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John Brown as guerrilla terroristBrenda J. Lutza & James M. Lutzb

a Decision Sciences and Theory Institute, IndianaUniversity-Purdue University, , Fort Wayne, IN, USAb Department of Political Science, Indiana University-Purdue UniversityPublished online: 06 Oct 2014.

To cite this article: Brenda J. Lutz & James M. Lutz (2014) John Brown as guerrillaterrorist, Small Wars & Insurgencies, 25:5-6, 1039-1054

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John Brown as guerrilla and terrorist

Brenda J. Lutza and James M. Lutzb*

aDecision Sciences and Theory Institute, Indiana University-Purdue University, FortWayne, IN, USA; bDepartment of Political Science, Indiana University-Purdue University

(Received 8 May 2013; accepted 2 August 2013)

John Brown is usually not considered to have been a terrorist, and even recentanalyses of his activities consider him to be a guerrilla fighter or insurgentin his activities in Kansas. Brown, however, meets the criteria of a terroristmore than a guerrilla fighter when his activities in the Kansas Territory areconsidered. His raid on Harpers Ferry, however, is more in line with guerrillaoperations or insurgent activities.

Keywords: terrorism; John Brown; slavery; Kansas Territory; Harpers Ferry

Introduction

Kansas in the years just prior to the American Civil War saw significant violence

between free soil and pro-slavery forces. John Brown was one of the key actors in

that struggle for control of the political destiny of theKansas Territory. Analysts of

the conflict have viewed John Brown from a variety of perspectives, but he has not

usually been considered a terrorist. Etcheson, who has written extensively on John

Brown, for example, suggested in one article that John Brown acted as a guerrilla

fighter and not as a terrorist in his violent struggles with pro-slavery groups in the

Kansas Territory.1 Further, Etcheson has basically argued that many of the people

who have applied today’s terminology and categories – such as terrorism–have

done so inappropriately. Her ownwork on Brown’s activities before the Civil War

demonstrates her obvious familiarity with Brown, and she has established herself

as a knowledgeable scholar of his activities.2 What remains, therefore, is a

question of evaluation, and there is a great deal of information to suggest that

Brown’s actions in Kansas can indeed often be characterized as terrorism rather

than guerrilla warfare. His later raid on the federal arsenal at Harpers Ferry,

however, does appear to more closely correspond to the actions of a guerrilla

fighter or insurgent instead of a terrorist. Evaluations of Brown’s actions are

important since many basic works on terrorism do not include or mention Brown,

and many analyses of his activities do not use terrorism as a term of reference.3

There have been, however, a few modern authors who feel that Brown was a

terrorist, at least while he was active in the Kansas Territory.4 More recently,

q 2014 Taylor & Francis

*Corresponding author. Email: lutz@ipfw.edu

Small Wars & Insurgencies, 2014

Vol. 25, Nos. 5–6, 1039–1054, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09592318.2014.945678

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scholarly analyses have appeared, and a number of scholars have considered him

a terrorist within the context of broader considerations of the phenomenon of

terrorism when looked at from a global perspective. In fact, Brown has been

considered as one excellent example of terrorism in the nineteenth century.5

One analysis of his activities prior to the Civil War concluded that ‘John Brown

was in a number of ways the most effective practitioner of terrorism’ in the Kansas

Territory.6

There are a number of issues raised about the classification of Brown that tend

to confuse the nature of terrorism with other forms of political violence, and, thus

to confuse the issue of whether John Brown qualifies as a terrorist. The first issue

involves an implied value judgment since he was fighting against slavery. To label

him as a terrorist would apply a very negative term to the positive goal of ending

slavery. The second issue involves the suggestion that John Brown’s actions were

not terrorism because the targets of his attacks were not victims of indiscriminate

violence. This argument offers support for the view that he was a guerrilla captain.

Etcheson also suggests as a third issue that Brown was not a true terrorist since

many of his activities involved actions against property – including the liberation

of slaves.7 A fourth issue involves the religious beliefs behind his actions. His

belief patterns are hard to analyze, and it is indeed difficult to categorize Brown in

terms of his motivations in many respects, but religion was a factor in his

willingness to use violence. Finally, there is the raid on the arsenal at Harpers

Ferry, which Etcheson suggests was not an example of terrorism, a point that is

well-taken. Of course, even if this last action was not terrorism, it would not mean

that Brown’s earlier activities in the Kansas Territory were also not terrorism.

An additional issue raised is the question of the underlying causes that led Brown

to engage in violence, whether as a terrorist or guerrilla, that might shed some light

on how his actions might be characterized.

