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Farewell to the tick box inspector? Ofsted and the changing regime

of school inspection.

Abstract

Since its inception in 1992 Ofsted (The Office for Standards in

Education), has inspected schools under Section 9 of the Education

(Schools) Act 1992; Section 10 of the School Inspections Act 1996;

and Section 5 of the Education Act 2005. During this time the

English approach to inspection of education has become increasingly

stringent. Pressure on England to improve its system of education

has not only emerged from the national need for all schools to serve

their pupils well, but has also been prompted by an increasing

emphasis on international league tables such as that produced by the

OECD (Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development). In

tables such as PISA England is viewed as underperforming against

comparable countries. As a result, Ofsted has introduced what they

term to be one of the most stringent and demanding inspection

frameworks since the agency was created. This framework reduces the

previous twenty eight inspection judgements to just four, placing a

far greater emphasis on the professional judgement of the inspector

and representing a major departure from the ‘tick box’ approach

which had characterised previous frameworks. This paper examines the

ways in which the revised framework places far greater emphasis on

inspector professional judgement and discusses the implications

arising from this for governing education by inspection in England.

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Introduction

This article explores the practice of inspecting schools as a way of

governing education. Despite the rise of more elaborate systems of

data that measure and map educational performance (Ozga et al.,

2011), many countries have maintained or developed processes of

school inspection as a means of managing educational performance.

Drawing on a larger study of school inspection in Sweden, Scotland

and England, we examine the paradox status of professional judgement

in school inspection in England. Like many other processes of

performance management and quality assurance developed in public

services since the 1990s, school inspection has appeared to be at

risk of becoming a ‘tick box culture’. The idea of the ‘tick box

culture’ has been a powerful critical idea that has been applied to

many fields (health care, social care, policing and criminal

justice, health and safety regulation and more). The Office for

Standards in Education (Ofsted), which has been responsible for

school inspection in England since 1992, has been recurrently

charged with promoting a ‘tick box’ approach to inspection

(Parliament, 2004:38; 2011b). Critics, both within and beyond the

school system, have consistently complained about the inspection

method and its pursuit of a narrow, check list driven approach to

the evaluation of teaching quality. For example, the heads of

private schools (subjected to a similar, although not identical,

regime of inspection, complained in 2011and were successful in

bringing about changes:

‘In a recent consultation exercise by the inspectorate, headteachers demanded a move

away from the "tick box" culture and the scrapping of some regulations so that

inspectors can spend longer in classrooms.’(Copping, 2011)

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The depth of feeling that the Ofsted inspection regime has evoked

can be found in a range of documents – from evidence submitted to

Parliamentary committees to the responses to interventions by Chief

Inspectors about the standards of schooling. For example, this

comment followed a report by The Guardian newspaper on a visit by

the recently appointed Chief Inspector (Sir Michael Wilshaw) to an

‘outstanding’ school in Birmingham:

‘If you put me in charge, the inspectors would have no tick boxes and would have to

use professional discretion. The illusion of objectivity is death by tick box.

I like the idea of Ofsted but in practice you end up doing special lessons for them,

where you have to make sure the inspector ticks the right boxes.’(Vasgar, 2012)

This comment starkly dramatizes the polarization between a ‘tick

box’ approach and the exercise of professional judgement and

discretion that has been central to debates over school inspection

and other quality assurance processes (see Travers, 2007). In this

article, we trace the emergence of an Ofsted regime of school

inspection and its recent transformation intended to liberate the

professional judgement of the inspector from the unwieldy and

constraining demands of the previous ‘tick box’ approach. As the

Coalition Government’s 2010 White Paper on schooling explains:

Along with making information and data about schools publicly available, the

publication of inspection reports is an important part of making schools accountable

to parents. Ofsted remains a highly respected part of the education system. The robust

independent challenge of inspection can confirm school self-evaluation, boost staff

morale and stimulate further improvement (DFE, 2010)

However, in recent years, Ofsted has been required to focus too much on inspecting

schools against government policies, at the expense of a proper focus on the core

function of schools: teaching and learning. We will ask Ofsted to return to focusing its

attention on the core of teaching and learning, observing more lessons and taking a

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more proportionate approach – devoting more time and attention to weaker schools

and less to stronger. (ibid: 69)

Liberating inspection from the ‘tick box’ approach was intended to

shift the focus of inspection to teaching and learning, and pupil

behaviour. It was also intended to free up the professional

judgement of professional inspectors to evaluate the qualities of

what they observed. In what follows, we will trace the somewhat

paradoxical fate of professional judgement in the new inspection

regime.

