Delegating Powers to the Cabinet: the Efficient Secret of Coalition Governance with decree powers in Brazil after 2001.

Josué Nobrega*May, 2013

Political ScienceUCLA

History Workshop - UCLA

Decree Powers in Brazil 1) 1988 Constitution (Medidas

Provisórias) 2) Decretto legge – Italy - (Constitution 1947)

• Italian Reform - Legge n° 400 (1988)• Latin American Reforms (Argentina 1994, Nicaragua 1995, Ecuador 1996)

• Brazilian reform (EC 32/ 2001)

Medidas Provisórias (Constitutional Decree Provision)

ProblemsDecrees Reissued %Reissued619 5,491 88%

Every decree was reissued on average 15 times, and lasted 1 year and 3 Months

Amendment 32 - 2001

1) Final Vote Enforced (Trancamento de Pauta)

Politician’s Expectations

1) Less Decrees (non urgent, policy issues, spending)

• Restriction on policy areas• Committee power has to deliberate about the constitutional prerequisites of the Congress, and to decide immediately for its invalidation (Prejudicada)

• Final Vote requirement (No reissues)

Preliminary EffectsDifference of Means

Before EC 32 After EC 32

% Approved 62% 82% P<0.95

% Issued/Year 51% 53% Not significant

Explanations and Theories

1) Presidential Dominance (Cox and Mogenstern, 2002) (Decrees Vs Statutes)

2) Delegation Theory (Shugart and Carey, 1998) Assume (Decrees Vs Statutes)

• Power (1998) found that decree authority in 1988 improved the prerogative of the authoritarian period and did not foresee that the executive would make abusive use of the prerogative.

• Amorim Neto, Cox and McCubbins (2003) claims that if the president is unable or unwilling to form a cartel (majority), then his weak legislative support will predispose him to govern by a unilateral policy-making instrument, that is, decrees. They find find inconsistent support for both theories, and they conclude that “there is no one-size-fits-all”” theory of presidential action.

Presidential Efficient Secret

• Wilson, inspired by Walter Bagehot’s The English Constitution

Delegation to the Cabinet (or Cartel)

• Reform of 2001 created accountability on presidential initiative to improve decree powers as an efficient instrument of legislative delegation from the majority in Congress to the Executive.

• My hypothesis for the effects of the reform suggests a relationship between presidents that engage in coalition-making with parties and factions in the assembly to form a majority and bargaining around procedural privileges.

Data• Decree Typology and letters of request from Ministers

• Classification. Executive Decrees (Administrative, Taxes and Budget;

. Executive-legislative Decrees (Economic and Social Policies)

Hypotheses• H1 - The choice on decree initiative is related to the decree’s content over cabinet policy jurisdictions;

• H2 – EC 32 would affect negatively unilateral executive decrees (presidential discretion)

• H3 – EC 32 would affect pre-agreements on economic and policy initiatives by decrees.

Total Number of Decrees

Decrees Total

Decrees - Budget

Decrees - Taxes

Decrees – Economic Policy

Decrees – Administration

Decrees – Social Policies

Preliminary Findings• My interpretation of the pos-reform system in Brazil planned to clarify the possibility of an agreement inside the majoritarian coalition around the use of decree powers. The reform of 2001 increased the control of the majority of the Congress giving the possibility to bargain ex-ante the use of decree powers with the majority coalition.

• My focus, different from the literature, is that executive control of the agenda is a choice made by a Congress to obtain gains from government formation.

• By specifying who has access to the government cabinet, president can gain loyal partners, and the control of the procedures can increase the participation on government decisions and effectively push policy preferences of the participants of the government.

Thanks