Australasian  Animal  Studies  Associa1on  Conference    The  University  of  Melbourne,  12-­‐15  July,  2015  

When   we   talk   about   an1speciesist   aFtudes  and  respect  towards  the  nonhuman,  we  face  two  kinds  of  problems:      1)  defining  the  animal  condi1on  and  species-­‐

specific  interests;    

2)  pinpoin1ng   the   values   and   the   rules   of  conduct   involved   in   human/animal  rela1ons  in  order  to  actualize  them  and  to  be  able  to  resolve  conflictual  situa1ons.    

However,  on  a  closer  inspec1on,  before  being  scien1fic   or   ethical,   this   is   a   philosophical  problem.    

The   first   form   of   speciesism   is   not   an   ethical  anthropocentrism  but  an  ontological  one.      In   order   to   overcome   anthropocentrism,   it   is  necessary  to  reiterate:  that  the  human  being  is  only   one   of   the   many   possible   animal  ontologies,   and   that   no   categorical   difference  is  established.      Nor  is  it  a  difference  of  degree:  no  species  can  serve  as  the  measure  of  the  other  ones.      According   to   this,   it   is   not   possible   to  transcend   speciesism   if   we   cannot   scru8nize  humanist  values.    

In   doing   so,   we   fall   into   a   “biocentric   magma”,  which  I  consider  fundamental  and  produc1ve.      However,   it   inevitably   asks   us   not   small   restyling  opera8ons.      This  means  not   just   the  procedures  aUempted  by  the  animal  rights  movement  at  the  end  of  the  20th  century,   but   a   real   revolu8on   as   paradigma1c   as  the   one   carried   out   in   order   to   overcome  theocentrism   in   the   15th   century   by   the   first  humanis1c   thinkers,   i.e.   Pico   Della   Mirandola,  Marsilio  Ficino,  Leonardo  da  Vinci,  etc.    

Humanism   has   transformed   the   human   being  into  a  universal  principle,  that   is  to  say:   into  a  compass  capable  of  guiding  us  even  when  all  other  references  are  lost.      If   we   call   into   ques1on   this   anthropocentric  principle  –  which  dictates  the  rules  of  conduct  –  how  will  we  be  able  to  determine  whether  a  certain  ac8on  is  right  or  wrong,  how  to  choose  the  correct  op1on  between  several,  and  know  what  is  legi1mate  or  desirable?  

As  I  have  repeatedly  maintained,  I  think  that  there  is  no  prescrip1ve,  direct  deriva1on  between   science   and   ethics,   but,   at   the   same   1me,   I   do   not   believe   in   a   total  parallelism  devoid  of  implica1ons.    I   believe   that   science   poses   problems   for   ethics   and   vice   versa,   such   that   there   is  rela1onship  of  prescrip1ve  problema1zing  between  them.      

This   is   clear   when   the   first  anthropocentric  principle  falls,  namely   ‘Do   not   do   to   others  what   you   would   not   wish   to  be  done  to  you’.  

Can   we   do   without   an   ethical   descrip8on?  Yes,   or   at   least   almost,   if   we   focus   on   the  human  being.    An  ethics  of  sympathy  is  not  able  to  help  us  when   he   have   to   respect   an   alterity   who   is  projected   into   the   world   in   a   different   way  than  the  human  being.      Keeping   the   Humean   division   between  science   and   ethics,   we   run   the   risk   of  remaining  at  the  lower  levels  of  percep8on,  the   only   condi1on   of   sympathy   across   the  vast   world   of   animals,   but   it   is   absolutely  useless   in   giving   us   helpful   sugges1ons   on  how  we  should  behave  with  them.    

Having   said   that,   when   I   affirm   that   the  problem   is   first   of   all   of   a   philosophical  nature,    I  mean  that  we  ocen  take  for  granted  certain   formula1ons,   both   in   reading   the  animal-­‐being  (and  thus  her  poten1al  interests),  and  in  examining  the  values  involved,  and  thus  the   requirements   and  priori1es  which,  on   the  contrary  deserve  to  be  discussed.      Let  us  start  from  the  first  point:  the  features  of  animal  condi8ons.    

We   are   used   to   thinking   that   the   tradi1onal  explana1ons   of   behavior   –   for   example  behaviorism   and   classical   ethology   –   show   us  an   objec1ve   ontology   of   the   animal:   the  animal   condi8on   as   it   is   effec8vely   and  indisputably.      On   the   contrary,   these   elucida8ons   are   only  hypotheses,   results   of   explanatory   models,  that  is  to  say  interpreta8ons  that  derive  from  concepts   such   as   reinforcement,   impulse,  ins1nct,  and  condi1oning.  

