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Policing and SocietyAn International Journal of Research and Policy

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Different styles of policing: discretionary power instreet controls by the public police in France andGermany

Jacques de Maillard, Daniela Hunold, Sebastian Roché & Dietrich Oberwittler

To cite this article: Jacques de Maillard, Daniela Hunold, Sebastian Roché & DietrichOberwittler (2016): Different styles of policing: discretionary power in streetcontrols by the public police in France and Germany, Policing and Society, DOI:10.1080/10439463.2016.1194837

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10439463.2016.1194837

Published online: 21 Jun 2016.

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Different styles of policing: discretionary power in street controlsby the public police in France and GermanyJacques de Maillarda, Daniela Hunoldb, Sebastian Rochéc and Dietrich Oberwittlerd

aCesdip-UVSQ-CNRS-Ministère de la justice-UCP and Institut Universitaire de France, Paris, France; bDepartment ofCriminology, German Police University, Münster, Germany; cCNRS, Pacte-Sciences Po, University of Grenoble,Grenoble, France; dMax Planck Institute for Foreign and International Criminal Law, Freiburg, Germany

ABSTRACTBy analysing French and German police stop and search on the streetsbased on embedded observations in police patrols and findings of a largeschool survey, this article comparatively questions their determinants.Control practices diverge in their frequency: the German police officerscontrol less proactively than their French counterparts. The targets ofcontrols also differ: a concentration on visible minorities is much morepervasive among the French police officers. These divergences may beexplained by contrasted professional orientations, especially theimportance given to the crime control agenda, and state/society relations.

ARTICLE HISTORYReceived 1 November 2015Accepted 24 May 2016

KEYWORDSDiscrimination; police; stopand search; proactivepolicing; street policing;comparison

France and Germany are often presented as proximal cases in international comparisons on topicsrelated to policing. In the typology proposed by Mawby (2008), they are part of the ‘continentalmodel’ defined by a legitimacy directed primarily towards the state, a broad definition of thepolice mandate and a rather centralised command structure. Comparative studies of crime policies,drawing on categories of welfare regimes (Hough et al. 2013, pp. 251–254), classify France andGermany in the same conservatist–corporatist category, characterised by a moderately generousstatus-related welfare state, moderately hierarchical society and a penal ideology dominated by reha-bilitation and socialisation (Lappi-Seppälä 2011, Cavadino and Dignan 2013).

A comparative sociology of policing may wonder whether police behaviours match these macro-level divisions. Do policing strategies in neighbouring European countries reflect a shared regime ofsocial and penal policies? More specifically, by analysing how French and German police proceed tocontrol on the streets, this article questions the sets of values, norms and practical reasoning of policeofficers in these two countries. We hence start with a microanalysis of police officers’ behaviours onthe streets and later seek to relate their features, set of similarities and differences, to wider organ-isational, political and cultural factors. By doing so, we echo seminal works exploring the internationalcontrasts in professional identities, police authority and uses of legal instruments (Banton 1964,Bayley 1978), and more recent empirically grounded comparisons (Cassan 2011, Body-Gendrotand Wihtol de Wenden 2014, Devroe and Terpstra 2015, Gauthier 2015) which have underlinedhow the use of force, the representation of the public and the training practices differ between Euro-pean countries.

This paper will focus on the practices of street control undertaken by police officers. The use of theterm ‘police officers’ obviously needs further specification considering the varieties of the organis-ation and policies of security forces within and between the two countries (see below). By street

© 2016 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group

CONTACT Jacques de Maillard demaillard@cesdip.fr

POLICING AND SOCIETY, 2016http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10439463.2016.1194837

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control, we mean the practices of discretionary identity checks or stop and search (or stop and frisk),and arrests that may accompany them. These control practices constitute an important starting pointfor comparative analyses because they present a mix of similarities and potential differences (seeBowling and Weber 2011). Identity checks, searches, questioning and arrests translate concretelythe ability of state representatives to limit the liberties of people. They thus represent a visible mani-festation of the police legal monopoly of violence and intrusive nature of the state (Weber andBowling 2011). They also constitute the most frequent type of interaction between state agentsand citizens (and non-citizens) and, as such, can be a source of controversial relations betweenthe police and communities. Stop and search in Great Britain (HMIC 2015), Terry stops (especiallystop, search and frisk in New York) or traffic controls (with the famous ‘Driving while black’) in theUS or identity checks in France (Jobard et al. 2012, Fassin 2013) have been a focal point of enormousmedia, public and political attention. Excessive, unfair and discriminatory controls are seen by manyas damaging police legitimacy and as a major cause of tensions between police and segments of thepopulation (Hough 2013).

But these control practices may diverge in their frequency (from rare to systematic), in their inten-sity (from a simple ID check to an arrest), in their handling (from decent and respectful to harsh andviolent) and in their distribution (from a concentration on the ‘usual suspects’ to more diversifiedtargets). In order to fully understand the implications of control policies, researchers need then toknow study how, why, when and where controls are exercised.

ID checks and more generally decisions to control are generally considered as involving dis-cretion by police officers as legal frameworks (see below) often define very broadly the necessaryrequisites to initiate a control. For this paper, we have identified those interactions in whichpolice officers had discretion (what we call, see below, discretionary controls) in order toanalyse how police officers make use of it in controlling, searching and arresting people.These decisions to control or not to do so, and then intervene in the lives of citizens are tiedto different styles of policing (Wilson 1968, Muir 1977, Hough 2013), that is, how the policehandle routine situations that bring them into contact with the public. In this research, wepay attention to the type of police work (police-initiated work or responses to calls), to moreor less formal behaviours (enforcing the law or maintaining order), and to more or less adversarialtypes of policing.

