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Is African Peace and Security Architecture the Solution? Analysing the Implications of

Escalating Conflicts and Security Challenges for African Integration and Development

By

Ernest Toochi Aniche, PhD

Department of Political Science

Federal University Otuoke, Bayelsa State

anicheet@fuotuoke.edu.ng. Ph. No: 07067554191

&

Michael Umezurike Egbuchulam

Department of Political Science

Federal University Otuoke, Bayelsa State

umazmike@yahoo.com

A Paper Delivered at the 30th Annual Conference of the Nigerian Political Science

Association Southeast Chapter on the theme: Elections, Security Challenges and African

Development at University of PortHarcourt, Rivers State on June 26-28.

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Abstract

Africa is a continent ridden by crises, and thus, confronted with enormous security challenges

in the post-cold war 21st century. Regrettably, the end of cold war did not result in conflict

reduction in Africa as predicted or expected, rather it exacerbated suggesting that the problem

is more internal than external requiring Africa to look more inward to resolve some of these

practices that cause crisis such as ethnocentrism, religious bigotry, political corruption, crisis

of regime change or political succession, among others. It was under this state of affairs that

African Union (AU) in collaboration with other external actors like European Union (EU)

and in synergy with sub-regional security organisations in Africa effectively established the

new African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) in 2004. APSA represents a paradigm

shift from the principle of non-interference of the Organization of African Union (OAU) to

that of non-indifference in internal affairs of member states of AU akin to the United

Nations’ responsibility to protect (R2P). The mandate of APSA includes conflict prevention,

management, resolution and post-conflict reconstruction. To achieve its mandate, APSA has

tried to harmonise and synergise Africa’s regional security arrangements with sub-regional

security architectures. But the rising conflicts in Africa have shown that APSA has not been

able to achieve its mandate more than a decade of its establishment. This portends ominous

implications for African integration and development. In emphasising the need for “African

solutions for African problems”, the paper recommends post-neo-functionalism as a panacea.

The study is essentially descriptive and qualitative.

Keywords: Peace, Security, Conflict, Development, African Integration, African Union,

Africa.

Introduction

African has been deservedly described or labelled as crisis region. This is because of the

prevalence of political crisis and instability in the continent right from the mid-20th century.

For example, over 30 wars have been fought in Africa such that half of the continent’s

countries, and 25% of its people, have been in some way or another affected by armed

conflict. Conflicts in Africa have caused the deaths of millions of people, injuries and abuse

to countless others and have destroyed innumerable livelihoods. There are currently some six

million refugees and internally displaced persons, and also, three quarters of all war-related

deaths in the world occur in Africa. Across the continent peace and security remains much

more a dream than reality. Conflicts in Africa have enormous impact on the fight against

poverty, ultimately stunting the continent’s prospects for long-term stability, economic

growth and sustainable development (Kastler and Liepert, 2008; Hendrickson, et al. 2013;

Aniche, 2014).

The escalation of armed conflicts in Africa in the first thirty years of independence of most

African states was blamed on the cold war between the former Union of Soviet Socialist

Republic and the United States of America. But the end of the cold war in early 1990 resulted

in a tremendous change in the nature of violent conflict in Africa as it assumed a greater

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magnitude against all expectations. Wars became more intra-state than inter-state leading to

the deaths of more civilians in the 1990s (Kaldor, 1999). The implication being that over fifty

years of independence in most African states have been fifty years or five decades of wasted

opportunities and generations. Nkrumah (1968) earlier foresaw this problem and suggested

establishment of Africa Continental Government or United States of Africa with an African

High Command but this was not to be as many of the continent leaders preferred

establishment of continental or regional organisation leading to the formation of Organisation

of African Unity (OAU) in 1963.

The establishment of OAU failed to solve this problem of escalating internal armed conflicts

due to its principles of non-intervention and respect for sovereignty of states. Subsequently,

the idea of non-interference and respect for the territorial integrity of states was challenged.

This also resulted in the transformation of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) into the

African Union (AU) in 2001 (Tiruneh, 2010). The AU has adopted a holistic approach to

peacebuilding that seeks to link peace, security, and development, and emphasises the

importance of national ownership of post-conflict reconstruction efforts. It is authorised to

coordinate the efforts of Africa’s eight major Regional Economic Communities (RECs);

namely, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS); the Southern African

Development Community (SADC); the Intergovernmental Authority on Development

(IGAD); the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS); the East African

Community (EAC); the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA); the

Arab Maghreb Union (AMU); and the Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD). It is

also mandated to involve civil society groups/actors (Adebajo, 2011; Paterson, 2012).

The Constitutive Act of the AU authorises and enables it to intervene in a member state in

grave circumstances such as war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity (Mbogo,

2006; Besada, 2007; Guicherd, 2007; Bachmann, 2011). It was against the backdrop of

security challenges that the African Union in collaboration with European Union, Group of

Eight countries (G. 8), and other international organisations and states like United States of

America, etc., decided to establish African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) for

conflict prevention, conflict management, conflict resolution, post-conflict reconstruction or

rebuilding and generally peace building and peace supports in Africa. This is to build and

strengthen African capacities for managing and resolving conflicts on the continent.

The Problem

The emergence of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) is one of the most

important recent developments in Africa. The institutional setting for fostering peace and

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security on the continent has been created by the efforts of African governments to engage in

comprehensive continental integration (Gänzle and Franke, 2010). The AU through the

principle of subsidiarity shares responsibility with the regional economic communities

(RECs) in ensuring that its activities are fully implemented in the regions. These institutions

are also mandated to develop regional mechanisms to address conflicts and to support post-

conflict peacebuilding efforts that fall within their respective regions (Aning and Lartey,

2014).

Even the UN has promoted the regionalisation of peace and security regarding it as a

necessary shift and an effective way to manage certain types of conflict. The organisation

envisions a two-tiered conflict management system with regional organisations playing the

on-the-ground role and the UN serving a coordinating role from above (Jackson, 2000). For

instance, the UN Report in 1995 further argued that sub-regional organisations sometimes

have a comparative advantage in taking the lead role in the prevention and settlement of

conflicts and in assisting the UN in containing them (Zwanenburg, 2006; Okoth, 2008;

Ancas, nd). Malan (1999) called this a ‘peace pyramid’ with the sub-regional organisations

and the OAU/AU acting as the initial respondents to the armed conflict, while the UN

contributes more to peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction at the top of the pyramid.

