Importance of Attitudinal Differences amongArtisanal Fishers toward Co-Management andConservation of Marine ResourcesSTEFAN GELCICH,∗† GARETH EDWARDS-JONES,∗ AND MICHEL J. KAISER†‡∗School of Agricultural & Forest Sciences, University of Wales-Bangor, Bangor LL57 2UW, United Kingdom†School of Ocean Sciences, University of Wales-Bangor, Menai Bridge LL59 5AB, United Kingdom

Abstract: The Chilean government has introduced a policy that gives formal property rights over definedareas of seabed to organized groups of artisanal fishers with the goal of achieving sustainable exploitation ofnatural resources. We assessed differences in the attitudes of participating artisanal fishers toward this form ofmanagement to understand their importance in the design and implementation of fisheries management. Weused questionnaires and participatory rural appraisal techniques to survey members of six fishing manage-ment committees. Fishers’ attitudes varied significantly among syndicates in three main domains: attitudestoward the environment, unresolved aspects behind the management area policy, and perceived benefits de-rived from adoption of the policy. These differences indicated the existence of distinct world views that structurefishers’ behavior toward the marine environment and its management. In addition, the responses made byfishers correlated best with the degree of off-sector pluriactivity and their dependence on diving as a sourceof income. This suggested that a livelihood approach to the development of Chilean artisanal fisheries thatconsiders the multiple economic niches of the fishers will be most effective in the implementation of dualconservation/management measures.

Key Words: attitudes, benthic resources, conservation, fishers, management areas, marine protected areas,property rights

Importancia de las Diferencias de Actitudes entre Pescadores Artesanales en la Cogestion y Conservacion deRecursos Marinos

Resumen: El gobierno chileno ha introducido una polıtica que otorga derechos de propiedad formales enareas definidas de lecho marino a grupos organizados de pescadores artesanales con la intencion de lograrla explotacion sustentable de recursos naturales. Evaluamos las diferencias en las actitudes de los pescadoresartesanales participantes con respecto a esta forma de gestion para entender su importancia en el diseno yaplicacion de la gestion de pesquerıas. Utilizamos cuestionarios y tecnicas de evaluacion rural participativascon integrantes de seis comites de gestion pesquera. Las actitudes de los pescadores variaron significativamenteentre los sindicatos en los tres campos principales: actitudes con respecto al ambiente, aspectos no resueltosdetras de la polıtica de gestion y percepcion de beneficios derivados de la adopcion de la polıtica. Estasdiferencias indicaron la existencia de distintas visiones globales que estructuran las actitudes de los pescadorescon respecto al medio marino y su gestion. Adicionalmente, las respuestas de los pescadores estuvieron mejorcorrelacionadas con el grado de pluriactividad fuera del sector y su dependencia del buceo como fuente deingreso. Esto sugiere que una estrategia de subsistencia para el desarrollo de pesquerıas artesanales chilenas

‡Address correspondence to M.J. Kaiser, email michel.kaiser@bangor.ac.ukPaper submitted November 25, 2003; revised manuscript accepted August 11, 2004.

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866 Attitudes about Co-Management and Conservation Gelcich et al.

que considere los multiples nichos economicos de los pescadores sera muy efectiva en la aplicacion de medidasduales de conservacion/gestion.

Palabras Clave: actitudes, areas de gestion, areas protegidas marinas, conservacion, derechos de propiedad,pescadores, recursos bentonicos

Introduction

Marine fisheries are important as providers of food andeconomic resources to fishing communities around theglobe, and they are in decline globally (Pauly et al. 2002,2003; Myers & Worm 2003). The major policy responseto mitigating further declines and simultaneously main-taining some level of harvest revolves around achievingsustainable exploitation (Bene 2003). Several instrumentsshow potential in providing both conservation and sus-tainable use of marine resources, including Marine Pro-tected Areas (MPAs) and no-take zones (Agardy et al. 2003;Gell & Roberts 2003). The success of such managementsystems that limit or restrict access to marine resources,however, depends on the extent to which fishers are will-ing to participate in these systems ( Jentoft & McCay 1995;Jentoft et al. 1998; Zanetell & Knuth 2004).

In general, examples of limited-access fisheries tend tobe isolated and do not necessarily reflect national policy(e.g., Acheson 1990; Blyth et al. 2002). The adoption ofa national policy in Chile that restricts access to manyareas of the seabed to achieve sustainable exploitationis therefore an exception. This policy has resulted fromthe social and economic importance of the artisanal fish-eries that are restricted to coastal waters (Castilla & Defeo2001). The management of benthic (bottom-dwelling) re-sources is a specific component of the Chilean Fisheriesand Aquaculture Law (FAL; 1991). The FAL redefines ar-tisanal fishers and incorporates new regulations that af-fect their user rights through three management steps.First, exclusive fishing rights within a zone that extends5 nautical miles (9 km) from the shoreline are assigned toartisanal fishers. Second, artisanal fishers are restricted toworking (diving) within the coastal zone adjacent to theirarea of residence (regionalization). Third, the FAL assignsexclusive diving rights to given areas of seabed, referredto as management and exploitation areas for benthic re-sources (hereafter referred to as MEABR), to registeredartisanal fishing syndicates. The rationale behind theseterritorial user rights is based on common property andco-management approaches (Ostrom & Schlager 1996).These propose that formal property rights will create sus-tainable institutional arrangements among fishers, whowill manage and harvest collectively (Ostrom 1990; Brom-ley 1992). In addition, this form of co-management shouldcontribute to more effective enforcement of regulationsby increasing the likelihood of compliance ( Jentoft et al.1998).