At  a  first  sight,  the  two  tradi1onal  accounts  –  as   expressed   by   Skinner,   on   the   one   hand,  and  Tinbergen,  on  the  other  hand  –  describe  mutually  incompa1ble  explanatory  models:      1)  according   to   behaviorism,   the   animal  

works  as  a  trigger  machine,  

2)  according   to   classical   ethology,   the  animal  is  a  pressure  cooker.    

 As  we  can  see,  these  two  explanatory  models  are  predicated  on  a  basic  assump1on  that   is  not   called   into   ques1on,   namely   that   the  animal  is  a  machine.  

The   scien1fic   explana1on   of   animal   behavior,  in   searching   to   define   “how   the   animal  machine   func8ons”   and   restric1ng   itself   to  defining   features   of   animal   mechanisms,   has  never   problema8zed   the   Cartesian   paradigm  of  the  animal  as  automata.        The  only  thing  that  has  been  problema1zed   is  whether   that   mechanism   is   an   ins1nct   or   a  condi1oning.      As  in  Kuhn’s  view,  science  has  only  chosen  the  type  of  machine,   remaining  well   anchored   to  the  philosophical  paradigm.  

For   this   reason,   I   believe   that   only   a  philosophical   approach   which   problema1zes  the  basic  paradigm  -­‐  namely  the  Cartesian  idea  of   animal   automata   -­‐   can   really   overcome  ontological   anthropocentrism:   unless   the  human   being   is   viewed   as   nothing   but   a  puppet  determinis1cally  moved  by  strings.      The  main   principle   is   refusing  mechanism,   or,  to   put   it   differently,   acknowledging   animal  subjec1vity.      In   order   to   do   so,   a   paradigma8c   alterna8ve  to  Descartes  must  be  found.    

Appealing  to  consciousness  is  not  enough.      In   l ine   wi th   Brentano’s   concept   of  inten1onality,  we   are   aware-­‐of,   that   is   to   say  we  refer  to  a  content.      A   machine   can   only   make   reference   to   its  mechanisms,   not   develop   judgments,  evalua1ons,   decisions,   projects,   plans,  simula1ons  or  whatever.        Subjec8vity   is   at   the   base   of   consciousness,  that   is   it   brings   out   consciousness,   not   the  other  way  around.  

In   order   to   overcome   Cartesian   automata   without   relega1ng   the   animal   into   an  indis1nct  agent,  it  is  necessary  to  consider  innate  or  learned  resources  as  “means  that  the  individual  uses”  and  not  as  “automa8c  devices  that  move  the  individual”.    

T h i s   p a s s e s   f r o m   a n  explanatory,   determinis1c   and  parad igma1c   model   ( the  structure   of   resources   implies  their   func1on)   to   a   usefulness  model   ( the   s t ructure   of  resources   allows   for   a   plurality  of  func1ons).  

A   substan1al   difference   between   the  two   models   is   that,   in   the   case   of   an  instrumental  view  of   innate  and  learned  resources,   two   basic   condi1ons   for  subjec1vity  are  opened  up:      1)  that  it  is  the  subject  who  freely  uses  

the  resources  by  adap8ng  them  to  a  specific   situa8on   or   even   by  coop1ng  them  to  other  contexts  in  a  crea1ve  way;    

2)  that   even   if   a   resource   evolved   in   a  species   for  a  certain   func1on,   in   the  end   it   is   the   subject   who   uses   it,  even  out  of  context.  

The   comparison   with   the   machine   is  useful.      If  in  Descartes  that  metaphor  is  used  for  declaring  an  analogy,   in  my  opinion   the  equivalence   is   useful   for   stressing   an  ontological  difference,  with  an  opera1on  similar   to   that   of   Heidegger   in   defining  the  human  being.      It   is   not   the   predicates   that   define   an  animal's  condi1on  –  the  resources  define  only   the   virtual   field   of   possible   ac1vity  for   the   animal   –   but   a   metapredica1ve  dimension:   the   animal’s   expressive  ownership  of  its  own  resources.      Animal   being   entails   the   crea8on   of  worlds.  