Scholars who advocated for a regional approach to conflict resolution and peacekeeping

contend that regional actors’ familiarity with the region, including the cultural, social and

historical factors or context, can make them more effective on the ground. Geographical

proximity should facilitate quicker, more rapid and less expensive responses. In addition,

sub-regional organisations should also be more committed to facilitating enduring conflict

resolution in their region having such a strong stake in creating peace in their neighbourhood

and avoiding the negative effects of conflicts such as cross-border refugee flows

(Zwanenburg, 2006; Ancas, nd).

However, Franke (2006) cautioned that peacemaking efforts led by a regional organisation

require greater levels of coordination and cooperation to harness these potential advantages.

The crowdedness or lack of coordination often termed ‘competitive’ peacekeeping remains a

substantial and unresolved challenge in African peacemaking due to multiplicity of actors.

Thus, some of the scholars who criticised regional approach to conflict resolution and

peacekeeping in Africa like Van Nieuwkerk (2004) argued that AU and APSA will not make

any difference to Africa’s security if Africa’s ruling elites do not develop the political vision

and will to effectively promote human security on the continent. The lack of consensus on the

importance of good governance, and the absence of true commitment to regional solutions on

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peace and security issues among members of RECs continues to limit what they can

contribute to the AU and UN relationship. This lack of willingness contributes to the fact that

responses by regional and sub-regional organisations in Africa are usually ad hoc and

reactive, rather than proactive. The unclear and contradicting principles governing the

relationship between the UN, AU and RECs worsen this problem, despite attempts to

formalise roles under the AU. The ultimate responsibility and coordinating role in Africa

between UN and AU have not been clarified, nor has the scope of the principle of subsidiarity

in regional peacemaking (Crocker, Hampson and Aall, 1999; Zwanenburg, 2006; Franke,

2007; Khadiagala, 2007; Whitfield, 2010; Ancas, nd).

Similarly, Gänzle and Franke (2010) noted that severe institutional and financial

shortcomings within some of the APSA features remain. First, the lack of capacity of AU

institutions; second the absence of sufficient political will by a majority of African states, and

third, changes in international support. The regional peacemaking efforts are still limited in

their success due to the strong devotion to national sovereignty held by Africa’s leaders.

Kastler and Liepert (2008) doubted the capability of African states to solve conflicts on their

own and the AU willingness to generate sufficient political will to live up to their

responsibility to protect civilian populations under threat in Africa. Even Adetula (2008) and

Nathan (2010) in their separate studies stated that each of the sub-regional organisations has

its own unique dynamic or defect that affects its ability to carry out successful peacemaking

and to cooperate with the AU and UN on joint efforts.

Govender and Ngandu (2010) on their own posited that mediation processes still take an

improvised or reactive approach, rather than an institutionalised approach. As such the field

of mediation remains unprofessionalised and under-capacitated in Africa. This is due to

deficit of trained human capacity for mediation, continuing financial limitations, and the lack

of an adequate framework or mechanism at the AU to supervise, monitor or oversee

mediation. Yet the implications of this inability of the regional approach or AU/APSA and

RECs to significantly reduce armed conflicts for African integration and development has not

been given adequate scholarly attention.

An Overview of African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA)

In order to confront these security challenges in Africa and the crisis engulfing and

devastating Africa that African Union (AU) in collaboration with various external actors,

especially European Union (EU) and United Nations (UN) and synergy with sub-regional

security organizations like ECOMOG, etc., decided to set up African Peace and Security

Architecture (APSA). Under the AUC peace and security department, African Peace and

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Security Architecture (APSA) includes a number of mechanisms for conflict prevention,

management and resolution as well as post-conflict reconstruction. The five main organs of

this African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) include Peace and Security Council

(PSC), African Peace Facility (APF), Panel of the Wise (PoW), Continental Early Warning

System (CEWS), and African Standby Force (ASF).

The APSA is built around a Peace and Security Council (PSC), which is modelled along the

lines of the UN Security Council, and is the AU’s backbone as a standing decision-making

organ for the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts through implementation of

peace-building and post-conflict reconstruction activities; developing a common defence

policy for AU; encouraging democratic practices, good governance and the rule of law; and

protection of human rights. The PSC is also charged with the responsibility of implementing

the Common African Defence and Security Policy (CADSP). The PSC protocol came into

force in 2003 with 27 signatories. It collaborates with the United Nations and the United

Nations Security Council in managing the African conflict. But it can deploy peace support

missions with express authority from the UNSC which has the primary responsibility of

maintaining international peace and security (Touray, 2005; Gänzle and Franke, 2010;

Mbugua, 2013; Vines, 2013).

The Council’s membership is meant to be chosen on the principle of ‘equitable regional

representation and rotation’ as well as an assessment of whether the state in question is in

good standing (i.e. has it paid its dues, does it respect constitutional governance and the rule

of law, etc.) and whether it is willing and able to shoulder the responsibilities that

membership would place upon it. Thus, it is composed of fifteen representatives of African

Union (AU) member states on rotating basis some of whom do not even appear to meet the

minimum standards of respect for human rights and the rule of law such as Equatorial

Guinea, Ethiopia, Libya, Sudan, Zimbabwe, etc. Even some of its members like Kenya, Côte

d’Ivoire, etc. have recently been subject to peace and security deliberations. The Council

members composing of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs or designates of AU member states’

governments are elected by the AU Executive Council. Five of the fifteen members are

elected for terms of three years while the remaining ten are elected for terms of two years.

Nigeria is the only country that has continuously been represented on the Council since its

inception (Pabst, 2008; Franke, 2009; Gänzle and Franke, 2010; Mbugua, 2013).

The Council also works in close cooperation with the African Union Commission (AUC) in

particular with the Commissioner for Peace and Security and its under-staffed Peace and

Security Directorate (PSD). So far, the PSC has operated without the support of dedicated

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working groups and AU member states have not been able to ensure a regular participation in

its meetings, mostly due to lack of human and financial resources in their embassies in Addis

Ababa, Ethiopia, the headquarters of AU. The Constitutive Act of AU empowers PSC to

ensure preventive deployment in order to prevent (i) a dispute or a conflict from escalating,

(ii) an ongoing violent conflict from spreading to neighbouring areas or States, and (iii) the

resurgence of violence after parties to a conflict have reached an agreement. It also shoulders

the responsibility of peace-building which includes post-conflict disarmament and

demobilisation; humanitarian assistance to alleviate the suffering of civilian population in

conflict areas and support efforts to address major natural disasters; and any other functions

as may be mandated by the Peace and Security Council or the Assembly (Mbogo, 2006;

Besada, 2007; Guicherd, 2007; Bachmann, 2011).