The MEABR policy, first formulated in the early 1990s,is viewed as an innovative management instrument that isconsistent with the current global policy agenda of com-bining neoclassical economics with liberal democratictheory. The first actual MEABR was formally establishedin 1997. Since August 2003, 188 MEABR have manage-ment plans in place, and 649 are at various stages ofthe application procedure (Subpesca 2003). These in-clude MEABR for which applications have just begun,those for which applications are being modified, andthose with a decree for future establishment. Thus, theChilean MEABR network comprises a large number ofmanagement areas established by numerous groups offishers over a wide geographical range under one pol-icy instrument. This network serves as a useful basis forresearch into the allocation of territorial user rights andco-management, and the results of such research shouldhave relevance to other countries considering similarpolicies.

To date, research on MEABR has described the genesisof the policy (Bernal et al. 1999; Meltzoff et al. 2002) andhas investigated biological sustainability and stock recov-ery within management areas (Castilla 2000; San Martin2001). Few studies, however, have examined the socialaspects and fishers’ perceptions of the policy (Meltzoffet al. 2002). Such considerations of attitudes toward theenvironment are becoming more important as conserva-tion activity increasingly depends on the actions of in-terested groups of people. In theory, understanding theperceptions and attitudes of such groups could help pre-dict their likely responses to a new policy or managementactivity before it is implemented and/or help understandthe responses of the groups to existing policies or ac-tivities. A major assumption of such work is that the at-titudes and objectives of individuals influence behavior.This interaction is reflected in the theory of reasoned ac-tion (TRA; Fishbein & Ajzen 1975; Ajzen 1988), whichunderpins much social and psychological work done inrecent years. This theory argues that behavior is best pre-dicted by the intentions of a populace, which in turn areaffected by the members’ attitudes and the influencesof significant others on their intentions to act. AlthoughTRA is still widely used, it does have its critics (e.g., Ben-der & Speckart 1981; Oliver & Bearden 1985; Valerand etal. 1992). Alternative models to TRA, such as the transac-tional model of behavior (Lazarus & Folkman 1984; Dearyet al. 1996), however, still emphasize attitudes as impor-tant elements that influence behavior.

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Partly in response to theories like TRA, empirical workhas sought to investigate the importance of attitudes andother factors in determining the environmental behaviorof different groups of people. Foremost among these havebeen the public and farmers. The public can engage in en-vironmental behaviors such as ecologically friendly con-sumerism, waste and energy reduction, and recycling ac-tivities, and several studies have identified the sociodemo-graphic variables correlated with such behaviors, such aseducation and income (Hines et al. 1987; Olli et al. 2001),age (Hallin 1995; Olli et al. 2001), and activity levels inenvironmental groups (Olli et al. 2001). The importanceof individuals’ attitudes in determining environmental be-havior has also been identified (Dunlap & Van Liere 1978;Hines et al. 1987; Vining & Ebreo 1992). It is probably in-correct, though, to totally disconnect peoples’ attitudesand behaviors from the social context, and both may bemodified by social constructs such as institutions and lo-cal culture (Rayner 1991; Olli et al. 2001).

In contrast to the public, farmers can undertake arange of environmentally related behaviors as they goabout their normal business. These behaviors may re-late to issues such as the use of agrochemicals, goodnutrient management, and water-use efficiency. In manycountries farmers can also choose to adopt so-called agri-environment schemes, which seek to enhance biodiver-sity on the farm in return for some form of paymentfrom the government (Whitby 1994; Kleijn & Sutherland2004). The adoption process of these agrienvironmentschemes is similar to that of any other new technology(Rogers & Shoemaker 1971), and surveys of farmers haveidentified a series of characteristics that affect their adop-tion decisions, including age, education, gender, attitudetoward risk, and personality ( Jones 1963; Bowler 1979;Brotherton 1991; Edwards-Jones et al. 1998; Vanslem-brouck et al. 2002; Sheikh et al. 2003). In addition thewider social context influences their decisions in termsof their farm’s household characteristics, such as stage infamily cycle, level of pluriactivity (Potter & Gasson 1988),and other social influences, such as information flow, lo-cal culture, social capital, attitude of trusted friends, pol-icy environment, and the structure and impact of a rangeof institutions (Guerin & Guerin 1994; Neupane et al.2002; Mathijs 2003). In addition, the role of farmers’ at-titudes in determining their environmental behavior hasbeen shown empirically (Carr & Tait 1991; Wilson 1997;Willock et al. 1999a, 1999b; Beedell & Rehman 1999).