Three questions are empirically addressed in this paper: (a) To what extent is control exercisedduring encounters, that is, which proportion of interactions between the public and the police aremade of control initiated by the police? (b) Why do police officers control, that is, what are theimplicit or explicit objectives followed by police officers, their proactive cues (Ericson 1982),when they undertake controls? (c) Who are the controlled, that is, who are the most likelytargets? Each question resonates with important debates in the literature. The first two onesraise the issue of the balance between the right to control and the right to privacy andfreedom of movement (see, in a large literature, the collection of papers on different nationalcases collated by Bowling and Weber 2011). The third one refers to the large debate on the over-controlling and ‘profiling’ of some segments of the population (mainly minorities) by the police (ina very broad literature, see Bowling and Phillips 2007, Rice and White 2010). The ‘how’ issue (howthe control is handled) is not directly addressed here for space reasons, even if we will inevitablyallude to it.

The analysis is developed in four steps. We first precise the legal context (rules constraining controlin both countries) and the methodologies mobilised. Secondly, we analyse what we call the ration-alities of control in the two countries and the part of discretionary controls, the reasons for enactingthem but also the potential reasons for avoiding controls. We then focus on the issue of discrimina-tory controls by identifying the proportion of controls devoted to minorities. In Section 4, we interpretthe differences observed in the two countries.

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1. Context of the study: legal framework and methodological background

1.1. Reasonable suspicion and discretionary controls

In both France and Germany, the legal framework defining conditions of controls are broadly similar.1

Controls may be used for investigatory or preventive purposes in relation to an individual suspectedof a specific offence. They must rely on ‘reasonable suspicion’ by police officers. The public cannotrefuse to be submitted to an ID check (even if this ID check is illegal). In addition to suspicion byan agent, stop and search may be triggered as part of a penal policy as decided by judicial authorities(article 78.2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure). For example, in certain areas of Lyon and Grenoble –known for being drug-dealing places – police are given authorisation by the local prosecutor to stopand search anybody regardless of his behaviour. This also applies to Germany, where police is able todefine so-called danger zones which permit ID-checks irrespective of behaviour (known as ‘gefähr-liche Orte’, dangerous zones).

Legal rules give the police officers a large leeway to decide what course of actions to choose. As aconsequence, we define discretionary controls as ID checks and/or stop and search based on anextensive definition of ‘reasonable suspicion’. Identifying these discretionary controls is a way of iso-lating them from other controls and ID checks that fall out of the decision of an agent, such as clearinfringement to the law (over speeding) or an indisputably suspicious behaviour (being aggressive,exchanging a small package in a drug-dealing zone for example). Discretionary controls are spoken ofwhen the officers decide to control on criteria external to the possibly delinquent behaviour of theperson: an individual out of place, the general condition of a car, clothing and the attitude of a person(for instance ironic looking). In all these cases, police officers decide to control based on a set offactors that we could call ‘proactive cues’, that is, ‘shared recipe knowledge about whom to stopfor what purpose in particular circumstances’ (Ericson 1982, p. 86).2

1.2. Methodology

This article is based on a joint French–German project (called POLIS, Police and Adolescents in Multi-Ethnic Societies) funded by the two Funding research agencies in the countries (the Agence nationalede la recherche and the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft).3 The research was multi-methods andmulti-sites. Four cities have been chosen: medium-sized cities between 300 and 400,000 inhabitantsand large cities of 1 million inhabitants (Grenoble and Lyon on the French side and Mannheim andCologne on the German side). These cities all have high proportions of minorities in their populations.If the measure is difficult in Lyon and Grenoble due to the census counting, half of the populationunder 18 is from a migrant background in Cologne and Mannheim, with Turkish being the largestgroup (Oberwittler and Roché 2013). In Lyon and Grenoble, minorities are from North Africa and,at a lesser degree, from Sub-Saharan Africa. The research was primarily based on around 800hours of direct observation of police patrol, with approximately 200 hours in each of the cities. More-over, 65 semi-structured interviews were conducted with police officers in Lyon and Grenoble andabout 50 in Cologne in the Land of North Rhine-Westphalia4) and Mannheim (in the Land ofBaden-Württemberg). In France, 293 police–citizen encounters have been observed, against 247 inGermany.5 As the main focus of the study was on police–adolescents relations, police officerswere partly selected on the basis that they specialised on this age group, the observations are toa certain extent biased towards interactions involving young people. The observational data are sup-plemented by standardised data from a large school survey which was conducted in all four citiesamong young adolescents (ca. 13–16 years) using an identical design and questionnaire. The ques-tionnaire follows the tradition of previous youth studies including the International Self-ReportedDelinquency Studies (Oberwittler 2004, Junger-Tas et al. 2012) and includes questions on self-reported delinquency, routine activities, social bonds and family situations of adolescents, as wellas a section with detailed questions on their contacts with police officers (i.e. experience at last

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contact) and their attitudes towards the police (cf. Hunold et al. in press). The survey was conductedin the paper and pencil mode in classes during school hours, in Germany in 2011 and in France in2012.6

These data enable us to mix quantitative (measuring the proportion of discretionary controls andthe various categories targeted by these controls) and qualitative (analysing the objectives, values,norms that guide the behaviour of police officers based on their explanations of their actions)data. Direct observation is particularly relevant as it enables to describe the concrete exercise of con-trols. By informally discussing with police officers after the controls, it also allows us to infer the con-textualised reasons that have generated the decision to control. In both countries, observations wereundertaken by trained observers during ride-along, and during the downtimes observers coulddebrief informally about their interventions. In Mannheim and Cologne, observations have beenmade with response teams (patrol officers), youth officers7 and with community policing units.8

