Civil society organizations and deliberative policymaking: interpreting environmental controversiesin the deliberative system

Jennifer Dodge

Published online: 5 June 2014� Springer Science+Business Media New York 2014

Abstract This paper argues that while research on deliberative democracy is burgeoning,

there is relatively little attention paid to the contributions of civil society. Based on an

interpretive conceptualization of deliberative democracy, this paper draws attention to the

ways in which civil society organizations employ ‘‘storylines’’ about environmental issues

and deliberative processes to shape deliberative policy making. It asks, how do civil

society organizations promote storylines in the deliberative system to change policy? How

do storylines constitute policy and policy-making processes in the deliberative system? I

answer these questions through an empirical analysis of two environmental controversies

in the USA: environmental justice in New Mexico and coalbed methane development in

Wyoming. Findings indicate that civil society organizations used storylines in both cases to

shift the dynamics of the deliberative system and to advance their own interpretations of

environmental problems and policy-making processes. Specifically, they used storylines

(1) to set the agenda on environmental hazards, (2) to construct the form of public

deliberation, changing the rules of the game, (3) to construct the content of public

deliberation, shaping meanings related to environmental policy, and (4) to couple/align

forums, arenas and courts across the system. These findings suggest that promoting sto-

rylines through accommodation and selection processes can be an important mechanism

for shaping policy meanings and for improving deliberative quality, although these effects

are tempered by discursive and material forms of power, and the competition among

alternative storylines.

Keywords Deliberative democracy � Deliberative system � Civil society

organizations � Environmental policy � Narrative inquiry � Interpretive

policy analysis

J. Dodge (&)Rockefeller College, University at Albany, 135 Western Ave., Albany, NY 12222, USAe-mail: jdodge@albany.edu

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Policy Sci (2014) 47:161–185DOI 10.1007/s11077-014-9200-y

Introduction

Deliberative policy making is becoming prominent among decision-making models as it

proposes a means for addressing normative and empirical questions relevant to policy

analysis (Hajer and Wagenaar 2003). The model typically focuses on forums that bring

citizens with diverse perspectives together to exchange reasons for policy proposals and to

negotiate a decision. Empirical research on deliberative policy making takes different

forms, but most commonly focuses on assessing the skills and willingness of public

officials to design and implement forums (Bingham et al. 2005; Feldman and Khademian

2005; Fischer 2000, 2003; Bryson et al. 2002; Nalbandian 1999; Forester 1993a, b, 1999;

Roberts 1997; Stivers 1994), and/or the design features that make for effective delibera-

tion, capable of fostering reasoned agreements in the presence of conflicting perspectives

and values (Cook et al. 2007; Mendelberg and Karpowitz 2007; Koontz and Johnson 2004;

Nelson and Pettit 2004; Zwart 2003; Fung and Wright 2003; Thomas 2001; Pelletier et al.

1999).

While necessary as features of deliberative policy making, the field emphasizes the

skills of public officials and deliberative design to the neglect of civil society. The focus on

government agents downplays activities of other stakeholders who make claims about

policy and policy making, and who are confronted with strategic decisions about how to

approach deliberation given other avenues of influence (Dodge 2010; Boswell 2013). In

particular, we lack understanding about how civil society organizations shape deliberative

governance.

While some scholars assess civil society organizations in deliberative democracy

(Levine and Nierras 2007; Fischer 2006; Hendriks 2006; Montpetit et al. 2004), there

remains relatively little empirical research in this area. Some evidence indicates that civil

society organizations make unique contributions to deliberative democracy (Fischer 2006;

Dodge 2009, 2010), and confront specific challenges when considering deliberation as an

entry point for influencing policy (Montpetit et al. 2004). While government agents may be

responsible for establishing deliberative forums, civil society organizations work with

citizens to shape them (Dodge 2010), by promoting certain definitions of policy or of

participation, the latter of which Hendriks (2005) calls ‘‘participatory storylines.’’ They

may also act cooperatively or confrontationally, but we should not dismiss them as non-

deliberative. By analyzing power in the deliberative system in an environmental contro-

versy in New Mexico, for example, Dodge (2009) shows how marginalized groups can use

power to serve deliberatively democratic ends, such as securing a fairer process and getting

issues related to justice on the agenda. This body of work suggests that understanding the

role of civil society organizations in deliberative democracy is critical.

To examine the civil society side of deliberative democracy, I adopt an interpretive

framework that conceptualizes deliberative policy making as a contest over the meaning of

public policy and policy-making processes. An interpretive approach surfaces the con-

testation over meanings embedded in competing ‘‘storylines’’ about public problems,

solutions, and the appropriate form of deliberation. These are precisely the types of con-

flicts that call for public deliberation. Thus, an interpretive approach is highly relevant for

understanding these conflicts and for building knowledge in this under-developed empir-

ical area.

A focus on civil society requires viewing deliberative forums within the broader

political landscape. It recognizes that claims making activities are not confined to discrete

forums, but include other spheres. Drawing on Mansbridge (1999), see also Mansbridge

et al. 2012), Hendriks (2006) defines the deliberative system as ‘‘a series of arenas where…

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communicative practices that foster critical, public reflection’’ take place (499). These can

include discrete forums in government (like committee meetings and task forces) or in civil

society (like public seminars and church events), but go beyond these to also include public

deliberation in courts, legislatures, news media, and even ‘‘everyday talk’’ (Mansbridge

1999).

Based on this understanding, this article seeks to answer the following questions: How

do civil society organizations promote storylines in the deliberative system to change

policy? How do storylines constitute policy and policy-making processes in the deliber-

ative system? To explore these questions, I present a comparative study of two environ-

mental controversies in the USA: environmental justice in New Mexico, and coalbed

methane development in Wyoming.

Findings indicate that civil society actors used storylines in different ways to shift the

dynamics of the deliberative system, and to advance their own interpretations of envi-

ronmental problems and policy-making processes. Specifically, they used storylines (1) to

set the agenda on environmental hazards, (2) to construct the form of public deliberation,

changing the rules of the game, (3) to construct the content of public deliberation, shaping

meanings related to environmental policy, and (4) to couple/align forums, arenas, and

courts across the system. These findings suggest that promoting storylines is an important

mechanism for improving deliberative quality and compelling agencies to address envi-

ronmental hazards, although challenged by discursive forms of power, and the degree of

competition among alternative storylines.

I begin with a discussion of interpretive approaches to policy studies, and their relevance

for studying civil society organizations in deliberative democracy, building a conceptual

framework drawing on framing concepts from social movement literature. I then describe

narrative inquiry as an appropriate methodology for the study. Following a description of the

cases, I present results, focusing on storylines that actors used to shape policy meanings about

environmental controversies and policy making. I end with a discussion about the importance

of civil society actors as claims makers in deliberative policy making.

Interpretive research in policy studies

Interpretive approaches to policy analysis experienced popularity in the 1990s as

researchers began asserting the importance of ‘‘problem definition’’ as a key strategy for

influencing policy (Schneider and Ingram 1997; Rochefort and Cobb 1994; Stone 1989).

For example, Rochefort and Cobb (1994) argued that we should distinguish between

‘‘objective conditions out there in the world’’ and the definition of those conditions as a

‘‘problem.’’ This approach highlights the politics of policy making by suggesting that key

actors, whom they call ‘‘claims makers,’’ bring problems to light and present them as

needing a solution. A key insight is that these activities do not merely identify a problem,

but advance a particular moral or political orientation through which to view it. In other

words, claim makers’ language frames the problem, bringing with it certain understandings

about the problem’s nature, thus suggesting certain causes and solutions. For example,

problems can be ‘‘medicalized’’ or framed in terms of ‘‘diseases’’ that need a ‘‘cure.’’ This

problem definition constitutes issues such as alcoholism as a medical problem rather than,

say, a moral one, with implications for policy intervention and definitions of policy

‘‘targets’’ (Schneider and Ingram 1997).

