defining iran: politics of resistance
TRANSCRIPT
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Introduction
The Question of Identity
Now, the important questions that arise are the following: where among these three cultures does our identity lie? What did those saviours and reformers mean by “salvation” and “identity”? What does “cultural identity” mean, anyway? Is it possible or desirable to aspire to a true and pure cultural identity, and in that case which of our three cultures would be closer and more loyal to us, which more faithful to our “true identity”? Which one subverts it and takes us away from ourselves? Is it a duty to remain loyal and to preserve the old culture? Is there such a thing as cultural repentance? Is any nation permitted rebellion against parts of its own culture? Is there an opportunity and an avenue for intercultural exchange, or must cultures keep their windows closed to one another? Is it right to advocate the hegemony of one culture over others? What does “returning to one’s authentic self” mean, and in whom and what does that “self” consist?
Abdolkarim Soroush (Sadri and Sadri 2000: 162)
The three cultures to which Abdolkarim Soroush refers in the above text are Iranian culture, Islamic culture and Western culture. It is the relationship between and with these three cultures that in many cases fuels the contestation of Iranian national identity. This book examines what it means to be Iranian and how Iranian national identity is constructed; how Islam, Iran’s pre-Islamic culture and relations with the West are dealt with. Integral to this process are the questions that Soroush raises: how is being ‘faithful to our “true identity”’ to be achieved; is it via a return to the “old”, or is it by allowing the different aspects of Iranian identity to intermingle?
There is no doubt that what it means to be Iranian is contested. Furthermore, it is an issue of some importance in Iranian politics, reflected in the fact that Iran’s politicians explicitly discuss it, as will be illustrated in the coming chapters. In addition to this, in a more academic sphere, a number of volumes have been published during Seyyed Muhammad Khatami’s presidency (1997–2005) discussing different aspects of Iranian identity and national identity, such as the relationship with the past, present and future, global trends, tradition and modernity, Iran’s relationship with its neighbours, nation and nationalism theory and the implications of the Eurocentricism of this theory. 1
1 For example, see Ahmadi (1378/1999-2000), Ahmadi (1383/2004–2005c), Mirmohammadi (1383/2004–2005), Shari’ati Foundation (1381/2002).
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Defining Iran2
The cause for contestation with regard to how Iranian national identity should be constructed is what is considered to be authentic and legitimate, also contested, and how it is justified. Part of this discussion, which Soroush refers to in the above text, is how Iran’s pre-Islamic culture and heritage, Īrānīyat, and its Islamic culture and heritage, Islāmīyat are used. In some cases it is believed that there is a conflict between Īrānīyat and Islāmīyat. The way in which these cultures and heritages are used as the basis of Iranian national identity has repercussions for the system of government. As will be illustrated in the following chapters, the exclusive use of Īrānīyat and its prioritization over Islāmīyat has been understood in terms of a monarchy in the form of Iran’s pre-Islamic past, or at least the aspiration for such a system of government. On the other hand, the exclusive use of Islāmīyat and its prioritization over Īrānīyat has been understood as a government based entirely on Islam. For some, it is the former that represents the ‘authentic’ and ‘legitimate’ Iranian national identity, which is justified by ‘returning’ to or ‘remembering’ Iran’s ‘original’ pre-Islamic culture and the glory of Iranian civilization. For others, it is the latter that is ‘authentic’ and ‘legitimate’, which is justified by ‘returning’ or ‘remembering’ Iran’s Islamic culture and the glory of Islamic civilization. In the Islamic Republic of Iran, the reality is that both Īrānīyat and Islāmīyat, to varying degrees, are perceived as ‘authentic’ and ‘legitimate’ and used in the construction of Iranian national identity.
What is perceived to be ‘authentic’ and ‘legitimate’ in the construction of Iranian national identity is also challenged by Iran being a multi-religious and multi-ethnic state, the support of the people, or nation (millat), and Iran’s historical experience of what is perceived as imperialism. With regard to the reality that Iran is a multi-religious and multi-ethnic state, it can be argued that an Iranian national identity that is more in line with a civic understanding of nation is constructed. In this case Īrānīyat and Islāmīyat have to be constructed so as to remain ‘authentic’ and ‘legitimate’. With regard to the support of the people, there have been attempts by various statesmen to show that their construction of national identity and its corresponding system of government is ‘authentic’ and ‘legitimate’ because it has the support of the people and, consequently, their construction of national identity is justified. Finally, bearing in mind Iran’s historic relationship with external powers, whether perceived as indirect or direct colonialism, the issue of Iran’s relationship with the ‘West’ and the ‘East’ also has its role to play. During the presidencies of Khatami and Mahmoud Ahmadinezhad (2005–present), this has been mainly concerned with the ‘West’, or ‘Western civilization’. To this regard, the extent of Iran’s relationship with the ‘West’ and its adoption of what are perceived by some to be Western ideologies need to be justified. Nevertheless, it should be pointed out that despite efforts to be ‘authentic’ and ‘legitimate’, since the various constructions of Iranian national identity are not necessarily adhered to or accepted by elements of Iran’s population, they can essentially only be considered as aspirations for the identity of the nation, or huvīyat-i millī.