Methodology

The research project on which this paper is based examines

inspection as a means of governing education and investigates the

governing work that inspection regimes do in three national

education systems: Sweden, England and Scotland. The project

methodology also includes analysis of the extent to which inspection

offers a resource for trans/intra-national policy learning within

and across these policy spaces. The project investigates tensions

between increased regulation through technical means such as

performance data and the rules followed by inspectors in their

school assessments, and their expert knowledge, professional

judgement and use of support, development and persuasion in

encouraging self-regulation in the teaching profession. As part of

this enquiry ,we are mapping the interrelationships of inspection at

different system levels and across Sweden, Scotland and England,

with a focus on transnational policy .We are also mapping inspection

processes within local authorities/ municipalities and between local

policy spaces and schools.

The project methodology is a mix of documentary analysis of relevant

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literature-including official literature and inspection handbooks,

along with a large sample of inspection reports from each system;

interviews with key ‘system actors’ at the international, national

and local levels [90 in total] and investigation of the background,

training, experience and ‘assumptive worlds’ of each national

Inspectorate. There are also detailed case studies of a sample of

inspection ‘events’ (5 in each system). The English case studies

include analysis of Ofsted school inspection reports from the five

case study areas including those reports which date from the last

inspection schedule under section 10 of the Education act

(Parliament, 1996) and the more recent inspections carried out under

Section 5 of the 2005 Education Act (Parliament, 2005). The data are

analysed via a combination of qualitative data analysis methods

including discourse analysis (Potter, 1996; Schiffrin, Tannen et

al., 2001; Wodak & Meyer, 2009) and data analysis software that

identifies patterns and trends in the use of key words such as

‘teaching’, ‘learning’, ‘standards’ and ‘evidence’.

The recruitment and training of inspectors are key elements in the

inspection process. Inspectors’ personal and professional qualities

are key factors in their appointment, contributing to the way in

which they make their judgments while also influencing their

abilities to convey these judgments both orally and in writing.

Previous research on inspection (see also Lee & Fitz, 1997; Nixon &

Rudduck, 1993; Woods & Jeffrey, 1998) has revealed that inspectors

rely very heavily on their professional judgment in order to decide

upon school levels of performance and also to create a productive

working relationship with schools that enables them to convey

decisions and feedback in ways perceived to be constructive by school

staff. This element forms a key part of their training as evidenced

in accounts provided by inspector trainers:

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‘[inspection] is 98% interpersonal, and that’s what we focus upon in terms of the training

‘(P11)

Our focus on possible tensions between professional judgment,

interpersonal relations and the regulatory role of the inspectorate

presents a complex arena for research but one that is of

considerable importance to the understanding of the credibility of

the inspection process.

The relevant policy texts that we have analysed in relation to this

topic include the various iterations of the inspection frameworks,

and this analysis forms the basis for semi-structured interviews

with key policy actors in the inspectorates of each country, in the

case of England, with agency inspectors and HMI (Her Majesty’s

inspectors), and with selected headteachers.

Governing education: data, observation and judgement.

The use of data in the governance of education within the countries

that make up the OECD (Organisation for Economic Cooperation and

Development), has been in evidence for some time now (Lawn & Grek,

2009; Ozga, 2009).Introduced in order to promote economic

competitiveness inter country comparison tables such as that of PISA

(define) have indicated that in terms of education England has some

way to go. A substantial body of evidence suggests that, with few

exceptions, in England pupils from disadvantaged backgrounds do less

well than their peers (Mortimore & Whitty, 2000). With 77% of the

between school differences in student performance linked to socio

economic background, pupils in England are considerably

disadvantaged compared to their counterparts in the rest of Europe

(OECD average 55%) (OECD, 2010b:1). A report by the same

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organisation revealed this gap to be almost three times larger in

England than in other OECD countries (OECD, 2006; Schütz, Ursprung,

& Wößmann, 2008). This data combined with recent damning reports in

the English press , and a new Chief Inspector (Sir Michael Wilshaw)

who believes that too many children in England are ‘being failed,

after spending their entire primary or secondary education in

schools rated no better than ‘satisfactory’ (Paton, 2012). Such

arguments place increasing levels of pressure upon Ofsted to ‘raise

the bar’ and create an inspection system which transfers that

increasing pressure onto schools, demanding that they raise

standards and ensure that England’s international education ranking

is improved.

