Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1679889

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Abstract

Iranians and the Bomb: Religion and Support for or Opposition to the Development of Nuclear Weapons

C. Christine Fair, Karl Kaltenthaler, William J. Miller

This essay examines the Iranian public’s beliefs about Iran’s development of nuclear weapons. To some extent, it also explains how and why Iranians have differing opinions on this important policy issue. In order to understand these views, we develop an argument about the role that religion plays in shaping views on foreign policy issues. We next test this hypothesis in an effort to explain observed variation in Iranian individual-level attitudes toward developing nuclear weapons. We find that approximately 25% of surveyed Iranians are in favor of their government’s development of nuclear weapons. Our regression analyses indicate that respondents’ views on whether Islam tolerates the development of nuclear weapons explain, in some measure, the observed variation in support for a weapons program. These findings suggest that Iranians, as do other publics, use core values to determine their position on foreign policy issues and their country’s nuclear posture rather than relying on detailed information about Iran’s national security concerns. Key words: Iranian nuclear proliferation, Iranian public opinion, Islam and nuclear weapons. Corresponding Author: C. Christine Fair, c_christine_fair@yahoo.com, ccf33@georgetown.edu

Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1679889

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Iranians and the Bomb: Religion and Support for or Opposition to the Development of Nuclear Weapons1

C. Christine Fair, Karl Kaltenthaler, William J. Miller

Introduction

Iran’s nuclear ambitions plague the international community, bringing the Islamic Republic into ever-

sharper conflict with the United States and its key European allies (Dueck and Takeyh 2007). The United

States, working with, among others, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), the EU-3 (France,

Germany, and the United Kingdom), and the European Commission, has tried to increase the pressure on

Iran to abandon its nuclear program through increased bilateral sanctions and UNSC Chapter VII

resolutions. While calls for military action were most frequent during President Bush’s administration,

President Barack Obama’s initial attempt to engage the regime through diplomacy has failed to bear fruit and

the Obama administration has begun to publicly discuss more punitive approaches (Cooper and Landler

2010). Israel, an important American ally, is increasingly considering military action to retard Iran’s program

(Levinson 2010). As Wikileaks has revealed, the antipathy of some Arab leaders towards Iran has even led

them to support military action to prevent the regime from acquiring nuclear weapons (Black and Tisdall

2010). Notwithstanding this fact, such an attack would inflame the Muslim world, already troubled by the

enduring Palestinian-Israeli conflict, America’s unwavering support for Israel, the invasion and subsequent

occupation of Iraq and Afghanistan, and widespread suspicions about the intentions of the U.S. towards the

Muslim community (Public Opinion in the Islamic World on Terrorism, al Qaeda, and US Policies 2009).

Given the high stakes involved in Iran’s nuclear brinkmanship, a number of organizations have

undertaken polling of the Iranian public to assess its views on the development of nuclear weapons, among

other domestic and foreign policy issues (Global Opinion Trends 2002–2007: A Rising Tide Lifts Mood In

1 The authors are grateful to David Edelstein, James Freeland and participants at the 2011 American Political

Scientists Meeting when a draft of this paper was presented. We are also grateful to Sarah Watson, our research

assistant on this project.The authors would also like to thank the Policy on International Policy Attitudes (PIPA) for

providing us with the data used here as well as Evan Lewis for answering questions we had about the data. We alone

are responsible for errors of fact or judgement.

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The Developing World – Sharp Decline in Support for Suicide Bombing in Muslim Countries 2007; Mogahed

2008; Muslim Public Opinion on US Policy, Attacks on Civilians, and al Qaeda 2007; Poll of Iranians and

Americans 2008; Results of a New Nationwide Public Opinion Survey of Iran before the June 12, 2009

Presidential Elections 2009).

All of these polling efforts and/or residual products present only tabulations which are geared to

producing media headlines. They offer few, if any, explanatory insights as to why Iranians may support the

development of nuclear weapons.2 Furthermore, with one exception noted below, the firms that do such

work in Iran do not make respondent-level data available to the public and thus scholars have no recourse

but to rely upon these unsatisfactory analyses.

