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CONSTRUCTING THE DIALOGUE OF

CIVILIZATIONS: A CASE OF ISLAMIC NORM-

MAKING IN INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY

DRAFT

PREPARED FOR THE ANNUAL MEETING OF

THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION

SEPTEMBER 1-4, 2011, SEATTLE

Turan Kayaoglu

Assistant Professor of International Relations University of Washington, Tacoma

turan@u.washington.edu

1900 Commerce Street, Box 358436 Interdisciplinary Arts and Sciences University of Washington, Tacoma

Tacoma, Washington 98402 (253) 692-5856

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Abstract:

Since the late 1990s, Islamic activists have been active in promoting a series of initiatives and institutions known as the ―dialogue of civilizations.‖ This agenda was initiated by the former Iranian President Muhammad Khatami and subsequently promoted by faith-based movements like Gülen Movement, and organizations like the Organization of Islamic Conference. This (agenda of) dialogue provides an excellent opportunity to study ―Islamic norm entrepreneurs‖ and their strategies. This chapter argues that the discourse of the dialogue of civilizations is a response to the discourses of the end of history, the clash of civilizations, and the rejection of the West by the Muslim fundamentalist. Islamist activists adopt dichotomous frames for promoting their agenda: when interacting with non-Muslims, they appeal to the ―dialogue of civilizations‖ and ―interfaith dialogue‖ for mutual understanding, coexistence, and peaceful solutions to conflicts to argue for dialogue in international society. Among Muslims, however, they appeal to (the) dawa, the propagation of Islam, to justify their dialogue-related activism.

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In the twenty-first century, the language of dialogue has become a global mantra. In 2001,

Kofi Annan, then the UN Secretary-General, declared that ―without this dialogue taking place

everyday among all nations –within and between civilizations, cultures, and groups—no peace can

be lasting and no prosperity can be secure.‖1 During the Danish Cartoon Crisis (2005), the UN, the

Organization of the Islamic Conference, and the European Union jointly condemned violent

protests and called for a respectful behavior towards religions and religious people. They pleaded for

dialogue: ―We urge everyone to resist provocation, overreaction and violence, and turn to dialogue.

Without dialogue, we cannot hope to appeal to reason, to heal resentment, or to overcome

mistrust.‖ At the UN Security Council Summit of 2005, Chinese President Hu Jintao called on the

international community to ―act on the purposes and principles of the UN Charter, [and to] make

joint efforts and step up cooperation to combat all forms of terrorism effectively. It is necessary to

promote dialogue among civilizations and address poverty, backwardness and social injustice, with a

view to eliminating the root cause of terrorism.‖2 In 2006, then Russian President Vladimir Putin

appealed to interfaith dialogue when he urged religious leaders meeting in Moscow to counter what

he said were efforts to pit Christians and Muslims against each other, warning that a potential clash

of civilizations could bring disaster.3

The dialogue of civilizations has frequently appeared in UN declarations in the last decade:

Promotion of Interreligious and Intercultural Dialogue, Understanding and Cooperation

(A/RES/63/22), Human Rights and Cultural Diversity (A/RES/62/55), Enhancement of

International Cooperation In the Field of Human Rights (A/RES/63/180), Combating Defamation

of Religions (A/RES/63/171), Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination

Based on Religion or Belief (A/RES/61/161), and the Promotion of Equitable and Mutually

Respectful Dialogue on Human Rights (A/RES/61/166). All these documents invoke the dialogue

of civilizations to emphasize the importance of cultural diversity in addressing global challenges. For

example, the declaration concerning Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism

(A/RES/63/129) appeals to the dialogue of civilizations in ―Emphasizing that tolerance and dialogue

among civilizations, and enhancing interfaith and intercultural understanding, are among the most

important elements in promoting cooperation and success in combating terrorism, and welcoming

the various initiatives to this end.‖

1 Annan Speech at Seton Hall University, 6 February 2001. UN Document SG/SM/7705; http://www.un.org/Dialogue/pr/sgsm7705.htm 2 http://www.china-un.org/eng/hyyfy/t212914.htm 3 http://www.unaoc.org/content/view/110/203/lang,english/

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Moreover, the dialogue of civilizations has also been increasingly institutionalized in the

international system. The UN designated 2001 as the Year of the Dialogue of Civilizations.

UNESCO selected the ―dialogue among civilizations‖ as a ―strategic objective‖ for the period 2002-

2007. The European Commission established a High-Level Advisory Group for the European-

Mediterranean Dialogue in 2004. In the same year, the Spanish Primer Minister José Luis Rodríguez

Zapatero and the Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan co-sponsored an initiative known

as the Alliance of Civilizations. This initiative eventually generated a UN High-Level Group on the

dialogue of civilizations in 2006. A staggering number of NGOs established in the last decade also

call for a dialogue of civilizations. Some prominent ones include: the Foundation for Dialogue

Among Civilisations,4 the Institute for Interreligious Dialogue, the Center for Dialogue,5 the World

Public Forum ―Dialogue of Civilizations,‖6the Comprehensive Dialogue Among Civilizations,7 the

Dialogue Euroasia Forum,8 and the Anna Lindh Euro-Mediterranean Foundation or the Dialogue

Between Cultures.9

Unlike other works that focus on the true nature of the dialogue of civilizations and its

importance for global coexistence and peace (Dallmyr 2002; Tehranian and Chappell 2002; Michael

and Petito 2009), the discourse surrounding the dialogue of civilizations is the focus of this paper. I

define the dialogue of civilizations agenda as a post-cold war approach to international politics that

acknowledges the importance of religious and cultural diversity in international society and claims to

promote the role of culture and religion in conflict prevention and global peace. Essentially, any idea

or practice can be part of the dialogue of civilizations agenda if it accepts: 1) the value of a plurality

of civilizations, 2) the necessity of an international order that accommodates the plurality of

civilizations, and 3) that dialogue and goodwill among people who identify with different

civilizations are essential in order to achieve a peaceful coexistence. This tripartite requirement

captures the discourse and activities of the diverse groups who define themselves and their efforts to

be part of the dialogue of civilizations. This paper focuses on the emergence and spread of this

agenda.

The popularity of the dialogue agenda in international society is puzzling given that it has

failed to yield tangible policies at the state and international level. I argue that this agenda has

4 http://www.dialoguefoundation.org/ 5 http://www.latrobe.edu.au/dialogue/ 6 http://www.wpfdc.org/ 7 http://comprehensivedialogue.org/cdac/index.php 8 http://www.daplatform.org/ 9 http://www.euromedalex.org/

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achieved global prominence because it provides an opportunity for Muslim normative posturing;

these Muslim groups and leaders support this agenda because it constructs a frame of reference (a

meta-frame) that provides symbols and a vision that empowers some Islamic discourses, groups, and

normative positions over other Islamic and non-Islamic discourses, groups, and normative positions.

In other words, the dialogue of civilizations binds these diverse groups of Muslim actors together

and provides them with a ready-made system of meaning within global politics that acknowledges

the value of a social and political system informed by Islamic political and ethical values. Specifically,

this agenda provides its supporters a set of frames and symbols i.e., Abraham, Andalusia, Rumi,

Hafiz, Akbar, the Charter of Medina, the Ottoman Millet System, that privileges tradition (as

opposed to progress), collective identities (as opposed to individual autonomy), and duties (as

opposed to rights). In this way, this agenda undermines the liberal philosophy common to most

international relations discourse that privileges progress, individual autonomy, and rights. It allows

Muslims to put issues about religion at the center of international society. It naturally fits with the

notion of the umma—Islamic community regardless of state-boundaries. It also allows Muslims to

engage with the dawa—representing Islam to non-Muslims.

Although this paper focuses on Muslims as the initiators and beneficiaries of the dialogue of

civilizations agenda, it should be noted that Muslim support for the dialogue of civilizations has not

been unanimous. Vocal anti-dialogue groups counter the calls for dialogue with three major

arguments: 1) the initiative is an anti-Islam conspiracy initiated either by the Vatican, the United

States, or the World Congress of Churches; 2) by legitimizing other religions, the dialogue of

civilizations undermines Muslim faith, practice, and institutions; and 3) dialogue weakens the Muslim

resoluteness and resistance against American imperialism (Lynch 2000). Also, despite the chapter‘s

focus on Islamic groups, the call for the dialogue of civilizations has not been exclusive to Islamic

groups. Various non-Muslim groups like World Council of Churches have been committed to the

dialogue agenda since late 19th century.

This chapter discusses how some Muslim actors embraced, lobbied for, and internalized the

dialogue of civilizations agenda in international society. I first describe how the ideological and

political environment of the post-cold war period led Muslim actors to coalesce around the dialogue

of civilizations. Second, I explain Khatami‘s role as an early advocate of this vision. The last two

sections are about the internalization of the dialogue of civilizations. I discuss the theological

internalization of the dialogue of civilizations, namely legitimization of the interfaith dialogue in

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Islamic thought. Subsequently I describe the development of the OIC institutional commitment to

the dialogue agenda.

Why did (Some) Muslims Embrace “The Dialogue of Civilizations”?

