communicative ethics and the claims of transcendental phenomenology exploring the foundations of...
TRANSCRIPT
COMMUNICATIVEETHICSANDTHECLAIMSOFTRANSCENDENTALPHENOMENOLOGY
EXPLORINGTHEFOUNDATIONSOFINTERSUBJECTIVITY
KEVIN P. LEE
WORKINGPAPER
NOVEMBER,2015
CAMPBELLUNIVERSITY
SCHOOLOFLAW
1
COMMUNICATIVEETHICSANDTHECLAIMSOFTRANSCENDENTALPHENOMENOLOGY
EXPLORINGTHEFOUNDATIONSOFINTERSUBJECTIVITY
INTRODUCTION
JürgenHabermasandKarl-OttoApelarethemostwidelyknowntheoristsof
communicative ethics.1 Their theories, while grounded in somewhat different
epistemologies,shareinholdingthatthetruthofanypropositionisdeterminedbya
process of open discourse and reasoned argument that leads, in principle, to
universalrecognition.Thisviewoftheintersubjectivenatureoftruth-claimsled,in
the twentiethcentury, tonewapproaches topolitical liberalismpredicatedon the
beliefthatdiscoursewouldleadtoapost-metaphysicaluniversalistposition.Unlike
earlier attempts to ground the transcendental analysis of subjectivity, Habermas
andApelseekthefoundationoftheirmoraltheoriesinuniversalprinciplesderived
from the transcendental analysis of intersubjectivity. They are both critical of
Husserl’s phenomenology because they view it as finding the foundations of
knowledge in subjective experience. That is to say, for Habermas and Apel, the
methodofphenomenologicalenquiry is“solipsistic” inthesensethat it isseeksto
1Theirtheoriesdevelopedrespectivelyintwowork:JürgenHabermas,
PostmetaphysicalThinking:PhilosophicalEssays,WilliamHehengartentrans.
(Cambridge,MA:TheMITPress,1992);andKarl-OttoApel,(GlenAddyandDavid
Frisby,trans.)TheTransformationofPhilosophy(London:RoutledgeandKagen
Paul,1980).
2
findthefoundationsofknowledgeinsubjectiveexperiences,whereastheirtheories
seek the foundations of knowledge in the transcendental analysis of
intersubjectivity,which theybelieveoccursexclusively in languageas it isused in
discourse.
Recently, however, Dan Zahavi has defended phenomenology against this
charge.Inhisbook,HusserlandTranscendentalIntersubjectivity,2Zahaviarguesthat
in his later work, Edmund Husserl worked out a transcendental analysis of the
intersubjective foundations of phenomenology and that Husserl’s analysis was
significantlydevelopedbylaterthinkers,especiallyMauriceMerleau-Ponty.Zahavi’s
reconstruction ofHusserl raises questions about the foundational epistemological
commitmentsofcommunicativeethics.Mostnotably,itchallengestheclaimmadein
differentwaysbyHabermasandApelthatlanguageistheexclusivesourceofhuman
meaning.Their theoriesof communicativeethics rely respectivelyonKantianand
Wittgensteiniannotionsofmeaningthataregrounded in logico-linguisticanalysis.
But, according to Zahavi’s analysis of Husserl, logico-linguistic practice does not
exhaustthelivedexperienceofmeaning.ZahavishowshowHusserl,particularlyin
his later work, viewed intersubjectivity as a lived experience between two
embodiedcreatures.ThisprojectwasfurtherdevelopedbyMauriceMerleau-Ponty.
Both communicative ethics and embodied theories of consciousness have
grownininfluence.Habermas’theorycontinuestobeinfluentialforpoliticaltheory
intheAnglophoneworldandisbeingdevelopedwithparticularsuccessinthework2 Dan Zahavi, (Elizabeth A. Behnke, trans.) Husserl and Transcendental
Intersubjectivity(Athens,OH:OhioUniversityPress,2001).
3
of theorists like Seyla Benhabib,3 who developed the modified account of the
epistemologythatisdiscussedlaterinthisessay.Ithasfoundnewusesintheethics
of technology, as discourse theories appear to have immediate application to
emerginginformationtechnologies.Embodiedcognitionhasalsoreceivedgrowing
attentionfromanumberofdiverseareas,includingcognitivesciencesandartificial
intelligence. There is, therefore, a need to examine closely the debate between
epistemological commitmentsof communicative ethics and thephenomenologyof
intersubjectiveexperience.
This essay begins with a description of phenomenology, paying particular
attention to its emergence in relation to analytic philosophy. It then describes
Zahavi’sproject,emphasizingtheepistemologicalassumptionsinhisanalysis.Next,
it explicates the theoretical critiques of phenomenology brought by Apel and
Habermas, givingparticular attention to their critiques of phenomenology. Zahavi
responds by arguing that Husserlian phenomenology in fact depends on
intersubjectivity.Hisreadingofphenomenologymakesmeaningoutsideoflanguage
acentralfeatureofthephenomenologyofintersubjectivity.Theconcludingpartof
the essay suggests the significance of this “extra-linguistic” meaning for “post-
secular”theoriesofdeliberativedemocracybysuggestinghowsuchatheorymight
includesomeunderstandingofhowexperienceisformed.
3See,pp.54-58,below,discussingSeylaBenhabib,SituatingtheSelf,Gender,
Community,andPostmodernisminContemporaryEthics,(London,UK:Routledge,
1992).
4
PARTI.THEINTERSUBJECTIVEINTERPRETATIONOFPHENOMENOLOGY
A.TheEpistemologicalDivisionBetweentheTwoCamps
Earlyinthetwentiethcentury,therewasnoriftbetweenanalyticphilosophy
andphenomenologybecauseneitheryetexisted.Accordingtoaninfluentialhistory
by Michael Dummett,4 the split in philosophy emerged from a disagreement
betweenGottliebFrege(1848-1925)andEdmundHusserl(1859-1938)thatarose
inthecontextofaspiritofcollaborationasHusserlandFregeworkedinopposinga
movement within neo-Kantianism that was called “psychologism.”5 This was a
solipsistic philosophy that argued that all knowledge, includingmathematics and
logic, is reducible to subjective psychology. Initially, Husserl was investigating
psychologism, but under the influence of Frege, whom Dummett refers to as the
“grandfather” of analytic philosophy, Husserl was persuaded that psychologism
couldnotestablishacriteria fortruth.HusserlandFregethenworkedtogetherto
opposeit.
BothFregeandHusserlwereseekingwaystodefendtruthagainstsolipsism.
Husserl’s phenomenology led to transcendental subjectivity, a view that Frege
would eventually arguewas still solipsistic. Frege’s approach led to language and
4MichaelDummett,OriginsofAnalyticPhilosophy,(Cambridge,MA:Harvard
UniversityPress,1993).
5Foradiscussionof“pyschologism,”seeKusch,Martin,"Psychologism",The
StanfordEncyclopediaofPhilosophy(Spring2014Edition),EdwardN.Zalta(ed.),
URL=<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2014/entries/psychologism/>.
5
eventually the linguistic turn inphilosophy.Husserldevelopedhis contribution in
thetwovolumesofTheLogical Investigations.6 In thesetwovolumes,Husserl lays
outanelaborateexaminationof therelationshipbetweensubjectivityandapriori
reasoning by examining the objective and subjective aspects to claims of self-
evidenttruth.Inthecourseofdoingthis,heexplorestherelationshipbetweenthe
experiencesofparticulartruthsandtheidealizationoftruthassuch,findingthatthe
abstractidealizationoftruthispriortoparticularlyexperiencesofself-evidence.
As Dummett explains, Frege, in his Grundlagen der Arithmetik (1884),7
sought to refute psychologism by showing that since the objects of study in
mathematicsandlogicarenotdefinedbyorprovenbysubjectivementalstates,the
fieldsarenotreducibletopsychology.InmakingthisargumentFregefocusedonthe
questionofhownumbersaregiventoconsciousawareness.Dummettobservesthat
inparagraph62oftheFoundationsofArthimatic,FregeinvestigatedKant’squestion,
“Howarenumbersgiventous?”Fregeimmediatelyreformulatesthisquestioninhis
own terms by speaking of the meaning (Bedeutung) of sentences containing
numbers.Dummettbelievesthisisoneoftheearliestformulationsofthelinguistic
turn.Asheputsit,thelinguisticturnholdsthat“anepistemologicalenquiry(behind6EdmundHusserl,LogicalInvestigations,Vol.I,DermotMoran,trans.(NewYork:
Routledge,2001);andEdmundHusserl,LogicalInvestigations,Vol.II,Dermot
Moran,trans.(NewYork:Routledge,2001)(“LUI”and“LUII”).
7GottliebFrege,FoundationsofArithmetic,ALogico-MathematicalInvestigationinto
theConceptofNumber,J.L.Austin,trans.(Evanston,IL:NorthwesternUniversity
Press,1981).
6
which lies an ontological one) is to be answered by a linguistic investigation.”
AlthoughFrege later expressed frustration about natural language, hemaintained
thatitisthe“bestthatwecando.”8
Fregemadeuseofhisconceptionofthoughts,whichhedescribesasa“third
realm,”neitherfullysubjectivenorfullyobjective.Thoughtsarenotobjectiveinthe
sense that they are solely external events nor are they objects fully grasped by
mental acts. But, they are not solely subjective either, since they are never “mine
alone.”Thoughtsare“timelessandimmutableentitieswhichdonotdependfortheir
existenceonbeinggraspedorexpressed.”9 Fregeappears toassert that linguistic
contextgivesthethoughtofnumberstheirmeaning.Thatistosay,thethoughtofa
number would have no meaning outside of the context of a language in which
numbershavesense.Hegeneralizesthisthesistostatethatitisonlyinthecontext
ofasentencethatanywordhassensebycorrespondingtothethoughttowhichit
refers. According to Dummett, this argument by Frege, which began with the
substitutionofKant’ssubjectivepsychologicalquestion(“Howarenumbersgivento
us?”)withanintersubjectivelinguisticone(“Howdosentencescontainingnumbers
have meaning”?) began the “linguistic turn” in philosophy. Although Frege later
expressed frustration with natural language because he believed that it often
obscuresmeaningratherthanclarifies,hemaintainedthatitisthebestwecando.10
8Dummett,OriginsofAnalyticPhilosophy,5.
9Ibid,23.
10Ibid,7.
