israeli wars of 1947 and 1948

Jill Suzanne Kornetsky Conflict and Peacemaking in the Middle East Midterm Paper – POL164

The Civil Conflict of 1947 and The War of 1948

Introduction

This paper represents a brief analysis of the Israeli War for

Independence in 1948, and the Israeli-Palestinian Civil War of 1947 which

immediately preceded the regional war; for many historiographers, these two

wars are nearly indistinguishable parts of the overall conflict arising

from political and diplomatic events at the local, regional, and

international levels leading to the establishment of the State of Israel.

The structure of this analysis will adhere to the system for analyzing

international relations in the context of war and violent conflict put

forth by Kenneth Waltz in his 1954 book “Man, The State and War: A

Theoretical Analysis.”

In Waltz’ neorealistic or neoclassical realistic approach he asks

“Where are the major causes of war to be found? The answers are bewildering

in their variety and in their contradictory qualities. To make this

variety manageable, the answers can be ordered under the following three

headings: within man, within the structure of the separate states, within

the state system… subsequently referred to as images of international

relations.1” Given the complexities of the evolving Middle East after the

1 Waltz, K. (2001). Chapter 1. 13 October 2010

Jill Suzanne Kornetsky Conflict and Peacemaking in the Middle East Midterm Paper – POL164World Wars and until today, the addition of a fourth “image” is logical.

This schema now includes global, regional, state, and individual levels.

The Wars of 1947 and 19482 represented a continuation and escalation

of intercommunal violence between Palestinian Arabs, and the Yishuv.

Still bitter about the Balfour Declaration of 19173 and the Peel Report

depriving them of their self-determination, Palestinian Arabs were further

incensed by Resolution 181 depriving them of their land and the UN’s

support for the founding of a Jewish State in Palestine. Less than 24

hours after the declaration was made, a series of bus ambushes - no

different from the violence of the past -marked the beginning of the Civil

War. Over the next five and a half months, acts of harassment and direct

violence, either retaliatory or spontaneous, were exchanged between the two

sides by way of ambushes, riots, bombings and massacres – all with

increasing frequency and severity4 in terms of the number of lives lost and

the impunity of the two parties towards one another.

With each passing month, the scope of these skirmishes and the death

tolls per incident began to rise, with the Haganah initially taking a

defensive stance, but shifting into offense when the United Nations seemed

2 General themes and timelines for this Introduction to the Wars taken from Morris, B. (2001). Chapter Five. 3 Morris, B. (2001). pp 73-764 Bar-On Section on “Retaliation and Escalation” p. 3513 October 2010

Jill Suzanne Kornetsky Conflict and Peacemaking in the Middle East Midterm Paper – POL164to have doubts about the prudence of the partition resolution. The

expiration of the British Mandate was then met by the Yishuv with a

declaration of independence. Once again reacting violently in response to

a political declaration, the Arabs invaded Palestine, this time drawing in

all of the Arab nations against a newly minted State of Israel for a multi-

front invasion on May 15-16. The battles that ensued pitted a newly-united

Israeli force made up of several fighting groups now united under a common

flag (with some British deserters and other sundry supporters thrown in)

against a group of more historically established armies with a common goal

– to eliminate the newly-formed Jewish state from the lands of Palestine

and perhaps even from existing altogether. In short order, however, it was

proven on the battlefields that the Arab armies were generally poorly

organized, poorly trained, and armed with outdated weaponry without

sufficient ammunition to carry on an extended battle.

An emboldened Haganah, now the Israeli Defense Forces, worked to

increase the number of arms available for use on the battlefields, and the

number of combatants available to carry them in the name of the State of

Israel and the existence of the Jewish people on earth. Aided by a duo of

truces which allowed time to breathe, reconnoiter, and exploit carefully

13 October 2010

Jill Suzanne Kornetsky Conflict and Peacemaking in the Middle East Midterm Paper – POL164cultivated connections in the military and political worlds5, in only seven

months Israel had forced the Arab world back on its heels and driven each

of their adversarial neighbors into Armistice Agreements. The war was

over, and though details may be disputed on both sides about the size of

forces, the quality of military strategy and training, the unity of forces

on each side and narratives of the conflict, what cannot and has not been

disputed was the identity of the victor. Round one had squarely gone to

the State of Israel6.