Fishers are similar to farmers in that their livelihood isderived from the environment. The determinants of theirenvironmental behavior therefore include some elementof financial gain, a factor that is largely absent from thedeterminants of environmental behavior of the public. Be-cause of this financial relationship with the environment,we expect many of the determinants of environmentalbehavior in fishers to be similar to those of farmers.

Unfortunately, although there have been calls to inves-tigate factors that encourage or impede the adoption of

new fishing strategies or policies ( Jacobson et al. 2003),to date the attitude of fishers toward such strategies has of-ten been overlooked (Kaplan & McCay 2004). We suspectthat as with farmers this is a rich area for academic study,offering the potential for real practical benefits to con-servation. Thus, understanding fishers’ attitudes is an im-portant aspect of the successful implementation of man-agement policies, in the general case of MPAs and in thespecific case of the Chilean MEABR.

Background of MEABR Policy

Co-management arrangements in the form of manage-ment and exploitation areas for benthic resources were in-troduced “to find mechanisms that would reverse the gen-eralized over-exploitation of benthic resources in Chile”(G. San Martin, personal communication). This overex-ploitation resulted from the neoliberal policies of the mid-1970s and the aggressive exchange-rate policy in 1974–1975 that substantially improved fishing export earn-ings. As a result Chile became the leading exporter offish and shellfish in South America (Thorpe et al. 1999).The rapidly expanding fleets and associated fishing effortquickly depleted resources such as the clam Venus an-tiqua (Schurman 1996) and the gastropod Concholepasconcholepas, known locally as loco (Fernandez & Castilla1998; Bernal et al. 1999).

Driven by the high demand from Asian markets (Castilla& Fernandez 1998; Castilla & Defeo 2001), the harvestof loco increased from approximately 6,000 t in 1974to 24,800 t in 1980. From 1982 to 1988, landings de-creased, probably because of overexploitation, and ex-port revenues doubled (Castilla & Fernandez 1998). From1989 to 1992 the fishery was officially closed for the firsttime. Since then, revenues from the export of loco havecontributed up to 50% of the Chilean export revenuesfrom small-scale shell fisheries and accounted for US$64million in 1993 (Castilla & Fernandez 1998). Loco is thesingle most economically important benthic resource inChile, and as such it has been used to drive policy develop-ment. The MEABR management system was introducedto conserve the loco fishery (San Martin 2001; Meltzoffet al. 2002).

The creation of MEABR arose from a combination ofdrivers that included (1) results of biological studies onthe benefits of protecting benthic resources from hu-man exploitation (Castilla & Duran 1985; Castilla & Bus-tamante 1989); (2) the theoretical and empirical conse-quences of open access and the evidence of successfulcommon property regimes (Dahl 1998; G. San Martin, per-sonal communication); and (3) the desire of some fishingsyndicates to manage resources in defined geographicalzones (Meltzoff et al. 2002; Subpesca 2002).

According to the Chilean Fisheries Undersecretary, thecreation of MEABR promotes and increases the produc-tivity of benthic resources and thereby maximizes the

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socioeconomic benefits derived from their exploitation(Subpesca 2002). The establishment of marine manage-ment areas through MEABR leads to a consolidation offishing activities into fishing coves (small ports). This pro-cess changes the historical migratory behavior of fishers,who are effectively encouraged to become nonmigratingbusiness people organized into syndicates that earn a liv-ing through the sale of self-managed resources (Subpesca2002).

The MEABR policy process began in 1988 with the im-plementation of experimental no-take zones (Castilla &Duran 1985), which were used as a model for the im-plementation of territorial user rights in the 1991 FAL.Nevertheless, details about how marine tenure was to begiven to fishers was lacking until 1997, when decreesfor legalizing management and exploitation areas for ben-thic resources were approved. Six years after the imple-mentation of the MEABR policy, then, the first area tobe designated under this system was decreed in 1997.Since then, the formalization of MEABR throughout Chilehas been promoted (Meltzoff et al. 2002). The state iscommitted to promoting, popularizing, and cofinancingthe implementation of MEABR. Until 1999 approximatelyUS$1 million had been spent on cofinancing MEABR stud-ies (Montesinos 2000 in Subpesca 2002). These additionalfinances are critical to the implementation of the policybecause the MEABR application procedures include aninitial baseline study and a management plan with subse-quent monitoring performed by universities or registeredconsultants. This activity is financed by both fishers andthe government (Subpesca 2002).