In 2009, the PSC has already held over 170 meetings, issued over 100 communiqués and

authorised sanctions against several African states as well as peace operations in Sudan, the

Comoros and Somalia. But numerous problems remain as the AU proved unable to impose

sanctions on the regime in Zimbabwe such as AU member states’ lacking the political will to

provide adequate financial contributions, occasional disregard for the Council’s procedures,

delays in establishing a sufficiently staffed secretariat (Gänzle and Franke, 2010). With

authority from the UNSC, the PSC has established a number of peace support operations

including AU Mission in Burundi (AMIB) in 2003, AU Mission for Support to the Elections

in the Comoros (AMISEC) in 2006, AU Mission in Sudan (AMIS) in 2004 and AU Mission

in Somalia (AMISOM) in 2007. The AU is set to establish a mission to the Central Africa

Republic (CAR) following conflict in that country (Mbugua, 2013).

Operationally, the PSC has been the most visible component of APSA. It has held nearly 250

meetings and briefing sessions on a wide range of issues. This shows the growing

commitment of AU member states to tackle conflicts on the continent. It also demonstrates

the fragility of the security situation in Africa. More so, the PSC has convened three retreats

on some key thematic and procedural issues in Dakar, Senegal in 2007, in Livingstone,

Zambia in December 2008 and in Ezulwini, Swaziland in September, 2009. During these

meetings, the PSC adopted its working methods, the Livingstone Formula defining its

relationship with civil society organisations and how to enhance the implementation of

sanctions in situations involving unconstitutional change of government (Fisher, et al., 2010).

The Military Staff Committee (MSC) was established under PSC as the second advisory

body, the other being PoW. The MSC is supposed to advise and assist the PSC in all military

and security aspects for the maintenance of peace and security in Africa as well as support

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ASF. For this purpose, it is composed of senior military officers of the fifteen PSC member

states. In addition to their advisory role, the members of the MSC also act as liaison officers

between the PSC, the African Chiefs of Defence Staff and the regional conflict management

mechanisms. The MSC has provided advice with regard to AU missions in Burundi, Sudan

(Darfur), Comoros and currently Somalia. MSC does not address police or civilian issues and

therefore it cannot address issues of peace support operations comprehensively. So far, the

MSC has not been very influential despite regular meetings (Gänzle and Franke, 2010;

Mbugua, 2013).

African Peace Facility (APF) is the organ through which donors contribute to the APSA.

Politically, the APF was established in 2004, funded through the 9th EDF reserve, in

response to a request by African leaders at the AU Summit in Maputo, 2003. The APF sought

to address the insufficiency of the financing mechanisms for the AU’s expanded involvement

on the African continent to no avail. The EU has been one of the major donors. The EU has

been at the forefront of international support to the African Peace and Security agenda,

providing, in parallel to EU political backing, substantial and predictable funding to African

peace support operations (PSOs) and relevant capacity building activities at the regional and

continental level. This includes predictable funding for Africa-led peace support operations,

in particular through the establishment of an EU predictable and sustainable funding scheme,

as well as through working with the international community to achieve a UN mechanism to

provide sustainable and predictable financial support for these operations (Cilliers, 2005a;

Vines and Middleton, 2008; Hendrickson, et al. 2013; Mbugua, 2013).

The original APF allocation of € 250 million was replenished four times under the 9th EDF

with a total of € 150 million in additional funding. In parallel, an EU debate on sustainable

funding for African peace support operations, complementary to the APF, was launched in

2007, resulting in mobilisation of nearly € 40 million in Additional Voluntary Contributions

by eight EU Member States, thus bringing the total to almost € 440 million channelled

through the APF under the 9th EDF. Under the 10th EDF a further € 300 million was

committed for the period of 2008-2010 constituting the 2nd APF. Between 2004 and 2010,

the APF has allocated a total sum of €740 million to capacity building, peace support

operations, early response mechanisms, and contingencies. It has financed four missions: the

African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and the consolidation of peace in the Central

African Republic (MICOPAX) are ongoing, while the African Union Mission in Sudan

(AMIS) and the mission to support the elections in the Comoros (AMISEC) have been

accomplished. In 2011, the APF was replenished for a new period of three years (2011-2013)

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with an amount of € 300 million coming from the intra-ACP reserve, bringing the overall

funds dedicated to APF to over € 1 billion (Hendrickson, et al. 2013; Jentzsch, 2014). For

further information on this see Table 1 below.

Table 1: The Ninth and Tenth European Development Fund (EDF) in Million Euro

Operations/Actions 9th EDF

APF 2004-

2007

10th EDF

3-Year Action

Programme

2008-2010

10th EDF

(replenished)

3-Year Action

Programme

2011-2013

Total

Peace Support

Operations

400 200,6[2] 240 840,6

Capacity Building

Programmes

34,5[1] 65 40 139,5

Early Response

Mechanisms

15 2 17

Adult, Evaluation

Technical

Assistance

12[3] 7 6 50[4]

Contingencies 12[3] 13 12 50[4]

Total 446,5 300,6 300 1.047,10

1. This amount includes Euro 7,500,000 South Africa Contribution for Capacity

Building in Conflict Prevention in Africa.

2. This includes Euro 600,000 from Belgian Voluntary Contribution to MICOPAX.

3. This is the sum of the two totalling Euro 12.

4. This is the sum of the two totalling Euro 50.

Source: Hendrickson, D. et al. (Eds.). (2013). African Peace Facility Evaluation – Part 2:

Reviewing the Overall Implementation of APF as an Instrument for African Efforts to

Manage Conflicts on the Continent. EU, ADE & IBF Final Report.

The European Commission delivers APF financing to beneficiaries mainly through

Contribution Agreements (under the system of joint management) or grants (under

centralised management). Contribution Agreements are signed for each individual

intervention, between the European Commission and the implementing organisation, that is,

the AU and/or other African regional organisations. The Contribution Agreement also defines

the procedures to be used by the implementing organisations, notably with regard to

procurement and award of grants, depending on the institutional capacity of the organisation

and the conformity of its procedures with internationally accepted standards. Initially, its

funds came from the Ninth European Development Fund which were limited to development

activities such as capacity building and training and could not be used for military equipment.

But as from 2007 to 2013, the APF received funds from the EU Stability Instrument, which

finances peace and security and anti-terror operations around the world. Some of the

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complaints of this facility are that money is not disbursed on time, while a counter complaint

from donors appears to be that of absorptive capacity of the AU. This Fund, however, can

only be for Peace Support Operations, and not for direct military support (Vines and

Middleton, 2008; Hendrickson, et al. 2013).

