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The Round TableThe Commonwealth Journal of International Affairs

ISSN: 0035-8533 (Print) 1474-029x (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/ctrt20

Fiji at the crossroads?

Rod Alley

To cite this article: Rod Alley (1997) Fiji at the crossroads?, The Round Table, 86:342, 245-256,DOI: 10.1080/00358539708454360

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00358539708454360

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The Round Table (1997), 342 (245-256)

FIJI AT THE CROSSROADS?AFTER THE CONSTITUTIONAL

REVIEW COMMISSION

ROD ALLEY

Fiji has been outside the Commonwealth since the military coups of 1987declared a republic, formalized the country's departure and rescinded the 1970independence constitution which had constructed a numerical balance betweenindigenous Fijians and Indo-Fijians in the Lower House of parliament. The 1990constitution that replaced it was palpably unfair to the island's Indo-Fijianpopulation as well as to urban Fijians. The 1990 constitution deterred badlyneeded inward investment and, faced with a number of other problems ColonelRabuka, the prime minister, realized that a substantial constitutional review andthe necessary post-report deliberations, would buy valuable time. After 15months of deliberation the Constitutional Review Commission handed a reportunambiguously committed to multi-ethnic public management to Fiji's president.The United Kingdom, Malaysia and India have said that Fiji's return to theCommonwealth would be welcome, pending progress on constitutional reform,but an early return is unlikely.

IN SEPTEMBER 1996, a former Governor General of New Zealand, Sir PaulReeves, acting in his capacity as chair of Fiji's Constitutional Review

Commission (CRC) delivered its lengthy report to Fiji's President Ratu SirKamisese Mara.1 Sir Paul said he believed the report provided a first essentialstep in Fiji's journey towards a strong and united future. In response, thePresident saw the Report's status as a consensus document a good omen for itsfuture consideration.2

A Maori, and former Anglican Archbishop of New Zealand, Sir Paul headeda three-member review team. He was assisted by ex-politician and formerSpeaker of Parliament Tomasi Vakatori, and locally born Indo-Fijian Dr BrijLai, an academic currently at the Australian National University. Supportinglegal counsel included New Zealander Alison Quentin-Baxter, who hadpreviously advised on constitutional development in Niue and the MarshallIslands, and Jon Apted from Fiji. During its 15 months of deliberations, thereview team conducted extensive local consultations receiving over 800submissions, most prepared on behalf of organizations. The CRC held 26 publichearings in centres other than Suva. Political parties were provided some public

Dr Alley teaches in the Department of Political Science at Victoria University, Wellington, NewZealand.

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funding for participation, the Fijian Labour Party and National Federation Partymade a joint submission utilizing advice from constitutional expert Yash Ghai,and former South Australian Premier Don Dunstan.3

Further afield, the CRC visited Australia, New Zealand, Malaysia, Mauritius,South Africa, the United Kingdom and the United States. It commissionedresearch, some of which was funded by the Electoral Assistance Division of theUnited Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs. This included studies onelectoral and political conduct in ethnically heterogeneous societies, fieldswhere additional expert advice was obtained.4 By any reckoning, the CRC exer-cise was systematic, thorough, and extensive.

Notwithstanding, contemporary expectations that published investigations ofany length need 'executive summaries', the Report team—after much debate—eschewed such supplementation. It did so on the grounds that the 688-pagedocument and its 697 itemized recommendations comprised a seamless web,any summary risked invidious selection and compromising the Report'sentirety. In effect, the CRC indicated that there are no short cuts to compre-hending Fiji's future constitutional requirements. Since publication, someprogress had been made in translating the report into Hindi and Fijian. Given itslength and substance, it is probable that deliberation of the CRC findings by thedesignated Select Committee will prove extensive. A report to Parliament isunlikely before mid-1997. From all sides, politicians are gauging publicresponses indicating support or rejection to not only individual recommenda-tions, but also of the report's unambiguous philosophy of multi-ethnic publicmanagement.

After identifying the CRC's terms of reference and discussing certain of itsfindings, this article will assess its potential implications for Fiji's future consti-tutional development and its international posture, including the possibility ofits return to the Commonwealth. Before doing so, the landscape that the CRCencountered when beginning its deliberations can be sketched briefly.

