the operating costs will depend on the quantities ofmaterials and equipment used. They would not be directly comparable with thecosts incurred in mechanized work (for example, the existing road constructionunits) in that the full costs of supervisors and their accommodation areincluded. 1/ In the agricultural sector 200 working days have been assumedso that running costs there would be reduced accordingly.

4.14 Annex X shows that total requirements for supervisory, technical andadministrative staff would be quite heavy. They would include 25 expatriates,assuming that all resident: engineers, assistant engineers, quantity surveyorsand senior technical officers needed in the labor-intensive construction groupswould have to come from abroad, 685 local supervisory and technical staff, themajority of which would be foremen (170) and assistant foremen (340); plus70 local administrative staff, to which figure has to be added the extraadministrative staff which will be needed in the Ministry of Works and Com-munications on whom the main burden of administration would fall.

4.15 The expatriate staff would need to be recruited externally andprocedures would have to be initiated rapidly to gain maximum advantage fromthe gestation period. The rate of recruitment would have to be matched tothat of local staff. It would probably not be easy to find staff of therequired caliber with former experience of labor-intensive work. The recruit-ment program should therefore allow time for a familiarization and experiencegaining period with the LCU before the expatriate staff assume their dutiesin mobilizing and managing the groups in the field. Althoughi a substantialinput of expatriate staff will be required for some time, the Mission wouldlike to stress the need to train local staff for various administrative,planning and technical functions as quickly as possible. In this context, theMission is happy to learn that the Government has agreed to participate in theILO's Inter-regional Project on Planning and Administration of Special PublicWorks Schemes.

4.16 The NES would be responsible for seeking out candidates to betrained for the local staff positions. Subsequently it would also have torecruit the unskilled labor force. It would keep close liaison with govern-ment departments to identify which of their existing staff can be sparedwithout undue detriment to their other work programs and what additionaltraining such staff would need. In some cases it might be possible to recruitpersons who are already trained (such as drivers) but it would be wise toassume in contingency planning that few would be available. A careful selec-tion procedure would be needed in recruiting trainees for the other positions,making use if possible of the identification papers carried by all miners inthe R.S.A. (footnote to paragraph 2.10 of-this report). Total requirementsfor trainees would need to be somewhat higher than the figures indicated inparagraph 4.14 since there is bound to be some fall-out and wastage bothduring training and immediately afterwards.

1/ For further details see Annex VII, paragraphs 19-23.

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4.17 Annex X also contains details on the training program for local staffwhich for junior technical officers, section leaders, foremen and assistantforemen, as well as for administrative staff, would all have to be done by theLCU. It is expected to take about one-half year to complete this trainingwork; every four weeks one construction group and three individual gangs wouldbe formed. Other organizations would have to take care of the training ofsuch staff as equipment supervisors, mechanics, operators/drivers, survey andsoil assistants and chairmen and draughtsmen. Contingency plans should bedrawn up within these organizations--the Government Plant Pool and the RoadsDivision--for this purpose.

4.18 In addition to the training aspects, the LCU could perform a numberof other useful functions in connection with the mobilization of the laborforces. The administrative section could place and process advance orders foraccommodation, building materials, office equipment and supplies, surveyingequipment, and the like which would be needed by the construction groupsduring the early months while they become established. The technical supportsection, assisted by the methods study section and the semi-permanent laborwithin the unit, could form a mobile team who would be responsible for theestablishment of camps for and in advance of the formation of the labor con-struction groups. In addition, the technical staff could assist in thedetailed advance planning of the work program for each construction group.

4.19 After the setting up of all the construction groups and individualgangs, the structure of the LCU, if still required, would probably need tobe reviewed. Some of its senior personnel might, for example, be transferredto form the nucleus of the organization that would be needed within theMinistry of Works and Communications to oversee and administer the works beingcarried out by the construction groups on roads.

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V. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE LONG TERM

A. Introduction

5.01 Lesotho's long-term economic development, particularly with respectto domestic employment creation, has to be considered in the context of thepull of the South African labor market. If this pull continues as strong asit was in the last decade and no appropriate counter-action were taken, the"bleeding" of labor referred to in Chapter I would continue. As was statedin para. 1.27, if the past trend were to continue, the anomalous situationwould arise that, by 1985, almost every male Basotho worker would be employedoutside of his own country.

5.02 As mentioned earlier (para. 1.25), indications are that for thenext several years at least, the pull of the South African labor market islikely to remain strong. Therefore, apart from the possibility of emerg-encies--with which the Mission has dealt in the earlier parts of thisreport--there is little reason to fear that, in the near future, Lesothowill face severe unemployment problems. To the contrary, the major problemmay well be a continuing increase in dependence on employment abroad, and aresulting further depletion of labor from the farms. In the longer run,however' as measures in the South African mines to reduce the dependence onforeign labor startvtiking effect, the prospects for Lesotho migrant laborappear not so bright (para. 1.26). In either case, the Government rightlyconsiders it a matter of life and death to the nation to accelerate thecreation of productive employment opportunities within its own borders to the,maximum extent possible. There is undoubtedly scope for this, in the Mission'sview, but particularly over the long haul, there are also limitations andconstraints.

5.03 One general constraint relates to the difference in wage levels inSouth Africa and levels of earnings that can be expected in Lesotho. In devel-opment projects, in particular in the important agricultural sector, it willinitially be difficult to offer prospects of earnings that are as high aswages that can be obtained in South Africa. Also, in order not to endangerthe competitiveness of labor-intensive industries to be attracted, wages inLesotho can probably not be allowed to rise to South African levels. TheGovernment might wish to consider the use of general policy tools to bringabout a change in the relative renumberation for work in Lesotho as comparedto that for work in South Africa. This could take the form of a migrationtax or an income tax on wages earned in South Africa. The revenues of sucha tax could then be used to help finance employment generating Governmentprojects (such as labor-intensive public works) or, for instance, to providespecial incentives to new private industrial and other enterprises directlyrelated to the number of laborers employed, or even for a direct wage subsidy.

5.04 Agriculture is the sector which has the greatest potential to absorbadditional Basotho in productive activities, thus at the same time creating amuch stronger internal economic basis to fall back on in times of crisis. Asexplained in detail in section B of this Chapter, to realize this potential, a

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determined effort must be made to complete within the next 10 to 15 yearsthe soil conservation program--combined with appropriate land use, crop andlivestock management--which is now beginning to get under way. The road willthen be open, provided the necessary research, experimentation and marketexploration is done in time, for the large-scale production of labor intensivecash crops without endangering the production of adequate supplies of basicfoodstuffs. The latter should increase rapidly as the simple productivity-increasing methods which are now being applied for the first time on a re-latively wide scale in the Thaba Bosiu project are disseminated over theentire nation. Farming would then be able to absorb gradually up to perhaps50 per cent (say some 100,000 people) more Basotho--in reasonably profitableactivities--than it does now and could thus make an important contributionto achieving a relative decline in Lesotho's dependence on employment in theR.S.A.

5.05 In the intervening years--i.e., before intensification of agricultureon a wide scale--chances to achieve a deliberate decrease in employment de-pendence on the R.S.A. are less good. As indicated earlier, the pull of theSouth African labor market could well continue to be strong for the nextseveral years. Also, the possibility of increasing productive employmentopportunites in manufacturing (including small-scale business) and tourism islimited, particularly in the short and medium term. Attempts to develop thecountry's natural resources--which, apart from water appear to be scarce--arenot likely to help much either. Nevertheless, as discussed in sections C andD of this Chapter, assuming effective promotional and supporting services, itmay be possible within the next decade to create perhaps 25,000-30,000 newopenings for Basotho labor in manufacturing, mining, tourism and ancillaryservices. This would amount to some 25 per cent of the natural increase inthe labor force between now and 1984, and would be an enormous improvementover recent years when, on the average, only 400-500 places opened up annuallyin the above-mentioned sectors.

5.06 In addition, there is a good possibility that, in the longer run, itmay prove economically feasible to adopt as a general policy the use of labor-intensive construction methods in certain public works. If this possibilityis confirmed, then there might well be continuous work for an extra 5,000 to10,000 Basotho within their own country.

5.07 Looking beyond the agricultural intensification process referred toin paragraph 5.04, Lesotho's fundamental employment problem is likely to re-emerge. It may even become more severe because mechanization in South Africanmines might well by then have progressed so far that South Africa's need forimporting labor from abroad would actually decline. The only way to meet thisfuture challenge satisfactorily, in the Mission's view, is to start an effectivefamily planning program, now. By its very nature, the results of such a programwould take at least 15 years before they are felt in terms of a decline in thenumber of additional people seeking employment. Any delays in taking actionnow therefore inevitably make the problems of the future more difficult tosolve.

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5.08 The terms of reference of the Mission were not aimed at providingassistance to Lesotho in the preparation of its next development plan, norwas the composition of the Mission and the time it had available suited toproviding the Government with a blueprint--in terms of concrete investmentprojects, their relative priorities and their costs--of the program whichthe Mission believes Lesotho should implement in order to provide, in thelong run, maximum productive and lasting domestic employment opportunities,and more generally, to reduce the degree of dependence on the South Africanlabor market. However, the Mission did attempt to review the generalstrategy which it believes Lesotho could best follow in order to achieve thisaim. The next sections of this chapter contain some details of the Mission'sthinking in this regard.

B. Agriculture

1. Soil Conservation

5.09 In Lesotho today, agricultural production (as distinct from the con-struction of agricultural and rural infrastructure) offers little opportunityfor absorption of additional labor. Productivity has declined as agriculturestruggles under serious handicaps including unfavorable terrain, uncertain andoften inadequate rainfall, low winter temperatures, some highly erodable soilsand increasing population pressure on the relatively poor land resource.These adverse factors have been compounded by a history of inadequate tillageand uncontrolled grazing which has led to depletion of soil fertility and wide-spread erosion.

5.10 Massive attempts have been made since the 1930's to control theerosion problem but they have not succeeded because a narrow engineeringapproach was taken which did not correct the fundamental causes of erosion--faulty land use, destructive cropping practices and overgrazing. It is,however, now widely recognized in Lesotho that conservation works must beaccompanied by changes in land use and management which can only be achievedby the enlightenment and cooperation of the farmers themselves.

5.11 This better understanding of the nature and control of soil erosionis fairly recent and is not confined to technical and administrative levels.The farming community, from the Chiefs down to the farmers, are becoming betterinformed and more receptive to the advice of extension and soil conservationofficers. Starting with the Leribe project in 1970, officers of the variouson-going projects are finding that Chiefs and farmers are prepared to givesatisfactory undertakings to make changes in land use and crop and livestockmanagement which will ensure the success of conservation schemes. This turn-about situation fully warrants a major expansion in soil conservation measures.The proper installation of conservation works will not only arrest decliningproductivity and soil loss, it will increase the retention of rainfall and

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soil moisture, particularly on arable lands. This, in association with appro-priate changes in land use, together with improvements in cultivation tech-niques and increased use of fertilizer, better seed and other inputs, whichare already resulting from the operations of the three projects, will mate-rially increase productivity and employment opportunities in agriculture.

5.12 Good progress is now being made and conservation works for more than150,000 acres of arable land would be completed by about 1978 if the on-goingprojects are executed at the rate considered feasible in Chapter III. Thisrepresents about one sixth of all arable land in the country. Sufficient con-servation and extension staff could be trained to permit this rate of executionto be doubled in follow-up projects, so long as financing (and labor) could beobtained. This would protect half of the arable land by about 1982. It wouldbe unrealistic to speculate concerning the rate of completion of the remaining50 per cent of arable land except that it should be possible for the rate tobe further increased. The added burden of the budget of the Ministry of Agri-culture (MOA) and technical staff to ensure the subsequent proper maintenanceand use of the completed conservation works should not be inordinate. Basedon the Khomokhoana project estimates, proper maintenance of the conservationsystems for the first 150,000 acres of arable land would require about 40 addi-tional assistant level officers and a budgetary provision of about R100,000(Appendix IX, para 19).

5.13 Erosion control in the mountainous grazing areas is equally importantbut has not been examined by the Mission because conservation measures aremainly through grazing control and with the possible exception of erectingstone wall fences, are not labor intensive. General conservation plans forthe pastoral areas should later be developed from the results of the proposedThaba Tseka project.

5.14 The Mission made no attempt to prepare a follow-up conservationprogram but was pleased to note that action in this direction is planned forthe near future by each of the three major on-going projects. The Missionrecommends that the following principles be kept in mind in preparation offollow up projects:

(a) On-going projects should be treated as nuclei from whereproject activities are spread into neighboring areas, wherefarmers should already be aware of and receptive to projectproposals.

(b) The follow-up orjects should continue with the integratedapproach, as successfully developed at Leribe and appliedso effectively at Thaba Bosiu. For example, extensionservices, field demonstrations, supply of inputs and otherfarmer services should be spread widely and rapidly andwell ahead of the more complex elements. These includechief and farmer agreement to changes in land use andmanagement which must precede soil conservation works,and introduction of intensive cash crops.

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(c) The concentration and coordination of trained manpower andother resources required for the integrated activitiespredicates a region by region rather than a nation-wideapproach. Regional development projects should continue tobe prepared. Inclusion of essential social infrastructurecould be considered.

(d) It may be desirable to treat some of the on-going MOA con-servation projects as nuclei from which further regionalprojects could be prepared, in addition to the Thaba Bosiu,Khomokhoana and Senqu River projects.

(e) The complexities of project operations and activitiesrequire full-time and adequately empowered and authorizedon-the-spot management. -The projects could not be effec-tively managed from Maseru, but should rely heavily on CDand other Divisions for guidance and assistance.

(f) An appropriate organization and management for thefollow-up regional development projects could be:

One Project Authority, established at high level alongthe lines of that for the Thaba Bosiu project, shouldbe responsible for direction and execution of all theprojects. It should determine policies and ensurecoordination of the-various ministries involved. Itshould meet at quarterly intervals and delegate re-sponsibility for day to day management, and approvalof normal expenditures, to the Project Managers throughthe Permanent Secretary of MOA.

The Project Managers should be responsible directly tothe Permanent Secretary, MOA. The Permanent Secretarywould be assisted, on project matters, by a TechnicalCommittee under his chairmanship and consisting of thechiefs of the Divisions of Soil Conservation, Crops,Livestock and Cooperatives and the Project Managers.

The Divisions would cooperate in the projects and secondstaff to work under the Project Managers. District levelstaff would also be allocated to the project. The localDistrict Development Committee would collaborate with theproject in an advisory but not executive capacity.

5.15 It is important that early action be taken towards study and prepara-tion of these follow-up projects for consideration for financing. The firststep should be to draw up detailed guidelines for this project preparationwork so that a start can be made by project staff to collect and prepare the

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data that will be required. The Thaba Bosiu project manager has requestedhelp from IDA for this purpose. The Senqu River project manager told theMission that a similar request for early assistance had been made. The in-tentions of the Khomokhoana project in this regard are not known to the Mission.

2. Irrigation

5.16 Reconnaissance level survey in 1972 by Binnie & Partners indicateda potential for irrigation of some 41,000 acres. This area of irrigation couldadd importantly to the volume and diversity of agricultural production but itsdevelopment is far from certain.

5.17 Fed from Lesotho's mountains, the annual runoff is about four billioncubic meters. Less than 20 per cent of this flows through the western low-lands where dry season flow is low and storage is required for major develop-ment. In the southern river systems, there is more perennial water thansuitable land. About 900 acres are now irrigated in relatively small dispersedschemes pumping from run-of-the-river and using sprinkler irrigation. Construc-tion has not included land levelling or canals and is not labor intensive.Diversion ditches to protect from up-slope run-off are handled as conservationworks. Capital costs average about R200 per acre or US$750 per hectare.

5.18 There is no irrigation engineer in Lesotho although one Mosotho isbeing trained abroad. There are two irrigation supervisors and an assistantin the field with some technical training, and six others are receiving in-service training at Maseru research station, where there is very little appliedresearch into irrigation. The initiative for irrigation development is cur-rently mainly under the Senqu River project, and formerly, the Leribe project.

5.19 When a scheme is developed, the previous dry-land holders are or-ganized into a Farmers' Association. The land is worked as one unit, underan outside manager, with net proceeds shared between the farmer members,usually according to their land holding. There are many problems, includingfaulty design criteria and watering practices, low yields and inappropriatecropping patterns, which may be improved from applied research to be under-taken by Senqu River project. Operating costs are thought to average aboutR 85 per acre (US$320/ha) so that an intensive high return cropping patternis essential. A special problem here is shortage of labor. The labor forcesufficient for the land under dry-farming cannot handle the much more inten-sive irrigation cropping and farmers are very reluctant to hire outside labor.

5.20 Two much larger projects have been proposed. The only informationwhich the Mission could obtain on the Phuthiatsana project was a report datedMarch 1974. On this basis, the project was neither technically nor economicallyjustified. However, the Mission was told that the report is now being revised.It would appear wise for an independent review to be made by an experienced ir-rigation firm before any decision to proceed with final design and construction.

5.21 The Mission was told that material prepared on the proposed Tsakholoirrigation project was far from feasibility standard. This project would irri-gate about 3,000 acres and the small dam involved would also provide water for

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the third and fourth phases of the Tsakholo fish farming project (Annex 7).All information available should be reviewed to decide whether a feasibilitystudy by a qualified firm would be warranted.

5.22 The Mission feels that irrigation holds considerable potential forlabor absorption but that an ad hoc and uncoordinated approach is being takento its development. It is, therefore, recommended that a special section beestablished within MOA with responsibility to the Permanent Secretary for irri-gation development. It should have professional staff including an irrigationengineer, and technical staff fot field supervision and scheme management.Its duties should include formulation of irrigation policies and programs andgeneral administration of irrigation development, giving special attention toapplied research and training, and including legislation and regulations andcoordination of the work of other bodies in irrigation. It should work closelywith the MOA and Central Planning units.

5.23 The Mission also recommends that a change be made in the size of landholdings, before the transition is made with public funds from dry farming toirrigation farming. If properly managed, half or less of a farm area shouldgive a more than equivalent return under irrigation to that for the full holdingwhen dry-farmed with an irregular 25-30 inches of rainfall. Labor requirementsshould also be more than doubled if proper cropping patterns are followed andthe proposed change would double the labor force available for irrigation.The appropriate relationship between dry farming and irrigation farm sizeshould be further studied, perhaps by the Senqu River project. Meanwhile, thetwo to one ratio is conservative and could be followed in discussions withchiefs and farmers before new irrigation schemes proceed.

3. Crop Intensification

5.24 Some S%000 feet and more of elevation gives Lesotho an essentiallytemperate climate very close to the tropics. This widens opportunities fordiversification into intensive temperate crops to serve not far-distant marketsat lower altitudes or latitudes.

5.25 The staple crops grown are maize and sorghum (for subsistence) andwheat, peas and beans in order of area and production. Yields have beenseriously declining over the past 20 years and Lesotho is now a net importerof grains, especially maize. Measures taken under the on-going projects areincreasing yields and reversing the declining fertilit5y trends. At the sametime a great deal of attention is being given by the MOA and Project staffsto trials and demonstration of the possibilities for introduction of moreintensive and higher return cash drops.

5.26 A wide range of new crops for both dry farming and irrigation areat various stages of experimentation, demonstration and pilot or commercialscale development. Amiong the field crops,- improved varieties of maize andsorghum are important in increasing yields so that land can be released fromsubsistence to cahs crops. Higher yielding varieties of white haricot beans,

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the main existing cash crop, are being introduced. Potatoes are expandingrapidly and some 120 tons recently realized good prices at Bloemfontein. Seedpotatoes grown at higher altitudes command special markets in Zambia and SouthAfrica. Asparagus is being successfully grown and processed in nearby SouthAfrica and the Thaba Bosiu project is experimenting with 6 acres grown byfarmers. If successful, the plantings will be increased to 105 acres and asmall cannery will be constructed. Some 500 acres of neighboring land havebeen assessed as suitable. Sunflowers and soybeans are being successfullygrown, often under irrigation. Numerous fodder crops grow well and their usewill be multiplied under soil conservation agreements with farmers for changesin land-use and exclusion of land under fodder crops from communal grazing.The more distant development of integrated cropping and livestock farming willrely even more on fodder for intensive systems of dairying or fattening.

5.27 Intensive horticultural crops have an equally wide range but aremore vulnerable to hail damage and will require insurance coverage. Tree cropsare in a special category in combining production with erosion control. Trialsof plantings on otherwise good land too steep for seasonal cultivation areexpected to be successful. Peaches (and apricots) thrive and spread naturally.Except for about 50,000 trees, the 800,000 odd trees enumerated in the 1970Census are too dispersed to be handled as an orchard crop. The quality of thefruit is poor and commands no marked except for local consumption. Improvedvarieties are being introduced but markets will have to be developed. Cherriesalso appear to thrive and five acres have been planted. There appears to bea market for fresh cherries in South Africa and there are also fruit processingplants within 60 miles. Apples and pears grow well and seem likely to havea marketing advantage in supplying a limited but growing demand in some Africantropical countries which now import requirements from Australia and Canada.Virus free varieties of strawberries and Young-berries grow excellently but,once again, fresh fruit or processing markets must be found. Vines grow verywell for table grapes. Except for cabbages, very few vegetables are grown inrural areas. The ready sale in the nearby village of mixed vegetables grownunder a Chinese technical assistance mission suggests that techniques ofproduction should be disseminated to other irrigation farms.

5.28 Technically sound opportunities for diversification into more inten-sive crops are ample and will continue to increase. The fact that additionalproduction will be over and above subsistence needs and will yield cash incomeshould motivate farmer participation. However, a number of factors will in-fluence the rate of intensification. One of these is the farm labor supply.The Mission expected to find that able bodied men between 18 and 45 were mainlyabsent from farms but was surprised to be told so frequently of criticalshortages of labor. This applied inter alia to on-farm labor for tasks asso-ciated with crop intensification. The women and older men who constitute thefarm work force are less capable of sustained physical effort and have othertasks to perform (child care, etc.). There is thus a tendency to confine thecrops to those requiring little labor. On the other hand, it appears thatcredit is not a serious constraint to intensification and that farmers aregenerally willing to accept some additional expense if prospects are shown tobe good. This may well be because cash remittances from family members inSouth Africa give a margin of safety against risks inherent in a break withtraditional practice.

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5.29 In the absence of any major change in the Basotho employment situa-tion in South Africa, farm labor shortage is likely to retard intensification.The rate of progress will be determined by the success of extension anddemonstration in persuading farmers to grow new cash crops and, throughprospects of cash income, persuading young men to remain on the farm despitethe pull of the South African labor market. Agriculture is the only sectorwith major production and employment potential, but intensive cash crops willonly be grown when the farmers are convinced that production will be suffi-ciently profitable. Under these circumstances there is no place for hastycampaigns to promote this or that crop without adequate assurance that theincreased production can be marketed at remunerative prices. Markets, ratherthan technically sound opportunities, usually set the limits to profitableproduction of new intensive cash crops. This holds particularly for Lesothowhere the sale of produce beyond domestic needs is almost totally dependenton a single market, that of South Africa.

5.30 Marketing arrangement have hitherto been mainly in the hands ofsome 200 private traders. Some produce is bulked before resale to Frasers(an official agents of various South African marketing boards with depots inmany parts of Lesotho) or direct to buyers in South Africa. Most traders dealalso in consumer supplies, often sold on credit which can easily lead toexploitation of farmers.