The first fishing syndicates to adopt MEABR were thosethat had worked closely with ecologists and academicsin joint meetings where they shared scientific and moni-toring data, modified their resource extraction strategies,and planned how to run the MEABR. The issue of thetrade-off between fishers’ ancestral migratory behaviorand the move toward a lifestyle as nonmigrating businesspeople meant that ecologists were more likely to workwith syndicates and thereby provided access to govern-ment funded projects, training, and studies that helpedinitiate these first MEABR (Meltzoff et al. 2002).

Understanding the attitude and beliefs of fishers withrespect to management and exploitation areas for benthicresources is important if we are to understand MEABR pol-icy. Currently, 64% of MEABR applications are under con-sideration (Subpesca 2003); hence, our study coincideswith a critical period in the adoption of MEABR policy inChile.

Study Areas

We examined six fishing syndicates that were each in theprocess of applying for single MEABR. For administrative

purposes Chile is divided into 12 regions, and we consid-ered syndicates in regions IV, VI, and X.

Syndicate Los Lobos was in the initial phase of apply-ing for a MEABR in region IV (31◦55′S, 71◦00′W). TheMEABR policy process has been established in region IVfor 5 years. Hence, most fishing syndicates already havebeen through the application process. Syndicates La Boca(33◦55′S, 71◦50′W), Matanzas (33◦57′S, 71◦52′W), andPuertecillo (34◦17′S, 71◦58′W) are all in region VI. Thesesyndicates had also applied for MEABR and were at thefinal stage of formulating management plans. This wastypical of the situation in region VI because it was one ofthe last in Chile to incorporate the MEABR policy.

The syndicates El Muelle-Ancud (hereafter referred toas Ancud) (41◦51′S, 73◦49′W) and Quicavi (42◦ 18′S, 73◦

35′W) are both in region X. This region had its first MEABRmanagement plans approved in 2001, but since then therehave been a large number of applications, which accountfor 39% of the current applications across Chile. Ancudhad just applied for a MEABR, and Quicavi was at theinitial phase of planning to present an application.

The members of the six artisanal fishing syndicatesuse benthic resources in different ways. Puertecillo iscomposed of mainly algae gatherers, who are also reg-ular intertidal food gatherers. They tend to operate dur-ing low tides and calm sea conditions. Ancud has onlyprofessional hookah divers (hookah divers use a pres-surized air supply from a support vessel) (Castilla & De-feo 2001). These hookah divers in general do not haveother sources of income. They operate with a crew ofthree or four people (boat operator, assistant, and one ortwo divers). Los Lobos has mainly intertidal food gath-erers and skin divers, who operate in shallow waters(Castilla & Defeo 2001). They dive to depths of between1 and 16 m to extract loco. La Boca, Quicavi, and Matan-zas are syndicates formed by fishers who fish for fin-fish, dive for benthic resources, and gather algae for theirlivelihoods.

Methods

We conducted our fieldwork between December 2002and March 2003. Primary data were collected using arange of different methods, including (1) participant ob-servation; (2) 60 five-point questionnaires with anchorpoints (1, strongly disagree and 5, strongly agree); (3) 18semistructured, open-ended interviews; and (4) participa-tory rural appraisal (PRA) techniques (six group meetingsand four group mapping sessions).

The interviews and PRA techniques enabled us todiscriminate among different attitudes with respect toMEABR and conservation. The questionnaires were de-signed to test whether dominant features with respectto MEABR occurred among different syndicates. We used

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the statistical software P.R.I.M.E.R. (Plymouth Routines inMultivariate Environmental Research; Clarke & Warwick2001) to perform multivariate analysis on questionnaireresponses. We applied the Bray-Curtis index of similarityto untransformed questionnaire data to conduct a clusteranalysis. The group average linkage technique was usedto form clusters of similar individuals that gave similarresponses. Subsequently, we used the similarity matrixderived from the questionnaire data to generate a multidi-mensional scaling (MDS) ordination plot that representedin two dimensions the similarity between the question-naire responses made by each respondent. Differences inthe responses made by fishers from different syndicateswere tested a priori for significance with the ANOSIM pro-cedure (one-way analysis of similarity; Clarke 1993). Weused similarity percentages analysis (SIMPER) to identifythose questions that accounted for the largest differencesin responses made by members of different syndicates(Clarke & Warwick 2001).

The relationship between the similarity among fish-ers’ responses and other factors identified from the PRAsessions and sociodemographic variables (both of whichare hereafter referred to only as demographic variables)was examined in the BIOENV program (Clark & War-wick 2001). This program tests sequentially for the com-bination of variables or a single variable that correlatesbest with the similarity among the responses of differentfishers. The sociodemographic variables selected for theBIOENV analysis were age; number of generations fish-ing; days spent at sea per month; on- and off-sector fisherypluriactivity (having multiple sources of income); owner-ship of a boat; number of people living in the household;past or present role in the syndicate; and relative impor-tance of fishing, algae gathering, and diving in terms ofincome generation.