The inspection system in England has at its disposal one of the

most extensive data banks in the world as indicated by Christine

Gilbert, the previous Chief Inspector of Schools:

The intelligent use of data affects the work of all professionals involved in education. There

can be no going back to the days when decisions were made on hunches and anecdotal

information. But we have to present and explain data in ways which inspire trust and

confidence, and lead to appropriate choices and judgements being made. Using data,

improving schools is intended to help everyone involved in school improvement achieve this

goal. The booklet also acts as a reminder that whilst data cannot be ignored, we must

recognise its limitations. There is no straightforward, formulaic link, for example, from

contextualised or any other form of data to the judgements inspectors make during

inspections. And data must never be used – by schools or inspectors – to furnish excuses for

poor attainment or slow progress’ (Ofsted, 2008:i)

Data, both qualitative and quantitative has been a feature of Ofsted

inspections for many years, but the data alone is not considered by

either the agency or the teaching profession to be enough on which

to judge schools. As one senior Ofsted official stated, ‘data tells you

how it was but not why it is’(P17).

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Although inspection data forms the cornerstone of the way in which

judgements are reached, the use of data amongst the teaching

profession varies widely. Many head teachers, although highly data

literate are suspicious as to the ways in which the data is used by

Ofsted in order to make a judgement. This can place inspectors in a

problematic position, as one Lead Inspector suggested: ‘you get these

heads and they really know their data, in terms of their school, they understand it,

sometimes better than the inspectors ‘(P2); while another quoted a head

teacher: ‘If all you are going to look at is the data then why bother coming into school’

(P1)

But the emphasis given to performance data is not the only reason

for the vilification of the agency by press, public and profession

and constant scrutiny by parliament (Parliament, 2004, 2011b). The

1992 Education Act and the creation of Ofsted implied great change

to the remit and role of inspectors. Prior to this HMI (Her

Majesty’s Inspectorate) was largely composed of a group of full-time

education professionals whose role was ‘not … a means of exercising control,

but of affording assistance’ (Maclure, 1986:22) often taking more of the

role of critical friend, as ‘supportive agents of change’ .Painting

a picture of a relatively autonomous inspector dependent upon their

own professional judgement, inspectors were to a great extent

reliant upon their own values and ideas of what constituted

effective teaching and pedagogies: values which formed via a mix of

personal schooling and teaching experiences. But the nature of

professional judgement and the ways in which the inspectorate

conducted its business was not unproblematic either for government

or the teaching profession, resulting in at least ‘13 internal and external

inquiries in the period between 1945 and 1984’ (Maclure,2000:105), reflecting

the suspicion over both the functions and power of the organisation

and those working within it.

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The shift from HMI to Ofsted came as a result of increasing doubt

about the professional culture and judgement of the Inspectorate, in

particular the suspicion that they were inclined towards

liberal/permissive/child-centred pedagogy. Nevertheless, the new

system brought new challenges for educational governance. Employing

an army of contract inspectors as well as full time centrally based

HMI Ofsted in 1992 consisted of a much reduced HMI workforce and,

‘hundreds of inspection agencies’ (P1) contracted to deliver inspections.

This model of sub-contracting called into question how consistency

could be effected (Maw, 1995). One response was a series of

handbooks, and from 1995 onwards a website, in which much of the

Ofsted documentation, procedures and practices were published

(Archive, 2012). From 2009 onwards the number of private contractors

approved by Ofsted to carry out inspections was reduced to just

three, with the aim of both reducing costs and improving inspection

efficiency (Ofsted, 2009c). The successful contractors: Cfbt, Serco

and Tribal have been, as part of their contractual arrangement,

subjected to rigorous systems of quality control, not only in terms

of the reports produced, but also in terms of the ways in which they

recruited, trained and developed inspectors. As part of this

arrangement both the agency and the providers sought not only to

streamline inspection processes, but also to achieve much greater

levels of standardisation than was previously possible. But issues

of consistency and quality in inspection continued to exercise both

sector and politicians and, following a number of reviews and

parliamentary debates and a change of government, a new ‘tougher’

2012 framework was introduced that was greeted as ‘the product of an

evolved inspection system’ (P17).

Reflecting the White Paper commitment to focus more directly on

teaching, learning and pupil behaviour, the new model of inspection

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reduced the number of judgements made by inspectors from twenty nine

to just four (Ofsted, 2012a).Removing much of the ‘tick box’ element

from inspection this framework places far greater emphasis on the

ability of the Lead inspector to ‘tell the story of the school’

(Ofsted, 2012b, 2012g) and involves a much greater degree of

professional observation of lessons than in previous frameworks. As

Parliament had requested, was this the end of the tick box

inspector?

