CULTURE: IMPROVING SITE SAFELY IS EVERY STAKEHOLDERS RESPONSIBILITY

Evelyn Ai Lin TEO, Department of Building, National University of Singapore ABSTRACT The responsibilities for safety of the various stakeholders involved in the construction process is often the subject of disputes as there is no common understanding of what these should be. There is a lack of understanding of safety responsibilities and what is expected of each stakeholder to ensure site safety. In Singapore, the government undertook a fundamental reform in the occupational safety and health (OSH) framework in 2006 in order to achieve a quantum improvement in the safety and health. The new workplace safety and health framework of Singapore emphasizes that to improve OSH on construction sites, the focus has to shift from technology and management systems to cultural aspects of the organization. The new framework calls for combined effort to deal with safety risks at their source. All stakeholders must assume responsibility for identifying risks and take steps to prevent or mitigate them with a safety culture deeply ingrained. This study originated in the need to establish ownership of the problems on work sites and the aim is to propose an empirical framework to effectively control risk and support the safe conclusion of work by construction stakeholders. A survey demonstrates that everyone on site has a role to play in improving safety levels and that, with realistic shared responsibilities, the overall level of safety on construction sites can be improved. Keywords: Safety performance, Shared responsibilities, Safety culture, Safety role INTRODUCTION In 2004, there were 1216 accidents (with 24 fatalities) in the construction industry in Singapore and according to statistics from the Ministry of Manpower (MOM 2005a) the safety level has been unsatisfactory for years. One of the accidents - the Nicoll Highway Collapse - shocked the nation and caused the Occupational Safety and Health Division (OSHD) of Ministry of Manpower (MOM) - the authority which promotes OSH at the national level – to start an investigation. It appointed a Committee of Inquiry (COI) to investigate the causes of accidents, the need to establish ownership of the problems, as well the safety regulatory framework and its ancillary systems. The report by the COI, stressed that although the industry recognizes that safety has to be addressed (MOM 2005b), site personnel often do not know how to do so. It draws attention to problems related to the regulatory system. It suggests that human and organisational failures caused by lack of ownership of safety outcomes had contributed to the accident (MOM 2005b) and that the fatalities could have been prevented if the ‘warnings of the approaching collapse had been taken seriously’ (MOM 2005b). The MOM accepted in its entirety the findings and recommendations of the COI (MOM 2005b). As a result, the Workplace Safety and Health Act (WSHA) was enacted in 1 March 2006 replacing the previous Factories Act which was repealed. From the COI’s report, there appeared to be no common understanding of safety roles. This reduced the efficiency of the legislation (Teo and Ong 2005). According to various studies, this will lead the various stakeholders involved in the construction process to assume safety roles which may result in a ‘blame culture’ (Gambatese 1996; Hinze 1997; Toole 2002b). The self-interest of each stakeholder and a continuing attachment to a culture of blaming everyone else are the traditional focus of the construction industry (Latham 1994; Bennett and Jayes 1995; Pidgeon and O’Leary 2000; Whittingham 2004). This implies not only an adversarial relationship but also affects the performance - especially the safety’s performance on site. It may disrupt work and, worse still, cost lives (Horlick-Jones 1996; Johnston 1996).