7
Frege’s approach embodies two distinguishing features of analytic
philosophy: (i) A philosophical account of thought can be obtained through the
analysis of language; and (ii) such an account can only be achieved through an
account of language. For Frege and for the later analytic philosophers, meaning
existsonlyintersubjectivelyinlanguage.Hearguedthatthe“sense”ofanintentional
beingisitsreferencetothoughtsinthecontextoflinguisticexpression.Conversely,
truth is language represented in the mind. It results when “thoughts” (the third
realm) are expressed (given sense) in language (derived from context), thereby
representingthethoughtsinsubjectivementalobjects(intentionalbeings).Truthis
thereforeintersubjective.It isamatterofusinglanguageinsuchawayastomeet
the norms and expectations of ordinary grammar and syntax among persons
sharinginalinguisticcommunity.Analyticphilosophyemploysconceptualanalysis
as its primary method because it presumes that only through the analysis of
concepts,astheyareactuallyusedinordinarylanguage,cantruthbegained.
Eventually the different approachs of Frege and Husserl led to the divide
between analytic and phenomenological methods. Frege influenced Bertrand
RussellandAlfredNorthWhitehead,and,throughRussell,Frege’slinguistictheory
influenced Ludwig Wittgenstein, whose early work, the Tractatus Logico
Philosophicus, led other philosophers to develop a style of philosophy called
“analytic” that focused on conceptual and linguistic analysis. Phenomenologywas
developed with greater sophistication by Husserl and his students (notably
Merleau-Ponty)innumerouslaterworks.Todayitiscommonlyunderstoodtobea
methodof analysis that focuseson richlydescribing the livedexperienceofbeing
8
awareofsomephenomenon.Despite the influenceofHusserl’s students inFrance
and Germany, its reception in the United Kingdom and the United States has
remained largely hostile. Analytic philosophers have tended to view
phenomenologyas introspectiveandunscientific.Fora long time,onlyavery few
philosophersinAmerica(notably,HerbertDreyfus)lookedfavorablyonit.
Recently, however, the resistance to phenomenology among Anglophone
philosophers has begun to ease. A recent book,The Phenomenological Mind,11 by
Shaun Gallagher and Dan Zahavi cites three factors for this change. First, that
cognitivesciencesdebatedthe“hardproblem”ofconsciousnessinthe1990s(ledby
DavidChalmers,ThomasNagel, JohnSearle,DanielDennett, andOwenFlanagan).
Methodological questions arose that sparked new interest in the resources that
phenomenology holds for investigating first-person experiencewithout becoming
introspectionist.Second,theoriesofembodiedcognitionappearedonthescenethat
found within analytic philosophy stubborn remnants of Cartesian mind-body
dualism. Theylookedtophenomenology,especiallytheworkofMauriceMerleau-
Ponty for arguments against disembodied cognition. And, third, developments
within neuroscience that allow researcher to glimpse in to the working brain
depended on techniques for assessing reports by test subjects on their lived
experiences while undergoing the experiments. This was necessary for designing
and carrying out the research. Phenomenology again offered some resources for
neuroscience.11ShaunGallagherandDanZahavi,ThePhenomenologicalMind,AnIntroductionto
PhilosophyofMindandCognitiveScience(London:Routledge,2008).
9
B.TheObjectivesofPhenomenology
TounderstandZahavi’sclaimthatphenomenologyrestsonaconceptionof
transcendental intersubjectivity, it is useful to consider his early thinking on the
conceptofintentionalitythatappearedinhisfirstmajorphilosophicalwork,Logical
Investigations.12InthisworkHusserl’spurposewastoargueagainstpsychologism.
His claim is that psychologism confuses the domain of logic and the domain of
psychology. Logic (and the philosophy that makes use of logical inference)
investigatesidealformalstructuresandlaws.Psychologismisconsciousnessturned
backonitselfthroughlogic.Itinvestigatestheideal(necessary)structureandlaws
of consciousness itself. Psychology, however, is an empirical science that
investigates the contingent factual nature of consciousness, and its results are
thereforecharacterizedbythesamevaguenessandmereprobabilitythatmarkthe
resultsofallotherempiricalsciences.13Zahaviexplainsthat,
to reduce logic to psychology is consequently a regular category
mistakethatcompletelyignorestheideality,apodicticity(indubitable
certainty),and(nonempiricalvalidity)characterizingthelawsoflogic.
12Husserl,LogicalInvestigations(LUIandLUII).
13Husserl,LUI,181.
10
Thesefeaturescanneverbefoundedinorexplainedbyreferenceto
thefactual-empiricalnatureofthepsyche.14
Zahavi summarizes Husserl’s view as meaning that “the fundamental mistake of
psychologismisthatitdoesnotdistinguishcorrectlybetweentheobjectofknowing
andtheactofknowing.”15Theobjectofknowingcanbeinvestigatedthroughlogic
alone,buttheactofknowinghassubjectivecontingenciesthatmustbeinvestigated
empirically. The method Husserl developed, which became phenomenology, was
intendedforinvestigatingthedistinctionbetweenobjectiveandsubjective.
Husserl developed the phenomenological method in the second volume of
the Logical Investigations, where he focuses on investigating the relationship
between logic and psychological idiosyncrasy in the structure of conscious
awareness.TheFifth InvestigationdealswithHusserl’sconceptof “intentionality.”
The termhas a technicalmeaning that is different from theusage found in Franz
Brentano’s book, Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint (Psychologie vom
empirischenStandpunkt),publishedin1874.16HusserldescribesBrentano’snotion
of“intentionality”thisway:
14DanZahavi,Husserl’sPhenomenology,(Stanford,CA:StanfordUniversityPress,
2003)9.(citationomitted).
15Ibid.
16FranzBrentano,(eds.OskarKraussandLindaL.McAlister)(trans.AntosC.
Rancurello,T.B.Terrell,andLindaL.McAlister)PsychologyfromanEmpirical
Standpoint,(London:Routledge,1993).
11
In perception something is perceived, in imagination something is
imagined, in a statement something is stated, in love something is
loved, inhatehated, indesiredesired,etc.Brentanolookstowhat is
graspable common to such instances, and says that ‘every mental
phenomenonischaracterizedbywhatthemedievalschoolmencalled
the intentional(ormental) inexistenceofanobject,andbywhatwe,
notwithoutambiguity,call therelationtoacontent, thedirectionto
anobject(bywhicharealityisnottobeunderstood)oranimmanent
objectivity.Eachmentalphenomenoncontainssomethingasobjectin
itself, though not all in the same manner.’ This ‘manner in which
consciousnessreferstoanobject’(anexpressionusedbyBrentanoin
other passages) is presentative in a presentation, judicial in a
judgmentetc.etc.17
Husserlsteadfastlydeniesthatintentionalityreferstosomementalcontentorevent
thatislocatedwithinconsciousnessbecausehedeniesthatintentionisapartfrom
therealobject.Hedoesnotmeanthatallintentionalobjectsarereal(unicornscan
beintendedbutarenotreal).Hedoesmean,though,thatifthereisarealobjectitis
whatisintendedandnotsomeephemeralrepresentationofit.18
Hearguesthattherearethreewaystostudyintentionalexperiences,asthe
immanent (reelle) content of an act, as the meaning of the experience, or as the
intendedobjectof theact. (The later, intendedobject, isnotanexternalcausebut17Husserl,LUI.95-96.
18Zahavi,Husserl’sPhenomenology,22.
12
alsotheinternalmomentsoftheexperience.)Ofparticularimportancetothisessay
is the type of intention associate withmeaning (the second of the threeways to
studyexperiences).Husserlobservesthatact,meaningandobjectareindependent.
Anobject,materialormental,shouldnotbeconfusedwiththemeaningoftheobject
orwiththeact(processbywhichitcomestoawareness).Acriticalobservationthat
he makes is this: “Our interests, our intentions, our thought—mere synonyms if
takeninsufficientlywidesenses—pointexclusivelytothethingmeantinthesense-
giving act.”19 He means we take the meaning of an experience from the act
(immanent content of experiencing). Phenomenology is the study of lived
experiences where the meaning of the experience is viewed as the immanent
contentoftheawarenessofexperience.
Experience,Language,andSignativePotential
ThisapproachfundamentallydiffersfromGottliebFrege’stheoryofmeaning.
Truth,forFrege,existsasathoughtsharedinlanguage.Hearguedthatthe“sense”
of an intentional being is its reference to thoughts in the context of linguistic
expression.Conversely, truth is languagerepresented in themind. It resultswhen
“thoughts”(thethirdrealm)areexpressed(givensense)inlanguage(derivedfrom
context), thereby representing the thoughts in subjective mental objects
(intentional beings). Truth is therefore intersubjective. It is a matter of using
languageinsuchawayastomeetthenormsandexpectationsofordinarygrammar
and syntax amongpersons sharing in a linguistic community.Analytic philosophy
19Ibid,24.
13
employs conceptual analysis as it primarymethod because it presumes that only
throughtheanalysisofconcepts,astheyareactuallyusedinordinarylanguage,can
truthbegained.ThisiswhereFregedifferedfromHusserl.
Husserlhoweverbelievedthatreferenceisnotalinguisticoutcomebecause
referenceisnotabstract,butlanguagemustbe.Forexample,tounequivocallyrefer
to an object, one might point with a finger. The object referred to is not some
instance of the object but “this” instance.20 The Scholastic concept of “haecceity”
(“thisness”)isusefulhere.Thehaeccietyofanobjectislostifmeaningisexclusively
theprovinceof language.Thismeans, forHusserl, that experiencehas cognitively
significantpre-linguisticandextra-linguisticaspectsthatareimmanentcontentsin
awareness.ZahavinotesthatHusserl’sinterestinpre-linguisticmeaningshouldnot
howeverbetakento implythatheneglectstheimportanceof language. Infact,he
argued in later works that language is a necessary condition for scientific
knowledge.
IntheLogicalInvestigationsHusserlarguesthething-in-itselfisknowableas
the actual fulfillment of a signative potential. That is, consider the example of
perceivingacubeofsugar:themissingsidesare immediately intuitedaspotential
experiences—theyareobjectsofcognitiononlyassignativeintentions.But,ifIturn
thecubeinmyhands,thesignativeintentionisfulfilledbythehaecceityoftheside
appearingtome.Husserlbelievedthatperceptionincludesasignativeintentionand
adequate intention, which is what he means when he speaks of the “thing-in-
20Ibid.
14
itself.”21 Phenomenology studies intention in its signative and fulfilled form, and
thereforeHusserl’smottowas“backtothings-in-themselves,”whichmeantforhim,
putasidetheKantianprohibitionofinvestigating‘noumena”notbecauseofanaïve
realism,butbecauseheunderstoodthemindtohaveawarenessofwhatfulfillsits
signativeexpectation.
