double denial in attitude formation1

Double Denial in Attitude Formation'

LENNART SJOBERG S~ockholm School of Economics

Srockholm. Sweden

HENRY MONTGOMERY 2 Siockholm University Stockholm. Sweden

While expressing their attitude toward an object, people sometimes deny both the probability of attributes that would speak against the attitude and the value of these attributes. We term this kind of functioning double denial. Double denial is incompatible with expectancy-value models of attitude formation. In eight studies of attitudes, values. and beliefs, there was clear evidence for double denial. The evidence was particularly strong for items measuring salient beliefs and for items and groups of participants yielding belief ratings that strongly correlated with attitudes. The results are interpreted in terms of the social functions of values and beliefs in the construing of arguments pro or con an attitude object, It is concluded that beliefs and values are dynamic entities, continually shaped in argumentation, and that expectancy-value models of attitude are inadequate to account for the relationships among attitudes, beliefs. and values.

Attitudes are commonly considered to be the outcome of cognitive information integration. In expectancy models of attitudes, beliefs and values are assumed to be integrated to generate attitudes. According to a dominating school of thought, the pertinent infwmation is assumed to be reflected in ratings of beliefs and values associated with salient attributes (Fishbein, 1963; Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975).

These notions are operationalized a s follows. Given that salient attributes have been established, they are rated as to the value they have by themselves (in the abstract), without regard to the particular attitude object. Furthermore, the likelihood that the attitude object will have the attribute in question or that the event denoted by the attribute will occur is rated. The attitude to an attitude objectj, A , , is assumed to be a hnction of the sum (or mean) of the products of beliefs ( 6 ) and values (V), according to the equation

Aoj = VI

'The order of the authors' names is arbitrary. Equal responsibility is assumed. The paper was supported by grants from The Swedish Council for Research in the Humanities and Social Sciences. We are indebted to the late Amos Tversky for his comments on the manuscript and to Maria Lewicka and Ingrid Tollgerdt-Anderson for help in data collection.

?Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Henry Montgomery, Department of Psychology. Universitet Stockholm. S- 106 91 Stockholm. Sweden.

Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 1999, 29, 3 , pp. 606-621. Copyright D 1999 by V. H. Winston & Son, Inc. All rights reserved.

DOUBLE DENIAL 607

where the sum ranges across all salient attributes. The expectancy-value class of models has been criticized on several grounds

(e.g., Bagozzi, 1984, 1985). In the present paper, we concentrate on an aspect that has not been covered in previous work on attitude models: double denial.

The Phenomenon of Double Denial

Consider the following incident, observed in an earlier study (Sjoberg, 1982). A woman who held a strongly negative attitude toward alcohol was interviewed about her ratings of alcohol effects. She had indicated in her ratings that there was a very small probability that someone becomes “happy” from drinking a specified amount of alcohol (a belief rating). She also rated it as very negative to be “happy” (value rating). But, given an expectancy-value approach, a low likelihood of an event rated to be quite negative would be less supportive for a negative attitude than would be the case for a high likelihood of such an event. At the same time, it was clear from the interview that her intended message was to express her very negative attitude toward alcohol. It seemed that she wanted to make sure that alleged positive effects of alcohol were downgraded by rating them both as very unlikely (probability denial) and as little positive, or even negative (value denial). We term this kind of paradoxical rejection of an attribute double denial since both probability denial and value denial are invoked.

Taken separately, probability denials and value denials appear as perfectly legitimate arguments for a given attitude. Their effects on attitudes are in line with an expectancy-value approach. The paradox emerges when the two types of denials are combined. Double denial then disconfirms expectancy-value models of attitudes.

The paradox of double denial becomes understandable if we assume that the individual does not consider the combined effect of probability denials and value denials, but uses each type of denial as a supportive argument for his or her attitude. Double denial thus is assumed to arise in an argumentative mode of information generation. The alternative, presumed in standard attitude theory, is an analytical mode of information integration.