My aim is to examine how these dynamics are manifested primarily during Khatami’s presidency but also during Ahmadinezhad’s presidency. In so doing,
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Introduction 3
I intend to demonstrate that despite a general belief in Īrānīyat and Islāmīyat being part of Iranian national identity, there continue to be multiple constructions of Iranian national identity, which coexist and compete with each other. These constructions can be better understood as discourses of national identity. On the one hand, during Khatami’s presidency I examine two competing state discourses of national identity: the Islamist and Islamist-Iranian discourses. The former is that of Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Seyyed Ali Khamene’i, and the latter is that of Khatami. The Khatami period is unique in terms of the articulation of national identity because Khatami has combined for the first time ideas as an official discourse on the state level. These are the combination of Islamic and pre-Islamic culture, the notion of ‘dialogue among civilizations’ and the idea of Islamic mardumsālārī (democracy), which together form the Islamist-Iranian discourse of national identity. However, it is also argued that Khatami’s discourse has allowed for a more open expression of alternative constructions of national identity. Thus, I will show that based on Iran’s historical experience, a contemporary Iranian national identity is being constructed that suggests a move towards an Iranian civic national identity.
It must be stressed, however, that the relationship between state and non-state is fluid. Not only are the divisions between state and non-state blurred to say the least, but also the classification of a discourse as state or non-state is fluid; what is perceived as a state discourse at a particular moment, can soon become a non-state discourse and vice versa. With this in mind, the dynamics surrounding the tenth presidential election of 22 Khurdād 1388/12 June 2009 and the development of Jibhih-yi Sabz (the Green Movement), or Mawj-i Sabz (the Green Wave)2 indicate a coming together of Khatami’s Islamist-Iranian discourse of national identity and a discourse of Iranian civic national identity in the form of the ideals articulated by some members of the Green Movement.
A deconstruction of these discourses of national identity demonstrates a complex set of relationships integral to which are politics of resistance. The complexity of these relationships and the nature of resistance have a lot to do with how the relationship between the ‘self’ and the ‘other’ are constructed. I will show that it is clear that the different discourses illustrate how Iranian national identity is constructed in relation to both an internal as well as an external ‘other’. This interactive characteristic of identity is evident in the following text taken from Ahmad Ashraf’s (1373/1994-1995: 7-8) examination of Iranian ethnic and national identity:
Identity has a meaning of existence; it is a means of knowing an individual that is a collection of individual properties and behavioural characteristics by
2 Green was the colour of Mousavi’s election campaign. Many supporters wore green headscarves, t-shirts and ribbons around their wrists. Following the election results and reactions to the protests against Ahmadinezhad’s election, the colour green has come to symbolise the call for reform in general and not specifically Mousavi’s supporters. This call for reform has come to be known as Jibhih-yi Sabz or Mawj-i Sabz.
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Defining Iran4
which the individual is distinguished from the group and the other. National and ethnic identity is a type of collective identity and has sentiments connected with the greater national and ethnic society, and has an awareness of sentiments of loyalty and devotion. National and ethnic identity is similar to individual identity in terms of our struggle to identify ourselves in terms of the other: Iran compared to Iran, Greece compared to the Barbarians … Persia compared to the Arabs and the Turks compared to the Tajiks. Therefore, self-awareness of our existence, as well as awareness of the existence of the ‘other’, come together. The ‘self’ and the ‘other’ are two sides of the same coin; and one without the other is meaningless.
This text is pertinent because it is argued that not only does it refer to the ‘other’ as an external foreigner, but also within Iran: ‘Iran compared to Iran’.