Thus, this study covered the work of ‘ordinary’ German policemen (and women) who constitutethe largest subgroup of the profession in German cities, as well as of specialised officers whosetasks are more tuned to variations of community-oriented policing. In Lyon and Grenoble, reflectingthe diversity of police organisations, observations have been realised in a broader variety of units(response teams, plain-clothes units with a crime-fighting mandate (Brigade anti-criminalité), uni-formed units specialised in transport, uniformed unit dedicated to specific areas with reinforced pro-tective equipment (Brigade spécialisée de terrain)). However, we did not observe any communitypolicing units, as community policing reforms introduced at the end of the 1990s have been sincepolitically challenged by the political right (especially by Nicolas Sarkozy when he was minister ofinterior between 2002 and 2005) and suppressed from the French National police (Roché 2005).As a consequence, the observed police units in the two countries differ to some extent in terms oftasks and code of conduct. Nevertheless, these differences display the reality of everyday policework in the streets. The observational data are supplemented by standardised data from a largeschool survey which was conducted in all four cities using an identical design and questionnairewhich contained detailed questions on contacts with police officers, including the experience ofthe last contact. Thanks to the very large sample sizes (13,500 in France and 7300 in Germany),the survey offers unique opportunities to analyse the experiences and attitudes of adolescentsfrom ethnic minorities (as well as of native adolescents) without quickly running into the problemof small numbers. Nearly, 2800 Maghrebian/African adolescents in France and 1400 Turkish adoles-cents in Germany participated in the survey (Hunold et al. in press).

2. Rationales of controls: proactive ID checks and searches in police–citizensencounters

In France, discretionary controls are clearly an important part of the toolbox used by police officers onthe streets, whereas this is true to a lesser extent among German police officers. The advantages andthe drawbacks of controlling are weighted differently by police officers in the two countries.

2.1. Rationales of controls

To measure the extent of the discretionary controls among all the interactions (Table 1), we have iso-lated those involving a discretionary control (see the definition in the methodological note).

Differences are striking. In Lyon and Grenoble, more than one in four interactions are made of adiscretionary control undertaken by the police (27.3%), whereas the proportion is one in eight inCologne and Mannheim (12.6%). This discrepancy calls for a closer scrutiny of the concrete inter-actions in order to understand the different approach of French and German police. Discretionarycontrols (stop and search but also simply ID checks) may, in principle, serve several purposes thatwe can divide into three categories: crime fighting, asserting authority and collecting information.

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Firstly, control may be seen as a way of detecting and arresting people engaged in, or planning,crime (Bowling and Weber 2011). Reasons related to crime investigation or detection are pervasiveamong the French police officers, some of them having a rather low threshold to define suspiciousbehaviours. Clothing, daytime and skin colour (as we will see later) are crucial factors, and they areoften combined. One example from the observed interactions may serve as emblematic illustrationhere:

I22 (Grenoble): The police officers see two young boys on a scooter, without a helmet and with a large bag. Theysuspect it could be drug-related. They decide to stop and check the boys.

The location is important: we are in a deprived suburb of Grenoble nearby a housing project. Theissue of drugs is also crucial: in Grenoble and Lyon, police officers are often looking for drugs, not iflimited to personal use, however. In the interactions we witnessed, they most of the time underen-forced the law (by simply destroying the hashish) when the quantity was an indication of personaluse only. In some (rare) cases, police officers have a maximalist conception of control in relation todrugs traffic, as the example below illustrates:

I91 (Lyon): We are nearby Lyon-Part-Dieu railway station. Two males from Maghreb ask the two police officers fordirections. The police officers asks them to show their ID and if they have any drugs. They take a look at their ID,tell them ‘it is your lucky day, no frisk’ and let them go after giving them the direction.

German police officers, too, are searching for drug-related crimes. The decision for a discretionarycontrol mainly relies on appearances or location:

I58 (Mannheim): The officers decide to control juveniles who are loitering at the street corner because of theirclothes which are suggestive of drug use.

However, as crime control is of little importance in general, corresponding actions were rarelyobserved. This is due to the structure and tasks of the units – community police officers andpatrol police – that are potentially in charge of proactive identity checks. Although communitypolice officers predominantly operate proactively and are instructed to conduct identity checks, infact they rarely practice controls. While patrolling the streets they rather focus on relationship man-agement with the public – for what they are also responsible. In most instances, community policeofficers already know the persons loitering at suspicious places and thus avoid checks, unless they donot know the persons or have a reasonable suspicion for a crime. Therefore, most of the contactsbetween young people and community police officers are informal (Hunold et al. in press) In contrast,patrol police are predominantly dealing with citizen calls, and thus rarely perform proactive controls(see below), simply because they do not have enough time for this kind of work.

The second rationale is asserting authority. It is expressed when police officers yearn to expressthat they are in control of the streets. Discretionary controls that may result here from an attemptto attest a visible presence in a neighbourhood show that ‘we are not afraid of them, that we arein control’ as one French police officer told us. Controls may also result here from tense interactions

Table 1. Discretionary controls.

Total interactions (abs.) Discretionary controls (abs.) Share of discretionary controls (%)

FranceTotal 293 80 27.3Assumed natives 71 10 14.1Visible minorities 205 64 31.2Mixed groups 17 6 35.3Germany 247 31 12.6TotalAssumed natives 115 14 12.2Visible minorities 120 15 12.5Mixed groups 10 2 20

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between the public and police officers. ID checks are the product of a latent conflict. Exchange ofsights, ironic expression or insults may trigger controls:

I287 (Lyon): three young guys from Maghreb are in front of a snack. The police pass in car and the sergeant hears‘go away’. They immediately make a half-turn and go to control the three guys’.