A Hypothesis of Explicit and Received Values

We assume that, in double denial, belief statements are made with reference to received values, not the values that the person explicitly expresses when rnak- ing value judgments, which may be termed contextual or idiosyncratic values. Received values are culturally given, and they are the values that a person assumes to belong to the generalized other, who is considered to be a potential opponent when in the argumentative mode. This approach is in line with the key notion in the rhetorical approach to the study of attitudes and opinions, which

608 SJOBERG AND MONTGOMERY

implies that thinking about controversial issues primarily aims at persuading an imagined or real opponent (Billig, 1987, 1991).

The following is assumed to be a crucial process in double denial: People operate with two evaluations of the same event-a received evaluation referred to when the probability of an event is generated, and a different and explicit evaluation when the value of an event is generated. Consider again the alcohol example: The subject rated “happy” as a quite negative state and as a very unlikely effect of alcohol. It seems clear to us that she said (a) happiness caused by alcohol is no good, and (b) happiness in general, or as I understand that you mean it, is unlikely to be caused by alcohol. She was thus referring to the received concept of the value of happiness in her probability rating and to a contextually defined value in her value rating. She rated happiness produced by alcohol, not happiness in the abstract and general sense. Summing up, we assume that double deniers do not really conceive of values in the abstract (i.e., regardless of any influence from the attitude object), but contextually, bound to the attitude object and its effects. Furthermore, we assume that they construe their beliefs with regard to the assumed value of a real or imagined opponent, the received value. Probabilities and values are adjusted in order to be consistent with the attitude toward the object-at the expense of mutual consistency.

The purpose of the present paper is to investigate if double denial occurs in typical attitude measurement tasks and for typical social attitude objects and to discover how common it is. We report eight studies which allow us to investigate double denial in the field of social and political attitudes,

Consider again Equation 1 and assume that it holds in a sample of individu- als. If, for a given attribute, V is constant, there should be a correlation between attitude, A,, and belief, b. The correlation should be positive if V is positive and negative if V is negative. If V = 0, the correlation should be 0. In contrast, if there is double denial, the correlation between A , and b should be independent of how events are evaluated explicitly, and instead be in line with the sign of the received evaluation assumed to be active when the probability of an event is in focus. That is, it is predicted that the A& Correlation is positive when the received value is positive and negative when the received value is negative. These predictions should hold, independent of whether the event is evaluated explicitly as positive, neutral, or negative.

To test these predictions, the concept of received value is operationalized as the mean value rating of an attribute. This generalization is based on the assump- tion that received values reflect majority positions in value ratings. In other words, we assume that the evaluations made by the imagined opponent represent the majority view.

We investigate the prevalence of double denial by computing the correlation between A , and b for a number of attributes, separately for those persons who gave negative, neutral, or positive value ratings of the attribute. Hence, for each

DOUBLE DENIAL 609

attribute, there will be three correlations. The prevalence of double denial is then tested by plotting the correlations between A . and b against mean value ratings across attributes. Such a plot will be made separately for positive, neutral, and negative explicit value ratings.

Double denial is supported by positive linear correlations in such plots. This is because, as noted previously, double denial implies that the sign of Ao-b correlation is in line with the received value, which we assume is reflected in the mean value ratings. By contrast, functioning according to an expectancy-value model is consistent with a zero linear correlation in the plots since in that case the sign of the correlation between A0 and b should be in line with the sign of the explicit value rating, which is constant in each plot. More precisely, expectancy-value models imply that Ao-b correlations based on positive value ratings should be confined to the two upper quadrants of a plot (i.e., positive correlations throughout), whereas Ao-b correlations based on negative value ratings should be confined to the two lower quadrants (i.e., negative correlations throughout). For neutral explicit values, all Ao-b correlations should be 0.

Method

Data from eight studies were used to examine the prevalence of double denial and for testing the attitude models described previously. In all of the studies, participants rated their attitude toward a given object, and they were later asked to rate values and probabilities of events that might be associated with the object. More precisely, the participants were instructed to rate the value of each effect, should it occur, and thereafter the participants were asked to rate the same events again, but this time with respect to how likely or unlikely they were. In Study 1, the rated events were selected by means of a pilot study according to the method- ology recommended by Ajzen and Fishbein (1980) to ensure that the events cor- responded to salient beliefs.

