Lack of Purpose and Unity; Hannibal’s Failures, Carthage’s Doom

Monica O. Aneni PhD

&

Tonye Al-Onyanabo

Department of Classics,

University of Ibadan

Ibadan, Nigeria.

Email: monaneni@yahoo.com

Phone: +234-8056501788. +234-7039574581

Lack of Purpose and Unity; Hannibal’s Failures,Carthage’s Doom

AbstractHannibal Barca, the son of Hamilcar Barca has been described

by several Classical and modern authors as one of the greatest

war strategists who ever lived. He fought and won several battles

against the Roman State which at the time was the superpower in

Italy and her environs. In spite of Hannibal’s skills and

strategies, Carthage could not annihilate Rome. This paper aims

to examine the rationale that instigated Hannibal’s failure to

deal a decisive and crushing blow on the Roman State. The paper

argues that the Carthaginian government’s unresponsiveness

towards Hannibal caused his failure. It continues to state that

because Carthage refused to nurture and maintain the offensive

realism stance, she was not motivated to consolidate Hannibal’s

victories in once allied territories of Rome now subdued by

Hannibal; Carthage was also not motivated to send troops and

resources to Hannibal which he needed to deal a crushing defeat

on Rome.

Consequently, Hannibal’s failures translated to Carthage’s

doom. Thus, in 202 BC, Hannibal was defeated by Scipio Africanus.

And again, after the Third Punic War of 149-146 BC, Carthage was

destroyed and razed to the ground by Rome. Further studies that

may examine Rome’s strategies and tactics against enemy states

are recommended.

Keywords: Hannibal, Carthage, Rome, unresponsiveness, failure.

IntroductionIn 218 BC, Hannibal Barca, in a bold and daring attempt

crossed the Alps. His mission was to strategically attack Rome

and eventually defeat her, freeing Carthage from the shackles of

Rome. Some authors believe that his mission was to fulfill the

wishes of his father Hamilcar Barca, who told Hannibal to ensure

that he festered and nurtured the hatred he must have for Rome.

Whatever the reasons, whether politically motivated or not,

Hannibal set out on a mission to destroy Rome, even when he had

to traverse very difficult and backbreaking routes to the

detriments of a part of his forces, losing some soldiers and even

elephants. Hannibal began a penetration/siege of different towns

and cities which were on his way towards Rome. He rallied the

support of some of the towns and cities and sacked the others who

refused to support him in his war against Rome. Hannibal reached

Italy, but could not eventually defeat Rome. The reasons are

various but the most important is the fact that the Carthaginian

leadership seemed to lack vision and foresight and consequently,

Hannibal could not receive effective reinforcements that could

have brought success to Carthage. This paper attempts to discuss

Hannibal’s successes and failures, which culminated into

Carthage’s doom because of lack of unity, purpose and foresight

among others by the Carthaginians. The study adopts a historical

methodology even as it attempts to apply techniques and

guidelines such as source criticism and historical reasoning to

the discourse. The study makes a significant contribution to

knowledge as it displays the fact that Hannibal’s failure led to

the destruction of Carthage by the Romans. Further studies that

may examine Rome’s strategies and tactics against enemy states

are recommended.

Carthage, a brief historyCarthage; financial hub of the ancient world at its heights