Bleeding Kansas: Prelude to civil war

The struggle in the Kansas Territory was part of a broader national confrontation

over the issue of slavery between thosewho supported the institution andwanted it

to be legal throughout the United States and the abolitionists who wanted to do

away with the institution. There were others who took more moderate positions.

Some opposed permitting slavery to appear in the North but were willing to

tolerate it in the Southern states, and some Southerners were willing to accept

limits on the spread of slavery. The Kansas Territory became a prize in the battle

over the future of slavery in the country as Southerners sought to have it become

a slave territory while many in the North wanted it to be free of slavery.

The controversy over Kansas had some broader political implications. For some

the issue was about the power of the states to determine policy and to prevent

the national government from imposing these determinations. The slavery issue

became the focus for the debate between those who preferred more power to be in

the states and those who wanted more power for the national government.8

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Groups on both sides carried the battle to Kansas. Pro-slavery groups in the

territory were able to get a great deal of support from residents in neighboring

Missouri, which was a slave state. In the first elections for a territorial legislature in

Kansas, many residents from Missouri crossed over the border and illegally voted

in the elections. The ballot box stuffing resulted in the election of a majority of

pro-slavery legislators.9 One sign of the extent of the electoral fraudwas the fact that

the 2905males that could vote in the territory cast 6307 votes in one election – with

5516 being cast for pro-slavery candidates and only 791 for those opposed to slavery

in the territory.10 TheMissourians, however, did not just rely on voting irregularities

to win the election. They also prevented voters opposed to slavery from voting

through the occasional use of violence and the massive use of intimidation.11

The irregularities that occurred during the early elections polarized political

feelings in Kansas and in the country as a whole. The pro-slavery groups from

Missouri had overreached, especially with the physical violence and intimidation

during the elections. Both sides in the conflict proceeded to arm themselves. Groups

in both the North and South supported their respective sides in the struggle by

sending in arms and funding themovement of new settlers to theKansas Territory.12

The violence between the two sides escalated as some on both sides resorted to

attacking each other in attempts to intimidate settlers on the other side – often quite

successfully.13 The struggle reached the point of becoming a low-level civil war that

led to the application of the term ‘Bleeding Kansas’ to the territory. The problems

with the violence were exacerbated by the unavailability of US military forces to

control the situation. Most available military units were involved in a show of force

in a confrontation with theMormons in the Utah Territory. Northerners in Congress

prevented the passage of additional appropriations requested byPresidentBuchanan

that would have raised additional troops to control the violence. They were

unwilling to use the funds to support what was then a pro-slavery legislature.14

John Brown went to the Kansas Territory to support the anti-slavery groups

willing to use whatever means necessary to achieve that goal. He was an avid

abolitionist, and he quickly became involved in the violent confrontations

between the two sides in Kansas. Brown, in fact, became one of the more famous

or notorious participants in the struggle for political control in the territory,

although he was by no means the only anti-slavery leader who was willing to use

violence. There were a number of years in which the violence escalated, but

eventually the political situation stabilized. Free soil groups eventually won

control of the territorial legislature in fair elections and were able to reverse

existing pro-slavery legislation. When the situation in Utah was resolved, US

troops became available. While the increased military presence did not

completely end the violence, it largely brought it down to manageable levels.

Terrorism in a righteous cause

John Brown went to Kansas to end the chances of slavery being established in the

territory. He clearly intended to end an evil institution. In the modern world,

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terrorism is a term that has come to have an extremely negative connotation that

makes it difficult to be connected to a good cause. The association of terrorism

with evil began in the 1960s and clearly became more connected in the aftermath

of the Oklahoma City bombings, the 9/11 attacks, the school takeover in Beslan

in Russia, and other major attacks that have killed large numbers of people. It is

worth noting, however, that terrorism did not always have such a negative

connotation. Anarchists in the late 1890s used the term proudly in their struggle

with the established order. The Social Revolutionaries that followed them in

Russia created a ‘Terror Brigade’ to undertake assassinations against government

officials in an effort to intimidate the elite and mobilize the population.15

Debates among leftist revolutionaries in Russia before World War I and after the

February and October Revolutions in 1917 focused on the utility of terrorism as a

technique of violence. This distinction is quite useful. The arguments against

using terrorism were not based in ethical concerns about the technique itself,

but practical concerns based on whether or not the technique would work.16

Extremist Jewish settler groups in British Palestine, like the Irgun and the Stern

Gang, used the term in a neutral sense. Terrorism, moreover, is ultimately a

technique that can be used by many different groups with widely varying political

agendas.17 The concern about negative connotations is what frequently had led

individuals to call favored groups freedom fighters rather than terrorists and

enemy groups terrorists rather than freedom fighters. It is only in modern times

that the label is commonly used as a means of minimizing the value of the cause

of those using terrorism. At the same time that the United States opposed Cuban

support for terrorists in Latin America, it was aiding Cuban groups of exiled

freedom fighters who used terrorist tactics.18 The preference to call favored

groups or those pursuing a just cause guerrillas rather than terrorists would follow

the same logic, but such semantic differences can be important in today’s world.