5 Kober p 35-366 Shlaim 2007, p 13413 October 2010


The Systemic or Global Level

Disintegration of the Ottoman Empire

The dissolution of the Ottoman Empire7 post WWI affected the balance

of power throughout the Middle Eastern and North African region, mainly via

new establishment of that balance. While retained to some extent in modern

Turkey, the remainder of lands freed from Ottoman rule fell into the

modern, anarchic, international system. Throwbacks to Ottoman culture

include a permissive hatred of the Jews, and the lack of a distinctive

system of authority in Jerusalem8. Results of the dissolution include

introduction to the region a British Mandate, and simultaneous loss of

sense of order and security that maintained a relative peace; a scrambling

for the acquisition and control of newly available territories and the

inter-Arab tensions that arose as a result, as well as the assignment of a

portion of Palestine to become a Jewish homeland via the Balfour

Declaration, superheated old inter-Kingdom and inter-religious misgivings

into new and potentially violent animosities of the same flavor.

The Anarchic World

The world writ large in the 1940’s was anarchical. Because of the

pervasive sense of insecurity caused by an anarchic global system, the

7 Tal (2004). p 8878 Morris, B. (2001) p 713 October 2010

Jill Suzanne Kornetsky Conflict and Peacemaking in the Middle East Midterm Paper – POL164security dilemma posited by Robert Jervis becomes an important

consideration for the rulers of newly self-determined Arab Nation States9;

the need to create standing armies for national defense must be balanced

with considerations of unduly alarming one’s neighbor and the risks of a

strong military contemplating a coup. Combined with the prejudices or

self-indulgent political leanings of individual leaders, such as Grand

Mufti Amin al-Husseini and King Abdullah, old prejudices and differences

are given to a new perception of danger. In a universal attempt to define

the “us” in comparison to the “them,” previous marginalization and

denigration of Jews in the Middle East is escalated to outright Anti-

semitism, fear, and often resultant violence.

Global Anti-Semitism and The Holocaust

As the perennial global whipping-boys, Jews in the 1940’s represented

a nation in diaspora having grown tired of relegation to second-class

citizens and the scape-goats within each of their adopted nations. The

escalation of Anti-Semitism from the Pogroms of Russia through the Dreyfus

Affair in France drove the development of modern Zionism and the nascent

Yishuv immigration to the historical lands of Israel. The culmination of

global Anti-Semitism resulted in a large-scale, organized attempt by the

9 Taken from Prof. Feldman in my classroom notes, 27 August 201013 October 2010

Jill Suzanne Kornetsky Conflict and Peacemaking in the Middle East Midterm Paper – POL164Nazi party in Germany to exterminate the Jewish people in their entirety.

This shift from a struggle for acceptance and assimilation to an actual

existential crisis strengthened the Zionist movement and made clear the

absolute necessity for a defensible nation with a majority Jewish

population that would never again be subject to the potential for wholesale

elimination. Return to Eretz Yisrael10 was no longer a religious and

theoretical longing, but a necessity for the survival of an ancient people.

The Rise of Modern Zionism

Beginning as a religious concept, more cultural and biblical than

practical or political, Zionism as a political or diplomatic movement was

solidified with the escalating violence justified by global Anti-Semitism.

Theodore Hertzl’s work “The Jewish State” outlined a solution to Anti-

Semitism by returning to ancient Zion11 and establishing a homeland

comprised of a returned worldwide diaspora. Not only did this movement

address the return of a people to their ancient lands, but also determined

the nature of the people who would populate the land, obtain majority rule,

and declare itself an independent nation. This new breed of Jew was to be

a “Muscular” Jew12, aggressive, agrarian, assertive, and prepared to

physically defend the Nation against certain future attempts at genocide. 10 Yablonka. (2006) “Make them feel as if they are coming home.” P 47511 Schencker. (2008) p 612 Morris, B. (2001), p 2113 October 2010

Jill Suzanne Kornetsky Conflict and Peacemaking in the Middle East Midterm Paper – POL164Such is the view of today’s Israeli: militarily capable, strategically

prepared, independent even to the level of domestic labor and military

provision if necessary.

The Cold War

The aftermath of WWII not only led to widespread immigration of

diaspora Jews into the Yishuv, but also created schisms within the world of

the Great Powers. Use of the atomic bomb that led to the cessation of the

second Great War taught otherwise adversarial communists and capitalists

that the expense of continued and overt hostility was not just the loss of

infrastructure and thousands of young men’s lives, but in this new age of

warfare, it could mean the end of us all. While the Cold War kept the US

and the USSR out of major conflict with one another, they continued to

jockey for territory by allowing or even assisting proxy wars in the third

world13. Even as the Arab world and the Israeli’s waged war for their own

sovereignties, each had to keep in mind the dangers of irritating the world

powers into diplomatic or military action.