had frontiers in modern day Tunisia, Libya, Morocco, Spain,

Algeria. Carthage was regarded as a wealthy city as a result of

her trade and commerce; items such as textiles, metals,

foodstuffs, slaves, household utensils were exported in large

quantities. In addition to this, Carthage was also said to have

produced and exported the immensely valuable Tyrian dye; a rare

and exquisite commodity . Carthage was initially a Phoenician

settlement created in the area of Western Meditterrean to

encourage trade. As a result of Carthage’s destruction by Rome,

it is quite difficult to get a precise date when Carthage was

founded. The Roman historian Appian while making use of the

chronology of Eratosthenes dates the foundation of Carthage to

around 1244 – 1234BC (Appian Alexandrius, Roman History) , some

fifty years before the Trojan War. Lancel Serge conclusively

dates the foundation of Carthage to around 846 – 813BC (.Lancel

Serge, 1997). As it is with all empires and cities in the ancient

world, legend has it that Carthage was founded by Queen Dido, a

Phoenician princess from the city of Tyre who fled after her

husband Acherbes; High Priest of Melquart was killed by her

brother; Pygamalion; King of Tyre (Maria, Eugenia, 1962) . Virgil

in his epic Aeneid says that seven years after she had fled from

Tyre, Dido built Carthage as a prosperous and wealthy city

(Virgilius Publicus, The Aeneid)

Trade, Commerce and AgricultureCarthage was the financial nerve point of the Mediterranean;

the Carthaginian economy was highly diversified; hence gold

poured into the Carthaginian treasury from all sectors of the

economy. According to Jack Goody, Carthage maintained the

monopoly on silver, lead, copper and iron ore which she obtained

from the cities of the Iberian Peninsula, these raw materials

especially iron ore was essential for the manufacture of bronze

objects by artisans of the ancient world (Jack Goody, 1991).

Lionel Carson also maintained that Carthage’s relations with the

cities of Iberia and the naval strength she exerted on the

Mediterranean upheld her status as the only exporter of tin and

gave her a huge advantage in the production of bronze products

(Lionel Carson, 1988). Carthage’s unique position in the

Mediterranean and control of the waters by her navy gave led to

her dominance of the solid minerals market in the ancient world;

mines in Iberia made Carthage the highest producer of Silver in

ancient times.

Apart from the monopoly she exerted on the solid minerals

market, Carthage also monopolized the market for Tryian dye,

Judith Sebesta tells us that purple dye was one of the most

highly valued commodity in the axis of the ancient Mediterranean

(Judith Sebesta, 1989). Carthage alone held the machinery that

organized the manufacture and distribution of Tryian dye in the

ancient world. As stated earlier, the Carthaginian economy was

highly diversified, Carthage also produced dyed cotton, linen and

wool. She produced embroidered silk that were highly sought after

in the ancient world, she also produced perfumes, incense, myrrh

and frankisense (Paul Domeelen, Gomez Bellard, 2008). Peter

Bogucki tells us that Carthaginian artisans were highly skilled,

they created splendid objects made from Iron, Ivory, Glassware,

Wood, Alabaster, Bronze, Lead, Gold, Silver and other rare gems

(Peter Bogucki 1987). They created household goods like chairs,

tables, necklaces, jewelry etc.

In addition to manufacturing and mining, Carthage was also

involved in agriculture. Agriculture in Carthage was

technologically advanced for its time, her farmers made use of

iron ploughs pulled by animals, used irrigation to provide

adequate supply of water and also practiced crop rotation (David

Soren, Ben Khader, 1989). She dealt in the sale of fish and

exquisite fish sauce in the Mediterranean. She also grew fruits

like olives, dates, pears, nuts, and grain, olive oil was also

processed and exported around the Mediterranean world (Jean

Flandrin, Massimo Motanri, 1970). Andrew Dalby also tells us that

Carthage produced fine wines that were exported around the

Mediterranean, (Andrew Dalby, 1999), some of these wines was the

Raisin wine, a culinary delight of the ancient world.

Fage in his analysis of the Carthaginian business empire

states that the naval superiority of Carthage contributed

immensely to her financial dominance as her ships visited every

major port in the Mediterranean, and were able to carry huge

amounts of goods for sale at these ports (Fage John, 1978). Apart

from these exports, Carthage also sent caravans into the interior

of Africa to sell goods, and in less developed areas to barter

goods. Bogucki tells us that Carthage traded her manufactured and

agricultural goods to the coastal and interior people of Africa

for salt, timber, ivory, apes etc (Peter Bogucki 1987). The

Carthaginians were the businessmen of the ancient world, they

traded in almost any commodity available to man; food, minerals,

precious metals etc, they also engaged in slave trade.