‘[inspections]That would enable inspectors to move away from a very tick-box method,

which they are having to use now, partly because of time pressure. The reliance on data is

also very symptomatic of the fact that they are not able to get a very good gauge

themselves by being in schools’ (Parliament, 2004).

Examining the implications of the new framework in terms of how this

impacts on the professional judgement of inspectors whilst also

discussing the implications of the perception of validity of

inspection judgements, the paper moves onto discussing these

elements in light of the ways in which Ofsted effects educational

governance in England.

Governing by inspection:

School inspection is currently a feature of the education systems of

a number of countries who employ it in order to govern increasingly

complex education systems (Ozga, 2009), and to satisfy governmental

demands for greater transparency within the public services,

reflecting Clarke’s argument that when,

‘Governments strive to reform public services and produce ‘improvements’, they encounter

an increasingly sceptical public, unwilling to believe things they are told by politicians.

Evaluation systems and agencies promise a way out of this paradox of government:

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independent and expert agencies that can assess performance and its improvement ‘at

arm’s length’ from government’(Clarke, 2008a:123)

There has been a proliferation of agencies, organizations and

processes that provide ‘arm’s length’ evaluation of public services

since the 1990s: forms of audit, scrutiny, performance management

and, of course, inspection. Inspection regimes are not homogenous

but vary according to the institutional culture, educational climate

and, to a great extent, on the prevailing political formation of

particular countries (Grek 2012) (Swedish papers add ref).

Inspection agencies also vary in terms of their remit: in some

countries such as Sweden, many inspectors come from a legal

background, and may not have any educational background, while in

others such as Scotland, the inspectorate is focused upon school

improvement and rests heavily upon the individual inspector’s

experience in education.

As discussed earlier, governing education by inspection has been a

feature of the English system for some time now but it’s role both

in terms of the ways in which it governs and the impact of

inspection are regularly the subject of parliamentary scrutiny

(Parliament, 2004) and 2010). But the matter which exercises both

the agency itself as well as its external critics, has always

centred around the ways in which inspectors make their judgements,

and to what extent these judgements can be considered to be valid,

robust and above all consistent: how does a team of inspectors enter

a school for two days and within that short timeframe, effectively

analyse whether a school is good, bad or in need of improvement? As

outlined in earlier, failing schools are not purely a blot on the

English educational landscape, but form part of a bigger picture,

reflecting on intercountry comparitors such as the OECD PISA scores,

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(Programme for International Student Assessment). As the 2010 white

paper points out,

‘What really matters is how we’re doing compared with our international competitors. That

is what will define our economic growth and our country’s future. The truth is, at the

moment we are still standing still while others race past.’(DFE, 2010).

Ofsted declares its task in national educational terms – its purpose

being to ‘regulate and inspect to achieve excellence in the care of

children and young people and in education and skills for learners

of all ages(Ofsted, 2012f). However, one Senior Official articulated

the international comparative framing of this task:

A big part of our work is where we sit in terms of international comparison, we

spend a lot of time poring over OECD and PISA comparisons and we pull out

complex messages about what the English system is doing. It isn’t a league table, it’s

much more complex than that…‘A big part of my role is when the OECD publish stuff

to try to distil what that actually means for the English System and to move away

from the league table nonsense to a more profound interpretation of individual

country data. (P17)

In addition to its regulatory function Ofsted also plays a vital

role in terms of the ways that education is perceived in England:

through the press, and through its website which has evolved from

being a simple repository for inspection reports to today’s

multimedia offering, designed to engage both an English and

international audience (Archive, 2012). The appeal of its regulatory

framework extends to the international context and this combines to

authenticate its work internationally,

For example, Croatia wanted to know how – what impact the system of inspection

had on improving the quality of leadership in schools- actually not just schools when

they eventually arrived it was the public sector in Croatia generally! (P17)

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In order for Ofsted to be considered to be an effective tool of

governance, it requires a good measure of credibility: credibility

in the way in which it functions, credibility as to the extent to

which judgements may be considered to be robust, and finally,

credibility in terms of the way in which the agency creates

discourses of successful and unsuccessful educational experience in

England (see Baxter & Clarke, 2012). At the core of its credibility

sits the inspector and the extent to which their professional

judgement and characteristics can create robust and credible

judgements. But who is this inspector and how do they execute their

professional role? In the following section, we discuss the changing

nature of the inspector and the ways in which they are being called

upon to exert far higher levels of professional judgement than

formerly and what this may imply for the inspection process.