At the time of this study none of the syndicates inthe study had a functioning MEABR. Hence, the expec-tations of the syndicates and their reasons for applying toMEABR are represented in the responses reported here.It is important to understand the expectations of fishersbecause presumably they will assess the success or failureof MEABR based on how well their expectations are met.

Results

Multivariate analysis of questionnaires and PRA tech-niques identified attitudinal differences and subsets ofquestions (key issues) that accounted for differences inthe fishers’ world views. The MDS ordination plot basedon the similarity between the responses made by differentindividuals (Fig. 1) and subsequent ANOSIM tests revealedsignificant differences ( p < 0.01) among different syndi-cates. This indicates that members of each syndicate hadsimilar views to each other but had distinctly differentviews from members of other syndicates. Pairwise com-

Figure 1. Multidimensional scaling ordination plot ofthe degree of similarity among fishers’ responses.Fishers are represented by a symbol according to thefishing syndicate to which they belong. The distancebetween the symbols represents the percent similaritybetween the respondent’s answers to a question.

parisons among different syndicates revealed that thesedifferences occurred between all syndicates (all pairwisetests p < 0.05).

The SIMPER analysis revealed that of a total of 60 ques-tions, 19 contributed most to the dissimilarity among thedifferent syndicates. These 19 questions fell into threesubsets of fishers’ attitudes with respect to the environ-ment: unresolved issues with the MEABR process and ben-efits and effectiveness of MEABR.

Attitudes toward the Environment

Differences among syndicates concerned the use and thevalue of the environment (Table 1). Members of Los Lo-bos and Puertecillo had strong positive attitudes towardconservation and the intrinsic value of natural resources.This was reflected in the low mean score of the responsesof these two groups to questions that attributed lower im-portance to conservation goals compared with financialstability. This attitude was strikingly different from that ofthe members of the syndicate La Boca, who perceived ofnatural resources primarily as a source of income. Fishersfrom Los Lobos saw natural resources as something “thereto be used, not overexploited, but used” (fisher). In con-trast, members of the syndicates Puertecillo, Matanzas,and La Boca agreed that natural resources should be usedas little as possible (Table 1).

Additional differences occurred with respect to fish-ers’ attitudes toward the statement “Enough is being doneto protect and enhance marine environments” (Table 1),with which both Quicavi and La Boca members agreed.Members of these syndicates perceived fishing activitiesas highly regulated and therefore did not want further im-position of regulations (e.g., quotas and size restrictions).

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Table 1. Statements that related to fishers’ attitudes toward the environment and accounted for the largest differences between Chilean fishersyndicates.∗

Syndicate

Statement Quicavi Ancud Matanzas Boca Puertecillo Lobos

Natural things must only be valued for what humans 2.7 a,b 3.8 b 3.8 b 4.2 b 1.5 a 1.6 aget out of them. (0.8) (0.9) (0.7) (0.8) (0.5) (0.5)

Conservation should only be considered once you have 2.7 a,b 3.1 b 3.0 a,b 4.5 b 1.2 a 1.7 areached your financial objectives. (1.2) (1.3) (1.5) (0.9) (0.4) (0.4)

Enough is being done to protect and enhance 3.9 a 2.9 a,b 1.3 b 3.5 a 1.3 b 1.2 bmarine environments already. (1.0) (1.5) (0.5) (1.6) (0.7) (0.4)

Chile’s seas are in a better state now 3.5 a 1.2 b 3.6 a 1.75 1.3 b 1.0 bthan 10 years ago. (1.0) (0.4) (1.0) a,b (0.8) (0.5) (0)

The earth’s resources, such as minerals, forests, 2.5 b 2.9 b 5.0 a 4.0 a,b 4.8 a 2.6 band fisheries, should be used as little as possible. (0.9) (1.1) (0) (1.0) (0.3) (0.9)

∗Numbers represent the average response (± SD). All syndicate responses showed differences ( p < 0.001) in a Kruskal-Wallis analysis. Pairwisedifferences were tested using Dunn’s test. Those syndicates that are not significantly different share the same letter.

Members of the other syndicates seemed willing to ac-cept new regulations and approaches to management aslong as they were introduced through participatory con-sultation.

Although fishers from different syndicates had distinctattitudes, all fishers surveyed agreed or strongly agreedthat “MEABR act as reserves for resources.” Seventy-eightpercent strongly agreed that “Fishermen should seek toimprove earnings from resources by improving the qual-ity of the resources.” Thus, fishers shared the belief thatMEABR could work as reserves to increase the qualityof resources and, in this way, to help conserve benthichabitats for future generations, even though their individ-ual attitudes toward the environment and its value or usewere structured in different ways.