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This ‘blame culture’ grabbed the attention of the nation after the collapse of Nicholl Highway as it demonstrated a lack of understanding of safety responsibilities and what is expected to ensure site safety (Teo and Ong 2005; Huang and Hinze 2006a & b). It showed that accident prevention and risk management are not main concerns of the stakeholders. They are more concerned with whom to blame when an accident occurs (Horlick-Jones 1996). The blame culture is not the only contributing factor for the unsatisfactory safety records. There are other problems such as (1) lack of understanding among stakeholders of site safety responsibilities; (2) lack of coverage and clarity in regulations and contracts; and (3) most important, the lack of a safety culture within the industry (COI Report 2005 – MOM 2005b). The COI report also highlighted the need to establish “ownership of safety on work sites’. This utilises the empirical theory of Toole (2002b) - that there is a strong relationship between the stakeholders’ roles and the causes of construction accidents - as well as the empirical framework of Teo et al (2004) which identified four factors; Process, Personnel, Policy and Incentive (3Ps + 1I) that affect the safety performances. This paper reports on the second stage of an on-going research project, but before doing so, a brief discussion of the initial stage will set it in context. The main purpose of the first stage was to determine whether the different stakeholders (namely developers, contractors, authority and safety auditors) have different perceptions on what affects the safety level the most. The findings of the first stage were that Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP) was effective in assessing trends and patterns for easy evaluation. The results supported the hypothesis that different stakeholders have different roles to play and thus different perceptions on how to affect safety. They also suggested that influencing or controlling factors of each construction stakeholder can be integrated into the ‘3P + 1I’ framework discussed above. It can be broadly categorised on expertise in safety requirements, ability to evaluate the work and site conditions expertise in performing the task, ability to interact with the workers and control their behaviour and ability to control work on the site using motivation. The aim of this stage is to develop an empirical framework to effectively control risk by construction stakeholders by conducting a survey (the survey was conducted before the enactment of the new WSHA). The objectives are to (1) explore the stakeholders’ perception of their safety role and their abilities to affect the causes of accidents and (2) propose a framework which advocates partnering and shared responsibilities to improve safety for the construction industry. There is an intrinsic-relationship among the three fundamentals of the safety problems in Singapore: the blame culture, the lack of a uniform allocation of responsibilities and the negative safety culture (Teo and Ong 2005). Hence, these problems cannot be addressed in isolation. The COI report points out that ‘safety culture is an attitude of mind and stresses that those responsible for the safe operation of construction works should not only be conversant with the relevant legislation but also should be actively committed to a safe approach to any operation’ (MOM 2005b). With a positive safety culture, shared, realistic expectations about the roles of each stakeholder can be established. This will reduce the uncertainty within the industry, and allow stakeholders to focus on the roles they can assume. In due course, shared expectations should improve the overall safety because shared expectations will lead to shared responsibilities that may prevent some accidents from occurring (Toole 2002b). Many studies have shown that safety culture is related to safety outcomes (Sawacha et al. 1999; Toole 2002a; Champoux and Brun 2003). COI’s recommendations (MOM 2005b) underlined the fostering of “a generative culture where responsibilities are shared, mistakes are quickly corrected, conflicts are well managed, and roles and responsibilities clearly established.” Reform of the OSH framework was necessary because, it suggested, effective change in safety culture is only possible when there are prescribed duties for all stakeholders with enforcement focusing on systemic and cultural issues, rather than on physical lapses. The COI also moved away from the “deemed to comply” approach to a performance approach (Teo and Phang 2005). However, since the two approaches are vastly different, significant changes are required to achieve this. Contractors need to change their mindset from complying with standards and procedures to a commitment to constant evaluations of, and improvements in construction processes (Haupt 2003) and this is one of the biggest obstacles to the performance approach as the attitude of workers and management is a fundamental factor in safety (Cheyne et al 1998). Others (Sawacha et al. 1999; Lingard and Rowlinson 1997) stressed that the top management has an important role to play in