Some Muslim leaders, groups, and institutions adopted the dialogue of civilizations as their

framework of international order in the post-cold war period. The adoption of this agenda was

closely tied to the early 1990s debates for the post-cold war order. The focus on a dialogue of

civilizations provided Muslims a normative position in international society that allowed them to

reject Fukuyama‘s liberal triumphalism, Huntington‘s cultural pessimism, and the radical Islamist

fundamentalism—the first predicted no role for religion in the future of world politics, the second

one saw it as a reason for conflict, and the third declared conflict on a supposedly religious basis.

Francis Fukuyama argued that the defeat of the communist alternative left liberal democracy

as the only alternative for societies to organize their political, social, and economic life. Sooner or

later, Fukuyama argued, regardless of their culture or religion, all societies will eventually become

liberal democracies: ―What we may be witnessing is not just the end of the cold war, or the passing

of a particular period of post-war history, but the end of history as such: that is, the end point of

mankind‘s ideological evolution and the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final

form of human government‖ (Fukuyama 1989:341). The post-Cold War period would see the

spread of the liberal values of the free market, liberal democracy, and human rights which would

permeate and convert the remaining non-liberal political systems. For Fukuyama, the spread of

liberalism would usher in a profoundly peaceful and prosperous era and reduce the chances of war

and the pervasive effects of anarchy. In contrast to the universal acceptance of core liberal values

envisioned by Fukuyama, the dialogue of civilization agenda was predicated upon the value of

cultural differences and accommodation. This agenda allowed Muslim leaders and groups to argue

against liberal demands such as democratization and compliance with internationally accepted

human rights standards.

Not everyone agreed with Fukuyama‘s optimism. A second vision that triggered some

Muslims to turn the dialogue and heavily influenced the framing of dialogue of civilizations was ―the

clash of civilizations‖ argument developed by the historian Bernard Lewis (1990) and later the

political scientist Samuel Huntington (1996). This argument saw the end of the Cold War as a period

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of increasing hostility due to the politicization of cultural and religious identities. In his ―Roots of

Muslim Rage,‖ Lewis explains the conflict between Muslims and non-Muslims as a reflection of the

―classical Islamic view‖ that divides the world into two opposing forces the House of Peace (Dar-ul

Islam) and the House of War (Dar-ul Harb). In such a view, any civilization outside Islam is, by the

very fact that it is not Islamic, the enemy. Lewis implies that the problem posed by Islamic

extremists is not that they ground their violent ideology in their own interpretation of Islam, but that

they are, in fact, reflecting the correct teachings of Islam. Citing Muhammad‘s legacy not only as

prophet but also as a ruler and soldier, Lewis maintains that a violent intolerance is at the core of

Islam; contemporary violent behavior is the logical, indeed necessary, result of such a core, rather

than the perspective of a particular school of Islamic history or a particular version of Islam. Instead,

he presents violent intolerance as an essential quality of Islam: it is the religious duty of Muslims to

destroy or subjugate God‘s enemies (i.e. non Muslims).

Huntington turned Lewis‘ historical observations on Muslim and non-Muslim societies into

a theory of post-Cold War international order. Huntington argued that post-Cold War international

relations would witness the increasing salience of cultural identities, largely shaped by religious

values, replacing the ideological affiliations and ideological polarization of the Cold War period.

Arguing against Fukuyama‘s optimism about the eventual spread of liberal democracy and

capitalism, Huntington unequivocally claimed that democracy and capitalism are inherently Western

values with little chance of being accepted by non-Western societies. Rather, the values of these

non-Western societies will increasingly clash with Western ones because ―[d]ifferences among

civilizations are not only real; they are basic‖ (1993: 24-25). Islamic and Confucius civilizations are

particularly prominent in Huntington‘s account because they are most likely to assert their values

against Western values. According to Huntington, the bloody boundaries of Muslim societies and

the history of conflict with Western people clearly indicates the problems that arise when Muslims

attempt to assert their values. This conflict is permanent because it is produced by Islam‘s

incompatibility with the fundamental core values of the West, not provoked by historical grievances

or political conditions, or economic interests. According to Huntington, Islam is inherently violent

in nature and thus violent attacks against the West are inevitable so long as Western civilization

exists. The emergence and spread of ―the clash of civilizations‖ vision increased the attractiveness of

the dialogue of civilizations because the latter accepts cultural diversity in international society and

emphasizes tolerance for and broader cooperation among different cultural and religious groups.

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The dialogue of civilizations suggests that global challenges—even those involving Islam—need not

result in inevitable clashes.

A third factor that resulted in several Muslim actors adopting the mantra of the dialogue of

civilizations came from within Islam itself: the rise of radical Islamist movements. Sayyid Qutb

(1906-1965) provided the clearest and arguably the most influential articulation of radical Islamist

ideology. Presaging Huntington, Qutb argued that Islamic and Western values are mutually exclusive

and antagonistic. Islam‘s demands of submission to God, social equality, civilization, and morality

are set against the West‘s willful ignorance of God, oppression, barbarity, and immorality. For Qutb,

this ideological enmity is reflected in Islam‘s relations with the West and Muslims‘ relations with

secular state authorities. According to Qutb, the global rule of God (Hakimiyat Allah) is the only

acceptable solution for this Manichean struggle between Islam and the Western jahilliya.

More than rhetoric, Islamic fundamentalism became a threat that menaced the existence of

some leaders of Muslim majority states and a major security concerns to Western states. While

radical Islamic groups have been active and visible since the 1950s, only in the 1990s did this radical

challenge scale its activities and goals up from the local level to the global level, thereby posing

bigger risks for international society. The Afghan resistance against the Soviet Invasion (1980-1988)

was a significant factor turning point in the evolution and expansion of radical Islamist ideology.

The Afghan war further radicalized Muslims who joined the jihad and allowed the ―Arab-Afghans‖

to establish their networks.

The homecoming of foreign Mujahedeen following the Soviet withdrawal then spread

radical Islamist ideology and networks beyond Afghanistan (Roy 2004:297, Mandaville 2007:242).

Violent Islamist groups from Algeria to Uzbekistan can be traced back to personal connections

forged during the Afghan war (Zahab and Roy 2004). For example, returning Algerians became

active in the radical wing of the Front Islamique du Salut (FIS) and later in the Armed Islamic

Group. Returning Egyptians took part in the violence of the 1990s led by Gemaa Islamiyyaa and

Islamic Jihad (Mandaville 2007:244). Combined with the radical Islamist failures in Algeria and

Egypt, the Afghan experiences shifted the focus of radical Islamists from targeting Arab and Muslim

governments to ―targeting foreign forces that occupy Islamic lands or persecute Muslims‖

(Mandaville 2007:237). The 1998 ―Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders‖, co-authored by the most

famous Arab-Afghan, Osama Bin Laden, called on Muslims to join a global jihad against Americans,

military and civilians, as well as their allies until they departed from Muslim lands and stopped

attacking Muslims (For the text of the ―fatwa‖, see Lawrence 2005:58-62) .

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Throughout the 1990s, these radical groups intensified their attacks on local targets such as

police stations and government buildings in Egypt and Algeria and on international targets such as

American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. For Muslim leaders, in addition to the obvious security

problems, these attacks also created an image problem: they put Islam in a violent light. In the

1990s, Muslim leaders started to discuss the negative consequences of radical Islam for the global

image of Islam. The debates in the Organization of Islamic Conference‘s (OIC) 7th Summit

Conference (1994) (the last meeting before the ascendance of the dialogue of civilizations) illustrate

these concerns. The host, Morocco‘s King Hassan called on Muslims to be tolerant and lamented

that some Islamic groups that do not respect the place of tolerance in Islam and condemned those

Muslims who ―have tarnished the image of Islam.‖ The Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak used

even stronger language. He accused Muslim militants of selling themselves to the devil, undermining

international sympathy for Islam, and thus making it more difficult to rescue Bosnia‘s Muslims from

Serbs (Jensen 1994). Concluding the Summit, the Casablanca Declaration denounced ―all forms of

terrorism‖ because ―they represent a total disregard of the teachings of the true Islamic religion.‖

The following year, at the 23rd Congress of Foreign Ministers of the OIC, ―speaker after

speaker‖ condemned radical Islam (cited in Gordon 1996:f. 25). While some of these statements

may reflect the domestic political concerns of these leaders, they also reflect some significant

concerns about the negative consequences for Muslims and Muslim majority states resulting from

the activities of radical groups. In particular, the image of Islam and Muslims in international

community was perceived to be deteriorating; Some Muslim leaders saw the dialogue as an

opportunity to ―correct‖ the image of Islam and Muslims in international arena.

In sum, for some Muslims, the dialogue of civilizations was the answer to the challenges of

the post-cold war international system and an alternative to the visions of the post-cold war

international system that either marginalized or demonized Islam or saw it as a source of conflict.

This vision of dialogue was further ingrained in Muslim political discourse as Muslims subsequently

invoked it when responding to various post-cold war challenges. Like their East Asian counterparts

who employed the rhetoric of Asian values around the same time (Bauer and Bell 1999), Muslims

rejected the increasing Western demands related to democratization and compliance with universal

human rights norms. The dialogue framework also allowed Muslims to condemn the Western

countries‘ lack of commitment to protect Bosnian Muslims, to criticize the treatment of Muslims in

Western Europe, and to oppose certain aspects of the War on Terrorism.