A legacy of constitutional compromise

When Fiji gained its independence from the British in 1970, the indigenouscommunity's misgivings about doing so were partly mollified by an effectiveassertion of paramountcy. At independence, and by a small percentage, Indo-Fijians outnumbered the autochthonous community.5 Longstanding concernsthat Indo-Fijian numerical and commercial advantage might translate into polit-ical supremacy were symbolized for public purposes through the identifiedthreat of a common electoral roll. In the event, the 1970 independence constitu-tion maintained communal representation in a 52-member Lower House. Herethe breakdown was 12:12:3; that is, Fijian and Indo-Fijian communal represen-tation of 12 members each, a generous allocation of three seats permitted torepresentation of other races, predominantly part-Fijians, Europeans, andChinese, aggregated within a smaller general roll. Ethnic allocation was repli-cated on a corresponding 10:10:5 basis, for the balance of 25 seats allocated tonational constituencies. Through what was locally termed 'cross voting', candi-dates standing in these seats would face voters of all races. Hence betweenIndependence and April 1987 a Fijian voter, for example, cast a ballot for a

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communal Fijian representative, but then in the larger national constituenciesjoined electors of other races to ballot for a further Fijian, an Indo-Fijian, and acandidate from the other races or general roll category. For all seats, a simpleplurality 'first past the post' system operated.

This outwardly symmetrical parity of ethnic representation was more thanoutweighed by defence of Fijian interest through the composition and powers ofthe 36-member nominated Senate. This permitted any three Council of Chiefsnominees effective veto over any legislative attempt to alter a listing of statutesprotecting core Fijian interests such as land. It remains a persisting curiositywhy the independence constitution, crafted under Lord Shepherd and decidedlyhospitable to Fijian interests, was never translated into the Fijian language.

Although it narrowly averted a loss of office in 1977, Ratu Sir KamiseseMara's ruling Alliance party maintained its increasingly aloof hold on poweruntil 1987. Within the Fijian community, these years witnessed two significantdevelopments. One was the emergence of a raw, if distinct ethnic populism, andthe other a growing political and economic gulf between rural dwellers and urbanwage earners. For different reasons many Fijians shared growing disenchantmentwith the public conduct of their elites, who were variously perceived as un-accountable, self serving, or out of touch with lewe ni vanua, or ordinary people.

In 1987, the late Dr Timothy Bavadra's Fijian Labour Party secured enoughsupport from urban Fijians to win sufficient national seats to join the Indo-Fijian dominated National Federation party within a brief, ill-starred coalitiongovernment. This victory alienated the ethnic populists, a schism the defeatedAlliance leadership quickly exploited to its advantage. Public ignorance ofexisting safeguards was an aide, and Colonel Rabuka a willing tool. This wasthe dynamic that precipitated the military coups of 1987. The first deposed theBavadra government, and was soon followed by a second rescinding the 1970Constitution, declaring a Republic, and led to a formalizing of Fiji's departurefrom the Commonwealth.

The 1990 constitution

The longer his exposure to the realities of governance, the greater Rabukaappreciated the advantages of constitutional legitimation. Resting on insecurefoundations, his post-coups regime was bled by an exodus of skilled Indo-Fijians, by deteriorating relations with important neighbours such as Australia,and with foreign investors reserving long-term financial commitments. Accord-ingly a constitution was framed that, although subject to some consultation,emerged as a palpably unfair construction. Its dominating features were a fullscale reversion to communal representation, selective Fijian paramountcy, butalso to transience because of a commitment to revision within the comingdecade. The selectivity of these arrangements came not only at the expense ofIndo-Fijians but of urban Fijians too. Although a third of the indigenous popu-lation, they received only five of 37 seats allocated within a 70-member LowerHouse of Parliament. Legally Rabuka and fellow coup-makers secured indem-nification against action arising from the events of 1987, and the constitutionalstatus accorded to Fijian Military Forces was necessarily a dilution of theircontrol by parliament.6

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The 1990 Constitution left other governments unimpressed. India persistedwith its threat to veto any attempted return by Fiji to the Commonwealth unlessthere was adequate constitutional reform. Australia and New Zealand sustainedconsistent positions opposing the constitution as unsatisfactory and requiringreform. Ironically Fijian elections fought under its dispensation in 1992 and1994 resulted in coalitions, the latter contest precipitated by a November 1993parliamentary revolt which saw Rabuka's budget defeated. Rabuka was also introuble following a commission of inquiry finding that he could face criminalprosecution for an alleged conspiracy to defraud the National Bank of Fiji, aninstitution now effectively insolvent.