This essay hopes to advance scholarly understanding of Iranian popular support for Iran’s acquisition

of nuclear weapons. Using respondent-level data collected by the Program on International Policy Attitudes

(PIPA) from a national survey of 710 Iranians in 2008, we aim to shed greater light on the strength of and

reasons for Iranians’ support for or opposition to a nuclear weapons program.

Our analysis finds that a majority of Iranians support Iran’s right to develop a full nuclear power

cycle. A significant minority wants to go further and, in fact, prefers that Iran develop a weapons capability.

Curiously, when other factors are controlled for, fear of the United States does not explain public support for

weaponization. This study will enable analysts to understand with greater clarity the distance between the

regime’s stated position on key policy questions and the diverse views of the Iranian people.

The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Following this introductory section, we address

an important question for this study: whether or not public opinion matters in authoritarian states like Iran.

We argue that it does. In the third section, we put forth several hypotheses that may explain Iranian views

towards Iran’s development of nuclear weapons. Fourth, we describe the data employed in this survey and its

relative strengths and weaknesses compared to that of previous surveys. This section addresses the

2 One exception is Fair and Shellman (2008). As the authors of that paper note, they confronted a serious technical issue:

the data they used (from a 2006 survey of Iranians conducted by the United States Institute of Peace and the Program on International Policy Attitudes) split the sample on key questions pertaining to support for the program. Fair and Shellman tested the hypothesis that those with “realist” views on foreign policy would be more supportive of developing nuclear weapons. This paper differs from that study in that it uses an improved sample and offers a new argument about factors, namely religious belief, that may shape attitudes toward nuclear weapons.

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methodological issues inherent in any effort to poll Iranians. The penultimate section of this paper discusses

the analytical results. Finally, we conclude by discussing several implications of this analysis.

Explaining Iranian Opinion of Developing Nuclear Weapons: The Importance of Religion

Myriad analyses have found that mass publics are not well informed about foreign policy issues. Early

studies argued that mass attitudes on external affairs lacked consistency and coherence (Almond 1950;

Converse 1964). Subsequent authors have found that opinions are more structured than originally assumed

(Aldrich et al 2006; Feaver and Gelpi 2003; Gelpi, Feaver, and Reifler 2006; Hurwitz and Peffley 1987;

Wittkopf and Maggiotto 1981), but that they are not based on highly developed mental models that unite

complex aspects of foreign policy issues.

These more recent studies have found that the average person uses cognitive short-cuts, or what

Hurwitz and Peffley (1987) call “cognitive heuristics,” to understand complex issues. The most important

cognitive heuristics are the core values that an individual holds about the world. Core values are beliefs are

general assumptions about how the world works in a certain issue area (Feldman 1988; Hurwitz and Peffley

1987; Peffley and Hurwitz 1992; Peffley and Hurwitz 1993; Hurwitz, Peffly, and Seligson 1993; Shamir and

Arian 1994).

What core values would the Iranian public reference when thinking about foreign policy? Wittkopf

(1990) developed a useful typology for understanding and categorizing members of the public as they

consider issues in foreign relations. He split the public along two dimensions on foreign policy issues: militant

internationalism and cooperative internationalism.

Militant internationalism is born of an assumption that other nations should not trusted. This means

a militant internationalist focuses on the dangers presented by other nations, the desire to use military force to

secure the nation’s interests, the need to maintain a strong military, and a view of the world as a zero-sum

struggle for power.

Cooperative internationalism starts from a very different core belief about the international system.

The cooperative internationalist assumes that it is possible for there to be trust between nations. Individuals

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whose beliefs fall in this dimension can envision international cooperation outside of security coalitions. They

view international institutions as useful for solving international problems and conflicts.

Those Iranians who view international politics from a militant internationalist perspective would be

more likely to favor developing nuclear weapons. They would want to develop nuclear weapons because they

see other states as threats and nuclear weapons make for good deterrents or defenses. And individuals who

view international politics from the militant internationalist perspective may see nuclear weapons as a useful

way to protect their nation’s interests beyond national boundaries.

