“Kant’s Political Philosophy,” Philosophy Compass vol. 7:12, November 2012, 896-909.Please cite published version only.

Kant’s Political PhilosophyKyla Ebels-Duggan

Northwestern University

Abstract: Kant’s political theory stands in the social contract tradition, but departs significantly from earlier versions of social contract theory. Most importantly Kant holds, against Hobbes and Locke, that we have not merely a pragmatic reason but an obligation to exit the state of nature and found a state. Kant holds that each person has an innate right to freedom, but it is possible to simultaneously honor everyone’s right only under the rule oflaw. Since we are obligated to respect each person’s right to freedom, and can do so only in a state, we are obligated to submit to the authority of the state if we have one, and to establish one if we do not. In the first half of the essay I reconstruct this argument in more detail. In the second half I survey four points of controversy: (1) What isthe relationship between Kant’s political philosophy and hismoral philosophy? (2) How does the innate right to freedom support the postulate that we are permitted to acquire property and other private rights? (3) How does the postulate support an obligation to found the state? (4) Howshould we understand Kant’s views about political revolutions?

Kant’s political theory stands in the social contract

tradition, while departing significantly from his

predecessors. Most importantly, while earlier figures such

as Hobbes and Locke argue that we have pragmatic reason to

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found and recognize the authority of the state, Kant goes

further. He holds that those in a state of nature have an

obligation to leave it by establishing a powerful and

authoritative government, and a corresponding obligation to

respect the authority of existing governments. The Doctrine

of Right, or Rechtslehre—the first half of the Metaphysics of Morals—

contains Kant’s most systematic defense of these claims.1 In

the last two decades this argument has attracted increasing

attention not merely for its historical interest, but as a

source of insight into questions in contemporary political

philosophy.2 In the first half of this essay I reconstruct

the broad outlines of Kant’s Doctrine of Right argument. In the

second half I highlight and discuss four points of

controversy.

Part I: Kant’s Argument for the Obligation to Establish and Obey the State

The core of Kant’s argument is this: each person has an

innate right to freedom. But it is possible to

simultaneously honor everyone’s right only under the rule of

law. Since we are obligated to respect each person’s right

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to freedom, and can do so only in a state, we are obligated

to submit to the authority of the state if we have one, and

to establish one if we do not.

The argument unfolds in three phases. It begins by

considering innate right, rights that we have just in virtue of

what we are. Innate right consists in just the right to

freedom. But this right implies the possibility of further

rights, those of property, contract, and what Kant calls

“status”. These are private rights, rights held between

individuals, considered as such. But Kant argues that no

individual has proper authority to establish, determine the

boundaries of, or enforce these rights. Thus private right

requires public right. Public rights are the rights of the

public, the people considered as a joint agent or general

will. For the people to act jointly in this way just is for

them to act as a state.

This argument begins with the claim that each

individual has an innate right to freedom. As we will see

below, both the grounding of this claim and its content are

points of contestation, but we can gain at least some

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clarity in advance of looking at these disputes. Kant is

here interested in external freedom, defined as “independence

from being constrained by another’s choice” (MM 6:237).

This contrasts with internal freedom, or autonomy, an idea that

figures heavily in Kant’s moral works. Internal freedom is

an intrapersonal relationship that, Kant contends, we

realize only in acting from the moral law. External freedom

is perhaps the more common idea, an interpersonal notion

that concerns your ability to direct your movements without

constraint by others.

Kant formulates the content of our innate right this

way: “Freedom (independence from being constrained by

another’s choice), insofar as it can coexist with the freedom of every other

in accordance with a universal law, is the only original right

belonging to every man by virtue of his humanity” (MM 6:237,

emphasis in original). Our right to freedom is limited by

being such that everyone else can enjoy a similar right, but

this is its only limit. Based on the innate right to

freedom, Kant formulates his Universal Principle of Right: “Any

action is right if it can coexist with everyone’s freedom in

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accordance with a universal law, or if on its maxim the

freedom of choice of each can coexist with everyone’s

freedom in accordance with a universal law” (MM 6:231,

emphasis in original). The relevant notion of right is not

moral but political or, as Kant says, juridical right. A

juridical right is a normative claim against others that it

is permissible to enforce, or to coerce others to respect. So

the Universal Principle of Right claims that so long as our

actions are compatible with others’ similar freedom, we may

coerce others to allow us to act in these ways.

The Universal Principle of Right governs our

interactions even in the state of nature, where we interact

without common government. Kant thinks that the basic

problem with the state of nature is that each person’s

innate right to external freedom entitles her to private

rights, but without a common authority we cannot establish

such rights consistent with the Universal Principle. I

focus here on the case of property rights, which he develops

in the greatest detail.

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I have a juridical property right over an object if I do

not wrong others in coercively enforcing the claim that it

is mine. Kant explicates the content of this claim by

contrasting sensible and intelligible possession. If you would have

to move my body to make use of a thing, then I sensibly

possess it. So I am in sensible possession of an object

that I am holding or land that I am occupying. If you move

my body you limit my external freedom, so rights to what we

sensibly possess seem to follow directly from the innate

right to freedom. But these do not yet constitute property

rights. If I have a property right in a thing my claim on

it endures even when I am not in physical control of it. So

even if I put my object down, you would still wrong me by

taking it. Even if I walk away from my land, you would

still wrong me by entering it. This is the relation that

Kant calls intelligible possession. To claim that a thing is mine

is to claim to possess it intelligibly.

Property rights face the following puzzle: If some

object is yours then everyone is under obligation not to use

it without your permission. But people don’t have an innate

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obligation not to use that object. So if you can establish

property rights over a thing you can thereby choose to place

others under a new obligation. And this is just what Kant says:

“When I declare (by word or deed), I will that something

external is to be mine, I thereby declare that everyone else

is under obligation to refrain from using that object of my

choice, an obligation that no one would have were it not for

this act of mine to establish a right” (MM 6:255). So if

you can establish property rights, you can create a 1 Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals, trans. Mary Gregor, Cambridge Texts in the History of Philosophy (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1996). Parenthetical citations of the Doctrine of Right are indicated with “MM” followed by the standard Akademie pagination.

This argument finds important supplementation in Kant’sessays on the philosophy of history, especially, "On the common saying: That may be correct in theory, but it is of no use in Practice," and “Toward Perpetual Peace.” There isalso relevant material in “On a supposed right to lie from philanthropy.” All of these can be found in Immanuel Kant, Practical Philosophy, ed. and trans. Mary J. Gregor, The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1996). In addition see, Immanuel Kant, "The Conflict of the Faculties," Religion andRational Theology, eds. Allen W. Wood and George Di Giovanni, The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1996).2 This is in part due to the obvious Kantian affinities of John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971). But Rawls’ view differs significantly from Kant’s own.

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permission to coerce others. That looks like constraining

them by your choice, limiting their external freedom. So it

looks like the Universal Principle forbids the establishment

of property rights.