From this view, policy problems are not objectively real, concrete, and unambiguous,

but are social constructions; they do not mirror reality but are interpretations of it (Yanow

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1996; Hoppe 2011). Similarly, solutions do not derive naturally from an accurate

description of the ‘‘real’’ problem, but from the constructions of problems embedded in

particular discourses. Policy making, then, cannot only be about ‘facts’ but representations

of issues from particular perspectives, nor only about interests, but ‘‘expressions of who we

are’’ (Yanow 1996). In other words, public policy is an exercise in meaning.

These approaches have expanded since the 1990s covering a variety of interpretive

frameworks to study public policy. Organized under the label ‘‘the argumentative turn’’

(Fischer and Gottweis 2012; Fischer and Forester 1993),1 these approaches share these

assumptions:

• … human action is embedded in and intermediated through symbolically rich social,

cultural, and institutional contexts;

• … human action is constituted by communicative practices;

• … the policy process is thus also embedded in these contexts and constituted by

communicative practices (Fischer and Gottweis 2012).

Rather than searching for generalizable patterns of causal relationships, causality from

this perspective refers to the constitutive effects of meaning on behavior (Schwartz-Shea

2006). In other words, how issues are framed profoundly shapes what people do. Thus,

interpretive research can be useful for policy (Yanow and Schwartz-Shea 2006), because it

shows how framing can open and constrain action (Hajer 2009). For example, Hendriks

(2005) has shown that the way ‘‘participation’’ is framed in a deliberative forum shapes

whether it is perceived as legitimate within existing institutions and thus whether citizens

will participate or view outcomes as valid.

These approaches call for in-depth analysis that examine how beliefs about policy come

to be adopted; how power relations undergird argumentative struggles; and how com-

municative activity constitutes and maintains power relations. It focuses analytical atten-

tion on discursive practices (Hajer 1997, 2009), which involve ‘‘the practical

communicative organizing (or dis-organizing) of others attention to relevant and signifi-

cant issues at hand’’ (Forester 1993a, b, 5). Storylines are important discursive practices. A

storyline is ‘‘a condensed statement summarizing complex narratives, used by people as

‘shorthand’ in discussions’’ (Hajer 2009, 61). Storylines, like other discursive strategies,

convey certain assumptions, legitimize certain forms of discussion, emphasize certain

claims over others, or develop a common frame of reference (Hajer 2009; Forester 1999).

From the civil society side, storylines may articulate local knowledge (Corburn 2005),2

frame policy problems and solutions, critique policy and advance alternatives, and justify

specific inclusions or exclusions in policy making (Hendriks 2005).

Furthermore, storylines are supported and (re)produced by specific social practices

(Hajer 1997, 2009). In environmental justice, for example, a participatory storyline about

direct citizen action is supported through community organizing practices such as ‘‘one-on-

1 These approaches are grounded in the ‘‘interpretive turn’’ in the social sciences, which took place in thelate twentieth century. At its heart, interpretive research has an ‘‘overarching appreciation for the centralityof meaning in human life in all its aspects…’’ (Yanow and Schwartz-Shea 2006, xii, see also Ospina andAuthor 2005).2 Drawing on Geertz (1973, 1992), Yanow (2004) defines local knowledge as ‘‘the very mundane, yet expertunderstanding of and practical reasoning about local conditions derived from lived experience’’ (S12, italicsoriginal). Coburn (2005) argues that local knowledge ‘‘includes information pertaining to local contexts orsettings, including knowledge of specific characteristics, circumstances, events, and relationships, as well asimportant understanding of their meaning’’ (47).

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ones’’ in which organizers meet with members to understand their opinions and interests

and incorporate them into policy agendas.

This approach suggests a discursive notion of power with overlapping and mutually

reinforcing forms. First, dominant systems of meaning might constrain the range of

acceptable storylines, not through an individual’s actions but through the general accep-

tance of their terms (Howarth and Stavrakakis 2000; Hajer 1997). There is little agency

here as accepted discourses protect the status quo. Second, an actor may use coercive

means to establish the terms of debate in ways that constrain topics or forms of discussion

(Fischer 2003; Hajer and Versteeg 2005; Dryzek 2000; Young 2001), or may use non-

coercive means which operate through mutual understanding (Niemi 2005). For example,

actors may mobilize meaning by uniting the concerns of diverse stakeholders under a

common framework (Benford and Snow 2000; Dryzek 2000). These forms of power

constitute understandings of policy and policy-making processes.

An interpretive approach to deliberative policy making

Deliberative democracy emphasizes argumentation and reasoning in the pursuit of a

consensus, or reasoned agreement, regarding political action and policy (Dryzek 2000;

Gutman and Thompson 1996). The theory rests on an ideal of undistorted communication

free from coercion, politics, and strategy, where interlocutors meet with an open mind and

willingness to adjust preferences in light of others’ arguments. For some, this activity

requires design features that generate distortion-free communication, such as good facil-

itation, procedures ensuring fair representation of affected communities, and equal access

to the process (Fung 2003; Fung and Wright 2003).

Based on the interpretive assumptions above, discursive democracy emphasizes ‘‘contes-

tation across discourses’’ as a key component of democracy (Dryzek 1990, 2000). While

interlocutors may come together to exchange reasons within forums, these reasons are

embedded in systems of meaning that bring with them assumptions about human behavior,

community, the role of the state, and so on. Thus, the exchange of reasons is not merely about a

specific policy question, but has the potential to perpetuate or constrain certain social meanings.

Which meanings prevail is negotiated through deliberation. Once constructed, agreements

shape political action through a particular understanding of policy problems and solutions.

From this conceptualization, civil society organizations can play a mediating role between

citizens and the state in deliberative democracy. For example, Fischer (2006) has noted how

civil society organization associated with the People’s Science Movement prepared citizens

for deliberation in participatory planning in Kerala, India. These organizations helped define

the meanings of deliberative spaces with participants and facilitated the discussion. ‘‘Citizens

were then assisted in analyzing [the] problems [at hand] on the basis of their own social

experiences, knowledge, and understandings, and to make suggestions for solutions’’ (23).

Such organizations work with constituents to articulate local knowledge and disseminate it

through the deliberative system, in forums but also other arenas.

While most approaches to deliberative democracy view forums as isolated from sur-

rounding politics, this reasoning makes clear that discursive democracy is not confined to

the forum, but cut cross-spheres (Dryzek 2000). Therefore, the focus of analysis should be

the interaction of storylines in interlocking spheres of public deliberation (Hendriks 2006),

a task requiring concepts to capture this dynamism. This means recognizing that delib-

erative forums take place in a broader political context that might involve some elements

of interest-based politics (Hendriks 2011), as deliberative forums co-exist with activism,

lobbying, and other strategic activities in the broader deliberative system.

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The social movement and deliberative democracy literatures suggest three interpretive

processes relevant to understanding the interplay of storylines in the deliberative system.

First, different actors may promote storylines in forums or other arenas, to spread meanings

about public policy. Benford and Snow (2000) label this process ‘‘accommodation’’

because successful promotion depends on the ability to reach audiences with different

perspectives (see also Dryzek 2000; Young 2001).3

Second, other actors must adopt the storyline. Benford and Snow (2000) label this

process ‘‘selection’’ because it involves ‘‘selecting and adapting the borrowed item to the

new host context or culture’’ (627). This process depends on the diversity of competing

storylines, the degree of competition across storylines, and the resonance with existing

meanings. It might also depend on discursive forms of power: when debate is framed in

broadly accepted terms, considerable effort is needed to convince interlocutors to select a

new storyline. Selection may be partial or alter original meaning.