Likewise, those who think about international affairs from a cooperative internationalist perspective

would be less likely to support developing nuclear weapons, or any other devastating weapon, as they would

believe such weapons are inherently tools of violence. Rather than engender trust and cooperation, nuclear

weapons could deepen a sense of threat and distrust.

We argue that describing all foreign policy beliefs as either militant or cooperative internationalist

risks ignoring the role that religious values play in shaping attitudes toward foreign policy. While religion may

play some role in shaping whether one is a militant or cooperative internationalist (see Guth 2010), religious

values may actually act to shape positions on particular issues, not just an entire worldview. In other words,

one may be a militant internationalist, in general, but one’s religious views may rule out certain policies that

would otherwise be consistent with the militant internationalist worldview. The same can be true of

cooperative internationalists: aspects of their views on religion might deviate from an otherwise benign view

of the world. Thus, religious views can act as modifying factors in shaping attitudes on specific policy issues.

Those people who believe that the development of nuclear weapons is against their religious code are

more likely to oppose the development of nuclear weapons, whether they are militant or cooperative

internationalists. Those who believe that the development of nuclear weapons is an affront to their basic

religious values, even when not contemplating them as tools of violence, may believe that such weapons are

prohibited by their religion and would thus oppose their development.

There is a growing literature that argues that religious values can play an important role in shaping

foreign policy views (Barnett 1999; Baumgartner, Francia, and Morris 2008; Clark 2007; Froese and Mencken

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2009; Hanson 1987; Guth 2009; 2010; Inboden 2008; Jelen 1994; Nair 1997; Telhami 1993; Tessler and

Nachtwey 1998; Wiktorowicz and Kaltner 2003). In a society such as Iran, where religious values are an

important part of daily life and of the national narrative, one must consider the role such values could play in

thinking on the development of nuclear weapons. It is widely known that Ayatollah Khamenei, the supreme

religious leader in Iran and its most important political figure as well, has stated that Islam forbids the

development of nuclear weapons (Yeranian 2010). In fact, in August 2005, Khamenei issued a fatwa, or

religious edict, condemning the production, stockpiling, or use of nuclear weapons. The view of the most

influential cleric in the country that the development of nuclear weapons is “haram,” (forbidden) by an

Islamic prohibition on weapons of mass destruction would likely play a large role on shaping public attitudes

among a people that takes its religious identity quite seriously (Islam Times 2010). The more authoritative the

religious figure making the pronouncement on the foreign policy issue, the more likely that view will be

adopted by many within the public. Since Ayatollah Khamenei is the supreme religious leader in Iran, he

would be particularly well-positioned as a legitimate source of religious opinion on the matter of nuclear

weapons.

But there may be some Iranians who disagree with the Ayatollah. They may think that Islam does, in

fact allow for the development of nuclear weapons. The example of Pakistan developing its “Islamic bomb”

may persuade some that Islam does sanction the development of nuclear weapons. Thus, this would lead us

to believe that:

H(1): Iranians who are convinced that Islam permits the creation of nuclear weapons will be more likely to support developing nuclear weapons.

But we also examine whether the conventional arguments about militant internationalism and

cooperative internationalism can explain support for and opposition to nuclear weapons. We test to see if

those Iranians who view other countries as threats to the security of Iran will be more supportive of the

development of a nuclear arsenal for Iran, yielding the hypothesis:

H(2): Those Iranians who view other countries as threats will be more likely to support developing nuclear weapons.

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We also test to see if those Iranians who support the use of force to further Iran’s national interests,

at home or abroad, will be more supportive of the idea of developing Iranian nuclear weapons. This leads to

the hypothesis:

H(3): Iranians who support the use of force to further Iranian national interests will be more likely to support developing nuclear weapons.

The following sections of this paper are devoted to exploring these ideas through empirical analysis.

The Data and Methods

The data used to test the aforementioned set of hypotheses comes from a 2008 PIPA survey. PIPA,

along with Search for Common Ground (SCG), fielded its survey in Iran using face-to-face surveys of 710

respondents between January 13 and February 9, 2008. Overall, the survey’s margin of error is +/- 3.8%.