C.ThePhenomenologicalMethod
PhenomenologyasRadicallySelf-ResponsibleandRadicallySelf-Reflective
Husserl developed phenomenology because he believed that philosophy
neededanewfoundation.Inhislaterworks,hecontinuedtodevelophisinsights.He
hoped to achieve a radically unprejudiced philosophy that could be unbiased by
opinion (doxa) and subsist entirely in true knowledge (episteme). A comment by
HusserlinErstePhilosophieIprovidesanentrypointintohiscomplexphilosophy:
Socrates’ethicalreformoflifeischaracterizedbyitsinterpretingthe
trulysatisfyinglifeasalifeofpurereason.Thismeansalifeinwhich
the human being exercises in unremitting self-reflection and radical
21Zahaviexplains,
UnlikeKant,however,Husserldoesnotidentifythething-in-itself(das
Dingas sich)with theunknowncauseof our experience, but simply
withthatwhichwouldfulfilloursignativeintention.Inshout,beingis
interpreted phenomenologically as a particular mode of givenness.
The perceptual givenness is identified with the object. Zahavi,
Husserl’sPhenomenology,pp.30-31.
15
accountability, a critique—an ultimately evaluating critique—of his
life-aimsandthennaturally,andmediatedthroughthem,hislife-path
andthennaturally,andmediatedthoughthem,his life-pathsandhis
current means. Such accountability and critique is performed as a
process of cognition, and indeed, according to Socrates, as a
methodological return [Rückgang] to the original source of all
legitimacy and cognition—expressed in our terminology by going
backtocompleteclarity,“insight,”“evidence.”22
ThispassageholdsakeyinsightintoHusserl’sapproachtophilosophy:philosophy
is not an ethically neutral activity, but one in which the philosopher takes on
“radicalaccountability.”Itisanunremittingself-reflectionon“hislife-paths”andthe
means for achieving them. But, as Zahavi notes, this description of “self-
responsibility”hasalreadyimplicitinitanappealtointersubjectivity,“fortheself-
responsibility of the individual includes a responsibility to and on behalf of the
communityaswell.”23
Additionally, Husserl describes self-reflection as being both “self-
responsible” and “radically accountable.” Zahavi suggests the moral claim at the
foundationofHusserl’sthoughtmergesateleologicalanddeonticclaim—tohavea
fulfilled life, the philosophermust be satisfy the duty to be self-responsible. It is
important to note at the outset, however, that Husserl is not seeking a22EdmundHusserl,ErstePhilosophie(1923/24).Husserliana7.QuotedinZahavi,
Husserl’sPhenomenology,68.
23Zahavi,HusserlandTranscendentalPhenomenology,3.
16
metaphysicallyteleologicalfoundationforhisethics,nordoeshedeny,asKantdoes,
the possibility of metaphysical teleology. He seeks to avoid making either
metaphysically teleological or idealist presuppositions. To be self-responsible the
philosopher must be presuppositionless. Husserl seeks only to explain that
philosophyrequiresacommitmenttoinvestigationthattakesthephilosopheraway
fromthecommonplace,everydayexperience.
TheNaturalisticAttitude
If the philosopher’s commitment is to become “presuppositionless,” then
Husserlbelievedthatthephilosopherhastotranscendhernature,sinceitisnatural
topresupposethatperception is themediationofapre-existentexternalworld to
themind.Hebelieveditisthenormforapersontobelieveinanontologicaldualism
wherein the world is represented to themind by perception. He called this the
“naturalisticattitude.”Itisnaturalinthesenceofbeingthenorm,andthustheuse
ofthetermpointsoutthatphilosophizingisnotacommonactivity.Itisaspecialty
thatrequirespreparationandachangeinperspective.RobertSokolowskidescribes
the naturalistic attitude as a presupposition about the world that allows for our
everyday function. When we move about in the world and seek to accomplish
commonplace tasks, “we are directly caught up in things of our world.” And
17
therefore we take our experience to be that of a world already there. 24 These
experiences arediverse andmanifold, but arising from them is thebelief that the
worldexistsexternallytousasthetotalityofwhatweperceive.Wefindourselves
coming to consciousness in aworld that already exists, intowhichwe come into
awareness with desires for it, and to manipulate it, and to be a part of it. Our
experience of the world in our activities of everyday life, tuned to optimal
functioningandseekingadvantage,concomitantlysupportandaresupportedbythe
backgroundbeliefthattheworldispre-given.
Ordinarily,thenaturalsciencesaresofocusedontheirfieldthattheydonot
question the belief that an external world is pre-given. As Zahavi and Shaun
Gallagherput it, “Reality isassumedtobeout there,waiting tobediscoveredand
investigated.”25 In his later work, The Crisis of the European Sciences and24Sokolowskiillustratesthispointwiththefollowingexample:
We sit in conversationwith others at a dinner table, aswewalk to
work,oraswefillouttheapplicationforapassportordriverslicense,
wehavematerialobjectspresentedtousthroughslides,aspects,and
profilesthroughwhichtheyaregiven,wespeakaboutandarticulate
them,wehaveemotionalresponseswehaveemotionalresponsesto
thingsthatareattractiveorrepellant,wefindsomethingspleasantto
look or hear and other things unpleasant and disruptive and so on.
Robert Sokolowski, Introduction to Phenomenology (Cambridge, UK:
CambridgeUniversityPress,2000)42.
25GallagherandZahavi,ThePhenomenologicalMind,22.
18
TranscendentalPhenomenology,26Husserlarguedthatthenaturalscienceswereina
stateof crisisbecause theyhadnotquestioned thenaturalisticattitude.AsZahavi
puts it, “the positive sciences have never advanced to an understanding and
thematictreatmentoftheirownintentionalaccomplishments.”27Itis“preciselythis
neglect (of questioning the ontic status) that has resulted in these sciences never
having advanced to an actual understanding of the genuine ontological sense of
their domain of research and, ultimately, to the genuine ontological sense of the
world.”28Hemeansthatthesciencesarenot“radicallyscientific”becausetheyrest
on unquestioned presuppositions and “leave their own foundations unthematized
andsimplypresupposethesefoundationsdogmatically.”29
Husserlchallengesthe“common-sense”acceptanceoftheontologicalreality
of the external world, “putting the being of the world into question instead of
presupposingit.30Inhisview,lackingself-responsiblefoundations,thesciencesare
incompletebothintheirontologyandintheiraccountoftheconsciousness.Dueto
the naturalistic attitude, the sciences presume that the world is mediated to the
mind through perception. This causes them to overemphasize the analysis of26EdmundHusserl,TheCrisisoftheEuropeanSciencesandTranscendental
Phenomenology,AnIntroductiontoPhenomenologicalPhilosophy,DavidCarr(trans.)
(Evanston,IL:NorthwesternUniversityPress,1970).
27Zahavi,HusserlandTranscendentalIntersubjectivity,2.
28Ibid.
29Ibid.
30Zahavi,HusserlandTranscendentalIntersubjectivity,3.
19
atomistic instances of perception, as if the mind is presented with a mosaic of
instantperceptions.Theycannotaccountfortheintuitionofthewholeoftheobject
that transcends the fragmentedperceptionaldataof it, and therefore the sciences
are incomplete both in their description of beings and in their account of the
consciousness. Husserl believed that philosophy should provide the pre-scientific
foundation forknowledge.Hisgoal forphenomenologywas todeveloparigorous,
self-responsible investigative procedure to determine the “essence” or formal
structure(heusedtheterm“eidetic” torefertothisnotionof“ideal”structure)of
the“wholelifeofconsciousness.”Inordertodothisthephilosophermustbecome
freeofthenaturalattitude.
PhenomenologicalReduction(Epoché)
Husserl views the taskof self-responsiblephilosophyasbeing: “todisclose
reality…asitshowsitselfbeforescientificinquiry.”Thismeansthatthephilosopher
mustquestionclaimsthataretakenastruewithoutreflection.Hebelievedthatthis
was the state of the natural sciences in the nineteenth century. They had
oversteppedthelimitsoftheirpresuppositions.Thusheconcludesthatphilosophy
“aims to provide a foundation for the sciences from pretheoretical experience.”31
31MartinHeidegger,(trans.TheodoreKisiel)TheHistoryoftheConceptofTime,
Prolegomena(Bloomington,IN:IndianaUniversityPress,1979)2.
20
But, Husserl believed that it is impossible to perform this task “if one simply
presupposes and accepts the metaphysical and epistemological assumptions” of
everydaylifegivenasthenaturalattitude.
Husserlarguedthatabackgroundassumptionthatresults fromthenatural
attitudeisthebeliefthatintentionalobjectsrepresentsomethingintheworldorin
the mind. He believed, however, that as a self-responsible investigator, the
philosophers should reach this conclusion from the evidence of the phenomenon
itself, but there is no evidence in the phenomenon that the intentional object is
representationalorthatitisnot.Thatistosay,theclaimthatperceptionsrepresent
thethingperceivedcanbeneitherconfirmednordeniedbytheevidenceprovided
throughthelivedexperienceofthephenomenon.Therefore,Husserlbelievedthatit
isresponsibleto“bracket”(setaside)thequestionofwhethertheintentionalobject
representssomethingexternaltothemind.32
32DonZahaviobserves:
Thus one of the decisive differences between Husserl’s theory of
intentionality and the theories that he was influenced by…is that
Husserl stubbornly denies that the intentional object should be
understoodasanintramentalcontentthatinthebestofcasesserves
asmediator for our access to the real,mind-transcendent object.As
Husserlemphasizesonecanonlyintendanobjectifitistheobjectof
our intention, that is, if it is the intentional object. Zahavi,Husserl’s
Phenomenology,21-22.
21
Insum,Husserl’spositionisthattheparticularexperienceofanintentional
object suggests nothing beyond itself. He does not believe that mental images
appear in themind that signify or represent something external to themind. To
believe sowould be to presuppose an externalworld—apresupposition that one
bringstoaninterpretationofthephenomenon.Thatistosay,thephilosopherasa
self-responsible ethical investigator must perform a substantial personal
transformation that engages the philosopher in a radical commitment to self-
responsible life built on radical self-reflection. No matter how obvious or “self-
evident”thenaturalattitudemightseem,itcannotbepresumed.Anunbiasedself-
reflectiononthecasetobemadeforwhatisnaturallypresupposedinordinarylife
must be carried out in order to be radically self-responsible. In order to bring
unbiasedfocustothetask,itisnecessaryto“suspendorbracket”ouracceptanceof
thenaturalattitude.