5.31 The only alternative to these private channels has been Coop Lesotho,originally conceived as a union of primary cooperatives but, in fact, operatingas a government trading body staffed by civil servants. It supplies inputsand markets agricultural produce for cooperatives and individual farmers and^credit to some cooperatives. However, it has insufficient field depots (about20), transport, staff and expertise to have had much impact on marketing.Consequently, the development projects, particularly Thaba Bosiu, have estab-lished special marketing facilities which are operated under project managementas agents for Coop Lesotho. Purchase prices and channels are decided in con-sultation. Eventually the facilities should be handed over to Coop Lesotho.

5.32 The general position changed early in 1974 when the Produce MarketingCorporation (PMC) was established with wide powers over marketing and trade. 1/It will clearly be many years before PMC, even with Coop Lesotho as agent,will have the facilities and commercial experience to handle the volume of thecrops now marketed and it may anyhow be better not to take over fully the func-tions of the private traders, but to exercise overall control over them andencourage them to act as agents of PMC as well. Recent regulations indicatethat PMC will indeed tighten up licensing and supervision of existing tradersto ensure their compliance with pricing and other policies. In addition, itmight well consider a more direct role in the development and operation ofmarkets for new cash crops which are not covered under existing marketingarrangements in South Africa. Recruitment of some specially experienced staffwould be necessary for this purpose.

1/ The Lesotho Farmers Livestock Marketing Corporation was established in1972 to handle livestock marketing.

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5.33 All produce from Lesotho is at present marketed in South Africa

either for internal consumption or re-export. The produce enters withoutquotas or tariffs. The relatively small volume makes little impact on the

supply-demand situation and Lesotho benefits from the pricing mechanisms setup by South Africa for maize, wheat, potatoes, dry beans, oilseeds and otherproducts, and from South Africa's export network, particularly for wool andmohair. On the other hand, Lesotho produces virtually the same products asthe surrounding areas of South Africa so that it is important to avoid asituation in which Lesotho's additional production of a specific product wouldtend to create an overall excess supply situation. This is another reasonwhy prospects should be actively pursued for opening markets for temperatefruits and similar products in nearby African countries where Lesotho goodsshould be welcome politically.

5.34 The preceding brief review of some aspects of the marketing situation

has been given to emphasize the Mission's view of the importance of marketsand marketing to the development of new cash crops. The Mission was impressedwith the attention being given, particularly by MOA horticultural staff, theMaseru Research Station and by development projects staff to the technicalpossibilities and problems of development of intensive cash crops. It notedthat interest wws expressed in marketing possibilities, but that the informa-

tion available was inadequate and superficial because of too few staff workingon marketing. It also gained the impression that a disjointed approach wasbeing taken and that there was insufficient contact between the techniciansthemselves and between technicians and market economists.

5.35 It is recommended that a special Crop Intensification Group or Task-Force be established to review existing work in this field; establish policiesand priorities; coordinate technical and marketing studies; and initiatestudies in depth of market prospects and marketing mechanisms for selectedcrops. The Task Force should be chaired by the Chief of MOA Crops Divisionand include representatives of other Divisions, the MOA and Central Planningunits, the Maseru Research Farm, Mlanagers of the three development projectsand representatives of PMC and Coop Lesotho. Mfeans should he found also toobtain the active collaboration of an exnert on marketing in South Africa.

5.36 Although the scope is wide, it would be unrealistic to attempt toput precise numbers on future labor absorptive capacity through intensificationof agricultural production. Apart from the many variables, the question of

labor absorption cannot be divorced from that of nrofitability. Policy shouldbe directed towards making farming more profitable, rather than encouragingcertain crops because they are labor intensive. Often the two aims will

coincide. But a prosperous agriculture comes first and increased labor inten-sity will automatically follow. Under reasonably favorable conditions, an

increase of about 50 percent in labcr absorptive capacity is in the realmof what can be expected, say 15 years hence.

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C. Industry and Tourism

5.37 The industrial sector, including manufacturing industry, handicraftsand other small-scale business, together with tourism, rank second to agri-culture as a base for providing long-term productive employment opportunities.

5.38 The Mission lacked the time and expertise for any independent in-depth study of the potential of this sector, the constraints to its development,the policies to overcome these constraints, and the investments which would beinvolved. However, as mentioned in Chapter I, the Government made availableto it two recent studies covering the whole field--namely a first draft of aSIDA-financed study by a Scandinavian team of consultants on "Lesotho, IncreasingManufacturing Output, Exports and Employment" and another study, in final form,financed by the Commonwealth Fund for Technical Cooperation and undertaken byAssociated Research Consultants Ltd., called "Development Plan for Tourism forKingdom of Lesotho". Both studies provide a comprehensive picture of thepresent situation, development targets for the future and what should be donein order to achieve these targets.

5.39 As pointed out in the recent IBRD economic report on Lesotho (No. 331aLSO) the industrial sector in Lesotho is still very small. Excluding tourism,it contributes only some 2 1/2 to 3 per cent to the total GDP and employsbetween 1,500 and 2,000 persons. From that viewpoint, there certainly is scopefor considerable expansion in the years ahead. However, such expansion in acountry which is seriously lacking in industrial raw materials and which hasno industrial tradition of its own, does not come by itself. Without dynamicindustrialization policies and effective institutions to implement them,Lesotho's industrial development may well, in the words which Prime MinisterJonathan used for the Lesotho economy as a whole (Introduction to Lesotho'sFirst Five-Year Development Plan) "remain insulated from the mainstream ofSouth African economic events" thus making the country more and more "a reser-voir of cheap labor for South Africa--with little hope of creating an indi-genous base for economic development."

5.40 In the medium term, small-scale business and handicraft developmentmay offer the least costly--in terms of investment per person employed--andquickest way to provide additional employment for Basotho labor within thecountry itself. However, looking ahead further, the more lasting push towardproviding Lesotho with an industrial base of its own will have to come frommedium and large-scale manufacturing industries. In order to achieve a firstbreak-through here, attitudes will have to be shaped and measures will haveto be taken aimed at making it attractive to foreign--i.e. primarily SouthAfrican--enterprise to establish itself or to expand within Lesotho's borders.This is so because, as a rule, only foreign enterprise will have the entre-preneurial skills, the technical know-how, the labor training facilities andthe market knowledge required to make a success of new industries which,because of the very limited domestic market, would have to serve primarilymarkets outside Lesotho itself. For this purpose, Government needs to createor reactivate an active promotional program. This program would have to in-clude a wage policy aimed at keeping Lesotho wages fully competitive, a minimum

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of governmental regulatory action with regard to foreign enterprise, a maximumof effective help in dealing with such regulations as do exist, the availabilityof adequate financing facilities, both in the form of participation (LNDC) andloans (LDB, if suitably organized) and the right type of fiscal and otherincentives. A package of this type might well meet with good results in thelonger run, provided it is implemented in the right organizational frameworkand under strong, competent and imaginative leadership. The projections inthe SIDA-financed study on the future development of the manufacturing industryas a whole are perhaps somewhat ambitious--the study itself concedes thatrealization of its targets may well take ten years instead of the five to sixyears on which it bases its suggested development program. However, if theright policy is pursued the targets for "foreign much labor requiring industries"(R30 million--the major part of which would of course come from abroad, so thatthere would be no heavy drain on Lesotho's scarce resources--leading to theemployment of 3,000 people) might well prove to be on the modest side.

5.41 Presumably, Basotho private enterprise would originally be mostinterested in those investments which would be primarily directed to serve thedomestic market such as building materials, furniture, etc. The SIDA studysuggests that it may be necessary to start this type of domestically orientedindustrialization within the public sphere, presumably in part because it isfeared that not enough Basotho private enteprepeurs will initially be forth-coming. This may well be so, but the Mission would suggest that the Governmentproceed cautiously in this area. The idea of starting manufacturing industriesin the public sector--even if modified, as is done in the SIDA studies, by therecommendation that groups of related projects should be formed which wouldinitially be run by foreign-hired business executives--only seems to make sensein a country like Lesotho which already is desperately short of staff to runthe normal government administration if it has first been clearly demonstratedthat private entrepreneurs (whether foreign or domestic) are unable or un-willing to do the job and undertake the risks thereof.

5.42 As to small-scale business, past attempts--often made in a hesitantand dispersed manner--to bring about a quicker pace of development have metwith little success. The Mission agrees with the SIDA report that what isneeded here is a concentrated approach to provide the necessary managerialand technical assistance and, where necessary, the required infra-structuralsupport. The Basotho Enterprises Development Corporation (BEDCO) appears topresent the right type of organizational framework for providing such a com-bination of extension and credit facilities to the small man. Whether thisnew institution, at the broad policy level, should retain some connection withthe LNDC could perhaps be a matter of further consideration; but certainlyas far as its day-to-day operations are concerned, it should be fully inde-pendent.

5.43 It is impossible to predict whether indeed the activities of aneffective BEDCO would lead, as suggested in the SIDA report, within the nextfive to ten years to the establishment of 85 new small-scale manufacturers inthe modern sector and to the support and protection of an additional 1,000small entrepreneurs in the traditional sector (outside of handicrafts) at an

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overall investment cost of some R7.6 million and giving employment or retainingemployment for about 4,400 people. In the Mission's view, quantitative projec-tions of this kind are relatively unimportant at this stage. What is essentialis that BEDCO be properly organized, obtain good leadership, and get to workat the shortest possible notice.

5.44 With regard to handicraft, the SIDA report's idea that a separateentity (presumably a semi-public one) be set up to deal especially with thepromotional and marketing aspects of the business, including design develop-ment and design standards, seems to merit serious consideration. Again, con-centration of efforts which too often were dispersed in the past, within asound organizational framework and under good leadership seems the indicatedway to tackle the development problems in this area.

5.45 Tourism, much like manufacturing industry, as the study by AssociatedResearch Consultants Ltd. states, fs not a particularly labor intensive under-taking. Even if the total program suggested by the Consultants, requiring aninvestment of R20 million for the six-year period 1975 to 1980, were fullyexecuted, direct employment opportunities would only increase by about 2,000places. This compares to a present employment in the tourist industry ofbetween 500 and 600 people.

5.46 The recommended investment of R20 million would be sufficient forthe construction of 2,750 new beds bringing the total number of beds availableup to 3,500 in the early 1980's, assuming the scrapping of 250 old beds inthe intervening period. This compares to the availability of 1,000 beds in1975 when the projects now in the pipeline will have been completed and assumesan increase in the number of visitors from 75,000 in 1973 to 200,000 by 1981and an increase in the average length of their stay from 2.5 to 4 days. Theseare clearly ambitious targets and while the Consultants' report appears to bethe product of thorough study and sound analysis, the Mission feels that theexecution of the recommended program may well take longer than was foreseenby the Consultants.

5.47 The recommendations of the Consultants with respect to organizationaland institutional matters at first sight appear to be well conceived but theMission lacks the expertise and the insight in the specific problems of thetourist industry in Lesotho to comment on them in any detail.

D. Other Sectors

5.48 The extend to which job opportunities may increase in private sectorservices (commerce, crafts, professional services, etc.) depends primarily onwhat will happen to agriculture and manufacturing industry although the addi-tional incomes created by an expanding government administration and possiblehigher remittances from abroad also play a role, of course. As stated inprevious sections, the Mission in the long run has high hopes for the creation

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of more work and higher incomes on Lesotho's farms. It also thinks it possi-ble that an initial breakthrough in the development of manufacturing industrymay occur within the next decade. However, during that time period there willnot yet be much effect on incomes. It therefore seems prudent to base tenta-tive projections on the absorptive capacity for additional labor by the ser-vices sector for the period 1974 to 1984 on the careful calculations made inthe latest IBRD Economic Report on Lesotho (Report No. 331a LSO of June 25,1974--see particularly paragraphs 187 and 188) with perhaps some accelerationtoward the end. This would mean that starting from a level of 10,500 in 1974about 17,500 people might be employed in private services by 1984.

5.49 The development of new employment opportunities in the constructionsector depends to a large extent on the rate of increase in investment whichcould well be quite high in Lesotho in the coming years. The IBRD EconomicReport just referred to (see, for example, paragraph 81) indicates that govern-ment development expenditures in real terms might almost quadruple as comparedto recent levels and investment in manufacturing industry, particularly foreigninvestment, as well as in tourism is also likely to rise. It seems thereforereasonable to expect over the next ten years that total employment in construc-tion (including public utilities) may well go up from 1,000 to 3,000 persons.

5.50 With regard to government services the Mission sees no reason todepart from the assumption made in the recent IBRD Economic Report that theywill be growing in the years ahead at the rate of about six percent per year.This would increase the total number of people in government services fromabout 8,000 in 1974 to some 13,000 by 1984.

5.51 Similarly, the Mission has nothing substantive to add to what theIBRD Report states about the development of the mining industry (paragraphs118 to 122). On the basis of present knowledge, prospects in this field arevery limited. For the next several years the only immediate possibility foradditional employment is in the diamond mine now being established by Anglo-deBeers at Letseng-la-Terai which would employ almost 500 people. The Missiondid not receive any further news either with regard to the exploration ofLesotho's water resources (paragraphs 123 to 128 of the recent Bank Report)other than that even if construction of the Malibamatso project would even-tually be agreed upon the work on it is not likely to start before some timein the 1980's.

5.52 In summary, and including a somewhat optimistic assumption on whatthe manufacturing industry--including small scale busiAess and handicrafts--may be able to absorb in terms of additional workers between 1974 and 1984,the following picture emerges:

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1974 1984 IncreaseSector (persons) (persons) (persons)

Manufacturing 2,250 12,250 10,000Mining -- 500 500Construction and publicutilities 1,000 3,000 2,000

Tourism 600 2,700 2,100Government services 7,500 13,000 5,500Other services 10,500 17,500 7,000

21,850 48,950 27,100

This tentative projection would mean that over the next decade the Lesotholabor market itself may absorb some 25 percent of the total expected increaseof the labor force, assuming that the latter will grow as fast as the popula-tion.

5.53 As stated earlier (paragraphs 3.18 and 3.29) preliminary calculationsshow that, provided sufficient planning, experimental and training work is donein advance an orderly shift from equipment-intensive to labor-intensive methodsin the construction of certain types of public works does not necessarilyresult in significantly higher construction costs. This in turn means thatit may make good economic and social sense for Lesotho to adopt the use oflabor-intensive construction methods in public works as a general policy inall those cases where the results-of the practical work of the Labor-IntensiveConstruction Unit confirm the initial cost comparisons made by the Mission.Of course, since the wage level of one Rand per day for casual labor on whichthese calculations are based is below that at which Basotho labor can now, asa rule, find work in the R.S.A., it will only be possible to introduce thispolicy gradually as domestic workers are willing to come forward. However,if the pull of the South African labor market were to slacken, the number ofBasotho workers willing to do so is bound to increase. Ultimately one canforesee a situation in which all public works in Lesotho lending themselvesto labor-intensive construction methods will be carried out in that manner.This will especially be the case if the prices of equipment in South Africawould continue to rise at a faster pace than wages generally.

E. Education and Training

5.54 In recent years the Government, aware of the crucial importance ofdeveloping Lesotho's system of education and training, in such a manner thatit will become increasingly responsive to the country's economic and socialneeds, has been very active in planning new strategies and policies in thisarea. With the help of several donors, various studies and surveys were under-taken including an assessment of future manpower requirements. This work cul-minated in an overall sector review by a UNESCO-ILO Education Policy andPlanning Mission in August 1973.

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5.55 All of this preparation work paved the way for an action programwhich is now in the early stages of implementation, again with the help ofseveral bilateral donors as well as with assistance from IDA and UNDP. Theprogram, as described in some detail in IDA Report No. 363a LSO "Appraisalof an Education Project in Lesotho" of June 14, 1974, includes major reformsand will lead to a massive expansion of Lesotho's training facilities, parti-cularly in vocational, technical, agricultural, commercial and adult education;it also aims at introducing pre-vocational agricultural and other practicalprograms into the secondary school curriculum together with non-formal train-ing programs for youths and adults.

5.56 Briefly summarizing the major projects in the program, first of allthe existing Lesotho Technical Institute (LTI) will be expanded from 120 to360 student places and significant additions are planned to its program ofinstruction. As an important feature in this expansion, LTI will be equippedand staffed to provide in addition to its normal training task for full-timestudents, in-service training to some 200 workers per year already in employ-ment. The newly to be established Lesotho Institute of Business and Adminis-tration (LIBA) will have room for 200 full-time students. LIBA will trainclerical, commercial and administrative staff for the civil service (40 per-cent) and for the private sector (60 percent) in such subjects as secretarialwork, bookkeeping, government administration, management, etc. The LesothoAgriculture Training College is being expanded from less than 100 to about 250student places--of certificate level. A National Teachers College is beingestablished with a total capacity of 550 places which would be additional tothe 300 places already available in a number of small mission colleges forprimary and secondary teachers. In six selected secondary schools a firststart will be made in introducing the teaching of practical subjects in theirprogram of instruction. The schools concerned will also be expanded from1,700 to 2,750 student places. Finally, a Lesotho National Extension Collegewill be developed which, it is planned, will reach 4,000 to 5,000 adults peryear after a three-year development period.

5.57 The Mission was impressed with the determination with which thiseducational program--which appears to be well conceived and to direct itselfto the right priorities--is being carried out. The investments and reformsinvolved will no doubt for the next several years place a heavy burden on theimplementation capacity of the Ministry of Education and of other institutionsinvolved. It would be unwise to add to this burden by suggesting additionalinvestments in training and education facilities at this stage. The presentprogram should first be given time to be completed. However, in the longerrun further expansion of and improvements in the education sector will nodoubt be needed. Even when the present program is fully executed the availa-bility of sufficiently trained Basotho workers will remain a serious bottle-neck. Table V.1 which is the result of joint efforts of an ODA Manpower Study,an ILO survey and more recent work by IBRD/IDA staff (and which was reproducedfrom Report 363a-LSO referred to above), shows that for virtually every cate-gory of middle level manpower a shortage is likely to exist by 1985. This

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shortage, which does not take account of any additional demands for Basothoskilled labor by the South African labor market, will be particularly pro-nounced in the field of skilled craftsmen which in turn emphasizes the impor-tance of the in-service training element which is now being built up in LTI.

5.58 There are only two additional comments which the Mission would liketo make. In the first place at the skilled craftsmen level there are a numberof technical and vocational training efforts undertaken in Lesotho in additionto the training provided by LTI. The facilities concerned are scattered overseveral agencies and private concerns without any coordination. As a conse-quence there are wide disparities between them in entry qualifications, struc-ture, content, duration of courses, standards of instructors and methods used,equipment and level of skill attained. The Mission understands that the Gov-ernment is in the process of appointing a Consultative Committee for LTI tomake recommendations on courses and to insure that courses are related toemployers' needs. The Mission suggests that consideration be given to havingthis Committee also review those areas of craftsmen training which fall outsidethe scope of LTI proper.

5.59 Secondly, the creation of the National Employment Service suggestedin Chapter II would offer an opportunity to give attention to vocational gui-dance and employment counselling along the lines perhaps of the system nowbeing worked out in Swaziland. There, the Mission understands, an organizationis being created which-will., among other tasks, provide vocational advice toschool leavers and job seekers, design and administer trade testing programsand offer employers and employees placement services. As the National Employ-ment Service in Lesotho proposed in Chapter II gains experience, it should be-feasible to include vocational guidance of this type among its tasks.

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Table V.1: MIDDLE LEVEL MANPOWER STOCK, REQUIREMENTS ANDSUPPLY, 1973-1985

Supply fromReplacement- Education/training

Stock Addi- ment of Attri- Institutions1973 tional Expatriates tion Total 1973-85

Technician 270 550 80 80 710 400

Craft 1,100 2,300 160 330 2,790 900

Agriculture(certificatelevel) 440 560 25 130 715 650

Business and admi-nistration 1,650 1,300 500 500 2,300 1,600

Teachers 3,300 1,600 200 1,100 2,900 2,500

Total 6,760 6,310 965 2,140 9,415 6,050

Source: Prepared by Bank staff on the basis of ODA manpower survey and ILOSurvey of major establishment. Rates of growth in employment byoccupational category are based on IBRD "Report on the Economy ofLesotho", 1973. Attrition rates assume an average working life of30 years. It is to be noted that the categories in which shortagesare expected to become more acute are those of technicians andindustrial workers; as institutional supply is expected to meetabout half of the total projected need of these categories, on-the-job training, strengthened by non-formal and evening courses, wouldhave to take up the slack.

F. Family Planning

5.60 The urgency of starting an effective nationwide family planningprogram in Lesotho has been emphasized in the introduction to this Chapter,but some elaboration may be useful.

5.61 As remarked earlier, in the long run--i.e., after the hoped-forintensification of agriculture has achieved its maximum effect in terms ofabsorbing additional farm labor--the Mission can see no realistic possibilityfor Lesotho to absorb net additions to the labor force of over 11,000 workers

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per year in manufacturing industry, various types of services, etc. Thenatural resources, the technical skills and entrepreneurial talents and the(private and public) investment funds necessary to achieve this target simplywill not be there. At an average investment of say R5,000 per worker (includ-ing the services sector) a yearly investment figure of around R55 million($82.5 million) would be required to provide work for 11,000 new laborerswhich is almost as much as Lesotho's present GNP. This compares to an esti-mated R5 million investment in fixed capital formation during 1971 (see Table4, page 17 of the Economic Report) and to annual government capital expendi-tures of some R3-4 million in recent years--which might increase, in realterms to an average annual R12 million over the next five years or so. Evenrecurrent government expenditures which amounted to around R16.5 million in1973-74 are expected to increase, in real terms to no more than about R21 mil-lion by 1980/81 (see paragraphs 73-85 of the Economic Report).

5.62 There normally are several well-intentioned international and bila-teral organizations prepared, often eager, to provide technical and financialhelp in the implementation of a family planning program. In order to avoiddispersion of effort, it is therefore important, from the very start, to seeto it that before specific activities financed by individual donors are begun,a well-integrated family planning program is set up first. Such a program--the formulation of which may well require assistance from an internationalagency thoroughly familiar with this work--may have to be linked in closelywith improved maternal and child health services. Once it is established,individual donors can then select from it those components in the financingof which they may have a special interest.

A'NINEX I

THE ECONOMY OF LESOTH 1/

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

The Economic Scene

i. The Kingdom of Lesotho is a small, over-populated country, surroundedby South Africa on all sides. It is very poor and desperately short of naturalresources. Traditional rural activities provide an important source of incomefor about 85 percent of the people. Not more than 13 percent of the countryis suited to crop cultivation; the rest is mountainous and suitable only forgrazing. Rapid population growth, deteriorating soil and declining agricul-tural yields have over the years led to a situation in which the country wasno longer able to provide enough food for its people. Many able-bodied menleft the land, but the only employment opportunities were in neighboringSouth Africa. At present an estimated 60 percent of the male labor forceare away as migrant workers in South Africa.

ii. Wages in South Africa, even those of unskilled workers, are muchhigher than prospects of agricultural earnings in Lesotho. The South Africanlabor market, therefore, has exerted a strong pull, which, conversely, hascontributed to the decline in agricultural productivity in Lesotho. Thestrong economic reasons for-working in South Africa are reinforced by socio-logical reasons. Working in South Africa, in particular working in the mines,has penetrated into Lesotho culture. Having been in the mines is now one ofthe ways in which a young Mosotho proves his manhood. However, the socialcost of migrant labor, i.e. disrupted family life, is undoubtedly high.

iii. Lesotho has acute soil erosion problems. About half of the cul-tivated areas and mountain pastures are affected in various degrees. TheGovernment has since long tried to stem erosion by constructing conservationworks, but these attempts were not tied in with any agricultural schemes.Bad farming practices continued, which caused serious further erosion. Onlyrecently, rural development projects have been developed which hold out hopethat what remains of Lesotho's soil can be saved.

iv. Apart from its soil, Lesotho has few other known natural resources.The only abundant natural asset, which is not being tapped yet,. is water in.the mountains. A feasibility study has been prepared for a project to exportlarge quantities of water to South Africa. The potential for irrigation hasnot been investigated comprehensively, but what studies there are suggest thatit is limited. Mining has so far been confined to some small-scale diamond.digging. A medium-size mine is about to be established. Another naturalasset which is still largely unexploited is Lesotho's beautiful mountainscenery. Consultants have prepared a report on the country's tourism po-tential.