PIPA used a multistage stratified, province-based sample (Poll of Iranians and Americans 2008). This poll

builds upon a previous survey fielded by PIPA, SCG and the United States Institute of Peace (Fair and

Shellman 2008).

In order to test the hypotheses developed in this study and alternative potential explanations, we

employ a logistic regression with data from the 2008 PIPA Iran Survey. These are the most current

respondent-level data available which are germane to our research questions. Using Gary King’s Clarify

program for Monte Carlo simulations, we additionally examine first differences to determine the relative

magnitude of the significant independent variables in explaining the variance in our dependent variables. This

statistic lets us directly compare which of the significant independent variables has the strongest influence on

the dependent variable. The number of respondents in the original sample was 710. We use a sub-sample of

that, which has removed the don’t know/refused responses from the original sample. This leaves a sample of

328 respondents for the analysis.

The Dependent Variable

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In order to assess Iranian attitudes towards nuclear weapons and policy, we ran a model with a

dependent variable based on a question that examines Iranian attitudes toward national nuclear policy. It asks

respondents: Iran’s position is that it should have a full fuel cycle nuclear energy program, but shouldn’t develop nuclear

weapons. Do you: (a) think Iran shouldn’t pursue a full fuel cycle nuclear energy program, (b) approve of this program, and (c)

think Iran should develop nuclear weapons.3 Figure 1 shows the breakdown of responses for the dependent variable.

Figure 1 about here

What we can gather from these results is that a majority of respondents are satisfied with the status

quo. Over 70% of respondents approve of the current Iranian nuclear policy. We do see, however, that just

under a quarter of respondents would like to see Iran expand its nuclear program to include weapons. Given

that we are most interested in assessing the differences between those who favor Iranian nuclear weapons and

those who do not, we combine those respondents who do not support the full fuel cycle nuclear energy

program and those who only approve of that program together and code them as 0 for not supporting the

development of nuclear weapons. Supporters of nuclear weapons are coded as 1.

The Independent Variables

Given the existing work, discussed above, on the Iranian people’s nuclear policy preferences and

their more general political attitudes, we examine several rival explanations within our model.

The first category of explanation focuses on an individual’s sense of threat from other countries.

Those Iranians who view other countries as threats will be more likely to support developing nuclear

weapons. We utilize several measures to test this argument. One of those measures explores the threat the

United States poses to Islam, the religion of the vast majority of Iranians. To measure this within our analysis,

we utilize the following question: Which point of view is closer to yours? The U.S. mostly shows respect to the Islamic

world (0), The U.S. is mostly disrespectful to the Islamic world, but out of ignorance and insensitivity (1), or The U.S.

3 This question is problematic because the respondents are first primed with a statement about Iran’s official position

(e.g. developing a full nuclear fuel cycle) and then asked whether they agree with this program or support weaponization. The structure of the question may influence what respondents believe about the country’s actual policy and/or bias them towards supporting the status quo position. Ideally, we would have preferred a question that simply asked respondents if they believe Iran should develop nuclear weapons, or pursue a non-weaponized full fuel cycle, among other options. While we cannot ascertain the degree to which respondents’ answers were affected by the question design, we are aware that the question is problematic. However, it is the only question that allows us to operationalize our dependent variable.

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purposely tries to humiliate the Islamic world (2)? Respondents who believe the U.S. aims to humiliate Islam are

hypothesized to be more likely to want Iran to possess nuclear weapons.

We also use measures that relate to physical threats to Iran. To assess these values in our sample, we

use three different survey questions. The first variable asks: How likely do you think it is that the United States will

take military action against Iran’s nuclear facilities in the next year or two? Those that believe the U.S. will attack are

expected to be more likely to want nuclear weapons. A second measure looks at the perception Iranian

citizens have of other nations’ secret nuclear programs. The question asks: How many countries do you think have

secret programs for developing capacity to produce nuclear weapons? The third measure examines the perceived threat

posed to Iran by the U.S. having military bases in the Middle East. The question specifically asks: How much, if

at all, do you think U.S. bases in the Middle East are a threat to Iran? Those that see U.S. military bases as a major

threat are expected to want Iran to possess nuclear weapons.