GovernmentAs a result of lack of verified accounts of Carthage’s

history by a native of Carthage, it is quite difficult to

describe the government of the state; however it is widely

believed that Carthage was at first a monarchy, however Richard

Miles tells us that after the defeat of Carthaginian forces in

Sicily around 483BC, a republican government was set up (Richard,

Miles, 1978). At the head of the government were two annually

elected magistrates called “Suffets”, assisted by a Council of

Elders and an assembly of the people. The Carthaginians also

created a separate officer of General who was appointed for a

specific mission and who would continue in office till the

mission was completed. The powers of the generals were checked by

the Council of 104 judges who had the power to convict and

crucify any negligent and unruly general. Aristotle described

Carthage’s constitution as the best constitution a state can have

because of the checks and balance inherent in it (Aristotle,

Treatises on Government).

Carthage also had democratic institutions and elements

despite the domination of oligarchs; elected legislature, town

meetings and trade unions were existent in Carthage. Aristotle

tells us that in a situation where the Suffets and the Council

were tied on the decision t make on an issue, the assembly of

citizens had the final and decisive vote .

Carthage’s government can be described thus: Suffets were

the heads of the government, elected annually from the wealthy

and influential families just like the Roman consuls, assisted by

a range of junior officers who oversaw other state issues like

taxation, public works, treasury etc; the Council of Elders

checked the Suffets. The Suffets had no military powers, hence a

general was in charge of specific military expeditions, he was

put in place by the Council of 104 who made sure he was strict in

the discharge of his duties: the assembly of citizens had the

final vote when the Suffets and Council of Elders were at

loggerheads on a decision.

Hannibal Barca famously regarded as the Scourge of Rome, was

a respected general of African stock. His father Hamilcar Barca

was the commander of the Carthaginian forces during the first

Punic War. Hannibal is often regarded as a military strategist

without par, Theodore Dodge describes Hannibal as the father of

strategy (Theodore Dodge, 1989). This description is because his

greatest enemy at the time; Rome adopted his military tactics.

His military tactics have been studied in military academies

across the world. He is still regarded as the forerunner of

psychological warfare. There is little or no information about

his birth and childhood, except the famous story of his oath of

hatred he was said to take when he was a child. It is reported

that he took an oath of at his father’s urging to become an

avowed enemy of Rome with the following words: “I swear that soon as age

will permit, I will use fire and steel to arrest the destiny of Rome” (Patton, George,

1952). However some scholars dissent with Patton’s description of

the oath, this dissent is because the story about the oath can

only be found in the works of Roman historians; one of who was

Titus Livius, who is aptly regarded as a patriotic Roman, in deed

and in words. Furthermore Romans used such stories to demonize

and dehumanize their enemies. As a military commander, Hannibal’s

physical and mental bravery, temperance and self control is quite

remarkable and has being praised over the millenniums, His worth

as a leader is clearly evident in the manner he managed the mixed

body of men he led for so long; throughout the Italian campaign,

his men did not riot or mutiny. As a leader, he also saw to it

that his men, horses and other instruments of war were given good

care and attention.

Following the defeat of Carthage in the First Punic War,

Hamilcar Barca, the father of Hannibal undertook a rigorous

campaign in Spain where he acquired large quantities of silver

which he used to pay off the war indemnities to Rome. He also

gained important political and military alliances; expanding

Carthaginian influence and interest in Europe; thus

reinvigorating the Carthaginian Empire. After Hamilcar died, his

son-in-law Hasdrubal continued these policies of Carthaginian

rejuvenation. Hasdrubal founded New Carthage in Spain. In 226 BC,

Hasdrubal signed a treaty with Rome, giving Carthage a free hand

of action in lands south of the River Ebro. Hannibal was elected

commander of the Carthaginian forces in Spain after Hasdrubal’s

death, he continued in the path set by his father. Friction with

Rome began as a result of the political situation in the city of

Sagutum. Sagutum lay to the south of the River Ebro, and thus

Hannibal believed it was within his jurisdiction to interfere in

the hostilities between the city of Sagutum and the Spanish

people who were allies of Carthage. Saguntum were allies of Rome,

and thus appealed to Rome for aid. Whilst they did so, Hannibal

laid siege to Saguntum and sacked it. The Romans sent an embassy

to Carthage to demand the capture of Hannibal, the refusal of the

Carthaginian government led to the outbreak of the Second Punic

War and the eventual destruction of Carthage.