The other studies were not designed to include only salient beliefs. In these studies, participants rated a relatively large number of events, all of which were conceivable effects of the attitude object. The events were selected on the basis of interviews with persons from the subject populations and by analyzing leaflets and newspaper articles that presented arguments related to the attitude issue. These studies were carried out because we wanted to investigate the extent to which double denial occurs for any event that might be associated with an attitude object, not just events that are salient according to standard procedures.

Study I : Attitudes Toward Closing Down a Nuclear Power Plant, Disarmament, and Building a Bridge Between Sweden and Denmark

Participants. The participants were students in senior high school or in so- called folk high school. The high-school students specialized in various areas,


namely, economics, distribution and maintenance, social science, technology, and theology. All of the participants lived in the southern part of Sweden (Skine). A total of 200 subjects participated ( I 17 women, 83 men). Their mean age was 19.8 years. They were approached while in class and asked to take part in the study. None refused to do so.

Selection of attitude objects. Three attitude objects were selected to represent societal issues assumed to be of current concern for the participants. Two attitude objects pertained to unsettled projects in the Skhne region: (a) closing down the Barseback nuclear power plant in 1996 at the latest, and (b) building a bridge between Sweden and Denmark. The third object was described as disarming the Swedish defense to half of its present strength.

Elicitation of salient beliefs. Salient beliefs were first elicited in a free-response format from 7 1 additional participants representing the populations described previously. The procedure followed in detail the standard procedure described by Ajzen and Fishbein (1980). Each subject was asked to list advan- tages and disadvantages associated with each of the three selected attitude objects. The four most frequently stated beliefs concerning each attitude object were selected as modal salient beliefs for the population. All of these beliefs were frequently mentioned by the participants and represented a great majority of all statements made by them.

Rating scales. The attitude object was rated on a 7-point scale ranging from 1 (extremely bad) to 7 (extreme/-v good). The value of the four selected events was rated on 7-point scales ranging from 1 (extremely good) to 7 (extremely bad). The probability of the same four events was rated on 7-point scales ranging from 1 (extreme1.v 1ikeI.v) to 7 (extremely unlikel-v). All response scales were defined exactly as described by Ajzen and Fishbein (1980) and translated into Swedish.

Studies 2 and 3: Attitudes Toward Defense and Disarmamen!

Participants. There were 40 participants (21 women, 19 men). Their mean age was 39 years. They belonged to various organizations and were sampled to get as wide a range of attitudes toward the Swedish military defense as possible.

Ratingscales. Participants were asked to rate their attitude toward (a) the present Swedish defense, including military defense, and (b) disarmament of Swedish military defense. These ratings were all made on 7-point scales ranging from -3 (very bad) to +3 (very good). Value ratings of 44 events were made on a 7-point scale of possible effects of disarmament and of continued use of military defense. The scale ranged from -3 (very bad) to +3 (very good). Likelihood ratings were made of the same 44 events, given continued use of a Swedish military defense and given a disarmament of the Swedish military defense. The scale had seven categories and ranged from -3 (very unlikely) to +3 (very likely).

DOUBLE DENIAL 611

Study 4: Attitude Toward the Restriction ofAlcohol Sales in Sweden

Participants. The number of participants was 40 (22 men, 18 women). Their mean age was 33 years. They belonged to various organizations and were sampled to get a broad range of attitudes toward legislation regarding the restriction of alcohol sales, implying that each person could only buy a specified amount of alcohol in a given period. Some further details of the suggested policy were also specified.

Rating scales. Participants were asked to evaluate the policy of sales restriction on a 5-point scale ranging from -2 (very bad) to +2 (very good). The participants were later asked to judge, on 5-point scales, the values of 44 events from -2 (very bad) to +2 (very good) and the probabilities of the same 44 events from 1 (very unlikely) to 5 (very likely).

Study 5: Attitude Toward the Restriction ofAlcohol Sales in Poland

Participants. A total of 62 psychology students (3 1 males, 31 females) at the University of Warsaw served as participants. However, data from only 59 participants were analyzed since data were missing for 3 participants.

Rating scales. The questionnaire was basically a Polish translation of the questionnaire used in Study 5. A few items were changed to fit Polish conditions. Another difference as compared to Study 5 was that all rating scales were 9-point scales.