The second explanatory category focuses on attitudes concerning the utility of violence to further the

national interest. The first question specifically asks: Do you think it would be a good idea or bad idea for Iraq's

neighbors to provide weapons to Iraqis fighting U.S. forces in Iraq? Those that believe it is a good idea are predicted to

want Iran to possess nuclear weapons as they demonstrate that they believe the use of force is moral. The

second and third variables focus on attacking American civilians either in Muslim countries or in the United

States. The questions ask: Thinking about the following kinds of attacks on Americans, please tell me if you approve of

them, disapprove of them, or have mixed feelings about them? The respondent is offered the scenarios: Attacks on U.S.

civilians working for U.S. companies in Islamic countries and Attacks on civilians in the United States. If views on the

morality of violence do condition views on nuclear weapons, those who approve of attacks on American

civilians in Islamic countries or in the United States are more likely to approve of the development of nuclear

weapons.

We also include a variable that measures Iranian views on what the principles of Iranian foreign

policy should be, asking Which is the more important principle for Iranian foreign policy? The following response

categories are offered: Iran should use its power and influence in the way that best serves Iran’s interests and values and Iran

should coordinate its power and influence together with other countries according to shared ideas of what is best for the world as a

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whole. Based on the logic of the use of force explanation, those individuals who want to expand Iran’s

influence and power will be more likely to approve of developing nuclear weapons.

The argument about the religious legitimacy of nuclear weapons (our third category of explanation)

conditioning support for their development is instrumentalized by the following: Is it your opinion that producing

nuclear weapons is or is not against the principles of Islam? Those who believe that Islam does not prohibit the

production of nuclear weapons are more likely to support the development of nuclear weapons.

In addition to these independent variables suggested by our three categories, we include controls for

education, gender, income, and whether the respondent lived in Tehran.

Table 1 about here Given that many of the independent variables ask respondents questions that could have answers

based on similar values, it is important that we assure multicollinearity is not an issue in the specification of

our model. Table 2 reports the correlations between all of the independent variables used in our model.

Attack U.S. Civilians and Attack U.S. Employees correlate highly (rho = .63). There is, however, still a

substantial amount of variation between them. Likewise, Tehran and income are highly correlated (.44) but

that is explained by the geographic disparity of income within the country.

Table 2 about here

Table 3 presents the variance inflation factor scores for the independent variables included in the model. All

are below the typical threshold of 10 for excessive collinearity.

Table 3 about here

As a result of the correlation matrix and the VIF scores, we do not believe collinearity is an issue for our

specified model of analysis.

Results of the Analysis

The logistic regression analyses results for our model are presented in Table 4.

Table 4 about here

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Model one examines only our explanatory variables while model two looks at the explanatory

variables along with the controls. Both models have similar results with regards to our explanatory predictors.

We find support for two of three categories of explanation: threats from other countries and religious

considerations. The threats from other countries category produced one significant variable (out of four). At

the .05 level of significance, we find that Iranians who believe there are a large number of secret nuclear

programs in the world are more likely to want their nation to also adopt nuclear weapons. Our results indicate

that fears of U.S. bases in the Middle East, fears of a U.S. attack on nuclear sites in Iran, and belief that the

U.S. is seeking to humiliate Islam are not significant predictors.

The morality or utility of the use of force explanation, which included four variables in our analysis,

did not prove to be a useful means of predicting support for the development of nuclear weapons in Iran.

The variables that focus on providing weapons to Iraqis fighting Americans, attacking U.S. civilians working

in Muslim countries, attacking U.S. civilians in the United States, and whether Iran should expand its power

and influence did not yield statistically significant results.

The third category of explanation, the importance of religion in shaping Iranian views toward nuclear

weapons development, , was a powerful predictor of support for developing nuclear weapons. The question

that asked the respondent if the development of nuclear weapons was in line with or forbidden by Islam

yielded a highly significant coefficient. As predicted, those Iranians who believe that Islam permits the

development of nuclear weapons were more likely to support the Iranian government developing such

weapons.