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affecting safety behaviour. The COI’s report (MOM 2005b) stressed that ‘effective management’ depends on the commitment of senior management and how it mobilizes everyone to work together with their safety representatives. The government was aware of the need to change workers’ and contractors’ mindset even before the COI’s recommendation (MOM 2005). However, despite the emphasis by the government on safety culture and attitudes, the accident rates are still unsatisfactory (Teo and Ling 2006). The MOM’s target is to halve the occupational fatality rate of Singapore from 4.9 fatalities per 100,000 workers in 2004 to 2.5 by 2015. The approach adopted is to seek a balance between production pressures and quality and safety goals’ so as to ensure that safety considerations are integrated into the planning and coordinating processes at the worksite”. This approach has met with some success in Hong Kong (Tam and Chan 1999). To further elaborate on the importance of establishing shared responsibilities the COI recommended that relevant Codes and Specifications should be developed to improve the performance of the design and construction processes. According to COI, a strict weighting system (including the safety records and culture of the bidder) must be built into the contract and tender evaluation system. The formalization of this system for public sector projects is through the Price-Quality (including Safety) Method which overcomes the shortcoming of contract and tender evaluation system based on price only. The important thing here is to address the causes of accidents - “why” rather than “what” - (Whittingham 2004). Organizations must strive to create a blame-free environment where workers are not afraid to speak out and offer feedback. Organizations must be able and willing to respond promptly to any feedback from workers. A voluntary disclosure scheme could be adopted to disclose any infringements of safety regulations without disclosing the reporting party. It is important that the organizations realize that the main aim of this scheme is to prevent accidents from happening rather than apportioning responsibility to offending parties. Organizations must also promote a good safety culture on their sites. Only within strong systems will workers learn to work safely and thus improve safety. By constant supervision and guidance, workers will develop good practices leading to a safe working culture within the organization and improved site safety. Finally, even though the general contractors are seen by other stakeholders as having primary responsibility on site, the expectations of the other stakeholders are not agreed upon. In the report for the Nicoll Highway Collapse, the COI noted that the complicated relationships between the stakeholders led to conflicts and confusion about responsibilities and critical gaps that “adversely affected judgment calls necessary to deal with the crisis and had caused uncertainty at the worksite.” The issue of common understanding of site safety responsibilities and the abilities to control the causes needs to be addressed. However, no work had been done to facilitate this. To address this need, the second purpose of this stage of the research is to develop a research framework which attempted to reduce the uncertainty among stakeholders about safety roles by theoretically analyse the perceptions of stakeholders’ abilities and compared these against theoretically derived abilities. RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY The study aims to evaluate the safety roles perceived by each party via a survey (survey was conducted before the enactment of the new WSHA) and evaluate these roles in relation to the abilities of the parties to affect the proximate causes of accidents. A survey was designed to determine the stakeholders’ perception of the relative importance (based on AHP) of the safety factors contributing to safety on construction sites. The reasons for selecting AHP are its ability to handle complex problems, complementing hierarchical nature, wide application and its effectiveness in identifying trends and patterns for easy evaluation. The survey questionnaire was based on the pairwise comparison method with scale 1-9 as advocated by Saaty (1980). Respondents were asked to make comparative judgments of the factors. The raw data collected would then be input into Expert Choice Version 11, which is an IT version of AHP, to work out the priorities. The perceived safety roles were contrasted with the actual control the stakeholders have over the causes of accidents. Discrepancies between the perceived roles and abilities to control the outcome may be a contributing factor to the persistently high accident rates in Singapore. The

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theoretical analysis and especially the abilities to affect the causes of accidents are based on Toole‘s framework (2002b), the COI’s recommendation (MOM 2005b), Teo’s and Ong’s (2005) framework and Teo's and Ling's (2006) study. The focus is on the identification of the factors necessary to prevent the causes of accidents. The analysis assumes the traditional contractual arrangement where the Developer hires a Contractor to build and a Designer to design. This analysis is practical as the role of each party depends on its operational activities and not on morality or ethics. The detailed explanation of each category of factors necessary to affect causes is shown below: Factors necessary to affect causes - Policy (expertise in the safety requirements) The determining factor here is the ability of the stakeholders to recognize hazards and prevent accidents utilizing understanding of safety requirements. Factors necessary to affect causes - Process (evaluation of work and site conditions) Determining factors in this category are the abilities of stakeholders to evaluate site conditions to identify visible and hidden unsafe conditions in the performance of construction work. Factors necessary to affect causes - Personnel (expertise in tasks, interaction and control of behaviours) Determining factors in this category are the abilities of the stakeholders to use the most efficient tools, materials and methods and to interact with and control the behavioral of workers. Factors necessary to affect causes - Incentive (control work on site via motivation) Determining factors in this category are the abilities of the stakeholders to control jobsite work via motivation. SURVEY FINDINGS A total of 120 questionnaires were sent out requesting the participation of the different stakeholders in construction (see Table 1) including developers (Real Estate Developers’ Association of Singapore registered developers), safety auditors (Ministry of Manpower registered safety auditors) and contractors (Building and Construction Authority registered contractors, including Sub-contractors). Designers declined to participate in the study, stressing that the regulatory framework, the Factories Act at the time of the survey, nominated the contractor as wholly responsible for safety outcomes. 75 surveys were sent to contractors, 25 to developers, 18 to auditors and 2 to authorities. Sixteen contractors, six safety auditors, seven developers and one authority responded.