Unresolved Issues with MEABR

Other differences among syndicates concerned unre-solved issues with MEABR policy (Table 2). Differencesoccurred between syndicates with respect to their opin-ions toward historical fishing rights and the lack of open-access areas where diving was possible. Only the respon-dents of La Boca and Puertecillo syndicates disagreed withthe statement that historical rights over resources are lostwith the implementation of MEABR (Table 2). Neithersyndicate has a history of diving that could be interruptedby MEABR. Similar differences in history may explain whymembers of three syndicates (Los Lobos, Puertecillo, LaBoca) had strong opinions with respect to the conflictand the problems that could result from an excessivenumber of MEABR. Specifically Los Lobos and Puertecillostrongly agreed with the statement that MEABR gener-ate conflict, mainly resulting from issues surrounding ac-cess rights and poaching. Fishers of Quicavi, Ancud, andMatanzas did not have strong opinions about MEABR asan extra cause of conflict between syndicates (Table 2)and therefore did not understand why limiting the num-

ber of management areas that are given throughout Chilecould have positive consequences.

Ninety percent of fishers agreed with the statement that“MEABR have increased the exploitation of resources athistorical sites,” although there was a discrepancy of opin-ion regarding the future of diving on open-access sites.Fishers from Ancud and Los Lobos perceived that thislack of open-access diving grounds was a threat to theirlivelihood. The fishers of Los Lobos stated that they havehistorical rights over resources that have been stolen fromthem by syndicates who have repopulated their MEABRwith locos from open-access sites. Because of this, theybelieve poaching from other management areas becomesa valid way of reclaiming what is rightfully theirs.

Perception of Benefits from MEABR

The largest differences among syndicates were related tothe perceived benefits and effectiveness of MEABR (Ta-ble 3). Syndicate members had different attitudes withrespect to the potential economic success of MEABR.Only Matanzas and La Boca members agreed strongly that“MEABR are economically successful” (Table 3). Fishersfrom Ancud also had high expectations of the economicsuccess of their own area as expressed in a group meeting:“We have all our hopes on MEABRs . . . we need them towork.” Nevertheless, the mean score of their responseswas low. Los Lobos respondents thought that withoutgovernment subsidies, MEABR were not economically vi-able because of the high cost of environmental and stockassessments required by legislation.

Syndicate members who had low economic expecta-tions of MEABR strongly agreed with statements that re-ferred to the importance of the support received from thegovernment (i.e., financial, political) once a MEABR is inplace. Despite fishers’ different attitudes with respect tothe economic success of MEABR, all were concerned about

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Table 2. Statements that accounted for the largest differences among fishing syndicate respondents and were related to unresolved issues withmanagement and exploitation areas for benthic resource policy (MEABR).∗

Syndicate

Statement Quicavi Ancud Matanzas Boca Puertecillo Lobos

Historical rights over resources are broken with the 4.4 a 4.0 a,b 5.0 a 2.5 b 2.8 b 5.0 aimplementation of MEABR. (0.6) (1.2) (0) (1.9) (1.0) (0)

Syndicates have taken resources from open-access sites in 3.8 b,c 4.0 b,c 2.3 a,b 3.2 a,b,c 1.5 a 5.0 corder to re-populate their MEABR. (1.4) (1.3) (1.0) (1.9) (0.5) (0)

MEABR create conflict with other syndicates for 3.0 a 2.5 a 2.6 a 4.7 b 5.0 b 5.0 baccess to resources. (1.0) (1.6) (1.8) (0.4) (0) (0)

There should be a limit to the number of MEABR 2.2 a 3.7 a,b 2.0 a 4.5 b 5.0 b 4.5 bthat are given. (1.1) (0.8) (1.5) (0.5) (0) (0.9)

Under current MEABR policy divers have to change their 2.1 a 4.6 b 4.1 a,b 3.7 a,b 5.0 b 5.0 blivelihoods toward fishing. (0.8) (0.5) (0.9) (0.8) (0) (0)

There will soon be no open-access sites left 3.3 a,b 3.8 a,b 5.0 b 3.0 a 4.8 b 5.0 bin which to dive. (1.5) (0.4) (0) (0) (0.3) (0)

∗Numbers represent the average response (± SD). Pairwise differences were tested using Dunn’s test. Those syndicates that are not significantlydifferent share the same letter.

having to pay taxes per hectare of their MEABR, whichbecame payable once they had harvested for 4 years.