A Mature System of inspection ?

The move from the 2009 inspection regime to the 2012 version

represented one of the greatest shifts to the inspection process

since its inception in 1992. But in little under six months, in the

period from January 2012 to September 2012 the regime shifted again

in response to a consultation which drew upon inspection results

drawn from inspections carried out under the January 2012 Framework

combined with data drawn from reports illustrating the high

percentage of schools which appeared to be ‘coasting’ at

satisfactory levels over a sustained period of time (over 2 years)

(Ofsted, 2012c, 2012e; Paton, 2012)

The 2012 inspection regime states within its code for inspectors

that:

‘[inspectors should] evaluate objectively, be impartial and inspect without fear or

favour, report honestly and clearly, ensuring that all judgements are fair and reliable,

and base all evaluations on clear and robust evidence.’ (Ofsted, 2012a)

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The judgements available to inspectors under the September Framework

are: Outstanding, Good, requires improvement and inadequate. The

satisfactory judgement has been removed for the reasons outlined

earlier. Both the January 2012 Framework and the September Framework

in contrast to the previous 28 judgements, under the 2009 version

classifies inspection judgements under just four overarching

categories: Overall effectiveness, achievement of pupils, quality of

teaching, behaviour and safety of pupils and leadership and

management (Ofsted, 2012a).

The Ofsted website explains why the sub-judgements have been

removed,

It needs to be said that there are no sub judgements or contributing judgements in the new

schedule , it is very clearly possible now for inspectors to take account of the context of the

school, look at the nature of the intake of the school , look at the progress rates those kids

have , their starting points when they joined the school and have that in depth discussion

with the staff about the rates of progress that have been achieved and why and what is the

impact of the actions of leadership and management and the quality of teaching is having

on improving the different rates of progress for different pupils. (Ofsted, 2012d)

The quote indicates the way in which the new framework is designed

to work to create a more holistic picture of the school, to counter

criticisms that the previous system left little room for

professional discretion and that the algorhythms involved in

analysis of the data only painted part of the overall picture.But

the new Framework and accompanying Inspection Schedule (Ofsted,

2012a, 2012g) bring different challenges to the role of the

inspector, challenges which begin to manifest during the training

period and continue during school inspection. One of the key

challenges lies in the paradoxical nature of the type of

professional judgement required by the new framework: what is meant

by ‘taking account of context’ and the way in which teaching and

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learning is assessed under the new regulations. An additional

challenge is inherent within the shifting understandings of what

constitutes a good or outstanding school, along with the downgrading

of the satisfactory judgement to ‘requires improvement’ .(Ofsted,

2012c; Paton, 2012) as a result of reports stating too many schools

rated satisfactory are failing to improve. These changes are not

only challenging for schools but are also the cause of some heated

professional debate amongst the inspectors themselves as one

inspector told us,

‘in the previous framework there was a very clear formula, so if you got this and this , it

would have to be that. This government wants to move away from that formulaic approach

and build in the professional judgement. That said, what we are seeing is that when HMI

read the report , cos a the moment they are reading every report, they are questioning the

judgements tht we made…questioning the professional judgements..’ (P10).

But the challenge is not only inherent in the ways that inspectors

make their judgements ,but also lies in the ways in which they

convey those judgements in a plausible and credible manner, a manner

that is persuasive enough to convince school leaders that the

judgement is indeed fair and equable. As one senior inspector

trainer told us:

‘[inspection] It’s 98% about communication’ (P11).

The communicative elements required by the inspectors extend to what

is required of them in the written form when they must not only be

able to ensure that the judgements are able to reflect context

without actually making allowances for it by,

Mak [ing]appropriate professional judgements about the extent of the detail needed to ‘tell

the story of the school’, depending on the complexity of the circumstances.’ (Ofsted,

2012a:22)

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In addition, to accommodate the shifting framework

‘[inspectors should] ‘Explain clearly in the report any apparently stark difference in the main

grades from one inspection to the next. This is to ensure that readers are clear about

aspects of the school’ s work that change significantly between inspections. It is also to

ensure that readers do not confuse such changes with a lack of consistency in

judgements.’(ibid:23)