Sample Frame Population

Sent out

Responded

% responde

d Contractor

BCA registered

contractors under CW01 (General

Building) category

1759

75

16

21.3

Developer

REDAS registered

developers (Property

Development - General category)

92

25

7

28.0

Table 1: Breakdown of survey responses

4

Auditor

MOM registered safety auditors

21

18

6

33.3

Authority

BCA and MOM

2

2

1

50.0

Total

1874

120

30

25.0

The results of the survey are shown in Table 2 classified under Contractors, Auditors, Authority and Developers with the ranking indicated. The ranking was according to the respective relative importance of the factors generated by the Expert Choice. The numbers in parentheses are the AHP results. Raw data are entered into Expert Choice Version 11 (software developed in using the AHP model to produce priorities); thereafter, the priorities are derived and Inconsistency Ratio (CR) calculated. The highest number will top the rank (e.g. 0.391 ranked no. 1 and 0.144 ranked no. 4 of Table 2). Through the results, the perception of stakeholders on their safety roles could be determined and thus verifying the proposition. It is observed that there is a distinct difference in viewpoints on the importance issue impacting safety on site (Table 2) as there is no one unique set of results among the stakeholders. The findings of the survey support the proposition that the understanding of site safety roles is a problem. There is no common understanding about the perceived roles of the stakeholders and their abilities to control the causes of accidents. This will be discussed in the next section. PERCEIVED SAFETY ROLES VS. STAKEHOLDERS’ ABILITIES TO AFFECT CAUSES This section discusses the stakeholders’ abilities to affect causes of accidents under the 3P + 1I model(Table 3) and compare and contrast them with the perceived safety roles evident from the Survey (Table 2). Table 3 is the ‘ideal’ theoretical influence stakeholders should have based on the previous tested studies conducted by Toole (2002b), COI (MOM, 2005b), Teo & Ong (2005) and Teo & Ling (2006). These findings goes a long way towards explaining the poor safety performances on sites as determined by a lack of common understanding of site safety responsibilities and abilities to control the causes.

Table 2: AHP results and rankings of the perceptions of respondents’ own influence

C

ontr

acto

rs’ R

ankin

g

A

uditors

’ R

ankin

g

A

uth

ority

’s

Rankin

g

D

evelo

per

s’ ra

nkin

g

Policy (expertise in safety requirements)

(AHP result)

3

(0.189)

3

(0.269)

4

(0.086)

4

(0.176) Process

(evaluation of work & site conditions)

(AHP result)

4

(0.144)

2

(0.278)

3

(0.099)

3

(0.189) Personnel

(expertise in tasks; interaction & control

(AHP result)

1

(0.391)

1

(0.288)

1

(0.432)

2

(0.274)

5

Incentive (control work on site via motivation)

(AHP result)

2

(0.276)

4

(0.165)

2

(0.383)

1

(0.361)

Table 3: Factors affecting proximate causes (adapted from Toole (2002b), COI (MOM, 2005b), Teo

& Ong (2005) and Teo & Ling (2006)) – the ‘ideal’ theoretical influence stakeholders should have

Contractors

Auditors

Authority

Developers

Policy (expertise in safety requirements)

High High Low Low

Process (evaluation of work & site

conditions)

Mixed High Mixed Low

Personnel (expertise in tasks; interaction &

control their behaviours)

High Low Mixed Low

Incentive (control work on site via

motivation)