The dynamic of Iranian national identity being constructed in relation to both an internal ‘other’ and an external ‘other’ and the politics of resistance embedded in these complex relationships can be understood in terms of a hegemonic and counter-hegemonic dynamic of discourses and counter-discourses of Iranian national identity. Some of these are or have been dominant and top-down and others that are marginalized and bottom-up and aspire to be dominant and top-down. The ultimate aim is to illustrate that indeed Iranian national identity in the Khatami period is contested and that this is evident in the multiple discourses and counter-discourses. Analysing the articulation of national identity in terms of discourses allows the concurrent constructions of national identity to be examined in terms of a hegemonic and counter-hegemonic relationship. Not only does this shed light on the Khatami era, but also indirectly on any society. If national identity in general is examined using this paradigm of investigation, it is possible to learn of new dynamics.
Throughout the twentieth century, Iran has been through a series of dramatic political events that have been instrumental in the articulation, and continuous process of construction and re-construction of its national identity. Such events include the Constitutional Revolution (1906), the Pahlavi Dynasty (1921–79), the rise and fall of Mohammad Musaddiq (1951–3), the 1979 Revolution, and the Iran-Iraq war (1980–88). More recently, the presidencies of Khatami and Ahmadinezhad have also played their part in the continuing reconstruction of Iran’s national identity. The Khatami period, often referred to as the reform period, is of particular interest because of the internal and external political and social dynamics. External changes can be symbolized by the notion of Khatami’s ‘dialogue among civilizations’, which signifies another attempt at a departure from economic and political isolation typical of the earlier stages of the Islamic Republic (former President Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani’s attempts essentially failed). For example, Khatami’s interview with CNN in 1998 was perceived by many as a step towards reconciliation with the United States; an attempt at a dialogue of civilizations in international relations as opposed to the clash of civilizations as argued by Samuel Huntington (1993). Internally, on the one hand, there was vibrant debate regarding the very nature of the Islamic Republic, and on
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Introduction 5
the other hand, there was relative social and political liberalization. By political liberalization I mean a degree of ‘the expansion of public space through the recognition and protection of civil liberties, particularly those bearing upon the ability of citizens to freely engage in free political discourse’ (Brynen, Korany and Noble 1995: 3). These factors and events are essential for a better understanding of the context of the construction of national identity in the Khatami period. After all, this did not take place in isolation.
Social and political liberalization is evident in the proliferation of newspapers and books, as well as non-governmental organizations. Since the 1979 Revolution, Iran had not observed such an increase in the publication of newspapers and magazines (Milani 2001: 43–4), as it was experienced in the Khatami presidency. It is argued that ‘the function of the press was in essence to set the terms of political discourse and dictate the agenda’ (Ansari 2006c: 119). Whether or not this is the case, it can certainly be argued that the press contributed to the opening up of political discourse, the transmitting of ideas and discussion regarding Iran’s political development. Another example of liberalization is evident in how the art community also particularly flourished in this period with the opening of numerous public cultural centres and galleries. Tehran Museum of Contemporary Art, in particular, was able to sustain education through art, which was made available to the younger generation. Social restrictions on this generation were eased in response to the election results in 1997; 70 per cent of the 29 million who turned out voted in favour of Khatami (Kazemi 1999: 12).
This relative social and political liberalization is positioned in a context of high rates of literacy and education. It is estimated that over 85 per cent of Iran’s population are literate (Ministry of Education 1383/2004–2005). In 1383/2004–2005, according to the National Statistics published by Iran’s Ministry of Education’s Educational Programme, over 15 million individuals were engaged in primary and secondary education. Over half a million of these were adults seeking literacy. Additionally, there were three million students in higher education, including vocational training, many of whom have entered urban spaces from remote towns and villages for the first time. These figures are on the increase, and significantly 65 per cent of this student body are female (Ministry of Education 1383/2004–2005). The youth, the 15 to 24 age group, is growing at a rate of 3.9 per cent annually (Salehi-Isfahani 2008: 243). Indeed, ‘by the mid-1990s, Iran’s post-revolutionary young had turned into “youth”, a collective social agent’ (Bayat 2007: 65). While Iran’s ‘youth’ cannot be considered a coherent organization with an ideology or leadership (Bayat 2007: 65), their very existence indicates a force in Iranian society because of the shared anxieties regarding the demand for individual liberty and the assertion of collective identities (Bayat 2007: 65). A larger, literate and well educated youth that is also increasingly connected through internet related technologies to the outside world has clear implications for Iranian society and subsequently politics and political identity.