But Kant argues that the Universal Principle not only

allows for a system of property rights, but in fact requires

that it be possible for us to establish such claims. I

suggest that we understand his argument as claiming that our

freedom is more restricted without property rights than it

would be with them.3 If you lack entitlements to control

external objects anyone may snatch any object that you are

using as soon as you lay it down. This renders your ability

to pursue your ends dependent on others’ choice not to

interfere. And the Universal Principle of Right does not

sanction this limit on your freedom: If everyone’s

3 As we will see below, this reading is not uncontroversial.For alternative interpretations see section II.B. Helpful statements of alternative views are to be found in Arthur Ripstein, Force and Freedom: Kant's Legal and Political Philosophy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009). Leslie Arthur Mulholland, Kant's System of Rights (New York:Columbia University Press, 1990). And B. Sharon Byrd and Joachim Hruschka, Kant's Doctrine of Right: A Commentary (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2010).

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relationship to all objects were like this, each person’s

freedom would be significantly constrained. Kant thus

complains that if we do not allow the possibility of

property rights, we will have “annihilate[d potentially

usable things] in a practical respect” (MM 6:246). He

concludes with the principle that he calls the Postulate of

Practical Reason with Regard to Rights: “It is possible for me to have

any external object as mine, that is, a maxim by which, if

it were to become a law, an object of choice would in itself

(objectively) have to belong to no one (res nullius) is contrary to

rights” (6: 246).

The postulate tells us that it must be possible—that is

permissible—to have and exercise property rights. But it

remains puzzling how this could be possible, and Kant

believes that in the state of nature it is not possible. He

identifies three interrelated reasons why this is so. The

first is the problem of unilateralism, a problem about

establishing property rights. In claiming a property right

in the state of nature you are trying to make a thing yours

by making a unilateral choice. But, as an individual, you

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lack the authority to create a permission to coerce others

not to use the thing without your authorization. This would

violate their innate right, as Kant asserts in the following

passage: “Now, a unilateral will cannot serve as a coercive

law to everyone with regard to possession that is external

and therefore contingent, since that would infringe upon

freedom in accordance with universal laws” (MM 6:256).

The problem of unilateralism is clearest when paired

with the second, the problem of indeterminacy.4 If you and I

disagree over the boundaries of our property in the state of

nature, neither of us has the authority to settle the

disagreement. In fact, while we remain in the state of

nature, there may be no fact of the matter about who has the

legitimate claim.5

Finally, Kant describes the third problem this way:

…the obligation [to refrain from using what another

claims as his own] arises from a universal rule having

to do with external rightful relations. I am

therefore not under obligation to leave external

objects belonging to others untouched unless everyone

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else provides me assurance that he will behave in

accordance with the same principle with regard to what

is mine. (MM 6:255-256)

Others’ claims to property rights cannot put you under an

obligation unless you have assurance of the effectiveness of

your similar claims. Call this the assurance problem.

So the state of nature creates a normative dilemma:

each person is entitled to property rights. But we cannot

exercise these rights if we cannot create, define and

enforce them, and no individual is entitled to do any of

these things. The postulate thus requires that we establish

an agent that can overcome these obstacles. That agent must

4 Kant does not mention indeterminacy in his initial explication of the argument in Part I of the Doctrine of Right,on Private Right. But when he begins the section on Public Right, Part II of the Doctrine he cites the indeterminacy problem as though this were the justification for founding the state that he had had in mind all along (MM 6:312-313). 5 Kant is committed to thinking that it is in principle impossible to ensure that such disputes will not arise. Settling cases will always require applying a normative principle to a particular empirical situation, and Kant thinks that applications of general principles to particulars always require an exercise of judgment. So there is always the possibility that your judgment and someone else’s will diverge. When they do, a version of theunilateralism problem reasserts itself, since no individual is entitled to have her private judgment prevail.

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be an authority that represents our collective, united will.

Kant holds that to establish such an omnilateral agent just

is to establish the state.

The next task is to fill in what could count as an

omnilateral agent. The state is partly defined

functionally, as that which can solve three problems in the

state of nature. This generates a familiar tripartite

account of the state’s powers. In its legislative function

the state makes laws specifying how individuals may

rightfully establish property claims. When they act

according to these laws individuals’ property claims are no

longer problematically unilateral, since they have the

support of the omnilateral state. In its judicial function

the state provides authoritative settlement to disputes

arising from the application of these laws. And in its

executive function it enforces the laws, solving the

assurance problem.

We may want a more detailed account of how an entity

could carry out these functions in a way that counts as

expressing the united will of its citizens, thus what counts

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as a legitimate government. Kant does not do as much as

many would like to specify and defend particular

requirements, and it is unclear whether this is an omission

or principled reticence. There is certainly a minimalist

strain in Kant’s treatment of the conditions of public

right, according to which any government at all is better

than none. Kant’s accounts of the connection between innate

and private right and the problems of the state of nature

suggest that, absent government, private individuals cannot

respect each other’s rights.6 Thus he thinks we have an

unconditional obligation to exit the state of nature and found

a government. The same horror at the state of nature

motivates the Hobbesian sounding view that any entity

powerful enough to exercise effective control over a

territory thereby has authority to act as the state.

Insofar as this is Kant’s view, he is unlikely to be able to

6 This is why he says that, though individuals who intend toremain in the state of nature do each other no wrong, “…in general the do wrong in the highest degree by willing to be and to remain in a condition that is not rightful…” (MM 6:307-308).

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say much about why the person or organization in question

counts as speaking and acting on behalf of all.

But, even on the most minimalist readings, Kant does

not leave the matter here. A second strain in his

treatment of Public Right lays out his account of the ideal

form of government. The ideal that Kant describes is a

republican government in which the three defining powers are

clearly distinguished and citizens are equally subject to

the rule of law. Kant also assigns states a range of

powers. Some, such as the right to tax and to punish those

who violate its laws, seem to follow straightforwardly from

the demands of the three central functions. Beyond this

Kant believes that the government is entitled to regulate

public roads and financial markets and to create welfare

policies to protect the poorest members of society from

dependence on the wealthy. Kant defends all of these powers

with arguments that they protect the freedom of individual

citizens. Thus the same standpoint of right that puts

pressure on him to count even a very poor government as

better than none also supports a much more robust ideal.

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Part II: Interpretive Controversies

Part I aims for neutrality in interpretive debates. In this

second part of the essay I raise several questions about how

to read the argument and survey the views of representative

scholars.

A. The Relationship Between Kant’s Political and Moral Work

A first question concerns whether and how Kant purports

to justify the innate right to freedom and the Universal

Principle of Right. This question provides the focus of a

larger debate over the relationship between Kant’s political

and moral thought. The majority of commentators treat the

foundational principles of the political philosophy as

somehow derivable from the moral philosophy.7 Paul Guyer

gives a detailed defense of this position.8 But a few argue

that this justificatory relation would violate Kant’s

division between right and virtue, and thus that he means

the fundamental principles of right to be self-standing.