Finally, the meaning across different spheres of the deliberative system may become

linked. ‘‘Coupling’’ is a feature of the deliberative system, a systemic property, ‘‘that

indicates the extent to which related forums are logically and practically connected’’

(Dodge 2010, 250–251).4 It refers to accommodation across different spheres in ways that

are felt in others. ‘‘Tight coupling’’ is ‘‘group think writ large’’ in which the conceptual-

ization of an issue dominates, erasing alternatives (Mansbridge et al. 2012). It may weaken

the ability of the system to self-correct, for example, by enabling discussion of different

dimensions of a problem based on lived experience rather than scientific knowledge

(Mansbridge et al. 2012). Coupling can be positive if arguments with potential to resolve

problems gain acceptance. ‘‘Decoupling’’ happens when ‘‘good reasons arising from one

part [of the deliberative system] fail to penetrate the others’’ (Mansbridge et al. 2012, 23).

Coupling requires effort by actors who may use the presence of storylines in one sphere as

evidence that they should be adopted in another. (This suggests that ‘‘selection’’ may

depend on meaning becoming coupled across forums, as actors are more persuaded by

understandings exhibiting acceptance elsewhere.)

These three processes provide the conceptual framework to understand the role of civil

society organizations in deliberative policy making.

Methods

The data for this article come from a project about non-profits in deliberative democracy

(Dodge 2010). The project integrated narrative inquiry (Dodge et al. 2005; Clandinin and

Connelley 2000) and interpretive case studies (Stake 1995). Narrative inquiry is suitable for

understanding competing storylines and practices (Lejano and Leong 2012), while case study

methodology adds a comparative logic that facilitates case selection and theory elaboration.

Using theory-based sampling (Miles and Huberman 1994), 2 organizations were

selected from 92 in a national program.5 Selection began with 19 environmental

3 While many deliberative scholars argue that rhetoric is a coercive form of communication, it can benecessary to convince a skeptical audience. It ‘‘can be used to draw attention to previously marginalizedconcerns, to reach categories of people traditionally excluded from discussion by couching points in termsfamiliar to them, and to force action on a problem or issue’’ (Dryzek 2000, 67; see also Young 2001).4 In institutional theory, coupling refers to ‘‘the creation and maintenance of gaps between formal policiesand organizational practices’’ (Beekun and Glick 2001; Meyer and Rowan 1977).5 Leadership for a Changing World was sponsored by the Ford Foundation and implemented in partnershipwith the Advocacy Institute and the Research Center for Leadership in Action at The Wagner School/New

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organizations; these were narrowed to 12 doing community organizing because they

engaged in policy advocacy and participated in various deliberative forums and arenas to

shape environmental policy. The final two cases represented the greatest diversity allowing

for theoretical elaboration across cases. They varied in terms of definitions of environ-

mental issues (environmental justice versus conservation), theory of change (transforma-

tion versus reformation), and organizational structures (network versus membership). They

were also located in states with different environmental policy regimes, different demo-

graphics (New Mexico is a majority–minority state with Native American, Latino, and

white populations while Wyoming is largely white), and different degrees of rural and

urban populations. With the assistance of organizational members, I selected as the focus

of analysis one policy controversy associated with each organization in which the orga-

nization played a significant role.

Data collection and analysis focused on an ‘‘embedded’’ unit of analysis typical of

qualitative research (Miles and Huberman 1994). Storylines about policy and policy

making (e.g., ‘‘environmental injustices are rooted in racism in New Mexico’’), and the

practices that support them (such as community organizing) were embedded in different

spheres of the deliberative system (Ferree et al. 2002).

I conducted 36 semi-structured interviews, with members, staff, and allies of each

organization, government officials, and industry representatives, organized around key

episodes in each campaign (identified with informants). I covered topics related to how the

organizations practiced deliberation and engaged in political action. Names of interview

participants have been changed to protect anonymity. I also conducted 28 observations of

organizational and public meetings and events and gathered over 400 documents (orga-

nizational and policy documents, and government reports) (see Table 1).

All data were analyzed using a narrative approach called re-transcription (Feldman

2005) that distills the organizations’ storylines and organizational practices, and those of

government agents, tribal representatives, and others involved in the controversy, enabling

analysis of competition across storylines.6 A traditional coding strategy was not used so as

to retain the cases’ contextual character. The systematic analysis of transcripts and doc-

uments resulted in detailed Analytical Memos (Miles and Huberman 1994) that presented

storied accounts (Clandinin and Connelley 2000) of each organization’s campaign. The

accounts were shared with members of each organization to verify interpretations. This

article presents the results that answer the research questions: How do civil society

organizations promote storylines in the deliberative system to change policy? How do

storylines constitute policy and policy-making processes in the deliberative system?

Storylines of policy and participation in two environmental controversies

In the mid-2000s, two environmental controversies were taking place in the USA. In the mid-

1980s, in Wyoming (and other Western states), the technology that enabled oil and gas

companies to produce coalbed methane (CBM) developed. Ranchers and other landowners

began experiencing the environmental effects, and as production expanded in the 2000s, a

Footnote 5 continuedYork University. Each cohort of nominees underwent a rigorous selection process, so that out of about 1,350nominees per year only 17–20 were selected.6 This technique involves re-writing transcripts to uncover the structure and meaning of participants’stories.

Policy Sci (2014) 47:161–185 167

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controversy emerged over whether or not it should be allowed and under what conditions. As

the controversy escalated, the issue was addressed in the courts, the legislature, and in a series

of forums created by the Governor and the Wyoming legislature (see Table 2), attracting

considerable media attention. In New Mexico (and other southwestern states), environmental

injustices had existed for decades if not longer. In 2004, the Secretary of New Mexico’s

environment department created a series of forums to address environmental injustices in the

state as urged by various grassroots organizations. In 2005, while the legislature considered

EJ legislation, the secretary invited EJ activists for the first time to participate in solid waste

working groups to revise environmental regulations (see Table 2).

Civil society actors played a key role in these cases. In Wyoming, the Powder River Basin

Resource Council helped get the effects of CBM development on the agenda. Powder River is

a grassroots organization with about 1,000 members, mostly ranchers and large landowners,

but also other residents in northeastern Wyoming. It focuses on responsible energy produc-

tion (of coal, coalbed methane, uranium, and other natural resources), renewable energy,

agriculture, and trade. When its staff and members began experiencing environmental and

personal impacts of CBM development, it began organizing and building coalitions across the

state and region.7 In 2002, when CBM development quickened, Powder River formalized its

campaign by creating the Coalbed Methane Task Force with a goal to ‘‘protect the property

and all water rights of surface and estate owners, both private and public, and require the

conservation and reclamation of Wyoming’s entire environment’’ (PRBRC 2005). In its

campaign, Powder River promoted several policy and participatory storylines about envi-

ronmental hazards related to CBM (see Table 3).

Similarly, the Southwest Network for Environmental and Economic Justice helped get

environmental justice on the agenda in New Mexico. The Network includes about 60

organizations and individuals—called affiliates—from southwestern states in the USA and

border states in Mexico, and from Native Nations in the region (Cordova et al. 2000).

Reflecting the Network’s identity as an organization of color, affiliates are ‘‘single-race, as

well as multi-racial organizations [that] are either single- or multi-issue focused’’ (Led-

esma, unpublished report, 17). In 2003, just prior to the establishment of forums on

environmental justice (EJ), staff and affiliates from the Network created the New Mexico

Environmental Justice Working Group (EJ Working Group)8 to address environmental

7 Powder River’s partners included the Wyoming Outdoor Council, the Landowners’ Association ofWyoming and the Sierra Club, and three regional coalitions: the Western Organization of Resource Council,the Rocky Mountain Energy Campaign, and the Western Coalbed Methane Project of the Oil and GasAccountability Project.8 The EJ Working Group included three grassroots organizations—Concerned Citizens of Wagon Mound &Mora County, Colonias Development Council, and Kalpulli Izkalli—three coalitions—The Laguna-AcomaCoalition for a Safe Environment, the Sacred Alliances for Grassroots Equality (SAGE), and the SouthwestOrganizing Project—and two mainstream (i.e., white) environmental organizations—the New MexicoEnvironmental Law Center and the Southwest Research & Information Center.