In addition to liberalization and high literacy rates, it is worth mentioning that Khatami’s presidency occurred in a period of growth in and advancement of
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Defining Iran6
communication technologies. It is argued that the fourth most popular language in weblogs is Persian. This in turn has enabled easier communication between Iranians in Iran and those among the diaspora (Alavi 2005: 1). More importantly, as far as this book is concerned, the growth in mass communications has enabled people to be local despite being part of a more globalized world. With regard to Iranian national identity, this has enabled the articulation of both particular and general discourses of Iranian national identity. While communication technologies and literacy have enabled expression on the internet, in a sense these reforms and changes have also allowed political and social discussions to be moved into a more public space in Iran. Furthermore, with the development of online spaces such as Facebook, YouTube, and Twitter the opportunity for the exchange of ideas, whether political or not, increases. This was certainly evident in the events surrounding the tenth presidential election in 1388/2009 when such sites were used to mobilize as well as to get news about the events taking place in Iran out of the country. The Iranian diaspora also played a significant role in this exchange of information.
These social changes and political liberalization are in many ways a part of or the result of a vibrant intellectual debate regarding the very nature of the Islamic Republic causing tensions within the establishment. Hamid Dabashi (2000: 189) points out that ‘many of the inner tensions within the Islamic Republic that surfaced after … Khatami’s election … were in fact already present during Rafsanjani’s presidency’. However, Rafsanjani had managed to ‘co-opt all the Islamic (and even some of the secular) dissenters by appearing to be their only hope, thereby saving the Islamic Republic … from internal dissent’ (Dabashi 2000: 189). This ‘internal dissent’ manifested itself in an ideological opposition that appeared from within the Islamic Republic. It was led by activist intellectuals, who came to call themselves Rawshanfikrān-i Dīnī, or Religious Intellectuals. Rawshanfikrān-i Dīnī were the main intellectual source of what Asef Bayat refers to as ‘post-Islamist practices’. He argues that their articulation of a ‘major discursive shift’ ‘generated one of the most remarkable intellectual movements in the Muslim world with far-reaching implications for religious thought and democratic practice’ (Bayat 2007: 84).
During Ahmadinezhad’s presidency the relative social and political liberalization that characterized Khatami’s presidency was essentially reversed. In his election campaign Ahmadinezhad presented ‘himself as a champion of the common people against the cancer of corruption and immorality in government’ and vowed to ‘fight to bring justice’ by using an Islamic economic model that would help the masses rather than the elite few (Naji 2008: 69). These aims were ‘music to the ears of Iran’s poor, who felt disenfranchised by the urban, middle-class reformist movement of the previous administrations’ (Naji 2008: 69). Despite this pledge to be the ‘champion of the common people’, Ahmadinezhad clamped down on civil liberties. One example of this is the exacerbation of human rights abuses. According to Human Rights Watch (2008), ‘Iran executes more people than any other country except China’. In 2008, they estimated that since Ahmadinezhad was elected in 2005 there has been almost a 300 per cent increase in the number of executions (Human Rights Watch, 2008). During the first term of Ahmadinezhad’s
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Introduction 7
presidency, reports from human rights agencies indicated an increase in the arrest of human rights and women’s rights activists, among others (Human Rights Watch 2008, Amnesty International 2008). Ahmadinezhad’s presidency also witnessed an exacerbation of the nuclear issue. The international community has reacted to Iran’s nuclear programme with a series of sanctions. Arguably, this in turn has led to further arrests in the name of ‘national security’.3 Despite social and political restrictions, the ideas that flourished during Khatami’s presidency continue to be espoused. The climax of these ideas can arguably be regarded as the election campaigns prior to the tenth presidential election and the subsequent protests and demonstrations.
Naturally, I am not able to explore here every way that Iranian national identity is constructed and articulated. I am aware that a discussion on certain groups in society (ethnic and religious minorities) is absent. It is recognised that ethnic and religious communities are part of the Iranian nation and yet, it is also taken for granted that some members of communities such as the Kurdish, Azeri, Baluchi and Arab communities offer alternative discourses of Iranian or even non-Iranian national identity and challenge those of the state. Similarly, some members of the Zoroastrian, Sunni, Bahai, Jewish and Christian communities may possibly have their own discourses of national identity. It should be highlighted, nevertheless, that for many of Iran’s ethnic and non-Shi’i religious groups, there is a strong sense of belonging to an idea of an Iranian nation. Furthermore, it must be stressed that Īrānīyat and Islāmīyat and Iran’s relationship with the West are by no means the only factors that are used in the construction of Iranian national identity. The position of religious and ethnic minorities and language among others are also often dealt with in the literature and considered as crucial to Iranian national identity, and/or its contestation.