High Low Moderate Mixed

Aggregate ability to influence proximate causes

High

Moderate

Mixed

Low

Contractors are attributed a high level of safety expertise and ability to influence safety through policy, because their employees are most exposed to hazards on the jobsite and they are required to train their employees on recognizing and avoiding hazards on sites (Toole 2002b). However, the survey findings show that Contractors do not pay too much attention to Policy (rank 3) as they adopt the ‘compliance’ approach - they only send the workers for the compulsory Construction Safety Orientation Courses (CSOC). They are reluctant to send foreign workers for extra safety training and view such training as a waste of resources as foreign workers can stay in Singapore for only four years. Training not only requires resources, but also takes away valuable work time. These findings are supported by the study of Teo and Phang (2005). The low emphasis on Policy reflects an emphasis on speedy completion rather than safety. Before the enactment of the new WSHA, Contractors are not required have a comprehensive safety and health plan to address the potential risks of the work. There is no structured risk assessment. As a consequence, the employees of Contractors do not fully understand safety requirements. The ability of the Contractors to evaluate potentially unsafe processes is mixed. The contractors are expected to ensure that progress and conformance with specifications are satisfactory. Contractors have a high ability to identify visible unsafe conditions but on the other hand; Contractors have a low ability in identifying the hidden unsafe conditions because assessing hidden unsafe conditions such as temporary loadings on the permanent structure, is beyond their experience (Toole 2002b). The survey findings indicate that Contractors do not pay much attention to Process (rank 4). They adopt the ‘compliance approach for reasons already mentioned.

Contractors are in a strong position to interact and control the behaviour of workers on site (Toole, 2002b). The Contractors ability to control is high because contractors are performing the actual

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construction work and specialize in a range of construction tasks using the most efficient tools, materials, and methods, and they rank Personnel number 1. Contractors abilities to control work and people on site via motivation (bonuses are one of the positive ways to influence the behavioural aspect of workers) is extremely high (Toole 2002b), because they are explicitly tasked with monitoring and coordinating the site work. Contractors also frequently provide equipment and facilities that are shared among stakeholders on site, but the survey shows that Contractors are not emphasising enough on Incentive (rank 2). They can do much more to motivate workers than just use disincentives, e.g. punish workers. The survey shows that Contractors could use Policy, Process and Incentives more efficiently while there is no difference between their perceived role and their abilities to influence safety through Personnel. Auditors are attributed a high level of safety expertise through policy, because they are required to be trained in recognizing and avoiding hazards, and it is their responsibilities to help contractors to effectively identify and control risk by performance feedback through safety audits. Good safety audits can prompt improvements in reporting accidents, incidents and near misses (Teo and Ong 2005; Teo and Ling 2006). Based on the survey, Auditors are not paying much attention to Policy (rank 3). The reason given is that in practice, safety audit checklists vary between audit companies. Many undercut fees to win contracts and low fees have led some companies to cut corners and spend less time on site, thereby reducing the quality of their audits to the minimum. This finding is similar to these of Teo and Ling (2006). The majority of the respondents felt that not all Auditors spend enough attention to Process (rank 2). There is no standardized audit protocol and due to low fees, most of them do the bare minimum to survive. Although they do not spend much time on site they are well placed to implement specific safety recommendations and their audits provide feedback to Contractors on their safety performances (Teo and Ong 2005). Auditors are not in a position to interact and control the behaviour of workers on site (Teo and Ong 2005; Teo and Ling 2006), because auditors are not performing actual construction work and have little or no knowledge of the most efficient tools, materials, and methods used on site. In contrast, the survey shows that they believe that they can control the behaviour (Personnel, rank 1) if only when Contractors believe in regular safety audits (which is not the case). The findings show that Auditors felt that they cannot exercise control over the jobsite and control people by Incentive (rank 4). In practice, their ability to exercise control over the jobsite is low because they are not on site enough to control the site and work and therefore not in a position to control people by motivation (Teo and Ong 2005; Teo and Ling 2006). Auditors are less practicable in influencing policy, process and personnel then they assume. On the other hand, the data indicate there is no difference between the perceived role of Auditors and their abilities to influence safety through incentives. The expected safety expertise for Authorities is low because its employees are exposed to hazards only occasionally during site inspections. Their representatives are trained to be well-versed with safety requirements but due to the very infrequent presence on site they will not have much influence in preventing accidents on sites (COI Report 2005 - MOM 2005b). The survey results show that the Authorities share this view and rank Policy low (rank 4). Authorities can influence the way the contractors work on site by regulating to ensure safety inclusions in the design but it is impossible for Authorities to inspect jobsite frequently, thus Authorities cannot evaluate work and site conditions regularly (Teo et al 2004; MOM 2005b). The survey shows that Authorities rank their control over Process at 3. Authorities can influence the way Contractors work on site by instituting fines and demerits points for unsafe practices but on the other hand, their presence on site is low, thus Authorities cannot control Personnel (COI Report 2005 - MOM 2005b). The survey shows that Authorities rank Personnel too highly (rank 1). The practical ability of Authorities to exercise control over jobsite through incentives is moderate (Teo and Ong 2005). The regulatory design decisions made by them can substantially influence what must be accomplished on-site. Authorities can also encourage Developers to motivate Contractors via monetary incentives. Authorities can also fine Contractors, issue them with demerit points or bar from tendering thus who do not use safe practices on site (COI Report 2005 - MOM 2005b). The data indicate there is no difference between the perceived role of Authorities and their abilities to