There are times when terrorism may be appropriate in some circumstances.

Crenshaw has suggested that ‘terrorism undertaken to combat demonstrable

injustice . . . is more justifiable than that which is not.’19 Violence in a just cause,

however, may still be terrorism. Many ‘would feel insulted by the classification of

the anti-Nazi warriors as terrorists, rather than as guerrillas . . . “terrorism” and

“guerrilla war” are used . . . to denote different strategies of warfare, whichmay be

utilized in the service of a variety of just or unjust causes.’20 The use of the

techniquemay legitimately raise questions evenwhen the cause does not. Violence

against a genocidal regime, however, is indeed different than violence against a

well-established democracy. National liberation movements that used terrorism

against Portuguese colonial power in Angola andMozambique were supported by

many African countries. South Africa, in turn, then briefly supported dissident

groups that used terrorism against the new governments of Angola and

Mozambique. In both cases the activities involved terrorism, even if for quite

obviously different ends. The Jewish fighters involved in the Warsaw Ghetto

uprising, which was a response to the German campaign of extermination, were

engaged in an act of (desperate) self-defense. Had the Jewish fighters chosen also

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to use terrorism against the Nazis and local collaborators, it would have been

similar and it would be difficult to denounce such action. Almost any violent

technique would be justified in the face of genocide or mass extermination. As a

consequence, the fact that Brown opposed slavery, a clearly evil and inhuman

institution as it was usually practiced in nineteenth-century America, does not

mean that his actions do not qualify as terrorism. As Etcheson notes, many of

Brown’s supporters felt that the end of slavery required violence (although not all

of them accepted the use of violence).21 In the context of the violence in theKansas

Territory, the violence could easily even be seen as defensive.

Terrorism is indiscriminate

Etcheson has suggested that terrorists practice indiscriminate violence, and that John

Brownwas not a terrorist because his violence was more targeted.22 In point of fact,

it is extremely rare that terrorism is actually indiscriminate. The suggestion that it is

indiscriminate is a misreading of what this technique is designed to accomplish.

A class or category of victims, not individuals, is chosen in some fashion.

The violence involved is designed to break the spirit of some group or groups, and

the immediate victims are a means of sending a message to that audience.23

Terrorism is basically psychological warfare.24 From the perspective of the

terrorists, the greater the fear that any incident creates, the better the ultimate effect

on the target audience. In fact, a target audience is one of the key characteristics for

terrorism – the immediate victims are not as important as the audience that the

violence is designed to influence.25 More importantly, for activities to qualify as

terrorism there has to be a target audience that will react to the violence so that the

violence will have the desired psychological impact. The more indiscriminate or

random the violence appears, at least within a target group, the greater the effect.

The appearance of randomness is designed to heighten the fear that the action is

intended to generate.26 The victims can be somewhat randomly chosen fromwithin

the target audience, but not the population at large (unless it is an anti-colonial

struggle). For example, the IRA set off car bombs in Protestant neighborhoods, not

Catholic ones; Shia militants in Iraq have attacked Sunni neighborhoods, not

neighborhoods at random; the Tamil Tigers used suicide attacks against Sinhalese,

not fellow Tamils. Terrorists can seek to intimidate categories of individuals

by campaigns of assassination, wounding, or kidnapping.27 Although there is an

element of randomness among the members of the target audience that become

victims, the violence is not indiscriminate. In fact, one of the advantages that

terrorists have is that they can choose among many members of a target audience.

If one individual or site is too well protected or otherwise not accessible, someone

else can be substituted.

In the case of John Brown and Kansas, the attacks, particularly the killings at

Pottawamie Creek, were a classic example of terrorist techniques. The individuals

whowere killedwere chosen because theywere Southernerswho supported slavery.