Allen Wood is a prominent advocate of this view.9

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Wood and Guyer agree that their debate turns on how to

understand Kant’s claim that the Universal Principle of

Right is analytic. Wood argues that this statement clearly

vindicates his reading, since analytic principles are not

subject to proof. But Guyer contends that Wood overlooks

the subtleties of Kant’s conception of analyticity. Guyer

also addresses claims for the independence of the political

theory arising from Kant’s designation of the Universal

Principle as “a postulate incapable of further proof.”10 On

Guyer’s reading, Kantian “analytic principles” may be

justified by deduction from more fundamental claims, and

“postulates” are not merely asserted, but rather subject to

a distinctive sort of defense.

Both sides agree on many further points as well: First,

there is an important division between right and virtue.

Duties of right concern only our external interactions,

while duties of virtue concern also our reasons for action.

It follows that it is possible to coerce others to fulfill

duties of right, but not duties of virtue (cf. MM 6:381).

These are marks of the distinction between right and duty

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that Wood is concerned to protect. Guyer grants that

juridical duties as such are not at all concerned with

motives, and further acknowledges that it follows from this

that “Strictly construed, the claim that Kant’s universal

principle of right is not derived from the CI, understood as7 Mulholland (Kant's System of Rights) argues that Kant’s political philosophy is founded on moral obligation and thatthe UPR is an application of the CI. For the latter argument see pp. 181-182. Other commentators endorsing thisposition include Kenneth Westphal, "A Kantian Justification of Possession," Kant’s Metaphysics of Morals, ed. M. Timmons(New York: Oxford University Press, 2002) p. 97. Wolfgang Kersting, "Kant's Concept of the State," Essays on Kant's Political Philosophy, ed. H.L. Williams (Chicago, IL: University of Chcago Press, 1992) pp. 144ff. Bernd Ludwig, "Whence Public Right?" Kant's Metaphysics of Morals, ed. M. Timmons (New York, NY: Oxford University, 2002). Allen D. Rosen, Kant's Theory of Justice (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993) p. 12. Mary J. Gregor, Laws of Freedom : A Study of Kant's Method of Applying the Categorical Imperative in the Metaphysik Der Sitten (Oxford:Blackwell, 1963) p. 46.8 Paul Guyer, "Kant's Deductions of the Principles of Right," Kant's Metaphysics of Morals: Interpretive Essays, ed. Mark Timmons (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2002). The most natural way to situate the political philosophy as a subset of the moral philosophy is to derive an obligation to respect either the innate right to freedom,or the Universal Principle of Right itself, from the Categorical Imperative. Guyer defends a somewhat different position. He holds that both the Categorical Imperative andthe Universal Principle of Right follow from the substantivevalue of human freedom, which he takes Kant to regard as foundational for all of his practical philosophy. For more on this see Paul Guyer, "Kant's Morality of Law and Morality

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the requirement to act only on maxims that can also serve as

universal law, is correct because the principle of right

concerns only the compatibility of all of our actions with

the freedom of others, and does not concern our maxims at

of Freedom," Kant on Freedom, Law, and Happiness (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2000).

Robert B. Pippin ("Dividing and Deriving in Kant's Rechtslehre," Metaphysische Anfangsgrunde Der Rechtslehre, ed. Otfried Hoffe (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1999) pp. 80-85.) suggests in a similar spirit that the best argument forthe obligation to leave the state of nature and enter the civil society must appeal to the moral value of free or rational agency. But, unlike Guyer, Pippin worries that this argument is not compatible with Kant’s moral theory.9 Allen Wood, "The Final Form of Kant's Practical Philosophy," Kant's Metaphysics of Morals: Interpretive Essays, ed. Mark Timmons (New York: NY: Oxford University Press, 2002) pp. 4-10. See, especially p. 9: “Considered simply as juridical duties, however, they belong to a branchof the metaphysics of morals that is entirely independent of ethics and also of its supreme principle.” Cf. Marcus Willaschek, "Why the 'Doctrine of Right' Does Not Belong in the 'Metaphysics of Morals': On Some Basic Distinctions in Kant's Moral Philosophy," Jahrbuch fuer Recht und Ethik 5 (1997). Pogge ("Is Kant's Rechtslehre a 'Comprehensive Liberalism'? ," Kant's Metaphysics of Morals, ed. M. Timmons(New York: Oxford University Press, 2002).) argues for the independence of the political from the moral philosophy, buthe has in mind a weaker thesis than does Wood. Pogge distinguishes helpfully between the view that the moral philosophy entails the political, and the view that the political philosophy entails the moral (p. 151). He denies only the latter view. Pogge reads Rawls as affirming the former dependence thesis when he characterizes Kant as

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all, a fortiori their universality.”11 This might be

thought to concede Wood’s central point.

But, second, Kant complicates the division between the

two sorts of duties by affirming a duty of virtue to respect

others’ rights, and so a moral obligation corresponding to

each obligation of right (MM 6:219). For example, you

fulfill your juridical obligation not to steal just by leaving

others’ property undisturbed. But you fulfill your moral

obligation not to steal only if you do so motivated by your

conviction that they are entitled to this forbearance.

Notably, Wood acknowledges that the value of humanity

provides a moral reason for respecting each person’s rights.

He writes, “In so far as juridical duties are regarded as

ethical duties, they can be brought under the principle of

endorsing a “comprehensive liberalism” in John Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993.10 Guyer, "Kant's Deductions of the Principles of Right," offers a particularly helpful discussion of the Kantian term“postulate,” surveying three distinct uses that Kant makes of this term and comparing his treatment of these other postulates to those found in the doctrine of right. For another view about what Kant means by “postulate” in the Doctrine of Right, see “Appendix: ‘A Postulate Incapable of Further Proof’” in Ripstein, Force and Freedom: Kant's Legaland Political Philosophy pp. 355-88.

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ethics, which can also be used to show that we have good

reasons for valuing external freedom (or right) and

respecting the institutions that protect right through

external coercion. To this extent, it may be correctly said

that Kant’s theory of right falls under the principle of

morality.”12 This might be thought to concede Guyer’s

central point.

This significant agreement renders the point of

contention more subtle than it may first appear, but each

scholar nevertheless clearly thinks that something important

is at stake. Wood appears to be motivated at least in part

by resistance to certain misreadings or misappropriations of

Kant, which take him to claim that we can draw conclusions

about individual rights directly from the Categorical

Imperative.13 For his part Guyer believes that reading

Kant’s political postulates as posits subject to no further

defense would leave the possibility of permissible coercion,

and with it the authority of the state, unvindicated.14

Each of these motivations seem to me to be well-founded, but11 Guyer, "Kant's Deductions of the Principles of Right," p.25.