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influence safety through policy, process and incentives but that they overestimate their level of influence over personnel. The expected influence on safety by Developers is low except for the potential use of incentives where it is mixed, as they visit sites only occasional when monitoring the progress of work. Also, they do not normally have safety training as it is not required. (Toole 2002b). The survey shows that the Developers share this view and give a low ranking to Policy (rank 4), Process (rank 3) and Personnel (rank 2). The practical ability of Developers to exercise control over the jobsite through incentives is mixed (Teo and Ong 2005). There are other ways for developers to influence contractors; but using incentives such as bonuses to exercise some control over Contractors has its merits but also limitations. Safety improvements require a positive safety culture. As they are not often on site, Developers cannot effectively monitor and control Contractors (Toole 2002b; COI Report 2005 - MOM 2005b). The survey found that Developers ranked their ability to control Process and Personnel too highly but that they ranked their ability to influence safety through policy and incentives correctly. PROPOSED FRAMEWORK - SAFETY ROLES BASING ON ABILITIES TO CONTROL This section proposes a framework for safety roles (Figure 1) by analyzing the perceived roles of the stakeholders against their abilities to control the proximate causes of accidents which in turn determine the appropriateness of the practice. The proposed theoretical framework was developed based on only mainly focusing on worksite behavioural issues. The proposed framework aims to eliminate any uncertainty on site safety responsibilities by establishing fair and practical expectations on site safety roles. According to Toole (2002b, p203) as long as the analysis of the factors of the survey are based on ‘the assumption that stakeholders have limited abilities to prevent construction accidents should also have limited responsibility for site safety’, such analysis can be used to establish fair and practical expectations on site safety roles. Contractors Summary Contractors generally have a high ability to influence the causes of accidents; hence, it is proposed that Contractors should emphasis all 3P + 1I. Contractors are the ‘site’ people doing the construction work and their actions would have most impact on safety as compared to other stakeholders. Contractors should have an effective risk management system in place so that deficiencies in construction processes can be recognized and expeditiously controlled. The Contractors, being the direct or indirect employers hold the key to the performance of the safety behaviour of workers. Hence, an effort to educate and motivate them through Incentive is fundamental. Auditors Summary Auditors generally have a moderate level of ability to influence the causes of accidents. As the inspectors of contractor’s safety management on site, they are proficient in safety regulations and identification of unsafe practices and conditions. Auditors would be able to detect infringements and identify hazards and bring them to the Contractors’ attention. Auditors should have the power to stop work when they feel that it is unsafe to carry on work on site. The findings indicate that Auditors should focus more on Policy and Process. Due to the undercutting of fees practiced by Auditors, the quality of safety auditing has been affected and there is a need to change the practice by standardizing the audit protocol so that Safety Management System governing structure is not lost. It is essential for safety Auditors to have comprehensive checklists when auditing sites and they need to be proficient in safety regulations so that they can detect safety infringements quickly and correct them. Authorities Summary Authorities generally have a mixed ability to influence the causes of accidents. On the whole, the Authorities perceive little difference between their roles and abilities to control. There is only one