By 1995 when the CRC commenced its work, Rabuka led a coalition com-prising his Soqosoqo ni Vakavulewa ni Taukei (SVT) supported by the GeneralVoters' Party. The Fijian Association Party, including the President's son in itsranks, moved to share the opposition benches with Jai Ram Reddy's NationalFederation Party and Mahendra Chaudhry's Fiji Labour Party.

With continuing coalition government in some form a likelihood, Rabukasaw little to lose and possibly something to gain by a reordering of the rules tofacilitate the possibility of gaining broader public support. Beyond personalaspirations to overcome an unfulfilled legitimacy, and the need for Fiji to workits passage back to a more central South Pacific regional role, lay Rabuka'srealization that the 1990 constitution's dubiety continued to deter investmentand shackle a badly needed growth in jobs. Related problems of growingurgency included public mismanagement under hazy accountability, andconstrictions to public participation despite a more assertive electorate. From atactical perspective, Rabuka could see that a substantial constitutional review,followed by lengthy post-report deliberation, would also buy him some neededtime.

Following initial consideration by a joint parliamentary committee on consti-tutional development chaired by Foreign Minister Bole, the CRC was estab-lished with generous terms of reference. It was asked to review the 1990 consti-tution, and recommend arrangements meeting the present and future needs ofall in Fiji to encompass racial harmony, national unity, and economic and socialdevelopment. The CRC would take cognizance of internationally recognizedprinciples and standards of individual and group rights, including their fullpromotion and protection; the interests and concerns of indigenous Fijian andRotuman peoples; as well as the rights, interests, and concerns of all ethnicgroups in Fiji.

The CRC Report's key findings

The CRC Report can best be analysed by considering the key constitutive func-tions recommended and their supporting principles. Further relevant headingsinclude consideration of the CRC Report as a Westminster-style accommoda-tion, as electoral innovation, and as a prescription for refurbished governance inthe Fiji Islands.7

A central recommendation of the CRC Report was its call for multi-ethnicgovernment based on the Westminster system. 'Power sharing', it was main-tained, 'should be achieved through the voluntary cooperation of political

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parties or increased support for a genuinely multi-ethnic party'. To achieve this:'The people of Fiji should move gradually but decisively away from thecommunal system of representation1. (Italics added) In rebuttal of the prevailing1987 coup leitmotiv, the report claimed 'trying to keep a predominantly Fijiangovernment in office in perpetuity may not be the best way of securing theparamountcy of Fijian interests'. Effective multi-ethnic governance, it wasmaintained, required institutional growth, and fuller deployment of backbenchskills through a stronger parliamentary committee system.

The key constitutive specifics of the CRC recommendations are outlined inTable 1.

(i) The President, and Vice President

The CRC recommended that the President, as Head of State of the Republic ofthe Fiji Islands, retain titular authority as Commander of Chief of the armedforces and that the office perform functions parallel to those previously dis-charged by the Governor General. It was further proposed that at least three, butnot more than five candidates for President and Vice President (without powerto succeed) be nominated by the BLV, both Houses of Parliament then formingan electoral college to elect candidates. Procedures regarding possible removalof office prior to the expiry of a term were stipulated. Ethnic accommodation isrecognized in the recommendation that candidates for President choose as theirrunning mates a non-Fijian candidate. Similar principles underpin a recom-mended consultative President's Council, comprising between 10 and 15 dis-tinguished citizens not parliamentarians or state servants, meeting at thePresident's discretion, although not less than annually.

