Maurizio Candiotto

KILL WILLFor a Libertarian Anomalous Monism

To Agnes, who introduced me to the debate on free will;To my cousin Laura, who introduced me to her – and made me visit Crete;

To Erika, with whom I enjoyed Quentin Tarantino’s masterpiece.

Abstract. Free will, it is often claimed, is killed by a classical dilemma: Determinism or Randomness,free will being incompatible with either horn. This dilemma rests on the supposed tie between explainingand necessity: randomness, and therefore inexplicability, would then be the sole alternative todeterminism. I contest this tie: explaining a volition only demands that one provides a motivating reason,not a sufficient – i.e. necessitating – reason for the volition. Once the tie between explaining and inserting ina deterministic chain is severed, the dilemma is abolished: the volition is by no means random, for anexplanation is provided; nonetheless, it is not deterministically enchained either, whenever is motivated byreasons that are not sufficient grounds in respect of it. One can still call in question the nature ofexplanations by motivating reasons; this, however, only could be done by means of independentarguments. The burden of the proof, then, has changed place. A suitable version of anomalous monism isproposed in order to allow non-random indeterminism to have ontological – and not merely epistemological– significance.

Note. In the following ‘randomness’ will denote the property of events of beingrandom, i.e. lacking any ground and therefore any possibility to be explainedhowsoever, while ‘Randomness’ shall designate the thesis that volitions areevents of this kind. We shall contrast Randomness with Determinism, conceived ofas the thesis that volitions are events having sufficient grounds (given someprevious events, a certain volition couldn’t but be taken – and that no volitioncould be taken without a grounding of that kind); ‘determinism’ is a thesis forevents of any kind stating either that all events have a sufficient ground(full-blown d.) or that at least some lines of events do (moderate d.). So‘Indeterminism’ will designate the negation of  Determinism, and ‘indeterminism’the negation of full-blown determinism.

Key Words: free will, anomalous monism, nomic necessity

0.Free will, it has been maintained, is killed by a dilemma

neatly expressed by A. J. Ayer: for volitions, as for everythingelse, there are only two possible ways to be brought about, eitherby causation by something else, with which they are, then,

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deterministically enchained; or by chance, i.e. by the‘spontaneous’ – in fact random – production of a volition. Nomatter whether one thinks that the latter is a genuine possibilityor not, the fact remains that, in principle, determinism has noother alternative than that. So: Determinism or Randomness – whilefree will is incompatible with either horn1.

Determinism as to volitions, as well as the general thesis ofdeterminism, is conceived of, here, as springing directly from thevery notion of grounding: providing sufficient grounds forsomething would be as necessary for explaining it as sufficient forestablishing its deterministic enchaining. Be determinism full-blown, i.e. embracing the whole universe, or moderate, i.e.relative to some lines of events in the universe; be this as it maybe, explaining an event is equated with construing it as a ring ina deterministic chain. Explanation is therefore claimed to bestrictly tied to determinism: to drop the latter would make us losethe former. No indeterminism could be less than the admission ofrandom events; such an admission, however, is an abdication fromunderstanding.

1 Cf. A. J. Ayer’s “Freedom and Necessity” (in Philosophical Essays, London:Macmillan, 1954) and, more recently, P. van Inwagen An Essay on Free Will, New York:Oxford University Press, 1983. The latter, however, after drawing from thisdilemma, by hypothetical reasoning, the conclusion that free will is logicallyinconsistent, adds that in fact the we are free – and know to be; he thereforerejects, by contraposition, the couple of arguments showing the incompatibilityof free will with Determinism and with Indeterminism respectively, just becausethey appear to establish, taken together, the impossibility of free will.According to van Inwagen, in other words, that dilemma, because it leads to aconclusion that we know to be false, must contain some flaw. I shall try to showwhich one, beginning by distinguishing between Indeterminism and Randomness: thedilemma that would really kill free will, if only it held, is the one opposingDeterminism to Randomness, while the one between Determinism and Indeterminism,though holding, is not killing. T. O’ Connor calls in question, in this concern,the cogency of the dilemma between Determinism/Indeterminism by contesting thatthese exhaust the plausible alternatives (cf. “The Agent as Cause” in Kane, R.(ed.) Free Will, Oxford: Blackwell 2002, p. 198); he too, in so doing, risks toidentify Indeterminism with Randomness, while the genuine third alternative thatcould thwart Ayer’s Dilemma is one where a volition does escape deterministicenchaining, and is therefore a counterexample to Determinism, without therebybeing random. Free will is incompatible with the volition being random, not withits not being deterministically enchained; now the two things are far from beingequivalent, hence there is no need to escape Indeterminism in order to find analternative to Randomness. The dilemma to be thwarted is the one betweenDeterminism and Randomness, and not the one between Determinism andIndeterminism – which on the other hand is much harder to thwart, not to saysimply too hard.

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One can still wonder whether moderate determinism is a coherentposition: is the admission of events having sufficient groundscompatible with the admission of events lacking sufficientgrounds ? Can determinism be less than full-blown ? We shall nottouch this issue, however: since our only concern are volitions2,we shall ignore all those doubts and contrast Determinism, as auniversal thesis about acts of will, and Randomness, stating that(at least some) volitions do lack sufficient grounds and are thereforesimply random, i.e. inexplicable. However, the dilemma Determinism orRandomness (henceforth D/R), i.e. the alleged killing-blowpurported to eliminate free will, far from consisting in the mereopposition of contradictory theses, supposes one assumption, namelythat the only way to explain a volition is to provide a sufficientground for it. And therefore to construe it as something beingnecessitated in its happening.

My argument is as a priori as is the dilemma I am trying torefute; i.e. is simply a priori. Nowadays one can easily feel boredwith a priori arguments in philosophy of mind, most of all becauseof the luxurious flowering of mental experiments they oftenstimulate, which slippery slide from high sophisticatedness intoheavy scholasticism. Not daring to defy the danger of such a fall,I do not propose any mental experiment; my line of argument isnonetheless a priori, for my primary intent is to displace theburden of the proof back on the tenant of D/R. However, I am notcontent with merely claiming the existence of a third possibilityneglected by him, namely of an indeterministic way to explain (vs.Randomness) volitions. In a somehow Kantian vein, I do not merelymention the formal possibility of a third way for volitions to bebrought about: I also try to justify the real possibility ofmotivational explanations – and, thereby, of indeterministicmotivated volitions. I try to perform such a Kantian task by using– and also modifying for use – Davidsonian tools.

The grounding relation between events that is appealed to isone which does require covering laws (that’s Davidson’s lesson),but is not ontologically tied with such a nomic explanation; in other

2 Our dilemma bears on the explanation of volitions: the notion of a free volitionis prior in respect of that of a free action. The volition that brings about afree action must of course in turn, and first of all, be free. Talking of freewill is attributing freedom to the act of will itself, were it in order to ensurefreedom to the action coming out: without free will, the talk of free actionswould be a very weak one. That’s why Ayer framed his dilemma in terms ofexplaining a volition and its having, by the same token, sufficient grounds vs. itsbeing random.

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words, it does not warrant any one-sided ontological consequencesone may be tempted to draw from nomic explanations. So, volition isfree – is not necessitated – even though it is needed that theevent described as a volition can be also described otherwise andexplained nomologically. In my view, nomic necessity is itself aproperty of descriptions, and not barely of the event which bearsdifferent descriptions. In this version of anomalous monism,motivational explanations are allowed to have not merelyepistemological legitimacy, but also ontological significance. Fornow ontological significance is equally distributed over differentdescriptions. The least involvement of ontology in the event – thelightest ontological burden for events – for the most ontologicalsignificance of its descriptions. Metaphysical neutrality of eventsfor ontological commitment of each description.