1/ Summary and Conclusions from IBRD Report No. 331a-LSO, June 25, 1974,entitled "The Economy of Lesotho".

ANNEX IPage 2

v. Together with South Africa, Botswana and Swaziland, Lesotho belongsto the rand monetary area and the Southern African Customs Union. Movementof goods and funds within the area is virtually free. Lesotho has no centralbank of its own, and the South African rand circulates as legal tender. Thissituation has both advantages and disadvantages for Lesotho.

vi. The disadvantages of the arrangements are mainly that they severelylimit the set of policy instruments normally available to independent coun-tries. Although in theory the arrangements provide for consultation amongthe participating countries, in practice it has been South Africa who hasdetermined the policies related to foreign exchange, exchange rates, mone-tary matters, and levels of customs, excise and sales taxes. These policiesare generally determined in the light of South African economic conditions,and are not necessarily in the best interest of the three smaller countries.

vii. A potential advantage of the arrangements is the duty free accessthat Lesotho's industries have to a large market with great purchasing power.Lesotho, however, has not yet been able to benefit substantially from thissituation. There is a natural tendency towards polarization of industrialdevelopment in areas which are already industrially advanced, all of whichare in South Africa. What is more, existing administrative and cartel ar-rangements in South Africa have in spite of the principle of a free flow ofgoods acted as a deterrent to the establishment of large-scale industriesin Lesotho. Lesotho, together with Botswana and Swaziland, need to keepthe customs union arrangements and South African trading practices underconstant scrutiny in order to identify defects and take steps to protecttheir interests.

viii. Lesotho receives a proportion of the total customs and excise rev-enue of the whole customs area, which accounts for a substantial part of itsrecurrent revenue. Since the re-negotiation of the customs agreement in 1969,Lesotho has received a significant increase in its share, not only because ofthe new agreement itself but also because of better recording of imports thelevel of which determines Lesotho's share in the common customs and excisepool.

ix. Lesotho's economic ties to South Africa go far beyond the monetaryand customs arrangements. South Africa is Lesotho's main trading partner.South African companies and individuals dominate not only foreign trade, butalso internal wholesale and retail business. Also, South Africa has tradi-tionally provided employment to a large portion of Lesotho's labor force.Lesotho derives significant benefits from this in the torm of remittances,but, on the other hand, the fact that there is almost no permanent core ofmale labor hampers agricultural development.

Economic Trends

x. Economic indicators for Lesotho are scarce and unreliable. TheGovernment's own budget statistics are the only reliable information avail-able. Production statistics are virtually nonexistant. Whatever indicatorsthere are, however, all point to poverty and stagnation over a long period

ANNEX IPage 3

of time, reflecting the country's poor natural resources and lack of develop-ment in the past. The rural sector contributes about 60 percent of GDP. The

other productive sectors are all very small. Manufacturing, mining, construc-tion and public utilities together contribute probably not more than 5 percent

of GDP. Agricultural censuses held in 1950, 1960 and 1970 suggest a steadydecline in production over the last two decades. Manufacturing output is es-

timated to have tripled since 1967, but its contribution to GDP is still in-significant. Available statistics suggest that in real terms total GDP percapita has fallen slightly over the last decade or so, but this decrease has

been compensated by an increase in remittances from migrant workers. GNP per

capita, therefore, may have remained more or less stable at $100.

xi. The level of gross fixed investment is estimated to have remainedat some R5 million a year (about 10 percent of GDP) since independence. Abouthalf of this would have been investment by the Government and public enter-prises, and the rest represents investment bv private enterprises, missions,as well as investment in kind in the rural sector. A very large proportionof all fixed investment would have been in buildings (45%) and vehicles (40%)and only a very small proportion (12%) in plant, machinery and equipment. Most

public investment has been financed by foreign grants and soft loans.

xii. Because of the limited employment opportunities within Lesotho(total wage enmployment is estimated at just over 20,000), the Basotho have

for many years sought employment in South Africa. Recent estimates are that

about 175,000 men and 25,000 women are employed in South Africa on temporarycontracts. The number of Basotho working in South Africa has increased by

6 to 7 percent a year over the last decade. Total earnings of Basotho workersin South Africa may now amount to more than $60 million a year (more than

Lesotho's own GDP!), of which an estimated R15 million to $20 million is sent

to Lesotho in one way or another. The migrant labor force is thus of criti-cal economic significance for Lesotho.

xiii. At independence, the Government inherited from the British Adminis-tration a situation in which current expenditures were more than twice as

high as current revenue. Up to 1968/69, British grants-in-aid financed abouthalf of Lesotho's current budget. Since 1969/70, Lesotho has received greatly

increased revenue from the new customs agreement. The recurrent budget defi-cits decreased from about $6 million in 1968/69 to less than R2 million in1972/73, and in 1973/74 a surplus of R4 million is expected. The BritishGovernment-decreased its grants-in-aid correspondingly, and stopped them

altogether in 1973/74.

xiv. The sharp decrease in budget deficits was also partly the resultof a deliberate policy of Lesotho's Government to reduce the country's de-pendence on British budget support as quickly as possible. Since 1967/68,recurrent expenditures, which provide in most cases for only a minimallevel of services, have not been allowed to increase in real terms. The low

level of recurrent expenditures, however, has severly hampered the build-up

ANNEX IPage 4

of an adequate framework for planning and plan implementation, and is there-fore one of the reasons why government capital expenditure has remained ata low level of about R3 million a year. The availability of (mostly foreign)financial resources for the capital budget has not been a constraint.

Development Strategy and Future Prospects

xv. The idea of development planning is quite new to Lesotho. Shortlyafter independence in 1966, the Government established a Central Planning andDevelopment office, but owing to serious initial staffing problems it was notuntil 1971 that the Planning office was able to publish the First Five-YearDevelopment Plan 1970/71-1974/75 with the main objective to "lay the founda-tions for economic development and economic independence". The Plan's maindevelopment targets are as follows:

(a) to achieve a marked increase in productivity in the mainagricultural sector;

(b) to promote as far as possible non-agricultural productiveactivities, putting special emphasis on small-scale indi-genous industries;

(c) to prepare for the full exploitation of the country's waterand mineral resources;

(d) to accomplish a radical and government-controlled developmentin education and post-school training related to the needsfor economic and social advancement;

(e) to create 10,000-15,000 new employment opportunities, mainlyin non-agricultural activities.

xvi. In order to achieve these goals the plan proposed a R28.8 millionpublic sector capital expenditure program for the five-year period. Inaddition, the plan estimated that during the plan period about $25 millionwould be spent on the construction of the Malibamatso Water Export Project,and that the Lesotho National Development Corporation would spend some $3million from its own funds, mainly in the form of LNDC participation inforeign private industries to be attracted.

xvii. The emphasis the plan places on the development of productive re-sources is basically sound, but, given the tentative character of many pro-jects the investment targets and development goals were quite unrealistic.In the first three years of the plan, total government capital expendituresamounted to only 56 percent of the planned target, and remained at about thesame level as before the inception of the plan. Moreover, relatively morethan intended was spent on less productive government services and relativelyless on productive sectors. One reason for this distortion is that projectsin the government sector (office buildings, etc.) are easier to prepare andimplement than those in other sectors.

ANNEX IPage 5

xviii. It would be incorrect to state that the First Plan was too ambitiousin the sense that finance would not have been available. Although no budgetarysavings were anticipated over the plan period, there are strong indicationsthat foreign donors among them would have been willing to provide the neces-sary capital assistance, had there been a choice of projects ready for imple-mentation. Nevertheless, financial constraints have played a role in thatthe Government's constant worries about the availability of local funds fordevelopment projects and for development related recurrent expenditures, aswell as the total dependence on foreign capital aid, have clearly frustratedproject planning and implementation.

xix. Since the inception of the First Plan, the Government has madeencouraging progress with identifying investment opportunities. A number ofpre-investment studies have been undertaken, with the help of which it shouldbe possible to give the next plan a solid foundation. The most importantstudies that have been completed, ox are currently underway, include compre-hensive transportation and tourism surveys, an industrial survey, a tele-communications development plan, a reconnaissance study for the development ofelectric power, and comprehensive surveys for the exploration of mineral re-sources. In the agricultural sector, recent schemes -- some of which of apilot nature -- are providing useful technical, economic and sociologicalinformation, which will greatly enhance the preparation of future projects.Last, but not least, the Government is taking important steps to improve theeducation system so as to gear it to the country's development needs.

xx. In the past, the most serious constraint to development has been thecountry's low absorptive capacity. In the future, the substantially improvedbudgetary position should give the Government much more leeway in planning.Recurrent revenue is likely to increase from R21 million in 1973/74 to about$45 million in 1979/80. The Government should use most of this increase tobuild up its administrative framework for planning and plan implementation,by strengthening the central planning office, and the planning units in thevarious ministries and establishing institutions outside the immediateGovernment sphere, such as agricultural credit and marketing organizationsand the development corporation which is to cater to industrial and tourismdevelopment. More money, however, is not sufficient to provide better in-struments for planning and plan execution. Lesotho is critically short ofeducated, skilled and trained local manpower in all occupations and at alllevels. Developed of education, therefore, has high priority. But it willtake considerable time before adequately educated and trained manpower willbe available in sufficient numbers. In the meantime, there is an urgent needfor more technical assistance.. -

xxi. If the Government succeeds in overcoming the absorptive capacityconstraints, it could aim at a capital expenditure program of some R85 millionin the country's Second Five Year Development Plan (1975/76-1979/80). SomeR25 million local resources would be available (budget surpluses and localborrowing) and the rest -- R60 million -- is a realistic estimate of whatforeign donors among them would be willing to make available in the five-yearperiod. A capital investment program of this magnitude would imply an averageannual increase of some 30 percent in real terms over the present level ofcapital expenditures.

ANNEX IPage 6

xxii. In spite of the anticipated improvement in administrative capacityto prepare and implement development projects, the scarcity of natural resourcesand the difficult geographic position make economic prospects not particularlybright. Present and anticipated government programs in agriculture may leadto an increase in agricultural production of about 2.5 percent a year betweennow and the end of the decade. The employment effect of this, however, isnot likely to be great, as it will be difficult to provide prospects ofagricultural earnings that compare favorably with wages in South Africa.Nevertheless, agricultural development should have very high priority because(a) it is essential for erosion control, (b) it will in any case increasefamily incomes and provide better nutrition standards, and (c) it would securea better basis to fall back on should something go wrong with employmentopportunities abroad.

xxiii. Manufacturing industries and tourism offer the best employmentopportunities within the country, but growth of these sectors depends largelyon the readiness of foreign private enterprises to invest in Lesotho. TheGovernment itself is not planning any direct investment, but is relying onfavorable investment incentives and the activities of the Lesotho NationalDevelopment Corporation to attract foreign investors. Assuming that a diamondmine will be established in the near future, that industrial production con-tinues to grow at a rate of some 15% a year (the same as the estimated growthrate over the last three years), and assuming growth rates of 2.5 percent ayear for agricultural production, and 6 to 7 percent a year for the servicessector (including government administration), GDP in real terms may grow ata rate of some 5 percent a year between now and the end of the decade.

xxiv. Such growth rate, however, is not likely to create new employmentopportunities for more than about 12,000 persons by 1980, whereas Lesotho'slabor force may increase by almost 75,000 persons. In the foreseeablefuture a large part of the labor force will have to continue to find jobsabroad. In these circumstances the Government might wish to consider togive as much assistance to migrant workers as possible. A realistic emi-gration policy would not only imply "market research" into the most remuner-ative possibilities for migrant workers, but also provision of techncialtraining. Ideallv, the Government's education policy should therefore aimnot only at overcoming domestic manpower constraints, but also at improvingthe earning capacity of Lesotho's large migrant labor force.

ANNEX IIPage 1

THE CREATION OF EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES BY USINGMORE LABOR-INTENSIVE METHODS IN CIVIL WORKS

A. The Feasibility of Using More Labor-Intensive Methods

1. The study of the history of civil construction demonstrates thatvery large and complex projects were successfully completed by hand labor inthe days before the advent of construction equipment. It is undoubtedly tech-nically feasible to carry out the majority of activities in civil constructionby hand labor assisted by simple tools. There are only a few activities whichhave to be carried out by hand, and also only a few for which equipment is es-sential; most activities can be undertaken either by labor or equipment.

2. A typical construction project comprises a combination of these ac-tivities in varying amounts. Hence there is a wide range of possible combina-tions of labor and equipment with which it is technically possible to under-take construction work, ranging from fully labor-intensive methods with mini-mum equipment at one extreme to fully equipment intensive methods with mini-mum labor at the other.

3. In practice, the choice of an appropriate mixture of labor and equip-ment is governed by a number of economic and other constraints, which varyfrom country to country and from project to project. The constraint mostfrequently met is the need to minimize financial cost. The appropriate mixof labor and equipment is a function of relative factor prices (e.g. wagerates for labor, hire rates for equipment) and of relative productivities.Low wage rates and high equipment rates lead to a higher labor content inthe optimal mix. Similarly, if the productivity of labor can be increased,the optimal solution provides a higher labor content. However, for givenrelative factor prices and productivities, the use of more labor (or equip-ment) than the optimal must lead to higher financial costs.

4. In a situation where there is severe unemployment, the true socialcost of labor will usually be less than the going wage rate. In evaluatingprojects from a national point of view, it is justified in such a situationto use a "shadow price" for labor which is lower than the actual wage ratebeing paid. The level of the shadow price for labor is then determined bythe level of earnings that can be expected from alternative activities (op-portunity cost). In a case of unemployed.returned mine workers in Lesotho,virtually the only alternative those people have is to'return to their farmhouseholds and-add marginally to the productivity of their farms. The mar-ginal product of the farm, which is likely to be only a fraction of the goingwage rate in Lesotho(para. 1.38)should then be used to determine the economiccost and economic rate of return of a specific project. The optimal solutionin an economic sense will then lead to an increase in the proportion of laborto be used, but the corresponding financial costs will be greater.

ANNEX IIPage 2

5. Recent studies 1/ of the highly labor-intensive techniques used inroad construction in India indicate that the optimum (i.e. least total cost)technique would need to employ about twice as much capital (equipment) aspresent road construction practices, and that the present techniques wouldbe optimal only at unskilled labor wage rates of less than ten percent ofmarket wages. Under these conditions the cost of creating employment overand above that which would be required if optimum construction technologywere used has been estimated at about $100 per job. This represents an in-come transfer from the government to those employed over and above what wouldbe required if optimum construction technology were used. 2/

6. By contrast, in Lesotho the three construction units of the RcadsDivision of the Ministry of Works and Communications are highly equipmernt-intensive. Their combined capacity is approximately R90,000 per month andtogether they employ less than 100 unskilled laborers which represents twoto three percent of project cost. Prima facie this appears to be too lowa proportion of labor to be optimal under present-day Lesotho conditions.However, limitations to the labor supply are frequently an over-riding con-straint in the choice of construction techniques. As mentioned earlier,where there are large unemployment problems, the social benefits of creat-ing more employment can outweigh the additional costs involved. On theother hand, labor shortages can dictate the greater use of equipment byoffsetting increased costs against savings in construction time, and thismay have influenced the choice adopted by the construction units referredto above.

7. Experience has shown that labor-intensive projects usually talkelonger to complete than those built by equipment which leads to additionalcosts in terms of benefits foregone. In the previously referenced studLesin India it was estimated that, for an average road, if the rate of returnon capital were 15 percent and the average construction period three yearsinstead of one year, the benefits foregone per additional job created wouldbe about R16.60; for a rate of return of 20 percent this would increase toabout R21.00.

8. The difference between construction times needed for labor andequipment need not be as great as in the above example, provided that a,de-quate labor is available and that the work is properly planned. On confinedsites, such as in large earth dam constructions, there is a limit to themaximum number of labor (and units of equipment) that can be efficientlydeployed and the greater productivity of each unit of equipment leads to

1/ See C.G. Harral, et al., IBRD Staff Working Paper No. 172, "Study ofthe Substitution of Labor and Equipment in Civil Construction: PhaseII Final Report" (January 1974). A good deal of the material in thisAnnex is excerpted from this study.

2/ Analysis based on a wage rate for unskilled labor of about $0.60/day.

AUNN1EX IIPage 3

substantial time savings. However, on road construction (and other uncon-strained sites) larger numbers of properly supervised and organized laborcan be productively employed. 1/ On the other hand such sites are lesssuited for the maximum use of equipment since for maximum effectiveness,equiipment needs to be concentrated. The differences in construction timeon unconstrained sites should therefore not be so great as on confined sites.

9. With force account labor-intensive work, detailed design caii hecarried out almost concurrently with construction, keeping design sufficientlyahead to permit efficient use of resources. On the other hand, equipmellt-intensive work carried out by contract needs complete and detailed designbefore bids can be sought and the gestation period will be correspondinglylonger. The saving thus achieved by the use of force account methods canhelp offset the longer construction period often needed for labor-intensivework.

10. The set up and mobilization costs for labor-intensive work are usual-ly lower than those for equipment particularly where labor can be recruitedlocally and large camps are not needed. Labor costs are spread more evenlyover the construction period, whereas with equipment large initial costs areinvolved in its purchase and mobilization and in obtaining the inventory ofspare parts needed for its efficient operation.

11. In certain construction activities, the quality and durability ofthe finished work is most important. For example, in earthmoving, compactionto specified levels may be essential; surface tolerances affect the rideabil-ity of road pavements, and products such as concrete/asphaltic concrete needintimate mixing. Specifications for required standards are invariably basedon the proved performance of modern equipment and it is necessary to care-fully examine whether such high standards are needed or are justifiable inlabor-intensive work. With equipment the marginal cost of raising the qualityof finished work is comparatively small whereas much higher marginal costsusually apply to labor-intensive methods.

12. To summarize, additional financial costs will be incurred in creat-ing more employment possibilities than those offered by the optimal mixtureof labor and equipment, and the costs per job created tend to increase as thefully labor-intensive situation is approached. Frequently there will also beadditional costs in terms of benefits foregone, from both longer constructionperiods and lower standards of quality and durability. To some extent allthese can be accepted in the interests of reducing unemployment. However,there is much scope for increasing the efficiency of traditional labor-intensive techniques and in using equipment to aid labor productivity ratherthan to replace it.

1/ The construction of the trans-American railroad was completed by labor-intensive methods in ten years - an average rate approaching 2 km/day.It would be a formidable task to repeat this achievement even with themost modern equipment-intensive techniques.

ANNEX IIPage 4

B. The Productivity of Labor

13. One of the major factors influencing the scope for using more laborin construction work is its productivity. A review of data obtained from asurvev of existing literature has revealed an extraordinarily wide range ofproductivity rates in differing environments. An important example is thesimple task of excavating "ordinary" soil and loading it into wheelbarrows.The highest productivity rate of 0.13 labor hours per cubic meter relatedto the Philippines (early 1960's) and the lowest of 8.00 to Abidjan (1952),a variation of some six thousand percent. Even discounting these extremes,the range of productivity rates taken from reliable sources was very largeand could be accounted for only by the different physical, managerial andsocial frameworks in which the work took place.

14. An understanding of the parameters that affect the productivity oflabor and equipment is an essential part of planning for labor-intensivework. 1/ Some parameters have much the same effect on the productivity oflabor and hence are of little significance in assessing the potential forjob creation. The parameters may be classified in three broad groups:physical, managerial and social.

15. The phvsical parameters are defined in terms of climate, vegetation,topography, geology and soils, all of which are interrelated geographically.Extreme temperatures lead to lower productivity of labor so that, ideally,works in the mountainous areas should be undertaken during the summer months.Tree planting, grassing and other works needing water should be carried outduring the wet summer months. In detailed planning, the effects of seasonaldemand for labor for agricultural purposes should be taken into account.

16. The hilly and mountainous terrain of Lesotho affects the scope forincreased use of labor in road construction. The majority of roads are lo-cated on sidelong ground and earthworks involve short hauls and little cut-to-fill (and hence little compaction). Road gravels are readily availableand hauls seldom exceed 2.5 km - so that the use of labor in loading opera-tions can be maximized. Rock, both sandstone and basalt, is often well-jointed and can be excavated by hand labor - and its uses are well-suitedto labor-intensive methods. Many of the soils are of a sandy nature and donot become excessively difficult to excavate by hand labor in the dry season.

17. The managerial parameters include the particular form of organiza-tion, the levels of management and supervision provided, and the incentives(or lack thereof) to motivate the efficient use of labor. A new organization

1/ Detailed descriptions of these and other parameters and their effect onproductivity are contained in the study referred to in paragraph 5, above.Onlv those of particular significance in the use of labor in Lesotho arereferred to here.

ANNEX II

Page 5

will have advantages in that it will not be constrained by traditional andout-moded procedures and practices. For labor-intensive operations manage-ment skills are required which differ significantly from those needed forequipment-intensive operations, the former requiring the leadership quali-ties necessary to motivate large groups of human beings over long periodsof time. Trained supervisors at the lower levels are equally important.

18. To control the performance of large bodies of labor it is desirableto relate output to wages, either by a task or piecework system. Taskwork issimpler to administer but the benefit to the workers is solely in terms oftime saved and this may often not be of great value to them. however, inagricultural areas workers may prefer task work so that saved time can beused to tend to their farms. Piecework is more complicated to administerbut has the advantage that both labor and management share in the benefitsfrom increased production, in terms of higher incomes or reduced unit rates.The provision of certain facilities like housing, recreation, health, etc.may influence worker productivity by increasing morale and these facilitiesmay be required to attract labor to sites in unpopulated areas.

19. In general, the social parameters may be divided into two groups:those affecting the capacity of labor (i.e. possible rate of output) andthose which affect the performance of labor (i.e. actual output). The scopefor increasing productivity by modifying the capacity parameters is largelyrestricted to long-term measures. These parameters include standards ofnutrition and health; traditional skills, methods and tools; customary work-ing hours and holidays; and human adaptability. The social factors commonlyaffecting labor perfonmance include (in addition to the managerial parameters)the work attitudes of the population, particularly towards "blue collar" workand physical labor, which affect the caliber and performance of people at-tracted to the industry as supervisors and managers, as well as the availabil-ity and performance of unskilled labor in manual work. In Lesotho, the "workattitude" of returning miners is not expected to pose a particular problem,as they are already used to industrial discipline and hard, physical labor.

20. It is believed that one of the most important factors influencingthe productivity of labor is the health and nutritional status of the workforce. A study in India by the International Labor Office 1/ identified themain reason for the consistently higher output ratio (80 percent greater) ofmembers of the Malabari tribes engaged on earthworks as being the highernutritional standards enjoyed by them. Fortu,nately, Lesotho enjoys a goodclimate and is free from many of the debilitating tropi,cal diseases so com-mon in the other developing countries. Moreover, returning miners can beexpected to have reasonable standards of health and nutrition but this willneed careful monitoring.

21. Traditional methods and tools can frequently be responsible forlow labor productivity. For example, recent experimental work in India has

1/ Men Who Move Mountains, Report of the Management Development and Pro-ductivity Mission to India, 1963.

ANNEX IIPage 6

led to a doubling of labor productivity in the widening of existing roads onsidelong ground primarily by improved methods of working. This is not anisolated example of improved productivity but an instance of what can oftenbe achieved by careful study of existing methods.