Table 1 Data collection by method

Method Number of observations

The Network Powder River Total

In-depth narrative interviews 18 18 36

Observations 16 12 28

Documents 69 359 428

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injustices stemming from racism in New Mexico through public policy. The group

implemented an EJ campaign to promote several storylines about environmental racism

(see Table 3).

Civil society organization and deliberative policy making

The following analysis shows how these organizations promoted policy and participatory

storylines through accommodation and coupling processes, and how others selected them

Table 2 Forums, arenas, and courts (and their purposes) in the two cases

Powder River Basin Resource Council a Southwest Network for Environmental and Economic Justice

ForumsDepartment of Environmental Quality’s Water Discharge Permitting Task Force, 2003

To make recommendations for streamlining CBM water discharge permitting processes under the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System.b

Governor’s Coalbed Methane Natural Gas Water Use Task Force, 2006

To address water quality and quantity impacts of CBM development.

Governor’s Committee Task Force on Split Estate, 2004

To draft split estate legislation that would regulate coalbed methane development on “split estates.”

EJ Planning Committee, 2003 To design EJ Listening Sessions

EJ Listening Sessions, 2004 To hear public testimony on EJ issues and experiences in four regions of the state

EJ Policy Committee, 2004To make EJ policy recommendations based on listening sessions testimony; to draft EJ policy for the state

EJ Task ForceCreated by executive order to assist agencies in implementing EJ policy across the state

Working groups on solid waste regulations and management plans, 2005

To revise solid waste regulations

WY legislative sessions 2003, 2004 and 2005 To decide on split estate legislation

NM legislative sessions, 2005, 2006, 2007 To consider EJ legislation

CourtsInterior Bureau of Land Appeals, 1999 to 2003

To challenge Bureau of Land Management’s administrative decisions on allowing CBM development in the Powder River Basin

2005 and 2006 court cases in Montana To assess water quality standards in Montana that would have a bearing on coalbed methane gas development in Wyoming

Environmental Quality Council, 2005 To develop policy to regulate water quantity as a means to regulate water quality.

Arenas

a Several forums are excluded for simplicity: federal legislative hearings on energy policy, watershedpermitting groups that set basin-wide water quality standards, and three interagency forums in Wyomingb NPDES is the water discharge-permitting program under the Clean Water Act

Policy Sci (2014) 47:161–185 169

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or not. It reveals that these organizations impacted deliberative democracy in four ways

(see Table 4). They (1) set the agenda on environmental hazards, (2) constructed the form

of public deliberation, changing the rules of the game, (3) constructed the content of public

deliberation, shaping meanings related to environmental policy, and (4) coupled forums,

arenas, and courts across the system. By examining these dimensions, we gain a deeper

understanding of how these organizations enhanced deliberative quality and compelled

agencies to take responsibility for environmental hazards, or failed to do so.

Setting the agenda on environmental hazards

Both organizations used storylines to get issues on the agenda in their states (Stone 1989).

While the Network engaged in discursive politics, Powder River also used coercive

strategies.

Powder River shaped the public agenda in several instances. First, it had tried, under the

‘‘pro-industry’’ Governor Geringer, to challenge administrative decisions made by the

Bureau of Land Management; to convince the environmental department’s Water Quality

Division to maintain and strengthen water quality standards in coalbed methane (CBM)

water discharge permits; and to convince the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to

remove the division’s authority to administer these permits. After these failed attempts, and

after democratic Governor Freudenthal was elected, Powder River began promoting its

storylines through accommodation processes to urge agency and state representatives to

create forums to address CBM development. For example, in 2002, it invited the new

Table 3 Policy and participatory storylines across the two cases

Powder River Basin Resource Council Southwest Network for Environmental andEconomic Justice

Policystorylines

CBM threatens existing agricultural uses ofnatural resources, especially water, andthus the livelihoods of ranchers and otheragriculturalists

This is a landowner’s right issues—CBMproduction had negative economic andenvironmental impacts for landowners thatare unique compared to conventional oiland gas development, and thus should beregulated differently

New Mexico has a history of racism inenvironmental decision making.

Solid waste decisions reflect racism inenvironmental decision making that hasresulted in the ‘‘over-concentration’’ ofpolluting facilities in low-incomecommunities of color and native originwho thus bear a ‘‘disproportionateburden’’ for environmental hazards

No policy in the state explicitly mandatesequal protection of New Mexico’s citizensof color and native origin fromenvironmental hazards, but that this kindof policy is necessary given the history ofracist practices and policies in NewMexico

Participatorystorylines

Landowners downstream from CBMdevelopment are heavily impacted buthave few rights as legitimate stakeholdersin shaping environmental decisions

Landowners should be recognized asstakeholders in making decisions aboutCBM development

Low-income people, people of color andnative people have a right to self-determination and sovereignty, and fullparticipation in environmental decisionmaking

These storylines are related to broader environmental discourses and movements

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governor to hear members’ concerns about the impact on their property, as one long-term

member explains:

‘‘We met at Powder River, and we were 12 landowners, and each of us gave our story

in a nutshell…. And I said, ‘You know. I have worked with your administration. I’ve

tried to work within the rules, but your DEQ [Department of Environmental Quality]

and your state engineer give a permit to these companies to come basically and

destroy my property. You are permitting them and it’s regulatory takings, they are

taking my property for their benefit so they can get a little case [money].’’

Table 4 Summary of findings

Contribution The network Powder River

Set the agenda The EJ Working Group urged thesecretary to create forums to heartestimony on EJ issues and to createpolicy based on that testimony

Powder River urged the creation of the2003 and 2006 water task forces andthe 2004 split estate task force, andto create policy to addressenvironmental effects of CBMdevelopment

Construct the form ofpublic deliberation

The Network promoted itsparticipatory storylines andconvinced its interlocutors to createa ‘‘bottom-up’’ space in the listeningsessions that prioritized itsconstituents’ perspectives

Powder River promoted itsparticipatory storylines to holdgovernment officials accountable toa fairer process. They shifted thepractice of deliberation but onlymarginally

Construct the content ofpublic deliberation

The Network promoted its policystorylines to shape framing ofenvironmental issues in forums. Itsconvinced interlocutors to adopt EJlanguage, and EJ defined thepurpose of forums. However, manybegan to interpret EJ as‘‘participation of’’ and‘‘communication with’’ affectedcommunities, removing ‘‘racialdiscrimination.’’ Plus, the agencychose a definition of EJ that avoided‘‘racial injustice.’’ While theNetwork made considerable policygains, it had to accept a moderateversion of EJ

Powder River promoted policystorylines about the unique impactsof CBM development and‘‘downstream effects’’ and shiftedthe perspective of some of itsinterlocutors by drawing ondominant scientific and economicarguments. Powder River’s ideaswere resisted in practice. Membersattributed resistance to the economicnarrative and the economic power ofthe industry. Even as they framedtheir concerns in scientific language,‘‘money spoke louder than science’’

Couple/align forums,arenas and courtsacross the deliberativesystem

The Network convinced theenvironment department to tightlycouple EJ forums. When ‘‘racialdiscrimination’’ was removed itdisseminated its ideas in otherspheres. It did not win legislation but‘‘educated’’ legislators about EJ, andcodified EJ in the public record,which motivated the EJ PolicyCommittee to write its EJ executiveorder. Finally, the Networkdeveloped a definition of EJ topromote in the public sphere

Powder River supported itscounterparts in a court case inMontana to maintain high waterquality standards that would alsoimpact Wyoming and shared itslessons with tribal communities whowere deciding whether or not toallow CBM development. Theseefforts advanced Powder River’sstorylines in venues where they weremore likely to get traction thusbuilding momentum towardselection of their storylines

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This regulatory taking storyline provided a causal analysis that linked CBM development

with the destruction of private property, a persuasive argument in a conservative state.