1.The assumption seen above (namely, that the only way to explain

a volition is to provide a sufficient ground for it) equates theopposition D/R with the one between Determinism and Indeterminism –which of course is a genuine dilemma. It may be (and often is)construed as a special case of the corresponding general thesisconcerning the explanation of any event, without restriction ofdomain. In both its restricted and unrestricted version, anyway,this thesis is not above suspicion. Which notion of necessity is atwork here, in fact, is not fully clear. The modal-logical notion ofnecessity, being the metaphysically simplest candidate, is thedefault one; however, the very target of our dilemma, i. e.volitions and actions meant (to be refuted) to be free are usuallyintended to have at least logically possible alternatives.Moreover, even if modal necessity were pertinent, i.e. if it wererequired, in order to explain an event, to provide a reason thatmakes it necessary in the sense of existing in all possible worlds,then one major problem would arise: too few explanations would meetthat constraint, perhaps none. How many events could find a reasonsuch that, in every possible world where the grounding event is present,the grounded one is too? Possible worlds, as is well known, allowfor an extraordinary freedom of variation: how many grounding linkswould survive the change of grounding laws? Such a variation is asfatal for those links as is, as Quine has shown, for the identityof objects (typically, bodies) throughout possible worlds3.

3 See Quine 1976.

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Or else, ought the ‘sufficient’ ground required in order toexplain an event simply not to be such as to make it necessary?Does it need to be? Can it be sufficient without necessitating itseffect? And even if it can, what remains, then, of the dilemma D/R?The latter works by having free will killed, if not by randomness,by necessity; if we drop the latter, D/R itself is threatened quadilemma. We need some notion of necessity to associate to the oneof sufficient ground, at least in order to make sense of D/R (infacts, for making sense of sufficient grounding as such, too). Inthe first place we took modal necessity as the notion pertinent toour dilemma – for good reasons; however, even though supposedlypertinent, modal necessity has proven unfit. We must then modulateit at least.

In order to define a suitable notion of necessity withoutbarerly abandon the modal talk, we can – keeping within it – limitthe range of possible worlds to be taken into account to the oneswhere the relevant causal laws and the relevant initial conditionsremain unchanged; we are then left with nomic necessity. Nomicnecessity is a notion defined in reference to one very suitablyrestricted class of worlds: given the sufficient grounds (initialconditions plus laws) required to explain an event, the latter isnomically necessary, i.e. without alternative in any world sharingthose laws and initial conditions. Different possible worlds, i.e.alternative courses of events, get into consideration, here, with atemporal index, namely from the instant when the sufficientconditions for an event are given onward. In fact, such courses ofevents only enter into consideration to get immediately excluded as(nomically) impossible: so the worst for them, the notion of nomicnecessity will have secured some content – and the one ofsufficient ground with it.

The notion of nomic necessity, however, is constantly at riskto get trivialized. The question is how one defines laws: if, fortwo possible worlds, to share the same laws is, by definition, to beinhabited by parallel courses of events whenever the initialconditions are the same, then the talk of nomic necessity becomesempty: of course any event ‘obeying’ one of such laws will benomicaly necessary! It will no doubt be without alternative in anyso suitably selected possible world. If the uniformity of theevents ruled by a law gets into the definition of the latter, anyworlds sharing the same ‘laws’ (and initial conditions) will bydefinition be uniform. This however, is by no means determinism(nor, in particular, Determinism), for it follows trivially from adefinition and is therefore compatible with some events (say,

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volitions) being utterly indeterministic – and only by chancematching what would be a deterministic course of events. This is aminimalist ‘compatibilism’, which is as hard to defeat as weak isthe notion of nomic necessity4.

Well, however loose the latter may be, it has nonetheless someintuitive appeal, mainly founded in its role in conterfactualreasoning. Moreover, it is plain that, according to our usual wayto account for some kinds of events, explaining is indeed providing‘sufficient’ grounds. Acknowledging this fact, however, does notcommit us, by itself, to any general, unrestricted equivalencebetween explaining and providing grounds capable to exclude anyalternative as (even nomically) impossible.

Coming now back to the assumption bearing, specifically, on theexplanation of volitions, let’s notice that it consists preciselyin an extension of that equivalence to such events. It is far frombeing obvious, however, that it holds in this field as well aselsewhere; the assumption that is required for the opposition D/Rto become a dilemma, on the other hand, supposes an uniformity ofthis kind.

It may be (in fact, it was5) objected to all this that it ismore appropriate to talk about determinism in terms of causationinstead of grounds. Our concern, however, is with a dilemma, whichas such does not aim to prove the truth of any of its own horns – adilemma is a dilemma is a dilemma is a dilemma – but only theimpossibility of free will; since the alleged proof is expressed interms of grounds for acts of will, it is much more appropriate – notto say obligatory – to do the same in discussing it. Its refutationdemands the existence of a kind of explanations that do not invokenecessitating grounds, so everything remains within the domain ofthe latter; causality must nonetheless be taken into acount,however not for its own sake.

For quite the same reason, there is no need of any ad hoc claiminvoking the existence of indeterministic events in the brain.Quite the opposite: here it is just claimed that a volition can beexplained otherwise than by the deterministic enchaining of eventsin the nervous system; no thesis is here implied about the latter.The talk of nervous system belongs to a level of description: bethe use of a physicalist vocabulary committed to determinism ornot, it is enough if we retain one other vocabulary (and art of4 For a general criticism of nomic necessity, which also contains a similarversion of minimalist ‘compatibilism’, see Swartz (1985).5 Thanks to Mario Brandhorst (Goettingen) for this and the following objectionand to an anonymous Referee for drawing my attention on Lewis’ theory ofcausality.

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explanation) that is not so committed. My point is wholly internalto the metaphysical implications of explanations, as is the one ofthe dilemma I am trying to refute.

Finally, if one invoked David Lewis’ theory of causality inorder to rescue causation – and thereby, somehow, necessitation –from the unsafe seat of nomic necessity, he would have recourse toa flawed and therefore blunt tool. Granted, Lewis does not startstraightforwardly with laws of nature; instead, he definescausation in terms of the truth of counterfactual sentences, whichneither demands (as modal necessity does) uniformity throughout allpossible worlds nor seems to be at risk of trivialization as isnomic necessity – though I am not sure this is the case with thenew version of his theory. However, both his early and his late6

theories were struck by so powerful criticisms7 that one canscarcely rely on either of them to deal with causation.

To be sure, following up these implications we shall face thequestion of whether or not a deterministic relation between eventsas such (i.e. under and below any description) should hold formotivational explanations to have explicative power, as Davidsonsuggests. This issue has a straightforward metaphysical – and notmerely epistemological – significance, for the alleged need of adeterministic relation between events is claimed to be a conditionfor them not to be random. I shall not take any position on thisclaim, since I am myself torn between Davidson’s and Kane’sopposite suggestions on this point; rather, I shall insulate thesafety of freedom (i.e. the refutation of D/R) from it. I shallmaintain that our dilemma can be refuted independently of thesettlement of this new dilemma (§ 8). This, however, will havedemanded a modification of Davidson’s original contentions (§§ 3,5, 7).

Before that, however, i.e. before assuming a nomologicalunderstanding of determinism, our talk will have to be modal – justbecause our concern is metaphysical. The nomological interpretationof necessity and the causal interpretation of determinism (andDeterminism), as such, are not central to the point at issue. Wehave to face D/R qua dilemma, which is supposed to work (providedit does at all) independently from the nomological understanding ofits first horn. The latter is just one specific (though veryimportant) interpretation of Determinism, while its minimaldefinition is modal. Our genuine concern is with Determinism (and

6 Lewis 1973, Lewis 2000.7 Cf. Menzies 2001.

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D/R) as such, i.e. under any possible interpretation; so, I startedby framing the issue in modal rather than nomological terms: onefirst move against D/R within a wider strategy.