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From Clash to Dialogue: Constructing a Normative Vision on Global Order

The former Iranian president Khatami‘s leadership in articulating and advocating dialogue of

civilizations in the first term of his presidency (1997-2001) put the dialogue on the international

agenda. At its inception, the dialogue of civilizations was an Iranian affair. In the May 1997 election,

Mohammad Khatami, supported by a reformist coalition known as the 2nd of the Khorod

Movement, beat the hardliner Ali Akbar Nateq Nuri who was supported by the Supreme Ruler,

Ayatollah Khamanei, and the Revolutionary Guard. Khatami‘s unexpected and overwhelming

victory—he received 69% of the votes—ushered in a new page in Iran‘s relations with the West.

Khatami envisioned the possibility of a relationship based on dialogue. Early in the first term of his

presidency (1997-2001), in December 1997, he articulated his wish for this dialogue: ―Instead of

speaking to each other with the language of force, we [should] speak with the language of reason,

opening a dialogue between civilizations‖ (Cited in Lynch 2000:307).

The dialogue agenda became a controversial topic in Iran. Khatami‘s overtures for ―a

thoughtful dialogue‖ with the US and the broader dialogue among civilizations immediately elicited

censure from Khamanei who often accused the West, and the US in particular, of global arrogance.

This schism turned acrimonious following Khatami‘s interview with CNN‘s Christiana Amanpour.

For example when Khatami, deviating from the regime‘s solid anti-Westernism and anti-

Americanism, referred to the contributions of Western civilization as worthy of respect, the

response came quickly; in his Friday sermon, Khamenei then criticized what he saw as the American

policy of world domination (Lynch 2000:329).

Despite the Supreme Leader‘s condemnation Khatami continued with his dialogue activities

using a variety of bilateral platforms, such as his visits to France and his meeting with the Pope, as

well as multilateral platforms, such as the OIC, the UN, and the UNESCO. Khatami‘s involvement

put the dialogue of civilizations on the agenda of both the OIC and the UN in 1997. In his opening

speech as the Chairman of the OIC‘s Eighth Summit Conference at Tehran in front of over 50

Muslim heads of state, Khatami urged the umma, Muslim community, to acknowledge past mistakes,

learn from others, and cultivate solidarity and support within the umma. According to Khatami, the

dialogue of civilizations was imperative for Islamic revival: in order to leave the ―painful state of

passivity vis-à-vis the ostentatious dominant civilization of the time‖ and to return to the ―once

shining human civilizations whose achievements and remnants are still praiseworthy and to which

the dominant world civilization is truly indebted‖ (Khatami 2003:15). Understanding one‘s own

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culture should precede the dialogue of civilizations, ―otherwise the dialogue between an alienated

imitator and others is meaningless and certainly void of any good or benefit‖ (Khatami 2003:18).

Khatami elaborated that:

―The relations between the Islamic world and others is also fraught with mistrust,

misunderstanding, and misconceived perceptions, part of which is rooted in history and another part of which emanates from hegemonic relationships, or are a consequence of the fanning of chronic misunderstandings by hegemons. In this connection, through providing the necessary grounds for dialogue among civilizations and cultures—with the people of intellect taking a pivotal role—we should open the way towards a fundamental understanding which lies at the very foundation of genuine peace, which is in turn based on the realization of the rights of all nations, and thus render ineffective the grounds for the influence of negative propaganda in public opinion.‖ (Khatami 2003:22)

In his talk, Khatami called on Muslim leaders to deliberate the parameters of a ―new and just

world order‖. He frames this within the context of the post-Cold War discourse regarding American

supremacy:

―Despite the efforts of American politicians to impose their will on others, as the remaining

pole of power, around whose interests the world should gravitate, international relations are in the process of transition from the previous bi-polar system to a new stage of history. In our view, a new order based of pluralism is taking shape in the world that, God willing, will not be the monopoly of any single power.‖ (21).

Khatami does not seem to think this new world order will be easy to achieve, nor that the

dialoge of civilizations will solve all the problems:

―The prescribed understanding of dialogue among cultures and civilizations will lead to a lively discussion of present-day global issues. Today, man yearns for justice, peace, and freedom and security, just as he has always yearned for them. Dialogue among civilizations needs peace to be realized, and once realized, it will help to sustain peace‖ (Khatami 2003:35).

In short, as Lynch (2000:307) puts it, Khatami believed that the dialogue of civilizations

―would help to overcome cultural misconceptions and deeply embedded hostility without sacrificing

authenticity, equality, or legitimate interests.‖ This vision was also important for Khatami as a means

of fostering an Islamic revival both by encouraging Muslims to embrace their own civilizations and

to learn from others. The Summit Conference ended with a declaration, discussed later, calling for

the dialogue of civilizations.

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Following the OIC, Khatami took his dialogue agenda to a larger international society

audience: the UN. In the 53rd Session on 4 November 1998, the UN General Assembly debated

President Khatami‘s proposal to designate the year 2001 as the UN year of Dialogue of Civilizations

(A/53/PV.53). The Iranian representative introduced the proposal by describing the dialogue of

civilizations as ―a reasonable and sound paradigm to approach the global problems likely to confront

us in the twenty-first century.‖ (A/53/PV.53). The representative also recounted the Islamic

attempts regarding the dialogue of civilizations to suggest that the dialogue of civilizations was

receiving international support. Among these efforts was the Tehran Declaration of the Eighth

Islamic Summit Conference. As this declaration emphasized, ―the imperative of positive interaction,

dialogue and understanding among cultures and religions and [rejected] theories of clash and conflict

which breed mistrust and diminish the grounds for peaceful interactions among nations.‖ After this

introduction, several representatives—those from Senegal, Egypt, Cyprus, Austria (on the behalf of

European Union and several other non-EU member European states), Malaysia, India, Syria, the

OIC, Solomon Islands (the only representative who expressed some skepticism due to the vagueness

of the concept) and Japan—expressed their support for the proposal. Many of the national

representatives explicitly rejected the concept of the clash of civilizations as they articulated their

support for dialogue (A/53/PV.53). The UN General Assembly designated 2001 the Year of

Dialogue among Civilizations (A/RES/53/22).

The designated year‘s official goal was to encourage ―tolerance in international relations and

[develop] the significant role of dialogue as a means to reach understanding, remove threats to peace

and strengthen interaction and exchange among civilizations‖ (UN Doc 1998). In late 2001, after the

9/11 attacks, the General Assembly held a two-day closing debate on the Year of Dialogue among

Civilizations (A/56/PV.40-43). Unlike earlier focus of the dialogue of civilizations on globalization

and poverty, the post-9/11 debates focused on terrorism and violence. In this two-day meeting, ―56

speakers, including three heads of state and government and ten foreign ministers‖ condemned

terrorism and praised the dialogue among civilizations as a significant means to peace (Sargent

2010:145). Subsequently, an Iranian-prepared draft resolution, ―Global Agenda for Dialogue Among

Civilizations‖ (A/RES/56/6) was adopted by consensus.

Khatami also approached other UN agencies, like UNESCO, in order to legitimize the

dialogue agenda within the UN system. Khatami gave a talk at UNESCO in October 1999 in which

he stressed the role of cross-cultural borrowing in the evolution of civilizations (Khatami 2003:29).

He also identified three conditions for the dialogue of civilizations: 1) the rejection of what he

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considered the dogmas of positivism and modernism; 2) the rejection of an essentialist

understanding of civilizations and religions, preferring to view them as dynamic and adaptable; and

3) an affirmation of the necessity of cultural and religious tolerance (Khatami 2003:31). While

acknowledging the diversity within each civilization, with its anti-positivist and anti-modernist stand,

Khatemi uses the language of pluralism and tolerance essentially to reject the substantive liberal

demands of universalism, reason, and progress. In other words, framed in this way, the dialogue

agenda question and diminish—if not totally discard—applicability of the liberal values to non-

Western societies.

Although few would doubt Khatami‘s contribution in promoting the dialogue agenda, the

motive behind his actions is a subject of debate. To some, an instrumentalist logic prevails: the

dialogue discourse provided Khatami with ―propaganda points‖ to use against his domestic

opposition and against the United States in the international community (Rubin 2000:34).

Admittedly, Khatemi, an elected politician, surely made such calculations. Yet, with hindsight, the

instrumentalist logic cannot fully explain Khatami‘s continued support for the dialogue of

civilizations through his Tehran-based International Institute for Dialogue among Cultures and

Civilizations (established in 2004) and his Geneva-based Foundation for Dialogue Among

Civilisations (established in 2007).10

Rather, there is a second explanation which points to Khatami‘s intellectual identity, an

identity forged during his time in Germany (1978-1982) and influenced by his exposure to the

philosophical debates of Kant and Habermas. His explicit references to deliberative democracy and

communicative rationality in developing his arguments for the dialogue indicate a strong

Habermasian influence. With the dialogue of civilizations, Khatami, like a Platonic philosopher king,

articulated a clear ―guidepost and ethical paradigm for the global community‖ (Dallmayr and

Manoochehri 2007). In a similar vein, Petito argues that creatively combining the elements in the

Western political theory and Sufi Islam, Khatami‘s initiative reflects ―a transgressive and

transformative dialogical journey in search of these ‗new global solidarities‘ aiming at regulating

peacefully the future multicultural and globalized international society‖ (2077:115).