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identified discrepancy as the Authorities slightly over-emphasized self-regulation and fostering a positive safety culture in place of the culture within the construction industry. To foster a positive safety culture ‘the right mix’ and ‘type of legislation’ is essential (Teo and Phang 2005). The findings indicated that the authorities constantly examine the adequacy of regulations in promoting safety and clearly stating the various roles and responsibility of the stakeholders. With clear guidelines, the stakeholders would be able to more efficiently carry out their safety roles. This is also the recommendation made by COI and the new safety regulatory system which incorporates such rules on roles and responsibilities implemented. Developers Summary Developers generally have little ability to influence the causes of accidents. It is the responsibilities of the Developers to incorporate in the process of evaluating tenders the safety aspects as one of the major criteria for selection (COI Report 2005 – MOM 2005b; Teo and Ling 2006). Though Developers’ role in safety is quite limited they can engage competent Designers to ensure the robustness of the designs and reward the Designers a share of safety bonuses should the project be completed without fatal or serious accidents. Developers should emphasize to Contractors the message that safety cannot be compromised and motivate Contractors who practice safety on site with incentives and bonuses (Teo et al 2004). Thus, if Developers want to indirectly help to promote safety they could:

1) allow a greater budget to designer to cover added safety effort and responsibility, 2) assign a higher budget to contractors for safety implementation purposes, and 3) introduce bonuses to contractors to encourage safer work sites.

To effectively improve the safety level on construction sites, the proposed framework depicted in Figure 1 consists of three aspects; (a) clear safety roles specified in the contracts with shared responsibilities, (b) ‘actual’ safety roles based on the abilities to control causes of accidents and (c) removal of the blame culture. With these three aspects focusing on the concept of a positive safety culture, improvements in safety on construction sites could be achieved. Worksite safety responsibility falls on all in a project and no one party is capable of ensuring safety alone. Only with inputs and commitment from all stakeholders would safety be promoted.

Figure 1: Proposed framework for the abilities to control proximate causes

Personnel

(expertise in tasks; interaction &

control their behaviours)

Policy

(expertise in safety requirements)

Process

(evaluation of work & site conditions)

Incentive

(control work on site via motivation)

Stakeholders & Roles

• Authority

• Developer

• Designer (Architect & Engineer)

• Contractor (including sub-contractor)

• Safety Auditor

Ability to control

at different levels of

different stages of

Shared

responsibilities

No blame

culture

Enhanced

Safety Culture

9

CONCLUSION The limitation of this paper is that the proposed theoretical framework was developed based on only mainly focusing on worksite behavioural issues and hence more sophisticated, multi-layered models of influence on construction OHS has not been the focus of this paper. Nonetheless, from the above discussions, it could be seen that safety level on site is hampered by a lack of common understanding of site safety responsibilities among stakeholders. The analysis offered here will reduce the uncertainty among stakeholders about site safety roles by theoretically analysing their respective abilities to influence the proximate causes of accidents (Figure 1). The safety expectations that are practical; establishing realistic, shared expectations about the safety role that each party can play, can be easily achieved. This will reduce the uncertainty within the construction industry. Most importantly, realistic shared expectations will help to prevent some accidents from occurring and hence improve the overall level of safety on construction sites. Moreover, the findings of this study can help all stakeholders fully appreciate the importance of self-regulating approach which is advocated by the new WSHA with the common understanding of site safety responsibilities among them. This research will act as a good platform for further research works to be conducted in this area to include more sophisticated, multi-layered models of influence on construction OHS for local construction industry.

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