22. The wage needed to motivate unskilled workers employed on labor-intensive construction projects is directly related to the wage rates theycould command in and the relative nature of alternative available employment.Too low a wage would not attract sufficient suitable labor whereas fixing therate too high would reduce the scope for economic employment. In the absenceof precise indicators, and the difficulties of lowering previously fixed rates,any new rate should be fixed initially at the lowest level likely to meet theprescribed objectives.

23. In Lesotho, experience with using large numbers of unskilled Laborhas been in the construction and maintenance of low standard roads in themountainous areas where up to 3,000 (mainly female) Food Aid labor have beenemployed. Smaller numbers have been engaged on soil conservation works, fishpond construction, etc. While despite the difficulties involved their con-tribution has been of value, labor productivity rates have been extremeLylow. A report dated April 1974 quotes productivity rates for earthworks inthe region of two cubic meters per 15-day work period, less than the normaldaily output of properly supervised labor. It is not surprising, therefore,that equipment has been used to an increasing extent to improve the rate ofconstruction of these roads, some is now also engaged on maintenance. toreuse is also being made of paid labor which is said to have productivity ratesin earthmoving some six to seven times greater than that of the Food Aidlabor. However, paid labor is engaged only on specific tasks which receivemuch more supervision.

24. The low productivity of Food Aid labor is attributed partly to thelack of motivation of the workers and the absence of any selection procedurein their employment but, primarily, to totally ineffective supervision result-ing from the total lack of trained lower- grade supervisors. Although it canbe desirable (or even at times essential) to provide food as part of therenumeration of workers, the Mission is firmly of the opinion that any pro-gram for the creation of new employment opportunities in Lesotho by the useof more labor-intensive techniques must be separate from the Food Aid laborand be properly organized on a productive basis.

C. Designing for Labor-Intensive Methods

25. The training of engineers in the developed countries is orientedto the use of capital-intensive techniques. Designs tend to favor the useof equipment in construction, and specifications are based on the standardsthat can be reasonably achieved by modern equipment. These procedures areinvariably followed in designing construction projects in the developingcountries and this has accelerated the change-over to more equipment-inten-sive techniques even where there are large unemployment problems. The policy

ANNEX IIPage 7

of some international agencies of financing primarily the offshore cost ele-ment has also contributed to the use of more equipment.

26. It is equally possible to adapt designs towards the use of labor-intensive techniques and this does not necessarily ehtail adopting lowerstandards of design. The minimum standards should be the same in eithercase and should be those necessary or justifiable, and not linked to thosethat can be achieved by a particular technology.

27. In designing for labor-intensive work, there is a need to maximizethose activities which can be efficiently executed by labor and to minimizethose for which it is less competitive with equipment: For example, haulagedistances should be kept as short as possible to minimize the need for mecha-nical transport. Roadway embankments can be constructed from borrow pitsparallel to and at the side of the road, minimizing the roadway cut-to-filloperation commonly encountered on equipment-intensive work (but recognizingthat there may be some loss of usable land). Hard rock excavation is costlyby hand labor but this can often be avoided. An interesting example of thelatter was encountered in Lesotho in the building of roads on sidelong ground.In equipment-intensive work, normal practice is to bench the road bed into theside of the hill, dozing the excavated material to waste across cut down theslope. Using hand labor, small dry stone retaining walls are built and theroad bed is partly benched into the hill and partly on fill retained by thewall. Both forms of construction are equally effective yet the latter maxi-mizes the efficient use of labor.

28. Many other examples in road construction can be quoted, such asusing masonry in place of concrete in bridge construction, lower designstrengths for concrete mixed by hand, bituminous surface dressing insteadof other equipment-intensive bituminous materials, mechanical stabilizationof base courses instead of cement/lime mixtures, all of which are particu-larly suited to conditions in Lesotho. It is conceivable that the routeand alignment followed by a road designed for construction by labor-inten-sive methods would differ from that designed for the use of equipment. Withlabor-intensive methods it may prove economic to stage construction over anumber of years, improving the road as traffic develops, whereas the highcost of equipment mobilization may lead to premature and less economic in-vestment.

29. It is possible to apply these principles to other forms of construc-tion such as soil conservation work. The stdbilization of "dongas" by drystone walling is essentially a labor-intensive operation. The alignmentsand cross-sections for diversion ditches can be selected to facilitate con-struction by hand labor.

30. The need for detailed design for labor-intensive technologies isequally as great as that for the use of equipment, and the technology to beused in construction should be known in advance so that designs can be adaptedaccordingly. Attempting to construct designs for equipment-intensive work bymanual methods places labor under a substantial disadvantage. Hence, beforeimplementing labor-intensive projects which have been planned for construction

ANNEX IIPage 8

by equipment, designs must be critically reviewed to see whether they can bemade more suited to the changed construction technique.

D. Conclusion

31. It is possible to use more labor-intensive techniques in the con-struction of civil works. However, without thorough advance preparation theresulting loss of efficiency and productivity normally leads to high increasesin financial costs even at low wagerates. Labor-intensive methods shouldtherefore "not be attempted without careful advance planning, organizationand training, particularly in regions where these methods have not been com-monly practiced." 1/

1/ Quotation from the Summary of Volume I of Staff Working Paper 172referred to earlier.

NATIONAL EMPLOYMENT SERVICE

Estimated Annual Staffing Costs

Post/Designation Salary

A. Central.Office

1. Chief FEmployment Officer R. 3,0002. Employment Officer R. 1,5003. Emp-loyment- Officer R. 1,5004.. Clerk- I R. 6005. Clerk - II: R. 6006. Clerk-curn-typist R. 600

TOTAL R. 7,800

B. District Offices

1. Nine- District- Employment Officers R. 13,5002. Nine Cl,erks-cumv-typists R. 5,hOO

TOTAL R,18,900

Gr'and Total of.Government Salary Costs R. 26,700

I-I1'-4

ANNEX IVPage 1

MOBILIZATION PROGRAM FOR THE LABOR-INTENSIVECONSTRUCTION UNIT, INCLUDING TRAINING REQUIREMENTS

1. In the main report (para. 2.24) the various stages of the mobiliza-tion program were enumerated. As a general guideline, some further detailswhich should be read in conjunction with the chart which is attached to thisAnnex, are_given below.

2. Stage 1: Recruitment of senior supervisors. A period of threemonths is likely to be needed for recruiting the expatriate staff to fi]lthe following posts:

Senior Engineer i/c UnitEngineer (Operations)AdministratorAssistant Engineer (Methods Study)Senior Training OfficerTraining Officers (2)Assistant Engineer (Technical Support)Quantity Surveyor

The Senior Technical Officer will also be needed at the end of month 3. Asthe main link between management and labor this post is most important.Ideally, the Senior Technical Officer should be a fully trained Basothoand it is suggested that an existing employee from the Roads Division ofthe Ministry of Works and Communications should be seconded to fill thisposition.

3. On mobilization the unit should be based in Maseru where it wouldremain until the end of month 7. During this period it would require accom-modation for offices and training facilities. The administration, technicalsupport and cost control sections should be set up as soon as possible afterthe arrival of the senior staff.

4. Stage 2: Planning and development of basic training material. Allsenior supervisors will need to participate in the detailed planning of theunit and the preparation of basic training material. While the bulk of thiswork will be completed within months 4 and 5, it will continue to the end ofmonth 7. Orders will need to be placed for caravans for field accommodationand offices, tools, materials, etc.; administrative and cost control systemswill have to be planned in detail; tentative work methods will be devised;and arrangements put in hand to prepare for the training courses for thejunior supervisors.

5. Stage 3: Recruitment of junior supervisors. The unit should bein a position to start training the junior technical supervisors at the endof month 5. These would include the technical officers and technical assis-tants in the methods study section, together with the three section leaders.The latter should preferably be junior technical officers who have compLetedthe Ministry of Works training course but if these are not available lolwercaliber staff will have to be recruited.

ANNEX IVPage 2

6. The intake of foremen and assistant foremen should be timed for onemonth later, the end of month 6. These recruits should have some previous ex-perience of construction work but they should be selected primarily on theirleadership potential. They must be literate and of reasonable intelligence.It is understood that suitable candidates for the foremen and technical as-istants posts may be available from within the existing resources of theRoads Division of the Ministry of Works and Communications.

7. Stage 4: Basic classroom training. Two basic classroom coursesare envisaged; the technical officer's course would extend over months 6 and7, while that for the foreman and assistant foreman would extend throughmonth 7. Outline details of these courses are given in paragraphs 13-16of this Annex.

8. Stage 5: Selection and design of work program. It is intended thatthe work to be carried out by the LCU should be selected from on-going proj-ects for which the design has been completed. Consequently, no capacity fordesign has been provided within the framework of the unit. Designs forlabor-intensive force account work need to be detailed to at least the samedegree as those prepared for equipment-intensive work carried out by contract.The technical support section would undertake the detailed planning and de-sign of the operational work program, determine the requirements for theequipment section and arrange for its mobilization. It would also overseethe employment of the semi-permanent labor and the establishment of the campduring months 5 and 7.

9. Stage 6: Recruitment of semi-permanent labor. It is proposed thatapproximately 20 percent of the unskilled labor should be recruited on a semi-permanent basis. This would permit continuity of experience gained at theunskilled level as the unit moves from project to project while minimizingthe logistic problems that would be involved if all unskilled labor were em-ployed on this basis. The semi-permanent labor must be able-bodied maleswho are willing to be mobile. They should be selected with care so that,in the event of an emergency, they could provide a nucleus suitable fortraining as assistant foremen. Hence, potential leadership qualities areimportant. It might be desirable to attempt to recruit such staff from theforeman group amongst the miners.

10. The semi-permanent labor would be recruited during months 6 and 7.They would undertake the establishment of the camp during this period andalso be available as demonstration labor for the training courses.

11. Stage 7: Establishment of camp. The camp would be built under thesupervision of the technical support section during months 6 and 7. Caravanswould be provided for the senior staff accommodation and offices, and tents/prefabricated huts for the remainder. Other facilities required would in-clude arrangements for sanitation, water supply, cooking facilities, stores,a small workshops and the like. The buildings/facilities would be eithermbbile or temporary unless they served a permanent useful purpose (e.g. asa road maintenance camp).

ANNEX IVPage 3

12. Stage 8: Recruitment of casual labor. The remaining unskilledlabor would be recruited during months 8 and 9 from the area in which theunit is to commence operations. It would be engaged on a casual basis andbe laid off when the unit moved to another project, though selected individ-uals showing promise could be transferred to a semi-permanent basis at thattime. This labor must also be male and able-bodied.

13. With respect to the training aspects referred to earlier, twocourses of basic classroom training are envisaged during the mobilizationof the LCU:

(a) For technical officers, of approximately two months' duration;

(b) For foremen and assistant foremen, of approximately one month'sduration.

The first course would be taken by the two junior technical officers, thethree section leaders and the four technical assistants, a total of nine.The second course would be taken by the nine foremen and eighteen assistantforemen.

14. Technical Officers' Course. The detailed course content would de-pend on the past training of the trainees but the main features are describedbelow:

(a) Study aimed at giving an understanding of the general prin-ciples involved in labor-intensive work.

(b) Work study procedures--flow charting, work measurement tech-niques and data recording and processing.

(c) Costing procedures.

(d) Work programming and sequencing.

(e) Basic work norms for labor and equipment.

(f) Organization of labor and equipment.

(g) Camp construction and organization.

(h) A knowledge of the relevant skills and training componentsfound in the foremen's course.

15. Foremen's Course. Again, the detailed content of the course woulddepend on the previous knowledge and experience of the trainees. The mainfeatures would be:

(a) How to keep timesheets and prepare paysheets.

(b) Use of hand tools.

ANNEX IVPage 4

(c) Setting out of work (using of boning rods, camber boards,etc.).

(d) Simple work measurement methods.

(e) Preparation of cost control returns.

(f) Work norms and methods.

(g) Labor management and organization.

16. Both the above courses would include a substantial practical con-tent. Labor for demonstration purposes would be available at the construc-tion camp. The classroom courses would be followed by on-the-job trainingand, in particular, the results of the methods study unit would be disseminatedrapidly.

17. Other junior staff, such as general and quantities clerks, chainmen,etc. would be trained on-the-job. However, as work procedures are formulated,detailed training material would be prepared for use in a possible emergency.Unskilled labor would be trained on-the-job by the foremen and assistant fore-men.

t Time in months from decision to set up unita DFSCRIPTION - -. - .g 1 2 5 6 78 10

1 Recruitment of senior supervisors

2 Planning and development of basictraining material

3 Recruitment of Junior supervisors

1h Basic classroom training

5 Planning and design of operations

6 Recruitment of semi-permanent I -labor l __

7 Fstablishment of camp-

8 Recruitment of casual labor

Ooerational date

Chart attached to Annex IV

Mobilization Program for the Labor-Intensive Construction Unit (Trainiin)

ANNEX VPage 1

ESTIMATED COSTS OF SETTING UP AND OPERATINGTHE LABOR-INTENSIVE CONSTRUCTION UNIT

A. SET UP COSTS

No. Rate Amount1. Accommodation

Caravans (fitted) 10 6,000 60,000Office Caravans (fitted) 9 6,ooo 514,000Tents

Administration 4Methods Study 2Equipment 4Technical Support 2Section Leaders 3Cost Control 1Labor 18Spare 6

S40 100 4,000Tents for trainees ,O 100 2,000Camping Equipment

Staff 63Trainees .60

-r", 123 50 6,150Water storage facilities -- -- 2,000Camp buildings (latrines., cooking

facilities, stores, classroom, etc.) -- -- 17X000

TOTAL R145.150

2. Equipment

Offi,ce equ,ipment 2 400Radio se8 ' l0M4ethodc~s study 1,20QT,ools (for -ehicle maintenance) ?-0Drawing office 200S.r,veying 2-,5°Soil testing -- -- 1,000Lighting ,s,et 2 5OO 000

TOTAL R18.300

ANNEX VPage 2

No. Rate Amount3. Hand Tools

Per gang of 50 menPickaxes 25 3.0 75Shovels 25 3.0 75Crowbars 5 4.o 20Mattocks 10 3.0 30Wheelbarrows 10 20.0 200Sledgehammers 5 3.0 15Other items, say -- -- j±5.

TOTAL per gang R460

For nine gangs R4L140

4. Summary

Accommodation 1h5,150Equipment 18,350Hand tools 4,14o

Say R168,ooo R167,640

B. OPERATING COSTS FOR FIRST YEAR(Months 4 through 15)

ManMonths Rate Amount

1. Expatriate Staff

Senior Engineer in charge 12 2,000 2h,o00Administrator 12 1,200 14,hooAssistant Engineer (Methods Study) 12 1,200 14,4ooEngineer (Operations) 12 1,500 18,000Senior Training Officer 12 1,500 18,000Training Officers 24 1,200 28,800Assistant Engineer (Tech. Support) 12 1,200 14),400Quantity Surveyor 12 1,200 14.hoo

TOTAL R146,40o

2. Local Staff

Senior Technical Officer (1) 12 350 4,200Junior Technical Officers (2) 20 200 2,400Section Leaders (3) 30 150 4,5ooLabor Officer (1) 12 100 1,200Technical Assistants (4) 40 100 4,o000

(continued)

ANNEX VPage 3

ManMonths Rate Amount

Foremen (9) 81 66 5,346Assistant Foremen (18) 162 7,128Equipment Supervisor (1) 10 150 1,500Operators/drivers (12) 119 66 7,854Mechanic (1) 10 100 1,000Chainmen (2) 24 66 1,584Draughtsman (1) 12 66 792Soils Assistant (1) 12 100 1,2(0Clerks/typists (6) 72 50 3,600Stores Assistant (1) 12 50 600Radio Operators (1) 10 66 660

TOTAL R47 564

HireMonths Rate Amount

3. Equipment and Fuel

Landrovers (8) 80 170 13,600Tractors (3) 27 210 5,670Trailers (4) 36 90 3,240Water trailers (2) 18 90 1,620Water pump (1) 10 25 250Trucks flat, 7 tonne (1) 12 500 6,000Rollers 8-12 tonne (1) 6 700 4,200Provision for experimental

equipment -- -- 10,000Fuel -- -- 15000

TOTAL R59,58o

ManMonths Rate Amount

4. Labor

Semi-permenant labor (90) 810 22 17,820Casual labor (360) 2,5?0 22 55,4P4Camp labor (10) 90 ?2 1.980

TOTAL R75;240

ANNEX VPage4

Anount5. Miscellaneous

Office Supplies 1,000Materials 2,000Maintenance of hand tools 1,000Camp maintenance 1,000

TOTAL R5.000

6. Sumary

Expatriate Staff 146 ,4ooLocal Staff 47,564Equipment and fuel 59,580Labor 75,,240Miscellaneous 5,000

TOMAL R333,784Say R335,000

C. ANNUAL OPERATING COSTS(Month 16 onwards)

ManMonths Rate Amount

1. Expatriate Staff

Senior Engineer in charge 12 2,000 24,000Administrator 12 1,200 14,400Assistant Engineer (Methods Study) 12 1,200 14,400Engineer (Operations) 12 1,500 18,000Senior Training Officer 12 1,500 18,000Training Officers 24 1,200 28,800Assistant Engineer (Tech. Support) 12 1,200 14,400Quantity Surveyor 12 1,200 14,400

TOTAL R146,400

2. Local Staff

Senior Technical Officers 12 350 4,200Junior Technical Officers 24 200 4,800Section Leaders 36 150 5,1400Labor Officer 12 100 1,200Technical Assistants 48 100 4,800Foremen 108 66 7,128Assistant Foremen 216 44 9,504Equipment Supervisors 12 150 1,800Operators/Drivers 144 66 9,504Mechanic 12 100 1,200Chairmen 24 66 1,584

(continued)

ANNEX VPage 5

ManMonths Rate Amount

Draughtsmen 12 66 792Soils Assistant 12 100 1,200Clerks/Typists 72 50 3,600Stores A'ssistant 12 50 600Radio Operators 12 66 792

TOTAL R58,104

HireMonths Rate Amount

3. Equipment and Fuel

Landrovers 96 170 16,320Tractors 36 210 7,560Trailers 48 90 4,320Water trailers 24 90 2,160Water pump 12 25 300Trucks flat, 7 tonne 12 500 6,000Rollers 8-12 tonne 12 700 8,400Provision for experinental

equipment -- -- 20,000Fhel -- -- 20,000

TOTAL R85 o60

ManMonths Rate Amount

4. Labor

Semi-permanent labor 1,080 22 23,760Casual labor 4,320 22 95,040Camp labor 120 22 2,64o

TOTAL R121 t0

5. Miscellaneous

Office Supplie s 1,000Materials 3,000Maintenance of Hand Tools 1.500Camp Maintenance 1,500

TOTAL R7,000

ANNEX VP-ag'e!o

Amount6. Simmary

Expatriate Staff 146,4ooLocal Staff 58, 104Equipment and Fuel 85,o60Labor 121 ,h40Miscellaneous 7,000

TOTAL Rh18,004Say R420,000

Notes:

1. Rates for expatriate staff include airfares, subsistenceallowances, etc.

2. Rates for local staff include field allowances.

3. No provision has been made for repairs to equipment whichwill be hired from the Government Plant Pool.

4. Actual equipment required will depend on nature of work.The items inserted in this section are provisional.

5. Salaries and allowances for trainees are excluded.

6. If local facilities are inadequate, it may be necessary toprovide:

(1) First aid staff and equipment(2) Cooking facilities and staff (for trainees).

SENIOR ENGINEER

Administration Methods Study Operations Training Equipment

Administrator Assistant Engineer I Senior Training SupervisorLabor officer Junior Technical Ehgineer Officer Operators/Clerks (2) Officers (2) Training Officers (2) driversTypists (2) Technical Assistants (4) MechanicStores assistant Tool repairRadio operator facilitiesCamp labor

l lTechnical Support Cost Control

Assistant Engineer Quantity SurveyorChainmen (2) Senior Technical Officer Quantities clerks (2)DraughtsmanSoil testingfacilities

Section Section SectionLeader Leader Leader

Nine separate gangs each consisting of

1 Foreman2 Assistant Foremen m W50 Unskilled Labor

ORGANIZATION OF THE LABOR-INTENSIVE CONSTRUCTION UNIT (TRAINING)

ANNEX VIPage 1

ESTIMATED COSTS OF SETTING UP AND OPERATINGA TYPICAL LABOR-INTENSIVE CONSTRUCTION GROUP

A. SET UP COSTS

No. Rate Amount1. Accommodation

Caravans (fitted) 4 6,000 24,000Office Caravans (fitted) 2 6,000 12,000Tents

Administration 4Technical Support 2Cost Control 1Equipment 5Technical Officers 3Section Leaders 9Foremen/Assistant

Foremen 27Labor 45

96 100 9,600Camping Equipment 130 50 6,500Water storage facilities -- -- 4,200Camp buildings (latrines, coqking

facilities, stores, etc.) -- -- 28,000

TOTAL R84,300

2. Equipment

Office equipment -- -- 900Radio sets 4 800 3,200Tools (to include maintenance) -- -- 200Drawing office -- -- 200Surveying -- -- 2,500Soil testing -- -- 1,000Lighting set 1 5,000 5,000

TOTAL R13,000

ANNEX VIPage 2

No. Rate Amount3. Hand Tools

Per gang of 50 menPickaxes 25 3.0 75Shovels 25 3.0 75Crowbars 5 4.0 20Mattocks 10 3.0 30Wheelbarrows 10 20.0 200Sledgehammers 5 3.0 15Other items, say -- -- 45

TOTAL R460

For 27 gangs R12,420

4. Summary

Accommodation 84,300Equipment 13,000Hand Tools 12,420

Say RllO,O0O TOTAL R109,720

B. OPERATING COSTS FOR ONE YEAR

ManMonths Rate Amount

1. Expatriate Staff

Resident Engineer 12 1,750 21,000Assistant Engineer 12 1,200 14,400Quantity Surveyor 12 1,200 14,400

TOTAL R49,800

2. Local Staff

Senior Technical Officer (1) 12 350 4,200Junior Technical Officers (3) 36 200 7,200Section Leaders (9) 108 150 16,200Foremen (27) 324 66 21,384Assistant Foremen (54) 648 44 28,512Office Manager (1) 12 200 2,400

(continued)

ANNEX VIPage 3

ManMonths Rate Amount

Labor Officer (1) 12 100 1,200Survey Assistant (1) 12 100 1,200Soils Assistant (1) 12 100 1,200Equipment Supervisor (1) 12 100 1,200Clerks/typists (7) 84 50 4,200Stores Assistant (1) i2 50 600Radio Operators (4) 48 66 3,168Chainmen (4) 48 66 3,168Draughtsman (1) 12 66 792Operators/drivers (11) 132 66 8,712Mechanics (2) 24 100 2,400Blacksmith (1) 12 100 1,200Carpenter (1) 12 100 1,200

TOTAL R110,136

HireMonths Rate Amount

3. Equipment and Fuel

Landrovers (5) 60 170 10,200Tractors (4) 48 210 10,080Trailers (8) 36 90 3,240Water trailers (4) 48 90 4,320Water pumps (4) 48 25 1,200Trucks flat 7 tonne (1) 12 500 6,000Rollers 8-12 tonne (1) 12 700 8,400Other small equipment, say -- -- 20,000Fuel -- -- 20,000

TOTAL R83,440

4. Labor

Casual labor (1,350) 16,200 22 356,400Camp labor (16) 192 22 4,224

TOTAL R360,624

ANNEX VIPage 4

Amount5. Miscellaneous

Office supplies 500Materials 10,000Camp Maintenance 1,000

TOTAL R11,500

6. Summary

Expatriate Staff 49,800Local Staff 110,180Equipment and Fuel 83,440Labor 360,624Miscellaneous 11,500

TOTAL R615,544

Say R620,000

Notes:

1. Rates for expatriate staff include airfares, subsistenceallowances, etc.

2. Rates for local staff include field allowances.

3. No provision has been made for repairs to equipment whichwill be hired from the Government Plant Pool.

4. Actual equipment required will depend on nature of work.The items inserted in this section are provisional.

5. Tentage requirements assure that one-third of the unskilledlabor and all staff/supervisors will live in camps.

6. If local facilities are inadequate, it may be necessary toprovide first aid staff and equipment.

7. No allowance has been made for residual value of accommo-dation, equipment, etc.

RESIDENT }X INEER

Administration Technical Support Operations Measurement and EquipmentCost Control

Office manager Senior Technical Officer S;o-ervisor

Labor officer Assistant Engineer Quantity Surveyor Upc.ratcrs/

Clerks (3) Survey assistant Quantities clerks (3) dr%vers

Stores assistant Chainmen (4) Mechani.cs

Typist Draughtsman Tooi. repair

Radio operators Soil testing facilities facili'ties

Camp labor

Three separate units each consistingof

I Operations GroupJunior Technical Officer

Senior Technical Officer 1I_______________________________ Junior Technical Officers 3

sections I Section Leaders 9Three separate sect ns each consisting Foremen 27

of Assistant Foremen 5

S Unskilled Labor 1350

SeCtiOn Leader

Three separate gangs each consistingof

1 Foreman2 Assistant Foremen

50 Unskilled Labor

ORGANIZATION OF A TYPICAL LABOR-INTFNSIVE CONSTRUCTION GROUP

ANNEX VIIPage 1

JOB POTENTIAL IN ROAD CONSTRUCTION AND MAINTENANCE

A. Introduction

General

1. The organizations primarily concerned with road construction are:

(a) The Ministry of Works and Communications, whose activitiesto date have been confined almost entirely to the main roadsin the lowlands and foothills areas.