Although the inspection schedule has been welcomed by both schools

and teaching associations for its focus upon teaching and learning

the reduction in judgements as the discussion above has revealed,

given rise to new challenges for both the inspectorate and the

inspectors and raised new concerns about levels of consistency

between inspectors and schools , as one officer within a schools

association pointed out,

‘Most heads in our area although they are apprehensive that it looks more rigorous most

feel it is fairer, that this is what we should be focusing on , not the nebulous initiatives oft eh

government of the day , but on the nuts and bolts of what happens in the classroom and the

competence of staff .’ (P10)

But a school improvement leader pointed out,

‘It’s the consistency , that’s what we are worried about, the consistency now that all of those

judgements have gone.’(P20)

The current schedule began in January 2012 since then evidence

suggests that either schools are regressing or the framework is

indeed far tougher. Figures released by Ofsted in April 2012

revealed that in January 2012 out of 348 schools inspected; only 19%

of schools improved, 50% stayed the same and over a quarter [28%]

declined on their previous inspection. This compares with 34%

improving, 47% staying the same and 19% declining at inspection

under the previous regime in the period 2010/2011(Ofsted, 2012e).

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The next section of this paper looks at how the changing goal posts

and emphasis on the professionalism of inspectors may impact on

inspection as a tool for educational governance in England.

Calling the professional inspector:

Inspection agencies in any field gain much of their credibility by

the ways in which the professionals employed within them go about

their business, reach their conclusions and the ways in which they

convey those judgements to their service users and government

(Boyne, Day et al., 2002; Boyne, 2006).The notion of ‘a professional

inspector ‘is therefore central to both their function and

reputation and much debate has swirled around questions about the

quality, experience and professionalism of Ofsted inspections and

the inspectors who conduct them. A Parliamentary Education Committee

report in 2011 circled around these questions of experience and

expertise, reflecting anxieties expressed about the quality of

inspectors (rather than the quality of inspections):

76. There are too many inspectors lacking recent and relevant experience of the

settings they investigate. The Inspectorate of Education should extend and develop

mechanisms—such as outward secondments to the front line—for ensuring that its

inspectors remain in touch with the system and changes therein. (Education

Committee, 2011: 26-7)

Differing and evolving notions of professionalism and what

constitutes professional judgement are well documented in both the

literature on the professions and the sociology of professions

(Evetts, 2003; Henderson, 1964). But due to the nature of the way in

which the inspectorate is organised England, the very term

‘professional inspector’ is problematic. The inspectors employed by

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the three contractors tend to be employed on a part-time basis and

therefore are increasingly engaged due to their current practitioner

status in schools (for further discussion see Baxter, 2012).Although

inspectors are employed by the companies, their work is quality

assured and monitored by Ofsted. Working in teams the lead

inspectors deal with evidence gathered prior to and during the

inspection and

‘They [the inspectors] are responsible for putting it all together in one report, and at

the same time they will QA the sections that come in from other inspectors. When

completed they will send it to the inspection service provider and they will also send

the report to the QA readers that QA the report, they it goes to Ofsted and an HMI

signs it off‘ (P3)

This multi-layered approach to quality assuring inspection and

inspection reports reflects Ofsted’s continuing concern with

ensuring the reliability and consistency of inspection (between

schools and between teams of inspectors). External evaluation of

services is always vulnerable to methodological challenges about the

quality, consistency and replicability of judgements (as well as to

the accuracy and adequacy of data, (seeClarke, 2008b), but it has

been a consistently contested issue in school inspection since the

creation of Ofsted. Even as we were drafting this paper, further

controversies were taking place about the processes of producing

inspection reports (Abrams, 2012b) BBC Radio’s File on 4 programme

revealing that in the first five months of implementation of the

January 2012 Framework one in twelve of all schools inspected made a

formal complaint afterwards. Ofsted did not release comparable data

for last year, but the figure certainly represents a rise. The

Association of School and College Leaders says its monitoring

suggests the number of complaints has doubled. At the same time, the

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number of schools judged inadequate rose from 6% during the last

full academic year to 9% in the spring term of 2012 (Abrams, 2012b)

Meanwhile, the inspectorate says its own post-inspection monitoring

suggests nine out of 10 schools are happy with the process. (ibid)

But although the process is rigorously quality assured, what happens

to the final judgement may represent a departure from that

originally decided upon by the inspection team,

‘Now if Ofsted say no we are not signing it off, then it becomes a key performance indicator

failure for the provider, so they are paranoid about this because they get slapped, you get

contract action notices that will say, that unless you improve this will happen, but at the last

inspection I said , ok teaching and learning are definitely satisfactory, and he said ok we

agree to all that, then we came leadership and management and we said , if teaching and

learning is satisfactory then leadership and management must be too, but he said , I would

have expected leadership and management to be good because without all of the things we

are doing, if leadership and management less than good then we couldn’t even keep the

thing even at satisfactory, I have some sympathy with that….so you get tied up in these

knots and in the end what inspectors are doing is saying ok well I have to follow this

rule….there isn’t a rule but I have to follow it….’ (P2).