Four of our control variables emerged as significant predictors, which explains the difference in

robustness between models one and two. We find that women, younger Iranians, Tehran residents, and less

educated individuals are more likely to want Iran to move toward developing nuclear weapons. Income did

not prove to be a significant predictor.

Given that we use logit, the coefficients reported in Table 4 do not represent the marginal effects of

the independent variables on the dependent variables. As a result, we report the first differences of our

significant independent variables in Table 4 as well. The first difference reported measures the probability of

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the dependent variable signifying a desire to see Iran move toward developing nuclear weapons when the

independent variable of interest moving from its minimum to its maximum value while all remaining

independent variables are held at their means. This allows us to consider the substantive significance of each

independent variable for explaining variation in the dependent variable. When looking at the model, we see

that the perceived acceptance by Islam of the development of nuclear weapons proved to have the largest

first difference: .299. That means that increasing the value of this variable from its minimum to maximum

while holding all other variables constant creates a 29.9% increase in the probability that the respondent

would want Iran to develop nuclear weapons. The variable that measured views on the likelihood of secret

nuclear programs in other countries produced a first difference of .130.

Conclusions

This essay analyzed how the Iranian public feels about Iran’s potential development of nuclear

weapons. Moreover, in some measure, it explained how and why Iranians differ on this issue. We argued that

religious views would likely play an important role in shaping Iranian opinions on the acceptability of nuclear

weapons. This is particularly likely to be the case as the Ayatollah Khamenei had issued a fatwa declaring

nuclear weapons to be forbidden by Islam. We tested this religion-based hypothesis against a set of

hypotheses covering other core values that could shape demand for nuclear weapons.

The results of our analysis proved instructive. When it comes to the issue of developing a full nuclear

power cycle, a clear majority of Iranians support their government’s position that it is Iran’s right to do so. A

significant minority of Iranians are willing to state that they would like their country to go further and develop

nuclear weapons. This set of findings, which corresponds closely to previous opinion research on Iran, shows

that there is a strong base of support for the Iranian government’s assertive position on the nuclear energy

issue.

This is important for understanding Iranian foreign policy, at least in the near term. It means that

there is little down-side, at least in terms of domestic politics, to the Iranian government taking an assertive

nuclear energy posture. In fact, this posture may help to bolster support for the Ahmadinejad government. If

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the mass public is enthusiastic about the idea of Iran pressing forward with the full nuclear cycle, the Iranian

government has a strong incentive to do so. This is particularly true if the international community cannot

impose sanctions that change the cost-benefit calculus for the Iranian government. As we have often seen,

governments use foreign policy issues that they know will generate mass support in order to distract attention

from domestic problems or weaknesses in the government. While public opinion is probably not driving the

Iranian government’s decisions on this issue, it is likely encouraging the intransigence of the Iranian

government in response to calls that Iran halt its nuclear program.

The results of our analysis of the factors that drive some Iranians to support the idea of Iran

developing nuclear weapons indicate that the religious explanation proved most predictive of Iranian views

on nuclear weapons. Specifically, the perception of the legitimacy of developing nuclear weapons in Islam is

the most important factor shaping support for this policy option.

This finding has significance for our understanding of the factors that can influence foreign policy

opinions held by the public. In religious societies, the opinions and edicts of religious authorities can have

great impact on the positions that segments of the public take on foreign policy issues. While this may not be

true in all societies, especially largely secular societies, it is potentially quite important in societies with deeply

religious publics.

This finding lends credence to the views of those scholars who have argued that religious views have

influenced public opinion toward foreign policy issues in particular places and at particular times (eg,

Baumgartner, Francia, and Morris 2008; Froese and Mencken 2009; Guth 2009; 2010; Jelen 1994; Telhami

1993; Tessler and Nachtwey 1998; Wiktorowicz and Kaltner 2003). One prominent finding in this literature is

that the more authoritative the religious figure who takes a stance on a particular foreign policy issue, the

more likely that stance is to be adopted by the faithful. This is clearly the case in Iran, where the chief cleric in

the country came out against nuclear weapons development and where most of the public seems to agree.