In analyzing the defeat of Carthage, one is tempted to

examine the tactics employed in each battle, and how they led to

Carthage’s doom. However as Clausewitz said : “ War is politics by other

means”( Carl von Clausewitz, 1989) ; battles are the last item in

the tussle that lead up to war between nations, we have to look

back to the events and circumstances that lead to them and how

they could have being averted. In some circumstances, it is

pertinent to analyze the errors and flaws that of a state that

contributed to her defeat. As we analyze the factors that led to

Carthage’s defeat in the Second Punic War, we would find out that

Carthage had some fundamental flaws in her that led to her

eventual defeat. To fully examine these flaws we would go back to

the foundation of Carthage and her expansionist goals.

As Carthage expanded and began to gain ground in the

Mediterranean area, she exhibited a colossal error in her foreign

policy towards her conquered lands. In contrast with the Romans

who compelled her conquered territories to participate in a

mutual defensive organization under the leadership of Rome,

Carthage had no such policy. Its important to note that Roman

allies were gradually integrated into the Roman hegemony as they

began to acquire Roman citizenship and rights. Carthage on the

other hand preferred to exact punitive taxes from her looser

confederates of subjects and subject allies. These taxes were

used to finance Carthage’s fleet and pay mercenary soldiers. This

policy was the fundamental flaw of the Carthaginian Empire; the

empire instead of being a strong and united front was a loose

confederate of cities led by Carthage, who had no real hold on

her allies. This flaw created problems for Carthaginian generals

charged with the protection of Carthaginian interests. After the

First Punic War, Hamilcar Barca was involved in a life and death

struggle with the mercenaries who fought for Carthage. The

struggle was as a result of Carthage’s inability to pay the

mercenaries as a result of her financial constraints. Niccolo

Machiavelli had this to say about mercenary troops;

“ mercenary troops are useless to a Prince, as they are only paid for their services….. in

most they go to the highest bidder…. They have nothing to lose if the nation that hires

them is cases defeated ….. all they care about is their pay, and there their caring stops”

(.Niccolo Machiavelli, The Prince). Hannibal also saw the

strength of Roman hegemony and cohesion when he invaded Italy;

despite his outstanding victories and acts of cruelty and

kindness to Roman allies, majority of them still pitched their

tents with Rome. On the contrary, when Scipio invaded Spain, it

was relatively easy for him to peel off the Spanish tribes loyal

to Carthage by promising alliance with Rome and the benefits it

conferred.

Carthaginian policy on citizenship was also faulty.

Carthaginian policy was more exclusive, the aim of the state was

the protection of the trade infrastructure than increasing the

citizen body, hence as Carthage expanded, she did not expand her

military and political citizen body. It’s no wonder then when

Polybius reports that Carthage relied heavily on mercenary troops

as she had no standing citizen army. This policy had adverse

effects of the number of men Carthage could summon to fight at

the beginning of the Second Punic War. Brunt using Polybius’

estimates claims that Rome could muster a force of 671,000 men

combined; made up of Rome and her allies: 615,000 infantry and

56,000 cavalry (Richard, Brunt, 1989). On the other hand Polybius

tells us that Hannibal could muster 90,000 infantry and 12,000

cavalry, all together 102,000, majority of which were mercenaries

(Polybius Histories).