22
He uses the term “epoché” to refer to the method for accomplishing
emancipationfrompresuppositionsofthenaturalattitude.33
This “bracketing” or “suspension” of the natural attitude allows for a self-
responsibleassessmentofthepresuppositionsbroughtbythenaturalattitude.For
Husserl this assessment is essential for any scientific endeavor. As Zahavi puts it,
“wemustgiveupournaturalpositingoftheworld…inordertopayattentiontothe
howofitsmodeofgiveness.”34
Twopoints shouldbeobservedabout the epoché. First, it isnotadenialof
ontological realism, but a suspension of dogmatic attitudes toward it until a self-
responsible assessment of it can be made and characterized. It is an ethical
33DonnWeltonexplains:
Husserl’swayofexpressing it is tosay that thenaturalattitudeasa
wholemust be “put out of play.”We no longer “go along” with the
normal course of living towards things, no longer “play along”with
thebeliefinexistence,abeliefoperativeinandthusconstitutiveboth
ofallparticularacts fixedon theirreferentsandof theworld that is
co-giveninandwitheachgiven.We“suspend”or“holdinabeyance”
thisunthematizedyetglobalbeliefandthishas theresultofshifting
our attention to an analysis of what, if anything, remains. To put it
noetically, existence is “bracketed.”Theneutralizationof thenatural
attitude Husserl calls epoché. Donn Welton, The New Husserl,
(Bloomington,IN:UniversityofIndianaPress,2003)89.
34Zahavi,HusserlandTranscendentalIntersubjectivity,4.
23
obligationofthephilosophertogroundthepresuppositionofontologicalrealismin
a radically self-responsible self-assessment. Second, the epoché should not be
viewedasalastingaccomplishment.“Theepochéisanattitudethatonehastokeep
accomplishing.”35Assumingonehasachievedamomentofclarityandsuccessfully
“bracketed”thenaturalattitude.Now,then,whatmightconstitutethefoundationof
knowledge fromaviewpoint thatdoesnotalreadypresumea theoryofevidence?
HusserladdressedthatquestioninSection24ofIdeasI.Hewrites:
Notheorywecanconceivecanmisleadusinregardtotheprincipleof
all principles: that very primordial dator. Intuition is a source of
authority (Rechtsquelle) forknowledge, thatwhateverpresents itself
in ‘intuition’ in primordial form (as it were in its bodily reality), is
simply tobeacceptedas it gives itselfout tobe, thoughonlywithin
the limits inwhich it then presents itself. Let our insight grasp this
fact thatthetheory itself in its turncouldnotderive its truthexcept
fromprimordialdata.36
Zahavi explains that “our investigation should turn toward the givenness or
appearance of reality,” in order that reality can disclose its true nature. The
fundamental question forHusserl is howdoes this turn to intuition asprimordial
dator lead to self-responsible assessment? This was a foundational question for
phenomenology.35GallagherandZahavi,ThePhenomenologicalMind,23.
36EdmundHusserl,(trans.W.R.BoyceGibson)Ideas,GeneralIntroductiontoPure
Phenomenology(NewYork:CollierBooks,1974),83-84.
24
TranscendentalIdealism
Husserl continued to develop his thinking on intention after the Logical
Investigations. In Ideas I written in 1913, he first undertook to develop
phenomenology as an investigation of transcendental subjectivity. The term
“transcendental”inthiscontextreferstoeideticdeterminationsthatarebroughtto
light in essences that define species of beings, and thus transcend species. In
scholasticthought,transcendentalswereattributes(ornames)ofthedivine,suchas
truth, goodness, and beauty. In modern philosophy, Kant sought to modify this
usage to refer to knowledge that includes knowledge of objects and our way of
knowing objects in so far as they might be known a priori.37 In Ideas I, Husserl
attemptedtodescribephenomenologyastranscendentalphilosophyinthissenseof
seekingtounderstandtheessentialstructureoflivedexperiencethatisapparentby
virtueoftheepoché.
But, why should the turn from the natural attitude lead directly to
transcendentalintersubjectivity?OnewaythatHusserlattemptedtodothiswasto
turntoaCartesian-inspiredthoughtexperiment: this isHusserl’s“CartesianWay.”
Descartes’FirstMeditationwasHusserl’smodelforthis—Icandoubttheexistence
of everything except my own existence. Husserl bends the Cartesian thought
experimenttohisownpurposes.HeviewsDescartes’achievementtobetheclaim
that consciousness is revealed to be “an independent region of being and
experience.”Inhisreflectiononthisachievement,Husserlsuggeststhatsubjectivity
37Welton,TheNewHusserl,22.
25
canbecharacterizedintworadicallydifferentways:(1)asanaturalpsychological
event; and (2) as pure, transcendental. In the first mode, subjectivity as
psychologicalevent,theidiosyncrasiesofhumanthoughtareemphasized.Thatis,I
am this type of subjectivity that has particular contingent features. In the second
mode, subjectivity as pure transcendental event, the contingent is removed from
consideration.This is theconditionnecessaryforthepossibilityofsubjectivity.To
achieveunderstandingofthetranscendentalsubjectivity,onemustbetransformed
throughtheepoché.
Thisdivisionoftwotypesofsubjectivitycreatesthedilemmathatliesatthe
heartofHusserl’stranscendentalidealism:
AccordingtoHusserl,everyobjectmustnecessarilybeunderstoodin
its correlation to experiencing (constituting) subjectivity if dogmatic
presuppositions are to be avoided. But if a decisive break with
ontological dogmatismdemands and implies a return to the field of
givenness, any assertion concerning the existence of an absolutely
mind-independent reality seems unacceptable. We are thus
confrontedwithHusserl’sidealism.38
Ontheonehand,Husserlbelievedthatrealityisnotdetachedfromexperience.But
on the other hand he vehemently denied phenomenalism—or the view that the
intentionalobject canbe reduced toperceptional sensations.He seeksa synthetic
38Zahavi,Husserl’sPhenomenology,68-69.
26
interpolationofperceptionandobjectivity,inwhichtheintentionalobjectisviewed
as“asystemofvalidityandmeaningthatneedssubjectivity….”39
Husserl’sconceptionofthetranscendentalobjectisthereforedependenton
the phenomenologically given. To speak of transcendental objects “is to speak of
objectsthatmightalwayssurpriseus,thatis,objectsshowingthemselvesdifferently
thanweexpected.”40So,forHusserlobjectsexistindependentlyofourexperiences
ofthem,andthuscanbesurprisingtous.However,healsobelievedthattheyhave
nomeaning for use apart from our consciousness of them. An implication of this
view is a critique of representationalism, or the belief that intentional objects
correspond to and represent objectively real objects. Zahavi explains thatHusserl
rejectedthisviewarguingthatitisaresultofthenaturalattitude.Zahavidescribes
Husserl’s view as being an “experiential realism,” which is realist in the sense of
denyingthatintentionalobjectsmediatebetweenanexteriorandinterior,butitnot
39Ibid.
40Ibid.70.
27
a naïve metaphysical realism that denies the role of subjectivity in constituting
knowledge.41
Summary
ForHusserl it is the ethical responsibility of philosophers to challenge the
presuppositionsofthenaturalisticattitude.Thereasonforthismoralobligationhas
to do with Husserl’s conception of absolute self-responsibility. Zahavi is quick to
notethatthesenseofmoralpurposethatliesatthefoundationofphenomenologyis
already intersubjective. Husserl explained that “the self-responsibility of the
individualincludesaresponsibilitytoandonbehalfofthecommunityaswell.Like
Socrates,Husserl “speaks of anultimately true, self-responsible life in full clarity
and transparency, a life that ismadepossibleprecisely througha radicalultimate
41 A disagreement among American phenomenologists should be noted here. The
disagreement regardshow to interpret the conceptofnoema.Husserl extendshis
analysis of intention by developing his conception on “noema.” There is some
controversyoverwhatHusserl intendedbythis term, leadingtowhatZahavicalls
West Coast and East Coast interpretations. TheWest Coast interpretation, led by
Hubert Dreyfus, is closer to Frege in reading the content of intention as
propositional.Inthiscase,noemareferstotheinternalcontentofawarenessthatis
separate from the external world. An East Coast interpretation, however, reads
Husserl as holding that intentionality is a “fundamental feature of conscious
experience….”(Ibid.59).
28
grounding, a radical self-reflection.” The philosopher, acting on this sense of
responsibility seeks to be responsible by pursuing truth through carefully setting
aside ontic presupposition in order to achieve an unbiased assessment of the
evidence. This is the phenomenological attitude, which seeks to “bracket”
ontologicalpresuppositionsinordertogiveunbiasedanalysistothebestevidence
for ontological commitments. The ethical commitment of self-responsibility
demands “constantly more radical self-critique towards the infinite search for
definitive evidence.” For Husserl, then, awareness of the world is an
accomplishment of themind as it struggles to learn the truth about aworld into
which it comes into existence. The philosopher, sensing an obligation to self and
others to seek truth “investigates the intentional accomplishments of the
experiencing,constitutingtranscendentalsubject.”
C.HUSSERLANDTRANSCENDENTALINTERSUBJECTIVITY
FoundationalQuestions
ZahaviarguesthatinhislaterworkHusserlcametoviewphenomenologyas
requiring a a transcendental accountof intersubjectivity.He argues thatHusserl’s
insight into thephenomenologicalnatureof intersubjectivitymakepossibleanew
understanding of philosophy. Fundamentally, the project of phenomenology
involves the detection and communication of the structure of phenomena. It is a
foundational presupposition that the phenomena are common (and therefore
intelligible)toothers.AsZahaviputsit,“Truebeingthusnotonlymeansbeingfor
an individual I,butpointsaprioribeyondthe individual I tothenexusofpossible
29
intersubjectiveverification.”42Fortheworldtobeacommonexperience,theremust
be an experience that transcends individual subjective experience. Therefore,
phenomenologymustprovideatranscendentalaccountoftherelationshipbetween
subjectivities.Husserl’sawarenessof thiscriticaldimensiongrewashedeveloped
histheory.
Thus critical to Husserl’s work is the phenomenological analysis of
experienceofothers.Thisisbecauseitisonlybyexperiencingothersthattherecan
be the possibility of a self-transcending experience. That is to say, it is necessary
(butnotsufficient)fortranscendingpersonalsubjectivitythatonehaveexperience
of others, “for it is through the experience of others that we are led beyond our
immanent sphere of owness and arrive at the truly transcendent inter-subjective
world.43ThisleadsHusserltoaradicalclaim,thatitisonlythroughtheexperience
ofanother(analterego)thatIcanexperienceobjectivityandtranscendence.That
is, it is the awareness of otherminds thatmakes objective truth possible. Zahavi
seems to mean that for Husserl, the fact that other minds exists, which have
experiences as my own, make it possible for me to believe that there can be
experiencesthatareobjective(externaltome)becausetheymightbeexperienced
by others. Zahavi believes that it is this insight into the fundamental character of
intersubjectivity thatmakes “a new understanding of phenomenology possible.”44
Hegroundsthisopinionontheconstitutivenatureofthereflectioninvolvedinthe42Zahavi,HusserlandTranscendentalIntersubjectivity,25.
43Ibid,32.
44Ibid,105.