Sociodemographic Relationships

The BIOENV analysis revealed that off-sector pluriactiv-ity (i.e., multiple job holding) and the exclusive use ofdiving to achieve a livelihood provided the best rank cor-relation (ρ = 0.38) with the responses made by fishers(Table 4). The questionnaire subset categories were eachtested separately against the demographic variables andyielded significant relationships for all subsets apart fromthat concerned with environmental attitudes (Table 4).In all cases off-sector pluriactivity was related to the re-sponses made by fishers and was the factor that had the

Table 3. Statements that accounted for the heterogeneity in fishers’ attitudes toward the perceived benefits of management and exploitation areasfor benthic resources (MEABR).a

Syndicate

Statement Quicavi Ancud Matanzas Boca Puertecillo Lobos

MEABR are economically successful. 3.7 a,b 3.8 a,b 4.8 a 4.8 a 3.5 b 2.3 b(0.6) (0.7) (0.4) (0.3) (0.5) (0.7)

An important aspect of having a MEABR is the support you 2.0 a 2.6 a 2.6 a 3.0 a,b 5.0 b 3.5 a,bget from government. (0.8) (0.9) (0.8) (0.6) (0) (0.6)

Gaining political power and accountability are important factors 2.0 a 2.6 a 2.6 a 3.5 a,b 5.0 b 4.8 bof applying for an MEABR. (0.8) (1.0) (0.8) (0.5) (0) (0.3)

MEABR are working well under the current policy. 3.2 b 3.0 b 4.0 b 3.5 b 2.2 a 1.1 a(0.9) (0.9) (0.8) (0.9) (1.3) (0.3)

MEABR are beneficial to the whole fisheries sector 4.5 a 3.0 b 4.3 a 4.6 a 4.8 a 1.2 c(divers, fishermen, gatherers).b (0.6) (1.0) (0.5) (0.5) (0.3) (0.4)

The fisheries department should mainly help to stop 2.5 a 4.7 b 4.8 b 4.5 b 5.0 b 1.0 aencroaching on MEABR. (0.5) (0.4) (0.4) (0.5) (0) (0)

MEABR are the only alternative for benthic resource sustainability. 3.8 b,c 3.9 b,c 5.0 c 5.0 c 1.6 a 2.8 a,b(0.3) (1.1) (0) (0) (0.7) (0.3)

aThe numbers represent the average response (± SD). Pairwise differences were tested using Dunn’s test. Those syndicates that are notsignificantly different share the same letter.bAnalysis of variance and a Tukey pairwise test.

greatest influence on the attitudes expressed in the ques-tionnaires.

Discussion

Significant differences in resource use, world views, andattitudes existed among artisanal fishers in Chile, as inmany other countries (Sandersen & Koester 2000; Perez-Sanchez & Muir 2003; Hampshire et al. 2004). Thesedifferences must be identified and understood if co-management and conservation are to be more inclusiveand participatory and thus more effective (Sandersen &Koester 2000; Sittert 2003). Current policies assume thatfishers will respond homogeneously and deterministically

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872 Attitudes about Co-Management and Conservation Gelcich et al.

Table 4. Sociodemographic variable or variables that had the bestcorrelations with fishers’ specific and overall attitudes toward theidentified domains.

SpearmanVariable correlation (ρ) p

Environmental subsetoff-sector pluriactivityexclusiveness of diving for

0.25 not significant

livelihoodowning a boat

Historical rights and conflictoff-sector pluriactivity

0.45 <0.05

Benefits and objectives ofMEABR∗

0.32 <0.05

off-sector pluriactivityexclusiveness of diving for

livelihoodOverall responses 0.383 <0.05

off-sector pluriactivityexclusiveness of diving for

livelihood

∗Management and exploitation areas for benthic resources.

to a given policy. Our results, however, suggest that theresponse of fishers to a policy depends on their attitudes,personalities, and livelihoods. Hence, the policy responsemay still be deterministic (if you understand the systemwell enough), but it will be variable both among groupsand between individuals within any group. Understand-ing this variability is important in predicting the likelysuccess of any given conservation measure.

Policy makers should have a broad idea of the sorts ofpolicy responses different groups will have to a given pol-icy. Although at one level, as emphasized throughout thispaper, individual differences in circumstance may makedifferent people respond differently to the same policy,it is clearly unrealistic for policy makers to consider allindividual responses separately. So to aid understandingof these differences, some sort of loose taxonomy of “re-sponse type,” as determined by attitudes, objectives, andother socioeconomic variables, may be helpful.

Based on our current understanding of the Chilean sit-uation, it seems that different syndicates of fishers thatcurrently participate in MEABR policy have different at-titudes and perceive different barriers toward the use ofMEABRs as a dual conservation and development policyinstrument. For the situation we studied, fishers can begrouped into one of three domains of attitude, whereasfour types of objectives illustrate their adoption of co-management through MEABRs.

The three attitudinal groups are environmentalists, live-lihood advocates, and commodity conservationists. (1)Environmentalists value nature for what it is and not forwhat humans get out of it, and fishers holding these at-titudes would apply for MEABR because of the conserva-tion status that they confer on benthic habitats. (2) Liveli-hood advocates value nature for economic reasons and for

the lifestyle it provides. (3) Commodity conservationistsare more business oriented than the other groups, whonevertheless also consider environmental issues impor-tant but rank these lower than financial considerations(B. Davies & I. Hodge, unpublished data).