In this kind of situation, control is connected to a disciplinary rationality (Gauthier 2015). Controlmay resemble a form of ‘street justice’ (Van Maanen 1978, Fassin 2013) for those who disrespect thepolice or do not accept the police definition of the situation: the person is immobilised for a fewminutes, may be searched in front of other persons, is questioned potentially intrusively. This useof discretionary controls reveals the poor relationship between the police and some segments ofthe youth. Our results suggest that they are more frequent in France: we did not observe any suchincidences in Germany, although some German police officers mentioned in interviews that theymay handle some situations this way.

Collecting information is the third rationale. Controlling ID and questioning is a way of gettinginformation on (groups of) individuals. In France, the ID controls undertaken in hallways of socialestates are particularly emblematic: their purpose is to collect information on individuals shared after-wards with other local actors (municipal agents and social housing companies). This logic is fuelled byinterorganisational processes: police, municipalities, the judiciary, social workers and housing estatesmay be part of working groups in which information is shared between individuals (according tocertain rules of confidentiality). In the two countries, ID checks may also be realised at thedemand of the transport companies when they fine people without their IDs.

In Germany, the collection of information follows a different logic. Community police officers andyouth officers, in particular, decide for a control when they notice youngsters in the streets they donot yet know personally. Their aim is not to share information with other local actors but to get intocontact, generally in an informal manner, with these juveniles:

When I don’t know a group of juveniles and they don’t suit to the neighbourhood, then I control them, talk tothem in leisurely manner and then I just ask what they are doing here and then I see how they react. (Communitypolice officer, Cologne)

French police officers use control mainly in the three first logics, German police officers more inthe two last ones. This implies that not only German police officers control less but they alsocontrol differently, with a lesser law enforcement tone.

2.2. Avoiding controls

The issue of controls can be analysed from the opposite angle: when police officers could have donea control but have avoided it. Two different situations must be distinguished here: either officers donot control citizens because they know them or they deliberately avoid control for other reasons. Thefirst situation reveals the interpersonal linkages between the police and public and the second acertain reflexivity of police officers about the consequences of control.

2.2.1. Non-control and interpersonal linkagesIn the first configuration, control is unnecessary by the mere fact that police officers know the indi-viduals, and more specifically the youngsters. In the four cities, such situations may occur. Forinstance, in I90 (Lyon), police officers search for someone suspected of a robbery. When gettingcloser to individuals matching the suspects’ description, they realise that they are people theyknow and who are no criminals and hence decide to avoid the stop and search. Non-controlresults from an interpersonal knowledge. According to our data, the difference is a matter ofdegree: interpersonal connections are simply more frequent in the German case. In France, wehave only two cases in which interpersonal connections may lead to an absence of control,whereas the frequency is much higher in Germany. Let us give the following examples: ‘A juvenile

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takes away his hood when the police officers aims a pocket lamp on him, they know each other’ (I10,Cologne), ‘the men are drinking alcohol in front of a house and hear music from a car radio, officersand men seem to know each other’ (I16, Cologne), ‘officers and juveniles have a chat about policework, they know each other’ (I21, Cologne) and ‘the young man is talking to his friends, the officerand the young man know each other’ (I24, Cologne). These examples suggest that control wouldbe more limited in Germany due to more interpersonal linkages between police officers and citizens.But this kind of police–public relationship is specific to community police officers.9

This is, however, not only an issue of interpersonal knowledge but also of professional values andnorms. In France, police officers might control someone because he is known for not carrying his IDcard: ‘A young Maghrebin is well-known for never having his ID on him. He is checked for that reason.The police officers teach him. His brother swears he will have it on him next time’ (I234 Grenoble). Inthis interaction, if police officers underenforce the law (as they should have taken him to his home orto the police station to prove his identity), they deliberately control him to remind the necessity ofcarrying his ID card: the interpersonal knowledge does not lead to a non-control but rather to thecontrary.

2.2.2. Non-control and police reflexivityIn the second configuration, police officers eschew control because they consider that its advantagesin terms of police work do not overcome its drawbacks in terms of their relations with the youths. InFrance, this kind of attitude, which remains rare, is expressed by experienced police officers seekingto avoid unnecessary tensions with the youths. One sergeant, for instance, insisted on the need forcontrolling only teenagers they did not know and expressed it clearly during controls (‘we control youbecause we don’t know you, but we won’t do it again’). It is more widespread among German policeofficers. In the two quotations below, officers show a lot of caution to use ID checks. They adapt theirbehaviour to the nature of the interaction (the control not being a requisite of the start of the inter-action) and may use information from other colleagues to identify the persons they do not know:

Well when I see a bunch of young people trying to tamper with something, that’s something I notice. When thishappens in my area for example, I would go to them on a very normal way and talk to them about commonplaces,ordinary things. And through this dialogue I will see if it’s interesting to control them or not. Well, I would never goto them and to let the ‘big man’ come out, I’m here now and you all give me your ID now. (Community policeofficer, Kalk, Cologne)As long as they simply hang around somewhere in the area where they grew up, and they hang around everyday,all the time, then I don’t need to control them. I can ask some people, listen, he looks like that and that, well I askolder colleagues, community police officers, he looks like this and that I think he is from Turkey, he is alwayswearing that and that, who is he? (Patrol officer, Kalk, Cologne)

These situations reveal that common practices of restraint may also rely on different logics ofspecific units. The community police officers in Cologne have an interactional notion of their work:they must be accepted by the youths to get information, adapt their approach depending on thecurrent interaction. Patrol officers have a more distant relationship, but they may avoid unnecessarycontrol by getting information by other means. They also have, in general, more reactive tasks inwhich they have less time for proactive activities, thus reducing any opportunity of discretionarycontrol.