Study 6: Attitude Toward Nuclear Power

Participants. There were 67 participants (8 men, 59 women). They were students at a teachers' college for preschool teachers. Their mean age was 27 years.

Ratingscales. The questionnaire was based on items used by Otway and Fishbein (1975) in their studies of Austrian participants. The participants were first asked to evaluate nuclear power as a whole on 5-point scales. Next, participants were asked to evaluate 37 events that might be associated with nuclear power and to rate the probabilities of the same events on 5-point scales. For details about this study, see Sjoberg and Biel (1983). The data were collected in 1980, a period of intense controversy in Sweden about the issue of nuclear power.

Study 7: Attitude Toward School Marks

Participants. The participants were students in senior high school, specializ- ing in economics or social science. In all, 157 subjects participated (105 men, 52 women). Their mean age was 17.2 years. They were approached while in class and asked to take part in the study. None refused to do so. The data were


collected in two waves ( N = 73 and 84, respectively), with some very slight variation of procedures.

Rating scales. Participants judged the overall value of the system of marks on a 5-point scale ranging from -2 (very bad) to +2 (very good). Values and probabilities of 42 events were rated on scales ranging from -2 (very bad) to +2 (vety good) and from 1 (very unfikefy) to 5 (very likefv), respectively.

Study 8: Attitude Toward Membership in the European Union

Participants. A random sample consisting of 3,000 persons living in Sweden was approached with a mail questionnaire containing questions about their attitudes toward membership in the European Union. Of the sample group, 50% responded, being representative in terms of gender, age, and education of the population.

Rating scales. The contents pertinent to the present paper were as follows: (a) a judgment of overall attitude toward membership, on a 7-point scale; (b) ratings on 5-point scales of how likely 36 changes were, given that Sweden was to become a member; and (c) ratings on 5-point scales of how desirable the 36 changes were, regardless of the membership issue.

Results

Owing to the small number of items for each issue in Study 1, the correlations between attitudes and belief ratings were computed across all attitude objects in that study combined. The computations and plots in Studies 2 through 7 strictly followed the procedure described above. In Study 8, a more detailed analysis was carried out than in the other studies inasmuch as correlations were computed for each of the value rating categories taken separately. Figures 1 ,2 , and 3 show rAh-

M , plots for Studies 1, 2 through 7, and 8, respectively. It can be seen that the rAh-Mv correlations are positive in 25 of the 26 plots and very close to 0 in the remaining plot. More precisely, positive ‘Ab correlations tended to be associated with positive mean evaluations and negative rAh correlations with negative mean evaluations. Exactly this pattern is to be expected under double denial. It is concluded that double denial occurred in all eight studies.

However, the size of correlations shown in Figures I , 2, and 3 varies across studies, implying that there was a corresponding variation in the prevalence of double denial. The rAh-Mv correlations tend to be highest in Study 1, which only involved salient beliefs. They are also high for Swedish alcohol, defense, and nuclear power participants, moderately high for Swedish disarmament and school marks participants, and low for Polish alcohol participants. In line with this pattern, “true” value reversals (i.e., value changes associated with a change

DOUBLE DENIAL 613

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Figure 1. Plots of attitudebelief correlations (rAb) for single items against mean value rating in Study 1. Each plot includes data from all three attitude objects. The correlations in the upper left panel were computed for all participants. The correlations in the other panels were computed separately for participants giving positive, neutral, and negative value ratings, respectively.

of rAb in line with the expectancy-value model) occurred for just a few items associated with high rAb-Mv correlations but were more common in studies for which these correlations were lower (cf. the upper-right quadrants in the plots of positive FAb's and the lower-left quadrants in the plots of negative rAb's).

In no study majority evaluations of an item were clearly associated with an rA6 of a sign opposite to the sign of the evaluations (cf. the empty lower-right quadrants in the plots of positive rAb's and the empty upper-left quadrants in the plots of negative rAb'S). This means that all deviations from the expected value principle were in line with double denial.