The United Nations

The global approach to maintaining relative peace and avoidance of a

nuclear holocaust was to create an international body that would oversee

13 Kober, p. 2013 October 2010

Jill Suzanne Kornetsky Conflict and Peacemaking in the Middle East Midterm Paper – POL164world affairs, provide a forum for discussion of differences (ideally) in

the advance of large-scale armed conflict, and produce resolutions advising

member nations about their behaviors and political structures.

Consideration of the global question of the “Jew Problem14” led to UN

Resolution 18115, a well-defined plan for the division of the lands of

Palestine between Arab Palestinians and the Yishuv. This resolution,

perceived as a way for the Western world to abrogate their guilt over the

holocaust on the shoulders of unsuspecting Arab people, was the thrown

stone that escalated ripples of conflict and violence16 (beginning with a

civil war and expanding into a regional war) across a previously calm if

contemptuous environment.

The Regional Level

Britain in the Middle East

With the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, Britain was granted a

Mandate over the land of Palestine in the dividing of the spoils of war

between the victors of WWI. Originally Britain sided with the Arabs in

preventing the mass migration of Jews to Palestine in accordance with the

Balfour Declaration17, due to a shared sense of Anti-Semitism between

14 Morris, B. (2001) p 18415 Yablonka. (2006) p48116 Moore, p 12717 Galnoor, p 75 13 October 2010

Jill Suzanne Kornetsky Conflict and Peacemaking in the Middle East Midterm Paper – POL164Europeans and Arabs, and the sentiment of the Jews as terrorists18. In

addition, there were defense acts in place between Britain and Egypt, and

Britain and Jordan.19 However, during the Arab Revolt, as terrorist

attacks focused on British interests and military installations, sympathies

reached their limits. With an eye towards the future of the region,

support leaned towards the Jews, as is evidenced by support of the

Partition Plan (UN Resolution 181). From that point forward, total support

of either side was shaky in the wake of continuing harassment of the

British by factions on both sides, and upon expiration of the Mandate for

Palestine, Britain pulled out of the region entirely.

Arab Nationalism and the Struggle for Self-Determination

With the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, a growing wave of

nationalism struck the Middle East20. Arab countries looked towards the

right for self-determination as a way to finally control their own affairs.

The planned end of the British Mandate presented an opportunity for self-

rule, which was abruptly abrogated by the Partition Plan, and later by the

Israeli Declaration of Independence. This oversight of Arabs as being a

people capable and ready to rule their own affairs likely contributed to

the anger at the Yishuv’s ability to garner international support for the 18 Evron, p 9919 Kober, p. 2520 Morris, B. (2001), p 26-2913 October 2010

Jill Suzanne Kornetsky Conflict and Peacemaking in the Middle East Midterm Paper – POL164formation of the State of Israel in the UN. Arabs bonded together in the

Arab League, a sort of united Islamic nations where issues of Arab

sovereignty were discussed.

Fragmentation of the Arab World: Hashemites versus the Arab Alliance

In what became a typical pattern for Arabic nations, infighting21

among the Hashemite (Transjordan and Iraq) versus non-Hashemite (Lebanon,

Egypt, Syria) kingdoms over control of united armies22, territorial

boundaries, control over Palestine itself and also of Jerusalem precluded a

true and defensible alliance of states. In the wars of 1947-1948, these

divisions seemed to be less important than the overall goal of eliminating

Jewish presence in Palestine, however in hindsight, these divisions were a

major determining factor in the failure of five armies to oust the

Zionists. With each Arab state concerning itself more with its own

alliance, secrecy about its plans23, the actions of the rival alliance24,

and whether territory could be gained for their own nation from Palestine,

it becomes clear that there was a definitive lack of cohesion25, ultimately

leading to Arab defeat.

21 Yitzhak (2008) p 2622 Yitzhak (2008), p 2523 Yitzhak 2008, p 3224 Yitzhak 2008, p 2725 Yitzhak 2008, p 4613 October 2010


The Domestic or State Level

Yishuv

Within Israel, the settlers who had been establishing Jewish territory

in Palestine since the late 1800’s busied themselves with putting together

an organized and functional society. Backed by the idea of the new Jews –

more than just intellectuals – as the means by which Israel would be

established as a strong and independent state26, the Holocaust was the

motive for how tenacious and indefatigable their forces would be in times

of military action. They would make the desert bloom and they would do

everything27 to prevent the “Second Round.” In their intent to establish a

homeland Zionists used political clout to garner the favor of the great

powers28 (nearly all of them – including the US, the USSR, and Britain),

enforcing support for Zionism both politically and in terms of arms

acquisitions; funds raised from diaspora communities were used to purchase

large tracts of Palestinian real estate29, often purchased from the

fellahin, poor farmers who had no choice.