In France, reflexivity about the antagonistic effects of control is rather limited. The interaction 91mentioned above is emblematic of a conception in which ID checks and searches are unquestionedroutine interactions. Control as a professional routine may also be illustrated by the interaction I122:

I122 (Lyon): The transit police stop two males (around 25 years old) in a subway station, dressed in a sportymanner and ask them for their IDs. They say they are social workers and are taking a group of kids out. Theyare indeed with a group of five kids. ‘OK, but you still need to have an ID,’ says one of the police officers. Thesocial workers say they don’t have them. The police officer lectures them about the fact that it’s irresponsibleto not have their ID while taking care of children. The two men are a bit irritated but acknowledge the policeofficer is right. They let them go.

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The decision to control is taken rapidly by one police officer, although there is no particularly sus-picious behaviour. When he becomes aware that they are social workers accompanied by kids, hedecides to teach them of the necessity to carry their IDs (although he could again have takenthem to the police station). Another example illustrates a weak understanding of antagonistic effects:

I49-52 (Grenoble): After a rather calm shift, the patrol officers wanted to show some ‘real police activity’ andperform some stop and search in an area known for being near a drug-dealing place. In about 10 minutes,they controlled five males, whose one of them will be particularly tense.

These interactions were handled professionally by police officers (calm and respectfully). In aninformal debrief after these interactions, they expressed anger, emphasising that their authoritywas constantly challenged, but did not reflect on the fact these controls had been completelyrandom.

This gives us a rather contrasted image of the French case: police officers have to deal with tenseinteractions when they operate controls (and they professionally handle situations most of the time),but most of them have a limited reflection on the resentment that the repetition of controls mayengender, nor on the very limited hit rate of these controls. This leads us to a paradox: if Frenchpolice officers admit that ID checks may degenerate, they still maintain that to control is part oftheir powers and as such their use should not be discussed. In Germany, the power to controlseems to be handled in a more flexible way depending on workload, situational factors and behav-iour of persons concerned. Additionally, most of the police officers are aware of negative outcomes ofcontrol practices. This leads to the reserved control patterns we have observed.

3. Controlling minorities

The second aspect of the research concerns the targets of discretionary controls. If contacts focusmainly young males in the two countries, the main question is on the potential overrepresentationof minorities (see for England, Bowling and Phillips 2007; for the US, Rice and White 2010). Here again,our findings are quite divergent between France and Germany.

3.1. An overrepresentation of minorities? Evidence from different methods

We address this crucial question by drawing on both the observational and the survey data collectedas part of our study. The observed control interactions can with some caution be categorised accord-ing to the ethnic backgrounds of the controlled persons. However, it seems appropriate to be carefuland to avoid false inferences from the visible appearance of persons. We therefore use the ratherbroad categories of ‘assumed natives’ (French resp. German) and ‘visible minorities’ which inFrance are predominantly persons from Maghrebin and Sub-Saharan African backgrounds and inGermany from Turkish or Italian backgrounds. During participant observations in Cologne and Man-nheim, we were able to distinguish ethnic origins only very broadly, that is, Eastern vs. SouthernEurope origin. In police jargon, all people from Southern European, Turkish and Arabian backgroundsalike are simply called, Southern’, with skin and hair colour being the essential criteria. ‘Mixed’denotes groups of persons from different backgrounds10 (see Table 1). In France, most discretionarycontrols are concentrated on minorities (64 out of 80), whereas in Germany, the proportion is verymuch equal between the majoritarian population and visible minorities. In terms of their relativeshares of all observed interactions by ethnic groups, 31.2% of interactions with visible minoritiesbut only 14.1% of interactions with assumed natives in France are discretionary controls, whereasthe shares are around 12% for both groups in Germany.

These results are in line with those of the standardised school survey which are displayed in Table2 where the prevalence rate of police-initiated controls over the last 12 months is ca. 30% in Germanyfor all male adolescents regardless of their ethnic group, whereas in France this rate is ca. 20% for thenative French and 39% for boys from Maghrebin origins (see also for convergent results, FRA 2010).

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We concentrate on male adolescents here because they are across ethnic groups more likely to becontrolled by the police. Looking to high-frequency controls (five or more during last year) only,the Maghrebin boys even have a threefold higher likelihood compared to native French boys(17% vs. 5%), whereas no differences can be observed in German cities. Not reported here, these strik-ing differences between France and Germany and the strong overrepresentation of migrant groupsin France remain after controlling for a range of sociodemographic and behavioural factors. Taking allquantitative evidence together, we find strong indications of ethnic profiling by the French but notby the German police forces. Our results give also credit to the hypothesis of a biased-policing ofFrench police officers (in particular see Jobard et al. 2012 for systematic observations of 525 identitychecks conducted in several Parisian locations).11

Such a discrepancy between France and Germany is also evident if we look at interactions in amore qualitative way. Three configurations can be identified (as overcontrol is more frequent inFrance, most of these configurations will be mainly illustrated by French examples). The first one issome specific interactions in which discrimination, if impossible to prove, may be presumed. Oneinteraction (91, Lyon) mentioned above is characteristic: two police officers check the IDs andcomment on the ‘lucky day’ of two Arabs who came to ask for directions. The stereotypes associatedwith drug dealing by young Arabs constitute an underlying cause. The clothing, the location, the timeof the day or the workload of the patrol may be cause for controls combined with the physicalappearance. The case below (I12) is typical of this uncertainty: although the observer may speculateon a potential discriminatory reasoning by the police officer, the situation in itself does not offer anyclear evidence of discrimination. It shows, however, a very low threshold for determining a suspiciousbehaviour (see above):

I12 (Grenoble): A 16 years old boy from Maghreb is walking with a backpack in his hands. The police check him, tomake sure it is not stolen. He has no ID; the police take him to his place to check his ID.I59 (Cologne): Two juveniles (Turkish background, streetwear style) are talking to each other in the front of a park;the officers decide to control them without any obvious reasons.