The variation in prevalence of double denial across studies appears to be associated with the extent to which variations in beliefs discriminated between attitudes (see the absolute levels of the rAb'S correlations). To get a quantitative measure of this tendency across the six studies that involved the same i"Ab computations (Studies 2 through 7), we first computed means of the absolute attitude-belief correlations across all signs of the value ratings in each study and then the correlation across the six studies between these means and the rAh-M,,

DOUBLE DENIAL 615

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ratings in Studies 2 through 7. The correlations in the uppermost panel were computed for participants giving positive, neutral, and negative value ratings, respectively.

each of the 12 items. More precisely, a weak form of double denial (same sign of rAb for zero value ratings as the sign of M,) occurred for all 12 items. A strong form of double denial (same sign of rAb and of bf, for value ratings with signs opposite to the sign of M,) occurred for 10 out of those 11 items for which the rel- evant rAb's could be computed. Table 1 also shows the number of participants for each rAb. The frequency of participants giving value ratings against the majority view varied considerably across items. For some items, quite large numbers of participants belonged to this group. Double denial also occurred in these cases.

61 6

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SJOBERG AND MONTGOMERY

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Figure 3. Plot for attitude-belief correlations against mean value in Study 8 for participants giving a particular rating (very positive, weakly positive, neutral, weakly negative, very negative).

Discussion

Our data suggest that double denial is quite common, especially for salient items, but i t may also occur for nonsalient items. It may be noted that each case of value reversal provides a critical test of the expectancy-value principle. If the

DOUBLE DENIAL 617

Table 1

Analysis of Double Denial for Items in Study 1

Sign of value rating

Positive Zero Negative Attitude Mean object Item rAb n rAb n rAb n Value

Nuclear The risk that a nuclear power plant will have a breakdown decreases .3 1

Energy becomes more

The worry about nuclear waste and radioactive pollution decreases .I7

Environmental pollution increases -.47

Sweden will be a good

expensive -.42

Disarma- ment example with respect to

disarmament .39 We will feel less protected -. 18 The government’s

expenses decrease .30 We can protect our

neutrality .50 There will be faster and

more convenient communications to the continent .38

The environment in SkAne

The export possibilities of the SkAne increase .30

The boat services across Oresund have to be abolished

Bridge

deteriorates .08

156 .59

18 -.06

145 .I2

16 -.52

105 .01 20 -.01

140 .15

104 .36

134 .22

7 -.55

157 .11

2 -.28

24 .06 11 2.06

15 -.28 162 -1.88

24 .09 26 1.55

12 -.43 166 -2.17

45 .40 41 0.83 39 -.09 134 -1.29

28 .24 24 1.39

43 .43 46 0.73

44 .29 17 1.30

18 -.23 170 -2.20

25 .24 13 1.57

11 -.32 183 -2.52


value reversal is associated with double denial, then the expectancy-value principle is disconfirmed. On the other hand, if a “true” value reversal occurs, the expectancy-value principle is confirmed. For 7 of our 10 data sets, the great majority of value reversals were associated with double denial.

The existence of double denial suggests that values and beliefs are dynamic entities (Slovic, 1995) which are produced in a given social context, such as defense against an opponent. To the extent that this is true, there are no unique values and beliefs, and modeling altitudes on a basis of static beliefs and values is therefore unrealistic and uninformative. But why do expectancy-value models fit at all, and why do they fit rather well, in spite of the evidence for double denial presented here? The reason, we suggest, is that most people after all have similar explicit and received values. That is, most people have the same events and values in mind when they evaluate the probability and value dimensions of an attribute or an item. If they construe the scaling situation as one of argumentation, they apparently expect the imagined opponent to share their value conception, and they appear to be correct in that expectation.

But consider again a case of double denial that involves using a contextual conception of value-sed in rating value-and a different, received value in the rating of probability. It is not obvious why people should refer to ‘1 ‘ b stract attributes while they make probability judgments and to contextual attributes while making value judgments. We suggest the following explanation:

Argumentation is normally not about values but about the state of the world. This is a common finding in studies of political controversies (Axelrod, 1976; Biel & Montgomery, 1989; Gallhofer & Saris, 1989). This may be because in debates values are typically either all positive to all parties or some of them are not suitable for public disclosure. In the latter case, it is obvious why people would not reveal a value, and in the former case, discussion about values becomes rather useless because (a) relative value weights carry little rational meaning, and (b) the slighting or downplaying of a value is risky because it could expose one to loud protests from some concerned parties. In addition, value argumentation tends to be seen as very subjective and quite futile, a question of taste, and as the Romans said, “De giistibus non est disputandem.”