Powder River’s efforts compelled the state legislature to create the 2003 Water Permitting

Task Force, with the governor’s backing, to streamline permitting processes. The governor

appointed four industry representatives, one landowner from Powder River, an environ-

mental academic, and two attorneys (representing ranchers and industry, respectively). An

advisory group included the environment department, the State Engineer’s Office, and the

Oil and Gas Conservation Commission.

Second, because Powder River competed against powerful economic interests and a pow-

erful storyline about economic growth (discussed below), recommendations from the 2003

water task force were not implemented. Therefore, it petitioned the Environmental Quality

Council—which oversees the environment department—to change water quality regulations.

This pressure compelled the legislature to create the 2006 Coalbed Natural Gas Water Use Task

Force to address unresolved issues. According to an organizer, the new task force

‘‘…came about also because of the continual push [to address water issues]. [From]

the first [2003 water task force…], there was a whole bunch of recommendations

about how to address the water problems…. And we still weren’t seeing those

managed or handled properly…. And so then we came in with our petition to change

the rules to try to address them.… And so then they [the state legislature] drafted

legislation to say, ‘all right, we got a big problem with the water.’’’

The legislature appointed four state representatives and four state senators to the task force, and

the Governor appointed three representatives of industry, three agriculturalists, and represen-

tative of ‘‘the public at large’’ (not from Powder River).9 The storyline started to shift, as others

began acknowledging the unique water management problems with CBM development.

Finally, Powder River collaborated with the Landowners Association of Wyoming

(LAW) to encourage the legislature to address CBM development on split estates.10 The

legislature considered but failed to pass legislation in 2003 and 2004. Afterward, LAW

floated the idea of a referendum to address CBM development. This seemed to pressure the

state legislature, which created the 2004 Select Committee on Split Estate Legislation to

address issues such as landowners’ rights to negotiate with gas companies and standards

for reclaiming land after development. The legislature appointed three state representatives

and three state senators, and the governor appointed two agriculturalists (one a Powder

River member), two representatives from industry, and one member-at-large.

Like Powder River, the Network also sought to set the agenda in New Mexico to

address environmental injustices. In 2003, the EJ Working Group had analyzed the

political aspirations of the incoming Governor and his appointees and realized that the

secretary and deputy secretary of the environment department would likely favor EJ

policy.11 The EJ Working Group met with the secretary to ask him to create a forum to

address EJ. It promoted a participatory storyline, by which, according to the Network’s

9 Stacking this task force with legislators suggests an attempt to control the process rather than allow theEnvironmental Quality Council to decide on Powder River’s proposed regulations.10 On split estates, ownership over the surface land and subsurface minerals is split between two parties.Often the state or federal government owns subsurface minerals and private landowners own the surfaceland.11 The secretary had been deputy secretary under an EJ supporter and in an interview claimed to want tomake EJ a priority. The deputy secretary had worked at the Navajo EPA and Tribal Council, and accordingto the Network’s executive director, ‘‘was very aware of the environmental justice issues from a reservationstandpoint and… the people of color perspective.’’

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executive director, the EJ Working Group ‘‘expressed… [that] the environmental depart-

ment… had an open door policy to industry and to municipalities…, but that same thing

had not been happening with grassroots environmental justice groups.’’ Plus, the group told

of attempts to thwart public participation, for example, in a landfill permit hearing in which

the hearing officer refused to hear testimony about social impacts. It believed this example

reflected a state-wide pattern. Its policy storyline focused on unjust policy. According to

the executive director, the EJ Working Group ‘‘expressed… [that] the environmental

department hadn’t been living up to the mission… [to] protect all [people] within the State

of New Mexico’’ from environmental hazards.

These storylines provided a rationale for creating forums to address pending environ-

mental hazards. With the backing of the governor, who wanted to develop an environment-

friendly platform in his run for the US presidency, the secretary and deputy secretary

created the EJ Planning Committee to design state-wide EJ Listening Sessions and

appointed 13 members that included representatives from the Environmental Protection

Agency; the EJ Working Group; tribal communities; industry representatives; and city and

state governments (ATRI 2004). Later, the Network would urge the secretary to create the

EJ Policy Committee to analyze the testimony from the Listening Sessions and design EJ

policy, which included many of these same participants.

In these cases, the organizations contributed to environmental agenda setting. While

typically agenda setting focuses on setting the legislative agenda (Kingdon 2011), in these

cases, it related to creating deliberative forums (Hendriks 2011; Pralle 2006) to address

environmental hazards in agencies.

Constructing the form of public deliberation in forums

These organizations also shaped the form of the deliberative forums they helped to initiate,

contributing to changing the rules of the game. Both used opposing storylines (Lejano and

Leong 2012) that contrasted their own notions of participation with agency practices,

justifying more openness.

In Powder River’s case, forums were implemented in ways far removed from their own

democratic practices. For example, during the 2003 Water Permitting Task Force meetings,

agency and industry representatives and attorneys would deliver a dizzying array of

technical presentations (Surdam et al. 2003, 26). While there were discussions about the

‘‘essential problems’’ with permitting, and meeting participants interviewed constituents to

inform the discussion, public comment sessions were only tacked on to the end.

A similar pattern was observed in the 2004 split estate task force, chaired by a house

representative. A Powder River member and participant recalled the first meeting this way:

‘‘The first chairman of that committee dispensed with any Robert’s Rules [of

Order]…. He was against a split-estate law and he let industry representatives… talk

all morning long. Then in the afternoon he gave people three minutes to testify,

landowners. It was so obvious what he was doing…. I didn’t know what to do, we

were just steamrolled.’’

Unlike the Network, Powder River was not invited to participate in designing forums, and

therefore had to work hard to establish inclusive practices. One member described her

reaction to the 2004 task force:

‘‘So I did call [Powder River’s lead organizer] that night and I ended up writing

letters to [the co-chairs] and the other members of the committee who were

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legislators…about, ‘What’s going on here? Why don’t we have Robert’s Rules? Why

aren’t we discussing any of this? Why are you giving industry all the time they need

and not talking to anybody else?’ And the governor, I also wrote to him.’’

This member implicitly juxtaposed the task force’s approach with her own understanding

of a fair process (e.g., Robert’s Rules). As a result, the next meeting had a new chair who

was more inclusive, although ‘‘he still had a lot of ideas ahead of time of how this was

going to take place.’’

Even though she was able to influence the process, she argues that the imbalance

persisted and influenced the deliberation’s outcomes. The task force wrote a compromise

bill—which became law—that adds protections for landowners but was too weak from

Powder River’s perspective.12

The Network also shaped the rules of the game, albeit in different ways. Because it

participated in the EJ Planning Committee, it could promote its participatory storyline to

legitimize a bottom-up approach to the state-wide Listening Sessions. Using oppositions, it

influenced four features of the forum design: testimony, documentation, agenda, and

outreach (Dodge 2009). While each is key, I provide one illustrative example.

The EJ Working Group promoted a participatory storyline to urge the environment

department to create an outreach process that would ensure strong citizen representation. It

contrasted its view with the environment department’s typical approach. One affiliate noted

that government agents will ‘‘put up an announcement on the website and… think that

you’re going to [get] community participation out of that, right, or maybe [post] something

to the Journal or the Santa Fe New Mexican and that’s it.’’ Another observed that ‘‘it’s just

not a matter of sending out a notice and a couple of public service announcements. There

really had to be groundwork before each of these meetings… to make this kind of a

bottom-up endeavor.’’ Initially, the environment department designed what members of the

EJ Working Group considered a weak outreach strategy. Based on its arguments, however,

the department hired a consultant and local liaisons with organizing experience in each

region—identified by the EJ Working Group—to do outreach, mobilize participation, and

identify local priorities.