(b) The Community and Rural Development Office which, using mainlyFood Aid labor, has developed and maintains a network oftracks in the mountainous areas.

(c) The Ministry of Agriculture which has relied on the RoadsDivision and Food Aid labor for the construction and main-tenance of access roads and tracks in the agriculturaldevelopment schemes.--

In addition to the above some tracks have been maintained by traders and mis-sions who receive yearly grants (R6 per km) from government towards the costof this work.

2. Table VII.1 contains a summary of the road network at September1974, by road type and by maintenance authority. The higher standard roadsare all maintained by the Roads Division of the Ministry of Works and Com-munications while tracks are currently the responsibility of the Communityand Rural Development Office and traders and missions.

ANNEX VIIPage 2

Table VII.1: ROAD INVENTORY 1974 /1

Maintained Primary Secondary Tertiary TotalType by /L km km km km

Bitumen MWC 194.0 7.3 -- 201.3Gravel 2 lanes MWC 280.5 64.3 22.7 367.5Gravel 1 lane MWC 234.1 252.5 13.1 499.7Tracks CRD 530.5 410.8 184.7 1,126.0 /3

Traders,Missions -- 424.4 106.0 530.4

Total 1,239.1 1,159.3 326.5 2,724.9 /

/1 The road classification and coding system was adopted in 1974./2 MWC = Ministry of Works and Communications; CRD = Community and Rural

Development Office./3 According to the CRD, they work on about 2,400 km in all./4 Roughton and Partners indicate 2,735.9 km.

Source: Based on Roughton and Partner's Transportation Study, 1974.

The Roads Division of the Ministry of Works and Communications

3. The organization of the Ministry of Works and Communications isshown in Chart VII.1. The Roads Division, which is headed by the Chief FoadsEngineer, comes directly under the Controller of Works Services. The Divisionis organized on a functional basis with separate sections for planning anddesign, construction and maintenance. It has no separate administrativesection and these services are provided centrally.

4. The staffing situation in the Roads Division is shown in TableVII.2. There is a notable shortage of senior staff, over half of whom areexpatriates engaged on short term (2-3 year) contracts. It is understooctthat there are two Basotho currently being trained overseas as civil en-gineers and that four of the students due to graduate from the TechniciansTraining School in December 1974 are considered suitable for professional.training. Hence it will be some time before all the engineering posts caLnbe filled by local officers.

ministry of workcsa nd

Fosti and rkco =W eatioBoe

Contr|fler or I

Works Services

Adftini- cv.' I "ruct- Water tc 'dertrostrative tomnioaUonu Pestal Civil strat tr Crdueioner .Wcantal A*htture Water & ads ktmdrolon & Lerothol PlanninaServices Servces SerVice k Avdtion Service Ittice *rbup 8M & BA4g Sfrf Dvso Nero Ts|hdca UnitCart & ~Branch Diviulon Bran institute

:~~~~~~~~~

Losotlw ,1 Leanieth|Rao la tAirwajs IfI lectricity ITransgvrtI aid Conataction .| Ma1ntemna

Corporation Corporatiton I

-cqot,Al WAt u Leribe

Drawing office} f ~~~~~Southern Uinit I

- Laboratos7 (Mohaes Hoek) EhM q ta Nlek

L (.ateisis e korthem ULSA L H( Leribe)

£5£211: Bintitry of Works and Coawications; Planning aM Developiwnt Offlcej o-n elabataon.Zutalhizwzt a. ot Septter 17lz.

ANNEX VIIPage 3

Table VII.2: MINISTRY OF WORKS AND COMMUNICATIONSROADS DIVISION STAFF

Designation Expatriate Local Establishment Vacant

Chief Roads Engineer - - 1 1Senior Roads Engineer 1 - 1 -Roads Engineer 2 - 4 2Assistant Roads Engineer - 2 2 -Junior Surveyor/Engineer - - 1 1Senior Technical Officer 4 3 8 1Higher/Senior Technical Officer - 2 3 1Higher Technical Officer - 4 4 -Technical Officer - 3 4 1Junior Technical Officer - 4 4 -Senior Plant Operator - 2 2 -Higher Technical Assistant - 4 6 2Plant Operator - 4 9 5Technical Assistant - 3 10 7Stores Assistant - 1 4 3Senior Chainman - - 1 1Drivers - 3 16 12Chainman - - 2 2Telephonist, Messenger, Packgroom - 4 4 -

7 39 86 4C0

Daily paid staff for maintenance, including drivers, operators, clerks aLndlaborers: 321.

Source: Ministry of Works and Communications, September 1974.

5. At the technical officer level, the outlook is more promising.The output from the Technician Training School is expected to be:

December 1974 - 16December 1975 - 16March 1978 - 16

The course is of three years duration and since students are not bonded thereis no guarantee that they will enter government service. There are alsco manyother requirements for technical officers in the other branches of the Minis-try of Works and Communications.

6. The present capacity of the Roads Division is estimated to be:

Construction R1.0 million per year,Maintenance RO.5 million per year.

ANNEX VIIPage 4

The capacity of the planning and design section is geared to these require-ments. Hence it has been necessary to employ consultants to prepare designsand documents for some of the works in the development program which envisagesan average annual rate of expenditure of R2 million.

7. The three construction units are highly equipment-intensive and em-ploy less than 100 unskilled labor. Two of the units are currently buildingthe main access roads in the Thaba Bosiu agricultural development projectwhile the third is working at Roma. At the time of the Mission's visit toLesotho, the value of road work remaining to be completed on the Thaba Bosiuproject was approximately R383,000 - about twelve months' work for oneconstruction unit. Two of the units will shortly be redeployed to startwork on the road development program described later in this Annex. It isplanned to set up a fourth construction unit in the near future and UK as-istance for this purpose has been sbught.

8. The road maintenance section of the Roads Division is being reor-ganized and District offices are being set up or strengthened at Leribe,Maseru, Qacha's Nek and Mohale's Hoek, each under the control of a seniortechnical officer. While the main function of the district offices is roadmaintenance, it is also intended that all Ministry activities should be co-ordinated through these offices. The Mission is in favor of this arrangementand recommends that it should be implemented forthwith. Apart from the pos-sibility of providing much needed administrative and logistic support in theevent of the deployment of large labor forces in an emergency, technicaladvice and assistance to non-technical departments will be more readilyavailable in the field.

9. The Roads Division currently maintains some 1,070 km of the nationalroad system of which some 200 km are bitumenized. It is intended that alltracks on the primary network should be taken over by the Roads Division by1976, those on the secondary network by 1978 and those on the tertiary net-work by 1979. Before these tracks can be maintained to all-weather stand-ards considerable improvements will be necessary.

The Comunity and Rural Development Office

10. This office was established in 1974 and took over the Food Aid pro-gram; it comes under the Prime Minister's office. It has a technical sectionthat is responsible for, inter alia, the maintenance and construction ofaccess tracks which are mainly in the mountainous area. It now has asmall amount of earthmoving and other equipment which carries out the bulkof new construction work, but most of the tracks have been built by FoodAid labor. This labor is mostly female and receives a food ration foreach work period of 15 five-hour days. As stated elsewhere, the produc-tivity of this labor is extremely low and supervision is ineffective.

11. Current construction procedures are for equipment to initially openup the track and then hand labor improves and maintains the track over a pe-riod of about five years. Between three and four thousand labor are generally

ANNEX VIIPage 5

employed in the vicinity of their own homes. The organization now has thecapacity to construct small structures such as culverts, fords and smallbridges.

Feeder Roads for Agriculture Projects

12. Funds (or food) are provided in the three on-going agriculture devel-opment schemes at Leribe/Khomokhoana, Thaba Bosiu and Senqu River for the con-struction of a number of access roads and tracks to varying standards. Theproject staffs have no technical expertise in road construction and hence theyrely on the Roads Division and the Community and Rural Development Officesto assist them. In the Leribe project, Food Aid labor has been used forconstruction and a similar procedure is being followed at Senqu River. AtThaba Bosiu, the Roads Division is constructing the main access roads wh:Lchwere designed by consultants.

13. Where the roads are properly designed and constructed to standardsapproved by the Ministry of Works (i.e. minimum Gravel 4), they are takenover by the Roads Division for maintenance. Otherwise, such maintenance asthey receive is provided by the project, using Food Aid labor.

ped e ncyProjec t

14. The Mission was presented with a proposal for a labor-intensive'road betterment project which provides employment for male labor over a pe-riod of 12 months on improvements to and repair of existing access tracks.Ten roads are involved and, with not more than five being worked at a time,the work would employ an average of 2,515 workers. Unskilled labor wouldbe paid seven cents per hour together with a food ration, roughly equivalentto 90 cents per day. The estimated total cost of the project is R 506,300excluding the cost of food, and its duration would be 12 months. It wouldinvolve work in seven districts.

15. This project was prepared at short notice when it was believed thatlarge numbers of returning miners would be seeking work. It suffers from thedisadvantage that the work to be carried out could not be properly planned andthat data for evaluation are incomplete. The problems involved in employingsuch large labor forces obviously were seriously underestimated.

16. In seeking new employment opportunities, the Mission considersemphasis should be placed on those areas where existing institutions alreadyhave the staff to speed up or expand activities which are relatively labor-intensive or can relatively easily be made more labor-intensive. The proj-ects should be such as will foster Lesotho's economic growth and be part ofor fit in with the overall development program. The Mission therefore ex-amined on-going projects and those which were currently being planned toevaluate the potential for job creation by using more labor-intensivemethods in road construction and maintenance.

ANNEX VIIPage 6

Basis of Estimates

17. It was necessary for the Mfission to make certain assumptions relat-ing to:

(a) work methods, particularly the optimal mix of labor andequipment;

(b) the future role of Food Aid labor;

(c) the productivity and cost of labor; and

(d) the availability of additional resources.

These are described in Chapter III and are not repeated here.

18. In comparing the costs of equipment- and labor-intensive work, itis essential to compare like with like. The comparisons which have beenmade are between the costs of work carried out by the existing constructionunits of the Roads Division and by labor-intensive groups as described inChapter IV, the estimated costs of which are contained in Annex VI. Thecosts of the former have generally been taken from the Roughton Report, ad-justed upwards by 20 percent in view of the increases in equipment costssince the estimates were prepared in June 1973. The costs of labor-intensivework prepared by the Mission have been based on a daily wage rate of R1.00for unskilled labor and present-day costs (Government Plant Pool) for equip-ment.

19. The estimates of the costs of setting up and operating a labor-intensive construction group contained in Annex VI are inclusive of all ad-ministrative and supervision costs and the group is completely self-contained.Assuming that set-up costs are distributed over a three-year period, the in-clusive costs of maintaining a group for a year are:

Set-up Costs R 33,300Operating Costs 620,000

R653,300

The group contains 27 gangs and hence the annual cost per gang 1/ is aboutR24,200. Hiowever, to compare costs against the project costs incurred bythe existing construction units, the costs of supervision (junior technicalofficers and above) should be excluded since these are separately providedfor in the budget. On this basis and including all set-up costs, the annualcosts of a gang, in a round figure, are about R22,000.

1/ Assuming 250 paid working days per year for labor engaged on road con-struction. For labor engaged in agricultural projects, 200 workingdays per year have been assumed in estimating job potential.

ANNEX VIIPage 7

20. The make-up of this figure is:

Rands Percent

Set-up costs per year

Accommodation 1,042 4.9Equipment 160 0.7Hand Tools 156 0.7

Total 1,358 6.3

Yearly operating costs

Supervisors 2,492 11.6Administrative staff 428 2.0Technical staff 236 1.2Tool repairs 89 0.4Equipment and transport 3,089 14.4Unskilled labor 13,356 62.1Miscellaneous 426 2.0

Grand Total 214i74 100.0

The amount of equipment and materials are minimal and this accounts for thefairly high proportions of unskilled labor.

21. In practice, the annual cost of a 50-man gang will depend on thenature of the work and will be as low as R19,000 where little materials orequipment are required, increasing for example to about R32,000 for a gangemployed on regravelling roads (assumed average haul 2 km).

22. Even with the most highly equipment-intensive methods there is aneed for some unskilled labor. The estimates of labor absorption in roadconstruction contained herein are for the additional unskilled labor thatcould be employed by using more labor intensive methods. Efficient use oflabor has been assumed throughout.

23. The tentative nature of the Mission's estimates of job opporl:unities,the effect that more labor-intensive methods would have on project costs andof the wage rates at which labor would become competitive with equipment mustbe stressed. They are all based on inadequate data and it will not be possi-ble to refine the data until experience is gained with the use of more labor-intensive techniques under Lesotho conditions.

ANNEX VIIPage 8

B. Job Opportunities in Road Construction

Programs for Road Construction

24. The second five-year development plan for road construction is shownin Table VII.3. 1/ In addition there are programs for tracks to be constructed/improved by the Community and Rural Development Office and for new roads toserve the three agricultural development projects.

Betterment and Improvement of Southern, Northern and Lowland/Foothills Roads

25. This project is the first item in the roads development program.The work is programmed to be carried out over two years:

1974/75 1975/76

Southern Roads R150,375 R150,000Northern Roads 136,300 130,000Lowland/Foothills Roads 119,250 110,000

Funds have already been issued for the first year's work on the southern andnorthern roads, and are expected shortly for the lowland/foothills roads.The work will be carried out by the Roads Division construction units.

26. The first year's work is almost entirely devoted to the improvementof road structures, including the construction of vented fords and culverts.The work in 1975/76 will consist of improvements to roadside drainage andregravelling the more difficult sections of roads and much of this workcould be carried out by labor-intensive methods. In the absence of fulldetails, the job potential and corresponding costs cannot be estimatedaccurately.

27. However, on the basis of available funds and assuming that two-thirds of the funds will be spent on regravelling, the work would offer em-ployment to 14 gangs fer.the whole year. On a daily wage rate for unskilledlabor of R1.00, the cost would increase by about R43,000 (11 percent). Thebreak-even wage rate, i.e., the wage rate to give the same costs by labor asfor equipment, would be about 78 cents per day.

Butha Buthe to Joel's Drift Road

28. This project, the second item on the road improvement program, isestimated to cost R112,650 (at 1973 prices) and is scheduled for constructionin 1976/77. The work consists of upgrading an existing road by improving the

1/ Detailed descriptions of projects in the second Five-Year Road Develop-ment Program are contained in the Lesotho Transportation Study: FinalReport: March 1974 prepared by Roughton & Partners.

LESOTHO

tentative Second Five Xear Develonenmt Plan 107S/80metaites based an June 1973 prices in Raz4s

Roads PI=

T A,LI Period of Development PlanLength F:v,-

Nare of Road XMA 197/75 1975/76 1976/77 1977/78 1978/79 1979/80 198/S1

1. Bettermnt and IqRoveents

a) Southern 1,0,000 150,375 150,000

b) Northern 130,000 136,300 130,000

c) Lowlands/Foothills Lo0,000 119,250 110,000

2. A.1 Butna-Buthe - Joel's Drift 13.9 112,650 112,650(Drainage Regravelling)

3. A.1 Lala - Letseng La Ter.l9' 70.2 9l 0,000 213,44W 600,000 300,000(Improvement to Access Track)

4. A.3 St. Michaels - Hantsonyane 104.0 770,000 770,000(Improvement to Gravel 3)

5. A.3 Mantsonyane - Thaba-TseIa 53.3 1,1)0 000 100,000 800,000 200,000(Improvemzent to Gravel 3)

6. A.3 Thaba-Taeka - Taung 32.7 350,000 350,000(Improvenent to Gravel 3)

7. B.416 Roma - Senonkong 79.6 3,269.000 1,000,000 1,269,000 1,000,000(Improement to Gravel 3)

8. A.18 Mafeteng - Van Rooyens Gate" 16.7 1405,000 o05,000(Imnprovement to Bitumen 1)

9- A.11 Leribe - Caledons Poort 40.0 1,8a6,000 886,000 1,000,000(Improvesent to Bitumen 1)

10. A.1 2 Hafeteng - ohale's Hoek 47.3 1,000,000 1,000,000 1,034,000(Improvement to Bitumen 1) _

Total Construrtion Coet 10,132,650 619.965 990,000 2.687.650 2.955,000 2.550,000 1,000.000 1.034.000

Maintenance Cost 4,:00,000 500,000 700,000 800,000 900,000 1,000,000 1,000,000 1,000,000

1/ a) B.232 B.231 - Kolojane b) A.1 Joel's Drift - Lala c) i.4 Quthirg - Mlunt Moroosi-6ekmkeaB.24 Teyateyaneng - Hapoteng A.1 Letaeng La Terai - iokhotlwng A.4 Mpiti - SekakesB.40 haleopeka - Old Hoek A.13 llokhotlong - Sani A.4 Mpiti - TsoelikeB.41 Hafetmen - Tsoloane A.11 Qachas Nelk - Ipiti.

A.15 ongeluks' Nek - A.. ,Notes, Fiiancing - 1/ Bo available; it can be noted that amounts for 197W/75 differ with the budget (Table ).

3/ Hining company has allocated funds (R 1 million) and will inplement the wrk.3/ IDA Second Highway Project will possibly cover these sectiDns. D Y

So, only part of 2., 7. and 10. have no funds assiped. CD

Sourceas Planning and Developint Offlce, September 19711, based on Roughton & Partrers Transportation Study; Ministry of Works and CoMMnicatbns.

F

ANNEX VII

Page 10

drainage and regravelling. The road is 13.9 km long and has a two-lane gravelsurface. The cost of regravelling the road (100 mm thick) by equipment isabout R20,000 and there are three vented fords to be built at a cost ofR24,750, leaving approximately R68,000 for drainage improvements. Threegangs could be employed on this project for the whole year. Costs couldincrease by about R7,000 (6 percent) and the break-even wage rate for un-skilled labor would be about 85 cents/day.

Lala sLetsena lTerai Road

29. Item 3 of the road program is the upgrading of the Lala to Letseng-la-Terai Road (70.2 km) at an estimated cost of R1,113,440. This work is tobe carried out during 1974/77 by the mining company which is re-opening thediamond mines near Letseng-la-Terai. The work includes the realignment ofa 6.5 km section of the Moteng pass, a number of vented fords and generalimprovements to provide a formation width of 4.0 m with a 3.2 m gravelledcarriageway.

30. It is understood that the mining company will undertake this workusing equipment under the general supervision of the Roads Division. However,if labor-intensive methods are used during the last two years of construction,about 28 gangs could be employed during 1975/76 and 14 gangs during 1976/77.Costs during these two years would increase by around R174,000 (19 percent)and the break-even wage rate for unskilled labor would be about 71 cents.

St. Michael's to Mantsonyane Road

31. This is an existing engineered gravel road with an average forma-tion width of 6 m. Some improvement is required to vertical and horizontalcurves to improve sight distances; the road drainage and formation need im-provement and regravelling is required. The road in general is on the cor-rect alignment and major earthworks will not be necessary. Designs and con-tract documents for this 104 km road are being prepared by consultants andthe work is programmed for 1976/77. Provision of R770,000 is made in thefive-year plan for this work.

32. The work would require about 38 labor gangs for a full year butthis would increase costs by about R118,000 (15 percent). The break-evenwage rate for unskilled labor would be about 78 cents per day.

Mantsonyane to Thaba Tseka Road

33. This road, an extension to that above, is programmed for construc-tion in 1976/79, at a cost of R1,100,000. The existing road is a single-laneearth access track with poor alignment and steep gradients. It has an averageformation width of 3 m. The standards to which the new road is to be builtare not yet finalized. Consultants are preparing designs for both Gravel 3and Gravel 4 standards and estimates of construction costs by both equipment-intensive and labor-intensive methods.

ANNEX VIIPage 11

33. A number of further preliminary estimates for the cost of this proj-ect are contained in the Final Report of the Lesotho Transportation Study:

(a) A new alignment with a formation width of 6 m reduced to 5 min the more difficult sections and a carriageway width of3.5 m - R2,391,900.

(b) Improving the existing track as a first stage plus construc-tion to (a) on certain sections - R1,209,000.

(c) To carry out the work as at (a) but by labor-intensive methods -R2,818,000. This envisaged a labor force of 3,000 employedover a three-year period with an assumed daily wage for un-skilled labor of 70 cents.

35. Taking the work that could be completed by equipment-intensivemethods at the total programmed cost of R1,100,000 as a basis, the addi-tional cost of carrying out this work by labor-intensive methods would beabout R210,000 (19 percent). This would provide employment for some 55gang years and the break-even daily wage rate for unskilled labor would beabout 74 cents. This iabor content is about one-third lower than that givenat (c) above.

Thaba Tseka to Taung Road

36. This road is a further extension, some 32.7 km in length of theprevious two projects. The existing road is a single lane track whichcrosses the Orange River at Komo Komo on a low level bridge. Consultantsare currently preparing designs and estimates for the improvement of thisroad to both Gravel 3 and Gravel 4 standards, for construction by labor-and equipment-intensive methods.

37. The preliminary estimates of cost contained in the Final Report ofthe Lesotho Transportation Study are:

(a) Gravel 3 standards on a new alignment but crossing the OrangeRiver by the existing bridge (6.0 m formation, 3.5 m carriage-way) - R1,080,381 by contract or R1,460,832 by labor-intensivemethods.

(b) Improvements to the existing access track, including wideningto 4.0 m formation, gravelling, additional side drains, cul-verts and fords but only local improvements to bends andgradients - R227,718.

38. Only R350,000 is provided in the second five-year development planand hence for the purpose of evaluating the job potential of this project ithas been assumed that the work would be limited to (b) above together withsome further improvements to bends and gradients. On this basis, labor-intensive methods would increase costs by about R52,000 (15 percent). Thework would offer employment to about 16 gangs during 1978/79 and the break-even daily wage rate for unskilled labor would be around 78 cents.