The Panel of the Wise (PoW) was inaugurated in 2007 to support the PSC’s work in the area

of conflict prevention and act as a “politically independent” advisory mechanism with the

aim of forging “a culture of mediation”. It is meant to operate through personal mediation,

discreet diplomacy and good offices with a view of de-escalating conflicts and facilitating the

conclusion of viable peace agreements. In three years, the Panel was able to hold seven

ordinary meetings (Gänzle and Franke, 2010). PoW is composed by five respected African

public figures, one for each African region, who can act either on instruction from the PSC or

on their own initiative to do behind the scenes conflict mediation. They have engaged in the

Comoros, Togo, Cote d’Ivoire and Kenya but yet to be deployed to Zimbabwe (Pirozzii,

2011).

For example, they have provided early warning such as during the African Peer Review

Mechanism in Kenya, 2007 or mediation between parties in conflict such as Kenya during the

post-election violence of 2007/2008. The Panel has been active in mediating conflict in some

African countries but its mediations in Mali, Cote d’Ivoire, Libya and Egypt, was considered

mixed success given extra-regional involvement in these conflicts. Africa has traditionally

gone in for Track One type mediation efforts relying on the idea that elder statesmen can

persuade others to do the right thing. What is lacking is the training of a number of

skilled/professional conflict mediators that can come in at short notice to assist negotiation

efforts. The Track Two involvement is expected, especially since civil society is theoretically

seen as key to conflict prevention. PoW has only recorded modest results in its core function

of conflict prevention and mediation (Pirozzii, 2011; Mbugua, 2013).

Continental Early Warning System (CEWS) is designed as a conflict anticipation and

prevention tool that consists of a central observation and monitoring centre in Addis Ababa

called Situation Room (SR) and regional early warning systems. CEWS is based at the AU

and uses open source information to compile reports. It also relies on information from the

regional early warning systems and from AU missions stationed in countries, as well as

ambassadors to compile and verify its reports. They have adapted software from the

European Early Warning system which can then provide them with conflict alerts. This

information is then to be fed to the PSC. This is to help the Peace and Security Council (PSC)

to take decisions and to guide the African Standby Force (ASF) in the deployment of troops

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through data and information gathering (Nathan, 2007; Wane, 2010; Pirozzi, 2011; Mbugua,

2013).

The implementation of the CEWS is progressing very unevenly as the RECs performing at

different levels. For instance, while Eastern, Southern, and Western Africa have already

operationalised their mechanisms, the northern and central regions are not on track (Gänzle

and Franke, 2010). Thus, ECOWAS and IGAD have been the most progressive in the

continent. Both organisations have progressed beyond mere paperwork and have started

collecting and analysing data from the field. The other regional mechanisms are still

struggling to create their mechanisms on paper (Cilliers, 2005b). There is also a big gap in the

implementation guidelines. IGAD’s early warning unit has the most sophisticated electronic

mechanism and tools in place and works as an open information centre whereas the SADC

places the early warning unit as part of its closed intelligence system (Tiruneh, 2010). The

limitations and challenges of CEWS include the need to train more personnel, further

strengthening of regional and national early warning systems, limiting political interference

in the gathering and transmitting of data and the responsiveness of the PSC to the information

they receive.

The African Standby Force (ASF) was established by AU to conduct autonomous peace

operations and other security-related interventions in the African continent. The ASF is

composed of a central headquarters located at the AU Commission and five sub-regional

structures including standby brigades of around 3000 troops (later 6500 troops) with civilian,

police and military components, and it will be ready for rapid deployment at appropriate

notice. Also, there is one continentally-managed permanent body responsible for final

oversight, coordination and harmonisation. In other words, the ASF is composed of the

Regional Standby Forces (RSF), such as Ecobrig, SADCbrig, Easbrig, North African Brigade

and the Central African Brigade, to provide Africa with a capability to deal with crisis, and

the five sub-regional organisations are preparing multi-dimensional capability encompassing

military, police and civilian components. This force will be available at both sub-regional and

continental levels. Africa and the European Union (EU) have adopted a joint strategy

comprising several action points in order to meet the objectives (Powell, 2005; Gänzle and

Franke, 2010; Pirozzii, 2011; Mbugua, 2013).

To this end, the “Rapid Deployment Capability” (RDC) capable of intervening, within

fourteen days, in cases of Genocide and gross human rights abuses was established under

ASF. The RDC was decided to be an integral part of the regional Standby Forces to be

deployed at the entry point, as a precursor to the deployment of a larger mission. At the end

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of 2013, the Expert Panel of the AU stated that the goal, recommended in Roadmap III, to

test, evaluate and operationalise the RDC by 2012, was not met (Aboagye, 2012).

They can be deployed for the following purposes: military advice to a political mission;

observer mission to be deployed alongside a UN mission; stand-alone observer mission;

peace-keeping force for humanitarian reasons, preventative deployment and peace-building;

complex multi-dimensional peace-keeping; intervention by AU when international

community fails to act, especially in cases of genocide (Cilliers and Malan, 2005). The

limitations of the AU’s peace-keeping capabilities have been exposed in their missions to

Darfur and Somalia. The UN was called in to come and assist with the Darfur mission. There

are still not sufficient troops or equipment to deal with a situation in which “there is no peace

to keep”. Many peace-keepers have perished under these conditions. The African Mission in

Somalia has suffered a similar fate in which far less than the 8000 troops pledged actually

arriving (Kastler and Liepert, 2008). Vines and Middleton (2008) identified some of the

difficulties that will transpire with the African Standby Force which include inability to raise

sufficient troops; limited intervention mandates; ability to pay troops on time; lack of

command structures for effective decision making for example, the death of Nigerian head at

MSC left a vacuum that is yet to be filled; large reliance on a few countries; and lack of

equipment, especially airlifting ability. For Pabst (2008), logistics, finance, capacity building

and complimentary military forces are what would be required for the ASF to function

effectively.

But the final concept for the ASF, presented in the Maputo Report of July 2003, at the time

provided for five regional Standby Brigade forces of about 15,000 soldiers continent-wide.

The five regional Standby Brigade forces include North Africa Regional Standby Brigade

(NASBRIG), East Africa Standby Brigade (EASBRIG); Force Multinationale de l’Afrique

Centrale (FOMAC); Southern Africa Standby Brigade (SADCBRIG); and ECOWAS

Standby Brigade (ECOBRIG). (Mbogo, 2006; Besada, 2007; Guicherd, 2007; Bachmann,

2011).