Esposito and Voll (2003) offer a third explanation for Khatami‘s commitment to a dialogue

of civilizations: it reflects his cyclical view of world history. In contrast to the progressive linear view

of history dominant within the Enlightenment worldview, this alternative approach to world history

views history as a dynamic process in which some civilizations deteriorate and decline while others

10 http://www.dialogue.ir/ and http://www.dialoguefoundation.org/

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renew themselves and rise. From this perspective, Esposito and Voll (2000:629) argue that for

Khatami:

[Dialogue] also is a long-term policy alternative of learning in order to strengthen civilisations as they evolve in constant change. Dialogue with the West, in this perspective, becomes an important way of strengthening Islam, because, as the West itself evolves and possibly declines, there is the opportunity for Islam to regain its position as the leading progressive world civilisation. ‗Dialogue‘ is not a passive policy of accommodation, it is a competitive strategy for strengthening and transforming Islamic civilisation and possibly the whole global context of clash and dialogue.

Despite all the discourse and resolutions, the formal dialogue of civilizations failed to

produce and concrete political outcomes. It remained an elite-level cultural interaction rather than a

form of genuine transformative political engagement. Several political reasons limited the political

impact of the dialogue of civilizations. The U.S. ignored the call. The 9/11 attacks, the War on

Terrorism, and the Iraq War further empowered the hardliners on both sides. Khatami‘s overtures

were also rejected by the Bush Administration, an administration that labeled Iran as a part of an

―international axis of evil‖. The election of hardliner Mahmoud Ahmedinejad in 2005 marked the

rise of conservatives in Iran and the ebb of Khatami‘s reformist block. Ahmedinejad‘s populist anti-

Americanism and his resumption of Iran‘s nuclear program in 2006 rendered an Iranian-led dialogue

of civilizations impossible.

Despite the limited political influence, Khatami‘s initiatives legitimized the dialogue of

civilizations as an acceptable normative framework in international society; this was reflected in the

formal declarations by the United Nations and in the quotes, resolutions, organizations in

international civil society that were presented in the introduction of this paper. In 2006, Khatami

himself acknowledged that ―Dialogue Among Civilizations was not conceived as a political project

seeking immediate results. Rather, the purpose behind it has been to cause a paradigm shift away

from violence, conflict, intolerance, and cross-cultural misunderstandings….and it will likely to

remain a UN agenda for the foreseeable future‖ (UN Chronicle 2006:69).

There is a further reason to be skeptical of the reduction of claims about Khatami‘s

leadership regarding the dialogue of civilizations to solely Khatami-related factors like his own

political position in Iran, Iran‘s political position in the international system, or his unique

philosophical vision. Khatami was not unique his pursuit of dialogue: Dialogue also emerged as an

Islamic global vision on the part of other important Muslim actors. Various Muslim intellectual-

15

activists and politicians, using resources different from those of Khatami, became what Esposito

and Voll call the ―Muslim voices for dialogue‖ (Esposito and Voll 2000). Intellectuals like Ismail

Ragi al-Faruqie, Tariq Ramadan, Hasan Hanafi, Abdulkarim Soroush, and politicians like Anwar

Ibrahim of Malaysia, Abdurrahman Wahid of Indonesia, and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan of Turkey all

supported the articulation and implementation of the dialogue of civilizations in international

society. These leaders saw the dialogue of civilizations as important for the renewal of Islam, and for

the strengthening of umma, engaging dawa (Esposito and Voll 2001).11

In sum, in the early 2000s there was a broader acceptance of the dialogue of civilizations as a

framework of international society; this represents a change from the 1990s. This change cannot be

understood without Khatami‘s efforts to advance the dialogue agenda in the international society.

While both Khatami‘s political needs and the influence of Kant and Habermas may have played

some part in Khatami‘s embrace of the dialogue agenda, his civilization-based thinking and his

desire to represent and strengthen Islamic civilizations against the West seems to be the most

important reason for Khatami‘s turn toward dialogue. Because of this last reason, Khatami‘s

message resonated with other Muslim leaders and intellectuals and became a collective project for a

variety of Islamic actors and intellectuals. There are always concerns that politicians may be

embracing a project for instrumental reasons and that intellectuals are not fair representatives of

public opinion. However, the dialogue of civilizations became not only a political and intellectual

project but also a theological and institutional one.

From the Dialogue of Civilizations to the Interfaith Dialogue

In addition to political leaders and intellectuals, some prominent Muslim religious leaders

have accepted the dialogue of civilizations. These leaders have supported the dialogue agenda and

substantiated it with increasingly sophisticated intellectual and theological justifications. Dialogue-

compatible interpretations of Quran, hadith, and Islamic history became central to the

(understanding of) Islam espoused by a variety of scholars and Islamic movements. Since the mid-

1990s, Muslim religious leaders have offered a religious discourse that accommodates the religious

―other‖ and works with various interfaith initiatives. These religious initiatives both strengthened

11 Anwar Ibrahim for example invokes a pluralist reading of the Quran, historical experience of Al-Andalusia‘s convivencia (coexistence) and Malaysian multiculturalism. Ibrahim envisions a ―global convivencia‖ that accommodates diversity of cultures and religions and sees his efforts in implementing a global conviviencia as ―dawa‖ (call to Islam) (Ibrahim 2007).

16

and extended the dialogue agenda, substantiating it with religious ideas and thus legitimizing it

among Muslim organizations and the masses. The actions of these elites spoke directly to a public

that struggles to reconcile religious commitment and the reality of religious diversity.

This shows the internalization of a commitment to diversity among some Islamic actors. An

analogy may be helpful here. Even if one questions the sincerity of the call of Pope John XXIII (r.

1958-1963) for a Catholic-Jewish dialogue, Nostra Aetate of Second Vatican Council (1962-1965) by

reinterpreting key Catholic ideas about Judaism and Jewish people was a significant step towards the

internalization and institutionalization of that dialogue within Catholic Church (Flannery 1996). The

next section focuses on two leading Muslim religious-intellectual activists and their articulation of

the dialogue of civilizations. While this diversity may fall short of liberal expectations, the ability of

Muslim actors to produce an argument for diversity grounded in an Islamic political ethic can have a

transformative influence on at least some Islamic elites. In this section, I examine two Muslim

interfaith initiatives: the first is led by a Turkish preacher named Fethullah Gülen, and the second is

a broad-based collective effort known as ―A Common Word‖. First, however, I discuss the notion

of interfaith dialogue.

Interfaith Dialogue

The people who see the post-cold war era through the lens of the clash of civilizations often

characterize religious interactions solely from the perspective of schism and exclusion. According to

this view, interfaith cooperation is especially challenging to Judaism, Christianity, and Islam due to

their monotheism; each essentially claims it is ―the one true path‖. This ―monotheistic exclusion‖

refers to an all-or-nothing theological view: either you are a believer, or you are an infidel. Judaism

identifies the chosen people, while outsiders are gentiles; Christians believe that no salvation is

possible outside of Jesus; and Islam calls for a perennial jihad against non-Muslims. Each faith would

claim the ‗religious other‘ is a stranger to God. Political ―us versus them‖ thinking evolves easily

from this Manichean ―believer versus infidel‖ worldview. This mindset, in turn, initiates the blaming,

dehumanizing, and demonization of the believers of other religious traditions. Eventually, it leads to

inter-religious violence and conflict.

The proponents of interfaith dialogue challenge this grim characterization of inter-religious

interactions. They show that at least two other understandings are also possible in addressing the

religious other. The first of these approaches, inclusivism, acknowledges other religious traditions as

the bearers of elements of truth, albeit in the form of an incomplete approximation of the absolute

17

truth represented by one‘s own religion. The other approach, pluralism, accepts that no single

religious tradition has a privileged access to religious truth, and honors all religions as potentially

equally valid paths (Race 1983, Aslan 1998, Eck 1993). Unlike the exclusivist view, the pluralist

attitude—and, to a certain extent, the inclusivist paternalism—can at least mitigate religious-based

conflict and at best facilitate mutual understanding and respect for other religions. Thus, there are

religious perspectives that support the peaceful coexistence of people of different faiths.

Until the mid-1990s, most of the major interfaith initiatives came from Christian

organizations. The modern interfaith and interreligious dialogue began with the first meeting of The

World‘s Parliament of Religions in Chicago in 1893, attended by a wide variety of faith and religious

communities. In the 20th century, a more conservative Christian ecumenical group closely grounded

in Protestant religious communities, the World Council of Churches (WCC), also took up the mantle

of interfaith dialogue. Starting in the 1970s, the WCC‘s Interreligous Relations and Dialogue

department became active in Muslim-Christian dialogue (Pratt 2010). The Vatican also espoused

interfaith dialogue with the Second Vatican Council (1962-1965). The Declaration on the

Relationship of the Church to Non-Christian Religions, Nostra Aetate, stressed shared beliefs and

practices with the aim of interfaith dialogue and cooperation. Regarding Islam, Nostra Aetate

identified common beliefs (monotheism, the virgin birth, and the judgment day) and practices

(prayer and fasting) with Muslims without commenting on the authenticity of Quran or the

prophecy of Muhammad (Cassidy 2005). The Pontifical Council of Inter-religious Dialogue has been

the vehicle for promoting interfaith cooperation.