As stated earlier, Carthage had some inherent fundamental

flaws in her polity, these flaws were made manifest in the

structure and organization of the state; these flaws led to

Hannibal’s eventual failure. Carthage failed to adopt the

offensive realism tactic in her grand strategic goal to maintain

Carthaginian hegemony in the Mediterranean area. Offensive

realism though recently coined and named is an important theory

of international relations. It has being in existence for ages

and has been the guiding force of the great civilizations that

have dominated the face of the earth. Offensive realism belongs

to the realist school of thought, this theory basically proposes

that the international system is anarchic and rational great

powers are uncertain of other states intentions, this results in

them using their military capabilities to maintain their survival

by being on the offensive and applying offensive tactics.

Maershemer John puts forth five central assumptions that form the

basis of offensive realism, these are:

a) Great powers are the main actors in world politics and

the international system is anarchical.

b) All states possess some offensive military capability

c) States can never be certain of the intention of other

states

d) States have survival as their primary goal

e) States are clear thinking actors, fully capable of

coming up with sound strategies that increase their chances of

survival. (John, Mearshimer, 2001)

One important feature of offensive realism is that states

that practice this tactic are uncertain about the intention of

rival states, they alleviate this feeling of uncertainty by

increasing their military and material prospects so that they

become the great power in the region. These states realize the

advantage military prowess gives them over rival states and so

they become assured of their security and in turn, their

survival. In offensive realism, alliances are made with friendly

nations with the aim of isolating rival powers and so reducing

the military prowess of rival states. As such, by increasing

their military capabilities, alliances and watching out for

potential threats, states achieve hegemony in the geographical

area which they occupy and control. This hegemony serves as a

bulwark against aggression from rival states.

John Mearshimer, a leading scholar on the theory of

offensive realism, had this to say: “great powers recognize that

the best way to ensure their security is to achieve hegemony, thus eliminating any

possibility of a challenge by another great power…… only a misguided state would pass

an opportunity to be the hegemon in a region because she thought she already has

sufficient power to survive…..”( John Mearshimer, 2001) . Accordingly the

grand strategic goal of any state with the aim of increasing her

power and standing in the region is to rely on offensive tactics,

achieve hegemony with her at the head, and pursue expansionist

goals with her at the fore front.

In analyzing Carthage and her polity, one finds

inconsistency in maintaining an offensive stance especially with

regard to Rome’s powers and in an era where there was no

international body to sanction nations, Carthage’s lack of this

policy lead to her doom. Every state possesses a grand strategy;

this is a system of plans to be implemented to ensure the growth

and survival of the state, however the goal while in some states

is clearly defined and pursued vigorously, in others it’s vague.

States that have left their marks in the annals of history always

carried out the theory of offensive realism, whilst they did not

term it so, they implemented offensive tactics that increased

their hegemony and ensure that had a better chance of survival.

Though Carthage may not have outlined a clear cut grand strategic

goal, it is safe to assume that Carthage’s only aim and goal was

to preserve her trade and business empire. All Carthage cared

about was money making and enriching the state. This goal could

be seen in the number of policies that Carthage implemented; the

exclusivity of her citizenship in a bid to maintain the financial

superiority of Carthage. Furthermore, when they eventually

conquered new lands, they only exacted taxes from these lands.

There was no vision to create Carthaginian hegemony on the coasts

of the Mediterranean. Carthage was content with maintaining the

status quo and the existence of her trade routes. Peradventure,

if the Punic Wars were about financial matters, Carthage would

have annihilated Rome. However their lack of offensive realism

caused them immense harm, her lack of hegemony in the

Mediterranean meant that she had no real allies to her cause. She

forgot that in the long run whoever had more power would have

more gold.

Rome on the other hand, while creating the grand strategic

goal of Roman survival and growth implemented offensive realism

tactics. The historian Josephus tells us that it seemed the

“Romans were born ready armed”. (Josephus, The Jewish Wars). Rome

evolved from a small Etruscan city to a world power because she

was always implementing offensive tactics. The Roman military was

an integral aspect of the Roman society. As Rome grew, she

gradually began to exert her influence in Italy; first she

defeated the Latin League and incorporated the members into the

fiber of Roman hegemony, granting them rights and concessions

that bound them to Rome. She then moved on to unify the Italian

peninsula with the aid of her Latin subject allies. And so with

the complete unification of Italy, Rome became the de facto head

of the Italian hegemony. As a rule, the Romans waged even their

defensive wars offensively, and only made peace with a conquered

foe. This conquered enemy was then compelled to conclude a treaty

with Rome, which assure Rome of her military support against

other foes. This treaty was regarded as perpetually binding and

any attempt to break off the relationship was regarded as a

hostile act. Furthermore voluntary allies of Rome were not

allowed to leave the Roman alliance, thus they became dependent

allies.