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I am not convinced that there is tension between them. One

might think that the Categorical Imperative requires, among

other things, that we respect the external freedom of all,

and that the Doctrine of Right tells us that doing this requires

a state. Since, for reasons detailed in the first section,

only the state can define the particular contours of our

individual rights, we cannot derive these directly from the

Categorical Imperative. Moreover, our obligation to found

the state entails—and so justifies—a permission to coerce

compliance from others, compelling them to fulfill their

duties of right even if they lack virtuous motives. This

strikes me as a very plausible interpretation of Kant’s

position, and consistent with both scholars’ central

concerns.15

B. From the Innate Right to Freedom to the Postulate of Practical

Reason with Regard to Rights.

The Postulate of Practical Reason with Regard to Rights

claims that it is possible for us to have objects distinct 12 Wood, "The Final Form of Kant's Practical Philosophy," p.9.

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from our own bodies as our own. Scholars disagree about how

to understand the move from the assertion of each person’s

innate right to freedom to this postulate. A few believe

that Kant’s use of the term “postulate” here makes the

search for an argument misguided.16 Yet Kant certainly

appears to offer a defense for the postulate. Those who

take this appearance seriously agree that the argument must

show that the universal right to external freedom requires

that it be possible to exercise property and other private

rights. But they disagree about precisely what it would

take to show this. This disagreement turns on the further

question of how to understand Kant’s conception of external

freedom. Arthur Ripstein understands the innate right to

freedom as the right to put your means to the use that you

choose.17 On this view, the exercise of property and other

private rights do not restrict anyone’s freedom, since using

something that belongs to me does not deprive another of

control of anything that belongs to her. Thus the exercise

of private rights does not violate the Universal Principle

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of Right, and so must be permissible. The Postulate seems

to follow.

One might worry that this establishes too weak a

version of the Postulate, one that holds only that it would

be permissible to exercise private rights, not obligatory to13 See Wood, "The Final Form of Kant's Practical Philosophy," p. 10. Stuart Brown’s criticism of Kant’s political philosophy may provide an example of what Wood is concerned to target. See Stuart M. Brown, "Has Kant a Philosophy of Law?" Philosophical Review 71.1 (1962). Ripstein subjects Brown’s approach to similar critique (Ripstein, Force and Freedom: Kant's Legal and Political Philosophy pp. 1-13.).14 Guyer claims that what needs to be established is that “it is theoretically possible for one person to exercise coercion against another without depriving the latter of hisright or his part in universal freedom” (Guyer, "Kant's Deductions of the Principles of Right," p. 52.). Scholars of Kant’s moral philosophy routinely treat coercion as one of a small group of basic wrongs. See, for example, Christine M. Korsgaard, "Kant's Formula of Humanity," Creating the Kingdom of Ends (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1996); Onora O'Neill, "Between Consenting Adults," Constructions of Reason (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1989). Japa Pallikkathayil ("Deriving Morality from Politics: Rethinking the Formula of Humanity,"Ethics: An International Journal of Social, Political, and Legal Philosophy 121 (1).1 (2010).) points out that an absolute prohibition on coercion would be difficult to reconcile with Kant’s political theory. She argues for a complex interdependence between Kant’s moral and political thought.15 Cf. Robert B. Pippin, "Mine and Thine? The Kantian State," The Cambridge Companion to Kant and Modern Philosophy ed. Paul Guyer (Cambridge: Cambridge Univerity

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make them possible.18 Absent the stronger claim, it is not

clear how the Postulate could ground an obligation to exit

the state of nature in which no such rights can be

established.19 A more common reading regards a person as

externally free just in case she can move her body around in

space unfettered by others.20 Universal unrestricted

freedom is impossible on this conception, since just by

being where you are you eliminate the possibility that I

could occupy that spot without removing you from it. So

freedom must be limited in some way, and the Universal

Principle tells us that we may limit freedom if, but only

if, universal application of this limit ensures the largest

possible scope of universal freedom. On this view, the

argument for the Postulate works by establishing that a

social arrangement allowing for property and other private

rights guarantees each person greater freedom than each

would be guaranteed without these rights. The

Press, 2006) pp. 419-28. And Patrick Riley, Kant's Political Philosophy, Philosophy and Society Series (Totowa,N.J.: Rowman and Littlefield, 1983) p. 2.

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reconstruction of the argument that I give above follows

this pattern.

C. From the Postulate of Practical Reason with Regard to Rights to the

Obligation to Exit the State of Nature

The next major move is from Private to Public right, or

from the Postulate’s assertion of the need for relationships

of rights between individuals to the demand for an

authoritative government. As the previous controversy

depends on a conception of freedom, this one turns largely

on an interpretation of the three obstacles to establishing

rights in the state of nature. Collectively these account

for the incapacity of private individuals to solve the

normative problem of the state of nature, and so their need

for the omnilateral will embodied in the state. A reading 16 Willaschek, "Why the 'Doctrine of Right' Does Not Belong in the 'Metaphysics of Morals': On Some Basic Distinctions in Kant's Moral Philosophy." Ripstein takes a more moderateposition. He holds that, qua postulate, the principle cannot be proven, but that it can nevertheless be defended. See his “Appendix: ‘A Postulate Incapable of Further Proof,’” Force and Freedom: Kant's Legal and Political Philosophy, pp. 355-88.17 Mulholland endorses a very similar conception in Kant's System of Rights, pp. 203-04.

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of the argument thus needs to explicate these problems and

their relationships to one another.

Some commentators read this part of Kant’s argument as

depending on anthropological claims about vices in human

nature. These readings emphasize the assurance problem, and

so Kant’s affinity to Hobbes, holding that our fundamental

problem in the state of nature is that we cannot reasonably

trust others to respect our rights. It follows that we

cannot have reason to respect their rights, since this would

expose us to exploitation, and so limit our freedom. So we

need a powerful sovereign who can guarantee our rights. On

this view, perfectly virtuous agents with mutual knowledge

of one another’s virtue would be able to establish

relationships of right in private transactions, and would

not need to establish a state.21

Recently, Ripstein and others have challenged this

view, claiming that it misrepresents the nature of the

Kantian state.22 The target view treats Kant’s political

philosophy as an exercise in non-ideal theory. But Kant

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seems to have higher aspirations, expressed in his claims

that

“It is therefore not some fact that makes coercion

through public law necessary. On the contrary,

however well disposed and law-abiding men might 19 Kant’s restatement of postulate at MM 6:252 makes this clearer: “…it is a duty of right to act towards others so that what is external (usable) could also be someone’s.”18 Byrd and Hruschka argue that the postulate is permissive in that it permits individuals to acquire new rights, but that this generates an obligation to establish the structures that make these rights possible. See Byrd and Hruschka, Kant's Doctrine of Right: A Commentary, Chapter 4, pp. 94-106. They seem closer to Ripstein’s view than to the version of the argument that I present here when they deny that the postulate aims to offer justification for overturning a presumption against the permissibility of establishing property rights (pp. 105-106).20 I defend this view in Kyla Ebels-Duggan, “Moral Community: Escaping the Ethical State of Nature,” Philosophers’Imprint vol. 9:8, August 2009. I explore the disagreement with Ripstein in more detail in “Critical Notice of Arthur Ripstein’s Force and Freedom” forthcoming in Canadian Journal of Philosophy. Cf. Westphal ("A Kantian Justification of Possession.") who provides a somewhat similar reconstructionof the argument for the postulate. Other defenders of this conception of freedom include Howard Williams, Kant's Political Philosophy (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1983) pp. 68-70; Thomas Pogge, "Is Kant's Rechtslehre a 'Comprehensive Liberalism'?," pp. 136-37; Paul Guyer, "Kant's System of Duties II: Duties of Right," Kant (London: Routledge, 2006) p. 263; and Rosen, Kant's Theory of Justice , pp. 11 and 13. Cf. also p. 18 where Rosen interprets freedom as the right to pursue one’s own conception of happiness. Pippin also seems to endorse this