I hope that this book will be of interest not only to those of the field of Iranian Studies, but also those interested in the construction of national identity. Iran is an example of a state that has competing discourses of national identity, and more importantly these different expressions of political identity have the potential, or indeed have, ramifications with regard to the state identity and system of government. I hope that the methodology I have employed can be used as a template for deconstructing similar, or not so similar, dynamics in other states.
Organization of the Book
Chapter 1 will present what is to be understood by the notion of ‘discourse of national identity’. It is contended that nation is a socially constructed political unit based on shared values and/or common heritage. Discourse is the means by which ideology is articulated. Discourses also reproduce what come to be considered as assumptions in society. As will be illustrated, the notion of discourse of national identity allows for an examination of the ideology or ideologies embedded in
3 See Holliday 2011.
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Defining Iran8
the way national identity is constructed. Furthermore, the notion of discourse of national identity enables the constructions of Iranian national identity to be understood in terms of hegemonic and counter-hegemonic dynamic; that is discourses and counter-discourses. Chapter 1 also stresses that a deconstruction of articulations of national identity requires an understanding of the meanings attached to the various factors that are used in the process of construction. Further, while concepts such as nation, culture and civilization are addressed and defined in theoretical terms, at the same time the meanings attached to the very same concepts in particular contexts needs to be tackled.
Naturally, the discourses and counter-discourses of Iranian national identity examined here cannot be addressed in historical isolation. Several of the ideologies embedded in the constructions of Iranian national identity have existed earlier in Iran’s history. This is particularly evident in Iran’s different ‘nationalisms’ during the twentieth century. Chapters 2 and 3 aim to contextualize the discourses identified for analysis in this book. This is done within the framework of how Īrānīyat and Islāmīyat are used in the construction of Iranian identity. Chapter 2, ‘Īrānīyat and Iranian Identity’, deconstructs the meanings attached to Muhammad Reza Shah’s construction of Īrānīyat, embedded in what the Shah calls his ‘positive nationalism’. Here superiority is given to Īrānīyat, which is prioritized over Islāmīyat. In order to understand the meanings embedded in the Shah’s ‘positive nationalism’ we must also understand that this nationalism is constructed in relation to an internal ‘other’, namely Muhammad Musaddiq and his call for ‘freedom and independence’. In this regard, the analysis is based on how Musaddiq and Muhammad Reza Shah construct Iranian national identity in two key texts: Dr Mohammad Musaddiq: Musaddiq’s Memoirs and Muhammad Reza Shah’s Mission for My Country respectively.
Chapter 2 also addresses how Īrānīyat has been used in the construction of Iranian identity during Khatami’s presidency. The aim is to show that even though in post-revolutionary Iran, Īrānīyat is not necessarily the basis of a political identity, it does continue to play an important role in Iranian identity. This is articulated by some in the purposeful prioritization of Īrānīyat and the exclusion of Islāmīyat, and particularly politicized Islāmīyat, and in the celebration of Īrānīyat in its various disguises. Since the use of Īrānīyat has been a dominant theme in the construction of Iranian identity throughout the twentieth century, it is necessary to illustrate that the emphasis on Īrānīyat, often reminiscent of Muhammad Reza Shah’s Iranist discourse of national identity, did not die away with the end of the Pahlavi regime.
Chapter 3, ‘Islāmīyat and Iranian Identity’, contextualizes the following chapters by illustrating how Islāmīyat is used as the basis of identity construction. The focus of the first part of the chapter is on the period leading up to the 1979 Revolution and the establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran. In this context Jalal Al-i Ahmad’s discourse of gharbzadagī (Westoxication), Ali Shari‘ati’s discourse of ‘return to the self’, and Ayatollah Khomeini’s Islamic Government are deconstructed. It is argued that while their use of Islāmīyat, albeit constructed
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Introduction 9
in different ways, illustrate a counter-hegemonic discourse of national identity in relation to an internal ‘other’, namely the Pahlavi regime, and in relation to an external ‘other’, primarily the ‘West’.
Chapter 4 turns to the first of the discourses of national identity during Khatami’s presidency to be discussed: that of Iran’s Supreme Leader, Khamene’i. I will show that three factors are embedded in the Islamist discourse of national identity: the idea of an Iranian Islamic Republic, the notion of independence of the ‘self’ from what is perceived as the hegemonic West, and populism. The first gives the discourse authenticity, the second justifies the discourse; and the third legitimises the discourse. These three factors illustrate how Khamene’i constructs his Iranian national identity in relation to both internal and external ‘others’: the ‘East’, the ‘West’ (primarily the US and its values) and ‘international Zionism’ on the one hand, and the Pahlavi regime and the Reformists on the other. This dynamic represents a politics of resistance within the Islamic Republic’s state apparatus.