Fishers could have four reasons to participate inMEABR: (1) to achieve an economically stable livelihoodthat could support their families (e.g., Ancud); (2) tosecure an additional source of income (e.g., La Boca,Quicavi, Matanzas); (3) to attain government support andthe social status fostered by participation (e.g., Puerte-cillo); and (4) to attain access to restricted resources (e.g.,Los Lobos). Further research is required to formally inves-tigate the existence of these categories and their associ-ated behavioral responses to management and conserva-tion policy.

The main causes of attitudinal heterogeneity amongfishers of different syndicates are related to their atti-tude toward the environment, traditional access rights(unresolved issues with the policy), and the objectivesfor participation in MEABR. The differences in fishers’attitudes toward these key issues are especially impor-tant because human behavior is determined by specificattitudes and the beliefs that people hold (Ajzen 1988;Beedell & Rehman 1999). Consequently, these underly-ing attitudes could lead to future observable differencesin management style and commitment to MEABR pol-icy. These attitudes influence fishers’ voluntary partici-pation in enforcing MEABR regulations and thus affectthe MEABR’s wider impact on benthic resources (Defeo& Perez-Castaneda 2003).

Potential influences on the observed attitudinal dif-ferences were ascertained from sociodemographic vari-ables. Of these, off-sector pluriactivity and the level ofdependency on diving to maintain an income correlatedbest with fishers’ overall responses. Thus understandingthe complexities in livelihoods of artisanal fishers is cru-cial to understanding the driving forces behind fishers’behaviors. This may be advanced by adopting a liveli-hoods approach to fisheries (Scoones 1998; Allison &Ellis 2001). The livelihoods approach seeks to improverural development policy and practice by recognizing theseasonal complexity of livelihood strategies. It considersthe conditions that create economic niches for coastalresidents and that relate to specific lifestyles (Allison &Ellis 2001). Central to the framework is the analysis ofinstitutional arrangements (informal and formal rules andregulations) that influence livelihood outcomes and thenotions of livelihood resources such as natural, financial,human, and social (Scoones 1998). Validation of a liveli-hoods approach to fisheries also fits with the shift awayfrom management of a fishery or fish stock in isolationtoward management of the ecosystem within which thefishery exists ( Jorgensen & Muller 2000). A considerationof livelihoods extends this management concept furtherto take local socioeconomic factors into account.

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Gelcich et al. Attitudes about Co-Management and Conservation 873

Figure 2. Conceptual relationships among factors thatstructure differences in responses of fishers’ syndicatecommittees and therefore the future outcomes ofmanagement and exploitation area for benthicresource policy (the dashed arrow represents arelationship that was not tested statistically).

Fisher attitudes toward historical rights and the benefitsof MEABR correlated significantly with off-sector pluriac-tivity and the level of dependency on diving to maintainan income. Nevertheless no combination of demographicvariables correlated significantly with the environmentalsubset of questions (Table 4), which indicated that thisattitudinal domain was determined primarily by other fac-tors, such as social norms (Aipanjiguly et al. 2003), eth-ical considerations, and personality, as has been foundfor farmers (Willock et al. 1999b). In this way, the ac-tual adoption and future behavior of fishers with respectto MEABR and conservation will be based on a complexset of factors, including fishers’ economic niches (liveli-hoods) and past experiences, in addition to their existingvalues, personality, and social norms ( Fig. 2). The im-portance of individual attitudes in determining behaviorraises the possibility that although a new policy or in-centive may change fishers’ short-term behavior, if thepolicy is not accompanied by any changes in fishers’ per-ception and social norms, when that policy ends or intimes of crisis, fishers will probably revert to their tra-ditional behavioral patterns. These patterns would thencomprise long-term environmental conservation and pro-tection (Pretty 2003).

Managers can learn about actors’ environmental atti-tudes with respect to natural resources through a nor-mative approach that highlights the importance of ma-rine conservation to which MEABR contribute. This isa long-term approach that involves education of fishersand carries benefits with respect to fishers’ behavioralintentions. In addition, we propose that MEABR be ana-lyzed in accordance with livelihood strategies of fishersin which differences in local economies (Scoones 1998),skills (S.G., unpublished data), flexibility (Huhmarniemi& Salmi 1999), and interests of fisher communities aredeveloped. In this way, development programs can tar-get the specific needs of high- and low-pluriactivity syn-dicates that have different objectives and attitudes. Our

research has shown that stakeholder attitudes can differsignificantly among groups of actors and are dependenton livelihoods. This heterogeneity must be consideredwhen providing incentives for fishers to respond to dualconservation and development policy.

Acknowledgments

We acknowledge the financial support of a Chilean MIDE-PLAN (Ministerio de Planificacion y Cooperacion) doc-toral scholarship provided to S.G. We specially thank fish-ers from Puertecillo, Ancud, Quicavi, Matanzas, La Boca,and Los Lobos syndicates for their support. We are espe-cially grateful to L. Peralta, M. Munoz, and N. Godoy fortheir support in regions VI, X, and IV, respectively.

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