(ii) The Senate

The Senate (Bose e Cake) should have the power to initially amend, or rejectBills originating from the House of Representatives (Bose Lawa) to where theymay be returned for subsequent consideration. While the House of Representa-tives retains ultimate legislative authority, scope for involvement by the Senatein possible amendment is provided. Although the Senate is envisaged asprimarily a body of review, some scope is provided for collaboration betweenboth houses of the legislature, as in the suggestion for a joint standing Financeand Expenditure Committee.8

(Hi) The Prime Minister and Cabinet

The CRC recommended that the Prime Minister head a Cabinet collectivelyresponsible to Parliament for advice to be tendered to the President. Whenappointing a Prime Minister, the President is expected to choose the individualmost able to command a majority in the House of Representatives, and to takeinto account electoral support and other potentially relevant factors includingthe outcome of negotiations in forming a government, the identity of the PrimeMinister, and the composition of the Cabinet. The CRC suggested thatthe Prime Minister maintain regular contact with the President supplying

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Table 1. Existing and proposed systems compared

Function 1990 Constitution CRC Report

President

Vice-President

Senate

Prime Minister

House ofRepresentatives

Citizenship

Bose LevuVakaturaga(BLV or Chiefs'Council)

Appointed by the Bose LevuVakuturaga.Term 5 years.

Provision for Acting President.

24 Fijians; 1 Rotuman;9 others.All appointed.

Fijian member of the House.

70 seats: 37 Fijians; 27 Indo-Fijians; 1 Rotuman; 5 other races.Term 5 years.

Citizen entitlement if father isFijian. Only women married to acitizen of Fiji so entitled.

Recognizes the BLV.Appointed by the President,Prime Minister, Minister FijianAffairs and Provincial Councils.

Registrationof voters

Ethnicity decided through themale line.

Fijian elected by Senate andHouse of Representatives.Nominated by the BLV.Term 5 years.

Non-Fijian elected by Senateand House of Representatives.Nominated by the BLV.Term 5 years.No right of succession to officeof President.

28 provincial representatives(elected); 1 Rotuman member(elected); 6 other members(appointed by President).Alternative preferential votesystem. Term as for House ofRepresentatives.

Member of the House; noprovision about ethnicity.

70 seats: • 12 Fijians andPacific Islands; 10 Indo-Fijians;1 Rotuman; 2 other races;• 45 open seats, 3 each from15 all race constituencies.Alternative preferential votesystem. Term no longer than4 years.

Children entitled to citizenshipif either parent a citizen of Fiji.Entitlement to any citizen ofanother country married to aFiji citizen.

Continued BLV recognition.• Ex Officio: The President;Heads of the 3 Confederacies;Minister Fijian Affairs.• Appointed: 20 by the 3Confederacies. 5 by theChairperson.• Elected: 14 by the ProvincialCouncils; 1 by the Council ofRotuma; 1 by the Rabi IslandCouncil. Term of those electedor appointed 3 years.

Ethnicity decided througheither male or female line.

information as requested. In most circumstances (some exceptions are identi-fied) the President will grant a Prime Minister's request for a dissolution ofParliament.

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However, the report is unambiguous in stating that where the Prime Ministeris defeated on a motion of confidence, in the event of a subsequent refusal toeither resign or request a dissolution within a time-bound period (unspecified),then the President should dismiss the Prime Minister. There should be aconvention developed that no more than a quarter of the Ministry compriseelected members from the Senate within a total Cabinet not exceeding 20.

(iv) The BLV

It is recommended that the BLV primarily advise the government on any matterdeemed to affect the well-being of the Fijian people, nominate candidates forthe Presidency and approve any Bills affecting entrenched legislation of directconcern to Fijian, Rotuman, and the Banaban communities. The BLV shouldalso be permitted to advise the government on matters affecting the nation as awhole. A future constitution should give the BLV a veto over any Bill designedto alter entrenched provisions, the powers and composition of the BLV, andprovisions which give the BLV a veto power to the foregoing. The NativeLands Commission should be constitutionally protected, comprising threemembers appointed by the President on the recommendation of the BLV.

Over an issue of critical importance to the BLV, and by a recommendationthat may prove contentious among Indo-Fijians, the CRC has recommended:'The section of the Bill of Rights affirming the right to equality under thelaw and freedom from discrimination on prohibited grounds, including thoseof race and ethnic origin, should permit the limitation of that right by orunder a law for the purposes of imposing a restriction on the alienation of landheld in accordance with Fijian custom, or permitting the temporary alienation ofsuch land without the consent of the owners'.9 The matter is contentiousbecause in the remaining years of this decade, hundreds of tenancies, predomi-nantly Fiji-Indian occupied land utilized for sugar cane-growing, fall due forreview.