30
analysis of intersubjectivity. It is a “meta-phenomenology” or phenomenological
analysisofphenomenologyitself.Reflectiononthelivedexperienceofothersleads
toreflectionon themes likegeneritivity,historicity,andnormality.45Asheputs it,
“we can begin to see intersubjectivity as the key to the transformation [of
phenomenology],orastheconnectingthreadthattiesitalltogether.
LaterDevelopments
Next,Zahavireviewsthecontributionsoflaterphenomenologicalthinkersto
the intersubjectiveawareness thatHusserl identifiedbutdidnot fullydevelop.He
describesHeidegger’sDasein as “comportmentwith theworld.”Takingcare inhis
analysis to emphasize the role of technology in Heidegger’s analysis as material
culturethatpresupposesothers.Hewrites,
AccordingtoHeidegger,wearenotfirstandforemostoccupiedwith
perceptualobjectsinatheoreticalway,butwith“handling,using,and
taking care of things.” But the entities we encounter in this “taking
careofthings”–entitiesthatHeideggercalls“usefulthings,”“gear,”or
“equipment” (eachof these expressionsused to translateZeug), and
whoseuniquemodeofbeinghecharacterizesashandiness—pointin
accordancewiththeirontologicalstructure,tootherpersons.46
Zahavi’spoint is that forHeidegger, inusingeveryday thingswearealreadywith
the“inner-worldly”beingofothers—wearepredisposedinprincipletobeopento
45Ibid,121.46Ibid,124(citationomitted).
31
others.Thisopennesstoothersis“theformalconditionofthepossibilityoftheco-
disclosureoftheDaseinofothersfortheDaseinwithineachinstanceisonesown.”
(Z2,125).Heideggercalls this“being-with,”andZahavibelievesthat it is themost
significant contribution that Heidegger makes to Husserl’s work on
intersubjectivity.
The second development comes from Jean-Paul Sartre’s analysis of
intersubjectivity in Being and Nothingness. Zahavi explains that while Sartre’s
approachissimilartoHusserl’sinasmuchasbothbelievethattheexperienceofthe
worldbyothers isconstitutiveof transcendingtheself, theexperiencebyanother
severstheworldfromme.But,forSartre,theseveringisadeprivationoftheworld.
Forexample,IcanexperiencemyfavoriteGustavKlimtpainting,knowitintimately
andrichlyinthedetailsoftheprivateexperienceofit.But,forSartre,whenIwatch
otherpersonsexperiencethepainting,Ifeeldeprivedofmyexperiencebecauseitis
transformedbymyawarenessoftheirprivateexperiences.WhileZahaviultimately
rejectsthisviewforbeinginconsistent,hepraisesSartreforintroducingaffectivity
intotheanalysisofintersubjectivity.
Finally,Zahaviexaminesthe“seriesofstrikinganalysis”thatheattributesto
MauriceMerleau-Ponty. He focuses on three themes, incarnation, perception, and
speech,whichareparticularlyformative.LookingtoMerleau-Ponty’swritings,The
PhenomenologyofPerception,47ZahaviexplicatesMerleau-Ponty’sunderstandingof
the conditions for the possibility of intersubjectivity. He is concerned with47MauriceMerleau-Ponty,(trans.DonaldA.Landis),ThePhenomenologyof
Perception,(London:Routledge,2014).
32
developing a transcendental account of the possibility of the intersubjective
experience. Zahavi suggests that the fundamental insight for him is that I, others,
andworldcan“onlybeexplicatedside-by-side.”48HesummarizesMerleau-Ponty’s
claimthisway:“thesubjectmustbeseenasaworldlyincarnateexistence,andthe
worldmust be seen as a common field of experience if intersubjectivity is to be
possible at all.”49 This stands as a critical perspective on idealist accounts of the
subject,whichseektounderstandsubjectivityapartforothersandtheworld.
Merleau-Ponty contends that it is impossible to understand subjectivity
within itself.Hearguesthat if theself,asself-constitutingconsciousness,werethe
absolute coincidence with itself, then the possibility of a co-equal other is
impossible.Zahavimakestwopoints:“First,anabsoluteconstitutingconsciousness
ofthisnaturecouldnottolerateanequal:itcouldnotconstituteandepi-primordial
otherandwould thereforenecessarilybeunique.”Andsecond, therewouldbeno
“rupture” intheself thatmakes itpossible tobeopentotheother.Hemeansthat
theexperienceofincompletenessoftheselfisnecessarytopositanother.Hequotes
Merleau-Ponty, stating that if the experience of self is perfect, “the contact ofmy
thoughtwith itselfsealsmewithinmyself,andpreventsmefromeverfeelingthat
anythingeludesmygrasp….”50Therupturethatisneededtopositanotherisabreak
withinself-awarenessthatinterruptsone’sthoughtbyimposinganawarenessofa
limit. Therupture isnecessary(butnotsufficient) for thepossibilityof theother,
48Zahavi,HusserlandTranscendentalIntersubjectivity,105.
49Ibid,150(citationsomitted).50Ibid.
33
and conversely, intersubjectivity is contingent upon the rupture in consciousness.
The subject is not closed in its own immanence; it is engaged in the world and
interactivewithothers.
The next set of themes that Zahavi takes up isMerleau-Ponty’s analysis of
temporalityandcorporality,bothofwhichcontributetotherupture.Temporalityis
experienced as a limit in self-awareness. Time is a “thickness of duration” that
interposesbetweenthereflectingIandtheIthatisreflectedupon,makingtheself
opaquetoitself.Sinceonedoesnothaveanexperienceofimmediateawarenessof
oneself in the past and future, temporality is known as a limit to self-awareness.
Similarly,havinga corporalbody createsa limitwithin subjective self-experience.
There is an awareness of self, distinct from an exteriorworld, butMerleau-Ponty
insists that the distinction is never a complete separation. This is critical to his
thought.Onefeelsseparateandyetconnectedtoanexternalworld,notthroughthe
mediumofinterposingsigns,butimmediatelyandbodily.
Similarly,beingaphysicallyembodiedcreatureisexperiencedasalimitfor
Merleau-Ponty. He describes perception as a drive toward overcoming the
essentiallyincompleteandlimitedactofpossessinganobject.Thebodyconstitutes
thespaceinwhichsubjectiveexperienceoccurs.Inthissensethebodyisour“being
–in-the-world.”ZahaviquotesfromMerleau-Ponty:
There is therefore no occasion to ask ourselves why the thinking
subjectorconsciousnessperceivesitselfasaman,oranincarnateor
historical subject, nor must we treat this apperception as a second
orderoperationwhichsomehowperformsstarting fromitsabsolute
34
existence: the absolute flow takes shape beneath its own gaze as ‘a
consciousness’,oraman,oranincarnatesubject,becauseitisafield
of presence—to itself, to others and to theworld—andbecause this
presencethrows it intothenaturalandculturalworld fromwhich it
arrivesatanunderstandingofitself.51
Zahavi explains that forMerleau-Ponty, “aphenomenologicaldescriptiondoesnot
disclose subjectivities that are inaccessible and self-sufficient but reveals a
continuity between intersubjective life and the world.”52 This distinction without
separationiscriticaltotheexperienceofotherpersons.“Thepossibilityofanother
person’sbeingself-evidentisowedtothefactthatIamnottransparentformyself,
and the my subjectivity draws its body in its wake.”53 For this reason, in our
corporal existence,we are already social, since thepossibility of experiencing the
otherisconditionedontheexperienceofcorporalselfasother.Threerelationships
are therefore already present in experience: the relationship with self; the
relationshipwithworld;andtherelationshipwithother.54Theyareconstituted in
awarenesspriortothepresuppositionofobjectivity.Thus,itisinthatpre-objective
experiencethattheymustbeanalyzed.
ZahaviiscarefultopointoutthatMerleau-Pontyisnotdenyingthepersonal
identityofthesubject,butratheraddinginanawarenessoftheroleofthesocialin51Ibid,153-154.52Ibid,153.
53Ibid,151-152.
54Ibid,155.
35
constructingidentity.Thesolitudeandindividualityofthepersonisexperiencedas
alimitandabsenceofthecommunicativeandsocial.Icannotexperienceothersas
they experience themselves or as I experience myself. My experience is always
uniquelymyexperienceand is a constituentofmyessence.But,myawarenessof
others is also fundamental tomy experience. And thus, intersubjectivity is both a
resultofandnecessaryformyself-awareness.AsZahaviputsit,
“Eventheself-awarenessof thought is incorporatedintoapre-thetic
and pre-reflective life, this does not cancel the distinction between
subjectsthatmakesintersubjectivityatrueinter-subjectivity.55
Zahavi suggests here that for Merleau-Ponty, it is the awareness of the limit
accompanyingtemporalityandcorporalitythatmakesitpossibletohaveexperience
ofanothersubjectiveself.This is foundational for intersubjectivity,but itdoesnot
deny the importance of subjects. It highlights the significance of the limit of
subjectivityforthepossibilityofintersubjectivity.
Next, Zahavi examines Merleau-Ponty’s conception of language, which
anticipates some of Apel’s critique of Husserl. He shows that Apel’s claim that
phenomenology is a solipsistic philosophy is anticipated by Merleau-Ponty, who
argues that it is “possible to create a solipsistic philosophy, but doing so
presupposesalinguisticcommunity….”Thatistosay,whileinprincipleacoherent
solipsism can be stated, the statement of it occurs through language that
presupposes intersubjectivity. Thus, the statement of a solipsistic philosophy is a
performative self-contradiction. Moreover, Zahavi notes that a closer analysis of55Ibid,157.
36
dialogue “recapitulates the corporal/perceptual co-existence at a higher level.”56
Here hemeans that in dialogue, the perception of each speaker is shaped by the
other.Theysharethoughtreciprocally,andthroughtheirsharingtheirperspectives
merge.WhenIengageindialoguewithanother,Ifindtheother’sthoughtsmingling
withmyown,andthereforeIexperiencemyselfasotherandotherasapartofme.
Discourse is notmastered byme, butmastersme. According to Zahavi,Merleau-
Pontybelieved that thispoint is thekey tounderstandingHusserl’s conceptionof
intersubjectivity. Zahavi suggests thatMerleau-Ponty’s greatest contributionmay
be his analysis of the importance of “self-rupture” for intersubjectivity: that I can
onlyencountertheother“ifIambeyondmyselffromthebeginning.”57
SummaryofZahavi’sInterpretation
Husserl came to believe, then, that in every lived experience there is a
transcendentexperiencethatisonlymadepossiblebytheexperienceofothers,“for
itisthroughtheexperienceofothersthatweareledbeyondourimmanentsphere
ofownnessandarriveatthetrulytranscendentinter-subjectiveworld.”58Husserl’s
radicalclaimhereisthattherecanbenoobjectiveawarenesswithoutothers—that
“thetranscendenceofobjectivityisconstitutivelyrelatedbacktothistranscendence
56Ibid.