These Christian-led initiatives had limited success in reaching out to Muslims. In addition to

lacking an institutional counterpart to the formal Christian organizations, Muslims did not express

much excitement and interest in interfaith dialogue in the 1970s and 1980s. Some Muslims and

Muslim organizations responded to the Christian calls for interfaith dialogue with caution and

apathy. In cases where they participated, they were ―guests‖ but hardly the hosts; they were reluctant

to initiate interfaith meetings (Siddiqui 1997:xvi, Pratt 2010:27; compare it with Goddard 2000:182-

183). Several factors may have played a role in the hesitancy with which Muslims engaged in

interfaith dialogue: institutional (lacking a formal hierarchy to denote who speaks for Islam in Sunni

Islam), political (Muslim‘s conflation of Christian groups with Western imperialism and support for

the State of Israel), historical (memories of a colonial past) and religious (a Muslim sense of religious

superiority).

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Yet, increasing numbers of Muslim leaders embraced interfaith dialogue in the 1990s. Post-

Cold War developments, concerns about Islam as a new threat (Esposito 1999), predictions about a

clash of civilizations (Huntington 1996), terrorist attacks in the name of Islam, the rise of

Islamophobia in the West, and the growing presence of Muslim minorities in North America and

Western Europe contributed to Muslim religious groups‘ desire to engage in interfaith activities.

There is evidence that Muslim minorities in the West are particularly interested in engaging in

interfaith dialogue. In a study in post-9/11 America, 65 percent of mosque-going Muslims told that

they have participated in an interfaith dialogue program and 37 percent in an interfaith social service

project (Cited in Smith 2007:55). In the last decade, Muslims have led interfaith dialogue initiatives.

In the reset of this section, I examine two such initiatives

Fethullah Gülen, the Gülen Movement, and Interfaith Dialogue

Fethullah Gülen is the leader of an influential Muslim group, known as the Gülen

Movement (Yavuz and Esposito 2003). He was born in Turkey in 1941 and has resided in the US

since 1999. Gülen has an estimated 6 million followers who established over 1000 schools in over

100 countries, mostly in Turkey and Central Asia. Two major Turkish dailies (Zaman and Today’s

Zaman) and several television satiations (STV and Samanyolu Haber in Turkey, Ebru TV in the US)

are also affiliated with the movement. A list of ―The 500 Most Influential Muslims‖, prepared jointly

by The Prince Alwaleed Bin Talal Center for Muslim-Christian Understanding at Georgetown

University and the Jordanian Royal Aal al-Bait Institute for Islamic Thought, named Gülen as the

thirteenth most influential Muslim in the world on both the 2009 and the 2010 lists (Lumpard and

Nayed 2010:52).

Gülen is a great example illustrating the construction of a Muslim theology and practice of

interfaith dialogue that substantiates the dialogue of civilizations. Likewise, Gülen‘s followers also

demonstrate how a social and spiritual movement internalizes an understanding of Islam where

interfaith dialogue and engagement are central. Gülen and his followers ―have devoted considerable

energy in recent years on inter-religious dialogue with tens of interfaith centers in Europe and the

US to foster better relations between faiths‖ (Lumpard and Nayed 2010:52). These efforts grew out

of Gülen‘s understanding of Islam‘s encouragement for interfaith dialogue, Turkish historical and

political experience, and the enormous geographical growth of his movement in the 1990s. Gülen

bases his interfaith approach on Turkish Islamic tradition, such as the medieval Sufi poet and

theologian Rumi (1207-1273); the Ottoman Empire‘s religious tolerance (such as the Empire‘s

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community self-governance, or Millet, system); and the twentieth century Islamic revivalist Said

Nursi (1878-1960) (Michel 2007).

Elsewhere I have argued that, coming from these traditions, Gülen‘s interfaith approach has

three religious bases: a history of revelation and prophecy, the commonalities among faiths, and the

Quran‘s explicit sanction of interfaith dialogue (Kayaoglu 2010). First, Gülen is clear about his

commitment to interfaith dialogue simply because ―the very nature of religion demands this

dialogue.‖ For Gülen, Judaism, Christianity, and Islam, and even Hinduism and other world religions

accept the same divine source for themselves, and they, with the non-theistic religions like

Buddhism, ―pursue the same goal‖ (Gülen 2000:243). This accommodating approach to other faiths

is rooted in Gülen‘s understanding of the spiral history of religion. Embedded in an Islamic

understanding of religion and history, this spiral view of history suggests that God sends prophets

and revelations to establish and re-establish the universal principle of the existence of God. The

spiral history of religion assumes the ―oneness and basic unity of religions.‖ While there may be

some variations, the divine revelation establishes an axis for religious unity. In Gülen‘s words, any

religion reflects the universality of religion, which is ―a system of belief embracing all races and all

beliefs, a road bringing everyone together in brotherhood‖ (Gülen 2002:243). Using this singular and

inclusive conceptualization of religion, Gülen relates all major religions to each other via the same

divine impulse for revelation, thus highlighting the similarities rather than differences.

The basic unity of religions derives its existence from the chain of prophecy and scripture,

and is reflected in the similarity of religious teachings: ―Regardless of how their adherents implement

their faith in their daily lives, such generally accepted values as love, respect, tolerance, forgiveness,

mercy, human rights, peace, brotherhood, and freedom are exalted by religion. Most of them are

accorded the highest precedence in the messages brought by Moses, Jesus, and Muhammad, as well

as in the messages of Buddha, and even Zarathustra, Lao-Tzu, Confucius, and the Hindu Scholars‖

(Gülen 2000:242). Essentially for Gülen, the fundamental universal values of love, compassion,

tolerance, and forgiveness are the basis of all religions (Gülen 2000:253).

Third, according to Gülen, the Quran is a universal call for dialogue. The focus is

primarily—but not exclusively—on engagement with Abrahamic religions (Gülen 2000; 249). The

dialogue between Judaism, Christianity, and Islam is the first pillar of interfaith dialogue. The Quran

provides scriptural support for a Muslim dialogue with the People of the Book (Jews and

Christians), saying ―O people of the Book! Come to common terms as between us and you‖ that we

worship none but God; that we associate no partners with Him; that we take not, from among

20

ourselves lords and patrons other than God. ―If then they turn back, say you: Bear witness that we

are Muslims (surrendered to God‘s Will)‖ Quran (3: 64).

The concept of the ―People of the Book‖ plays a prominent role in Gülen‘s view of

interfaith dialogue. He interprets the Quran‘s twenty-four references to Jews and Christians as

―People of the Book‖ as sanctioning the Islamic accommodation of them (Saritoprak and Griffith

2005). To that end, Gülen stresses the Quranic verses (like Quran, 2: 3-4) in which Muslims are

asked to believe ―…in what is sent to you [Muhammad] and what was sent before you…‖. From

this particular verse, Gülen argues that, in the beginning, the Quran calls Muslims to accept ―the

former Prophets and their Books‖ and by requiring a belief in former prophets and revelations,

Islam thus establishes the foundation for interfaith dialogue. Believing in early prophets is supported

by procedural encouragement given to Muslims in the Quran: ―And discuss you not with the People

of the Book, except with means better (than mere disputation)‖ (Quran, 29:36). Gülen suggests that

the Quran establishes that dialogue should focus on finding commonalities rather than refuting the

religious beliefs of others (Gülen 2000:251). Gülen‘s approach, however, does not address to what

extent and how one might legitimize religious differences.

The unity of the chain of prophecy, revelation, and the commonalities of religious traditions

do not necessarily translate into dialogue, particularly between Muslims and Christians. Gülen gives

four reasons for Muslim difficulties in this situation: the Western assault on Muslims since the

crusaders; the authoritarian political regimes dominating Muslim-majority states; the politicization of

Islam; and the misrepresentation of Islam in the West (Gülen 2002:243-244). These political factors

are compatible with the general skepticism Gülen has about politics: Politics, with its focus on the

allocation of (mostly material) resources, divides people, while religion unites them. According to

Gülen, these difficulties should not discourage the faithful from participating in dialogue, but, rather,

motivate them to advocate for it more strongly.

Essentially the Muslim scholar Fethullah Gülen develops an interfaith theology—offering an

understanding of Islam that accommodates other faith traditions—using resources within the

Islamic tradition. Gülen‘s interfaith theology establishes a theology of revelation and prophecy as an

axis linking faith traditions. The existence of this axis is supported by shared beliefs and practices

across faiths. He also relies on the Quran, particularly the Quran‘s positive references to ―Peoples of

the Book,‖ to support his inclusive interfaith theology. Gülen emphasizes the shared beliefs and

practices among religions to substantiate both of his claims: the divine origins of all major religions

and the possibility of interfaith cooperation. He is silent about the differences among faiths,

21

reducing the religions to a least-common dominator for an interfaith agenda. As a Muslim leader, he

accommodates other faith traditions, but not atheism or anti-religious positions.