The matter being one of correctly placing (and correctlydisplacing, if ever) the burden of the proof, the burden inquestion is one concerning not so much, in the first place, thetruth of a thesis as the having content of one. If determinismcannot warrant its content against the suspicion of emptiness thatwas shed on it, so the worst for it and, in particular, forDeterminism – and therefore for D/R, too. After this first move,however, we still have to face the nomological interpretation ofdeterminism and Determinism: since they can, on suitableinterpretation, be given a content – although one that is itselfnot above all suspicions, as nomic necessity is not – I now have tokeep arguing in order to contest, so to say frontally, the validityof D/R by showing the existence of a third possibility. Up to now,I cast doubts on the contentfulness of one (D) of the two horns –the standard ones, those which simply define our dilemma. In otherwords, even if we grant that D is not contentless, D/R cannonetheless be contested; which amounts to say that either theresimply is no dilemma or there is in fact a trilemma. In the lattercase there are three lemmas, in the former there are not even thetwo meant there to be. After all, it is not inappropriate tocriticise the validity of a dilemma by a disjonctive strategy.

2.The validity of the dilemma D/R, which is supposed to kill free

will, depends on an assumption that may appear very light, but thatis not. The deep reason of this tricky appearance is theindisputable connection between explaining an action and explainingthe volition that brings it into being. Explaining an action doesdemand providing a sufficient condition for it; however, it doesnot follow – their relationship notwithstanding – that the sameholds for the explanation of a volition.

No doubt, the connection between the explanation of each ofthem is as tight as the one between their freedom, and for the samereasons. The volition that brings about a free action must in turnbe, in a primitive sense, free: any talk of free action withoutfree volition would be a very weak one. Now, freedom isincompatible with randomness as well with respect to volitions asto actions: one should be able to explain the very volition for itto be possibly free, and the action with it. No volition (as few as

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any action) would be free if it were taken (undertaken,respectively) actually random, without any reason. This, however,should not lead us to think that they both uniformly requiresufficient grounds to get explained. The connection between theexplanations of each of them, although very strong, is of quite adifferent kind: it consists rather in this, that the volition,though not being itself necessitated by sufficient grounds, makesthe mental states having, as their content, the reasons itendorses, into sufficient grounds for the action it promotes. Thereasons that explain the volition are the very same – but for thevolition itself – that explain the action, this time in the role of(the content of the) sufficient grounds. Explaining an action onlydemands that one provide a sufficient ground for the action itself,but not for the act of will promoting it. The latter operatesrather by making the reasons for an action into (the content ofthe) sufficient grounds for it. The relation between actionexplanation and volition explanation can be expressed by a slogan:sufficient grounds by choice without grounds sufficient to bringabout the choice.

The tie between explicability of volitions and their insertionin a deterministic chain of sufficient grounds and consequences istherefore severed. The dilemma D/R is thereby abolished: the act ofwill is by no means random, for an explanation is provided for it;nonetheless, it is not deterministically enchained either.

So the action was explained by a volition free from sufficientgrounding, and the volition itself by the reasons that motivate it.Now the question arises: how can one explain anything by means ofsomething that is, in turn, free from sufficient grounding – be itan act of will? And how can the latter be itself explained? Infact, explanations of this kind claim to escape the constraint toprovide grounds which are themselves grounded by previoussufficient reasons – even though we of course demand and providesome reason motivating a choice and thereby explaining, in onesense, the preference the agent accorded to one action instead ofanother one8. The point of this kind of explanation is that the

8 O’ Connor (2002) thinks that it is too a strong requirement to ask for a«contrastive explanation», i.e. an explanation of the choice of one action ratherthan any other. In his opinion, if we had to provide so a strong explanation wewould be committed to determinism; however, simply it’s not the case that we do.In the perspective I am proposing, in contrast, the request for a contrastiveexplanation is legitimate; it is equally legitimate, however, to answer with anexplanation of quite a different kind than the one entailing such a commitment.In fact, the volition that responds to what motivates us to act in a certain way

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reasons motivating a volition do not play the role of thesufficient reasons of the act of will that endorses them, for theexplanation simply does not require anything of this kind. Thevolition is explained (vs. random) by the presence of reasons thathave a certain appeal on the agent without thereby being itssufficient grounds. Not only the action is not random: the act ofwill itself is not either, because, for an act of will, not to be randomdoes not demand having sufficient grounds, but only being motivatedby some reason. In fact, the reasons that motivate the agent’schoice are, at the same time, the motivating reasons for hervolition and, taken together with this volition, the sufficientreasons for the action.

Explaining without providing a sufficient ground: this conceptof an explanation is what remains to explain. It is the concepteverything hinges on in my argument, and no doubt it may look quiteweird. It is nothing so exotic, however: we all make use every dayof explanations of this kind in explaining one’s own and others’actions. Moreover, we implicitly make use of this concept itselfwhen we talk about the explanations we are used to give and demandof actions. We all show thereby a quite nice familiarity with thisnotion, and in any case with the kind of explanations it expresses:what, then, did make of it a bastard in our conceptual family?

The story would be long with that dynasty plot. Let’s ratherconcentrate on the familiarity we do have, that notwithstanding,with the notion which only can thwart the D/R dilemma. If weexplicit the knowledge we have of it, the familiarity that wasbanned will perhaps get acknowledged.

In the explanations of actions of the style we are used to giveand look for, a sufficient reason is of course provided for theaction to explain, but not for the volition that brings it intobeing. Let’s repeat: this does not render that volition random,because for an act of will not to be random it is not necessarythat it has sufficient grounds. This is an essential part of thecontent of our intuitions concerning action and will: moreaccurately, of the beliefs we draw from the know-how we have ofaction explanation9. As we saw above, the point of this kind of

does provide a contrastive explanation, only of a kind such that the volition isnot itself susceptible, as the action it explains is, of sufficient grounding.This, I think, permits to escape determinism without losing the explicativepower we want for action explanations: the advantage, in respect to O’ Connor,is that here we are able to give a contrastive explanation for the action andeven for the volition.9 The kind of knowledge we do tacitly have of explanation by means of freevolitions deserves the name of intuition, provided that one does not barely

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explanation is that the reasons motivating a volition do not playthe role of the sufficient reasons of the act of will that endorsesthem: the explanation simply does not demand anything like that. Aconceptual cartography taking all this into account should limitthe domain of randomness in order to withdraw decisions from whatis bound to be either random or necessitated.

Indeed, indeterminism is wider than the admission ofrandomness: Randomness is not the only alternative to Determinism.The act of will by which an agent undertake actions is notdetermined by sufficient reasons, but has nonetheless its reasons.And we do not have to look too far to find them: the reasons thatmotivate a volition are the very same reasons that prompt anaction, i.e. that are – just with the contribution of the former –the sufficient reasons of the latter. In fact, the volition isitself one of the explaining factors of the action, or, better, thechief factor, the factor acting on the items listed as reasons forthe action. It is the act of will that endorses them as reasons toact so and so, i.e. that is necessary for them to be(come)sufficient reasons for an agent to undertake a certain action.

3.Our point, let’s remind ourselves, is genuinely a metaphysical

one, not at all one concerning the mere epistemology or thesyntactic structure of psychological explanations. Or, rather, wehave to spell out the metaphysical implications of our art ofexplaining acts of will. Now, I propose to conceive of thesemetaphysical roots, or consequences, of our way to understandwilling in terms of a triangular relation between the freedom ofvolitions, the indeterminism of motivational explanations andevents being describable both as volitions and as causal (maybedeterministic) brain processes. My proposal on how to construe thenotions of freedom, indeterministic explanation, nomic

attach to this term the meaning of spontaneously held belief, pre-theoreticallyentertained opinion. Intuition here is, in first place, a piece of know-how, viz.the familiarity we have with a way to look for and give explanations and to takethe requests of action-explanations by others. We know how to satisfy suchrequests, and we are ourselves interested in explanations of this kind; farbefore supporting any belief, intuition is knowledge in this sense, i.e. theknowledge of a way to proceed in explaining. It does constitute a basis – invirtue of the beliefs we spell out in making explicit the knowledge we have ofaction explanation, namely the belief that actions are caused by a volitionwhich is not grounded in anything else – for the belief we have to be freeagents, but is not itself an opinion: it is rather a piece of know-how.