27

be, it still lies a priori in the rational idea of

[the state of nature] that before a public lawful

condition is established individual human beings,

peoples, and states, can never be secure against

violence from one another, since each has its own

conception of freedom in his brief summary of the argument (“Dividing and Deriving in Kant's Rechtslehre," pp. 76-77.) when he says the problem with limiting property to physical possession is that “only a very small number of ends could be pursued.” Note that Pippin argues that no reading of Kant’s argument is free of serious problems.

Byrd and Hruschka open an interesting middle position by arguing that external freedom, like Kant’s internal freedom or autonomy, should be understood as having both a negative and a positive aspect. They identify freedom from determination by another, apparently the conception that I am defending here, as the negative aspect (Byrd and Hruschka, Kant's Doctrine of Right: A Commentary, p. 4 and cf. p. 79.). But they argue for understanding the positive conception of external freedom, like that of autonomy, as governed by law, and so as enabled, not limited, by the founding of the juridical state (pp. 87ff). By contrast, I grant that property rights limits others’ freedom and seek to justify this limit as consistent with the Universal Principle.21 Williams, Kant's Political Philosophy suggests that external legislation is made necessary by our inability to perfectly follow the moral law. See especially pp. 10ff where he appeals directly to the assurance problem and makesKant sound very Hobbesian. Cf. pp. 56, 65, 166-170, and especially 71, where he characterizes the Kantian state a “necessary evil.” Jeffrie G. Murphy also explicitly endorses the idea that the state is a remedial response to human moral imperfections (Kant: The Philosophy of Right, ROSE edition (Macon, GA: Mercer University Press, 1994) p.

28

right to do what seems right and good to it and

not to be dependent on another’s opinion about

this” (MM 6:312).

Here Kant treats the state as part of ideal theory.

Ripstein treats the unilateralism problem as the most

76.). Onora O’Neill apparently presumes such a view ("Transnational Economic Justice," Bounds of Justice (New York, NY: Cambridge, 2000), see, especially, pp. 137-140). And cf. Riley, Kant's Political Philosophy pp. vii, 3-4, and9-10, the last of which makes reference to the assurance problem. Guyer focuses on the role of the state in enforcement, which is related to the problem of assurance inthe state of nature ("Kant's System of Duties II: Duties of Right " pp. 265-66). In this initial presentation of the argument he does not attend to the problems raised by unilateralism and indeterminacy, but evidently treats enforcement as the fundamental ground for an obligation to found the state. Guyer emphasizes that the Kantian state isnot merely prudentially but morally required, but understands this moral requirement as itself grounded in universalized prudential considerations. Pogge also presents the argument for exiting the state of nature as a pragmatic one, based on an interest in maximizing one’s own external freedom (Pogge, "Is Kant's Rechtslehre a 'Comprehensive Liberalism'?" especially section IV). He makes the connection with Hobbes explicit on p. 149. Hoffë does not exactly attribute the pragmatic argument to Kant, but seems to think that it is the best strategy for legitimization of the state, and lays out how it might proceed (Otfried Hoffë, "'Even a Nation of Devils Needs the State': The Dilemma of Natural Justice " Essays on Kant's Political Philosophy, ed. Howard Lloyd Williams (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992).). Pippin makes assurance central to his reconstruction of Kant’s argument, but emphasizes the relationship of assurance to the other

29

central: the fundamental problem in the state of nature is

that individuals lack the requisite authority to establish

rights against others. He argues that while the Postulate

establishes that it is possible to have rights against

others, it leaves untouched the question of how one could

acquire rights to external things.23 Only an omnilateral will

can establish the procedures that make it possible to

two problems and the result that the need for assurance is fundamentally moral, not pragmatic as in Hobbes ("Dividing and Deriving in Kant's Rechtslehre," pp. 76-78). 22 Ludwig ("Whence Public Right?") also affirms that the justifications for an obligation to leave the state of nature and for state authority in no way depend on a thesis about human beings being prone to conflict (esp. p. 171), and emphasizes the unilateralism problem (esp. p. 177). Andcf. Katrin Flikschuh, "Reason, Right, and Revolution: Kant and Locke," Philosophy and Public Affairs 36 (4).4 (2008): p. 386. Flikschuh emphasizes unilateralism in her section II.B, pp. 389ff. And cf. Helga Varden, "Kant's Non-Voluntarist Conception of Political Obligations: Why JusticeIs Impossible in the State of Nature," Kantian Review (2).2 (2008). Kersting finds the Hobbesian argument in Kant, butalso an additional argument, which he calls “genuinely Kantian” ("Kant's Concept of the State"). The latter depends on the deficiencies of unilateral authority rather than any concern about human vice. He believes that both arguments yield a moral, not merely a prudential, obligationto exit the state of nature. Cf Wolfgang Kersting, "Politics, Freedom, and Order," Cambridge Companion to Kant,ed. Paul Guyer (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1992), p. 352.

30

acquire new rights, and this problem of acquisition provides

the impetus for the establishment of the state.24

But one might think that the problem of unilateralism

itself depends on the further problem of indeterminacy, and

so regard the latter as more fundamental. Ripstein

emphasizes that the state and its laws allow individuals to

act on the omnilateral authority of the general will, rather

than merely their own unilateral authority. But suppose

that the content of our rights were completely determinate

pre-politically. If the Universal Principle of Right, or

some other pre-political principle, were sufficient to

determine procedures of acquisition there would be no

apparent need for the state to play this role. Individuals

acting on these procedures would not rely solely on the

authority of their individual wills, but could invoke the

authority of Universal Principle. Accordingly, many

presentations of Kant’s argument lay most emphasis on the

state’s necessary role in eliminating indeterminacy.25

D. Legitimacy and Revolution

31

A final issue concerns the practical upshot of Kant’s

denial of a right to revolution. Many contemporary readers

find this position implausible, and Kant’s own support of

the French Revolution complicates the interpretive issue.