This research is one more piece of evidence that religion should be considered an important factor in many

worldviews.

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The belief that other nations post threats proved to be the second most important explanation of the

distribution of views on developing nuclear weapons in Iran. (This is also an operationalization of the core

foreign policy value of international trust.) The data show that Iranians who believe that there are nations

with secret nuclear programs are more supportive of the idea of Iran developing its own nuclear weapons

than those Iranians who do not believe other countries have secret nuclear programs. This is an indication

that a citizen’s perception of international threat is a factor in her determination of whether she wants her

country to develop nuclear weapons. Thus, the demand for nuclear weapons, at least at the level of the mass

public, is driven, to some extent, by how worried one is that other countries are developing weapons that

could be used against one’s own country. However, in the Iranian case, a sense of threat was still trumped by

views of the religious legitimacy of nuclear weapons.

Perhaps just as important as determining what drives the demand for nuclear weapons is finding

what does not affect that demand. The results of this study show that support for the use of violence to

further the national interest does not condition attitudes toward nuclear weapons. Also, the study finds that

an Iranian’s sense of the threat posed by the U.S. (believing that the U.S. is out to humiliate Islam, that its

bases in the Middle East pose a threat, or that the U.S. may attack Iran’s nuclear sites) does not affect support

for the development of nuclear weapons. This finding is particularly important because it seems to indicate

the the Iranian public as a whole may be less likely than the regime to view the United States as a threat.

Overall, what type of a picture does this analysis paint of Iranian views on nuclear weapons? An

important conclusion to draw from the results is they seem to indicate that very general respondent

predispositions seem to drive a great deal of the variation we see among Iranian responses to the survey

items. The fact that there was little reference to tangible external security threats, such as U.S. bases in the

Middle East or a U.S. attack on Iranian nuclear facilities, indicate that the Iranian people, like almost any

other mass public, use very general cues to determine the stances they take on foreign policy issues.

What implications do these findings have for the policies of countries trying to halt Iran’s suspected

nuclear weapons program? The findings of this study seem to offer cause for both pessimism and optimism.

It appears that we should not look to Iranian public opinion to shift the Iranian government from its present

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position on its nuclear program because Iranians, in large numbers, support the government’s stance on

nuclear energy, despite the threat of sanctions and the possibility of attacks from Israel or the United States.

But at the same time, the majority of Iranians do not want their government to develop nuclear weapons and

believe that to do so would be to violate the precepts of Islam. As long as the top clerics in Iran maintain that

nuclear weapons are forbidden by Islam, the majority of the public should continue to oppose the

development of such weapons.

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Figure 1: Iranian Nuclear Policy Preferences

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Table 1. Hypothesis Table

Hypotheses Independent Variables

H(1): Those Iranians who view other countries as threats will be more likely to support developing nuclear weapons.

1) Which point of view is closer to yours? The U.S. mostly shows respect to the Islamic world (0), The U.S. is mostly disrespectful to the Islamic world, but out of ignorance and insensitivity (1), or The U.S. purposely tries to humiliate the Islamic world (2)? 2) How likely do you think it is that the United States will take military action against Iran’s nuclear facilities in the next year or two? not at all (0), not very (1), somewhat (2), or very (3). 3) How many countries do you think have secret programs for developing capacity to produce nuclear weapons? none (0), a few (1), some (2), and many (3). 4) How much, if at all, do you think U.S. bases in the Middle East are a threat to Iran? not at all a threat (0), a minor threat (1), some threat (2), and a major threat (3).

H(2): Iranians who support the use of force to further Iranian national interests will be more likely to support developing nuclear weapons.

1) Do you think it would be a good idea or bad idea for Iran's neighbors to provide weapons to Iraqis fighting U.S. forces in Iraq? good idea (1) or bad idea (0). 2-3) Thinking about the following kinds of attacks on Americans, please tell me if you approve of them, disapprove of them, or have mixed feelings about them? Attacks on U.S. civilians working for U.S. companies in Islamic countries and Attacks on civilians in the United States. strongly disapprove (0), somewhat disapprove (1), mixed feelings (2), somewhat approve (3), strongly approve (4). 4) Which is the more important principle for Iranian foreign policy? Iran should use its power and influence in the way that best serves Iran’s interests and values (1) or Iran should coordinate its power and influence together with other countries according to shared ideas of what is best for the world as a whole (0).