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necessitation and randomness, is in fact a new (as far as I know)variety of anomalous monism.

Indeed, my argument for a third alternative to both D and Raims at such an outcome as invalidating D/R at a metaphysicallevel. I do not think that true motivational explanations ofdecisions leave undecided whether or not the production of theevent truly described as a free volition was after all necessitated(as physicalists descriptions may suggest, and as according toDavidson is required for the motivational explanation itself to beexplanatory). If this were so, the significance of motivationalexplanations would actually be merely epistemological, and wouldthen be powerless to deal with Determinism and Libertarianism asmetaphysical theses (whose cogency and possibility are to berefuted and defended, respectively); however, I maintain that thisis not the case. This is because of the way I conceive of therelationship between freedom in acting, indeterminism inexplanations and events: the truth of one motivational,indeterministic explanation does, by itself, bear metaphysicallyon the freedom of the action. When an act of will is free, it isneither necessitated nor random; the event underlying both amotivational and a physicalist description, on the other hand, isneither nomically necessitated nor random, even less free, foraccording to my proposal these predicates are defined on – and thecorresponding properties belong strictly to – events under some orsome other description, respectively. In particular, freedom belongsstrictly to acts of will, i.e. on mental events inasmuch they are sodescribed. This entails a good deal of extensional neutralism: atthe deep level of events, as extensional items underlyingdifferent descriptions, neither freedom nor nomic necessity norrandomness do apply. The event as such, on the other hand, mayitself be said, derivatively, nomically necessitated* for want ofany true motivational explanation10, namely when all trueexplanations of it are blind-causal or unintentional.

Thus, the truth of a motivational explanation, far fromleaving undecided the nature of the event, does ‘decide’, or ratherimply, how it took place: the event is neither deterministic norrandom (nor free); the event itself – and not its explanation! –10 Or, more accurately, of any true motivational explanations of the right kind,for compulsive neurotics are not always without motivation – nor without willing– in their acting (deciding?), which is nonetheless unfree. I suggest that,within the mental, nomic necessitation applies just to their volitions. Plusperhaps certain sub-volitional mechanisms studied by empirical psychology,although it is far from being clear to which extent they actually belong to themental.

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is neutral. This neutrality distinguishes my version of anomalousmonism from – si parva licet – the original, i.e. Davidson’s: thelatter implies causal determinism at the level of nude events andtherefore gives birth to a (strongly) compatibilist theory offreedom; while my extensional neutralism, even though it allowsfor motivational explanations to be matched by causal ones,warrants (at most) for something that only by courtesy may becalled compatibilism.

If one construes freedom as a property of volitions-so-described, one tied up with the truth of (one at least)motivational explanation, then, when such an explanation isprovided, there is no room for any residual randomness, as few asfor nomic necessitation, for these simply do not apply to eventsas such. An explained volition is not random, and this eliminatesrandomness at a level as deep as a metaphysician may wish,provided he conceives of it and all the interrelated properties inthe way I have suggested.

So, the point of my refutation of D/R is not merelyepistemological, but as metaphysical as is the one of D/R itself.It’s matter of being free under some description (and perhaps of beingnomically necessitated under some other, respectively). Therefore,there is no metaphysical remainder (be it randomness or nomicnecessitation) which would lie deep down, at the level of theevent underlying different descriptions; once metaphysics hassurfaced onto descriptions, it penetrates that surface on deep.

4.So, in our usual explanations of actions volition does enter in

the list of reasons. This is the very least one can say; in fact,it is only in virtue of a volition that the sum up of the reasonslisted becomes the sufficient reason for the action we were lookingfor. But explanations of actions have also the specific trait ofstopping there, without demanding a sufficient reason for thevolition itself, namely a reason which would be sufficient elsethan by an unnecessitated endorsement. The specific nature ofwilling, according to the implicit knowledge we have of the art ofgiving explanations of actions, is that of endorsing something as areason for acting, and thereby making it the sufficient reason(i.e. the content of the sufficient ground) for it – with noimplication of its being a sufficient reason, in turn, for the veryendorsement.

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How do reasons ‘act’, however, on the act of will? How do they,in other words, motivate each of us to undertake a certain actioninstead of another? Without some appeal exerted by the reasons onthe volition that makes them into sufficient reasons for theaction, this volition would actually be random. The relationshipbetween a decisory act and the reasons it endorses cannot be one-sided – in fact is not, according to our ‘intuitions’: we decide andact on the basis of reasons that have a certain appeal on us, that‘call’ us to a certain action. Only, the relation between ourreasons and our actions is different from the one between thesevery reasons and the volition by which we respond to their call.The former is one of sufficient grounding, the latter is not –though it does contribute to make the former into one. We respondby an act of will to what calls (each of) us to do x or y, but themental states entertaining these reasons for acting so and so arenot sufficient grounds for our action without the contribution ofour volition – even less for our act of will itself.

In this context, the talk of reason ‘inclining’ (withoutnecessitating) an agent to do x or y risks to be misleading. We dohave inclinations, but that’s another matter. The point here is toshow how volition explanation can escape D/R; now, to talk of‘inclination’ is of no help, for it leaves the dilemma untouched.One may still ask: is the effect of inclination deterministicallygrounded or random? When, on the other hand, things call us to do soand so, we respond by a volition that has, in the reasons that callus, its own reasons, thereby making the mental states whose theyare the content into the kind of ground we were looking for. Thegrammar of volition, viz. our know-how in volition explanation,prescribes that a satisfactory explanation should indicate thereasons that appeal an agent and she responds to – a notion wecannot make sense of by dealing in terms of ‘inclination’.Inclining does not wait for responding.

The talk of inclination is a metaphor issued from the physicalworld: now, the extraneousness of the notion it conveys to nomicdeterminism is just what was to be made intelligible. Such a way tointroduce the notion of motivation begs the question, for themetaphoric source appealed to is of no help. In fact, I think inmotivations there is something like an inclination, however, one hasto look elsewhere in order to explain what it is and in what itdiffers from those inclinations that do necessitate (caeteris paribus)sliding. The talk of answering a call is of course a metaphor aswell, only it is one issued from a domain – speech interactionbetween rational beings – where we do experience something like

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acting willingly on the ground of a motivation (this experiencebeing, in turn, the intuitive source of the third alternative to Dand R). In answering someone as well in making a choice we (often)believe not to be necessitated, nor to act random either: we thinkwe have a ground that waits for an ‘answer’ (in the first case, aperson waits together with it for an answer properly), where thiskind of wait, inasmuch we are aware of it, is just what we arepresented with, i.e. is the way in which the action that groundexerts on us makes itself known by us. Inclinations in general,however, do not wait for anything at all: so, that metaphor isinapt to express our experience of a motivation. Instead, it isonly in the perception we have of being waited for, or of our‘answers’ (i.e. our volitions; sometimes, literarily our answers)being waited for, that we experience an action (appeal) of theappropriate kind, namely motivational.

Granted, even when we are walking on an inclined plane weexperience a force we can (more or less successfully) resist;however, it is just because of our will (strive) and effort that webecome aware of the non-necessitating nature of that inclination,while we do not know anything about a similar inclination acting onlifeless (in particular, willingless) bodies. Even with ourselveson the inclined plane, we must feel a strive opposing to thegravity force to realize that, though omnipresent, it is sometimesresistible, so not necessitating; were we aboulic, we would simplyfeel that inclination and roll down. So, again, inclination is notadequate in general to express motivation as a non-necessitatingforce. The talk of will has to be added from outside, while with‘answering’, motivational explanations are at home.