Anticipation of the conflicts to come (which many saw as inevitable in

the regional system) prompted the creation of Jewish munitions factories,

26 Borris, B. (2001) p 1727 Avnery (2008) p 7928 Evron (2008). P 10129 Morris, B. (2001) p 122-123, p 3813 October 2010

Jill Suzanne Kornetsky Conflict and Peacemaking in the Middle East Midterm Paper – POL164and the concept of the “new Jews” who would not acquiesce to the kind of

poor treatment that had been ubiquitous in “the deep insult of diaspora

life”30. Every settler was, at Ben-Gurion’s behest, taught to fight and

bolstered by American and European settlers who had found in the armies of

their adoptive nations . Given the “clarifying” effect31 that an impending

fight for one’s survival (especially in light of a previous attempt at

total genocide) has on a person, the Yishuv had been preparing for these

wars since the first waves of Aliyah from Europe.

Arabs of Palestine

By refusing to even consider that Jews had a legitimate claim to their

historical homeland, Palestinians started a fight that they were far too

myopic to understand and too weak to prevent. In the aftermath of the

previous anti-British rebellion and subsequent seizure of arms32, as well

as the absenteeism of the Grand Mufti, the Palestinian people were not yet

ready to mount a substantial military force, even with British

soldiers/deserters among the ranks with their superior training and

experience. Additionally, there was a lack of cohesions stemming from the

loss of al-Husseini to exile33, a tendency to fight close to home in small

30 Morris, B. (2001) p 11, p 14, p 21, p 4731 Taken from Prof. Feldman in my personal lecture notes of 3 September 2010. 32 Morris, B. (2001) p 12133 Morris, B. (2001) p 99, 13 October 2010

Jill Suzanne Kornetsky Conflict and Peacemaking in the Middle East Midterm Paper – POL164ambushes (guerilla style) rather than in a large and organized militia, and

the mistaken opinion of Palestinians and Arab nationals that the Jews of

Palestine could be overrun and finally exterminated or “thrown into the

sea” with a coordinated effort.

The result of the Wars of 1947 and 1948 was the loss, perhaps

permanently, of the opportunity for an established State of Palestine.

This was to become known as al-Nakba or the “Catastrophe,”34 Palestinians

underestimated the strength and tenacity of their foe35, brought the fight

to their enemy’s door even after repeated demonstrations that they would

not be easily swayed in the fight for their own survival, and failed to

seize opportunities for peaceful settlement by way of Partition.

The Individual Level

David Ben-Gurion

Ben-Gurion’s36 position as the leader of both the Zionist moment in

Israel and the eventual Prime Minister of the new State of Israel afforded

him a significant degree of latitude and power in the operations of a small

and forming country. Through his leadership the forming Jewish nation

understood the values of self-defense37 including his encouraging able-

34 AbuZayyad – Sentiments about al-Nakba until today.35 Tal. (2000) p 1736 Aronson. (2008) pp 70-8237 Tal. (2000) p 613 October 2010

Jill Suzanne Kornetsky Conflict and Peacemaking in the Middle East Midterm Paper – POL164bodied Yishuv members to join the Jewish Legion during WWI, agricultural

independence, even-handed but firm leadership in the face of strong

opposition at home and among dissidents, and diplomatic intransigence when

survival is at stake. Without his fervent Zionism and intelligent

leadership, the fate of the Yishuv could not have been certain during the

period leading up to his declaration of the state’s independence.

Many of the major events in the history of Zionism (and the formation

of the state of Israel) as laid out in Benny Morris’ “Righteous Victims”

are the result of Ben-Gurion’s inspiration or implementations. These

included illegal immigration to Palestine (an essential element of creating

a strong-enough Yishuv to eventually vie for statehood and win wars), the

Biltmore Conference in which the necessity and tenants of Zionism were laid

out, lack of apologism for the concept of Palestinian Arab transfer as to

establish relevant ethnic majorities in the appropriate territories,

buildup of the Haganah38 in anticipation of the inevitable war, willingness

to sacrifice land for and only for complete peace, and so many others.

There is a reason why he is celebrated in Israel to this day.