Although the AU base its division of security administration zones on RECs, they do not

always correspond to the existing organisations. In Eastern Africa, there is the East African

community (EAC) and Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA). These

two organisations focus more on economic union than security. The Eastern African Peace

and Security Mechanism (EAPSM) has been undergoing the process of restructuring to

harmonise the work of IGAD, EAC and COMESA. Unlike Nigeria in West Africa and in

SADC in South Africa which are regional hegemonies respectively; Ethiopia and Kenya

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compete for regional dominance. The political differences between Ethiopia and Eritrea and

the long cordial relationship between Kenya and Ethiopia has made Eritrea view EASF as an

Ethiopian leaning entity (Mbugua, 2013; Vines, 2013).

Thus, the responsibility of the regional structure for peace and security architecture was given

to Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) which covers seven countries in its

original formation as one of the RECs; namely, Kenya, Uganda, Djibouti, Sudan, South

Sudan, Ethiopia and Eritrea but it accommodates more countries in the AU regional security

structure. For example, Seychelles and Rwanda are not members of IGAD but they are

members of the AU regional peace and security structure. IGAD has a peace and security

mandate and has developed conflict prevention, management and resolution mechanism.

IGAD has developed capacity to monitor conflict through IGAD-CEWARN an early warning

and response unit based in Addis Ababa. The focus of CEWARN was however limited to

pastoralists based cross border conflicts (Kinzel, 2008; Mbugua, 2013; Vines, 2013).

IGAD has also demonstrated capacity to handle regional conflicts through mediation such as

the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) for Sudan and the Djibouti and Kenya based

inter-party negotiations for peace in Somalia. IGAD develops capacity in the management of

arms proliferation and control of terrorism through the Regional Centre for the Control of

Small Arms and Light Weapons (RECSA) and IGAD Capacity Building Programme against

Terrorism. However, IGAD does not have the capacity to respond militarily to conflict

situations, though the East African Standby Force (EASF) is geared to provide that capacity

(Mwaniki, 2012). IGAD also does not have a mandate to intervene in internal conflicts of

member countries. This provision might have to be reviewed in APSA (Mbugua, 2013).

The East African Standby Force (EASF) with a secretariat based in Nairobi is the Eastern

African peace support operations force under the AU peace and security architecture. The

mandate of EASF is to provide military advice to a political mission, participate in complex

multidimensional peace keeping missions, with deployment of military elements and be ready

for deployment by the AU when the international community fails to act, for example over

genocide. The force is comprised of 3000 strong troops who are based in member countries.

The force brings together members of IGAD, East African Community and the Indian Ocean

Commission. The eleven member countries include Kenya, Uganda, Djibouti, Sudan,

Comoros, Burundi, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Somalia, Rwanda and Seychelles. The EASF supports

various aspects of PSO capacity building including training on rule of law, security sector

reforms, and protection of civilians, logistics, human rights and post conflict reconstruction.

EASF has not been tested enough on the ground though it has offered invaluable support to

14

AMISOM. The conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea could prevent smooth operations of

EASF in the Eastern Africa region. Operations of EASF will be highly dependent on global

powers interests and the political situation in the region and the inter-state relations among

key regional powers. But its relationships with other RECs such as IGAD and COMESA with

regard to implementation of APSA has not yet been well defined (Powell, 2005; Mbugua,

2013).

COMESA did not want to compete with other organisations dealing with peace and security

but would provide another wider forum for dealing with regional security. COMESA

established war economy and regional maritime security programmes to cover

economic/resource based conflicts. Therefore, the organisation found a niche in specialising

on resource based conflicts. COMESA seems to have structured some of its institutions to

reflect the AU peace and security architecture (Mbugua, 2013). COMESA collaborates with

other RECs such as IGAD, EAC and SADC to prevent duplication. An early warning system

was also established in line with the CEWS of the AU. A comprehensive framework for

dealing with piracy and money laundering has also been established. COMESA bridges the

gap between SADC, EAC, IGAD and the Maghreb Union in implementation of peace and

security agenda. It has provided mediation in many conflicts from Burundi, DRC,

Madagascar, to Eritrea/Ethiopian conflict (Mutunga, 2012).

External and International Supports for African Peace and Security Architecture

(APSA)

Today, over 90% of the AU’s peace and security efforts are funded by external actors

(Adebajo, 2011; Paterson, 2012). The AU continues to be fully dependent on donors such as

the EU to fund its institutional mechanisms and the running costs of its operations. While

such an institutional emulation may yield positive effects with respect to the bureaucratic

efficiency, political viability and international compatibility of the resultant African

structures, the EU runs the risk of eroding African ownership. A way to escape this dilemma

for the EU is to actively seek to strengthen institutional links with key AU member states on

peace and security (Pirozzi, 2009; Gänzle and Franke, 2010).

Since inception, the Fund has raised about US$ 96 million, a quarter of which came from

member countries and three quarter from outside donors (Ulrich, 2004). During the 2007

audit of the AU, it was concluded that there is a cause for concern regarding the funding of

peace operations in Africa. Only 6% of the AU budget is allocated to the Peace Fund. The

AU Commission resolved to look for resources within the continent to increase the fund to

12% in 2012 (Mbugua, 2013). For information on top ten donors, see Table 2 below.

15

Table 2: List of Top Ten Providers of the Peacekeeping Budget for 2013

S/No Countries Effective Rate (%)

1 United States of America 28.38

2 Japan 10.83

3 France 7.22

4 Germany 7.14

5 United Kingdom 6.68

6 China 6.64

7 Italy 4.45

8 Russia 3.15

9 Canada 2.98

10 Spain 2.97

Source: United Nations (UN) Document. A/67/224/Add. 1. Cited in Jentzsch, C. (2014). “The

Financing of International Peace Operations in Africa: A Review of Recent Research and

Analyses”. African Peacebuilding Network (APN) Working Papers, 1, May.

International partners have become increasingly engaged in capacity-building activities over

the last decade. On the bilateral level, the United States, France, the United Kingdom and

Germany are the biggest providers of funds with the latter paying for the construction of a

new building for the AU’s Peace and Security Department and supporting the Kofi Annan

International Peacekeeping Training Centre in Ghana. Also, at the 2004 G. 8 Summit, the US

announced its intention to significantly increase the funds it provides in African crisis area to

US$ 660 million over five years. China has also made a contribution to the AU’s capacities

by contributing more than US$ 100 million to the construction of new office buildings on the

AU compound in Addis Ababa (Kingebriel, 2005; Pirozzi, 2009; Gänzle and Franke, 2010).