But Katrin Flikschuh helpfully brings out the way in which

Kant’s opposition to revolution follows from his central

commitments and cannot be easily excised from his overall

approach: A right to revolution could only belong to the

people as a whole, since any unilateral act of violence

against the government would violate the Universal Principle

of Right. But on Kant’s view the people is constituted as

an agent only in the civil condition, and is represented by

the government.26

This does not settle all questions about what

individuals may or must do in the face oppressive regimes,

and scholars have defended a range of positions as Kantian.

Since Kant explicitly claims that any state is entitled to

rule, many tie their interpretation to a reading of the

sufficient conditions for constituting a “collective general

(common) and powerful will” (MM 6:256), that is for being a

32

state at all. A high bar here would considerably soften

Kant’s apparently harsh view.27

Ripstein uses this strategy to defend a Kantian right—

indeed a Kantian duty—of resistance against horrendously

unjust powers.28 He argues that we cannot regard laws that

violate rather than uphold the innate right to freedom as

issuing from the general will. Thus purported governments

who try to enforce such laws fail to constitute a genuine

state, but are merely powerful thugs in the state of

nature.29 The “duty to put up with even what is held to be

an unbearable abuse of supreme authority” (MM 6:320) does

not apply in such situations. Rather, the duty that applies

is the duty to exit the state of nature—resisting the powers

there by force if necessary—and found a state that creates a

rightful condition.

This approach is appealing, but threatens to prove too

much. Kant purports to derive both the legitimacy of

government authority and substantive parameters on the

ideally just state from the innate right to freedom. If his

argumentative strategy succeeds it will show that anything

33

short of a fully ideal government in some way violates the

innate right to freedom. Ripstein’s position might then be

thought, contrary to his intent, to justify violent

resistance in the face of even minor defects. This is

23 Ripstein, Force and Freedom: Kant's Legal and Political Philosophy, p. 62. I have a similar distinction in mind when I say, above, that the postulate tells us that, but nothow, it is possible to have rights to external things.24 Ripstein’s view here is similar to Mulholland, Kant's System of Rights.25 Sarah Williams Holtman also affirms that the state is notmerely a feature of non-ideal theory, but emphasizes indeterminacy more than unilateralism ("Revolution, Contradiction, and Kantian Citizenship," Kant's Metaphysics of Morals ed. M. Timmons (New York: Oxford University Press,2002).). Similar positions are found in Kersting, "Politics, Freedom, and Order." And Rosen, Kant's Theory of Justice. Rosen seems clearly to deny the remedial reading (p. 10), and emphasizes indeterminacy (p. 119, and cf. Chapter 1). But Rosen thinks that Kant’s argument fails to yield the strong conclusion that it is obligatory to leave the state of nature. Rather, on his view, Kant is entitled only to the less controversial conclusion that one must leave the state of nature if there is an option to establisha more just arrangement. Pallikathayil also treats indeterminacy as the leading problem ("Deriving Morality from Politics: Rethinking the Formula of Humanity"). She regards assurance, though apparently not unilateralism, as an independent issue. Pippin’s stated thesis emphasizes assurance: “…the solution is: mutually assured reciprocal observance of the boundary between mine and thine…the primary authority of the state stems from its role in securing property rights” ("Mine and Thine? The Kantian State ," p. 416.). But his treatment of the argument, at

34

obviously problematic as a substantive position and clearly

opposed to the spirit of Kant’s views.30

Christine Korsgaard takes Kant’s denial of a right to

revolution at something closer to face value by

acknowledging a low bar for legitimacy.31 On her reading,

in advance of the founding of a state there is no fact about

what procedures should be counted as issuing in the people’s

decision. And in the wake of the founding of a state,

whatever procedures are in place must be so counted, even if

these appear to be substantively unjust.32 The

revolutionary thus engages in unilateral violence against

the only possible candidate for the expression of the

general will. She must understand her action as

incompatible with respect for universal freedom, and so as

least in this article, emphasizes indeterminacy (See 428-433). Mulholland (clearly makes indeterminacy prior to assurance, interpreting the latter in terms of the former. But he also treats indeterminacy as the fundamental obstacleto the acquisition of rights, and thus prior to unilateralism. See Kant's System of Rights, pp. 283-285.26 Flikschuh, "Reason, Right, and Revolution: Kant and Locke." And cf. Katrin Flikschuh, "Sidestepping Morality: Korsgaard on Kant's No-Right to Revolution," Jahrbuch fuer Recht und Ethik 16 (2008). See also Pippin, "Mine and Thine? The Kantian State," p. 437.

35

not rightful. But Korsgaard tries to blunt the force of

this, by arguing that nevertheless a good person might

revolt for good reasons, acting out of respect for (the

rights of) humanity. Since she acts against the Universal

Principle of Right she cannot take her actions to be

justified, at least prospectively, and if the revolution

fails she will still be rightly condemned. However, if her

27 Several commentators simply reject Kant’s views about revolution. Among these are Thomas E. Hill, "A Kantian Perspective on Political Violence," Respect, Pluralism, and Justice : Kantian Perspectives (New York NY: Oxford University Press, 2000). And Mulholland, Kant's System of Rights. Hill reads Kant as having a low bar for legitimacy,and thus a very strong view about the impermissibility of revolution. But he thinks Kant’s arguments for this strong position fail. Mulholland sets the bar for legitimacy much higher: An existing government must have effective coercive power to protect people from one another and enforce its laws. Lacking this, the people have no obligation to submit. He also cites Perpetual Peace (Immanuel Kant, "Toward Perpetual Peace," Practical Philosophy, ed. Mary J. Gregor, Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1996) as claiming that despots (rulers who control both executive and legislative powers) who intentionally wrong their subjects and cannot bepersuaded to stop are not wronged by deposition through rebellion. Finally he holds that all rights in non-Republican states are merely provisional. From all of this he concludes that Kant’s position should have been, though it was not, that revolution against non-republican governments can be justified.

36

attempt succeeds then it may, after the fact, be deemed

justified, in both a legal and a moral sense.

Korsgaard seeks to vindicate our admiration of

revolutionaries who succeed in overturning injustice, while

maintaining Kant’s central political commitments. While it

is easy to see the attraction of this outcome, it is not

clear how to combine Korsgaard’s argument with Kant’s own

understanding of virtue. Kant holds that the duty to respect

rights is absolute, so—as Korsgaard acknowledges—a clear

thinking revolutionary cannot take herself to have

sufficient reason to violate it. But it is hard to see how

a Kantian can count as virtuous someone who acts against her

own assessment of what duty demands.28 Drawing on her view about the role of indeterminacy, Holtman argues for a similar conclusion ("Revolution, Contradiction, and Kantian Citizenship"). On her reading, indeterminacy is the fundamental obstacle to justice in the state of nature, and so settling issues of indeterminacy is the most essential function of the state. But she argues that not all substantive duties of justice are indeterminate, so it is possible for a government to violatedeterminate duties of justice. When the revolutionary acts to prevent this sort of violation, he may be justified.29 Cf. J. Ebbinghaus, "The Law of Humanity and the Limits ofState Power," Philosophical Quarterly 3 (1953). And Byrd and Hruschka, Kant's Doctrine of Right: A Commentary, pp. 90-91 and 181-84.