Thus, argumentation is usually about the state of the world, not about values or tastes. In making a statement about probability, one therefore has little to gain by referring to an idiosyncratic or contextual value. The discussant instead refers to the received value and goes straight on to deny its actual applicability to the attitude object under discussion by means of belief argumentation.

It may be asked if the individual recognizes the inconsistencies implied by double denial. Perhaps, from the individual’s point of view, there are no inconsistencies, only different judgments in different situations. Let us consider the previously mentioned inconsistency in explicit and received evaluations of a given event. The received value is taken for granted when the probability is in focus.

DOUBLE DENIAL 619

This value may reflect how the individual evaluates an event which is believed not to occur. When the explicit value of a denied event is in focus, the individual may imagine how the event would be evaluated if it were to occur (e.g., if the Swedish military defense proves to be inefficient for defending Swedish territory). The individual might then find reasons for reconsidering the (received) evaluation of the event (e.g., “After all, it is bad if the military defense is success- ful in defending our territory,” or “Being occupied by enemy forces may not be all that bad, it could even have some positive effects”). Here, the person imagines a different situation than the situation that was in mind when the probability of the event was rated. That is, he or she imagines the situation that an improbable event will occur and tries to find out how it is possible to stick to the initial attitude in this situation by reevaluating the consequences of the pertinent event.

A person who thinks in this way will regard his or her position in an issue as a dominating alternative. Whatever happens, the value of the pertinent events will be in line with his or her attitude. In other words, the person has access to a dominance structure (Ariely & Wallsten, 1995; Montgomery, 1983), a cognitive structure in which possible drawbacks associated with a taken position or favored alternative are eliminated in one way or another. Previous research has shown that belief systems associated with attitudes are often structured as dominance structures (for a review, see Montgomery, in press). By having access to a dominance structure, it will be easier for the individual to act in a consistent way across different situations (i.e., to behave in line with a chosen alternative or taken position; see Montgomery, 1989). Double denial may be seen as one way in which dominance structuring helps the individual to be consistent; in this sense, in his or her thoughts and actions.

Double denial is also consistent with a conception of attitudes as based on imagery. We suggest that images give rise to attitudes, beliefs, and values, rather than attitudes being generated on the basis of beliefs and values (cf. Sjoberg & Biel, 1983). The attitudes are backed up by an arsenal of arguments that at the expense of logical consistency help the individual to defend and preserve his or her position. Such an approach is compatible with the notion that attitudes may serve a value-expressive function which implies that the attitude is defended against any counterargument, irrespective of the strength of the evidence (Abelson, 1986; Lindstrom, 1995; Lydon & Zanna, 1990).

We finally consider when double denial occurs and when it does not occur. We first note that in Study 1, which involved modal salient beliefs, double denial clearly occurred for all items. Double denial was also common in most of the remaining seven studies, which involved a large number of items that were not all salient. Thus, it appears that double denial is not restricted to a few salient beliefs.

The prevalence of double denial varied considerably across the seven studies that involved a relatively large number of belief-value items. There was a corresponding variation in absolute level of the attitudebelief correlations across all


signs of the value ratings. The more beliefs discriminated negatively or positively between attitudes for a given set of items or group of participants (high rAh-Mv correlations), the clearer were the signs of double denial.

A high positive or negative correlation between belief and attitude suggests that the beliefs may be used as arguments for or against a given attitude. In line with our previous reasoning of possible social functions of double denial, it may be suggested that the rAb-M,, correlations imply that double denial serves the function of providing a maximal defense against any given belief-based argument that threatens an attitude.

We conclude that there is strong evidence for the occurrence of double denial. Hence, the expectancy-value principle does not give a true description of how attitudes are related to beliefs and values. A quite different approach than expectancy- value is required for modeling the relationship between attitudes, beliefs, and values. Indeed, the whole notion that attitudes are the outcome of an integration of values and beliefs is challenged by the present results. Expectancy-value models cannot account for such a mode of functioning as documented here.

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