ANNEX VIIPage 12

Roma to Semonkong Road

39. This project is item 9 in the road development program. The exist-ing road is a single-lane track in very poor condition. There are no culvertsand only one of the six rivers is crossed by a ford. There are two passes tobe negotiated and a difficult climb down and out of the Makhatleng Valley, allwith sharp hairpin bends and steep gradients. R3,269,000 is provided for theconstruction of the new road, almost 80 km long, on a new alignment to Gravel3 standards (6.0 m formation, 3.5 m carriageway). No design work has as yetbeen started and the work is programmed for construction during 1976/79.

40. Using labor-intensive methods would provide employment for some180 gang years; 54 in 1976/77, 72 in 1977/78 and 54 in 1978/79. Much of thelabor required would have to be accommodated in camps in view of the lack ofpopulation in the area. Costs would increase by about R615,000 (19 percent)and the break-even wage rate would be around 76 cents per day.

Mafeteng to Van Rooyen's Gate Road

41. This is a two-lane gravel road and the condition of the surface isgood. R405,000 is provided in the development program for the reconstructionof the road to Bitumen 1 standards. The work involves reshaping and upgradingof the formation, the provision of a stabilized base course and the provisionof a bituminous surfacing. This type of work is not suited to labor-intensivetechniques. The work is programmed for 1976/77 but design work has not yetstarted.

Leribe to Caledon's Poort Road

42. Between Leribe and Butha Buthe, the existing two-lane gravel roadrequires regravelling and parts need realignment. From Butha Buthe to Caledon'sPoort, the road surface is in better condition. There is provision in thefive-year plan for upgrading this road to Bitumen 1 standards at a cost ofR1,886,000 and the work is programmed for 1977/78. As for the previousproject, this work is not suitable for labor-intensive methods. Designwork has also not started.

Mafeteng to Mohale's Hoek Road

43. It is proposed to upgrade this road to Bitumen 1 standard at acost of R2,034,000. Construction is programmed for 1979/81. Again, thisproject is not suitable for labor-intensive techniques.

Community and Rural Development Office

44. At the time of the Mission's visit most of the road building equip-ment operated by the Community and Rural Development Office was concentratedon the road from the top of Sani's Pass to the border of the R.S.A. Otherequipment was being mobilized in the Mokhotlong area for improvement/mainte-nance of the existing track from Mokhotlong to Rafalotsane. There are noknown proposals for construction of new tracks and it is understood that allwork will be concentrated on the maintenance and improvement of existing

ANNEX VIIPage 13

tracks. Consequently, no employment possibilities have been identified inrespect of these works.

Thaba Bosiu Agricultural Development Scheme

45. The original program for this project called for the constructionof 91 km of main access all-weather tracks and 99 km of subsidiary dry-weather tracks at an estimated cost of R718,000. However, the program hasbeen changed to provide a higher standard of main access road; 74 km ofGravel 3 roads are being built by the Roads Division construction unitsto designs prepared by consultants. There is no provision for the re-mainder of the roads in the original program which is being financed byIDA. Since construction is well advanced, this road project has not beenconsidered suitable for changing to labor-intensive methods.

46. There is still a need for about 400 km of dry-weather access tracksto minimal standards to link the main access roads to collection points andfor further unidentified tracks to more collection points. USAID is provid-ing equipment for soil conservation work and it is intended that these tracks,will be built by this equipment, possibly with assistance from Food Aid labor.No specific funds are provided in the budget for the cost of construction ofthe tracks, and no engineering has been carried out. The new access trackswill mostly follow existing tracks which need repair but about 50 km of newtrack will be required on side long ground. Tracks need to be passable totractor/trailer units in the dry season only.

47. This type of work can be carried out almost entirely by hand labor.It is difficult to estimate costs without detailed knowledge of the conditionof existing tracks and where new tracks are to be located but costs wouldprobably be in the region of R400 per km for improvements and R3,200 per kmfor new tracks on sidelong ground. Total costs would therefore be abou.tR300,000 which would provide work for about 15 gangs spread out over a two-year period. Further road construction of this nature will undoubtedly beneeded in any extension of the agricultural development scheme.

Khomokhoana Agricultural Development Scheme

48. There is provision in this project for the construction of 143 kmof minor access tracks at a cost of R28,000 (1971-72 prices). The work willmainly consist of improving existing tracks. It is iptended that projectequipment will be used for this purpose assisted by Food Aid labor whichhas not been costed.

49. By labor-intensive methods, costs of-treek improvement would beabout R400ikm, so that the total funds needed would be approximately R57,000.This would provide work for about three gangs for one year.

ANNEX VIIPage 14

Se er Agricultural Developmen me

50. The road requirements for this project are for 114 km of main ac-cess tracks and 165 km of minor access tracks. Costs have been tentativelyestimated at R3,000 and R2,000/km, respectively. The main access tracks areurgently required to give access to large areas of arable land mountainousgrazing country and to facilitate field activities of personnel engaged inproject planning and agricultural extension. There are no funds availableat present and detailed alignments have still to be selected. However, astart has been made on the Seaka Bridge - Phamong track (60 km) with theassistance of some 700 Food Aid labor.

51. The immediate priority is the construction of the main access tracks.It will cost at least R10,000 per km to construct all-season minimum standardtracks in this type of terrain, and about R3,200 per km for the lower standarddry-weather access tracks. Together these roads would provide employment forabout 72 gang years, or 24 gangs over a three-year period. Total costs willbe about R1,642,000. Further roads will be needed if the project is extendedin the future.

C. Job Opportunities in Routine Road Maintenance

52. The main work involved in routine road maintenance consists of keep-ing the running surface in good condition by patching potholes, correctingwheel-tracking on gravelled roads; cleaning drains and culverts, and cuttinggrass. Minor improvements, such as widening sight-lines and the provisionof new drains, are often carried out as part of routine maintenance. Allthis work can be carried out by hand labor using virtually no equipment.The effectiveness of the maintenance is largely dependent on the standardsto which the road has been constructed.

53. On low-trafficked low-standard roads, and assuming that labor isavailable, the best way to organize this work normally is to establish smallmaintenance camps at intervals of about ten kilometers so that labor does notspend too long in walking to its work place. Six to eight men (including aheadman), depending on the nature of the terrain and corresponding difficul-ties of maintenance, are based at each camp. The road is divided into sec-tions of 40-50 kilometers, each supervised by a road maintenance foreman.The maintenance labor is permanent and the provision of camps leads tobetter motivation and discipline in the work force.

54. On higher standard roads with greater traffic volumes, the mainte-nance forces are generally smaller, concentrated at less frequerlt intervalsand assisted by equipment such as graders, rollers and trucks. This arrange-ment is largely for administrative convenience and, unless wage rates are high,can lead to higher costs. There may be a possibility of increasing the use ofunskilled labor on roads already being maintained by the Roads Division butthis has not been taken into account in the Mission's estimates. The posi-tion should be reviewed when the district organizations have been established.

ANNEX VIIPage 15

55. The Roads Division is scheduled to take over the maintenance ofall tracks on the primary network by 1976, those on the secondary networkby 1978 and those on the tertiary network by 1979. The distances involvedare:

Network km.

Primary 530Secondary 835Tertiary 291

Total 1,656 /L

/1 There are inconsistencies in the distancesobtained from different sources.

No detailed program has as yet been prepared for the take-over and thii; willclearly depend on the progress made in setting up the district maintenamceorganizations and the availability of trained maintenance foremen.

56. Advantage could be taken of the presence of construction forcescarrying out the improvements referred to in paragraph 25 to set up and pro-vide on-the-job training for labor to maintain those roads which are in theprimary network. These are:

Route Section Length

Al Letseng-la-Terai to Mokhotlong 72.0 km.A13 Mokhotlong to Sani's Top 53.6A13 Sani's Top to Border 6.8A4 Mount Moorosi to Sekakes 117.7A15 A4 to Ongeluks' Nek 15.1

265.2 km

Thereafter the program outlined above should be followed.

57. The cost of this routine maintenance is approximately R220 per kmper year. 1/ The number of new permanent jobs so created each year and thecorresponding total annual costs are:

1/ Based on a daily wage rate of R1.00 for labor and excluding the cost ofbuilding camps.

ANNEX VIIPage 16

Length CumulativeYear km Foreman Labor costs/year

1975/76 265 5 185 R 58,3001976/77 265 5 185 R116,6001977/78 415 9 290 R207,9001978/79 420 9 295 R300,3001979/80 291 7 205 R364,320

1,656 35 1,160

D. Job Opportunities in Recurrent Road Maintenance

58. Apart from routine maintenance, there is the periodic work of re-sealing surfaced and regravelling unsurfaced roads. The required frequencyis dependent on traffic volumes and is greater in the mountainous areas,but is generally in the range of once every four to seven years. The volumeof bituminous resealing work is not great (24 km in 1974/75) and in view ofthe lower standards usually associated with labor-intensive work of thisnature, it is better to continue using equipment-intensive methods.

59. Lesotho is fortunate in that it has ample supplies of readilyavailable materials 1/ suitable for gravel-surfaced roads, including doloriteand sandstone gravels in the lowlands/foothills areas and decomposed basaltin the mountains. Haul distances seldom exceed five kilometers. The workinvolved in regravelling unsurfaced roads consists of:

(a) Excavating, loading, hauling, unloading and spreading gravelto a depth, usually, of 100 mm;

(b) Loading, hauling and spreading water for compaction, espe-cially during the dry season;

(c) Shaping and compacting.

60. All these operations can be carried out by equipment with minimaluse of unskilled labor and this is the normal work method adopted by theRoads Division. On the other hand, all operations except haulage in excessof;(say) 100 meters and compaction can be carried out by labor. Providedthat proper compaction is given at the time of spreading, the work can becarried out at any time of the year though some disruption can occur duringthe rainy season. Compaction can be left to the action of traffic duringthe dry season but this leads to a poor running surface, particularly sincemany of the gravels contain oversize material which rollers break down duringcompaction.

1/ RRL Report No. 47: Road Making Mlaterials in Basutoland - UK Transportand Road Research Laboratory 1966.

ANNEX VIIPage 17

61. Maximum job creation while still retaining reasonable quality:stand-ards and costs can be achieved by mechanizing the haulage-of gravel, the load-ing, haulage and spreading of water and the compaction operation.. In view ofthe relatively short haulage distances, the tractor/trailer technique shouldbe used with several trailers/water trailers to each tractor, thereby maximiz-

ijug the use of the expensive traction unit. Compaction equipment should beeither towed or of such a size that its capacity is matched to that of thelabor force.

62. The approximate annual requirements in km for regravelling rcads,allowing for the additional lengths being taken over by the Roads Departmentand the planned rate of improvement/betterment works referred to earlier,are: 1/

CarriagewayPoad Type Width 1975/76 1976/77 1977/78 1978/79 1979/80

Gravel 2-lane 7.6 85 50 50 50 50Gravel 1 lane 3.5 50 50 50 50 100Gravel tracks 3.2 -- 40 100 160 250

63. With the setting, up of the road maintenance districts, regravellinggangs could be organized within each district. Assuming an LCU-type gangof 50 men with one foreman and one assistant foreman, the gang-weeks requiredper kilometer would be about 2.6, 1.2 and 1.1, respectively, for gravel 2-lane, gravel 1-lane and gravel tracks.

64. Assuming an average haul distance of 2 km, the costs of a regravel-long gang are estimated at about R32,000 per year. Spreading the work loadmore evenly between years, the jobs that would be created and the costs peryear are:

Year Foreman No. Asst. Foreman No. Labor Gangs Annual Cost

1975/76 5 5 5 R160,0001976/77 5 5 5 R160,0001977/78 5 5 5 R160,0001978/79 7 7 7 R224,0001979/80 11 11 11 R352,000

265. The above costs, equivalent to about 21 cents/m ., are based on con-servative estimates of labor productivity and a daily wage rate for unskilledlabor of R1.00. They compare with a reported current cost of 18-1/2 cents/m 2

for work carried out by the Roads Division using equipment-intensive methods.

1/ liased on the assumption that (1) improved roads will not need regravel-ling for four years following improvement, (2) regravelling frequenciesof four, five and six years for two-lane roads, one-lane roads andtracks, respectively.

ANNEX VIIPage 18

The unskilled labor content of the labor-intensive method is about 45 percentof the total cost. At a daily wage rate for unskilled labor of 74 cents, thecosts of the two methods would be about equal.

E. Summary of Job Opportunities

66. Table VII.4 contains a summary of the job opportunities describedin this Annex. It will be noted that the potential for new jobs drops offsharply in 1979/80--due entirely to the construction of bituminous surfacedroads at this time. Some rescheduling of the program would be desirable tobring forward to this period other projects which lend themselves to labor-intensive construction. A number of such projects are already identifiedin the Final Report of the Lesotho Transportation Study.

Table VII.)4(page i) EKPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES

Sector/Project Number of Gangs RemnrksShortTerm Mediumn T rm . _.______

Road Construction L975/76 1976/77 1977/78 1978/79 199/80 __

Betterment and improve- 14 __ __ _ Increase in costs R43,000 (11 per cent)ment of Southern, Break-even wage rate 78 cents per dayNorthern and Lowlands/Foothills Roads

Butha Buthe to __ 3 __ __ __ Increase in costs R7,000 (6 per cent)Joel's Drive Road Break-even wage rate 85 cents per day

Lala to Letseng- 28 14 -_ _ Increase in costs R174,000 (19 per cent)la-Terai Road Break-even wage rate 71 cents per day

St. Michael's to __ 38 __ __ __ Increase in costs R1]8,000 (15 per cent)Mantsonyane Road Break-even wage rate 78 cents per day

Mantsonyane to __ 5 40 10 __ Increase in costs R210,000 (19 per cent)Thaba Tseka Road Break-even wage rate 74 cents per day

Thaba Tseka to __ __ __ 16 __ Increase in costs R52,000 (15 per cent)Taung Road Break-even wage rate 78 cents per day

Roma to __ 54 72 5- Increase in costs R615,000 (19 per cent)Semonkong Road Break-even wage rate 76 cents per day

Mafeteng to Van __ __ __ __ _ Upgrading to Bitumen 1 standards and henceRooyen's Gate Road not suitable to labor-intensive techniques

Leribe to Caledon's __ __ __ __ __ As abovePoort Road

Mafeteng to Mohale __ __ __ __ __ As aboveHoek Road '. 9

Community and Rural __No -r -rt-�-ties

Development OfficeNew Roads

Table VII.4, Employment Opportunities(page ii)

Sector/Project Number of Gangs RemarksShort MediTerm Medium term

Road Construction 1975/76 1976/77 1977/78 1978/79- 1979/80 _

Thaba Bosiu agricul- 8 7 __ __ __ Total cost approximately R300,000. Worktural development assumed to be required in 1975/77. It thisscheme scheme is extended there will be further

job opportunities in road construction inlater years

Khomokhoana agricul- 3 __ __ __ __ Total cost about R57,000 and work assumedtural development in 1975/76. Further roads will be re-scheme quired if scheme is expanded.

Senqu River agricul- 24 24 24 __ __ Total costs estimated at R1,642,000.tural development Further roads will be required if thescheme scheme is extended

Sub-totals per sector 77 145 136 80

Road Maintenance

Routine

Taking over of access 4 9 13 19 23 The numbers of unskilled laborers employedtracks from the Corn- (185) (370) (660) (955) (1160) each year are shown in brackets.munity and Rural De-velopment Office

Periodic

Regravelling program 5 5 5 7 11 Increase in costs about 14 per cent. Break-even wage rate 74 cents per day

Sub-totals per sector 9 14 18 26 34 X

GRAND TOTAL 86 159 154 106 34

ANNEX VIIIPage 1

LABOR ABSORPTION IN AIRFIELD CONSTRUCTION AND MAINTENANCE

A. Introduction

1. The Ministry of Works and Communications is responsible for theconstruction of new airfields and the maintenance of the 31 existing air-fields in Lesotho. The Director of Civil Aviation plans this work but, hasno permanent maintenance staff and such maintenance as is needed is carriedout by the Roads Division or Food Aid labor on an ad hoc basis.

2. It is understood that surveys of all airfields are in progress bythe Roads Division to prepare a firm base on which to formulate future bet-terment/maintenance programs. At present the expenditure on airfield mainte-nance is approximately R7,000 per year.

B. Construction of New Airfields

3. The Mission was informed of a number of proposals for the construc-tion of new airfields. The most significant is that for a new internationalairport to serve Maseru and a detailed feasibility study is currently in pro-gress by consultants. However, it seems unlikely that projected traffic w:Llljustify construction starting much before 1980.

4. There is also a proposal for a new airfield at Maputsoe nearFicksburg to serve the projected diamond mine near Letseng-la-Terai. Sur-veys have been completed and construction is estimated to cost some R700,000.If this project goes ahead, it will be constructed by the mining company.

5. There are also proposals to construct five new airfields by FoodAid labor, including airfields at Kitani Falls (near Semonkong) and atOngeluk's Nek. The cost of this work, plus the upgrading of a number ofexisting airfields and the provision of minor buildings is estimated atabout R1.5 million. However, full details of these projects are not avail-able, and it is not yet certain whether or when the work will commence.

6. Although the construction of airfields, particularly the new air--port to serve Maseru, could absorb large numbers of unskilled labor,-theseprojects have not been taken into account in assessing the potential for jobcreation in the short and medium term owing to the lack of detailed proposalsand firm construction dates.

ANNEX VIIIPage 2

C. Maintenance of Existing Airfields

7. The Mission was provided with details of a scheme for the mainte-nance and betterment of airfields using labor-intensive methods. It providedfor 18,600 man days employment for a total of 790 workers of whom 745 wouldbe employed for 20 days. In addition, 72 workers would be retained as apermanent maintenance force. The work envisaged was the patching of holesand rutted surfaces, the removal of grass and other vegetation, and theconstruction of airstrip markings. Unskilled labor was costed at R1.00per day, giving a cost of R51,000 for the initial maintenance work andR25,000 per annum for the permanent maintenance force. The work wouldcover all 31 airfields in Lesotho.

8. The Mission accepts that the present arrangements for the mainte-nance of airfields are far from satisfactory and that there is a need forsome betterment of existing airstrips. However, in view of the very lowdensities of traffic, high maintenance standards cannot be justified. Thesurvey work referred to in paragraph (2) above should first be finished,before starting actual maintenance and improvement works. And even thenany labor-intensive construction methods should, the Mission believes, becarried out within the right organizational framework.

9. With the setting up of the district organizations and the extensionof road maintenance activities referred to in the preceding Annex, the RoadsDivision will be in a better position to provide facilities for the mainte-nance of airfields. Except perhaps for the main airfields at Maseru andQacha's Nek, permanent maintenance forces could not be justified. It shouldprove possible for regular inspections to be made by road maintenance fore-men and for any necessary maintenance work to be carried out on an ad hocbasis by nearby Roads Division staff.

10. While maintenance work of this nature is suitable for labor-inten-sivermethods, the work load would not be heavy and there would thus be littleopportunity for the creation of additional employment. On the other hand,betterment works could provide some short-term jobs but precise identifica-tion is needed before employment opportunities can be evaluated. Consequently,these works have been excluded from the Mission's assessment of the potentialfor job creation.

ANNEX IX

Page 1

LABOR ABSORPTION IN AGRICULTURE-

A. Introduction

1. The main scope for absorbing labor in agriculture for the foresee-able future lies in soil conservation works, which could best be undertakenunder the management of the three on-going projects, Leribe-Khomokhoana,Thaba Bosiu and Senqu River. There are further opportunities in the smallerschemes of the Soil Conservation Division of the Ministry of Agriculture,of which seven are on-going or planned and ready for early execution; inexpansion of the woodlot program and in the development of fish ponds.The proposed Thaba Tseka project in the highlands is unlikely to be laborintensive because soil conservation in the mountains is through grazing con-trol rather than works construction. Similarly, relatively small run-of-the-river irrigation schemes as being undertaken or planned use pumping andsprinkler irrigation and little labor is involved in construction. Thelarger storage scheme under consideration (Phuthiatsana) does not appearto be technically or economically justified from the incomplete informationavailable to the Mission.

2. Further ahead, there will be additional opportunities for employmentof labor in agricultural production itself. The proper installation and useof soil conservation works will increase the retention of rainfall and soilmoisture, particularly on arable lands. This, in association with appropriatechanges in land use, together with improvements in agricultural techniquesand increased use of fertilizer, better seed and other inputs, all of whichis already resulting from the operations of the three projects, should mate-rially increase productivity. Cropping patterns can, and are being intensifiedand this will further augment labor requirements and production. In contrastto the present situation where the bulk of production is to meet subsistenceneeds, the additional output will be of cash crops. This cash return may wellprovide the motivation to attract male labor back to farming.

3. The remainder of this Annex deals with the near to mid-term andnot with the long-term future.

B. Soil Conservation

1. General

4. Soil erosion has long been the major agricultural problem in Lesotho,due largely to the relatively steep terrain, some highly erodable soils, therainfall pattern, conducive land use practices and increasing population

1/ The Agricultural Sector is described in "The Economy of Lesotho",IBRD Report No. 331a - LSO of June 25, 1974, paras. 86-117.

ANNEX IXPage 2

pressure on the diminishing land resource. More than half a million acreshave been served by conservation works, largely terraces and grass bufferstrips, constructed mainly during the 1930's. These were largely unsuccess-ful due partly to lack of works maintenance and, more importantly, to failureto adjust traditional cropping and grazing practices to requirements essentialto soil conservation. It is now widely recognized in Lesotho that engineeringworks for conservation must be accompanied by changes in land use and manage-ment which can only be achieved through the enlightenment and cooperation ofthe fanners themselves.

5. Procedures for enlisting the support of the local chiefs and farmershave been developed under the UNDP/FAO Leribe pilot project where some 7,000acres have been served with conservation works, following the full agreementof farmers to necessary changes in traditional land use and livestock manage-ment. The project was designed to demonstrate the impact on production andincome of an integrated approach within the existing framework of land ten-ure. 1/ The first step was to improve farming practices through extensionservices and a simple pattern of inputs. When farmer attitudes appeared tobe receptive, preliminary layouts of soil conservation systems covering allor part of the area controlled by the local chief were explained and dis-cussed with the chief, village head-men and farmers. The discussions in-cluded the obligations of the farmers and changes which would have to bemade in their management, etc., e.g., exclusion from community grazing ofcritical erosion areas and of fodder crops. When agreement in principlehad been reached, detailed conservation plans for the "village" area werecompleted and similar but more specific discussions were held. Construc-tion was not commenced until formal agreement had been reached with allconcerned. The farmers and chiefs have met their obligations and a pro-gressive attitude towards conservation works and measures is spreadingrapidly.

-6. Generally similar procedures are being applied in other conserva-tion and agricultural development projects. Detailed conservation planshave been prepared and farmer agreement in principle has been reached for37,000 acres undet the Khomokhoana Project, which is an expansion of theLeribe project. Final plans and farmer agreement have been reached forthe first 5,000 acres of soil conservation for the Thaba Bosiu projectand a similar area is well under way. Conservation planning is also pro-ceeding within the Senqu River project and a number of the smaller projectsbeing implemented by the Soil Conservation Division (CD).

7. The scope for an expanded soil conservation program is furtherenhanced by an USAID Technical Assistance Project approved in June 1974,to greatly strengthen the Soil Conservation Division of the Ministry ofAgriculture (see page 14). The US contribution will provide for 37 man

1/ The land tenure system is described in "The Economy of Lesotho," IBRDReport 331a-LSO of June 25, 1974, paras. 27 to 37.