Therefore,   subjec1vity   is   arbitrariness,  possibility,   unpredictability,   imagina1on,  crea1vity,  and  par1ality.      In   a   nutshell,   full   possession   of   a   “here-­‐and-­‐now”   and   not   simple   immersion   in  1me,   inven1on   of   the   present   as  experienced   1me,   existence   that   is  inevitably   exi1ng   from   a   categorical  bubble,  whether  it  be  an  umwelt  or  a  set  of  lived  experiences.      Appropria1ng  the  laUer  means  reinven1ng  them.    

 On   the   contrary,   I   mean   an  emergent   condi8on,   which   is  precisely   the   result   of   the  plurality   of   func1ons   of   these  resources.   Subjec1vity   is   thus   a  redundancy   of   possibili1es,  which   gives   rise   to   a   sort   of  ontological   incompleteness   in  the  animal-­‐being:      hence   its   desiring-­‐being   and  rela8onal-­‐being   as   existen8al  dimensions.  

I   do  not  have  1me   to  beUer  define  what   I  mean  by  animal   subjec1vity.    What   is   sure,  however,   is  that   I  do  not  refer  to  a  new  form  of  dualism  or  a  new  en1ty  governing  the  naviga1on  of   innate  or   learned   resources,   a   kind  of  homunculus   that  would   lead   to  an  infinite  regression  in  explanatory  terms.    

Therefore,   an   animal's   interests   lie   in  existen1al   possibility,   in   being   able   to  carry   out   its   own   subjec1ve   capaci1es  for   ac1on,   which   as   I   have   observed  consists   in   freely   using   its   own  resources.      This   brings   to   light   a   first   principle:  sensi8vity/percep8on   is   func8onal   to  expressive  freedom  and  not  vice  versa.      Following  the  principle  of  sen1ence  as  a  royal   road   to   iden1fy   the   rules   of  conduct,  we  are  brought   to  an  ethics  of  absten1on  rather  than  of  opera1vity.  

 The   respect   of   the   animal   condi1on  must   always   be   based   on   the  expressive  possibili1es  that  render  it  possible   because   life   is   always   the  result   of   a   balance   which   must  allow   the   possibility   of   ac8on   in  order  to  be  useful.  

We  inevitably  end  up  at  the  aporia  that  to  respect  all  living  beings  we  must  die.    But  if  we  did  so    we  would  not  respect  our  own  life  and  we  would  find  ourselves  once  again  trapped  in  a  state  of  incoherence.      Acknowledging  that  coherence  is  difficult  in  ethics,  it  is  evident  that  there  is  something  wrong  with  this  thought.    

At   this   point   it   is   vital   to   recognize   that  between   human   beings   and   other   species  there  are  differences  in  the  predicates  and  not  in   the   meta-­‐predica1ve   condi1on   of  subjec1vity.      That   means   that   a   new   interpreta8ve  guideline  is  required:  no  longer  a  sympathising  projec1on   (you   are   like   me),   nor   a   distance  (you   are   alien   to   me),   but   rather   an  empathising   understanding   (I   can   see,   hear  and  accept  what  you  are  feeling,  even  though  you  are  different  from  me).  

 The   animal   condi1on   is   desire,  expression,   and   will...   All   this  connects   the   human   being  with  other  species.      The  difference  between   them   is  not   found   in   the   expressive  principle,   but   rather   in   the  expressive  field.  

The  ethics  of  empathy  refutes  anthropomorphism,  as  each  species  and  even  more  so  each  individual  must  be  respected  according  to  its  characteris1cs,  on  the  ground  of  its  agency.      This  ethics  rejects  as  well  that  vision  of  an  alien  animal  derived  from  the  prac1ce  of  considering  the  different  umwelten  as  separate  monads.    

You   cannot   give   welfare   to   someone   if   you  deny   them   this   existen1al   sovereignty,   this  prevalence  of  free  expression  over  the  simple  preserva1on  of  physiological  parameters.    Life  is  not  welfare  but  well-­‐being.      In  other  words,  being  able  to  express  all  the  power  that  each  individual  has  deeply  in  her  being-­‐alive   that   is   not   simply   a   being  exposed  to  life.      Otherwise,  we  claim  to  realize  a  life  ethics  via  an  unsupportable  mor1fica1on  of    life  itself.  

Thank  you  for  your  kind  aNen8on!  Roberto  Marchesini    Mail  me  at  estero@siua.it  Or  find  more  on  my  Academia  profile.