They had been active in the pro-slavery movement, making them quite logical

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targets, but little else distinguished them from other pro-slavery individuals in the

territory except perhaps their vulnerability. The ‘victimswerewell chosen byBrown

not because they were guilty but because they were innocent. He instinctively

grasped the essence of maximum terror.’28 In fact, ‘Brown’s victims had done

nothing directly to provoke or challenge Brown and his men.’29 The message that

Brown was sending was that any or all supporters of slavery in Kansas were in

danger. Other free soil and slavery advocates in Kansas followed similar practices,

and they were actually successful in their campaigns of terrorism since settlers

did flee the territory as noted above. The fear became increasingly pervasive.

For example, a warrant was issued for the arrest of a free soil advocate, but the judge

was too afraid of Brown to execute the warrant.30 Terrorists have been known to

use provocation strategies to attempt to get the government or their opponents to

overreact to their actions, alienating populations thatmight then support the terrorist

organization.31 Brown (perhaps intuitively) was following a classic provocation

strategy in that he wanted to force confrontations between the two sides and to force

the free soil groups to fight rather than to negotiate.32 The strategy didwork since his

attacks led to a response by the pro-slavery forces, which burned a free soil town in

retaliation – killing andwoundingmore than30 individuals.33Brown’s actionswere

carefully considered ones, and they were anything but indiscriminate; they were,

therefore, still terrorism.

It is important to note that the violent tactics used by Brown in Kansas in a

good cause were exactly the same as the violent tactics used by some of the

pro-slavery bands in a bad cause. In the final analysis, terrorism is a technique

that can be used by a great variety of groups in the pursuit of different, even

contradictory, goals. Terrorism is essentially a technique that is available to many

different kinds of organizations, and many different organizations have, in fact,

used terrorism as a technique to achieve objectives.34 The violence in Bleeding

Kansas by both sides demonstrates this fact rather convincingly. Many of the

same tactics, moreover, were used a decade later by the Ku Klux Klan (KKK)

after the Civil War in a less than virtuous cause. The KKK wanted to reestablish

white control in the Southern states and to remove Republicans and former slaves

from power. The KKK relied on assaults, murder, robbery, arson, and other forms

of intimidation to bring this change about.35 Former slaves were physically

prevented from registering to vote or from voting if they did register.36 When

black militias were formed to protect the freed slaves, the KKK simply targeted

the militia members as a means of regaining control; it became too dangerous for

individuals to remain active in these militias.37 The same techniques that helped

to keep Kansas a free territory were ultimately quite successful in permitting the

old white elite power structures to regain control of state political institutions.

Property attacks as terrorism

In addition, Etcheson also suggests that Brown was not a terrorist because,

during his second foray into the Kansas Territory and Missouri in 1858, he ‘only’

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attacked property as part of his efforts to free slaves (who were considered

property in the eyes of the target population of slave owners).38 This suggestion

misreads the concept of terrorism by only focusing on the most violent forms of

activity undertaken by terrorists. In point of fact, a majority of modern terrorist

actions have not involved any fatalities, and many of these actions are actually

designed to avoid inflicting any harm on people. Some of the most effective

campaigns of terrorist violence in history have relied on property attacks.

The violence of the Sons of Liberty and similar groups before the outbreak of the

American Revolution involved non-lethal property attacks (and occasional

assaults and beatings) that effectively neutralized support from those loyal to the

British Crown.39 The anti-abortion groups in the United State have normally

relied on property attacks rather than violence directed against individuals.

The assaults and murders of medical personnel at abortion clinics have been

rare occurrences that have stood out from a larger background of property

attacks. These property attacks themselves have been quite effective in

persuading property owners not to rent to clinics performing abortions or

persuading insurance companies to raise rates, thus making abortions more

difficult to obtain.40 Environmental and animal rights groups have depended

upon property attacks to further their cause with significant successes. In this

particular case, the campaigns directed against property have been especially

effective since they target the economic profits of companies that have degraded

the environment or abused animals, providing a clear incentive for changes in

practices.41

The above examples indicate that property attacks can be an effective form of

terrorism. Property attacks may be a prelude to other kinds of attacks when the

individuals involved find that such actions are insufficient to achieve their goals.