ANNEX IXPage 3

years of expatriate expert assistance together with machinery, overseas train-ing, etc. This additional expertise will considerably increase the capacityof existing professional staff in planning and supervision and permit a majorexpansion of soil conservation activities under labor-intensive methods.

2. Labor Intensive Conservation Works

8. The labor absorptive capacity of soil conservation works is analyzedunder three main activities - construction of grassed waterways, diversionditches and miscellaneous activities.

9. A detailed soil conservation plan for a "village" area of 5,000acres (2,000 ha) in the Thaba Bosiu project, which is thought to be repre-sentative of the non-mountainous lands of the project area, has been usedas the basis for employment capacity estimates. About 2,000 acres (800 ha)are arable and the balance is grazing and steep unusable slopes.

10. The conservation works would be constructed predominantly on arableland and labor requirements have been calculated on the basis of arable landrather than gross project area. However, some adjustment is made for worksnecessary on grazing land and 10 percent has been added to the arable landfigure for waterways, and 25 percent for diversion ditches and other activi-ties. Quantities and work rate estimates from the Soil Conservation Officerfor Thaba Bosiu have been checked against Leribe experience by the Soil Con-servation Officer for that project. All estimates are made for a labor gangof 50 under a properly trained foreman with two assistants.

11. Grassed Waterways. These should be constructed up to a year aheadof the banks and diversion works, so that there is a firm sward of grass be-fore they are required to carry diverted water. The work should be confinedto the six months wet season to ensure proper grass establishment. The sampleplan includes 14 waterways averaging 10 yards in width and with a total lengthof 10,000 yards or covering an area of 20 acres (8 ha). The work involved in-cludes shaping the waterway so that it will carry the required volume of water,collecting from nearby fields the grass award or stolons (mainly Kikuyu grass)required for planting, transporting by tractor and trailer, planting, applyingfertilizer and watering. The labor gang should complete about half an acreof waterway per day or 40 days for 20 acres of waterway for 2,000 acres ofarable land. Adding 10 percent to cover waterways on grazing land, the normbecomes 44 gang days for 2,000 acres (800 ha) arable, or 55 gang days per1,000 hectares of arable land. Assuming 100 working days during the wetseason, 0.55 gangs would be required for 1,000 hectares, or one gang couldconstruct waterways for about 1,800 hectares of arable land per wet season.

12. Diversion Ditches. The conservation plan provides for-8.7 km ofdiversion ditches for 2,000 acres (800 ha) of cropland. This is equivalentto approximately 11 kms per 1,000 hectares of cropland. Adding 25 percentto cover diversion ditches required on grazing land gives 13,75 kms, or,say, 14 km per 1,000 hectares of cropland. Earthwork involved in construc-tion is apl-roximatelv 1,000 m3 per km of ditch, or 14,000 m3 per 1,000 hec-tares. Assuming that the gang moves 100 m3 per day (2 m3 per man is rela-tively low figure for the simple dig and pile involved) the norm for diversion

ANNEX IXPage 4

ditches becomes 140 gang days per 1,000 hectares of arable land. Assuming200 working days per year, this is equivalent to 0.7 gang years per 1,000hectares.

13. Miscellaneous Activities. The various works involved are largelyconcerned with the stabilization of gullies or "dongas" including rock pack-ing, groin and silt trap construction, tree and grass planting, watering andfertilizing, and construction of small dams. Work may be done on tracksgiving access to fields and some work on terraces and banks, including broadlybased crossing points for carts or equipment. Fencing of critical areas isalso undertaken. Labor requirements for these tasks cannot be directlyquantified but experience is that the work involved is at least equal tothe work in construction of diversion ditches. The norm is therefore takenas 140 gang days per 1,000 hectares of arable land or 0.7 gang years per1,000 hectares.

14. In terms of labor gangs of 50, requirements for soil conservationworks per 1,000 hectares of arable land are summarized:

Grass Waterways 55 gang days or 0.27 gang years,during wet season only

Diversion Ditches 140 gang days or 0.70 gang years,Miscellaneous Activities 140 gang days or 0.70 gang years

TOTAL 335 gang days or 1.67 gang years per1,000 hectare arable.

15. The above estimates are, of course, approximate but should indicatethe order of magnitude of the labor absorptive capacity of conservation worksunder labor intensive techniques. One or more gangs from the proposed LaborConstruction Unit should be employed as soon as possible, preferably on theThaba Bosiu project, so that more accurate data based on actual experiencecan be obtained.

3. Soil Conservation Costs

16. Cost estimates are based on data provided in the field by expe-rienced soil conservationists but are necessarily approximate. They coverdirect field costs and exclude overheads and contingencies. They also ex-clude the cost of constructing contour banks or terraces and grass strips,which would continue to be mechanized. Labor is priced at Rl per man day.The estimates cover costs per 1,000 hectares of arable land.

ANNEX IXPage 5

Grassed Waterways R per 1,000 ha arable

Labor - 55 gang days at Ri 2,750Plus supervision (3 for R7 day) 390

3,140Fertilizer 10 ha at 500 kg/ha 400Tractor and trailer 25 days at R30 750Carting water (for 10 ha grass) 500Tools, etc. 50

4,840

Diversion Ditches

Labor, 140 gang days 7,000Plus supervision 980

7,980Tractor (and trailer) work 10 days at R30 300Materials 400Tools, etc. 200

8,880

Miscellaneous Activities

Labor, 140 gang days 7,000Plus supervision 980

7,980Tractor work (up to D4) 30 days at R70 2,100Materials - cement, etc. 1,000Tools, etc. 200

11,280

The total is R25,000 for 1,000 hectares or R25 per hectare of arable land.Arable land is expected to average 40 percent of the area surveyed for '3oil

conservation systems. The area surveyed for 1,000 ha arable would be 2,500hectares and the cost of conservation per hectare surveyed would be R10..

17. Costs will vary according to the terrain and, in addition, theabove estimates are subject to a wide margin of error. Provision must bemade to collect reliable data from the early operations of the proposedlabor unit. Meanwhile, they may be used to give some approximate indica-tion of the cost of labor intensive versus mechanized construction. Thecomparable cost estimate for the Thaba Bosiu project is about R39 per hec-tare of arable land, and for the Khomokhoana project, R21 per hectare arable.

4. Recurrent Maintenance Costs

18. The 1Watershed Management Plan for the Khomokhoana Project emphasizesthat if conservation projects are to succeed it is essential that the worksreceive sufficient maintenance and that agriculture extension services becontinued. The Plan assesses continuing staff needed to ensure that con-servation practices are followed and that works are maintained as one con-servation and three extension assistants for 40,000 acres with about 8,000

ANNEX IXPage 6

farm families. Works are designed for one-year-in-ten rainfall intensities.Farmers' labor would normally be sufficient for maintenance but emergencyrepairs may require machinery. Annual maintenance costs estimates for40,000 acres, adjusted for subsequent escalation, are nearly R10,000, in-cluding about R1,500 for the occasional use of machinery, or perhaps, 20days for a LCU maintenance gang.

19. Continuing requirements for maintenance are, therefore, assessedat one assistant level officer and an annual maintenance cost of R2,500 for10,000 acres of soil conservation (4,000 acres arable), and the possible em-ployment of one labor gang for 20 days.

5. Rate of Planning

20. A planning team normally consists of a senior soil conservationist(expatriate), a trained assistant, at least two diploma or certificate levelin-service trainees and an experienced extension officer. Specialist expertssuch as soil surveyors are also required from time to time. There is one suchteam operating at each of the Khomokhoana, Thaba Bosiu and Senqu River proj-ects. A second team is under recruitment for Khomokhoana and most elementsfor a second team at Senqu River. An "associate expert" planner and a lay-out man ("volunteer") are being provided through UNDP for Thaba Bosiu andno doubt USAID could complete a second team if necessary. It should, there-fore, be possible to operate six teams if shown to be warranted.

21. One team can complete the planning and layout for 5,000 acres (2,000ha) in a month. Final discussions and agreement with the chief and farmersusually takes several months. This is mainly the responsibility of the ex-tension officer and discussions proceed concurrently with several "village"plan areas. Discussions for each area total about a month, so that as longas there is about six months lead time, field plans can be completed andfinal agreement can be reached at a rate of about 2,000 hectares per month.Allowing for some village dropouts and other lost time, an annual rate of16,000 hectares per team can be expected.

22. The above 16,000 ha represents the gross area of the land whichwarrants survey for soil conservation within the project area. Allowingfor exclusion of unusable land where nothing is to be done, the proportionof arable land would average about 40 percent, so that one team can planworks for 6,400 hectares of arable land per year. Execution of works forthe present feasible rate of planning (three teams) of about 19,200 hectaresper year should be able to absorb about 33 labor gang years, or 1,650 laborers.In view of the need to widen employment opportunities, to complete existingconservation projects as soon as possible and to plan for subsequent expandedprojects, an additional planning team should be established urgently at eachof the projects. Six teams would double the rate of forward planning.

ANNEX IXPage 7

6. Labor Opportunities by Project

The Thaba Bosiu Project

23. The project is nearby to Maseru and covers the watershed of theLittle Caledon River with an area of about 300,000 acres of which 75,000acres are arable, 125,000 acres are grazing land and 100,000 acres areunusable. The area contains about 17,000 farming families.

24. The objectives of the project are to increase agricultural produc-tivity and farmer incomes by arresting soil erosion and providing extensionservices, farm inputs, credit, and research and improved marketing services.The project includes soil conservation and road construction works and thetransformation of land use patterns towards permanent systems of farming.A fully integrated system of cropping and livestock is to be introduced onan initial area of 5,000 acres.

25. The project cost estimate was US$9.8 million (Rand 7.6 million) ofwhich $5.6 million was financed by IDA. USAID provided $2.8 million, mainlyfor the soil conservation component. The credit became effective in August1973.

26. An autonomous Project Authority chaired by the Senior PermanentSecretary executes the project through a competent project manager withcapable senior staff. The project is staffed up to establishment exceptfor the senior research officer and some local staff.

27. Field activities started in April 1973 and good progress has beenmade, particularly in the extension work, in the supply of farm inputs andarrangement for their distribution through Village Distribution Points, ofwhich 50 out of 80 planned are already in operation. Most farmers paid cashfor inputs rather than seeking credit. Marketing facilities were improved.Intensive crops such as potatoes, beans and asparagus are being encouraged.Funding is insufficient for the road program of 91 kms of major access and99 kms of minor access roads because of higher design standards, dollar de-valuation and escalation, and will finance only 74 kms of major access roads.In lieu of the balance, means are being sought to spot repair 150 kms ol minoraccess roads together with new construction of 50 kms. This would enableproper supply of inputs to all VDP's.

28. Project management anticipates that funds will be exhausted by thefourth year (1977) instead of the fifth, with all project objectives mel: ex-cept for some road and soil conservation works. A request has already beenmade to IBRD for assistance in preparing an expanded follow-up project.

29. The project's Conservation Division has 11 professional or technicalofficers including a Chief Conservation and Roads Officer, a Conservation En-gineer, a Soil Scientist and a Hydrologist. It requires an additional sixtrained staff, of which two might be expatriates. An experienced "associateexpert" planner and a "volunteer" lay-out man are being provided by JNDP .The work will mainly be mechanized. Procurement is a year behind, but l:heequipment is now arriving.

ANNEX IXPage 8

30. Conservation planning is on schedule with 5,000 acres (2,000 ha)fully planned and agreed and confirmed in writing by the local Chief andfarmers. Planning is also completed for a second area and discussions areproceeding. Collection of grass for waterways for the first area has com-menced with local labor at RO.60 per day. Not enough persons are offeringand these are almost all women.

31. The planning team is capable of planning conservation works formore than 15,000 acres (6,000 hectares) of arable land per year but projectofficers have some doubts as to whether farmer agreement can be reached atthis rate and whether the target for completion of works for 15,000 acresof arable land per year can be met. A great deal of time was spent in dis-cussioni and agreement for the first 5,000 acres because this was regarded asprototype for the area where land use is to be transformed into a fully in-tegrated system of livestock and cropping. In addition, farmers (and Chiefs)should become more receptive as agreement is reached in other areas. Forthese reasons, the Mission believes that farmer agreement at the rate of16,000 acres (6,400 ha) (para 21) should be practicable. A key factor willbe the calibre and farmer acceptance of the senior extension officer con-cerned, and this should be given special attention.

32. Employment Opportunities. This project appears to be the mostsuitabLe for the initial experimental operations of some of LCU's own laborgangs. Short term employment opportunities will depend on the season of theyear. Grass waterways must be completed ahead of diversion ditches and manyother works, and must be constructed during the wet season. In the wet sea-son from three to four gangs would be needed to construct waterways for 6,400hectares arable. Shaping of the waterways would be done by hand labor ratherthan machinery. Should the program commence during the dry season, two ormore gangs could be employed on "donga" and similar work until switched towaterways with the wet season.

33. Given prior construction of waterways, about 11 gangs would beneeded to construct all the works at the 6,400 ha annual rate. This wouldnecessitate a change over from mechanized to labor intensive methods foralmost all works except terraces and buffer strips. This would not bewarranted until trials of the best "mix" of machinery and labor had beencompleted. It would be reasonable therefore during a short term emergencyto continue with the employment of three to four gangs for diversion ditchand "donga" work during the dry season.

34. Should a medium term emergency arise there would be sufficient leadtime for proper preparations to be made and skilled supervisors would be avail-able from the LCU. If the go ahead decision is during the wet season, workshould be commenced immediately on waterways, diverting existing- project re-sources to this work as necessary. If during the dry, preparation should bemade to start the labor gangs on waterways with the start of the wet season.

ANNEX IXPage 9

35. If only one conservation planning - farmer agreement team is operat-ing, 11 labor gangs could be employed. This assumes that the change over frommechanized to labor intensive methods would be made, bearing in mind that. therewould be enough experience from the LCU by then to decide whether this wouldbe warranted.

36. A second survey team should be established during 1975/76 whichcould plan and prepare for a second 6,400 ha arable per year. This woulclgive employment for another 11 gangs or a total of 22 gangs or 1,100 laborers.At this rate the project conservation works would be completed in from 2 to2-1/2 years. Any continuation of this rate beyond the project area woulcl ofcourse, require a new project with increased professional and technical staffand supporting services and financing.

37. Costs. The Mission's approximate estimate of direct field costs,before contingencies, of labor intensive works is about R25 per hectare ofarable land. This work excludes construction of contour banks, terraces andgrass buffer strips which would be mechanized and add about R3 to costs perhectare.

38. The IDA appraisal report estimate of the cost of Soil Conservation,before contingencies, is R1.971 million. Treating the cost of Consultancies,Training and Staff (other than plant operators and laborers) as overhead, theremaining cost is R1.164 million. Applied to 30,000 hectares (75,000 ac:res)this represents R38.8 per hectare of arable land. It appears, therefore, onthe incomplete evidence as now available, that funds for soil conservationunder the project should be more than sufficient for construction under Laborintensive methods.

Khomokhoana Project

39. Located some 60 miles northeast of Maseru by good road, the projectcovers the Khomokhoana River watershed and some adjacent areas which total48,000 acres. The terrain is exceptionally favorable and some two-thirdsof the area is arable land. The project includes continuation and expansionof the Leribe Pilot Project (UNDP/FAO) which commenced in 1970, to introduceand demonstrate an integrated approach, within the existing land tenure sys-tem, to agricultural development over an area of 7,000 acres. Farmer responseto the Leribe approach has been excellent and similar techniques are now to beapplied to the wider areas. Agricultural support services will concentrate ona package of inputs including mechanization, seed and fertilizer, and on creditand marketing services and better farmer organization. Better crop and animalhusbandry practices and land use will improve soil structure and fertility andtend to reduce soil erosion. Additionally, erosion control works are to bebuilt and provision made for their maintenance.

40. FAO continues as executing agency. Staff, equipment and facilitiesprovided under the Leribe project are being transferred to Khomokhoana. Ex-cluding the funds involved in this transfer, the Plan of Operations signed onJuly 24, 1974 provided for a project cost of US$2.93 million of which SIDAwill contribute $1.89 million and GOL $0.84 million. A substantial revision

ANNEX IXPage 10

of cost estimates is presented in a revised Plan of Operations of August1974, which is under consideration. If agreed, the cost estimate will beincreased to US$4.19 million of which $2.46 million from SIDA and $1.73 mil-lion from GOL.

41. The project is executed by a Project Manager appointed by FAO witha national co-manager, and advice from a Consultative Committee which has metsomewhat irregularly. When UNDP support via Leribe ends in March 1975, aProject Director appointed by GOL with agreement by FAO and SIDA, will assumethe duties of Project Manager. FAO will appoint a Team Leader from the FAOstaff.

42. There is one well experienced Soil Conservation Officer with onelocal counterpart and a second locally trained officer. Soil survey is com-pleted and the surveyor has left. A.soil conservation engineer for designand supervision is due in November-for two years. Three more diplomatetechnicians for in-service training are being sought.

43. The project is to be executed over five years from July 1974. Theareas involved for soil conservation are:

Project Area

Status of Acres HectaresWorks Gross Arable Gross Arable

K. River Watershed Planned 37,000 25,000 14,800 10,000

New Area To be planned 4,000 2,700 1,600 1,080

Sub Total Works to beConstructed 41,000 27,700 16,400 11,080

Leribe Completed 7,000 4,700 2,800 1,870

Total Project 48,000 32,400 19,200 12,950

44. The Watershed Management Plan for the Khomokhoana River, with de-tails of conservation works and measures and their costs, was completed in1974, after preliminary agreement had been reached with the Chiefs andfarmers. The plans are well prepared and no time constraint is expectedin obtaining formal agreement so that construction could commence.

45. The new adJoining area of 4,000 acres could be planned in one monthby existing staff and ready agreement is expected because farmers in the gen-eral project area are now receptive to the integrated approach. Planning istherefore well ahead and should be eXtended beyond this project area to planfurther ahead against a possible labor absorption emergency. 1/ Such planning

1/ Planning should be extended irrespective of any employment emergency.

ANNEX IXPage 11

work is provided for in the work plan for the fourth and fifth project years.The Hlotse and Phuthiatsana watersheds--on either side of this project area--are both suitable for extension of the integrated approach on a regionalbasis. Each watershed covers about 250,000 acres. As recommended elsewhere,a second planning team should be established as soon as possible. The nainadditional staff requirement would be a second experienced soil conserva-tionist. The two teams could prepare detailed plans for 80,000 acres (32,000ha) gross per year.

46. Employment Opportunities. The planned rate of construction is 8,200acres gross area, or 5,540 acres (2,216 hectares) of arable land per year.Much of the work will be mechanized but equipment (other than from Leribe)is not due until the second project year. Hand labor is largely to be pro-vided through Food Aid. 1,350 hands are being sought, but availability ispresently much lower and 1,200 may be the maximum. It is essential that LCUlabor units, if employed, be entirely separated both administratively andphysically from any Food Aid operations. The productivity of Food Aid laborwould probably be less than one-sixth of LCU labor, so from the viewpointof work output, the possible employment of 1,200 workers under Food Aid istaken as equivalent to 200 men (four labor gangs) of LCU labor. It isassumed in this analysis that should there be an employment emergency, FoodAid labor would be transferred to village or community works and that con-servation works would be undertaken by LCU gangs.

47. For a short term employment emergency, the season of the year wouldhave less significance than with Thaba Bosiu because the Khomokhoana planrelies much less on new grassed waterways and more on stabilizing dongasand existing waterways, which are non-seasonal works. Major equipment wouldnot have arrived, so labor intensive methods would be required. About 3.7gang years of LCU type labor would be required for the planned rate of con-struction of about 2,220 hectares arable per year.

48. To meet a medium term emergency, the planned rate of constructionmight readily be doubled. This would give scope for employment of eightLCU type gangs uinder capable gangers. The rate of execution of Khomokhoanaproject works should not be more than doubled because it would take at leasttwo years to carry out sufficient planning, prepare project proposals and ob-tain funding for a follow-up project. This new project could be designed toexecute works at the total rate for two planning teams, viz. 12,800 hectaresarable, requiring about 22 LCU gangs.

49. Costs. The Mission's approximate estimate of direct field costs,before contingencies, of labor intensive works is the same as for ThabaBosiu, or R25 per hectare of arable land. Recent Khomokhoana Project costestimates do not separate the costs of soil conservation works. The Water-shed Management Plan of 1972 gives a detailed breakdown of the cost of works.These are based on some data available on 1971 costs under the Leribe Projecttogether with unit cost data from the Department of Works. Quantities hadbeen estimated under the Plan. All labor was included at RO.60 per day, withthe possible cost free benefit of Food Aid labor disregarded.

ANNEX IXPage 12

50. Deducting the cost of making contour banks which would continue tobe mechanized, the 1971 cost of works which would under this proposal beundertaken by labor intensive methods was R162,000 for 10,000 hectares ofarable land, or R16.2 per hectare. Allowing 30 percent for price escala-tion since 1971, the cost becomes about R21 per hectare arable. It is pos-sible, therefore, that some relatively minor additional funding would benecessary for any changeover to labor intensive construction.

Senqu River Project

51. This UNDP/FAO project is designed to improve the specially diffi-cult conditions of agriculture in the Southern Districts of Mohale's Hoekand Quthing, which have a combined area of 1.6 million acres (20 percent ofthe country) and a population of about 220,000. Half of the area is moun-tain and there are about 165,000 acres of arable land. Climate in the low-lands is unfavorably dry. Soils are highly erodable and erosion is wide-spread. Activities are to be focussed within selected concentration areastotalling 286,000 acres, plus two concentration pastoral areas to be addedafter roads have been constructed to permit jeep access to the mountain areas.

52. The objectives of the project are essentially to strengthen exist-ing agricultural support services and take other measures necessary towardsexpansion and improvement of crop and animal production and marketing. Pro-duction practices are to be improved and conservation practices and worksare to be introduced. Run-of-the-river irrigation is to be developed anddemonstrated. Other important elements are staff training and formulationof a comnprehensive rural development plan for the entire area. The projectends in December 1976, and assistance has already been sought in preparationof a proposal for a follow-up rural development project to commence in 1977.

53. The project cost estimate is US$1.26 million of which UNDP con-tributes $1.05 million and GOL $216,000.

54. The project is being executed within the existing structure of theMinistry of Agriculture. Work programs are approved by the Permanent Secre-tary, subject to review by a Project Coordinating Committee, chaired by thePermanent Secretary and including representatives of other Ministries andinterested bodies. All existing agricultural staff in the two Districtscome under the Project Manager as counterparts, except that the Co-manager,as Senior Extension Officer, retains responsibility for the extension pro-gram. -Responsibility for other activities is to be hauded over to counter-parts during 1975 and 1976. Local staff will be fully responsible for plan-ning and execution of conservation works from February 1976.

55. Project activities have been largely directed to 10 "core" areaswithin the 286,000 acre concentration areas. The core areas total 650 acresof which 380 acres have been constructed or approved for irrigation. Activ-ities include land consolidation, formation of Farmers Associations to operatethe areas, mechanized cultivation, inputs, and introduction of more intensivecrops. Grazing control programs and animal husbandry improvements have beencarried out in the mountains.

ANNEX IXPage 13

56. Soil Conservation staff consists of one experienced Soil Conserva-tion Officer, a qualified Surveyor, a Soil Surveyor due full-time from i:heS.C. Division (CD), and two local counterparts. Two other local positionsof Assistant Conservation Officer appear not to have been filled. The worksare to be undertaken by Food Aid labor. There is no provision for equinmentexcept hand-tools ($15,000), but an allocation of $8,000 per year has racentlybeen approved for hire of soil moving equipment.