In the second configuration, overcontrol results from targeting practices of specific police units.Direct observation is here again useful to identify a series of discretionary controls in which minoritiesmay have been targeted. Two examples may be given: during their shift, a uniformed patrol unit inGrenoble had eight encounters with the public, all of them with minorities, with five discretionarycontrols (May 2011). In the second example, a transit police unit in uniform in Lyon had eight inter-actions during their shift, all of them with minorities (November 2012). The four discretionary controlsundertaken in the first part of the shift (in a train) were all targeted at minorities.

The third configuration results from the poor relationship between the police and minorities:discretionary control stems from prior tense interactions (which refers to the second motive: assert-ing authority). In France, several controls have been initiated in response to ironic or defiant

Table 2. Police-initiated discretionary contacts during last 12 months by male adolescents (self-reports, by ethnic background).

Countries of origin N Total prevalence

Frequency of contacts

1–2 3–5 5+

Cologne and MannheimNative German 1601 29.8 19.4 6.2 4.2Turkey 706 30.5 19.3 6 5.2Europe 344 25.4 13.1 7.6 4.7Other 405 29.9 17.3 6.7 5.9Mixed native/migrant 404 33.6 21.5 6.9 5.2Lyon and GrenobleNative French 3300 19.7 11.7 3.5 4.5Maghreb 911 39.1 14.4 7.9 16.8Europe 366 26.5 13.7 4.9 7.9Other 686 26.6 11.8 5 9.8Mixed native/migrant 1091 27.1 13.1 5.2 8.8

Note: POLIS youth survey, boys only (N = 3460 in Germany, N = 6354 in France).

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gestures of minority persons, whereas no equivalent cases could be found in Germany. In thesecases, the interaction often starts with a more symbolic exchange (police and youths watchingeach other for instance) and then deteriorates (from irony to insults), leading to a control. Thesetypes of control, caused by the sometimes rather defiant attitudes of young minorities, arisemore generally from the long history of strained relationship between the police and some seg-ments of young minorities. For all these reasons, apparent ethnicity, especially in France, is oneof the factors to initiate a control.

3.2. Explaining overcontrol: stereotyping, suspicion and control

The main interpretation relies on the link existing between specific stereotypes, the formation of sus-picion and course of action (Bowling and Phillips 2007, p. 957). In both countries, police officers havestereotypes towards the public. In Germany, most of the interviewed and observed police officers alsohave ethnic stereotypes, as this quote from a patrol police officer illustrates: ‘When I think about itquickly… the Germans steal scooters, the Russians booze and beat others and the Turks deal withdrugs.’ But the linkage between stereotypes and the course of action differs in the two countries.

An idea commonly shared by French police officers is that the minorities would be more oftendelinquents, and it would therefore be more rational to control them. In various informal discussions,police officers explained why overcontrol is rational: it is simply the best way to improve their hit rate.Speaking of his colleagues as kids receiving candies, a sergeant from a juvenile unit in Lyon explainedus: ‘If you give a kid two bags containing candies and tell him that one bag has eight sweet candies init, the other only three, which one do you think he’s gonna choose?’.

Three illustrations taken from our observations give an idea of the rationalities of overcontrol ofethnic minorities. The first one is the classical linkage between stereotyping, the formation of suspi-cion and control, without any underlying hostility.

The van is passing the police car in the town centre of Lyon. The driver seems to have a coloured skin. ‘How doesthe driver look?’ asks one of the officers. ‘I think it’s a Pakistani,’ retorts the sergeant. ‘It would interest me if it was aGypsy’, replies the driver. We follow the van, and stop it a few blocks away. (Field notes)

In this case, there is no hostility expressed towards minorities, either before, during or after thecontrol (and this will be confirmed during the remaining of the shift), but traditional crime-fightingreasoning. We may have equivalent situations in Germany:

The officers stop a car driven by a Roma’s woman. They justify the stop with the fact that they thought the kids onthe back seat were not belted (but this is not the case). The woman is already known as Roma and by name by thepolice officers. (I28 Cologne)

The second rationale is also a consequence of stereotyping that conducts to repeated controls. Ina train (see above), two police officers start controlling three young Arabs (one is in on parole or con-ditional release), then check the ID and the train ticket of an Afghan asylum seeker (whose papers arein order), then control two Arabs (both with criminal records, and a bit of hashish), the fourth onetargets two Arabs one of which has a criminal record and no papers. The police officers do notarrest any of them for the small amount of hashish (although they could legally have). Answeringa question of the observer on how they choose to control one person rather than another, the ser-geant commented: ‘It’s a matter of look, attitude and anyway 80% of offenders are Arab, there isnothing racist in that, it’s a reality.’ Interestingly, all interactions were handled softly; the sergeantdid not hesitate to cool the atmosphere when the youths controlled expressed exasperation.

The third situation illustrates a control in which the rationale of control is affected not only bystereotypes but also by an implicit hostility. A police officer stops a damaged car and controls thedriver (who happens to be an Arab) near Grenoble. The control is courteous and the police officerchooses not to fine the driver for a minor infringement to the traffic regulation code. When debriefinginformally about the reason of the control, the police officer comments:

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I chose this car because I saw that it was badly damaged… and I also saw the hand of Fatma, thus that means it’san Arab or an African, they often put it to avoid that their car could be f. up… These people often don’t have theirpapers in order… so for us, it is a good hit rate.