Groups will either escalate and face the probability of killing people or give up

the struggle if they are unwilling to do so. Brown’s reappearance in Kansas to

liberate slaves was in fact largely devoted to property attacks because

circumstances had changed. He no longer had to engage in violent attacks against

the territorial government in Kansas because free soil forces had won the recent

election, and the territorial administration was no longer the enemy. He could

even use a base in Kansas for forays into Missouri to liberate slaves there where

the government was hostile to abolition. It is interesting to note that when Brown

did return to Kansas and Missouri in his effort to liberate slaves, his very name

spread fear among the pro-slavery groups and individuals.42 A contemporary

noted that ‘it was his presence more than his activities, that made him a power’

to be feared.43 Such a psychological effect on a target audience represents

a major success for a terrorist group. Brown’s reputation also came into play

when he openly escorted the liberated slaves through Northern states to their

eventual destination in Canada where they would be safe. No law enforcement

officers dared to arrest him or impede his progress or send the slaves back to

their owners for fear of engendering resistance and riots among abolitionist

supporters.44

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Brown as guerrilla in Kansas and the raid on Harpers Ferry

John Brown did operate as a guerrilla to some extent as Etcheson suggests, but his

guerrilla activities were somewhat limited when he operated in the Kansas

Territory. Guerrillas normally attack the military forces of a government or

opposing militias and engage in military battles with those forces. They attack

those who can fire back. Guerrillas, moreover, often use military weapons,

including artillery, while terrorism often involves improvised or unconventional

weapons. Tactically, guerrilla operations resemble to some extent the activities of

conventional military forces.45 Guerrilla activities also normally require more

resources than terrorism. Groups relying on terrorism aspire to be able to launch

guerrilla attacks. In addition, guerrillas also do not focus their violence on the

civilian population – or if they do so, such attacks would normally be considered

terrorism. It was rare for Brown to be involved in direct battles with pro-slavery

forces. He and his band of abolitionists did ride to Lawrence to defend that center

of free soil activity against an attack by pro-slavery forces. He arrived too late,

however, to be a factor in the negotiations that ended the immediate threat.46

In this case, he clearly demonstrated his willingness to engage in direct military

action with armed pro-slavery groups. There are other instances that indicate

Brown was indeed willing to use guerrilla tactics against other armed groups,

and he did engage in conventional battles with pro-slavery groups.47 In fact, he

wanted to increase the level of conflict in Kansas, as noted above, and to force a

military confrontation between the free soil groups and pro-slavery settlers.

Circumstances were ultimately not propitious for such a confrontation. When

Brown made his second foray into Kansas, he was even less of a guerrilla since

the territorial government was now safely in the hands of the free soil groups, and

there was no significant area of contention with the federal government and the

territorial administration in Kansas.

Etcheson does quite legitimately suggest that Brown’s later raid on Harpers

Ferry obviously falls in the category of a guerrilla action.48 The raid on the

federal arsenal in Harpers Ferry might even be more appropriately labeled an act

of open rebellion. Brown envisioned a number of goals that would result from

this action. The capture of the arsenal led to fighting between Brown and his

small group of followers and federal troops and Virginia state militia units.

The tactical goal was to instigate a slave uprising – which clearly would have

spread terror among the white population throughout the South. The broader

strategic objective of the raid was a desire to drive a wedge between the North

and the South. Brown wanted to make political compromise between the two

regions impossible since any such compromise would accept the continuation of

slavery in at least some portions of the country. Moderates in both regions were

discredited by the violence and the negative reactions that the situation

generated.49 Brown was actually hopeful that the attack would lead to war

between the regions.50 In the South, Northerners were assaulted by locals and in

some cases driven out of the region.51 The attack at Harpers Ferry and the

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increased tension between the North and South that followed did contribute to the

outbreak of the war and the perception in the South that secession was the only

recourse. Brown’s decision to offer no sanity defense (or diminished capacity

arguments) in his criminal trial for treason by the state of Virginia was a reflection

of his intent to inflame opinions. It was essential that he become a martyr for the

cause of abolition, and that goal could be accomplished with a death sentence.

The trial itself became a means of furthering his goals.52

John Brown was intentionally attempting to create a spark that would lead to a

war that would end slavery, and he at least helped to create such a spark. In a way,

his actions were similar to those of Gavrilo Princip, who killed theArchduke Franz

Ferdinand and his wife in Sarajevo in 1914. The assassination was the spark that

started a war that was waiting for such a spark. The assassination was aided

by the Black Hand, a Slavic nationalist group that had the clandestine support

of Serbia and Russia. The Black Hand had been supporting a campaign of

assassinations against Austro-Hungarian officials in the Slavic territories of the