Gülen and his followers have made interfaith dialogue the core of their activism since the

early 1990s (Kuru 2005). Gülen has had bilateral meetings with key religious leaders, including the

Chief Rabbi of the Jewish community in Turkey, the Greek Orthodox Patriarch, and the Pope. The

Journalist and Writers Foundation, founded with Gülen‘s initiative in 1994, has launched a series of

elite-level meetings between policymakers, journalists, academics, and religious leaders on a variety

of topics, including multiculturalism, interfaith dialogue, secularism (Ugur 2007). With the

globalization of the Gülen movement, interfaith activities have only expanded. Now, in addition to

educational institutions and the media, the movement shares the ideas of Gülen with the larger

public through a global network of interfaith organizations. Even if one were only to examine the

Gülen movement in relation to interfaith organizations in the United States, Gülen‘s through loosely

connected network of organization is impressive: The Institute of Interfaith Dialogue (Houston-

based with 15 branches in Texas and neighboring states); The Interfaith Dialogue? Center (New

Jersey-based)12; The Rumi Forum for Interfaith Dialogue (Washington DC-based with 5 chapters in

other states)13; The Istanbul Center (Atlanta-based with 5 branches in the Southwest); Divan Center

(North Carolina-based)14; The Interfaith Dialogue Organization (Kentucky-based); The Niagara

Foundation (Chicago-based with 8 other chapters)15; The Pacifica Institute (San-Francisco-based

with 6 chapters)16; The Maryland Institute of Dialogue17; The Universal Foundation (New York-

based)18; The Philadelphia Dialog Forum19; The Dialogue International (Wisconsin-based)20; The

Multicultural Mosaic Foundation (Denver-based),21 The Rosegarden Cultural Center (Portland-

based)22; and The Acacia Foundation (Seattle-based)23. These organizations typically seek to

cooperate with religious and community leaders: they organize interfaith meetings, public lectures,

and conferences on interfaith initiatives and Gülen‘s ideas. In their communities, they carry out

12 www.interfaithdialog.org 13 http://www.rumiforum.org/ 14 http://www.divannc.org/ 15 http://www.niagarafoundation.org/ 16 http://www.pacificainstitute.org 17 http://www.dialoguemaryland.org/ 18 http://universalfoundationny.org/ 19 http://www.dialogueforum.us 20 http://www.dialogue-international.org 21 http://www.mosaicfoundation.org 22 http://rosegardencc.org/ 23 http://www.acaciafoundation.org/

22

activities under the banners of Abraham (e.g. Abrahamic interfaith dinners) or Noah (Noah‘s

pudding celebrations), making these Hebrew Bible prophets central to their interaction with non-

Muslims. They also organize travel to Turkey in order to introduce what they term

―Turkish/Anatolian Islam‖ to American religious, political, educational leaders.

In sum, Gülen and his followers embraced interfaith dialogue in 1990s in Turkey. Their

subsequent growth made them a global movement in which interfaith dialogue continues to play an

ever-important role in their social and spiritual activism. With this religious discourse and interfaith

activism Gülen and his followers have legitimized and grounded the dialogue of civilizations within

some segments of Islamic discourse and faith-based activism. In the process, they seem to have

internalized an understanding of Islam and faith-based activism that accommodates religious other.

A Common Word Between Us and You

A second example of the internalization of the dialogue agenda via interfaith dialogue is the

initiative known as ―A Common Word Between Us and You.‖ Unlike Gülen and his grassroots

movement, this initiative is an elite project. These efforts began when the Royal Aal al-Bait Institute

for Islamic Thought in Amman, Jordan, coordinated a group of influential Islamic scholars and

leaders to publicly reach out to their Christian counterparts. The catalyst for this activity was Pope

Benedict XVI‘s Regensburg Lecture in September 2006 in which he, citing a fifteenth century

Byzantine Emperor (Manual II Paleologus), linked Islam to violence: "Show me just what

Mohammed brought that was new, and there you will find things only evil and inhuman, such as his

command to spread by the sword the faith he preached‖ (Benedict XVI 2006). This quotation, for

which the Pope later apologized, drew a range of responses: violent protests occurred in several

Muslim majority countries, the Iranian Supreme Leader accused him of leading a crusade with

President Bush, and several Muslim leaders published an open letter to the Pope.

A month later, in October 2006, 38 Muslim scholars, representing all branches of Islam,

published an ―Open Letter to His Holiness.‖ This letter responded to the Pope‘s remarks in an

effort to shift the focus from religious, ethical, and political disagreements to the commonalities of

the two faiths. The Vatican largely ignored this initial letter (Ghazi 2010). Undeterred, and in an

unprecedented step, a year later in October of 2007, 138 Muslim scholars and leaders worldwide

signed a document entitled ―A Common Word Between Us and You.‖ While the Pope was the

primary audience, the document was also addressed to the heads of many different Christian

communities including Eastern Orthodox patriarchs, judicatories of a number of Protestant

23

denominations, and leaders of the Christian church in general (Ghazi 2010:12, Waleed El-Ansary

and David K. Linnan 2010).

Essentially, this public letter affirmed that, while differences exist, there is also a strong basis

for religious understanding as well as for practical cooperation between Christianity and Islam. The

authors of the document took the theme from the Quran (3.64): ‗Say, O People of the Book

[Christians and Jews]! Come to a common word between us and you.‘ The text of the document

explains its purpose clearly: ―Muslims and Christians together make up well over half of the world‘s

population. Without peace and justice between these two religious communities, there can be no

meaningful peace in the world. The future of the world depends on peace between Muslims and

Christians.‖ The signatories of the document sound hopeful for such a peace between Muslims and

Christians: ―The basis for this peace and understanding already exists. It is part of the very

foundational principles of both faiths: love of One God, and love of neighbor. These principles are

found over and over again in the sacred texts of Islam and Christianity.‖

In terms of what it says, the document does not chart a new theological path. Several

scholars in the past have made similar claims, including Islamic intellectuals located in American and

European universities, like Isma‘il Raji al-Faruqi, Mahmoud Ayoub, Khursid Ahmad, Sayyed

Hossein Nasr (Siddiqui 1997). However, what distinguishes this initiative from earlier efforts is its

broad-based support from key Muslim opinion leaders of diverse sectarian credentials. This support

gives the document an authoritative voice to reinterpret the tradition in an inclusivist way. It is the

first major effort by Muslim leaders to publicly challenge their Christian counterparts to join them in

affirming commonalities and stressing dialogue. The fact that these Muslim scholars and leaders

publicly commit themselves, staking their religious credentials and reputation, is itself an indication

of their commitment to (the) dialogue (agenda). The sheer collective power of the group, makes the

letter, in the opinion of Muslim observer Ibrahim Kalin, an ―ijma, universal consensus of Muslim

scholars‖, thereby elevating the declaration to the level of Islamic law (Kalin 2007).

While calling it a universal consensus may be premature, the authoritative weight of the

signatories potentially increases the appeal of interfaith dialogue to conservative Muslim groups and

provides a theological rationale for Muslims to accommodate the religious other. It also offers a

traditional religious justification for the dialogue of civilizations; this religious justification is built on

the doctrines and religious consensus that makes it difficult to reverse with changing political

conditions. The open letter indicates that the dialogue-oriented approach to Christians is being

internalized within Islamic legal doctrines and dominant interpretations.

24

Adding to its Islamic pedigree, the norm entrepreneur for the ―A Common Word‖ initiative

is a major Islamic research institution with close ties to Jordanian government and traditional ulema.

The Royal Aal al-Bait Institute for Islamic Thought in Amman, Jordan, is an Islamic research

institution, partially funded by the Jordanian government. Founded in 1981 by Prince El Hassan bin

Talal, a 42nd generation direct descendant of the Prophet Muhammad, the Institute embraced

interfaith dialogue in the 1990s (Haddad and Smith 2010:370). For example, the Institute created the

Royal Institute for Inter-Faith Studies in 1994 with a focus on issues of ―religion, cultural and

civilizational‖ and started publishing the Bulletin of the Royal Institute for Inter-faith Studies in 1999.

The director of The Royal Aal al-Bait Institute for Islamic Thought, Prince Ghazi, has been

the driving force behind the ‗A Common Word‘ initiative. Prince Ghazi explains his motivation for

the initiative by invoking the post-cold war debates. He criticizes Huntington for both what he

perceives to be Huntington‘s essentialist and monolithic view of the West and Islam, and his

exaggeration of Islamic-Chinese cooperation while neglecting Islamic-Western alliances. Prince

Ghazi also questions Fukuyama‘s assertion that Western-style liberal democracy can fit all societies.

Additionally, Prince Ghazi cites the rise of terrorism and mutual prejudices among Muslims and

Christians leading them to ―routinely mistrust, disrespect, and dislike each other, if not popularly and

actively trash, dehumanize, demise and despise, and attack each other‖ as important concerns

leading him to launch ―A Common Word‖ initiative (Ghazi 2010:7).

Since the publication of the letter, the Royal Al Bayt Institute has collaborated with several

institutions to advance ―A Common Word‖. While short of establishing a coalition, the Institute was

able to get support from several Christian organizations and leaders. Together with the Yale Center

for Faith and Culture, they authored Loving God and Neighbour in Word and Deed: Implications for Muslims

and Christians (in July 2008). Collaboration in October 2008 with the Archbishop of Canterbury and

the University of Cambridge Inter faith Program yielded ―A Common Word and the Future of

Christian-Muslim Engagement‖. The Institute also cooperated with the Pontifical Council for Inter

Religious Dialogue in November 2008. In conjunction with the Prince Alwaleed bin Talal Center for

Muslim-Christian Understanding of Georgetown University, the Institute published A Common

Word Between Us and You: A Global Agenda for Change in October 2009.