The police officer admits having targeted the car because of a religious sign and on the basis ofstereotypes (‘they often do not have their papers in order’) but he adds an element of negative preju-dice towards this group by implying the hand of Fatma would be a way of avoiding to get their cardamaged by (implicitly) other Maghrebins or Africans. In this case, statistical and categorical discrimi-nation (Reiner 2010) are blurred. From this point of view, racism (as a set of belief and sentiments) anddiscrimination (as attitudes and practices) may be tied for a minority of police officers.

In Germany, there seems to be a more differentiated idea of suspicion not predominantly focusedon ethnicity. Rather, many police officers associate certain crimes with visible attributes as clothing.For example, ‘street’ and ‘hip-hop’ fashion is seen as a signal for drug-related crimes. Lifestyle andother behavioural criteria appear to be more relevant than ethnicity for the decision to conductan identity check. And those criteria are strongly connected to notions of place: lifestyle signs thatare associated with drug-related crimes become salient at places known for those crimes. Place is,in particular, relevant for the proactive work of community police officers, as this quotation illustrates:‘When we patrol the streets for identity checks, we selectively approach venues that are alreadyknown for drug dealing juveniles.’ The same approach also applies to other crimes such as graffitiand vandalism. In addition, dress styles may influence officers’ decision-making by transportingmessages of social status which are flatly equated with decency: ‘I would decide whether they arewell-dressed – come from a good family – or whether they are dressed like juveniles who fuck up.’In contrast to Jobard and Levy (2009, p. 32) who identified clothing as a ‘racialized variable’ becausethey mainly observed minority youths wearing typical styles associated by the police with crime, inGermany, style patterns are not primarily ascribed to ethnicity but rather to social disadvantage. Thismay reflect the fact that urban areas of concentrated disadvantage in Germany are characterised byethnic diversity.

4. Discussion and conclusion

Stopping, searching, frisking and arresting people are activities common to police all over the world.It is therefore crucial to understand comparatively how, when, where and with whom this process isaccomplished. In this perspective, our research stresses four main findings.

The first one is a note of caution: the coherence and homogeneity of national practices, values andprofessional norms must not be overestimated: there are intra-national contrasts dependent upon thetype of units and the profile of the police officers considered (for similar results in England and Wales,see HMIC 2015). Community police officers in Cologne avoid control most of the time and have anindividualised knowledge of youngsters, although patrol officers in Cologne and Mannheim maycheck IDs but in more reactive ways. Variations have also been identified in the French case, someexperimented police officers showing caution in resorting to control. However, our study is basedon more than one monograph in each country which strengthen the possibility of generalisation.

The second main finding is that two dominant professional orientations can be distinguished. InFrance, a more proactive street control style dominates, whereas in Germany, a more informal andreactive style of policing prevails. The categories of Wilson (1968) are useful to set these professionalpractices into perspective. German police officers could be said close to the order maintenance style:their concern is to ensure order in the community, operational autonomy and informalism are valued.Police officers will, for instance, look for other ways to collect information than resorting to IDs checks.French police officers would be closer to the legalistic style: they give priority to law enforcement,relations and interpersonal contacts are more limited. However, as we have seen, the same Frenchofficers often underenforce the law (either for limited possession of hashish, for the absence of IDsor for infringement to the Highway Code). There is a paradoxical formalism, with a crime control

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orientation on the one hand and recurring practices of underenforcement on the other, that woulddeserve further investigation in future research.

Thirdly, interactions with minorities display significant differences. In France, interactions arecharacterised by a pattern of overcontrol of minorities, whereas proportions are evenly distributedin Germany. Explaining these variations is a difficult task, as often discrimination is based on physicalappearance mix with other social attributes (age, sex or clothing). Direct observation and informaltalks with police officers following controls provide support for the existence of a linkage betweenstereotypes, formation of suspicion and decision to control, although in Germany, police officersshow a great deal of care in dealing with these issues. The existence of heterogeneous practicesaccording to units, especially on the French side, is also a dimension to be taken into account.

If this research has mainly focused on the descriptive dimensions, an important question is torelate these practices to organisational policies, policing policies undertaken and, more globally, tothe relations between the police and the public. Our reasoning is here more speculative, but threedifferent sets of reasons (politico-institutional, professional and social) may be put forward.

The first reasons are the policing policies andmandates existing in each country. The priority givento the ‘fight against crime’ and the ‘culture of performance’ in policing policies in France between2002 and 2012 have encouraged practices of control, as a way of getting immediate results in thefight against crime (policies whose effects have been discussed in the literature, see Roché 2012,Jobard and Maillard 2015). More generally, the interpretation of the police mandate is broader inGermany than in France: police is often described as ‘dein Freund und Helfer’ (‘your friend andhelper’). This orientation towards the public also translates itself into training policing: ‘interactionwith the public’ is a component of training curricula in police schools in Baden-Württemberg andNorth Rhine-Westphalia, whereas interactions with the public are rather seen through the angle ofthe protection of the police officer in France. Cultural and religious diversity are also addressed inGerman police schools but not in French ones as a dedicated and well-identified set of courses.Therefore, policing concepts/styles vary in the two countries with regard to the police mandate,the content of training or the value given to the relation with minorities.