A Westminster transplant?

How well does the CRC's advocacy of multi-ethnic accommodation complywith Westminster principles and their assumptions that the underlying rules ofthe game are sufficiently robust to withstand the buffeting of adversarialpolitics? The critical bridge here is representation, in particular the role of polit-ical parties. The central role that these organizations will have to play underreformed constitutional arrangements is constantly stressed throughout the CRCreport. The rejuvenation entailed is substantial, the reversion to full coramun-alism in recent years having taken its toll of party structures that lack depth inpolicy formation, recruitment of women, and organizational capacity able toperform a multi-ethnic role. If needed party development does not eventuate,then it is likely that such intra-elite formation as occurs among parliamentaryfactions, even under the guise of multi-ethnic accommodation, will witherfor lack of public support. The CRC would have reasoned that lack ofincentives to recruit candidates and win voting support among all races, areconditions that stunt party development and facilitate ethnic populism. The case

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for public funding of political parties would seem a sound one worth furtherinvestigation.

At a step removed from the immediacy of political representation, theCRC report has attempted to underpin a future constitution through a Compactdesigned to enshrine a consensus of shared public values. This wouldinclude a statement of rights over land, religion, and civic functions; continua-tion of the existing separate system of Fijian administration; full account of theinterests of all communities by future governments; the legitimacy of coalitiongovernments; and commitments to negotiate differences between ethniccommunities in good faith. Another system legitimizing function is seenthrough various references to the role and status of the Leader of theOpposition. If that precise standing is a matter for debate among constitutionaltheorists, there is also scope for argument about whether a written constitutioncan prescribe convention in a manner other than hortatory—in this instance therecommendation that no more than a quarter of the Ministry come from theUpper House.

Electoral innovation

In the interests of fostering multi-ethnic political accommodation, the CRC hasrecommended an electoral system which if not historically novel, is uniqueunder current circumstances.10 Of the 70-member House of Representatives, it isrecommended 45 are elected from 15 constituencies each returning three repre-sentatives via the alternative (preferential) voting system. For the CRC, keyobjectives included a workable electoral system securing voter participation;representation of minorities; effective government; effective opposition;perceived fairness; cooperation across ethnic lines; and legitimacy. In methodsof election for the three-member open seats to the Lower House, it is suggestedthat first, second, and third preferences apportioned each candidate by votersare pooled. Contestants with the lowest total of votes are progressively elimi-nated following each reallocation of preferences, until the three highest pollingcandidates emerge. Electors would receive a ballot paper where the top halfprovides an opportunity to vote on a ticket basis for candidates via an order ofpreference indicated by a party, coalition of parties, or independent candidate.Should electors wish to vote according to a different order, then they wouldhave an option of placing their preference numbers beside candidates listedindividually in the bottom half of the ballot paper."

Counting votes under this system could prove as complicated as explainingthe nature of preferential voting to electors long inured to communal representa-tion. Nor is it clear how tactical voting—potential coalition formation in mind—might affect the goal of achieving multi-ethnic representation. Speculationaside, it is imperative the report's recommendation that suitable electoral legis-lation facilitate an effective programme of public education should these inno-vations proceed. The retained 12:10:3 allocation of communal representation isrecommended as transitional, meaning Fiji's electoral arrangements couldremain subject to protracted review. For the next five years this may not matter,although its continuation beyond then could compound voter confusion andapathy.

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Refurbished governance

Even before, but particularly since the 1987 coups, standards of governancehave deteriorated in Fiji. The CRC addressed these difficulties by recom-mending that sector standing committees of Parliament assume a stronger, moreautonomous conduct of audit, scrutiny, review, and policy investigative func-tions. Given continuing scandals of malfeasance, the observation that 'muchwork remains to be done' towards improving government accounting systemsand procedures is highly pertinent. A reformed constitution, it is suggested,should state clear procedural and accounting rules required to allocate amongstate institutions responsibility for estimating and accounting for revenue andexpenditure.