Key interlocutors selected the Network’s participatory storyline—despite alternatives—

and in 2004, the environment department and the EJ Planning Committee implemented EJ

Listening Sessions across the state. These forums were praised as highly successful efforts

to gather the perspectives of the EJ public to inform policy making.

These storylines opposed the images of a fair process with the agency’s usual practices,

justifying a bottom-up, open deliberative process. They enhanced deliberative quality by

bringing in the voices of affected citizens and broadening the range of possible topics

covered in deliberations.

12 Powder River wanted the loss of land value included in surface use agreements, which it got. Theywanted companies to post bonds of up to $100,000 to cover reclamation costs in the absence of a surface useagreement (to return land to its original condition), but they only got up to $2000. They wanted 180 daysnotice before development would begin but only got 30. They also wanted landowners to have equalnegotiating rights, e.g., to give or deny permission for companies to enter their land, but they did not.Companies are now required to submit a plan of development to inform landowners, although implemen-tation is uncertain.

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Constructing the content of public deliberation in forums

As these organizations shaped the rules of the game, they also shaped the content of public

deliberation. Powder River framed CBM as different from ‘‘conventional’’ oil and gas

development and advocated for landowner rights, while the Network framed specific

environmental problems as systematic racial injustices, arguing for equal protection.

Early in its campaign, Powder River appealed decisions made at the Bureau of Land

Management (BLM), which had leased several parcels on split estates for CBM devel-

opment. Engaging in accommodation processes, its members promoted a storyline to get

CBM recognized as an ‘‘experimental technology’’ with unknown and unique environ-

mental impacts that should be evaluated and regulated differently.

There were powerful competing storylines. Industry representatives from Pennaco

developed ‘‘the supplemental theory,’’ which posits that pre-leasing decisions (whether or

not to allow development) can be made based on conventional assumptions if ‘‘supple-

mented’’ with project level analysis (that specify conditions of development) that do

consider unique features of CBM. Requiring the former analysis, it argued, constituted an

undue burden for industry. While challenging the unconventionality of CBM, this storyline

simultaneously acknowledged its unique environmental impacts, responding in terms set

by Powder River.

Pennaco won its case, but Powder River and two allied organizations won on appeal,13

compelling BLM to do additional analysis. Afterward, however, BLM concluded that

CBM development was appropriate (BLM 2003), upholding conventional assumptions and

resisting environmental protection in practice.

Industry representatives and government agents (in interviews and newspapers) accused

Powder River of using a stall strategy called ‘‘paralysis by analysis.’’ The strategy may

have delayed CBM development rather than fundamentally changing it. But from a dis-

cursive perspective, it also forced more public dialogue. When I asked a BLM leader

whether Powder River had influenced his thinking, he replied, ‘‘Oh yes, they have. The

water discharge, the… downstream impact issue is something that they have been very

effective, in bringing forward examples.’’ He also acknowledged that ‘‘…we didn’t fully

understand CBM development and its extent in the basin at that time. They looked at it

more like they did traditional, or… ‘conventional,’ oil and gas development.’’ Now its

uniqueness is widely acknowledged.

Powder River also advanced a storyline about landowners’ rights. Reflecting a partial

selection of its policy storyline, a Powder River member who served on the 2003 Water

Permitting Task Force thought that the final report from these deliberations ‘‘put [forward]

some very good recommendations, including protection of [agricultural] lands and

downstream landowners.’’ However, the department’s subsequent changes focused on

improving permit reporting to the EPA through upgrading information technology rather

than permit enforcement and compliance (Bleizeffer 2003).

Exemplifying considerable competition over storylines in this case, Wyoming’s gov-

ernor, according to one Powder River member, was more compelled by the story of tax

revenues:

‘‘Because a lot of times they [government agents] hear the [coalbed methane]

company… at their bedside every night just telling this story… [that coalbed

13 Environmental groups thought these cases put into question the validity of BLM’s pre-leasing decisionsacross the Powder River Basin. Industry representatives argued that these cases only applied to the smallhandful of parcels that were allowed in the appeal, and did not apply to the basin as a whole.

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methane gas development is] going to fill up the coffer…. I mean when the rest of the

nation is struggling, we [in Wyoming] are in a pretty good position…. But, people

speak loud and clear how it’s going to bring you money: ‘Just take the money and be

happy and… pick up the pieces later on.’ But some pieces will never be the same.

That’s the way I feel.’’

From the landowners’ perspective, the storyline about tax revenues drowned out others,

reflecting a coercive form of discursive power and a tight coupling of the deliberative

system. So while Powder River enhanced deliberative quality by improving participation,

getting an important issue on the agenda, and even shaping the dialogue, it struggled to win

policy in practice.

While the Network had a considerably different experience, it also shaped the meaning

of environmental policy. Environmental justice was codified in solid waste regulations and

in a governor’s executive order—which created an interagency task force to implement EJ

across the state, among other accomplishments. The selection of EJ concepts in New

Mexico policy was an important change, yet many of the Network’s ideas were only

partially selected.

For example, in the EJ Planning Committee, which met to design EJ Listening Sessions,

the EJ Working Group promoted its policy storyline about racial justice. The environment

department adopted a definition to frame the sessions that had translated EJ into ‘‘neutral’’

language. It states that EJ is:

‘‘…the fair treatment and meaningful involvement of all people, regardless of race,

ethnicity, culture, income or education level with respect to the development,

implementation and enforcement of environmental laws, regulations, and policies. EJ

seeks to ensure that no population is forced to shoulder a disproportionate burden of

the negative human health and environmental impacts of pollution or other envi-

ronmental hazards’’ (ATRI 2004, 97).

This definition includes EJ concepts like disproportionate burden and meaningful

involvement, and implies inequalities related to race, ethnicity, class, culture, income, and

education, but neglects mention of racial discrimination as a structural cause of

inequalities. For EJ activists, however, discussing inequality is as important as discussing

remedies (Schlosberg 1999). Representatives from state and local governments in the EJ

Planning Committee also began interpreting EJ as ‘‘participation of’’ or ‘‘communication

with’’ affected communities, omitting racial discrimination and intentionality.

This neutralization would persist in the deliberative system for EJ in New Mexico. For

example, the EJ Policy Committee drafted an EJ executive order, which the governor

signed the in 2005 (State of New Mexico 2005). It refers to disproportionate exposure to

environmental and health hazards, requires state agencies to include EJ in all decisions that

impact environmental quality and public health; creates a task force to assist agencies in

this task; calls for meaningful participation; and creates an EJ Coordinator position at the

environment department. However, it avoids explicitly naming racism. This pattern

repeated in solid waste regulations. As one affiliate notes, ‘‘we got some excellent language

in there… I’ve spoken to different folks across the United States … [who] all feel that…it’s a major step.’’ However, she noted that ‘‘We’re not going to get race in come hell or

high water….’’

Industry representatives simultaneously promoted storylines against EJ. For example,

the Association for Commerce and Industry (ACI)—a lobbying group for industry in New

Mexico—prepared a statement on ‘‘regulatory justice’’ and met with legislative

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committees to secure support for it (ACI 2006), while the Network was proposing EJ

legislation. ACI claimed that regulatory justice is about ‘‘implementing a system in state

and local governmental regulatory agencies that ensures confidence, accountability and

consistency in the administrative decision-making process’’ (ACI 2007). Its proposals were

a weaker threat to the Network than industry was to Powder River. But, according to the

environment’s deputy secretary, they did influence the debates.

In response to these influences, the Network culled storylines from spheres outside its

own context to justify the development of EJ policy in New Mexico. For example, while

the EJ Policy Committee met, the Network discussed how recent solid waste case law

showed momentum toward EJ policy in the state. One legal decision reinforced that:

‘‘…testimony regarding the impact of the proliferation of landfills is relevant within

the context of environmental protection promised in the Solid Waste Act and its

regulations. Therefore, the Secretary [of the Environment] must evaluate whether the

impact of an additional landfill on a community’s quality of life creates a public

nuisance or hazard to public health, welfare or the environment’’ (Supreme Court of

New Mexico 2005).