This leads to our second series of reasons, which are the implicit values, norms and assumptionsthat guide police officers. Even if too homogeneous conceptions of national police cultures should beavoided, several striking differences appear: controls are seen as a legitimate way to exercise powerand as a multi-purpose activity (control crime effectively, assert authority and collect information) inFrance, although the antagonistic effects of controls are poorly internalised. In Germany, there is aheightened awareness of these negative effects. These reflections are shared by police officers(more or less extensively) and internalised through a process of socialisation. It is also to be notedthe ‘we’/‘they’ divide was more commonly expressed by French police officers during interviews.

One may even say that policies directed at ID checks are rather made of non-decisions. In France,stop and search and ID checks are not registered by police officers in any systematic manner, thereare no guidelines on how to conduct them, no immediate supervisors, and, even more, administra-tors have a poor knowledge of the controls undertaken. During our observations, it has never been atopic of discussion and debrief between street police officers and their supervisors in France as inGermany. As Jobard et al. comment (2012, p. 357), ‘ID checks are a widespread practice, and, para-doxically, benefit from a legal cloak of invisibility.’ In both countries, no clear policy exists relatingto the practice of control. However, discretionary checks are less relevant in daily work in Germanycompared to France. This is to be explained by several factors that reflect a different cop culture.German police officers are not always ‘hunting for the good case’ (Lukas and Gauthier 2011,p. 191). Patrol police officers are mainly concerned with conflict resolution by handling citizen com-plaints and emergency calls, thus time for proactive controls is limited. Community police officersindeed are in charge of proactive controls but their work is predominantly focused on the mainten-ance of [good] relationships with the local public. Their habitus is consistent with watchman style(Wilson 1968, p. 141). In consequence, crime fighting is not considered as a primary task in theireveryday work (Hunold 2015, p. 443).

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This leads us to our final comments. The level of trust and legitimacy of the French police is lowerthan in Germany (Hough et al. 2013, see also Lévy 2016). Perceptions of unfairness are also in disfa-vour of the French police (FRA 2010, Hough et al. 2013), as are the experiences of violence duringinteractions by the police (Oberwittler and Roché 2013). These various elements raise serious suspi-cions on the causal link between the crime control style of policing prevailing within the Frenchpolice and its lack of social legitimacy. Our data imply that by multiplying controls, French police offi-cers put themselves in situations where they have to deal more frequently with defiant attitudes andconflicts.

Notes

1. In France, ID checks are regulated by the article 78 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. In Germany, they aredefined by the Federal Code of Criminal Procedure and by the police laws of the different Länder.

2. These suspicious behaviours were identified through direct observation and/or informal debrief with police offi-cers. Among the interactions with an ID check and/or search, we have excluded: (a) controls resulting from a clearlaw breaking (for instance the absence of valid tickets and IDs when controlled in public transport, breach of theHighway Code or – more rarely – criminal act) and (b) controls resulting from a suspicious behaviour (such assomeone throwing away something as the police arrive, an apparently too young person driving a car,persons involved in a violent dispute, etc.)

3. Grant reference: ANR-08-FASHS-19, Pacte research unit (Sciences Po, CNRS, University of Grenoble Alpes) and DFGAL 376-11/1, Max Planck Institute for Foreign and International Criminal Law, Freiburg.

4. Police are in the hands of Länder (apart from the Border Control police and the Criminal Federal police, but theyare not studied here).

5. By police–citizen encounters, we mean more or less durable contacts (either verbal or physical) between policeand citizens. It can be a mere verbal exchange or a sequence of interactions entailing verbal and physicalcontacts.

6. In France, the survey sample is representative of the young adolescent population in the metropolitan area ofGrenoble and of Lyon which are the major municipalities of the second largest and wealthiest region ofFrance, Rhône-Alpes. The sample population resembles urban France in terms of age, sex and school level. Itdeparts from the rural parts of the countries in terms of SES since such areas display more farmers or workersas parents’ professions than the urbanised sectors. In Germany, the survey population is representative of theyoung adolescent population in the cities of Cologne and Mannheim, two large cities in the western part ofGermany with very high shares of migrant populations. The sample of schools includes public and private sec-ondary schools of all academic levels excluding those for special needs. Thanks to the very large sample sizes(overall ca. 13,500 in France and 7000 in Germany) and the high share of adolescents with migrant backgrounds,the survey offers unique opportunities to analyse the experiences and attitudes of adolescents from ethnicminorities (as well as of native adolescents) without quickly running into the problem of small numbers.

7. The work of youth officers is usually characterised by the supervision of serious juvenile offenders or specificcontrols of young people during special events.

8. In Cologne and Mannheim, we did not observe plain-clothes units whose main mandate is to search for drugs.These units may have more crime control-oriented practices than the ones we have observed.

9. In contrast to France, the concept of community police is well established in Germany. The 16 states (Länder) andto some extend local police forces are responsible for the implementation of community policing. In Cologne,each police precinct employs several community police officers who are in charge of local networking (e.g.school visits) and crime prevention by proactive police work. The community police officers are frequently incontact with local juveniles. Usually, they have already worked on their beat for several years or decades. In Man-nheim, community policing is less elaborated, but ‘reach out’work with adolescents is an important task of specialyouth officers whereas patrol police officers are in charge of proactive police work as identity checks.

10. Contrary to other analyses, we are not here capable of comparing these numbers to the available population atthe time of control. If this limits the reliability of results, the use of the available population as benchmark hasbeen discussed. And our method authorised more qualitative input in the analysis (see below).

11. After controlling for the benchmark population, the authors demonstrate that ‘depending on the location, a Blackwas 3.3 times more likely to be stopped than a White, with similar figures for Arabs (1.8/14.8 times more likely)’(Jobard et al., 2012, p. 364).

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

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Funding

This work was supported by Agence Nationale de la Recherche and Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft.

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