H(3): Iranians who are convinced that Islam permits the creation of nuclear weapons will be more likely to support developing nuclear weapons.

Is it your opinion that producing nuclear weapons is or is not against the principles of Islam? is not (0), Islam has no position on WMDs (1), is (2).

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Table 2: Correlations between Variables

Provide

Weapons to Iraq

Attack U.S.

Employees

Attack U.S.

Civilians

Nuclear Weapons Against Islam

U.S. Humiliate

Islam

U.S. Attack

Nuclear Facilities

Secret Nuclear

Programs

U.S. Base

Threat

Iran Focus

Education Income Tehran

Resident Age Gender

Provide Weapons to Iraq

1

Attack U.S.

Employees .2016 1

Attack U.S.

Civilians .2113 .6284 1

Nuclear Weapons Against Islam

-.0893 -.1547 -.1918 1

U.S. Humiliate

Islam .0495 .0700 .0458 -.0157 1

U.S. Attack

Nuclear Facilities

.0730 .0790 .1540 .0436 -.0615 1

Secret Nuclear

Programs .0730 -.0309 -.0289 -.0478 .0009 .1278 1

U.S. Base Threat

-.0053 -.0044 -.0184 -.0329 .1077 .2685 .2084 1

Iran Focus -.1835 -.1063 -.0606 .0335 .0900 -.0895 .0688 .0383 1

Education -.2040 -.0599 -.1612 -.0035 -.0723 .1402 .0050 -.0523 -.0049 1

Income -.2320 -.0705 -.1411 .0146 .0027 .0066 .0360 -.0956 .0416 .2942 1

Tehran Resident

-.1092 -.1924 -.1507 -.0074 .0469 -.1107 -.0941 -.1352 .0844 .1643 .4367 1

Age .0892 -.0400 .0013 .0619 .1430 -.1597 .0461 -.0268 .0289 -.0814 -.0136 -.1063 1

Gender -.0935 .1246 .1562 -.0822 .0835 -.0919 .0100 .0571 .0723 -.0814 .1135 .0033 .0616 1

20

21

Table 3: Variance Inflation Factor Values

Variable VIF

Attack U.S. Civilians 1.80 Attack U.S. Employees 1.75

Income 1.43 Education 1.40

Tehran Resident 1.38 Age 1.28

U.S. Attack Nuclear Facilities 1.21 Provide Weapons to Iraq 1.20

U.S. Base Threat 1.18 Secret Nuclear Programs 1.09

Iran Focus 1.07 U.S. Humiliate Islam 1.07

Nuclear Weapons Against Islam 1.05 Gender 1.05

Mean VIF 1.28

22

Table 4: Logistic Regression Results Dependent Variable-Iranian Nuclear Weapons Preference

Model One Model Two

Independent Variables

Coef. S.E. First Diff.

Coef. S.E. First Diff.

Provide Weapons to Iraq .357 .290 .045 .340 Attack U.S. Employees .154 .121 .235 .135 Attack U.S. Citizens -.126 .156 -.244 .180 Nuclear Weapons Against Religion -.857*** .147 .299 -.968*** .171 .298 U.S. Humiliates Islam -.149 .241 -.063 .268 U.S. Attack Nuclear Facilities .094 .141 .016 .165 Secret Nuclear Programs .339* .172 .130 .545** .201 .164 U.S. Base Threat -.020 .137 .077 .156 Iran Focus .231 .283 .177 .317 Education -.396** .150 Income -.367 .190 Tehran Resident .790* .376 Age -.454** .179 Gender -1.321*** .324

Pseudo R2 .124 .229 Log Likelihood -167.09 -138.33 Log Likelihood Χ2 47.50 82.28 N 357 357

Note: Figures are unstandardized coefficients shown alongside standard errors. *p<.1; **p <.05; ***p<.01.

23

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