When we talk of someone or something waiting for an answer fromus, we believe to know what it is inclination (such is the actionexerted on us by the reasons that appeal us) without necessitation,and it is from here that we can draw the third alternative to D andR I have been making use of in refuting D/R. This move of coursesupposes our pre-theoretical access to motivational explanations –with the kind of grounding it brings with it. This does not amount,however, to a blind faith in all of folk psychology down, for it isenough if one can exhibit an art of explaining volitions which doesnot imply determinism. Notice that, while that art of explainingitself is of course a concern for epistemology, its implications(motivational grounding) go far beyond, namely up to metaphysics.

5.

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The reformed anomalous monism can be objected11 that a) itleaves without any definite answer such a natural and intuitivelylegitimate question as “Was the opening of the door that Joneswillingly performed anything that could have been avoided?” or, inother words: since the event itself was neither nomicallynecessitated nor free, was it avoidable or not, after all? And,moreover, that b) it does not satisfy the need for a truth-makerthat causation sentences share with all other sentences; for sucha truth maker can only be a causal, nomically necessitating bondbetween events, so that the physicalistic description stating a causallink is still and will always be in want for a truth-making bymeans of events – which must then be themselves causally tied.

In order to answer this second objection (and then,derivatively, the first one) one has to come back to the verynotion of nomic necessity. The latter, as it was shown above (§1), is in constant danger of trivialization: in fact, the possibleworlds where a physical law holds are exactly those whereeverything is concerned by the laws conforms it, too. All thathappens, provided it is something the law talks about, simply must‘obey’ it – or else it is not its concern, i.e. belongs to theouter space of extraneous possibile worlds. Either what happens issuitable or is negligible. In other words, the law and itsnecessity only hold where and when facts… are willing to respectthem. Should this not happen (i.e. in the worlds where it doesnot), law and nomic necessity would simply have nothing to say –nor to do with. They do not even have to be afraid of beingviolated by facts, even less to be falsified: falsification is anepistemic notion and, moreover, it takes pace within the actualworld – while interworldly (metaphysical) ‘falsifications’ have todo with alethic necessity (if a sentence does not hold in everypossible worlds, it is not necessary), instead of the nomic one.As to the latter, on the other hand, in the worlds in which thelaw does not hold, it is not even supposed to. In nomic lands, law& necessity, not to say order, are always in oder.

Now, this absorpsion of the interwordly scope of nomicnecessity by its sucessfully mastered interwordly dominion, exemptsbonds between bare events from the task of making causation sentences true, i.e.from the role of truth-makers that objection b) attribute to them.Of course the truth of a causation sentence C requires that the

11 Thanks to Professor Cyrille Michon (University of Nantes) and Dr. Patrice Soom(University of Lausanne) for the two following objections, respectively, made atthe Sopha Congress 2009 in Geneva, where a shorter version of this paper wasread.

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actual world belongs to the subclass of the worlds where C holds;this, however, does not entail that events should get into thenomic enchaining nude as they were born, i.e. minus anydescription. The truth-maker of C is the actual world in as much it isgathered together with a net of suitably selected possibile worlds where things go as teyare intended to; in other words, where also holds (is ‘obeyed’) the lawthe sentence rests on. The actual world, therefore, only makes Ctrue in as much it is described in a nomic-physicalistic way – in a waythat is laden, in particular, with just that selection ofpossibile worlds.

Bonds between bare events are not causal bonds. Causation is notso extensional as Davidson thinks: instead, it is itselfcompromised with the descriptions that allow explanations. Ofcourse, causal relations do need a ground – just like causationsentences need truth-makers – at the level of events. In facts,causality finds its extensional ground in the continuity betweenevents as salient moments of processes: this continuity is theneeded extensional, sub-descriptional tie between them; this,however, is not itself a causal bond, but rather the ground of one.Of course temporal continuity does not by itself make a causationsentence true; however, events can do just beacause they arecarved up by descriptions out of such a continuity. Causalrelations are, if not themeselves intensional as are explanations,at least ‘open’ to intensionality because of the role played intheir inner structure by the selection of possible worlds requiredby nomic necessity.

If nomic necessity had a content independently of thatselection, in other words: if the scope or field of claimedvalidity of a law would not coincide automatically with its fieldof actual validity (as does not in the case of modal necessity, sothat the latter can be metaphysically ‘falsified’), then it couldperhaps aim at being true of – and having thereby a grip on – nudeevents straightforwardly. However, since the very scope of C isexactly circumscribed by just the same selction of worlds thatalso make C true, it is idle to ascribe its truthmaking to bondsbetween bare events. Where could such bonds draw the needed stufffrom? Namely, what is needed to be extensionally transcendent inrespect of any description; nomic necessity, therefore, couldhardly hook anything more on deep than is reached by descriptions.While events themeselves do lie under all of their descriptions,the causal links between them do not share the same extensionalstatus.

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These reflections afford us with tools to answer the firstobjection too, i.e. the reproach of theoretical aphasia towardsuch an innocently pre-theoretical question as the one mentionedin a) above. The question whether the opening of the doorperformed by Jones was in fact avoidable or not is pre-theoreticalin as much it faces the (un)escapability of an eventstraightforwardly, without mentioning nor making any use of suchtheoretical distinctions as the ones between nomic (vs. modal)necessity, libertarian (vs. compatibilist) freedom and neutrality(of events) between the two. All this, the objector may say, is aconcern of the reformer of anomalous monism; if he cannot make useof all that to answer his simple, honest question, so the worstfor the proposed reform.

Well: according to my version of anomalous monism, the doorquestion as it stands, so crude and rough as is in a), is indeeddeemed to remain unanswered. As an opening move, it can only be facedby requiring to take into account the different descriptions of whathappens. Avoidability and unavoidability do not pertain to bareevents, but rather to events described in such and such a way. Itfollows that the opening of the door by Jones, as an event, is as fewunavoidable as is nomically necessary or free. Of course, if nomotivational description implying a free volition is true of it(as is the case if Jones was, say, a compulsive door opener, orunder the effect of drugs etc.), it can ‘by default’ be saidunavoidable (because nomically necessitated*); while the truth ofat least one description as promoted by a free volition allows one(so to say, ‘by entering’) to treat it as avoidable. The talk ofavoidability caeteris paribus demands the truth of one suchexplanation, while unavoidability requires that all trueexplanations are blind-causal. To warrant avoidability one hasonly to ‘enter’ one true motivational explanation – which is, on ametaphysical level (let alone epistemological concerns), a merelyexistential ‘burden’; the (genuine) burden of universality, on theother hand, is born by the tenant of inevitability by nomicnecessitation*.

Just like fredom and nomic necessity* depend on descriptions,so do also avoidablity and unavoidability. Which is no surprise,after all: one can hardly see why the latter couple of notionsshould be true of bare events more than is the former one, whichis the only ground of each of its members, respectively. If theopening of the door was unavoidable, it only can be so because ofits blind-causal enchaining matched by the lack of any trueexplanation through free volition – i.e. because of its nomic

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necessitation*; on the other hand, if it was avoidable, it canonly be so – ceteris (namely, physicis) paribus – because of theexistence of one true explanation of that kind.

So that, in sum, (un)avoidability is as few extensional as arefree and blind causation, i.e., each time, its metaphysicwarranters. The loss of univocity as to the inevitability of anevent is the price to pay in order to describe it many,heterogenous ways – in particular, in order to explain it througha free volition. There is no point in regretting the extensionaltransparency of events; the latter can no more go naked, but onlyclothed with quite opaque descriptions. The extensional innocenceis lost once eaten the fruit of the knowledge of freedom.