57. The project staff supervises works construction for the CD's I4ountMoorosi conservation scheme within the project area. It covers 5,600 acres(2,000 arable) and is funded by U.K. In addition, project plans are readyfor works over 1,000 acres on their own account. Attempts are being madeto recruit 750 Food Aid laborers, but a general lack of demand for work isreported and it is not expected to obtain more than half this number. Laborshortages are said to be holding up additional on-farm work resulting fromdryland and irrigated crop intensification under the core program, and alsoroads work, at RO.60 per day.

58. The project aim is to complete conservation planning for the full286,000 acres of concentration areas, together with some limited executionof work during the next two years. Without a second experienced conserva-tionist, the staff cannot be separated into two survey teams and a rate ofplanning of about 40,000 acres gross a year is all that can be expected.. Asecond planning team is essential to meet the project objective for a loanproposal for a follow-up project to be prepared in 1976.

59. Employment upportunities. irrigation development requires littlelabor. Soil conservation planning is insufficiently advanced to absorb sig-nificant LCU type labor except at Mount Moorosi, which is treated as a CDscheme. There would be no scope for LCU type labor for conservation duringany short term emergency.

60. The position would be different for a medium term emergency, becauseconservation planning will have proceeded in the meantime and be sufficientlyadvanced for construction to be launched at at least the annual rate o. plan-ning. Assuming that 40 percent of the areas surveyed is arable land, thisrate for one planning team is 16,000 acres, or 6,400 hectares, arable peryear. However, the areas under the project requiring urgent soil conserva-tion measures are so extensive that a second survey team should be establishedirrespective of any future labor "emergency". Another experienced Soil Con-servation Officer, and, if possible, a Soil Conservation Engineer for worksdesign and supervision, should be recruited and means must be found for ob-taining them. Works could then proceed at an annual rate of about 13,000hectares arable per year. Food Aid labor would be transferred to other work.The contribution of machinery would be relatively low and labor requirementswould be equivalent to about 22 LCU gangs. There is sufficient land requir-ing treatment for this rate of activity to be continued or increased underthe proposed follow-up project.

ANNEX IXPage 14

61. Costs. Based on the Mission's approximate cost estimate of R25 perhectare arable, direct field costs before contingencies would amount to aboutR325,000 annually. New funding would have to be found to meet most of theseexpenditures.

Ministry of Agriculture Schemes

62. A number of relatively small integrated agricultural developmentand conservation schemes are being executed by the MOA under various sourcesof funding. Most schemes are the responsibility of the Conservation Division(CD) in cooperation with the other Divisions, Crops, Livestock and Cooperatives.The CD also has a major role in the few schemes run by the Crops and LivestockDivisions.

63. There are no Basotho professional soil conservationists but severaldiplomates have received in-service.training in planning and execution of con-servation works. The CD has 45 established civil service positions of which27 are currently filled by Basotho middle and lower level personnel. Thethree professional officers, including the Chief Conservation Officer, areexpatriates. Local staff have been made available as counterparts to theThaba Bosiu, Khomokhoana and Senqu River projects, and in addition, juniorConservation Assistants are stationed at District Headquarters. The Divi-sion operates a machinery pool including about 35 tractors which are usedlargely for farm cultivation.

64. The position of CD will be greatly strengthened by an USAID Landand Water Resource Development project commencing in 1975. The present threeexpatriate professionals will be increased to eight for up to eight years.Fourteen Basotho counterparts will be trained overseas to B.S. level and afurther 12 will receive two years specialized training in other African coun-tries. $2 million is to be provided for staff and staff training, $550,000for field and workshop equipment and $350,000 for housing, etc., including$125,000 for studies of labor intensive vs. mechanized construction of soilconservation works. Procurement of heavy equipment is to be deferred pendingthe outcome of these studies.

65. A "Request for Assistance in a Labor Intensive Pilot Project" datedApril 1974, was presented to the Mission. This proposed the employment fortwo years of:

(a) 1,200 laborers for general conservation and construction workin the nine administrative districts; and

(b) 800 laborers for land development schemes and afforestationprograms already planned in some detail.

66. The general conservation work in the nine Districts has not beenplanned, and the staff proposed for planning and supervision of works is onesenlior Conservation Officer and half time for a Conservation Assistant ateach District. This is clearly inadequate and the proposal is unsuitablefor LCU type labor until proper planning and execution facilities are avail-able.

ANNEX IXPage 15

67. Data which could be provided on seven specific schemes under (b)above, are incomplete. With this reservation, the proposals are analyzedbelow:

Mount Moorosi

68. This covers 5,600 acres within the Senqu River UNDP project area.Some 2,000 acres are suitable for cultivation (some irrigated); 3,000 acresare grazing land and 500 acres are set aside for tree planting.

69. The works and measures proposed, and the staff to undertake them,are virtually the same as those for the Senqu River project, which is tnder-taking field supervision. A Conservation Plan on a scale of 1:12,500 isavailable and works scheduled for 1974/75 are costed at R24,500, which hasbeen funded by ODA. The work is to be undertaken with machinery from theDivision's pool and Food Aid labor.

70. Employment Opportunities. Should construction be made labor in-tensive and Food Aid labor be used elsewhere, the employment capacity wouldbe one LCU type gang for one and one-half years, either for a short term ormedium term emergency.

71. The gang could be administered by the Senqu River Project. Laborrequirements for afforestation development are considered under Woodlots.

Kolonyama

72. This conservation development project covers 18,000 acres of ara-ble, and 2,000 acres of grazing land between the Caledon and PhuthiatsanaRivers, and southwest of the Khomokhoana project.

73. The project is to be developed over a six-year period from April1974. An integrated approach is to be followed with emphasis on conserva-tion works and improved cash cropping together with better livestock manage-ment and grazing control. An Extension Agent and a Conservation Assist:antbased on the project will be guided by District and Leribe Project staff.

74. Aerial photographs are available but soil survey and land use plan-ning has not yet been undertaken except on a very general basis. This year,discussions will be held with Chiefs and farmers to enlist support for con-servation and grazing proposals. If and when an exper'ienced planning t:eamcould be made available, completion of land use and conservation plans insufficient detail, and farmer agreement, should be possible within sixmonths.

75. The Division is to maintain a construction equipment unit in thearea. Works scheduled for 1974 are estimated to cost R24,000. ODM fundinghas been approved.

ANNEX IXPage 16

76. Employment Opportunities. There would be no significant employmentcapacity for any short term emergency. Subject to completion of land use plan-ning in the meantime, and a changeover to labor intensive construction, therewould be employment on works for 18,000 acres or 7,200 hectares of arable landover, say, two years. In the event of a medium term emergency, six LCU gangscould be employed for two years.

Thaba Phats'oa

77. This project covers the catchment area of the Fenyane stream withthe Lionel Collect Dam, empounding about 1,500 acre feet. There are othersmaller dams in the catchment area, which covers 8,900 acres including 1,700acres arable. Some 400 acres are irrigated.

78. The integrated approach is being taken to improve land use and man-agement, and agricultural and livestock productivity, and to carry out conser-vation plans for the entire catchment so as to prolong the useful life of theLionel Collect Dam.

79. There is a project manager stationed at Hlotse and responsible alsofor several other projects. An extension agent is stationed at the projecttogether with a conservation unit foreman, supervised by a conservation as-istant stationed at Leribe.

80. A general soil survey needs updating and a general land use and con-servation plan, which is in progress, is to be extended to cover the wholecatchment. A conservation construction unit (with seven tractors) will beassigned to the area. Small scale works have been proceeding on an ad hocbasis and works scheduled for 1974/75 are estimated to cost R25,000. ODMfinancing has been approved.

81. Employment Opportunity. The conservation works scheduled for1975/76 would provide employment for one LCU type gang for up to one year, tomeet a short term emergency, if construction were made labor intensive.

82. For a medium term emergency, the early provision of a properlystaffed watershed planning team would be essential. They could completefield work in less than two months and Chief and farmer agreement not longafter. Works required on grazing land to minimize siltation of the damwould be more extensive than normal and, from the works viewpoint, thecatchment is arbitrarily assessed as equivalent to 3,500 acres (1,400hectares) of arable land. This would provide employment for two LCU gangsfor about 15 months.

Matsieng-Morij.a

83. This conservation development project covers 17,250 acres about25 miles southeast of Maseru by good road. Some 7,500 acres are arable.The Lerato River traverses the area. There are 12 small dams with sevenacres irrigated and a dam site capable of storing 478 "surface acres" isbeing investigated.

ANNEX IXPage 17

84. There is, again, an integrated approach to improve land use, cropand livestock productivity, and conservation. The natural drainage syst:emis badly eroded and immediate attention is being given to conservation mneas-ures. The project commenced in 1974/75 and is to be completed in three tofour years.

85. A Senior Extension Agent at Maseru is in general charge of extension,with an Extension Agent and a Livestock Assistant stationed at Morija. A Con-servation Assistant based at Morija is in charge of conservation activitiesand, no doubt, will receive close supervision from nearby Maseru. A Construc-tion Unit, with seven tractors, will be stationed in the area.

86. There are aerial maps at 1:10,000. A detailed soil survey is to bemade, followed by conservation planning, which is to be completed by mid 1975.Chiefs and farmers are supporting the project proposals.

87. Works scheduled for 1974/75 on 1,050 acres arable and 9,750 acresof grazing land are estimated to cost R15,000. ODM funding has been approved.

88. Employment Opportunity. Should a short term emergency arise, ongo-ing works should provide employment for one LCU type gang for 12 months, iflabor intensive construction is followed.

89. The lead time for a medium term emergency would permit planning tobe completed and the labor required for labor intensive construction would beabout two LCU gangs for 2-1/2 years.

Liphering Integrated Project

90. The data which could be provided to the Mission, in the Request forAssistance of April 1974, and in a Progress Report to March 1973, with threeessential pages missing, is insufficient for any assessment of labor absorp-tion capacity of the project except that it could be of only minor nature.

Moroeroe

91. This covers 5,470 acres, of which 1,800 acres are arable, the catch-ment area of the Moroeroe River. It is presented as a comprehensive ruraldevelopment project aiming to increase crop or livestock production ancl tointroduce soil conservation.

92. The report by Crops Division (undated; 18 pages) gives a reasonabledescription of crop and livestock programs but the treatment of soil conservationis inadequate. The conservation staff - a Conservation Assistant to work inthe area as and when required - is also inadequate.

93. No assessment can be made of labor requirements for soil conserva-tion. Conservation planning, if and when undertaken, is unlikely to revealany substantial labor requirement.

ANNEX IXPage 18

Matelile

94. The report "Integrated Farming Project on 1,900 Acres of Consoli-dated Land at Matelile" does not provide data for any assessment of laborrequirements for conservation works, which, however, could not be substan-tial.

C. Woodlots

95. Afforestation in the usually understood meaning does not, for eco-logical and related economic reasons, have any important potential, and wood-lot establishment and management will be the main source of forestry products.

96. The Woodlot Project is financed by the Anglo American Group throughAnglo de Beers Forest Services, and GOL and other donors. It commenced inApril 1973 with a duration of 12 years, subject to review in the fourth year.Funding for the first four years by Anglo American, R286,000 and GOL and otherdonors, R316,000.

97. The project's objectives are to develop a national forestry policyand a balanced administrative and technical forestry infrastructure, to es-tablish woodlots for provision of fuel and building materials and to providetrees for stabilization of catchment areas. Training of nationals is an im-portant component. The immediate objective is to establish 2,300 acres ofwoodlots by 1976/77.

98. The project absorbed the small Forestry Section of the Soil Conser-vation Division (CD) and works within MOA, with the Project Manager directlyresponsible to the Permanent Secretary. The three professional officers areexpatriates, the Project Manager, Forest Officer and Nursery Manager. Provi-sion is made for additional forest officers to commence in April 1975 andApril 1976. The one national under professional training must complete thisyear at Roma before four years overseas. Priority should be given to increas-ing the intake for professional training.

99. 'At technical level, three local foresters have diplomas or long ex-perience and are effective officers at Districts, where they supervise allwoodlot activities. There is demand for diploma level training under deBeers Forest Services School; two men are there now and four more are to besent this year.

100. There are three well experienced rangers each with an in-servicetrainee. They are in charge of woodlot establishment and labor gangs. Nodifficulty is expected in maintaining the intake for in-service trainees.

101. The establishment for nine nurserymen and ten assistants is beinghard to fill. Pay scales should be increased and in-service training steppedup.

ANNEX IXPage 19

102. All unskilled labor is from Food Aid, which is not charged to theproject, but entered at 30 cents per day in cost estimates. Productivity islow but probably higher than on other projects because of trained rangersupervision and some use of piece work for hole digging, etc. However,project officers consider that productivity would be at least doubled bypaid labor. At the present time, activities are being held back by short-ages of Food Aid labor, only 300 being available against 400 required. Semi-skilled paid labor for nursery work is also very short. Training of nursery-men, rangers and technical foresters are also bottleneck areas.

103. Woodlots average from 30 to 40 acres and are fenced to exclude live-stock. An initial chisel plowing is given where necessary to break hard pan.Other establishment activities are by hand labor and involve about 20 man daysper acre. Establishment involves fencing, cultivation, pitting, provision andtransport of seedlings, planting and fertilizing. Together with field super-vision, the cost is about R56 per acre. Overheads add a further R30 per acre.Project officers expect to be able to reduce costs materially when a higiaerrate of operation is achieved.

104. Little cost is involved in maintenance until the first full harvestafter about ten years, when the value of production well exceeds the establish-ment cost. Following this harvest, there should be three or four coppiclerotations of about ten years each, with little cost except for fencing re-newal.

105. The history of tree planting is not unlike that of soil conservationworks, in that destruction has nearly matched the rate of planting. However,the present time is opportune because Chiefs and farmers are becoming awareof the value of treelots to their communities and there are many requestsfor establishment. It is essential that full agreement is reached with itheChief and farmers before a lot is commenced. There is also often difficultyin selecting suitable land. Farmer agreement and land selection take muchof the time of the professional officers, some of which might be saved ifDistrict Extension Officers participated more in discussions with Chiefsand farmers.

106. Good progress was made during the first years of the project. Es-tablishment is now at an annual rate of 1,200 acres and some 5,000 acres arelikely to be established during the first four years instead of the targetof 2,300 acres.

107. Given assistance in reaching farmer agreement and more labor forfield work and nurseries, the rate of establishment could be increased to1,700 acres per year with existing supervisory staff. Some 50 additional.men would be required for the nurseries to produce the additional seedlings.The lead-time would be from five months for fast growing eucalypts to 11months for slower growing species. Field planting-out time is Januarythrough March. Another 50 men would be required for field establishmentwork.

ANNEX IXPage 20

108. Employment Opportunity. Should there be a short term emergency,two LCU type gangs could be employed to increase the annual rate from 1,200to 1,700 acres. Each gang would require enough supervisors to be able tooperate in two or more work units.

109. During any medium term emergency, it is assumed that Food Aid wouldbe transferred to other community work. The Food Aid labor involved in fieldwork is around six gang years. LCU gangs would be about three times as pro-ductive, and two LCU gangs would be required for field work to replace FoodAid for the 1,200 acre rate of woodlot development. Two more gangs would berequired for the higher rate of 1,700 acres per year, making four LCU gangsin all.

110. A few more professional and technical staff for supervision wouldpermit a further increase in labor intake, and there is a good case for in-creasing the rate of woodlot development, irrespective of any special employ-ment emergency. Fuel and poles and other simple building requisites are ex-tremely short and expensive. The only important local source of expandedproduction is from woodlots and, in addition, the establishment of woodlotsin critical areas is a major soil conservation measure. It is estimated thatabout one-quarter hectare of woodlot would be required to meet the full woodneeds of one family which would give a target area of about 75,000 hectaresor 190,000 acres of woodlot. This may never be reached but there is greatscope for expansion and cost benefit figures from project officers indicatea satisfactory return on investment in woodlots. The Mission recommends,therefore, that steps should be taken now and include:

(a) recruitment of one or both of the additional expatriate for-esters provided for 1975 and 1976 in project estimates;

(b) appointment of an experienced local extension officer to assistin land selection and negotiations and discussions with Chiefsand farmers;

(c) appointment of in-service trainees to assist the three tech-nical level Foresters and a second trainee under each of thethree Rangers;

(d) trainees at the de Beers Forest Services School be increasedfrom six to ten or more;

(e) salary scales be increased for semi-skilled nurserymen andassistants;

(f) seeking additional funding to permit selected and adequatelypaid labor to be employed. The Project should cooperate withthe proposed Employment Service in recruiting this labor untilLCU gangs become available.

Ill. If the above steps are taken, the annual rate of woodlot establish-ment could be increased to about 3,400 acres over two or three years. Thisshould provide employment for a total of eight LCU gangs.

ANNEX IXPage 21

D. Fish Ponds

112. Fish pond development is the responsibility of the Fisheries Sectionof the Livestock Division. The two professionals, a Fisheries Officer and arecently recruited Assistant Fisheries Officer, are expatriates. Three na-tionals have diplomas from training in Israel and four others are partiallytrained. Officers from the on-going development projects, particularlyKhomokhoana, work closely with the Fisheries Officers in developing villagefish ponds within their project areas.

113. The Fish Pond Program has been financed by ODA, the amount requestedfor 1974/75 being R50,000. During the few years the program has operated some117 fish ponds covering a total of 20 hectares have been built. These aremainly groups of three or four small ponds located nearby, and operated by,a village. There are six larger Pilot Fish Farm schemes including a new fourhectare farm at Tsakholo. Hatchery facilities at Maseru Research Staticn arebeing expanded and supplies of fingerlings are ample.

114. Modern techniques are used in production of the common carp, whichcan digest cellulose and convert carbohydrates to protein. The food conver-sion ratio is 3:1. Yields of about two tons of carp per hectare can be ex-pected from well managed and properly fed and fertilized ponds. Muscovyducks are often run as well as the fish and add materially to the proteinyield. Fodder crops are frequently grown on the floors of the ponds whenthey are drained from May to September. Both fish and ducks command a readymarket (carp retail at RO.75/kg dressed in Maseru) but are usually sold atvillage level.

115. It is planned to establish a further 10 hectares of village pcondsduring 1974/75, using equipment and some Food Aid labor. In addition, muchlarger commercial development is being considered by possible donors.

116. The Fish Culturist of the Israel Ministry of Agriculture visitedLesotho in 1973 and 1974 and confirmed that conditions were very favorablefor carp production and that commercial fish farming would be profitable. 1/His preliminary survey located about 1,000 hectares for fish ponds through-out the lowlands where terrain and soil and water conditions are favorableand the land is unsuited to agriculture. The most important of these lcca-tiops is at Tsakholo (near Mafeteng) where 350 hectares are most suitable.Detailed plans have been prepared for development in four phases and devel-opment of the first phase of 40 hectares is being considered by U.K. in-'terests. The cost of Phase I is estimated at about R70,000, plus workingcapital, and prospective returns appear to be favorable. However, theMission was not in a position to make any technical assessment of theproposals or of the likelihood of their early execution.

1/ Y. Pruginin, "The Potential for the Commercial Development of IntensiveFish Farming in Lesotho", 1974.

ANNEX IXPage 22

117. Employment Opportunity. In a short term emergency, the FisheriesOfficer estimates that three LCU type gangs could be employed for one yearon the regular program (excluding Tsakholo).

118. Should there be a medium term emergency, there are sufficient super-visory staff to expand the regular program, but additional funding would benecessary. If finance is available, about six LCU gangs could be employedfor two or more years.

119. The Tsakholo proposals provide for mechanized construction. If adecision is made to develop the scheme, and if a change towards labor inten-sive methods is made, about four gangs could be employed for one year onPhase I, or ten gangs for two to three years on the entire 350 hectarescheme. These Tsakholo employment opportunities are not included in theemployment estimates because of their uncertainty.

ANNEX XPage 1

TRAINING OF STAFF BY THE LCU DURING AN EMERGENCY

1. Paragraph 4.04 and 4.06 of the main report project that as a maxi-mum, in 1976/77, 35 individual labor gangs plus seven large labor-intensiveconstruction groups would have to be formed in the case of an emergency.The maximum requirements for supervisory, technical and administrative staff-- assuming that at the time of an emergency two labor-intensive constrictiongroups would already exists -- would therefore be as follows: 1/

Expatriate Staff

Resident Engineers 5Assistant Engineers 5Quantity Surveyors 5Senior Technical Officers 2/ 5

20

Local Technical and Supervisory Staff

Junior Technical Officers 15Section Leaders 45Foremen 35 + 135 = 170Assistant Foremen 70 + 270 = 340Equipment Supervisors 5Survey Assistants 5Soils Assistants 5Chainmen 20Draughtsmen 5Operators/drivers 55Mechanics 10Blacksmiths 5Carpenters 5Officer Managers 5Labor Officers 5Clerks/Typists 35Stores Assistants 5Radio Operators 20

There would also be a need for additional administrative staff within theMinistry of Works and Communications on whom the main burden of administ:ra-tion would fall.

1/ Numbers are approximate and are indicative only of the scale of require-ments.

2/ Included as expatriates but Basotho would be preferable.

ANNEX XPage 2

2. The critical factor determining the rate of mobilization anddeployment of the labor force would be the rate at which junior technicalofficers, section leaders, foremen and assistant foremen could be trainedin labor-intensive methods. The Mission assumes that courses of one monthswill be needed for both the category of junior technical officers and sectionleaders and that of foremen and assistant foremen. To gain the necessarypractical experience it would be useful to have the newly trained people workon site alongside their couhterparts in the LCU for about another month afterthe course.

3. The one month training courses would be given by the three trainingofficers in the LCU. With the output of one class of, say, three juniortechnical officers and nine section leaders, and two classes each for 30foremen and 30 assistant foremen, it would be possible to staff one largeconstruction group and three individual gangs, which is about one-fifth ofthe maximum requirement. It would, therefore, take about half a year of suc-cessive courses before a labor force of some 12,000 workers could be efficient-ly employed in the job opportunities identified by the Mission.

4. Extra classroom and living accommodation would be needed at theLCU to handle three courses running concurrently and catering arrangementsmight have to be provided for the trainees. The supervisory staff of theLCU would assist the instructors in the training courses, particularly inarranging demonstrations and supervising the practical on-site experience-gaining period after completion of the classroom training. Depending on thetiming of the emergency, it might also be possible for the Lerotholi Train-ing Institute to assist in the training by, for example, conducting coursesfor the more senior supervisors.

5. The administration section of the LCU would provide on-the-jobtraining facilities for administrative staff; the monthly output would needto be one office manager, one labor officer, and one stores assistant eachplus seven clerks/typists and four radio operators. THe quantity surveyorof the LCU would assist in this training. Trainees would have to have somebasic knowledge pertinent to their work and, provided this is so, one monthshould be sufficient time for them to become conversant with the necessaryprocedures.

6. Because the LCU would not be competent to train the other requiredpersonnel it would have to rely on other organizations for the followingassistance:

(a) The Government Plant Pool for the training of equipmentsupervisors, mechanics and operators/drivers.

(b) The Roads Division of the Ministry of Works and Communica-tions for the training of survey assistants, soil assistants,chainmen and draughtsmen.

ANNEX XPage 3

Contingency plans should be prepared within these organizations for thispurpose. The Lerotholi Training Institute could probably provide assistancewith the classroom aspects. Such staff would need a longer training periodthan the junior supervisors, and training should be started as early aspossible within the "gestation" period referred to in paragraph 4.03 of themain report.

7. The blacksmiths and carpenters would be needed for the repairingof hand tools so that a high degree of skill would not be necessary. How-ever, should trained artisans not be readily available, it would be best tocentralize the repair facilities at Maseru and to keep a revolving stock ofspare hand tools for use in the field.