Dual monarchy.53 While Brown had support for his activities in Kansas and his

raid on Harpers Ferry from a number of individuals, he lacked the level of

organizational support that Princip and his conspirators received. Interestingly

enough, Brown became a martyr for his cause when he was executed. Princip,

although convicted by an Austrian military court, avoided the death penalty

because he was too young for such a sentence.54

Causes of Brown’s violence

A particular intriguing question concerns Brown’s motivations for violent actions

that he did and how they reflect on whether he should be considered a terrorist or

a guerrilla. The conflict in the Kansas Territory involved a number of different

components. The conflict between pro-slavery groups and their free soil

opponents involved both moral and religious issues. There were also concerns

about the economic implications of slavery for the groups involved. Further, for

many participants in the struggle on both sides, the issue was essentially about

political rights.55 One factor that may have led Brown to be considered a terrorist

is that his motivation for opposing slavery had a strong religious basis, and there

has been a distinct tendency of many terrorism scholars to equate terrorism, but

not guerrilla activity, with religious motivations.56 In point of fact, violent

religious organizations, like other groups, can and have used both terrorism and

guerrilla activities. More importantly, religious groups have no particular claim

on the use of terrorism. Although it may be true that many people analyzing

terrorism have focused on religious terrorism (especially recently with a focus on

only Islamic terrorism), that approach is myopic since it ignores other

motivations for terrorism.57 Rapoport posits that in the modern era there were

four waves of terrorism. The first wave in the late 1800s was ideological

(principally linked to anarchism), followed by a national liberation wave after

World War II that was largely ethnic, followed by a wave of terrorism

Small Wars & Insurgencies 1047

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(represented by groups such as the Red Brigades, the Baader-Meinhof Gang, and

others) centered in new left opposition to capitalism especially on the global

level, and finally the most recent religious wave of terrorism.58 While there has

been a significant increase in religious terrorism in the last wave, a great deal of

secular terrorism has remained to plague governments and their citizens,

indicating quite clearly that not all modern terrorism is religious.

It is difficult to determine with any precision whether John Brown would

qualify as a religious terrorist or as an ideological terrorist. Admittedly some

analysts have suggested that religious reasons for engaging in terrorism are

simply one form of ideological terrorism.59 A greater number of analysts,

however, consider religious terrorism to be different enough from ideological

causes so as to be in a separate category.60 In the case of Kansas, the differences

between the two sides did involve religion or some principles that were distinctly

different from the political concerns. Even if religious motivations were to be

considered simply a different ideology, the religious concerns and the political

concerns of the protagonists were quite different. There is little doubt that Brown

was deeply religious, but it is unclear exactly how his religious views and his

political views interacted. He opposed slavery as an institution, and he felt that

his efforts to end slavery were approved by God.61 He does appear, moreover, to

fall within the category of Puritanism that accepted the view that it was quite

acceptable to break man-made law in the pursuit of God’s law.62 He saw his

efforts to abolish slavery as a service to God.63 Even though he was driven by

religious convictions, his actions were not intended to further any particular

religion. Most modern religious terrorist groups, by contrast, have been seeking

distinctly religious objectives through their use of violence. The abolitionist

groups, with which he identified, based their views on both ideology and religion

and attracted adherents with different grounds for opposition. These groups felt

that his efforts to end slavery would improve the United States in a political and

social sense.64 For some engaged in the conflict in the Kansas Territory, the

political differences went beyond the question of slavery. The underlying issue as

noted was the division of power between the national government and the states

and individual rights.65 Southerners were advocates of states rights as a means of

preserving slavery, but they also saw it as a means of maintaining local control of

politics. Interestingly enough, the free soil groups were pragmatically pro-federal

government to some extent because the federal government was more likely to

support their cause, but they also wanted to protect local rights, including the

ability of voters in Northern states and territories to prevent slavery from being

established on their soil. Thus, both were in some respects in favor of states

rights, at least when it served their interests. They were both opposed to the

national government if they saw that it might compromise on what each side saw

as their core principles or key economic goals.

Brown was more in the camp of those that saw slavery as a moral issue, but

his activities have clear political overtones in that he was opposed to the

territorial government in Kansas when it was pro-slavery and sought to change

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that government. The changes that he sought, therefore, were political and not

religious. He also was adamantly opposed to efforts at the national level to

achieve a compromise on the slavery issue. Any national compromise would of

necessity have permitted the continuation of slavery in the South. He opposed

at various times the Democrats, Whigs, and Masons because they were willing

to support the continuation of slavery.66 In this regard, his motivations were

political/ideological rather than religious. To the extent that his efforts to end

slavery, and to free individual slaves, reflected an effort to provide greater

equality to slaves as a group or as individuals, he could qualify as an early

terrorist and guerrilla with leftist, egalitarian tendencies. Brown’s religious

views, however, also led him to hold some views that would at times have left

him on the political right. Clearly, during his second foray into Kansas, the fact

that he did not attack the new territorial government led by free soil groups

indicated support for existing governments, support that could have trumped any

desire for greater equality for slaves or former slaves and whites.