The Network’s executive director argued that this case added ‘‘a lot of weight to the two or

3 years [of work] that the EJ Working Group had [done to get] the Executive Order.’’ In

another example, the Network referred to President Clinton’s federal Executive Order on

Environmental Justice to define meaningful participation in decision making of affected

communities, which often means participation of people regardless of race, color,

ethnicity, religion, income, or educational level. It also drew on the National Environ-

mental Policy Act14 to promote the idea of measuring cumulative impacts of an additional

facility in any community, reflecting the EJ concept of over-concentration of environ-

mental hazards.

The Network also crafted an EJ definition for New Mexico, drawing on testimony from

the Listening Sessions that retained cultural and historical rootedness, and connection to EJ

experiences. This statement asserted that EJ:

‘‘…aims to end disproportionate and negative environmental consequences, such as

increased health risks in poor and working class communities of color, hazardous

jobs, unsustainable depletion of natural resources, and the destruction of sacred

place. …seeks to make business, academia, industry and government accountable to

the people and that they recognize and remedy environmental injustices resulting

from irresponsible planning, development and inherently racist policies. …affords

equitable access of natural resources to sustain community, livelihood and culture, to

the extent it is sustainable—not detrimental to the environment—and is respectful of

Mother Earth. …means that communities have the right to meaningful participation

and fair treatment in making, carrying out, and enforcing environmental laws’’

(Espinosa and Gauna 2004, 17).

This definition sharply contrasts with the one codified in the executive order and solid

waste regulations (ATRI 2004, 97). The effort enhanced deliberative quality not by

responding directly to the sanitization of EJ language in policy, but by influencing its

conceptualization in broader public discourse beyond the immediate context.

14 NEPA, one of the first environmental laws in the US, requires federal agencies to assess environmentalimpacts of proposed federal projects and document them in Environmental Impact Statements. NEPAanalysis must include provisions for public input and assess EJ impacts.

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Coupling forums, arenas, and courts

These two organizations operated in very different deliberative systems. Above, I

described coupling as a systematic property of the deliberative system that links diverse

spheres logically and practically. Powder River operated in a deliberative system in which

state-sponsored forums had no logical continuity: participants changed and issues dropped

from one to the next (for example, in the 2003 and 2006 water task forces). This de-

coupling made it easy for environmental issues to fall through the cracks.

In contrast, the Network’s forums were tightly coupled, demonstrating conceptual and

practical continuity: the EJ Planning Committee designed and implemented EJ Listening

Sessions, and its members joined the EJ Policy Committee to analyze listening session

testimony and draft policy. The Network shaped this continuity. It encouraged the envi-

ronment secretary to create the policy committee to advise the department on EJ policy.

The executive director argued that people ‘‘need to make sure that their voice was… heard

in the listening sessions, [and that] their voices were added to whatever changes were

going to take place here.’’ This suggests that coupling can be motivated by participatory

storylines that provide a rationale for using citizen testimony in decision making. Coupling

across these forums created a context for EJ discourse to take hold in the deliberative

system.

Coupling can also mean ‘‘group think writ large’’ (Mansbridge et al. 2012). In this

sense, the two organizations’ experiences also differed. In Wyoming, the deliberative

system for CBM development was tightly coupled; economic arguments dominated

‘‘drowning out’’ alternatives, as one member put it. In response, Powder River actively

sought to promote its storyline in spheres outside the immediate context to gain leverage.

For example, it participated in a court case in Wyoming where three oil and gas companies

sued the Environmental Protection Agency for approving new water quality standards in

Montana. These standards would impact development in Wyoming because, when CBM

produced water flows into Montana, Wyoming operators have to maintain Montana’s

standards. Because Montana’s standards have been historically stronger than Wyoming’s,

Powder River’s intervention in this case served to strengthen its own arguments, not simply

by shaping policy in Montana, but by supporting precedent-setting regulations in another

location that justified its own storyline about landowner rights and natural resource use.

In another example, Powder River stepped outside the deliberative process to shame

public officials in the media for allowing certain discourses to dominate. When the 2006

water task force was revisiting permitting processes for CBM, it held a public meeting

attended by many Powder River members. One member later wrote an opinion editorial

reflecting on this meeting:

‘‘...we had hoped that this task force would be taking a good hard look at how the

state and the energy industry plan to improve their stewardship of a precious

Wyoming resource: Water.

The early signs made us worry.

Task force members spent most of their first morning on the job hearing about all the

money coalbed methane brings into the state. John Corra, Wyoming’s top environ-

mental regulator, went so far as to ask for even more information from the Revenue

Department.

…The committee is supposed to issue a report reviewing water management

options… [not] CBM’s contribution to the state treasury...’’ (Rogers 2006).

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He opened the article saying, ‘‘We all know money talks. But does it always have to drown

out every other conversation…?’’ This editorial provoked a debate in the media about

whether or not staff at the environment department was competent enough to regulate

CBM water discharges. This enhanced deliberative quality by highlighting problematic

agency practices.

The Network also actively promoted its storyline outside deliberative forums in New

Mexico to enhance deliberative quality of the system. First, while the environment

department did outreach for the listening sessions, the EJ Working Group drew on its

extensive networks to do its own independent outreach. It educated local community

members to ensure that their testimony went beyond describing individual problems to

discussing impacts and policy recommendations. As one EJ Working Group member put it,

this ‘‘was really critical for us because we wanted [testimony] to lead to policy.’’ From

their vantage point, they could see state-wide patterns. In consultation with other grassroots

organizations, they prepared talking points tailored to each region and the state and dis-

tributed them to constituents.

Supporting Fischer’s findings (2006), outreach enabled members of the public to make

sense of environmental issues on their own terms and in coordinated ways that would

translate into government contexts. This reflected a discursive form of ‘‘power with’’ because

participants were able to align their storylines about policy in preparation for formal forums

and to show unity, and the process linked (coupled) storylines in civil society to the state.

Finally, the Network generated critical ideas—namely its definition of EJ described

above—that could be fed back into broader public discourse outside formal forums, courts,

or arenas. This work was generative. As the EJ Working Group developed its definition, its

members were in contact with national networks that were watching closely what was

happening in New Mexico. Importantly, circulating this definition allowed it to inform

future political action in other places. These activities show that coupling storylines across

spheres of the deliberative system requires active effort.

In sum, civil society organizations played an important role shaping deliberative policy

making in these cases. Both promoted storylines to convince government agencies to create

and design deliberative forums to be more inclusive of citizens who had experienced

environmental hazards. Both also promoted storylines about policy to encourage govern-

ment agencies to address EJ and CBM, respectively. The Network convinced interlocutors

to adopt EJ language and won considerable policy gains. But its interlocutors began to

interpret EJ as ‘‘participation of’’ and ‘‘communication with’’ affected communities,

removing ‘‘racial discrimination.’’ Plus, the Network had to accept moderate versions of EJ

in policy. Powder River promoted storylines about the unique impacts of CBM develop-

ment and landowner rights. While it shifted the perspective of some interlocutors in

forums, and won significant court cases, its storylines were resisted in practice. It also won

legislative policy but many lamented it as too weak to be meaningful. Members attributed

this resistance to the narrative and economic power of the gas industry. While Powder

River shifted the debate, its members are largely left addressing CBM effects in individual

court cases against major corporations.

Despite these challenges, or maybe because of them, both organizations promoted

storylines in other venues. Powder River supported its counterparts in Montana, and dis-

seminated lessons from the Wyoming experience with other communities. The Network

wrote an EJ definition and promoted it throughout its US networks to inform future

political action. These activities reflect an active, dynamic engagement of actors in the

deliberative system and point toward important dimensions of civil society organizations in

these dynamics.

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Discussion and conclusion

By drawing on an interpretive perspective of deliberative policy making, this research

advances two areas of debate in deliberative democracy theory and practice.