From the Fourth Century, Rome deliberately prevented the

development of a strong state in the southern part of Italy. She

gladly began to protect weaker communities who felt threatened by

stronger neighbors. As a result of this, Rome became the leader

of the hegemony in Italy; she gradually exerted her influence

into Europe and the world at large.

In examining Carthage’s policies in terms with the ideals of

the tenets of offensive realism and Rome’s implementation of

offensive realism, it is quite evident that Carthage fell way off

the mark and was eventually doomed to fail. Carthage was content

with maintaining her trading routes and outposts; she didn’t look

out for potential rival states. She was happy to sit back and

keep making money from her trade. This behavior is clearly what

John Measrshimer views as the actions of a misguided state when

he said; “only a misguided state would pass up the opportunity to become the

hegemon in a region because it feels it already has sufficient power”( John,

Mearshimer, 2001). If Carthage had applied offensive tactics, she

would have seen the need for a citizen army and the dangers a

mercenary army brings in it wake. She would have also recognized

Rome as a threat to her hegemony in the Mediterranean and would

have gone on the offensive decades earlier, invaded Italy and

thus had confined Rome to the Italian peninsula. If she had

applied offensive realism tactics, she would have seen the need

for a strong hegemony amongst the coastal cities and the need to

bind her subject allies to her cause by demanding soldiers from

them in form of a mutual defensive pact.

Carthage’s lackadaisical attitude, lack of foresight to root

out potential enemies and desire to maintain the status quo of

being the financial hub of the Mediterranean led to her eventual

fall and destruction. Hannibal was just one man, he was a man

ahead of his time, however he could not repair the damage of

decades of laziness of Carthaginian state policy.

Another factor that contributed to Carthage’s fall was the

lack of national sentiment amongst her people. Decades of myopic

state policies and flimsy foreign policies had done much to erode

the national sentiment of Carthaginians. This lack of national

sentiment led to a lack of unity amongst the Carthaginian

leadership and people. The Carthaginians did not believe in their

state and the survival of their sovereignty as a whole.

Furthermore, even if they did believe in their state, years of

preservation of their trading structure had done much to erode

this feeling. In contrast with the Romans, the Carthaginians had

no hint of what Sun Tzu refers to as Moral Law. In his military

treatise, Sun Tzu defines Moral Law as “what causes the people to be in

accord with their ruler,…. So that they will follow him regardless of their

lives….undismayed by any danger…..(Sun Tzu, Art of War). The Roman

people were strongly bound to the preservation and defense of

Rome, this feeling of national sentiment is quite evident in the

behavior of the Roman people Hannibal’s period of invasion. After

the disastrous defeats of the consular armies at the battle of

Cannae, Romans still flocked to join the army as they sought to

defend the honor and prestige of Rome. The Roman people had a

strong attachment and feeling for their state. This feeling was

what loads of prominent Roman politician banked on to secure

public support and votes. This feeling was what held the Roman

state together during Hannibal’s outstanding victories over Roman

armies.

The Carthaginians were beset with corruption and

incompetence on a large scale. William and Boak had this to say

about the Roman conduct of the Second Punic War: “a struggle which

called forth in Rome the patriotic virtues of courage, devotion and self sacrifice to a

degree that aroused the admiration of subsequent generations….” (Sinnigen

William & Boak, A. E. R., 1977)The feeling of national sentiment

played a huge role in keeping Rome together, the Roman electorate

voted for men they felt would restore Rome’s prestige and honor.