Extensive recommendations are also provided for the administration ofjustice, endorsing findings of the 1994 Beattie Commission in places, butopposing it over allowing the Chief Justice to sit on the Court of Appeal.Recommendations are made for improved local government; needed freedom ofinformation legislation; and an extensive section on the promotion and protec-tion of human rights. The CRC outlines principles and procedures for the opera-tion of a neutral public service, a strengthened role for the ombudsman, andmethods of appointment for key officials. Taking this opportunity, the CRCobviously decided that the time was more than overdue for Fiji's public sectormanagement to face a full and independent scrutiny.

The political responseSince publication, the CRC report has elicited contrasting political responseswithin Fiji. From a loose coalition comprising the Fijian National Party, theVanua Party, and elements of the Taukei movement, there has been an a prioriroot and branch rejection. Responses from Muslim and some European-domi-nated political bodies have also been dismissive. Under an umbrella entitledCampaign Against the Reeves Report (CARR) desultory protests and poorlyattended street marches have been organized. A larger body of Fijian opinionhas adopted a guarded, but still open minded approach. It has been encouragedto do so by Church leaders, in particular Methodist leader the Reverend Tuwere(who established a good rapport with Sir Paul Reeves), this figure publiclysupporting a fair hearing for the CRC report. Notwithstanding rejection by twoprovincial councils, most Fijian rural opinion is reserved pending fullercomprehension and explanation of details of the report. Resistance from thesequarters is possible given the Upper House provision of each province havingtwo members elected by voters of all races.

The opposition National Federation Party's leader, Jai Ram Reddy, hasregarded the CRC report as providing a turning point from which the countrycan either advance or regress. For his party, should the opportunity to install afairer constitution go begging, then Fiji's economy will falter, resulting inpossible social unrest and further Indo-Fijian emigration.12 Indo-Fijian ruralopinion is understandably ambivalent about the CRC Report's already citedconditionality regarding rights in relation to land tenure arrangements. The FijiLabour Party was quick to designate its three parliamentarians serving on the

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Select Committee and to vest them with the authority to negotiate with otherparties towards securing a just, fair, and democratic constitutional outcome.13

Responses by Prime Minister Rabuka have varied; his initial responsefavoured due deliberation was then followed by his reassertion of the centralityof indigenous interests after local consultation. This echoes what he told theUnited Nations General Assembly in 1995, namely: 'The United Nationsshould guarantee that external values and forces did not continue to coerce fromthe indigenous political concessions, economic reforms, and social changes thatthey do not themselves desire'.14 Nevertheless, the Prime Minister is at one witha leading opponent, Joseph Kamikamica, through his appeal for consensuswithin the join parliamentary committee deliberating the report. Should that notprove sustainable in regard to favoured changes, Rabuka has warned, sectionsof the 1990 constitution will be retained.15 He has also told those in his Cabinetto cease their links with a now waning Taukei movement which has adopted arejectionist posture towards the CRC Report16—a warning which probablyapplies to three of his colleagues.

Rabuka's widely noted inconsistencies highlight a more fundamental politicalproblem facing reform of Fiji's constitutional arrangements. This is the lack ofa sufficiently committed core of parliamentarians, operating as a nucleus fromthe centre, willing and able to take the initiatives needed to promote, and toimplement the CRC Report.

Foreign and Commonwealth implications

Although internal political developments are not regarded as regional concerns,South Pacific Forum governments want a Fijian role in the South Pacific that isoutward looking and constructive. Fiji's prospects for enhanced regionalstanding are seen as improved by processes of constitutional reform andstronger national unity. With the Forum's headquarters in Suva, as are theregional offices of UN agencies and the University of the South Pacific, anunsettled constitutional situation stands to disturb these functions. The SouthPacific Forum is keen to promote an uncluttered decolonization of NewCaledonia. Fiji is a member of the Forum's ministerial mission that reported oncurrent progress under the Matignon Accords. In 1996, Fiji joined the 'Spear-head group' of Melanesian countries, although it incurred Beijing's irritation bysharing with Vanuatu and Papua New Guinea an approach according Taiwan aform of semi-diplomatic status through a so-called 'mutual recognition pact'.17

Towards Europe, and regarding the phasing down of sugar access arrangementsunder the Lome Convention, one estimate has put Fiji's possible price declineat between 12 and 15 per cent by the end of the decade.18 That possibility is awarning for Fiji to establish coherent and united bargaining positions, some-thing more than usually persuasive when political accommodation is occurringover constitutional reform.