Additionally, there have been numerous other conferences, workshops, speeches and

interfaith activities self-identified as inspired by or exploring ‗A Common Word‖. These have

included lectures and workshops in Cambridge (February 2009), Oman (March and April 2009), the

USA (2009), Egypt (2009), and Sudan (2009). The Mediterranean Dialogue of Cultures (2008), the

25

Brookings Institute in Qatar (2009), Fuller Theological Seminary (2009), the Islamic Society of

North America Conference (2009), and Yale University (2009) have all organized symposia to

discuss ‗A Common Word.‖

In sum, as illustrated by the Gülen movement and the initiatives surrounding ―A Common

Word‖, starting in the 1990s support for interfaith dialogue replaced earlier apathy in some Islamic

circles. Championing several interfaith initiatives, these Muslim activists claim that their commitment

to Islam does not prevent them from coming together with the followers of other religions and

searching for common truths and fostering shared values. To the contrary, these Muslims see their

activities as religiously sanctioned. These activists have developed an interfaith discourse that

accommodates the religious other, establishes interfaith-oriented NGOs, and reaches the followers

of other religions both at the grassroots and elite levels. With all these efforts, they challenge the

basic assumption of the clash of civilizations and pave the way for a dialogue of civilizations within a

religious framework. In the process an increasing number Muslim religious leaders and communities

embraced the dialogue agenda and offered interpretations for how Islamic doctrines justify interfaith

dialogue and the dialogue of civilizations.

The OIC and the Institutionalization of Dialogue Agenda

In addition to the interfaith dialogue situated within Islamic civil society, the dialogue of

civilizations agenda was institutionalized at the intergovernmental level. The Organization of Islamic

Conference (OIC) became the intergovernmental basis through which Islamic groups and activists

have promoted the dialogue agenda. At each OIC summit since 1994, supporters of the dialogue

agenda have tied their vision to that of the OIC, securing an organizational platform for their goals.

Increasingly, the OIC became a vehicle for these activists to coordinate their efforts and use the

OIC‘s organizational access to the UN to push for change within the UN. Since Khatami was

instrumental in consolidating this agenda within the OIC, I examine the evolution of the dialogue

agenda in the OIC in three parts: before Khatami, under Khatami‘s leadership, and in the post-

Khatami period.24

24 The OIC has three primary organs 1) The Islamic Summit of the Heads of the Muslim states, a group which meets every three years to discuss major issues facing the Muslim world; 2) The Conference of Foreign Ministers, a group which meets yearly to implement general policy and review progress on resolutions; and 3) the General Secretariat, a body that coordinates OIC activities. Since my focus is on how the idea of the dialogue of civilizations became central to the OIC mission, I focus on the summit meetings with the heads of Islamic states (Khan 2002).

26

A) Early Attempts to Articulate the Dialogue of Civilizations

The dialogue discourse first appeared on the OIC agenda in the post-cold war period. In this

period, Muslim leaders began to call for the dialogue of civilizations. The term ―dialogue" first

appeared in the OIC‘s documents in the early 1990s. Its early usage was compatible with the

traditional meaning of the term—inter-state diplomacy. The Dakar Declaration of the Sixth Islamic

Summit Conference (9-11 December 1991) refers to ―dialogue and cooperation among all nations‖

in order to solve international problems. In subsequent declarations, however, ―dialogue‖ took on

an increasingly religious and cultural connotation. In the view of its Muslim advocates, ―dialogue‖

became a strategy to ―repair‖ the image of Islam—later it even became a way to realize a global

order that accommodates the plurality of religions and cultures in international society.

The Casablanca Declaration of the Seventh Islamic Summit Conference (13-15 December

1994) expressed participants‘ concerns with the ―Image of Islam outside of the Islamic World.‖ The

Declaration condemns ―the evil intention of the quarters that seize every opportunity to discredit

Islam or present it as contrary to progress and development or as threat to the foundations of

modern civilization,‖ rejects ―the use of this distorted image of Islam to justify aggressing and

occupation against Muslim countries and peoples,‖ and denounces ―the double standard approach

adopted by anti-Islamic quarters whenever a just cause of interest to the Islamic Ummah is at stake‖.

Following these introductory criticisms, the text of the Declaration affirms ―the readiness of the

Islamic Ummah stemming from the teachings of Islam to engage in a constructive dialogue with the

revealed religions in a spirit of tolerance and respect for international legality.‖

The Casablanca Declaration links anti-Islamic discourse and action with violence against

Muslims.25 The references to ―anti-Islamic quarters‖ echo Huntington‘s clash of civilizations

argument, published a year before the declaration and heavily discussed within Islamic circles. The

reference to ―double standards‖ is suggestive of the Western inaction to protect Bosnian Muslims.

The Declaration‘s call for dialogue was primarily tied to the goal of improving the image of Islam.

The 1994 Casablanca Declaration was the first to conceptualize ―dialogue‖ with the connotation of

the ―dialogue of civilizations‖ in the OIC. That view of dialogue, however, was a marginal issue in

the document, employed in the document mainly as a defensive strategy limited to correcting the

25 It uses ―anti-Islamic‖ rather than ―Islamophobia‖ as I argue in the next chapter the Declaration pre-dates the term Islamophobia which emerged in 1997.

27

image of Islam. While this may suggest an instrumentalist logic, the fact that these Muslim leaders

care about the image of Islam in international society indicates a level of norm internalization.

B) Elaboration of the Dialogue of Civilizations within the OIC

From 1997 forward, the OIC‘s view of dialogue as a means of repairing Islam‘s image was

replaced by a view of dialogue as an elaborate and universal normative vision for international

society. The dialogue agenda became an integral part of the OIC‘s global vision and agenda at the

Eighth Islamic Summit Conference (9-11 December 1997). At this conference, Khatami secured the

OIC‘s commitment to the dialogue agenda and used this platform to bring the issue to the fore in

international society. Over 50 Muslim heads of state met in Tehran under the chairmanship of

President Khatami. His influence was evident in the conference theme: ―dignity, dialogue, and

participation.‖ In this formulation, more than just correcting Islam‘s image, dialogue appears as a

means to build and project Muslim dignity and to enhance Muslim participation in the global order.

The shift of the role of the term ―dialogue‖ was not clear-cut. As in earlier conferences, in

Tehran the term ―dialogue‖ appeared under the ―information sector‖, signaling that dialogue would

simply be an instrument to repair Islam‘s image. To that end, the conference declaration identified

the ―dialogue of civilizations‖ as one of the tools to enhance ―the image of Islam, promoting the

heritage and values as well as the achievements, the potentialities, and the various policies of the

Islamic Ummah whilst giving priority to inter-Islamic exchange, encouraging dialogue among

civilizations and bringing together Muslim minorities and communities and communities or the

Organization of the Islamic Conference and other Muslim populations‖ (§110). Two paragraphs

later, within the context of the ―image and interests of Islam‖, the declaration repeats the

importance of dialogue among civilizations to correct the distorted image of Islam (§112).26

However, the authors of the declaration also move beyond this limited and instrumental

view of dialogue. Significantly, they offer an elaborate and universal vision of international relations

grounded in the dialogue of civilizations. The preamble of Tehran Declaration (December 1997)

contrasts ―the clash of civilizations‖ with ―the dialogue of civilizations‖ in this way: ―the imperative

of positive interaction, dialogue and understanding among cultures and religions; and rejecting the

theories of clash and conflict which breed mistrust and diminish the grounds for peaceful interaction

26For that the Tehran Declaration[?] emphasized the importance of media: ―in promoting the just causes, true image and heritage and values of Islam, in raising awareness of the achievements, resources and policies of the Islamic Ummah, calling for dialogue among civilizations, and bringing Muslim minorities and communities closer to each other, to the OIC, and Islamic peoples.‖

28

among nations‖. With these words the declaration signals a move toward (the acceptance of) the

value of cultural and religious plurality.

Muslim heads of state also agreed to hold a special OIC meeting to prepare a declaration

solely about the dialogue of civilizations. The resulting Tehran Declaration Among Civilizations (3-5

May 1999) outlines the OIC‘s vision of plurality for international society. The Declaration first

enumerates the reasons for the importance of cultural diversity: it rejects ―attempts of cultural

domination and imposition as well as doctrines and practices promoting confrontation and clash

between civilizations.‖ The Declaration further calls for the international community to find

―common grounds between, and within, civilizations‖ in order to face global challenges and to build

an inclusive global order. To that end, the Declaration suggests the dialogue of civilizations as the

method by which global coexistence and tolerance might be promoted. It asks Muslim societies to

employ the dialogue of civilizations inside and outside the Islamic world as ―the new paradigm of

international relations.‖ The Declaration‘s suggested methods were secular: organizing conferences,

publishing books, journals, brochures, preparing documentaries that project the "true message of

Islam and depicting from numerous instances of constructive interaction between Islamic and other

civilizations." It called Muslim majority states to support the NGOs that are "fostering

understanding among civilizations.‖

Building on these ideals, the Declaration identified several ―critical areas of international

relations‖ in which the dialogue of civilizations should be applied. Some of these concerns were

related to participation in the creation of a global order: the ―determination of various actors at the

international scene to build a global order based on inclusion, dialogue, mutual understanding and

respect instead of the outdated doctrines of exclusion, rivalry, power politics and selfish pursuit of

narrow interests‖ and the ―application of the principles of equality, transparency and democratic

representation in various global institutions‖. In addition to these broader issues of global order and

decision-making procedures, the Declaration also lists the ―withdrawal of Israel from occupied

territories‖ as a step for the dialogue of civilizations. The Declaration concludes with the promise

―of a 10 year program of action to be followed at the national, regional, and global level in order to

promote and institutionalize dialogue among civilizations and a new global order based on such

paradigm.‖ (OIC Document 2005b:16).