37

The problems with these attempts to soften Kant’s

opposition to revolution lead some to serious consideration

of the hard line anti-revolutionary position. Flikschuh

defends this interpretation of Kant’s own views, and also

advances considerations that make it substantively more

palatable than it may first appear. Like Korsgaard, she

maintains a clear distinction between merely legitimate

governments on the one hand and fully just governments on

the other, and reads Kant as endorsing a low bar for

legitimacy.33 She takes Kant to claim that a government is

legitimate just in case it is acknowledged by the people

living in the territory. Kant’s prima facie hard opposition to

revolution follows: violent resistance against the existing

powers, however apparently oppressive, is wrong.

This absolute prohibition on violent resistance appears

to render principled citizens powerless in the face of

injustice, and a refusal to accept such powerless motivates

the search for a more moderate Kantian position. Flikschuh

also takes this objection seriously, but argues that Kant’s

affirmation of citizens’ right to “freedom of the pen,”

38

public criticism of the government aimed at reform, is

sufficient to meet it.34 Reasoned criticism is less flashy,

and sometimes more dangerous for the individuals involved,

than attempts at violent revolution, but it is far from

impotent. In fact it may often be more effective than

violence as a means to securing substantive justice.35

Kantian approaches have the potential to enrich

substantive normative discussions on a range of issues in

political philosophy. Here I have focused on various

aspects of Kant’s argument for government authority, but I

30 For a more detailed presentation of this concern see Ebels-Duggan, “Critical Notice of Arthur Ripstein’s Force and Freedom.”31 Christine M. Korsgaard, "Taking the Law into Our Own Hands: Kant on the Right to Revolution," Reclaiming the History of Ethics: Essays for John Rawls eds. Andrews Reath,Barbara Herman, Christine M. Korsgaard (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1997).32 Korsgaard makes this vivid by describing a case in which the would be revolutionary assembles all of the subjects of a power and they vote unanimously to try to overthrow a tyrannical ruler. Korsgaard thinks that, even in this case,the revolutionary cannot claim to be acting for the people because “In this country, the procedure for determining the general will is to consult the dictator, not to take a vote”("Taking the Law into Our Own Hands: Kant on the Right to Revolution," p. 312).

39

have had to treat the issues raised in a cursory way.

Moreover, Kant’s thought has much to offer even beyond this

central argument. Already there is a rich Kantian

literature on several contemporary issues in political

philosophy, including but not limited to welfare policies,36

theories of punishment,37 and international relations.38

Kant offers a unique perspective that ties the resolution of

all of these questions to the unified starting point of a

universal right to external freedom.

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Byrd, B. Sharon, and Joachim Hruschka. Kant's Doctrine of Right: A Commentary. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2010.

Ebbinghaus, J. "The Law of Humanity and the Limits of State Power." Philosophical Quarterly 3 (1953).

33 In fact, Flikschuh believes that Korsgaard’s position ultimately collapses this distinction. See Flikschuh, "Sidestepping Morality: Korsgaard on Kant's No-Right to Revolution."

40

Fleischacher, Samuel. "Kant's Theory of Punishment " Essays on Kant's Political Philosophy. Ed. Williams, Howard Lloyd. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992. 191-212.

Flikschuh, Katrin. "Reason, Right, and Revolution: Kant and Locke." Philosophy and Public Affairs 36 (4).4 (2008).

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Gregor, Mary J. Laws of Freedom: A Study of Kant's Method of Applying the Categorical Imperative in the Metaphysik Der Sitten. Oxford: Blackwell, 1963.

Guyer, Paul. "Kant's Deductions of the Principles of Right."Kant's Metaphysics of Morals: Interpretive Essays. Ed. Timmons, Mark. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2002. 23-64.

---. "Kant's Morality of Law and Morality of Freedom." Kant on Freedom, Law, and Happiness. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2000. 129-71.

---. "Kant's System of Duties Ii: Duties of Right " Kant London: Routledge, 2006. 262-303.

34 See Immanuel Kant, "On the Common Saying: That May Be Correct in Theory, But It Is of No Use in Practice," Practical Philosophy, ed. Mary J. Gregor, The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1996) p. 8:304. Flikschuh’s lowbar is apparent in her position that even a governing authority that denies its people this right could retain legitimacy if it is “the sole possible representative of theidea of the general will” ("Reason, Right, and Revolution: Kant and Locke," p. 395). 35 Flikschuh also recognizes the possibility of the violent dissolution of the state, which she says may occur if and when repression becomes “literally unbearable” ("Reason, Right, and Revolution: Kant and Locke," p. 396). But she treats this possibility, in a broadly Hegelian or Marxist way, only as a natural caused event, not one subject to moral evaluation. On her view, so long as the possibility of revolution arises in a practical way, it must be rejectedas both immoral and unjust.

41

Hill, Thomas E. "A Kantian Perspective on Political Violence" Respect, Pluralism, and Justice: Kantian Perspectives. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2000. 200-36.

---. "Punishment, Conscience, and Moral Worth " Kant's Metaphysics of Morals: Interpretative Essays Ed. Timmons, Mark. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2002. 233-53.

---. "Kant's Theory of Punishment: A Coherent Mix of Deterrence and Retribution." Respect, Pluralism, and Justice : Kantian Perspectives. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2000. 173-99.

Hodgson, Louis-Philippe. "A Kantian Argument for a World State." Proceedings of the Tenth International Kant Congress. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2006.

Hoffë, Otfried. "'Even a Nation of Devils Needs the State': The Dilemma of Natural Justice " Essays on Kant's Political Philosophy. Ed. Williams, Howard Lloyd. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992. 120-42.

Holtman, Sarah Williams. "Revolution, Contradiction, and Kantian Citizenship." Kant's Metaphysics of Morals Ed. Timmons, M. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2002. 209-32.

Kant, Immanuel. "The Conflict of the Faculties " The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant: Religion and Rational Theology Eds. Wood, Allen W. and George Di Giovanni. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1996. 233-93.

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---. "On the Common Saying: That May Be Correct in Theory, but It Is of No Use in Practice." Practical Philosophy. Ed. Gregor, Mary J. The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1996. 273-310.

---. Practical Philosophy. Trans. Gregor, Mary J. The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1996.

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Kersting, Wolfgang. "Kant's Concept of the State." Essays on Kant's Political Philosophy. Ed. Williams, H.L. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992. 143-66.