Since the release of the CRC Report, the United Kingdom, Malaysian andIndian governments have issued statements indicating that Fiji's return to theCommonwealth would be welcomed pending progress on constitutional reform.Membership would bring advantages of not only political, sporting, cultural andprofessional association, but access to schemes advantageous to small states

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such as the Commonwealth Private Investment Initiative. Yet early re-admis-sion, say by late 1997, could prove unrealistic with Fijian opinion resistant toany notion that the pace of the constitutional revision process run to exogenoustimetables. A key link for Fiji will be a re-establishment of ties with Bucking-ham Palace through the Queen as Head of the Commonwealth, this possibilitymentioned by a number of submissions made to the CRC. While a significant,even emotional symbolic reassertion for many Fijians, resentment might accrueshould taking this step emerge as an incentive to accept other measures lessfully supported.

Fiji's military coups of 1987 may have been bloodless, but they seriouslywounded the country's self respect and slow accumulation of inter-ethnic trust.The CRC Report is a blueprint for a gradual recovery, its processes of delibera-tion themselves providing a possible climate where consensus over agreedground rules might start to emerge. Aspects of the CRC Report concerning thepromotion of human rights, management in the civil service, and the adminis-tration of justice could commence their initial deliberative stages without unduedelay. Educational authorities could begin considering what the Report saysregarding the desirability of the major communities making a greater effort tolearn and use each other's languages. More time will be needed to develop thepolitical structures capable of competing under an altered electoral dispensationyet to be finalized.

Regardless of contrasting future trajectories, there is much in the CRC Reportthat provides an incentive for public interests to participate. Unlike the seclu-sion that marked previous constitutional drafting in Fiji, the CRC exercise hasopened windows of expectation. A decade since the dark days of May 1987, thecountry is ready for change under conditions of greater international inter-dependence. It remains possible that the expert services and guidance of thethree wise men involved in the CRC may be required for further advice andconsultation.

Notes and references1 The Fiji Islands. Towards a United Future. Report of the Fiji Constitution Review

Commission (Parliament of Fiji, Paper No 38), 1996.2 Fiji Daily Post (Suva), 7 September 1996.3 Mr Dunstan is also Chairperson for the multiracial Movement for Democracy and

Human Rights in Fiji. The submission is entitled Towards Racial Harmony. TheSubmission of the National Federation Party and the Fiji Labour Party to the FijiConstitution Review Commission (Suva, August 1995).

4 Among those consulted were Donald Horowitz of Duke University, ArendLipjhardt of the University of California, San Diego, and David Butler of OxfordUniversity.

5 Following independence, the relative percentages of the two major communitiesdid not alter markedly, this occurred only after the exodus of up to 70 000 Indo-Fijians subsequent to the 1987 coups. Hence in 1986 Fijians comprised 46 percent of the population; Indo-Fijians 48.7 per cent; and others 5.3 per cent.However 1995 estimates of Fiji's approximately 790 000 total resident populationindicated Fijians comprising 50.7 per cent; Indo-Fijians reduced to 43.5 per cent;

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FIJI AT THE CROSSROADS?

and others relatively stable at 5.8 per cent. Fiji Bureau of Statistical News, No 19,1996.

6 The CRC decided to leave undisturbed the indemnification issue, but recom-mended that the Fiji Military Forces be subject to parliamentary statute.

7 The CRC Report has throughout preferred the terminology The Fiji Islands andFiji Islanders as more neutral, inclusive nomenclature.

8 Recommendation 376, CRC Report.9 Recommendation 630, CRC Report.

10 Between 1919 and 1946, this system was used to elect the Australian FederalSenate.

11 Recommendation 268, CRC Report.12 Reuters News Service, Suva, 21 October 1996.13 Fiji Sunday Post, 22 September 1996, p 3.14 UN General Assembly. Press, GA/8969 24 October 1995, p 77.15 Fiji Daily Post, 26 September 1996, p 1.16 The Fiji Times, 26 September 1996, p 1.17 Reuters News Service, Taipeh, October 4 1996.18 Peter Osborne, 'Trade issues of Pacific Island countries', UNCTAD, E/CN,

17/1996/Misc 2, p 32.

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