Conclusions

Many definitions of terrorism have been suggested, but there are some common

themes in most of them. Terrorism involves violence that is designed to achieve

political objectives (as opposed, for example, to financial gain). Such violence is

organized and directed towards a target audience. It is a weapon of the weak, and

it often involves attacks on civilians.67 Brown’s action in the Kansas Territory

and Missouri seem to clearly fit within this definition. He, and others active in

Kansas, intended to generate fear in the pro-slavery population. The attacks were

not intended to eliminate specific individuals. While it could be argued that using

modern definitions to define historical figures may be imposing current values,

definitions of terrorism do seem to have universal validity. If the definitions do

not fit the past, then the actions under analysis reflect a different phenomenon.

Modern definitions have usefully been applied, among other cases, to Jewish

revolts against the Greeks and Romans, the Assassins in the twelfth and thirteenth

centuries, Muslim suicides in South and Southeast Asia against colonial powers,

and the Sons of Liberty and other groups opposed to British taxes and laws prior

to the American Revolution.68 As it turns out, good definitions can and should

transcend historical epochs. Such common definitions also help to place Brown’s

violent actions in a broader context.

It is obvious that Brown was willing to engage in more conventional violent

confrontations with armed groups that favored slavery. These confrontations

would have been more akin to guerrilla tactics or insurgent warfare than

terrorism. Ultimately, he did not, however, have many opportunities to do so in

the Kansas Territory. In many respects, Brown was a terrorist who aspired to be a

guerrilla fighter or insurgent. Many successful insurgencies have, in fact, started

as terrorism.69 His great opportunity for insurgency came with the raid on

Harpers Ferry. Individual groups can move between terrorist attacks and guerrilla

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actions, and the type of violent action chosen can be modified in response to

changing circumstances. It is somewhat more difficult to classify the causes of

Brown’s actions as a terrorist and guerrilla leader since he does not clearly fit

conventional classifications from any time period. His goals reflected a mixture

of religious and ideological beliefs, but his agenda was more political than

religious – even if religiously driven. Ideology can obviously underlay terrorism

just as religious beliefs can. In the context of the United States in the 1850s, his

political beliefs would probably not be classified as conservative. They were very

much a challenge to the status quo in the South and national compromises that

permitted the continuation of slavery. If his views were not revolutionary, they

were at least radical. His violence challenged many in the North, including even

some who sympathized with the need to end slavery. Ultimately, John Brown was

primarily a terrorist (and secondarily an insurgent or guerrilla) in the Kansas

Territory and a guerrilla or insurgent later in Virginia. In addition, he has to be

considered as someone who was seeking to bring about radical changes in the

United States in the 1850s.

Notes

1. Etcheson, ‘John Brown, Terrorist?’.2. Etcheson, Bleeding Kansas; ‘The Great Principle of Self-Government’; ‘John

Brown, Terrorist?’; ‘Our Lives, Our Fortunes, and Our Sacred Honors’.3. Etcheson, ‘John Brown Terrorist?’, 31.4. Oates, To Purge This Land, 151; Reynolds, John Brown, Abolitionist, 106.5. J. Lutz and B. Lutz, Terrorism: Origins and Evolution, 50, 60.6. B. Lutz and J. Lutz, Terrorism in America, 53.7. Etcheson, ‘John Brown, Terrorist?’.8. Etcheson, Bleeding Kansas, 4.9. DeCaro, Fire from the Midst of You, 218; Napier, ‘The Hidden History’, 53–4;

Oates, To Purge This Land, 166.10. Abels, Man on Fire, 47.11. Etcheson, Bleeding Kansas, 57; DeCaro, Fire from the Midst of You, 217.12. DeCaro, Fire from the Midst of You, 217; Oates, To Purge This Land, 158; Oertel,

‘Free Sons of the North’; Roberts, ‘Now the Enemy’, 207.13. DeCaro, Fire from the Midst of You, 232–3; Nichols, Bleeding Kansas, 223; Oates,

To Purge this Land, 146.14. Roberts, ‘Now the Enemy’, 210–12.15. Parry, From Robespierre to Arafat, 123.16. van Ree, ‘Reluctant Terrorists?’.17. J. Lutz and B. Lutz, ‘How Successful Is Terrorism?’.18. Bell and Gurr, ‘Terrorism and Revolution’, 337; Gurr, ‘Political Terrorism’, 221–2;

Hewitt, Understanding Terrorism, 36; Jenkins, Images of Terrorism, 52–3.19. Crenshaw, ‘Introduction’, 3.20. Merari, ‘Terrorism as a Strategy’, 44.21. Etcheson, ‘John Brown Terrorist?’, 30.22. Ibid., 29, 32, 34, 38, 39.23. Gaucher, The Terrorists, 298.24. Chalk,West European Terrorism, 13; Hoffman, ‘Emergence of the New Terrorism’,

45; Wilkinson, Terrorism, 81.