Following the AU’s request, NATO has supported the African organisation in peace

operations and capacity building since 2005. NATO’s first mission on the African continent

provided airlift support and training for AU personnel for the AU mission in Sudan (AMIS)

from 2005 until the mission was replaced by the hybrid UN-AU mission (UNAMID) on

January 1, 2008. Since then, NATO has provided planning and strategic air- and sealift

support to AU member states involved in the AU mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and was

involved in capacity building for the African Standby Force (ASF) brigades. However, the

AU’s cooperation with NATO has not yet attained the same strategic outlook and predictable

funding as the AU-EU partnership (Smith-Windsor 2013; Jentzsch, 2014).

16

Another international network for coordination is the ‘Africa Clearing House’ which came

into existence in 2005 and offers a platform for representatives from the G8, the AU, the UN

and other donors including Scandinavian countries, Russia, China, India. This is an inclusive

framework in which partners to Africa can share information on their respective activities to

improve coordination, so as not to overburden the AU with disparate partner agendas

(Franke, 2009; Gänzle and Franke, 2010; Tadesse, 2012).

The African Union Partner Group (AUPG), for example, is a place where the EU, through its

Delegation to the AU, is particularly active. Established in 2006, the AUPG comprising

Brazil, China, EU member states, India, Russia, the USA, and other countries accredited at

the AU, acts as a loose network of donor countries. However, the relations between the EU

and the AU are very much focused on the AU Commission, less so on key AU member states

(Pirozzi, 2009; Gänzle and Franke, 2010).

Africa has increasingly become the focus point of UN peacekeeping mission after his low ebb

of the 1990s such that out of the sixteen operations underway throughout the world on

February 28, 2005, seven were concerned with Africa. The UN’s annual budget, July 2004 to

June 2005, has earmarked a total of US$ 3.87 for these mission, the percentage of these funds

projected for measures in Africa is high at 74.5% or US$ 2.89. The largest mission

worldwide involving 14,943 military personnel and 1,074, civilian police is currently

underway in Liberia, while that UN Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) topped the list with

over 17, 000 troops before its reduction in 2004 (Kingebriel, 2005).

Thus, the EU is an important partner in financial terms. Beyond financial support, it devises a

uniquely comprehensive approach in the context of the Joint Africa-EU Strategy which was

adopted at the EU-Africa Lisbon Summit in 2007. The EU is also a body for coordination

among its member states; and it is increasingly playing a pivotal role in coordinating with

China and other countries in driving the international policy agenda for global development

(Franke, 2009; Gänzle and Franke, 2010).

The World Bank’s efforts have made available more resources for peace and security efforts

in Africa particularly with respect to the demobilisation and reintegration of combatants. But

its actual impact on post-war stability remains contested (Harrison, 2012; Jentzsch, 2014).

Several external actors are building the capabilities for rapid military interventions including

the NATO Response Force (NRF) which reached a preliminary states of operational

readiness in October 2004, and the EU’s battle group concept designed for mission in the

African continent. The battle group concept was first agreed bilaterally by Britain and France

in November 2003, which Germany joined in February 2004, and in November 2004,

17

Europe-wide agreement was reached by a joint initiative of EU ministers of defence. The

concept provides for 13 battle groups, each of which is to include 1,500 troops and is to be

available within 15 days.

The EU-African peace facility capacity building component amounts to almost 34.7 million

euro annually, out of which 27 million euro derived from the European Development Fund

(EDF) and 7.7 million euro from the European Commission development budget for South

Africa. The objective of this component is to increase the capacity of the African Union (AU)

and of the regional economic communities (RECs) in the planning and conduct of Peace

Support Operations (PSO) on the continent. Out of the African Peace Facility (APF) envelop

of 27 million euro, a contribution agreement of 6 million euro was signed between the

European Commission and the African Union Commission (AUC) in October 2004 to

reinforce the AUC Peace and Security Department; 1 million euro have been earmarked for

African Standby Force (ASF) for workshops, the remaining 20 million euro were spent

mainly to cover staff reinforcement, training and equipment on the African Standby Force

(ASF) and the RECs (Kingebriel, 2005).

Also, 6 million euro of APF funds were earmarked for institutional capacity of the AUC

Peace and Security Department (PSD) within its main areas of activities. This included

recruitment of additional staff, the rental of office premises and the purchase of office

equipment. The objective is to strengthen the PSD’s role and leadership in promoting peace,

stability and security. The programme aims at; one , strengthening the capacity of the AU to

implement the various elements of the AU Peace and Security Council; two, strengthen the

AU planning cell responsible for strategies and military planning for peace support

operations; and three, strengthening the capacity of the PSD in the areas of financial and

administrative management for peace support operations. In addition, a joint EU-AU study

was carried out to identify the long-term capacity needs of the AUC and other sub-regional

organisations in Africa. The outcome of this assessment served as basic for subsequent

Contribution Agreements related to AU capacity building in the field of peace and security

(Kingebriel, 2005).

Pirozzii (2011) stated that the initial APF allocation of 250 million euro came from the 9th

EDF between 2000 and 2007. However, these funds proved soon to be insufficient, mainly

due to the financing of the AU Mission in Sudan (AMIS), and the APF financial envelop was

raised to 440 million euro in 2007. Additional funding of the original allocation was provided

through four successive replenishments, the last which relied on contributions from EU

member states, namely, to finance ASF activities, to develop human resources within the AU

18

commission, to reinforce institution-building at international and regional levels. Out of three

contracted funds, slightly more than a half was actually paid due to the AU’s difficulties in

recruiting personnel and implementing related projects.

In 2007, the 7.7 million euro of the EC development budget for South Africa was allocated to

establish REC liaison offices with the AU and further develop and consolidate early warning

capacity achievements. Out of the 7.7 million euro of the South African development

contribution to be specific, almost 3 million euro was earmarked for the CEWS. Priority was

given to regional economic communities (RECs) whose early warning systems are less

developed than others (Pirozzii, 2011).

However, under the 10th EDF between 2008 and 2013, the APF initiative has been expanded

to 300 million euro. The funds allocated to PSOs have been reduced to 200 million euro,

while a greater part of the available resources, that is, 65 million euro has been devoted to

capacity building. There is the creation of a pool funding mechanism for salaries of AUC

personnel, which would allow a more coordinated and continuous support to staffing,

currently financed on a project basis by multiple donors such as EU, UN, and bilateral

contributions, support to the work of the Panel of the Wise (PoW) and the development of

mediation unit at the regional level; support to the African training capabilities in peace and

security (Pirozzii, 2011).