57Ibid,159.
58Ibid,32.
37
… the particularly elusive character of this experience of others.”59 I take this
difficult passage to mean that it is the possibility of other conscious minds that
makes possible the claim of objectivity. That is, once the possibility of others
becomesrealtome,Icanimagineanobjectiveworldthatisstablebetweenus.
Zahavidrawsseveralconclusionsfromthisanalysisoflaterphenomenology,
but several are particularly important here: First, he is convinced by Merleau-
Ponty‘sclaimthat“Intersubjectivityisarelationbetweensubjects,whichiswhythe
point of departure for a phenomenological treatment of this theme must be an
investigationofthesubjectthatisrelatedtotheworldandtoothers.”60Second,the
intersubjective character of a person is not contingent. It is an apriori
determination. And, third, pre-linguistic and extra-linguistic structures of
subjectivityplay significant roles in intersubjectivity. That is to say, a part of the
relationshipofonepersontoanotherpersoninvolvesaspectsthatareunexpressed
or are not capable of being reduced to a linguistic form. Zahavi believes that this
claimisdeniedbyphilosopherswhohavemadethe“linguisticturn”sincetheyview
intersubjectivitysolelyintermsofthepragmaticsoflanguage.
PARTII.THEPRAGMATIC/LINGUISTICAPPROACH
Zahavi engages communicative ethics by putting his interpretation of
phenomenologyintodialoguewiththewidelyinfluentialdiscoursetheoriesofApel
59Ibid,33.
60Ibid,165.
38
and Habermas, who develop critiques of phenomenology based on their
pragmatic/linguisticmethod.Zahaviarguesthatneitherofthesephilosophersfully
grasped the scope of Husserl’s philosophy. The critical issue for the discourse
theoristswas thestatusofphenomenologyasa transcendental intersubjectivity—
that is, as an analysis of the necessary and sufficient interpersonal conditions for
reason.Acentralcommitmentofdiscoursetheoristsistheclaimthatvalidcognitive
awarenessispossibleonlyinandthroughintersubjectivity,whichtheytaketobea
rationaladjudicationofthepragmaticconsequencesofdefeasiblepropositions.That
istosay,forApelandHabermas,meaningfulcognitionisanaccomplishmentofthe
skillfuluseoflanguageinargumentativeexchange.
Although both philosophers draw fromKantian conceptions of philosophy,
they developed somewhat different critiques of phenomenology. Where Kant’s
understandingofpracticalreasonisderivedfromhisconceptionoftranscendental
subjectivity, both Apel and Habermas shift the foundations of validity from
transcendentalsubjectivitytotranscendental intersubjectivity.Thismeansthatfor
them validity is achieved when defeasible propositions have been adjudicated in
free and open discourse. This approach is intersubjective in as much as it takes
discourse between and among subject individuals as its starting point. It is
transcendentalinthatitseekstofindtheprinciplesfordiscoursethatarenecessary
andsufficientforreason.Althoughtheyagreethatmeaningisacognitiveoutcome
oftheuseoflanguage,ApelandHabermashaveslightlydifferenttheories.Working
out the differences is useful here, since Zahavi’s reading ofHusserl takes on each
39
theoryandmakescounter claimsagainst the critiquesofphenomenologybrought
byeachphilosopher.
A.KARL-OTTOAPEL’STRANSFORMATIONOFPHILOSOPHY
In The Transformation of Philosophy,61 Karl-Otto Apel advocates for a
“linguistic-pragmatic” perspective that grounds practical reason in the principles
necessary for pragmatically effective discourse. He shares with Habermas in
believing that the truth of any proposition lies in its potential to be universally
realizedthroughaprocessofopendiscourseandreasonedargument.Althoughthey
develop somewhat different approaches—Apel calling his approach a
“transcendentalpragmatic”andHabermascallinghisa“universal”pragmatic—both
advocate for a "transformation of philosophy," away from Kantian subjectivity
towardanintersubjectivegroundingofepistemology.Apel’sprojectisrootedinhis
beliefthatKantfailedtofindthefoundationsofknowledgeintheconditionsforthe
possibilityofuniversallylogicalformofconsciousnessbecausehedidnottakeinto
accounttherolethatintersubjectivityplaysasaconditionforvalidexperience.62
Apelarguesforashiftawayfromthesubjectiveturn,whichheidentifieswith
Kantiantranscendentalidealism,towardsanintersubjectiveepistemologygrounded
inthepragmaticdiscourse.ForApelthepossibilityofknowledgeisdependentupon
personsengagingincommunicativediscourseaimedatsolvingapracticalproblem.
HisclaimisthatKantiantranscendentalidealismwasnaïvebecauseitdidnottake
61Karl-OttoApel,TheTransformationofPhilosophy.
62Apel,TheTransformationofPhilosophy,p.311.
40
into account the role that intersubjectivity plays as a condition for valid
experience.63 He begins his analysis by looking to Wittgenstein’s assertion in
Philosophical Investigations that there is no “private evidence.” This comes up for
Apel in the context of his analysis of the relationshipbetweenunderstanding and
meaning. He takes Schleiermacher and Dilthey to be exploring the nature of
understandingandWittgensteintobeseekingtounderstandthe logicofmeaning.
Dilthey’s method is that of the hermeneutic of the “historical school” of human
sciencesinnineteenthcenturyGermany,whichsoughttointerpretatextthoughthe
“positive preconditions for understanding” by means of achieving an “historical
understanding of the age.”64 This attention to historical context includes for
Schliermacher and Dilthey, the reconstruction of a psychological motif that lies
externaltolanguage.Forthinkersinthisschool,atexthasmeaningopentovarious
interpretiveunderstandingthatareconditionedbytheparticularitythatresultfrom
historical circumstances, and these particularities include attitudes and
predispositionsthatareineffable.
ApelcontrastsDilthey’sinvestigationof“understanding”withWittgenstein’s
logical investigationof“meaning.”TheyoungWittgenstein,anaircraftengineerby
training, expressedBertrandRussell’s hope to achieve amathematically educated
philosophyoflogic.IncontrasttothehistoricismofDilthey’shermeneuticapproach,
this school sought to clarify expressions though the development of a logically
precise language. This approach, which Apel describes as logical/empiricist is63Ibid.
64Ibid,2.
41
associated with Ockham’s nominalism. It is ahistorical, in the sense that it seeks
autonomyfromhistoricalunderstandingsuponwhichDilthey’smethodrelied.The
logicalmeaningofpropositionswas its focus.ForWittgenstein,particularly inhis
early work in the Tractatus, this understanding of logical meaning is simply the
informationcontentofacommunication.65Thus,whenhewritesintheTractatus:
“Theworldiswhatisthecase”(1.0)and
“Theworldisthetotalityoffacts,notthings”(1.1)
he means that what can be understood about the world is only the information
carried in communications. Later, Wittgenstein states that to understand a
propositionis“toknowwhat isthecaseif it istrue.”(4.024)Apelarguesthatthis
mustmeanforWittgensteinthatto“tounderstandaproposition,therefore,means
tobeabletostatethelogico-linguisticmethodofitspossibleverification.”Thatisto
say,tounderstandapropositionistoknowhowtoshowwhetherwhatisstatesis
the case or not. This iswhat the neopositivists called the “verification principle.”
Where propositions fail to contain themethod of their verification, they have no
sensible meaning—they are nonsensical. Wittgenstein believed that most
philosophical statements are nonsensical because they do not. Apel notes that
Wittgensteinwasawareofapsychologicalproblemwithunderstanding,becausehe
acknowledgedthatineffablequalitiesaccompanyunderstanding,butforhimthese
are“philosophicallyinessential.”66
65Ibid,4.
66Ibid,7.
42
The laterWittgenstein rejects the project of a logically precise language in
favorofan“ordinarylanguage”approach.Thisfoundationalshiftisexpressedinthe
PhilosophicalInvestigationinWittgenstein’sclaimthat“Philosophyisnotabodyof
doctrine, but an activity (4.112).” For Wittgenstein, this is a radical rejection of
theory-formation in philosophy, which extends to correspondence of mental
concepts to their reference. That is, he denies that concepts and words refer to
quiddity or essentialism. They havemeaning only in use in the linguistic practice
thathecallsthe“languagegame.”ForApel,Wittgenstein’slanguagegameisa
“quasi-transcendental philosophical perspective. As he explains,
“whereas it originally seemed as if… the understanding ofmeaning
was to be replaced by the external description of behavior, this
doctrine now seems to assert that only within the framework of a
language-gamedoeshumanbehaviorbecomepossible….”67
It might appear that Wittgenstein endorsed a form of behaviorism—that
understanding is accomplished only through the method of objective criteria of
empirically observable action. But, Apel is careful to point out here that
Wittgenstein’sintentionistoshowthatthemeaningofbehaviorisintelligibleonly
within the language game because individual acts of verbal expression are
unintelligiblewithout the context of the language game inwhich they are located
andtowhichtheycontribute.
Thisexplains forApelwhyWittgensteinbelieves thatmeaningcannotbea
“private” affair. One cannot privately follow a rule because there would be no67Ibid,32.
43
intelligible way to determine whether the rule is being followed without some
verbaldescriptionoftherule.Apelexplains,
He would be unable to distinguish between the arbitrary and the
norm, since every operative norm which provides criteria for such
distinctionsisdependent,amongotherthings,uponthefactthatother
people can check whether the norm is being followed. Another
person, however, would be unable to recognize from his outward
behaviourwhether hewere following a rule of not, unless they had
already agreed upon this rule, or the other person could reach an
agreementwithathirdpersonwhocouldcheckthebehaviourofthe
firstbyrecoursetoapublicrule(forinstance,‘habit’or‘institution’).
Without reference to such a public controlling instance the other
person might regard even fortuitous (natural spontaneous)
movementsasrule-governedbehaviour.68
68Ibid,32.
44
Onecannotprivatelyfollowaruleorhaveaprivatelanguage,norcanbehaviorbe
intelligible, without presupposing a language game that has aspects of a public
“habit”orinstitution.69
Apel takes this to be a critical insight of Wittgenstein that entails the
relationship between his thought and Dilthey’s. Apel refers to the modern
philosophyofthepersonasamethodologicalsolipsism.HehasinmindDescartes’
Cogito,whichheunderstandsas anattempt to followaprivate rule.Theproblem
withthis,fromWittgenstein’sperspective,isthatDescartesfailstorealizethatthe
Cogito itself is, at least to some degree, an outcome of language. It is a
methodological solipsism in the sense that it denies it the transcendental
intersubjective conditions of its own possibility. Apel recognizes that Dilthey’s
approach seeks an intersubjective ground for understanding the person. That
ground is empathyachieved throughhistorical awareness. Wittgenstein’sviewof
meaning,however,wouldimplythatthehistoricalawarenessthatDiltheyseeksisa
form of a language game. His claim against hermeneutical approaches, including
69OnKripke’sreading,Wittgensteinisassertingthatonecannotprivatelyfollowa
rulebecause,ifonecould,thentherewouldbenodistinctionbetweentheobjective
practiceofobeyingaruleandsubjectivelythinkingoneisobeyingarule.Itfollows
fromthisthattherecanbenoprivatelanguagebecausetherulesofaprivate
languagewouldnecessarilybeprivaterules.Kripke’sworkprovokedmany
responses,somearguingthathisreadingofWittgensteinisoriginal,ledtoitbeing
calleda“Kripkenstein”synthesis.