6.By the notion of answering to the appeal that reasons exert on

us, we can improve on Kane’s treatment of volitions, or ratherenrich its content. He maintains that by free acts of will we makea motivation into a moving one12. Once agreed with him on thispoint, however, one still has to give some content to that centralnotion. Kane himself, in his rich and detailed discussion, is quiteparcimonious of explanations, though not of examples, on thisspecific point, although it is pivotal in his theory of free will.Here the notion – and the phenomenological experience13 – ofanswering to a call can turn out to be very helpful.

We do not choose how we are nor what exert some appeal – nor towhat either – on us, that’s a fact14. This, however, does not entailthat each act of will by means of which we respond to what exertsome appeal on us has its sufficient reason in the way we are.Answering to an appeal simply is a different sort of principle of explanationthan sufficient grounding. Superposing the former to the latter isan illegitimate move, springing from ignorance of the difference inquestion. Instead, with volitions it is matter of rendering areason a ‘decisive’ one just by deciding (i.e., when there areothers options with their own stocks of reasons at stake, thepredominating one, or else simply one whose appeal is worth to be

12 Kane 1996: 131-7.13 Cf. de Monticelli 1997, chapters 2, 4, 10.14 Is this more than a fact? Is it logically necessary? The arguments I know tothat effect (cf. Strawson (1995) p. 16) appear to me flawed by a conceptualconfusion of quite the same kind as the argument against free will I amcriticizing.

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answered), and thereby making it a sufficient ground for what isdecided – the action15.

The existence of an explanation that does not commit the thingexplained to determinism is by itself no warrant for its ‘freedom’from determinism. The point of this paper however, is notdeterminism (nor Determinism) itself, but rather the existence of athird possibility beyond the ones D/R consists of. Its aim wassimply to displace the burden of the proof. This does not mean thatour third possibility was definitively established16: grammar is not sopowerful, nor can any metaphysical theory be straightforwardyjustified simply on its basis. One can still contest the legitimacyof explanations we usually give for actions and volitions, as welltheir metaphysical counterpart (i.e. libertarian freedom); he willthen declare illegitimate the feeling we have to be in want forexplanations of this kind. What he cannot legitimately do, however,is to appeal, in support to his claim, to the dilemma D/R, for thissupposes precisely that uniqueness of principles of explanationthat is now called in question. If we admit the principle ofexplanation I called answering to an appeal, then the tie betweenexplanation and determinism (where only randomness is left as an

15 In explaining actions, on the other hand, both principles of explanation areused, but in a hierarchical order: we do provide a sufficient ground for theaction, but we do so by appeal to the volition – which is not, in turn, explainedby means of sufficient grounding. It is simply explained as the answer to anappeal. In action explanations, therefore, a proviso is to be made on the waythe reasons we provide for the action behave as its sufficient grounds. It is aproviso on the conditions under which these reasons come to be sufficient toprompt and therefore to explain the action in question: an action usually has inthe reasons that motivate the agent to it its sufficient reasons only inasmuchthe agent decides to this effect. With this proviso, sufficient groundingbecomes harmless: the action itself can now be said free. We saw above that freewill is necessary to free action; in fact, it is also sufficient: an explanationthat affords a sufficient ground for the thing to explain – here, an action –without taking its own chief factor – here, the volition – as a ring in the samechain of sufficient grounding, entails no genuine determinism concerning theaction itself. One can say that sufficient grounding was dissociated, for once,from any implication of determinism (even of the moderate one): such an event asan action can have its own sufficient ground – namely, a free act of will withits kit of motivating reasons – without being enchained in a line of grounds andconsequences. One could say only by courtesy that an action brought about by afree volition is, due to its having a sufficient ground, a ring in adeterministic chain, no matter if this chain springs with the free volition thatpromoted it.16 Cf. Bencivenga (1987), ch. 1, for the slippery nature of the establishingpossibilities and the investigation of its elusiveness by philosophers from Kantto Quine.

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alternative to the latter) is severed, so that the dilemma isthwart. Hence, one cannot make use of that dilemma in arguingagainst the compatibility between libertarian freedom and theexplicability of volitions. In order to contest the thesis that thetwo are compatible (and therefore against free will, the latterdemanding both and getting killed by the loss of either) one has tofind out independent arguments. A displacement of the burden of theproof has taken place.

7.I was already insisted at lenght (§ 3) on the metaphysical

significance of D/R and of its refutation. While the notions(motivation, answering an appeal etc.) used in refuting D/R havetheir roots in our art of explaining, they are in turn the basis ofa metaphysics, namely of that piece of metaphysica specialis which isphilosophy of mind. Here is at stake the very relationship betweendescriptions and explanations of volitions on the one hand andvolitions as events on the other. If I am right in maintaining thatit is explanations, rather than events, that can be genuinelydeterministic and indeterministic, the path is open to theadmission that the existence of a true indeterministic explanationwarrants for the volition being (not itself indeterministic but)free. Here, ‘free’ is understood as conveying ‘susceptible of atleast one true indeterministic, reasons-grounded explanation’.While ‘indeterministic’ is a genuine predicate of the explantionitself, ‘free’ is a predicate of the volition so explained under thedescription allowing that explantion.

As to Compatibilism, from this point of view it follows thatone may concede, at most, that a volition’s being free iscompatible with some brain process being nomically necessitated,where one and the same event underlies both. This, however, doesnot import any necessitation into the event as such, which wouldrender Compatibilism too loose – i.e. too tolerant toward D – toface D/R. Since nomic necessity applies to the event only under aphysicalist description (as well as freedom does only under apsychological one), D/R does not apply at the level of the event assuch either; it might apply, if ever, only at the level ofdescriptions, where however it is actually thwart by the existenceof a third alternative (motivational grounding) to D and R. Thecompatibility in question, therefore, is itself compatible withLibertarianism, and can even be used to defend it. So, whileCompatibilism lives D/R untouched, for it cannot turn that third

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alternative to a metaphysical account, my theory does just that –for metaphysics has now become ‘descriptive’; i.e., the propertiesof volitions metaphysically pertinent to D/R have becomedescription-tied. Freedom belongs strictly to volitionspsychologically described, as nomic necessitation does to brainprocesses physically described. The second half of this latterclaim has actually been contested (see below § 8); however, thepossibility – provided one concedes it – of ‘parallel’deterministic explanations of the same event, does not invalidatethe freedom of the act of will, for freedom is only pertinent to avolition conceived of under a reasons-oriented description: onlythe lack of any true explanation of that kind can prevent the willfrom being free17. It is true that I displace the discussion ontodescription-dependent properties; however, at the same time I placejust there the metaphysical problem, too.

Once so metaphysically displaced the burden of the proof,however, it is very unlikely that the battle stops there. In orderto defend D/R as a genuine dilemma, its tenant might have recourseto Davidson’s arguments for the tie between explication andcausality and for the extensional nature of the latter. After all,making use, as I did, of a reformed anomalous monism in arguingsuggests by itself to look for counterarguments in the originalone. The main lesson of Davidson’s anomalous monism is that,against Ryle, reasons18 can be causes, and even must be ones, i.e.17 The latter is, by and large, the case of compulsions, where however there isno proper volition to act so and so. Now, even in those cases a motivationalexplanation must be looked for (as many psychiatrists do, since LudwigBinswanger); weren’t to find out, perhaps, that the action, though motivated,was not genuinely free. In fact, compulsions suggest that the existence of amotivational explanation is (a necessary but) not a sufficient condition for thefreedom of will. If it is this case, the predicate ‘free’ is still to bedefined, the ‘definition’ sketched above being only a partial explication. Itmay finally be objected that being motivated is not a necessary condition offreedom either – in a wider (the widest) sense of ‘free’; and of ‘will’, too. Forthe spontaneous doing something for its own sake, artistic inspiration, mysticexperiences, world-embracing joy, saying ‘yes’ (or ja) to life, do provideexamples of free (abandonment of) will – and of the very experience of freedom –that go beyond whatever determinate motivation. Now to go beyond is not to miss;for they are not random experiences either, nor experiences of randomness.That’s why a wider notion of freedom is required to account for suchexperiences, one within which will does not need to be motivated in order to beneither necessitated nor random. The narrower notion of freedom we have beenworking with in this paper, on the other hand, is of course the one that appliesto volitions; while in those experiences will does not take place as a volition.18 ‘Reasons’ means, here, the mental states resulting from the endorsement to acertain motivating content, while in this paper I have been and will be using theword ‘reason’ to designate what is endorsed, i.e. that very content.