A similar dynamic, in terms of politics of resistance, is also revealed in Chapter 5, which examines another state discourse of national identity, namely Khatami’s Islamist-Iranian counter-state discourse. In this case, resistance to the Islamist discourse of national identity is embedded in three pillars: Iranian-Islamic culture, ‘dialogue among civilizations’ and Islamic mardumsālārī (democracy). It is the bringing together of these three pillars as a state discourse that makes Khatami’s presidency unique in terms of the articulation of Iranian national identity. It is clear that while both Khamene’i and Khatami are firm believers in the idea of the Islamic Republic of Iran, different meanings are attached to it. Even though like Khamene’i, Khatami resists what is perceived as ‘Western hegemony’, the resistance takes a different shape. Similarly, the meanings attached to Īrānīyat and Islāmīyat are constructed differently compared to those of the Islamist discourse of national identity. These dynamics indicate that both the Islamist and Islamist-Iranian discourses of national identity are at once hegemonic and counter-hegemonic. On the one hand, their resistance to ‘Western hegemony’ and Muhammad Reza Shah’s ‘positive nationalism’ as well as their resistance to each other illustrate that they are counter-hegemonic discourses. On the other hand, their aspirations to be the dominant discourse in Iranian society and politics, albeit to varying degrees, illustrate their hegemonic ambitions.
Chapter 6 turns primarily to non-state constructions of national identity because to regard Iranian national identity only in terms of the state Islamist and Islamist-Iranian discourses of national identity is an oversimplification and gives an inaccurate picture of national identity construction in Iran. The deconstruction of a variety of sources demonstrates a trend during Khatami’s presidency towards a contemporary Iranian identity and/or Iranian cosmopolitanism. In this case, the construction of Iranian identity is far more complex than simply Īrānīyat, Islāmīyat and Iran’s relationship with the ‘West’. Rather, it is the case that a contemporary Iranian identity is being constructed whereby aspects of Īrānīyat, Islāmīyat, and Western influence are used while also having a sense of being cosmopolitan. This chapter also illustrates that there is a trend towards a discourse of Iranian civic
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Defining Iran10
national identity as articulated during Khatami’s presidency as well as among the Green Movement leading up to and following the tenth presidential election. Embedded in this discourse is the construction of Iranian national identity whereby it is being a citizen in Iran, the idea of equality for all Iran’s citizens, and the rejection of national identity based entirely on Iran’s past heritage, whether Īrānīyat or Islāmīyat, that are advocated.
Sources and Method
The method of the research has been to deconstruct a number of ‘texts’, by determining how discourse emerges out of the ‘text’. In many cases, I have included substantial ‘texts’ in the analysis throughout the book. My intention here is to show how I have come to the conclusions I have made and to let Iranians speak for themselves. I also think it is interesting to see how ideas are articulated and the type of language used. These ‘texts’ in the most part are taken from primary sources, which include speeches, statements, interviews and articles on Iranian identity in general or nation identity in particular. In addition to these, informal discussions with academics, friends and family both within Iran and outside of Iran have contributed to a deeper understanding of issues surrounding the construction of Iranian national identity. A deconstruction of discourse, whether speeches, academic articles or interviews, helps to illustrate how subjective the construction of Iranian national identity is despite the claims by some that Iranian national identity is an objective and static phenomenon.
The two state discourses, Islamist and Islamist-Iranian, are primarily based on the speeches of Khamene’i and Khatami respectively. Khatami’s speeches are usually collected in an edited volume organized according to subject matter. Most of these have an introduction by his former vice-president Seyyed Mohammad Ali Abtahi. An interview was also carried out with Abtahi by the author in November 2005. Many of Khamene’i sermons have been published as booklets and pamphlets. In addition to these, the ‘viewpoints’ of Khamene’i regarding a variety of issues have been published according to subject matter.
The non-state constructions of national identity are based on a number of sources. These include interviews where some interviewees have been given pseudonyms depending on their context, and articles, newsletters and academic works on Iranian identity or Iranian national identity form a major part, as well as ‘statements’ and ‘declarations’ by different individuals or groups, which are usually available online. With regards to academic articles, it is often the case that Iranian national identity is discussed in terms of what their perception of Iranian national identity is, rather than a discussion of various approaches to national identity. For this reason they can be identified as being part of a particular discourse.