In order to speed up the decision making process when necessary and to inject funds faster,

the new APF also includes an Early Response Mechanism (ERM) which is aimed at

financing activities such as first stages of mediation actions in the framework of preventive

diplomacy; identification and fact finding missions to initiate the planning process of PSOs,

temporary and ad hoc reinforcement of the planning cell for a potential operation. It relies on

an ad hoc, shortened decision-making procedure and has an allocation of 15 million euro

(Pirozzii and Miranda, 2010).

European support to African peace and security is not only by funds and technical

cooperation coming from the EU institutions, but also by a series of initiatives implemented

by EU member states, both in the framework of the Africa-EU partnership and on their

bilateral relationships with African actors. In particular, EU member states released matching

funds for the African Peace Facility in order to support AU-led PSOs, offer support to AU

and refund organisations for the operationalisation of the APSA, and regularly contribute to

training, technical cooperation and exchange of expertise with African personnel

(Kingebriel, 2005; Pirozzii, 2011).

Constraints and Challenges of African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA)

19

Some of the constraints and challenges of APSA include administrative failures, institutional

incapacity, problems of political infighting, poor funding, inadequate skilled human

resources, poor planning, poor coordination, lack of political will, etc. (Paterson, 2012).

Mobilising the necessary financial, material, and logistical resources has been a major

challenge to conducting peace operations in Africa that has often exposed the dependence of

African states on the international community to act in their crises. Beyond the urge to take

responsibility is the realisation that international organisations do not have the capacity, nor

their member states the political will, to intervene in all the crises in Africa, and that AU and

RECs might be better equipped to respond efficiently and effectively to threats to peace and

security (Jentzsch, 2014). Regrettably, this is yet to be practically demonstrated in conflict

situations.

Being mostly donor funded, the AU’s Peace Fund could only pay for small observer

missions, not larger peacekeeping operations (Cilliers 2005a). Despite introducing many new

financing instruments and involving new actors in funding peace operations in Africa, the

results have been mixed. The assessment of recent UN reforms, the evolution of voluntary

contributions, and the devolution of peace operations to regional organisations demonstrates

that while some problems have been addressed, many remain to be resolved. The limitations

of reforms and adaptations of financing mechanisms for peace operations have led to a

continuous debate on alternative sources of funding (Jentzsch, 2014).

Efforts of the past two decades to respond effectively to challenges to peace and security in

Africa have produced various new programmes and institutions, funds, and budgets and led

to revisions of previous programmes and financing mechanisms. This proliferation of

institutions and funds has also created challenges. Some of which include the inadequacy of

UN reforms to overcome financing constraints; the insufficiency and unpredictability of

voluntary contributions; and the limited capacity of African regional organisations. All are

rooted in the demand for more integrated approaches to peace operations on the one hand and

the lack of coordination, duplication of structures, and waste of resources on the other. Thus,

two trends in financing peace operations in Africa are particularly notable: the actors

involved have proliferated, but the options to fund the activities have remained limited.

Duplication of structures and waste of resources through proliferation of RECs and multiple

memberships are financially constraining APSA. The improvisation of financing mechanisms

and the proliferation of actors involved in peace operations over the last decades has brought

about a duplication of administrative and organisational structures (Franke, 2007; Adebajo,

2008; Jentzsch, 2014).

20

The central and regional ASF, particularly the Northern brigade, are lagging far behind

(Gänzle and Franke, 2010). There is increase in regional internal tensions such as internal

conflicts in the member states, piracy in Somalia; inadequate funding to support all EASF

activities; shortfall in regional contribution to forces due to inability of member states to

commit forces to EASF; constraints in political, diplomatic and military regional cohesion;

inadequate coordination of the various structures of the EASF (the Bde HQs, LOGBASE and

PLANELM); and regulating partners technical and financial support in respect to EASF

strategic plans and programmes (Fisher, et al., 2010).

Despite NARC’s potential given the strong economies of its members, the status of readiness

of the standby brigade based on the AU’s roadmap, indicates that it is lagging in the

operationalisation of the standby arrangement. Although the Brigade HQ to be located in

Cairo and the two logistic depots to be located in Algiers and Cairo have been identified, they

were yet to be operational due to some political and bureaucratic constraints in some member

states. Additionally, it seems that creating, rostering and deploying a civilian component is

somewhat problematic due to the voluntary and individualistic nature of this component and

the lack of an AU strategic guidance in this regard (Fisher, et al., 2010).

The fact that constitutional and legal regulations in some member states have delayed the

ratification of the NARC Memorandum of Understanding (MoU). For example, although

Tunisia signed the MoU in June 2008, it has not been able to activate its membership and as

such has not pledged any military, police or civilians due to the lengthy internal constitutional

procedures in Tunisia to ratify the MoU. This challenge is compounded by the reluctance of

some NARC members to sign the founding documents. Also, the unresolved dispute over the

status of Western Sahara is a complicating factor between members of the NARC, with

significant impact on its operationalisation. The fact that, four of the six members of NARC

do not recognize the Sahara Arab Democratic Republic complicates how these states relate to

it in the context of NARC and beyond. This was identified as a crucial challenge that

continues to impact on the operationalisation of NARC (Fisher, et al., 2010).

SSF is confronted by a range of challenges. Among these challenges include, the complex

political dynamics in the region; challenge of Command, Control and Communication; the

evolution of common or different battle procedures; lack of common training doctrines;

interoperability of equipment and language barriers. The funding a stand-alone peace support

operation will be a challenge in the region. While the AU and ECOWAS have progressed

very well in creating the institutional architecture for this component, other RECs are either

at the initial stages of establishing theirs or have adopted different models such as SADC

21

which has opted not to establish a standing body. The absence of a formal Memorandum of

Understanding (MOU) between ECCAS and its Members States relating to FOMAC remains

a big gap (Fisher, et al., 2010).

The deployment of peacekeepers in Burundi (AMIB), Comoros (AMISEC), Sudan (AMIS)

and Somalia (AMISOM) has exposed a major gap between the PSC’s willingness to

authorise such missions and the AU’s ability to implement them. The shortage of human and

material resources has emerged as a major shortfall (Fisher, et al., 2010). No adequate

solution has been found for the reimbursement of troop contributions, as the amounts of the

reimbursements often still exceed the actual costs states pay for their troops (Jentzsch, 2014).

There is a potential disconnect between the AU and the regions when it comes to electing

members of the PSC, as despite the laid down criteria, election of members rests with the

regions. This limits the ability of the AU to enforce its principles as the regions have adopted

their own formula for nominating members to the PSC. For instance, some regions have

agreed to have one of their members occupy the three year seat almost on a permanent basis,

thus, creating a pseudo-Permanent member, but without any veto powers (Fisher, et al.,

2010).