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that the explanation of a mental event has to indicate a reasonthat is also its cause; and this independently from the way eachexplanation presents their causal relation, i.e. lawlikely or not.An anomalous (mentalisitic) explanation of a mental state, thoughbeing free from the constraint to conform a law in order to do itswork, must nonetheless indicate the cause of that state. If thisshould hold for any mental events, volitions included, then thepossibility to explain them would actually require that they arecausally necessitated. The appeal to our know-how in order to makeroom for another kind of explanation, on the other hand, should berejected: one would be obliged to reduce the alleged explanationsby reasons endorsement to causal, though non-lawlike, ones. What ispeculiar to those explanations, namely their claim not to be causalat all, should not be taken at face value – for, as such, it wouldsimply be illegitimate.

The supporter of D/R may then draw the conclusion that, as forany other mental events, volitions, if it is to be possible at allto explain them, must be caused19, and therefore (nomically)necessitated. Causal relations are extensional, i.e. independentfrom the different ways to refer to them. They go beyond what ismeant in any explanation, for they are what underlies both thelawlike and the non-lawlike ones; anomalous explanations, however,are as well in want for a causal warrant as the lawlike ones. Sothey also imply (nomic, if lawless) necessitation.

Davidson’s point is that a mentalistic, non-lawlike explanationof a mental event only is successful if it indicates the cause ofthe event: if it did not, the alleged explanation, far more thanbeing anomalous, would simply possess no explicative power. So boththe lawlike and the non-lawlike explanations of an event need to becausal, although each one in its own way; whence the necessitationthat even mentalistic explanations are claimed to imply. They wouldthen not warrant for a genuine third alternative to D and R at ametaphysical level; and so D/R would be vindicated.

19 This holds for volitions, but not for the actions brought about by them. As toactions, I have myself been holding, here above, a quite Davidsonian positionadmitting that ‘reasons’ (as mental states) can be causes, and even that theymust be ones, i.e. that the explanation of an action needs a ‘reason’ that isalso its cause. In fact, the volition that endorses the reasons (in my sense)for an action is its cause: by making those reasons into sufficient reasons (i.e.the content of the sufficient ground) for that action, the volition is itselfsuch a ground (the kit of reasons it has endorsed being its own content). Itdoes not follow, however, that this volition is itself the consequence of someprevious cause.

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Anomalous monism, generally speaking, is a metaphysical theorybuild up on the basis of our art of explaining; the latter ofcourse allows for very different (indeed, rival) metaphysicaltheories to be build, which amounts to say – were it necessary tostate it explicitly – that, though based on a received conceptualframework, metaphysics does have a relative autonomy. Indeed, it isjust a matter of theories to be build.

The libertarian option can the be justified, even though notultimately, by claiming that the explanation of a volition in termsof endorsement of reasons imply that the event itself is at least‘free’ from any necessitation – even though it cannot be freeproperly, freedom belonging only to events under a certaindescription. If not an implication, it is at least a nicely strongsuggestion: the grammar of motivational explanation seems to havesomething to tell us even in relation to what underliesextensionally the explanations it rules.

No doubt, this appeal to the grammar of mental explanations isno definitive argument either, as few as was the one directedagainst the inclusion of volitions in the domain of events that areto be either necessitated or random. That one aimed at displacingthe burden of the proof; this one calls in doubt the pertinence ofthe appeal to anomalous monism in order to displace it back.Although the game is not over, however, it is a nice point to scoreif one proposes a metaphysical alternative to the theory that thetenant of D/R might use for his purpose and shows how the groundfrom which metaphysics rises is more propitious to his own ratherthan to the opponent’s building.

8.In sum: since causal relation and nomic necessitation only

belong to events under a certain description, I reject Davidson’ssubordination of the explicative power of reasons to the existence,along with an extensional relation of causation between events, ofan equally extensional distribution of nomic necessity on theevents causally tied to each other. On the other hand, I do retainsomething of Davidson’s insight that causation is an extensionalrelation between events – and that the explicative power ofreasons-explanations requires that it holds; in facts, I maintainrather that causation need and finds a ground and truth-maker atthe extentional level of events, whose ties, however, are notthemeselves – minus any description – causal (cf. § 5). I havealso conceded, though my theory does not oblige me to, that

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causation entails nomic necessitation (however weak a notion thelatter may be); however, I construe nomic necessity as anintensional property, i.e. that it is itself as description-dependent as are the (different kinds of) explanations that owe ittheir explicative power. So to say, instead of subordinatingintensional explanation to extensional [causation plusnecessitation], I would subordinate intensional [explanation plus(perhaps) necessitation] to extensional sub-causal ties betweenevents within processes. So, I grant the possibility for amotivational explanation of a volition, to be matched by a blind-causal one of some brain process, where, however, the eventunderlying each of them is itself neither free nor nomicallynecessitated20. In fact, it is not even either psychological orphysical.

However, a very interesting suggestion on the condition for theexistence in the world of an indeterminate self-determination ofthe will, was made by Robert Kane21. His question is how can takeplace, concretely, something like an act by which we make onereason for an option into the moving one – such is my own reasons-endorsement. His answer is that the world must make room not onlyfor chance but also for indeterminate properties and quantities, asin quantum mechanic (from which he draws suggestions not merely byanalogy but straightforwardly). By this way, he aims at escapingthe strict indeterministic condition of multiple equally rationaloptions for an agent given exactly the same past up to the momentof the volition, on the ground that exactness (of past or whateverelse) would not be defined on ‘indeterministic’ – in the strongsense above mentioned – worlds.

Though charmed by this idea, however, I am not sure that theargument is conclusive, for one may object that some sameness maynonetheless be defined even on such worlds, e.g. by analogy withDavidson’s move of taking ‘samesaying’ as a primitive notion, fully

20 So – one may ask – why to retain events at all? What for? The point of theirintroduction, however, covers a very wide range of problems, by no means limitedto (the extensionality of) mental causation. Now I find the reasons provided byDavidson’s general theory of action (cf. Davidson 1980) are good enough to keepevents even if one does not accept his anomalous monism as it is, i.e. goodenough to prompt one to reform instead of dropping it. Of course the use of onenotion in two different fields makes it even more interesting. Moreover, onemain idea of anomalous monism, namely the holding of a dependency relationbetween heterogeneous explanations, has an attractiveness in its own right, andcalls therefore itself for a reform instead of abandonment. 21 Kane 1996: 172-4.

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independent of any notion of sense22. In the same vein, one maydefine ‘samepast’ on worlds where some properties and quantitiesare not exact. Be this counterargument sound or not, at any rate,it remains that Kane’s suggestion stands in tension with what I amequally tempted to draw from (and concede to) Davidson’s anomalousmonism, i.e. with the idea that, at the physicalist level ofdescription, one deterministic explanation is needed and has tomatch the indeterministic, motivational one.