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25. Hoffman, ‘Emergence of the New Terrorism’, 45; Merari, ‘Terrorism as a Strategy’,

31; Neumann and Smith, ‘Strategic Terrorism’, 588; Schmid, ‘The Response

Problem’, 10–1; Thornton, ‘Terror as a Weapon’, 79; Wilkinson, Terrorism, 81.26. J. Lutz and B. Lutz, ‘How Successful Is Terrorism?’, 3.27. Merari, ‘Terrorism as a Strategy’, 34.28. Abels, Man on Fire, 76, emphasis in the original.29. Stauffer, Black Hearts of Men, 22.30. DeCaro, Fire from the Midst of You, 231.31. Kydd and Walter, ‘Strategies of Terrorism’.32. Abels, Man on Fire, 89; Etcheson, Bleeding Kansas, 111.33. Hofstadter and Wallace, American Violence, 90.34. Crenshaw, Explaining Terrorism, 2; Laqueur, History of Terrorism, 143.35. Chalmers, Hooded Americanism, 10; Davis, ‘American Experiences’, 229.36. Cresswell, Mormons, 29.37. B. Lutz and J. Lutz, Terrorism in America, 57.38. Etcheson, ‘John Brown, Terrorist?’.39. Bobrick, Angel in the Whirlwind, 75; Maier, ‘Popular Uprisings’, 11; Rapoport,

‘Four Waves’, 37–8; Schlesinger, ‘Political Mobs’, 244, 248–9.40. Laqueur, New Terrorism, 229; Perlstein, ‘Anti-Abortion Activists’ Terror’; Wilson

and Lynxwiler, ‘Abortion Clinic Violence’.41. J. Lutz and B. Lutz, ‘Economic Warfare’.42. Oates, To Purge This Land, 256, 262.43. Villard, John Brown, 230.44. Oates, To Purge This Land, 256–7.45. Merari, ‘Terrorism as a Strategy’, 25.46. DeCaro, Fire from the Midst of You, 220; Etcheson, Bleeding Kansas, 107.47. Oates, To Purge This Land, 102–3; Reynolds, John Brown, Abolitionist, 185–7,

199–20148. Etcheson, ‘John Brown, Terrorist?’, 37.49. Woodward, ‘John Brown’s Private War’, 124–5.50. Oates, To Purge This Land, 361.51. Woodward, ‘John Brown’s Private War’, 126–7.52. Etcheson, ‘John Brown, Terrorist?’, 37.53. Laqueur, A History of Terrorism, 50.54. Ford, Political Murder, 247.55. Cf. Etcheson, Bleeding Kansas.56. Etcheson, ‘John Brown, Terrorist?’, 39.57. J. Lutz and B. Lutz, Terrorism: Origins and Evolution, 2.58. Rapoport, ‘The Four Waves’.59. Combs, Terrorism in the Twenty-First Century, 49; Fettweis, ‘Freedom Fighters and

Zealots’, 277.60. Hewitt, Understanding Terrorism in America; J. Lutz and B. Lutz, Terrorism:

Origins and Evolution; Martin, Understanding Terrorism.61. Villard, John Brown, 334, 362; Oates, To Purge This Land, 147.62. Reynolds, John Brown, Abolitionist, 16–17.63. Abels, Man on Fire, xv; DeCaro, Fire from the Midst of You, 248; Oates, To Purge

This Land, 305.64. Reynolds, John Brown, Abolitionist, 124.65. Etcheson, Bleeding Kansas; B. Lutz and J. Lutz, Terrorism in America, 142.66. Villard, John Brown, 87, 131; Oates, To Purge This Land, 21; Reynolds, John

Brown, Abolitionist, 120.

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67. Claridge, ‘State Terrorism’; Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, ch. 1; J. Lutz and B. Lutz,Terrorism: Origins and Evolution, 7.

68. Chaliant and Blin, ‘Zealots and Assassins’; B. Lutz and J. Lutz, Terrorism inAmerica, ch. 2; J. Lutz and B. Lutz, ‘Role of Foreign Influences’; Rapoport, ‘Fearand Trembling’.

69. J. Lutz and B. Lutz, ‘How Successful Is Terrorism?’, 17.

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