45
Husserlianphenomenology,isthattheyaresolipsisticmethodologiesbecausethey
failtotakethelinguisticturn.
Zahavi summarizes Apel’s argument for the discourse approach and his
critique of phenomenology (more on Apel's critique of Husserl later). Zahavi
explainsApel'sintersubjectiveargumentintwopoints:First,“Apelclaimsthatthe
solipsisticpositioncanbedefinitivelyrefutedbyproving that theassumptionofa
privatelanguageisnonsensical."ThesecondpointofZahavi’sreadingofApelisthat
“intersubjectively valid interpretability of the evidence of a given phenomenon is
dependent upon the propositional sentence with which the state of affairs in
questioncanbelinguisticallydescribed.”
With the first point Zahavi means not only that a person cannot gain
universal acceptance of a private truth, but also that no criteria exists for an
individualtodiscovertruthalone.Truthis inherently intersubjective.Anyonewho
wished to introduce a language for empirical data accessible only to himself (e.g.,
pain) that was intelligible only to himself (one not consistently connected with
standardusageandconsequentlyuntranslatable)wouldnotpossessanycriteriafor
the correct use of language. He would be unable to distinguish between the
arbitraryandthenorm,sinceeveryoperativenormwhichprovidescriteriaforsuch
distinctions isdependent,amongother things,uponthe fact thatotherpeoplecan
checkwhetherthenormisbeingfollowed.70ZahavireadsApelasholdingthatitis
onlythroughalinguisticcommunitythatonecanaccessthevalidityoffollowinga
70Ibid,32.
46
language game, and thus only in a discourse community can the truth of an
apprehendedmeaningbevalidated.
ThesecondpointofZahavi’s readingofApel is that “intersubjectivelyvalid
interpretability of the evidence of a given phenomenon is dependent upon the
propositional sentence with which the state of affairs in question can be
linguisticallydescribed.”71HemeansthatforApelmeaningissolelytheprovinceof
communication.Tohavevalidmeaning,athoughtmustbeexpressedindefeasable
propositions and those propositions must be communicated to others for
adjudication. Therefore subjective experience is not meaningful unless it is
linguisticallyexpressedandcommunicated.Whichistosay,therearenomeaningful
pre-linguistic experiences, since phenomena are intelligible only against the
backgroundofapriorigrammaticalandsyntaxicalstructuresthatareshapedbythe
pragmatics of language itself. Apel defends a reconstruction of transcendental
idealismfromanintersubjectiveperspectivethatputsatthecenterthecontribution
of the pragmatics of language and discourse. He argues that an intersubjective
analysisisnecessarytoinvestigatethestructureofinterpersonaldiscoursebetween
subjectiveminds. This “intersubjective” turn in epistemology places emphasis on
seeking to ground knowledge in the universally necessary structure of rational
interpersonalcommunication.
Thus,ZahaviconcludesthatforApelmodernapproachestothephilosophyof
thepersonaremethodologicallysolipsisticsincetheirclaimsabouttranscendental
subjectivity do not recognize the status of intersubjectivity achieved in language,
71Ibid.
47
andthereforeviewsthevalidityofknowledgeasanindividualaccomplishment.For
this reason,Habermas andApel can be said to deny the possibility ofmeaningful
pre-orextra-linguisticexperiences,sincethepossibilityofmeaningfulexperienceis
necessarily conditioned by the grammar and syntax of pragmatic linguist
expressions that form the structure of linguistic intersubjectivity. A core claim of
their analysis is thus that true propositions can be assessed by their potential to
garneruniversalassenttotheir legitimacy,andthusthetruthofapropositioncan
beassessedthroughrationaldeliberationandargument.
B.JÜRGENHABERMAS’“UNIVERSALPRAGMATIC”
Habermas concurs with Apel's analysis of the need for an intersubjective
approachtoepistemology,althoughheargues forthisclaimsomewhatdifferently.
Habermas’ theory is intended to replace theKantian epistemology thatHabermas
describes as a transcendental subjectivity. In the First Critique, Kant’s method of
transcendentalargumentlookstotheself-evidentlynecessarynoeticstructuresthat
provide the principles that are foundational for self-responsible, autonomous
reason. Kant’s approach is subjective, in the sense that it seeks principles of
validationwithin subjective self-awareness. Kant lookswithin the self because he
believesthatsinceinternalawarenessisimmediate,itsstructureisself-evident.And
thereforeheholdsthatsubjectivitycanbethebasisforself-responsiblephilosophy.
Habermasargues thatKant’s approach cannot resolve fundamentalaporias
because it starts from amonological presumption that takes as given an isolated
individualwithaself-governingmind.ForHabermas,thispresuppositionprevents
subjectivetheorieslikeKant’sfromgraspingthecontributionofintersubjectivityto
48
the self and to reason. The self is constituted by interaction with others, for
Habermas,andcognitiveawarenessisafunctionofinteraction.Therefore,without
intersubjectivity there is no possibility of reason. Habermas’ discourse theory
attempts to describe the necessary and sufficient conditions for reason beginning
fromthispresuppositionofintersubjective.
Since Habermas views Husserl as also starting from a monological
perspective, he believes that phenomenology also fails to account for the
intersubjectivenatureofreason.AccordingtoZahavi,however,Husserlwasaware
of the problem of intersubjecitity, and in fact believed that a transcendental
intersubjectivityisatthecoreofphenomenology.OnZahavi’sreading,Husserlwas
aware that phenomenology depends on a coherent theory that accounts for how
knowledgeispossibleinthetranscendentalstructureoflivedexperiencesthatare
sharedamongmultipleminds.
ForHabermas,theseaporiassuggestthattheprojectofsubjectivephilosophy
lacks the ability to see beyond its own starting point. Habermas believes that
Kantian philosophy is structured by its presuppositions regarding the dualistic
natureofmindandworld.AsZahaviexplains, "InHabermas'view, the conceptof
intentionality, and the entire architectonic of the philosophy of consciousness, is
determinedbyamodelofknowledgethatisorientedtowardtherepresentationof
objects."72 The belief that themind is at distance from an external reality that it
knows,ifatall,throughintentionalrepresentationisdeeplyentrenchedinwestern
thought, but also is unsupported by evidence or apriori reason. It is a basic72JürgenHabermas,PostmetaphysicalThinking.
49
presupposition that arises without contest in the natural course of a developing
mind.Husserlwouldlatercallthisthe"naturalattitude"andarguethatresponsible
philosophy involvesovercoming thispresupposition. Theaporias evolve fromthe
presumption of the mind-intention-world structure that Kantian philosophy
maintains. The intersubjective cannot be evolved from a monological subjective
because it already presuppose the self in isolation from the Other, and the
separation ismediated through intentional representation. A truly intersubjective
theorymuststartfromintersubjectiverelation--atranscendentalcommunity--asthe
primaryontologicaleventandthesubjectiveselfasthemediatedobject.
In developing this claim, Habermas turns to Husserl. As Zahavi puts it,
HabermasisawarethatHusserl'sphenomenologyisconcernedwithamultitudeof
"I's" and therefore the problem on a transcendental community. This problem is
essentialtothephenomenologicalmethod.Zahaviexplains:"Itispreciselybecause
the phenomenological account proceeds from the I, with egoic subjectivity
constantly counting as the final possible horizon of legitimization, that there is a
persistingasymmetrybetweenmyselfandtheotherineachcase."73Zahavibelieves
thatsinceHabermasreliesonlyonhisreadingofHusserl'sCartesianMeditation,he
misses other resources, and he is unaware of Husserl's full development of this
claim.Therefore,Zahaviconcludesthatit,andphenomenologyisafailure.
Zahavidoesnotattempta full critiqueof theviewof thecontrastingviews
developedbyphenomenologicalinterpretationsofintersubjectivity.Hehasargued
elsewhere that phenomenology develops several accounts, noting the distinctions
73Zahavi,HusserlandTranscendentalIntersubjectivity,179.
50
betweenHusserl,Heidegger,Sartre,andMerleau-Ponty(andonemightaddLevinas,
Derrida,andLyotardaswell). In thisbook,Zahavimakes just fourpoints thatare
intended to reply to Apel and Habermas: (1) that their conception in
intersubjectivity is fraught with inconsistencies, notably that an instrumentalism
underlies thepragmatic; (2)althoughtheyacknowledgethat the intersubjective is
tightlyboundtothesubjective,theynonethelessattempttokeeptheirdistancefrom
it; (3) phenomenological analysis suggests that their distinction between public
linguistic consensus and private experience is too sharply drawn; and (4) the
pragmatic-linguistic construction of intersubjectivity is solipsistic in precisely the
waythattheyseektodeny.
C.ANALYSIS
Husserl’sphenomenologyisrootedinadesireforphilosopherstoovercome
thenaturalattitude througharadical self-assessment.But, inseeking thegrounds
bywhichsuchanassessmentcanbemade,Husserleventuallydevelopedananalysis
of transcendental intersubjectivity. In this regard, Husserl is similar to Apel and
Habermaswhoagreethatknowledgeistheresultofacooperativeendeavoramong
subjectiveminds.But,forApelandHabermas,languageisthetooloftheindividual
subjectivemind bywhich it expresses its needs, plans, reasoning, and so on. It is
onlythroughtheverbalmediumthatindividualscanexpresssubjectiveneedsand
coordinateintersubjectivebehaviorthroughdiscourse.
HusserlagreeswithApelandHabermasinbelievingthatmeaningisaresult
of the complex relationship between self and other. He also acknowledges that a
51
necessary (but not sufficient) condition for objective meaning is the
interpenetration of subjective and intersubjective, which is to say that the
transcendental structures within subjectivity make intersubjectivity possible and
viceversa.Itiscorrect,then,toclaimthatforbothapproaches,phenomenologyand
communicative ethics, meaning is a result of intersubjectivity, provided that one
takes this claim to allow that for Husserl, intersubjective awareness is always
already also a result of a dynamic process to which subjectivity makes a
contribution.And,thisdefinesmeaningasanoutcomeofanintersubjectiveprocess.