In view of a successful refutation of D/R, however, I am notobliged to choose between these two alternatives; either can work,provided it allows (as both in fact do) motivational explanationsto have a metaphysical – and not merely epistemological –significance. Another disjunctive move in the refutation of adilemma.

Appendix. On one alleged way out: chancy causation with statistical explanation.

If, being satisfied with reasons endorsement, we drop anycausation of volitions, we still have to compare this kind ofexplanation of acts of will with another alleged way out of thedilemma D/R, namely one which does not give up causality inrespect of them. If one contests the very tie between causationand necessity, admitting some sort of ‘chancy’ causation, thewhole issue gets a reset. The notion of chancy causation23 has someattractiveness in many respects. One is this: as to the causationof actions, a difficulty looms in any theory that takes thenecessity of the effect as an indispensable trait of the causalrelation. Now, since we have been working with nomic necessity,one remains with no necessity to associate to lawless causation, ifsuch has to be the one of actions by volitions. So, in order notto lose any content, such a causal relation must be understood à laDavidson, i.e. as something susceptible both of lawlike andanomalous explanations; and, most important, as something owing anecessity warranting the lawlike ones. Anscombe’s dissociation ofcausality from necessitation, on the other hands, i.e. heradmission of causal connections that do not involve any necessity,simply bypasses that difficulty. Kane’s causal indeterminism (§ 8)can be seen as an extension of her theory stretching up to thephysicalist level.

22 Cf. On SayingThat in Davidson (1984).23 Cf. Anscombe (1981).

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In the following I shall not take position on which is thegood theory of causation for actions. While I shall try, as tovolitions, to reduce chancy causation in Anscombe’s style to (acomponent of) reasons endorsement, as to actions I leave the issueopen.

Chancy causation, i.e. the relation of derivation withoutnecessity between two events, looks like an alternative both tothe deterministic enchaining of events (here, volitions) and totheir randomness. It may be thought to be a fourth alternative toRandomness, Determinism and the self-determination of will byreasons endorsement: volitions as chancily caused would be caused,and therefore woul not be spontaneous as is answering to anappeal; however, they would not be necessitated, and thisnotwithstanding not random either. Being uncaused, then, would notbe required in order to escape D/R.

Is being uncaused, then, required to preserve free will? Woulda volition chancily caused by previous events deserve the label‘free’? Is the admission of free will tied to its self-determination by reasons endorsement or else is compatible with acausation of this kind by external factors as well? Now, the‘chancy causes’ that are supposed to bring about a decisionwithout necessitating it can hardly be distinguished from theevents that present us with a reason to endorse. In reasonsendorsement, reasons are brought to the agent by psychological andenvironmental events that do act causally on her in variousmanners and, at the same time, configure a reason to make acertain choice24. The reason being (at least, a part of) thecontent of the agent’s mental state at the moment of the decision,it acts itself on her the way the content of one’s mental statecan do, i.e., in this case, by appeal. I daresay that this kind of

24 In the following I will talk of events’ configuring a reason to act so and so,or, alternatively, of their presenting an agent with such a reason, meaning thatthe preferences, the values, the convictions an agent entertains only motivateher to take a certain volition in some given conditions. In different conditionsthe same values etc. could very well prompt her to make a different choice.Since by ‘reason’ I mean the content of a mental state, no reason is, strictlyspeaking, configured or presented by events happening around the agent; her ownmental states involved in her volition themselves, on the other hand, do‘present’ their own contents, but in another sense. What is important to noticehere, however, is that reasons only call an agent to a certain decision incertain circumstances, inclusive of psychological and physical events causallyinterrelated with each other. Reasons’ uncausal action only takes place with thecontribution of the causal one of other factors coming with, that may thereforebe said to ‘configure’ (or ‘present’ the agent with) them.

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action does not deserve the label of ‘causal’. This, however, doesnot prevent events going with from acting causally on the agent invarious ways, though without determinating her will. Their role inmaking possible the reason’s action (appeal) on the agent may besaid a ‘chancy causation’ of the agent’s volition. In theseconditions, the act by which the agent responds to the appeal ofthe reason to do x she is presented with, may very well bespontaneous. The causal action of the events having configuredthat reason on the agent’s answer is harmless, i.e. is of nohindrance in respect to its spontaneity. The latter does notrequire at all the absence of reasons motivating the agent nor ofevents presenting her with them.

In this light, chancy causation is not a fourth alternative toRandomness, Determinism and the self-determination of will byreasons endorsement. If volitions’ being chancily caused consistsin their having as their conditions, in addition to the motivatingreasons they respond to, some events that have configured it (andthat acted causally on the agent in other respects), then chancycausation simply reduces to an element of reasons endorsement. Inparticular, the volition was not caused in such a way as toprevent them to be spontaneous as an answer to the appeal thosereasons made. So, chancy causation is no ‘deviant’ way out of D/R:it simply contributes to the taking place of reasons endorsement.

Finally, it would be beside the point, here, to appeal tostatistical laws in order to allow for such a causation torepresent an autonomous alternative to necessitation andrandomness, i.e. one fourth possibility beside them and reasonsendorsement. In facts, the statistical explanation of a volitiondoes not tell anything about its individual happening: theexplanations that statistical laws provide of singular events arecompatible with their being freely decided, with their beingcausally necessitated and even with their being random. Whilebeing compatible with any of these ways to be brought about, theydo not attest the existence of any other autonomous manner, forevents, to take place nor do they provide a peculiar art ofexplaining them in their individual happening. So, the supporterof D/R as a dilemma can easily reiterate, as to a singularvolition, his dual alternative in response to the attempt toexplain it statistically, even if combined with the appeal to‘inclination’. In particular, he would reiterate his charge ofrandomness if the statistical explanation is presented as all wecan say to explain its happening. As far as they bear on classesof happenings, statistical laws simply leave untouched the

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randomness of any individual member of these classes, ifrandomness there has to be (i.e. if the event is not the effect ofa previous cause nor is itself a free volition). So they cannot,by themselves, hinder D/R from being a dilemma.

References

Anscombe, G.E.M. (1981): “Causality and Determination”, inMetaphysics and the Philosophy of Mind, Minneapolis: University ofMinnesota Press.

Ayer, A.J. 1954: “Freedom and Necessity” in Philosophical Essays,London: Macmillan.

Bencivenga, E. 1987: Kant’s Copernican Revolution, New York: OxfordUniversity Press.

De Monticelli, R. 1997: L’Ascèse philosophique. Phénoménologie et Platonisme,Paris: Vrin.

Davidson, D. 1980: Essays on Actions and Events, NewYork: OxfordUniversity Press.

Davidson, D. 1984: Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, NewYork: OxfordUniversity Press.

Kane, R. 1996: The Significance of Free Will, New York: Oxford UniversityPress.

Lewis, D. 1973: “Causation”, The Journal of Philosophy 70, p. 556-67.

Lewis, D. 2000: “Causation as Influence”, The Journal of Philosophy 97,p.182-97.

Menzies, P. 2001: “Counterfactual Theories of Causation”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2001 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.),

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URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2001/entries/causation-counterfactual/>.

O’ Connor, T. 2002: “The Agent as Cause” in Kane, R. (ed.) Free Will,Oxford: Blackwell.

Quine, W. v. O. 1976: “Worlds Away”, The Journal of Philosophy 73, p.859-64.

Strawson, G. 1995: “Libertarianism, Action and Self-Determination”in O’ Connor, T. (ed.) Agents, Causes, and Events. Essays on Free Will andIndeterminism, New York: Oxford University Press.

Swartz, N. 1985: The Concept of Physical Law, New York: CambridgeUniversity Press.

van Inwagen, P. 1983: An Essay on Free Will, New York: Oxford UniversityPress.

Published in Carlo Marletti (ed.) First Pisa Colloquium in Logic, Language and Epistemology, Pisa, 2010.

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