C) Elaboration of Dialogue of Civilizations and Flourishing of New Initiatives

29

The dialogue of civilizations both as a means to change Islam‘s image in international society

and as a perspective on international relations gained strength with subsequent OIC summit

conferences. The OIC‘s sense of importance and legitimacy grew as the idea of dialogue of

civilizations found broader international acceptance. The OIC seems to internalize the dialogue

agenda as its defining quality in its engagement with the organs of broader international society. The

Ninth Session of the Islamic Summit Conference, (Doha, Qatar, December 2000) started on a self-

congratulatory note, with much attention paid to the OIC‘s success in promoting the dialogue of

civilization and with ―commending‖ the UN‘s declaration of 2001 as the UN Year of Dialogue

Among Civilizations.

The 2000 OIC Conference Declaration begins by praising Islam, noting with ―great pride

that the lofty precepts of our noble religion offer optimal solutions to the contemporary problems

facing human societies for Islam is the religion of love, justice, tolerance, progress and respect for

human rights and dignity.‖ The Declaration then promotes the dialogue of civilizations with equally

lofty praise: ―We consider that the initiative of Dialogue among Civilizations constitutes a new

paradigm and universal vision to build an equitable international order, founded on inclusion,

participation, mutual understanding, and tolerance among peoples and nations.‖ In the view of the

Conference participants, the dialogue of civilizations is important for the dissemination of ―the true

image of Islam and highlight[s] its import as a fundamental source of human civilization, at a time

when it is being constantly misrepresented through various means.‖ Attendees at the Doha meeting

also adopted the Global Program of Action on Dialogue Among Civilizations and established an

Islamic Committee for continued dialogue among Member States within the UN.‖27

For the OIC, the dialogue of civilizations has also become a tool to clarify its stance against

Islamic extremism. At the Third Extraordinary Session of the Islamic Summit Conference (Mecca,

Saudi Arabia, 7-8 December 2005), the OIC contextualized the ―Dialogue of Civilization‖ within the

context of spreading ―the correct ideas about Islam as a religion of moderation and tolerance‖ and

safeguarding ―Islamic values, belief and principles in order to fortify Muslims against extremism and

narrow-mindedness.‖ Likewise, the conference declaration condemned ―extremism in all its forms

and manifestations.‖ The final report of the conference ―Ten-Year Programme of Action: To Meet

the Challenge Facing the Muslim Ummah in the 21st Century‖ further detailed ―intellectual and

political issues‖ and ―development, socio-economic and scientific‖ issues to help ―the Ummah to

27 At the summit conference in Putrajaya Malaysia (16-17 October 2003), the OIC discussed to adopt a draft resolution on dialogue between Islam and Christianity, but it was not materialized.

30

achieve its renaissance.‖ One of the five items listed under the ―intellectual and political issues‖ was

―Islam- The Religion of Moderation and Tolerance‖ enumerated action to be taken regarding the

dialogue of civilization. This section emphasized ―that inter-civilizational dialogue, based on mutual

respect and understanding, and equality amongst people are prerequisites for international peace and

security, tolerance, peaceful co-existence, and participation in developing the mechanism for that

dialogue.‖ To that end, the report encouraged member states to support ―inter-religious dialogue‖

and ―common values and denominators‖ among religions through ―the participation of the OIC and

its specialized bodies, as a proactive partner in the dialogue among civilizations and religions, as well

as in initiatives and efforts exerted in this regard‖. The report also called on Muslim states to use the

―mass media in order to serve and defend the causes of the Muslim Ummah, promote the noble

principles and values of Islam, and correct misconceptions about it‖ (OIC Document 2005a).

A separate document, Framework for the Implementation of the OIC 10-Year Programme

Action, illustrates how these goals would be achieved. The main responsibility has fallen to three

OIC bodies: the Dawa Affairs Committee, the Research Centre for Islamic History, Arts and

Culture (IRCICA), and the Islamic Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization (ISESCO).

These departments work to disseminate ―correct‖ ideas about Islam, hold symposia, seminars, and

workshops on Islamic culture; to improve Islam‘s global image; to advance interfaith dialogue; and

to highlight the beliefs and practices shared by all faiths (OIC Document 2005b).

One specialized agency of the OIC that has been particularly important in advancing the

dialogue of civilizations is the Islamic Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (ISESCO).

This organization is the OIC‘s cultural arm, parallel in function to UNESCO‘s relationship with the

UN. ISESCO‘s engagement with the dialogue of civilizations began with the 8th General Conference

of the Higher Council for Islamic Affairs in year. At this conference the participants discussed

―Islam and the Future of Civilizational Dialogue.‖ Following this initial conference, ISESCO has

actively organized or co-organized several conferences both among Muslim-majority states as well as

between Muslim and non-Muslim states. The number of dialogue-related conferences with which

ISESCO is involved has gradually increased: 3 in 1998; 3 in 2000; 3 in 2001; 8 in 2002; 8 in 2003; 8

in 2004; 6 in 2005; 13 in 2006; 16 in 2007; and 8 in the first 6 months of 2008. Additionally, ISESCO

publishes and supports dialogue-related publications, as well as lobbying for the dialogue of

civilizations at UNESCO.

In sum, for Islamic activists promoting the agenda of a dialogue of civilizations, the OIC has

become a significant body. Since the mid-1990s, the OIC has been an important forum allowing

31

Muslim states to discuss issues related to the dialogue of civilizations and the role of such a dialogue

in repairing and promoting Islam‘s image in international society and its place in the normative

structure of international society. Since Khatami‘s promotion of the dialogue of civilizations as a key

idea within the OIC‘s, the OIC‘s commitment to the project has gained force with each successive

summit conference.

Conclusion

Although a variety of actors have been involved with the dialogue agenda, Islamic actors

have been its initiators and most visible supporters since the 1990s. Notably, it was Iranian President

Mohammad Khatami who initiated the modern ―dialogue of civilizations‖ agenda during his

presidency (1997-2005). Following a proposal from Khatami, the General Assembly of the United

Nations then designated the year 2001 as the Year of the Dialogue among Civilizations. Currently,

various global Islamic movements; Islamic inter-governmental organizations, like the Organization

of Islamic Conference (OIC) and its cultural arm ISESCO; Muslim intellectuals; Muslim

communities in the Diaspora; and a plethora of Islamic NGOs continue to advance the dialogue of

civilizations and its related agendas of interfaith dialogue.

Since its inception in the 1990s, the agenda has united some Muslim politicians and

intellectuals across national boundaries, and across the political and sectarian divide. Muslim

politicians and intellectuals initially embraced the dialogue of civilizations as a way to improve the

image of Islam, but later formulated it as a full-fledged normative perspective on international

politics. This framework involved a discourse of plurality, tolerance, and cooperation as the key

themes. To advance the dialogue agenda, Muslim politicians and intellectuals also used a variety of

platforms, such as the OIC, UN, and UNESCO.

In a separate—but parallel—campaign, some Muslim leaders and groups espoused the

dialogue of civilizations. They began producing religious arguments to support the dialogue of

civilizations, relying on the similarities and common symbols of the Abrahamic faiths. The themes

of this initiative include both religious ideas (the centrality of God) and secular ideas (love of one‘s

neighbor). These arguments can accommodate the religious other (particularly the followers of other

Abrahamic religions). The grassroots strategy of the Gülen Movement and the ecumenical approach

of the scholars and writers affiliated with ―A Common Word‖ illustrate how these actors have

advanced interfaith initiatives that strengthen the dialogue of civilizations ideologically and increase

32

its appeal among Muslim masses by providing a religious justification for such dialogue. The same

process also gave these groups an understanding of Islam and Islamic activism that is compatible

with religious diversity.

While the practical consequences of the dialogue of civilizations remain limited thus far,

Muslim groups have been successful in advancing an agenda of interfaith dialogue. This shows that

Islamic norm-making is possible in international society. The dialogue of civilizations and the related

agenda of interfaith dialogue will probably continue to provide Muslims discourse and symbols both

compatible both with international society‘s secular-liberal orientation as well as Islamic political

ethics. Furthermore, there are signs that Muslims groups are increasingly invoking the dialogue of

civilizations to advance controversial ideas like combating Islamophobia, arguable a direct challenge

to liberal free speech. Both Islamophobia and the conceptual stretching of the dialogue of

civilizations necessary to accommodate the fight against Islamophobia may present challenges for

the future of the dialogue of civilizations.

33

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