The quote above illustrates the dichotomy and tensions between the

framework, the inspector’s professional judgement and need to take

in to account the evidence provided by the in school senior

leadership team. The judgement must also be robust enough to pass

through layers of quality assurance and be deemed robust by up to

twenty five people who analyse the report in terms of its ability to

justify the final judgement.

Professionalism and professional judgement are intrinsically linked

by both professional bodies and in the literature on the sociology

of the professions (Evetts, 2003; Parsons, 1954). One of the core

traits of being a professional is the ability to employ professional

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‘discretion’ (Evetts, 2012). As mentioned earlier, recruitment of

serving headteachers and senior teachers to the inspectorate has

recently formed a key performance indicator for all three inspection

agencies, raising questions around what type of professionalism and

professional judgement is being called upon to carry out the role of

inspector. That of a teaching professional or that of an inspector ?

Ofsted’s most recent School Inspection Handbook contains numerous

references to tasks to be carried out under the auspices of

professional judgements: that ‘inspectors should use their

professional judgement to plan an appropriate lesson observation

strategy’ (Ofsted, 2012g:section 27) that they should ‘engaged with

professional dialogue with the headteacher or senior member of

staff,’ (ibid:31). Textual analysis comparing The 2009 inspection

guidance and Framework with the September 2012 Inspection Handbook

and Framework revealed that the word professional appeared 24 times

in the new documentation compared with only 13 in the 2009

documentation (Ofsted, 2009a, 2009b, 2012b, 2012g). Discretionary

application of professional judgement is a core element within most

professional occupations (J Baxter, 2011; Evetts, 2010, 2011), but

the study of professional judgement is a complex one, as Taylor

states , ‘experimental methods of investigating decision making tend

to be constrained by practical and ethical difficulties, whilst

questions about validity and generalizability surround ethnographic

and other descriptive methods.’ (Taylor, 2006:1187). Many ‘tick box

methods’ that have evolved in other sectors have come about through

attempts to lessen accusations of subjectivity and to give the

inspection process greater levels of public transparency (Boyne,

Day, et al., 2002). The change in regulatory style between the pre-

1992 inspectorate and Ofsted as discussed earlier, was largely

prompted by a need to create greater levels of transparency within

the education system (see The Citizen's Charter Parliament, 1991)

21

whilst also attempting to create a system of regulatory inspection

in which the occluded aspects of professional judgement were

replaced by a more {superficially?) transparent process of

inspection. (Maclure, 1986, 2000).

But a return to a system which is largely reliant upon the

professional judgement of its inspectors presents challenges, not

purely in terms of the judgements themselves but also of public and

professional perception of the judgements. Linking trust to

professionalism Frowe maintains that ,’trust always involves risk

and even if we try to reduce the amount of risk by reverting to

alternative mechanisms we still need to trust in those mechanisms

(Frowe, 2005:38). Viewing the inspectorate’s recent emphasis on the

recruitment of headteachers from good or outstanding schools as

discussed earlier, represents an attempt by the agency to mediate

judgements and by enjoining inspectors to create enhanced

collegiality between they and schools under inspection, but fails to

address the issue of shifting standards and professional trust in

those standards. (Abrams, 2012a, 2012b). This also touches on the

two areas of professionalism characterised by Downie: ‘legal and

moral legitimacy’: legal legitimacy arising throught the profession

being established in law and given certain powers to regulate its

affairs , moral legitimacy on the other hand, being ‘concerned with

how the profession is viewed by the public, notably to what extent

the profession is seen as creditable, that is, the extent to which

it is regarded as ‘being independent, disciplined by its

professional association, actively expanding its knowledge based,

and concerned with the education of its members.’ (Downie,

1990:154). The professional education inspector unlike their

counterparts in for example Spain, have no professional association

22

to represent their interests (ANIE, 2012).1 The idea such an

association seemed to one lead inspector with over fifteen years

experience as being something of an anathema to the agency, when

asked whether there existed such an organisation they replied,

‘no and I don’t think that Ofsted would allow ether to be one……HMI are closeted up without

any professional association contact, they are not allowed to.’ (P1).