Given that the various APSA components are developing at different paces, the level of

horizontal coordination has been limited (Engel and Porto, 2010; Murithi and Mwaura, 2010;

Fisher, et al., 2010). A major consequence of this has been the heavy reliance on external

partner support for the key components of the APSA (Engel and Porto, 2010; Murithi and

Mwaura, 2010; Fisher, et al., 2010).

The Implications of Escalating Conflicts and Security Challenges for African

Integration and Development

There is in Africa tension between sub-national centrifugal forces (like ethnic nationalism,

religious intolerance, insurgencies, terrorism, etc.) and supranational centripetal forces (like

regional integration or cooperation, free trade area, customs union, common market, single

market, monetary union, etc.). As the balance tilts towards the former, the RECs in Africa are

continuously threatened by the sub-nationalism or disintegrative nationalism, and are thus,

confronted with the challenge of intervening to resolve disputes, conflicts and crises arising

from or within it, and are thus, distracted from the primary task of achieving sub-regionalism

let alone continent-wide community formation (Aniche, 2014). Thus, the implications of

these escalating conflicts are deepening crises of African integration and development. Even

Hendrickson, et al. (2013) aptly noted that unless the root causes and underlining threats to

security are addressed, the economic, human and social development of Africa will continue

22

to be hampered. They suggested that a comprehensive approach to peace and security in

Africa needs a broad regional policy framework, covering different aspects of peace and

security as well as clear and accountable role-sharing between the national, sub-regional,

continental and multilateral levels.

As a result so much effort is wasted and energy dissipated by African leaders and regional

bodies in managing centrifugal forces of sub-nationalism to the extent that they are not able

to harness the human resources of their people towards synergising them in transforming the

numerous mineral resources that abound within their territories into manufactured products,

and thus, constituting a clog in the wheel of industrialisation. It is this very fact that has

confined African states to export-oriented primary producers whose primary products are in

very little demand within the regional group and which must be exported to industrialised

countries of the West (and recently China) in unequal exchange with manufactured goods

imported from them. This has ensured that Africa with its enclave economy remains in the

periphery of world politics and as well at the mercy of neo-colonialism thwarting all efforts

towards regional integration in Africa (Aniche, 2014; Aniche and Ukaegbu, 2016).

It is under this disintegrative nationalism or sub-national centrifugal tendencies that APSA is

proposed as a solution, an option or an alternative towards overcoming escalating conflicts

and numerous security challenges in Africa. But following from the above, it is obvious that

APSA is certainly not the solution to escalating conflicts and numerous security challenges in

Africa. APSA could be a necessary condition but not a sufficient solution for security

challenges in Africa. This is because all available evidence shows that armed conflicts are on

the increase in Africa, especially intra-state war. This includes the resurgence of armed

conflict in South Sudan.

Regrettably, the AU still insists on modelling itself on the EU neo-functional approach even

as the supranational template for region-building adopted in Europe may not be appropriate

for Africa. For instance, many of the 500 million inhabitants of the 27 countries in the EU

have benefited from European integration. In contrast, Africa’s integration efforts have failed

to redress colonial patterns of commerce as trade among the AU’s 54 countries represents

less than 10 percent of the continent’s total; and have delivered few tangible benefits to its

800 million citizens (Adebajo, 2011; Paterson, 2012).

A better alternative would have been post-neo-functionalism which by blending neo-

nationalism, post-nationalism and humanism in fact can complement and reinforce APSA

rather than dismantling it. This is because post-neo-functionalism through post-nationalism

advocates for regional cooperation in matters of security at the onset as a short-term strategy

23

for tackling the enormous security challenges in various states in Africa at the continental or

regional level. It suggests that regional security cooperation should precede regional

economic integration, and even regional integration in political sphere (Aniche, 2015). The

implication being that all regional economic and political integration in Africa including AU,

AEC, RECs, etc. should be dismantled to be replaced by regional security cooperation in

form of APSA and other sub-regional equivalent like NASBRIG, EASBRIG, FOMAC,

SADCBRIG and ECOBRIG. This reduces waste of resources occasioned by proliferation and

multiple memberships as well as multiple dues. This will enable African states to concentrate

their resources on regional and sub-regional security apparatuses for resolving conflicts and

tackling insecurity.

Thus, post-neo-functionalism through neo-nationalism advocates for national integration,

nation-building and nationalism needed to address national questions like ethnic jingoism and

religious bigotry as a necessary step or starting point or take off point towards achieving

stable and sustainable regional integration, and ultimately global integration. Most of the

European states who kick-started European integration have already achieved sufficient or

satisfactory level of national integration, nation-building and national development. But this

is not the case with African states which are still confronted by national questions and

injustice; battling with poverty, underdevelopment and devastated by centrifugal forces of

sub-nationalism. Post-neo-functionalism or post-neo-nationalism follows more or less the

following stages: national integration, sub-regional integration, regional integration, trans-

regional integration and finally global integration (Aniche, 2014). It is only through this

blend of neo-nationalism, post-nationalism and humanism that APSA could be reposition to

acquire both necessary and sufficient conditions for resolving the escalating armed conflicts

and tackling enormous security challenges in Africa.

Conclusion

From the foregoing, it is obvious that APSA is certainly not the solution to escalating

conflicts and numerous security challenges in Africa. APSA could be a necessary condition

but not a sufficient solution for security challenges in Africa. This is because all available

evidence shows that armed conflicts are on the increase in Africa, especially intra-state war.

The implications of these escalating conflicts are deepening crises of African integration and

development. The study concludes that escalating armed conflicts and enormous security

challenges undermine African integration, and by extension, impede African development.

The study recommends post-neo-functionalism or post-neo-nationalism as way of

repositioning APSA to acquire both necessary and sufficient conditions for resolving the

24

escalating armed conflicts and tackling enormous security challenges in Africa. The

implication being that all regional economic and political integration in Africa including AU,

AEC, RECs, etc. should be dismantled to be replaced by regional security cooperation in

form of APSA and other sub-regional equivalent like NASBRIG, EASBRIG, FOMAC,

SADCBRIG and ECOBRIG. This reduces waste of resources occasioned by proliferation and

multiple memberships as well as multiple dues. This will enable African states to concentrate

their resources on regional and sub-regional security apparatuses for resolving conflicts and

tackling insecurity. In a nutshell, post-neo-functionalism is a hybrid of neo-nationalism, post-

nationalism and humanism which ultimately advocates bottom-top, humanistic, people-

centric or private-sector-driven approach to integration, or people-to-people integration.

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