The Senate put aside factional strife and united to repel

Hannibal and defend Rome. Military commanders put the interests

of Rome ahead of their personal interests, this can be seen in

the incident that occurred in 210BC, Claudius Nero, the commander

of the Roman forces in Spain gave way to allow Scipio Cornelius,

a far younger and less distinguished man take command. The

rationale behind his decision was the loyalty and love the troops

had for the Scipio family .Coincidentally, it happened that

Claudius on his return to Rome led the way to defeat Hasdrubal

who was on his way to Italy as a further menace to Rome (Titus,

Livius, History of Rome). Such was the devotion the state the

Romans exhibited.

Boak and William in their analysis of the fall of Carthage

in the Second Punic War had this to say: “ a major factor that greatly

hampered the Carthaginians in Spain and Sicily: important theatres of the war was the

personal rivalries and lack of cooperation amongst Carthaginian military

commanders” (Sinnigen William & Boak, A. E. R., 1977). The

Carthaginians were not united in purpose: every Carthaginian did

not think like Hannibal who was totally devoted to the survival

of Carthage. The Carthaginians Senate refused to send

reinforcements to Hannibal, leaving him stranded in Italy. He

found it difficult to strike the fatal blow needed to bring Rome

to her knees. The Carthaginian admiral Bomilcar failed to upturn

the Roman dominance of the seas, this is quite disheartening as

Carthaginians were expert sailors and navigators, and hence a

Carthaginian admiral’s failure to make use of his inborn and

natural ability to defeat an enemy leaves much to be desired.

Bomilcar’s failure contributed to Hannibal’s inefficiency. In

addition to this, the Carthaginian Senate was lily livered who at

the first instance of a reversal of fortunes recalled Hannibal

from Italy with is veterans. It must be noted that Hannibal

invaded and departed from Italy with no obstruction by the

Romans. The Carthaginians were lazy people who felt Hannibal

alone could defeat Rome, they failed to realize it was a

collective effort.

ConclusionHannibal invaded Italy with the aim of inflicting enough

damages on Rome to cause her to relinquish her hold on Carthage

and her interests. Hannibal’s plan was destined to succeed but

for the behavior of his people. If Hannibal had his people’s

support and total backing, the war would have resulted in a

stalemate where Rome and Carthage would divide the spheres of

operations in the Mediterranean. The Romans were practical people

didn’t believe in wasting time and effort on what brought no

benefit to the state. In the Late Republic, the Romans had to

endure the Parthians who were in control of Armenia and its

environs. Though the Romans strongly desired these lands, the

military prowess of the Parthains made them check their bid to

annex these lands. Even after Marcus Crassus rashly attacked the

Parthians and was defeated and killed, the Romans did not declare

war as they saw the Parthians as one strong enough to withstand

them. With this, it is safe to assume that if only the

Carthaginians had built up their state, the Romans would have

respected them and treated them as one treats an equal.

Hannibal was a genius; however he had misfortune of not

having Carthaginians who believed in his vision of a strong

Carthage. Boak and William state that it took the personality of

only a man like Hannibal to develop the cohesion and discipline

that characterized his troops (Sinnigen William & Boak, A. E. R.,

1977). This feat is quite remarkable when one bears in mind the

fact that majority of these troops were mercenaries. Hannibal’s

brilliance can be seen in the aftermath of the Second Punic War;

on his return to Carthage, he ran for the post of Suffet and won.

He reorganized the state, instituted new policies that fired up

the growth and development of post war Carthage. Agriculture was

improved, democratic institutions were given more prominence, and

aristocratic institutions that hampered Carthage were dispelled.

It’s quite disheartening to note that Hannibal was eventually

betrayed by his own countrymen who felt threatened by his

brilliance and zeal to uplift Carthage. If only every

Carthaginian thought like Hannibal, Carthage would have being a

force to reckon with. It is safe then to say that Hannibal’s

failure was as a result of Carthage’s lack of unity and purpose.

This eventually led to her doom.

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