36 Ripstein, Force and Freedom : Kant's Legal and Political Philosophy, Chapter 9, pp. 267-99; O'Neill, "Transnational Economic Justice." Alexander Kaufman, Welfare in the Kantian State (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1999.37 Ripstein, Force and Freedom: Kant's Legal and Political Philosophy, Chapter 10, pp. 300-24; B. Sharon Byrd, "Kant'sTheory of Punishment: Deterrence in Its Threat, Retribution in Its Execution," Law and Philosophy: An International Journal for Jurisprudence and Legal Philosophy 8 (2).2 (1989); Thomas E. Hill, "Punishment, Conscience, and Moral Worth " Kant's Metaphysics of Morals: Interpretative Essays ed. Mark Timmons (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2002); Thomas E. Hill, "Kant's Theory of Punishment: A Coherent Mix of Deterrence and Retribution," Respect, Pluralism, and Justice : Kantian Perspectives (New York, NY:Oxford University Press, 2000); Herbert Morris, "Persons and Punishment," Monist: An International Quarterly Journal of General Philosophical Inquiry 52 (1968); Samuel Fleischacher, "Kant's Theory of Punishment " Essays on Kant's Political Philosophy, ed. Howard Lloyd Williams (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992).38 Onora O'Neill, "Kant and the Social Contract Tradition," Kant Actuel: Homage a Pierre Leberge, eds. Francois Duchesneau, Guy Lafrance and Claude Piche (Montreal: Bellarmin, 2000). Thomas Pogge, "Kant's Theory of Justice,"Kant-Studien: Philosophische Zeitschrift der Kant-Gesellschaft 79 (1988). Louis-Philippe Hodgson, "A Kantian Argument for a World State," Proceedings of the Tenth International Kant Congress (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2006). Helga Varden, "International and Cosmopolitan

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---. "Politics, Freedom, and Order." Cambridge Companion to Kant. Ed. Guyer, Paul. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1992. 342-66.

Korsgaard, Christine M. "Kant's Formula of Humanity." Creating the Kingdom of Ends. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1996. 106-32.

---. "Taking the Law into Our Own Hands: Kant on the Right to Revolution." Reclaiming the History of Ethics: Essays for John Rawls Eds. Reath, Andrews, et al. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1997. 297-328.

Ludwig, Bernd. "Whence Public Right?" Kant's Metaphysics of Morals. Ed. Timmons, M. New York, NY: Oxford University, 2002. 159-84.

Morris, Herbert. "Persons and Punishment." Monist: An International Quarterly Journal of General Philosophical Inquiry 52 (1968): 475-501.

Mulholland, Leslie Arthur. Kant's System of Rights. New York, NY:Columbia University Press, 1990.

Murphy, Jeffrie G. Kant: The Philosophy of Right. ROSE edition. Macon, GA: Mercer University Press, 1994.

O'Neill, Onora. "Between Consenting Adults." Constructions of Reason. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1989.

---. "Kant and the Social Contract Tradition." Kant Actuel: Homage a Pierre Leberge. Eds. Duchesneau, Francois, Guy Lafrance and Claude Piche. Montreal: Bellarmin, 2000.

---. "Transnational Economic Justice." Bounds of Justice. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2000. 115-42.

Pallikkathayil, Japa. "Deriving Morality from Politics: Rethinking the Formula of Humanity." Ethics: An International Journal of Social, Political, and Legal Philosophy 121 (1).1 (2010): 116-47.

Pippin, Robert B. "Dividing and Deriving in Kant's Rechtslehre." Metaphysische Anfangsgrunde Der Rechtslehre. Ed. Hoffë, Otfried. Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1999. 63-85.

Political Obligations," Coercion and the State, eds. David A. Reidy and Walter Riker (New York, NY: Spinger Verlag, 2008).

44

---. "Mine and Thine? The Kantian State " The Cambridge Companion to Kant and Modern Philosophy Ed. Guyer, Paul. Cambridge: Cambridge Univerity Press, 2006. 416-46.

Pogge, Thomas. "Is Kant's Rechtslehre a 'Comprehensive Liberalism'? ." Kant's Metaphysics of Morals. Ed. Timmons, M.New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2002. 133-58.

---. "Kant's Theory of Justice." Kant-Studien: Philosophische Zeitschrift der Kant-Gesellschaft 79 (1988): 407-33.

Rawls, John. Political Liberalism. New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1993.

---. A Theory of Justice. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971.

Riley, Patrick. Kant's Political Philosophy. Philosophy and SocietySeries. Totowa, N.J.: Rowman and Littlefield, 1983.

Ripstein, Arthur. Force and Freedom: Kant's Legal and Political Philosophy. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009.

Rosen, Allen D. Kant's Theory of Justice. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993.

Varden, Helga. "International and Cosmopolitan Political Obligations." Coercion and the State. Eds. Reidy, David A. and Walter Riker. New York, NY: Spinger Verlag, 2008.

---. "Kant's Non-Voluntarist Conception of Political Obligations: Why Justice Is Impossible in the State of Nature." Kantian Review (2).2 (2008): 1-45.

Westphal, Kenneth. "A Kantian Justification of Possession." Kant’s Metaphysics of Morals. Ed. Timmons, M. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2002. 89-109.

Willaschek, Marcus. "Why the 'Doctrine of Right' Does Not Belong in the 'Metaphysics of Morals': On Some Basic Distinctions in Kant's Moral Philosophy." Jahrbuch fuer Recht und Ethik 5 (1997): 205-27.

Williams, Howard. Kant's Political Philosophy. New York, NY: St. Martin's Press, 1983.

Wood, Allen. "The Final Form of Kant's Practical Philosophy." Kant's Metaphysics of Morals: Interpretive Essays. Ed.Timmons, Mark. New York: NY: Oxford University Press, 2002. 1-22.

45

Further Reading

Flikschuh, Katrin. Kant and Modern Political Philosophy. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2000.

O'Neill, Onora. Bounds of Justice. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2000.

---. "The Great Maxims of Justice and Charity " Constructions of Reason: Explorations of Kant's Practical Philosophy. New York, NY:Cambridge University Press, 1989. 219-33.

Ripstein, Arthur. "Authority and Coercion." Philosophy and Public Affairs Vol. 32, 2004. 2-35.

---. "Private Right, Private Order and Public Justice: Kant and Rawls." Virginia Law Review 92.7 (2006): 1391-438.

Timmons, Mark. Kant's Metaphysics of Morals: Interpretative Essays. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2002.

Varden, Helga. "Kant's Non-Absolutist Conception of Political Legitimacy: How Public Right 'Concludes' Private Right in the 'Doctrine of Right'." Kant-Studien: Philosophische Zeitschrift der Kant-Gesellschaft (3).3 (2010): 331-51.

Weinrib, Ernest J. "Law as Idea of Reason." Essays on Kant's Political Philosophy. Ed. Williams, H.L. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1992. 15-49.

Williams, Howard. Essays on Kant's Political Philosophy. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1992.

---. "Kant on the Social Contract." The Social Contract from Hobbes to Rawls. Eds. Boucher, D. and P. Kelly. New York, NY: Routledge, 1994. 132-47.

---. Kant's Critique of Hobbes: Sovereignty and Cosmopolitanism. Political Philosophy Now. Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 2003.

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