Also, onemust allow that for Apel and Habermas, the individual subjectivemind
experiencesmeaningasanoutcomeofdiscourse.
But,iftheymutuallyshareinthisperspectiveontheintersubjectivenatureof
meaning,theircommonalitiesonlyhighlighttheirdifferences.ForHusserlmeaning
arisesfromsubjectiveexperienceandisrealizedinconsciousawarenessonlywhen
sharedincommonwithothers.Individualshaveexperiencesthatarenotsharedbut
are full of latent meaning, sometimes profoundly so. Temporality is a very
significant example, as Heidegger rightly observed. Past, present, and future are
more than concepts. Time exists for me as an experience with latent meaning
beyondtheconceptofit.Thelatentmeaningoftimeexistsbeyondthelimitsofwhat
can be defined or articulated in language. It is a meaning that we share in the
experience of time, for example in the anticipation or apprehension of a future
event,thegrowingdistancefromthepast,orthesenseofimmediacyofthepresent
moment. The concepts, “future,” “past,” and “present” do not fully exhaust the
meaningoftheexperience.
52
Thecommunicativeethicsapproachdeniesthathumansshareinmeaningful
experiences thatarenot shared linguistically. It iswellknown that this claimwas
disputedbylaterphenomenology,notablyHeidegger,Sartre,andMerleu-Ponty.The
new reading of Husserl that Zahavi develops confirms that the grounds for their
defense of phenomenology was present from the beginning in Husserl’s work.
Zahavi suggests that Husserl’s motivation, which was to understand the
interrelationship between subjective meaning and intersubjective meaning—to
grasp the interpenetration of one with the other, was not a thematic goal of the
communicativeethicist.
Philosophers likeApel andHabermas are captured by the natural attitude,
the termHusserl used to refer to the commonplacepresupposition that themind
and the world are distinct. The purpose of phenomenological reduction is to
overcomethispresupposition.Fromwithinthenaturalattitude,thetranscendental
conditionofintersubjectivityisaquestionoftheconditionsforlinguisticdiscourse.
An individual mind can share in common with others only by overcoming the
separations of mind and world through participation in the common linguistic
behavior that occurs in the objective world. But, after the phenomenological
reduction,thephilosopherseesthattheremanywaysthatmindsshareincommon
withothermindsandthattheexperienceofanothermindisaconditionprecedent
for the possibility of an individual coming to believe in an objective world. To
perceiveanother is to forcethequestion,“AmIbeingperceived?”Thisquestion is
experienced as a rupturebetween self andworldbecause it asserts a limit to the
self.Theotherisaregionthatisapartfromme,andconcealedfromme.Theother
53
maybeperceivingme,andifso,thensharinginthesameexperienceasmeprecieve
theother.Thisdualityoftheselfperceivingtheotherandbeingperceivedbyother
is an example of intersubjectivity that occurs without language. To answer
Wittgenstein, I canprivately follow a rule (to distinguish between self and other)
onceIhaveencounteredanotherwhoIbelieveisperceivingme,becausethenIcan
ask, would the other believe that I am following the rule? My subjective rule-
followingismeasuredagainsttheperceptionofwhatanobservermightbelieveof
me.
ThisengagementofZahaviwithApelandHabermassuggeststhatthestatus
ofextra-linguisticmeaningisaparticularlycriticalissue,sinceitcutsdeeplyintothe
differencesbetweenphenomenologyandthecommunicativeethicstheories.While
thisisnotanewissue,Zahavi’sreadingofHusserlindialoguewithcommunicative
ethicsprovidessomenewinsightsintothenatureoftheclaimofHabermas’theory
of post-secular deliberative democracy. For Apel and Habermas, the idea that
languageisthesourceofthecapacitytothinkisanachievementofmodernthought.
It displaced a naïve realism that existed in the medieval religious context that
viewed the mind as having a faculty for immediately grasping ontological forms.
Whatmodernphilosophy,beginningwithDescartes,achievedwasawarenessofthe
contributionthatthesubjectivemindmakesinperceptionandcognition.Language
allowsforthefixingandthesignificationofthought,whichinturnallowsforshared
consideration though discourse. Viewed from this perspective, the contemporary
discoursetheoriesseektobringmoderncognitiveaccomplishmentstodemocratic
politics.Zahavi’sintersubjectivereadingofHusserl’sphenomenologysuggeststhat,
54
perhaps, in pursuing the desire to be freed of dogmatic authority, modern
philosophy becamemethodologically blind to extra-linguisticmeaning thatwas a
partofhumanawarenessandthatthisblindnessisanewdogmatism.
PARTIII ImplicationsforDeliberativeDemocracy
Zahavi’s critique of the epistemological foundations of discourse ethics
suggests limitations and opportunities for revising the theory of deliberative
democracy. What does it mean for a theory of deliberative democracy that it
excludesfromitsepistemicfoundationsthepossibilityofknowledgebeingderived
from pre-linguistic and extra-linguistic awareness? Some insight into these
questionscanbefoundinSeylaBenhabib’sanalysisoftheepistemicfoundationsof
discourse ethics.74 Contemporary thought’s challenges to intersubjectivity have
their origins in Hegelian critiques of Kantian formalism. Benhabib begins her
analysis by turning to Hegel’s critique of Kant. She notes that for Hegel, Kant’s
description of the categorical imperative as a universalmaxim cannot be applied
withoutreferencetomoralprinciplesoutsideofthemaximitself.Hegelarguedthat
Kantianethics is atbest incompletebecause the conditions for rationallyderiving
thoseprinciplesareexperiential(aposteriori)andarise insomespecifichistorical
community(Sittlichkeit).BenhabibsuggeststhattheHegeliancritiqueofKantfinds
influencetodayinapproachestopoliticalliberalismthatquestiontheuniversalityof
the discourse principle for producing the type of justified belief that a theory of
political liberalism demands. Although Hegel was concerned primarilywith Kant,
74Benhabib,SituatingtheSelf,21-68.
55
she sees similar arguments atwork in a number of theories that look to specific
livedexperiencesthatoccurinparticularhistoricalcommunalsettings.Theneutral
autonomous reason idealized by Kantian transcendental idealism is necessarily
constructedbyheteronomousfactors.
Benhabib looks to three specific challenges to discourse ethics:
Communitarians,suchasMichaelSandel,MichaelWalzer,CharlesTaylor,andJean
Elshtain,arguethatthestandardsofrationalityandtheautonomousagentposited
bycontemporaryliberalismareoutcomesofpersonslivinginparticular,historically
situated,communities.75TheyhavebeenparticularlycriticalofRawlsianliberalism
for failing to adequately appreciate the need for nurturing and protecting
communities within the polity where understandings of the moral good are
cultivated through tradition and ritual practice. A second avenue of critique has
been contemporary feminist thought. Various forms of feminist critique from
thinkerslikeSusanMollerOkin,VirginiaHeld,NancyFrazier,PamelaSueAnderson,
and others challenged the hegemony of the white male ego in the accounts of
intersubjective truth. For example, Okin asserts that Rawls (and the
communitarians)make gender-biased presuppositions about the nature of family
relationsthatmisleadthemtoassumethatthefamilyisajustinstitution.And,the
thirdchallengewasadvancedbypostmoderntheorists,atermthathasveryloose
meaning,but in this case refers to the thoughtofMichelleFoucault, Jean-François
Lyotard and Jacques Derrida. Inspired by post-Heideggerian critiques of
metaphysics,thesethinkerssoughttobringtothesurfacesubmergednarrativesof
75Benhabib,SituatingtheSelf,68-82.
56
meaningthatdiscloseunexploredalternativestandardsofrationalityandnormative
horizons.
Although a complete analysis of Benhabib’s thought in relation to the
phenomenologicalanalysisoftranscendentalintersubjectivitymustwaitforafuture
essay, the significance seems clear. Each of the three challenges that Benhabib
identifies lookstoaparticularstandardofrationalityandsourcesofmeaningthat
arenotuniversalbecausetheyarederivedfromlivedexperiencesofparticularlives
and practices in particular historical settings. Communitarians look to the role of
particularpracticesinparticularcommunitiesinformingmeaning,particularmoral
intuitions and the standards of reasoning appropriate to evaluating moral
sentiments. From thephenomenological perspectivedescribedbyZahavi, persons
will,mostlikely,findmeaninginlivedexperiencesofpracticesandofeachotheras
theyliveincommunity.And,theseexperiencesandpracticesarethepre-linguistic
and extra-linguistic grounds of moral knowledge and moral reasoning. Similarly,
gender develops particular ways of living in the world, with distinctly gendered
practicesandwaysofencounteringthe“other.”Thisprojecttoocanbenefitfromthe
broaderepistemologicalaccountdevelopedinphenomenology.And,finally,mostof
the works cited by Benhabib as “post-modern” draw from later reading of
Husserlianphenomenologythatdonotseektodevelopatranscendentalaccountof
intersubjectivity.HeideggerrejectedtranscendentalaccountsandDerridasoughtto
deconstructthem.
Zahavi’sreadingofphenomenologythusholdssignificanceforrethinkingthe
conception of what Benhabib calls the conception of “public space.” Here, she
57
examines three alternatives: the agnostic conception, which she identifies with
Hannah Arendt; the legalistic conception that she sees as being derived from a
rights-basedtheoryofliberalismbeginningwithKant,andthediscourseliberalism
ofHabermas.WhileshedefendsArendt’sagnosticapproachovertheothertwo,her
reading of the agnostic space can be refined and supported by the analysis of
transcendental intersubjectivity. This projectwould entail drawing fromMerleau-
Ponty’s theory of perception and exploring the potential of his ontology for
providingadescriptionofpublicspace.
This essay has initiated an investigation of the significance of
phenomenology for contemporary liberal democracy. It appears to have promise,
particularly for thinking about the public space in which democratic discourse
occurs. Understanding the nature and theoretical limits of the public space for
discourse is an important question today, as many theoretical disagreements
concerntheepistemologicalconditionsforvalidityindiscourse,andthetheoriesof
subjective universals (Kant) and intersubjective universals (Habermas and Apel)
comeunderfire.Inthesetimes,thepossibilityofanintersubjectiveuniversalthatis
extra-linguistic holds the promise of better understanding of the role of various
typesofdiscoursemighthavewithinthepublicspace.Iftranscendentalanalysiscan
reveal transcendental structures thatareextra-linguisticandyetuniversal, then it
mightbepossibletoachieveaclearerunderstandingofhowagreementisreached
when the language of discourse is diverse and the values of participants do not
coincide. These are crucial questions in the contemporary period, which is
58
characterized by rapid change in the global discourse environment, which is
pervasivelynetworkedandinconstantengagement.