Considering the size and scope of the English inspectorate (Ofsted,

2012f) and the challenges inherent in maintaining consistency

amongst the agencies who carry out a substantial proportion of the

work , it seems puzzling that no such body exists. That given the

substantial remit of the work of Ofsted and the demands placed upon

inspectors in terms of keeping pace with changes in pedagogy,

practices and the changing landscape of education in England, (DFE,

2010; Mulholand, 2012; Parliament, 2011a; Richards, 2010), that

responsibility for updating, professional dialogue and monitoring

and evaluating performance should fall on the three agencies

(Tribal, CFbt and Serco) overseen my means of key performance

criteria imposed by Ofsted.

The concept of the discretionary power of the professional (Frowe,

2005:44) is recognised to emanate partly from the knowledge base of

the professional (Arnal & Burwood, 2003; J Baxter, 2011; Evetts,

2011; Nixon & Rudduck, 1993), but also from a liberal perception of

professionalism to be underpinned by a theoretical basis which expands upon what

Oakshott terms,’ an understanding of the complexity of the many situations which will lead

1 Es objetivo de ANIE la gestión y la representación de los intereses profesionales de sus asociados. A la vez, como asociación de inspectores, defendemos que el ejercicio de la función inspectora educativa esté orientado al cumplimiento delas leyes y a la mejora de la calidad de la enseñanza que se imparte a todos los ciudadanos.

23

to equally knowledgable people making different choices about appropriate courses of

action (Oakeshott, 1989).

These understandings of professional practice, heavily focused upon

professional learning, both initial and ongoing that individuals

receive whilst carrying out their work. (See Baxter and Hult 2012

for discussion on inspector training and development), also raise

interesting questions focused around they ways in which inspectors

are trained to carry out their work. Decision making in other

professional environments explores elements such as : ethical

dimensions of decision making (Healy, 2003),explorations of the

meaning of expertise (Clifford & Williams, 2002), normative studies

investigating ‘rules of thumb or heuristics’ (Taylor, 2006:1190) as

well as other taken for granted elements of professional practice

(Boyne, 2006; Hammond, 1996; Healy, 2003; King, Murray et al., 2004;

Wallander, 2009). These elements key into fundamental principles of

professional identity and have been identified across the public

services as being key to individuals’ and organisations’

understandings of the delicate balance between professional

discretion and consistency (J Baxter, 2011; Beijaard, 2004; Burke &

Reitzes, 1981; Johnson, Morgeson et al., 2006; McCall & Simmons,

1966; Stryker & Serpe, 1994). Continuing professional development

and ample opportunity for professional dialogue are also hallmarks

of most public service professions and as such are often

instrumentalised by professional or representative bodies in order

to overcome political and cultural elements of organisational events

and opportunities, as well as offering individuals a ‘safe space ‘

in which to discuss issues and problems arising from their

professional practices and policies that may be testing to

operationalize (J. Baxter, 2011; Bradford, 2008; Maudsley &

Strivens, 2000; Nicol & Harrison, 2003; Slotnick, 2001; Weiss &

24

Welbourne, 2008; Wiles, 2010). Ongoing opportunities for

professional dialogue and development are have also been identified

as key to the retention and role efficacy of staff, particularly

when faced with challenging and constantly evolving work contexts

(Atkinson, 2002; Ball, 1998; Gleeson & Knights, 2006; Leadbetter,

Daniels et al., 2007).

During the course of the discussion within this paper we have

highlighted the challenges facing both the inspectorate and the

inspectors who work within it. The new regulatory framework has

clearly been designed to address the most fundamental issues facing

English education today: the quality of teaching and learning. In so

doing it also aims to create a more bridgeable gap between the

inspectorate and the profession whilst also providing a driver for

school improvement which will overcome the substantial inequalities

in educational provision in England. But as we have outlined, the

complexities of using this to achieve a credible, effective and

regulatory consistent method of governing education, are considerable.

The paper has outlined the centrality of the role of the inspector

within this system and whilst the Framework For Inspection has

undergone radical changes in order to eradicate the tick box

framework this paper suggests that a return to an environment in

which the professional judgement of the inspector as the core of

educational governance is considered both trustworthy and credible

may take somewhat longer.

‘

25

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