King Abdullah of Jordan

38 Tal. (2004). p 88813 October 2010


One of the more interesting and nebulous figures in the Middle East in

the 1940’s was King Abdullah of Transjordan. In the Arab Rebellion,

Abdullah established himself as firmly interested in “getting a foothold in

Palestine,”39 and may have been in the best position to do so, given his

control of the Arab Legion (later the Royal Jordanian Army) which was the

only armed force in the region experienced in a recent war. Adept at

playing both sides of the fence, Abdullah often hinted at alliances between

himself and the Jews, while also maintaining his apparent obligation to

throw his hat in the ring with fellow Arab nations when it came time to

fight a war.

In his desire to regain parts of Eastern Palestine including a portion

of Jerusalem, Abdullah secretly agreed to exhibit restraint in the

inevitable conflicts following the Partition Plan, couched in innuendo and

vague language so as to not commit himself to aims that would put him at

odds with his Arab brethren, but with enough conviction to be understood as

generally non-belligerent to his Jewish neighbors. At times he unilaterally

changed the battle plans, or refrained from full engagement therein, as to

maintain his delicate balance on the fence. This position was prudent, as

there is no guarantee, or even no presumption that his full-scale

39 Morris, B. (2001) p 13413 October 2010

Jill Suzanne Kornetsky Conflict and Peacemaking in the Middle East Midterm Paper – POL164involvement in aspects of the Wars would have created the opportunity for

definitive victory for the Arab armies and Palestine

The Most Powerful Tier in Explaining the Outcome

While each tier by necessity played it part in setting the stage for

the Wars of 1947 and 1948 – the international system creating an

environment of insecurity and hostility that would drive the Jews into a

political and militaristic quest for a homeland, the regional level

promising certain violent conflict between all invested parties, the state

levels shaping the attitudes and necessities of each side, and the

individuals plotting the course for the actual wars, victories,

acquiescence or non-adherence to international attempts of forcing peace by

diplomatic measures – for the purposes of this paper, only one can be said

to be the most powerful.

The most powerful tier explaining the development of the conflicts

surrounding the establishment of the State of Israel is the systemic or

global image. Zionism was the major driving force to the location of the

state of Israel in ancient Zion, it was fostered and heightened by

worldwide Anti-Semitism (leading to the terror of the Holocaust), the

window opportunity for the creation of new Nation-States was opened with

the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire and the vacuum of sovereignty it left

13 October 2010

Jill Suzanne Kornetsky Conflict and Peacemaking in the Middle East Midterm Paper – POL164behind, it was permitted and indeed resolved by the international consensus

of the United Nations, and supported or shaped by the reality of the Cold

War (its players, their interest in proxy wars and territorial divisions,

and the international arms trade). Small variations at the individual,

regional, or state levels are unlikely to have altered the inevitability of

war.

Even in 1903, before the Balfour Declaration, the Partition Plan, the

Peel Report, WWI, WWII, the Arab Revolt, the formation of the UN, and many

of the significant events and documents leading up to the Wars, an Ottoman

civil servant wrote “Two important phenomena, of the same nature but

opposed, are emerging at this moment in Asiatic Turkey. They are the

awakening of the Arab nation and the latent effort of the Jews to

reconstitute on a very large scale the ancient homeland of Israel. These

movements are destined to fight each other continually until one of them

wins.40” Looking back at events since that 1905 publication, and at the

sentiments of many leaders and intellectuals from within the region and

beyond up until this very day, who can say that there was a more true

evaluation of international relations in the Middle East? Inevitable even

40 Najib Azouri in Benny Morris (2001) p 5713 October 2010

Jill Suzanne Kornetsky Conflict and Peacemaking in the Middle East Midterm Paper – POL164then, the effects of the global system have ensured this ingrained and

assured discord to be true for the last 105 years.

13 October 2010


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Jill Suzanne Kornetsky Conflict and Peacemaking in the Middle East Midterm Paper – POL164Waltz, K. (2001). Man, the State, and War: A Theoretical Analysis. New York: Columbia University Press. (The Kindle for PC version, which doesn’t contain concrete page numbers).Yablonka, H. (2006). Holocause Survivors in the Israeli Army during the 1948 War: Documents and Memory. Israel Affairs 12(3), 329-360. Yitzhak, R. (2008a). A Small Consolidation for a Big Loss: King Abdallah and Jerusalem During the 1948 War. Israel Affairs 14(3), 398-418. Yitzhak, R. (2008b). The Question of Arab Solidarity in the 1948 War: Political Interest versus Military Considerations. Mediterranean Quarterly 19(2), 19-46.

13 October 2010