First, it supports research that locates deliberative forums in their surrounding political

context. Two contextual conditions noted by Hendriks (2011) seem relevant to these cases:

the extent to which powerful interest advocates with insider status will actively resist or

support deliberative forums (84), and the level of broader discursive conflict (193). In a case

of recycling policy in Australia, Hendriks shows the relationship of these two contextual

factors to actual deliberative processes. She finds that the prospect of public deliberation was

‘‘an especially threatening proposition to those who… managed successfully without it. It

[had the potential to] expose weak arguments, the misuse of power and issue capture’’ (84). In

this context, powerful interests, went ‘‘to great lengths to undermine public deliberation’’

(84), resulting in ‘wasted’ deliberation’’ (85). Furthermore, there had been ‘‘a continuous tug

of war between competing groups’’ (76) that contributed to the difficulty participants had in

making a switch from contestation in the public sphere to deliberation.

These dynamics played out in the two cases presented in this paper. In Powder River,

the state government is widely acknowledged as captured by the gas industry (Duffy 2005),

which used its influence to interrupt public deliberation. Given the elevated discursive

context in which the public hotly contested the value of coalbed methane development,

deliberative forums also competed with other access points in the deliberative system and

were easily overruled. The water quality task forces could be described as ‘‘wasted

deliberation’’ because they did not result in changed policy even though problems with

water management were widely acknowledged. The split estate task force more success-

fully incorporated landowners concerns but in ways many landowners viewed as weak. So

while not ‘‘wasted’’ the deliberative forum did not reach its full potential as a mediator of

competing interests.

In the Network’s case, industry representatives exited the deliberative process. While

they also had other points of access in the deliberative system (mostly due to a history of

cooperation with government agencies), they did not have the power to override the

deliberative process initiated by the environment department. Plus, EJ fell under the radar

in broader public discourse (as evidenced by the lack of media coverage) and so did not

face the kind of public opposition that Powder River experienced. In other words, delib-

erative forums were shielded to a large extent from contentious public discourse. These

conditions isolated forums from potential challengers and enabled the adoption of EJ

policy.

While these two contextual factors—resistance to deliberative forums and conten-

tiousness of public discourse—are important, an analysis of storylines adds to our

understanding of how context matters: the discursive context—the presence of competing

storylines in the deliberative system—will shape how participants perceive the accept-

ability of storylines promoted by civil society actors (and others), influencing whether or

not they will be selected and acted upon. In other words, storylines may have a greater

chance of being viewed as legitimate if they fit within existing notions of participation or

policy (Hendriks 2005). This rings true to some extent in both cases. For example,

members of the Network who participated in deliberative forums fully acknowledged that

the environment department had an obligation to consider the perspectives and interests of

all affected parties in making decisions. However, both cases also suggest that civil society

organizations can influence notions of participation and policy, opening new possibilities.

They can thus shape the context in which they seek to affect policy.

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Both Powder River and the Network critiqued existing participatory storylines and pro-

moted alternatives (Dryzek 2000), helping to create the legitimacy of alternative modes of

deliberation and new ‘‘discursive horizons’’ on environmental hazards (Dryzek 2000). Doing

so required persistent work, dialogue, and sometimes contestation. The terms of debate

shifted slowly and were constantly redrawn through ongoing, persistent communication.

Second, my findings suggest that civil society organizations are not simply ‘‘problematic

participants’’ in deliberative democracy (Baber and Bartlett 2007), but can enhance delib-

erative quality, even when acting confrontationally, and even in extremely unequal contexts.

These findings support research that challenges the dichotomy between ‘‘micro’’ and

‘‘macro’’ theories of deliberation, and between strategic and communicative forms of action.

From the ‘‘micro’’ view, civil society actors are problematic because they act contrary to

procedural norms of deliberation (Gutman and Thompson 2004; Fung and Wright 2003),

instead using coercion to advance narrow interests (Hendriks 2011). From the ‘‘macro’’

view, civil society organizations make myriad contributions to free and open public dis-

course in the public sphere (Dryzek 2000; Habermas 1996), which may include articulating

local knowledge (Fischer 2006), forming public will, and challenging policy (Dodge 2010).

In practice, civil society actors in these cases operated in subtle and complicated ways

between both ‘‘micro’’ and ‘‘macro’’ deliberative politics. The mechanism was the promo-

tion of storylines that could affect face-to-face deliberation and broader discourse.

Strategic activities interacted with deliberation in many ways. On one hand, civil

society organizations sought the creation of deliberative forums to address public issues

and shaped the rules of the game to enable the participation of affected communities.

Sometimes this required visiting elected officials to make a case for creating forums and

working with them privately to create ground rules that gave historically marginalized

communities a chance. On the other hand, changing the rules of the game required the

threat of exit or protest at times, and shaping public discourse often involved, especially for

Powder River, harsh critique in the media. Hendriks defines this type of participation as

‘‘strategic deliberation,’’ which.

‘‘...recognizes that public deliberation is not just an activity limited to those seeking

mutual understanding. It… takes place somewhere between the extremes of strategic

and communicative action…. It is ‘strategic’ because participants engage to pursue

particular ends; but it is ‘deliberative’ to the extent that participants are exposed to a

process based on the ideals of communicative action’’ (212).

She rightly indicates that strategic and communicative forms of engagement are not

mutually exclusive. But I depart with her valorization of the ‘multiplier effect of

impartiality’ (citing Elster 1995), whereby activists learn to frame arguments in more

impartial terms. We should not strive for this ideal in a society characterized by inequality.

Should EJ activists who are morally outraged at the overconcentration of polluting

facilities in their neighborhoods—where children experience nosebleeds and respiratory

problems from chemical exposure—be impartial? While Hendriks claims strategic

deliberation is not a normative ideal, it could be understood as a call to neutralize moral

outrage, as activists are encouraged to ‘‘observe and experience what more communicative

deliberation looks like’’ (214).

Therefore, in these cases, deliberative advocacy is a more appropriate concept to

describe the contribution of these organizations. It conceptualizes participation in delib-

erative forums from the perspective of civil society organizations making claims about

injustices. They may show willingness to participate in deliberative democracy but not

under conditions of impartiality. Rather, they reserve the right to engage in confrontational

Policy Sci (2014) 47:161–185 181

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action if deliberative rules shut them out or if hegemonic ideas limit their potential to make

claims about environmental hazards (Fung 2003). This concept also captures activists’

efforts to simultaneously promote storylines within deliberative forums and in broad public

discourse to bring attention to injustices and seek redress. It does not suggest that anything

goes—on the contrary, confrontational actions have to be justified15—but it acknowledges

the functionality of conflict in deliberative settings (Norval 2008; Collins 1975).

I do not mean to argue that civil society actors solve all that ails deliberative democracy.

They may be exclusive (Schwadel 2002), intolerant (Torpe 2003), encourage apathy

(Eliasoph 1998), or promote hatred and bigotry (Chambers and Kopstein 2001). Further-

more, they may have limited capacity to support deliberation compared to governments

(Sirianni 2009). But some civil society actors can play an essential role shaping the

character of deliberative forums and enriching broader public dialogue. They often foster

the particular type of communicative action that deliberative democracy calls for (Sch-

losberg 1995) and that is essential to solving complex social problems (Sirianni 2009).

This article contributes to a growing body of work that examines civil society actors in

deliberative democracy by examining how they promote storylines through accommoda-

tion and coupling processes, and how others ‘‘select’’ them, taking them into account in

public deliberation. The practical implications center on recognizing the often overlooked

role civil society organizations play in enhancing deliberative quality: getting new hazards

on the agenda, shaping deliberative design to be more participatory, shaping discourse to

reveal new dimensions of problems, and coupling forums. It suggests that governments

could do well to develop skills needed to partner with civil society organizations that have

capacity to mobilize and prepare constituencies to inform deliberation and enhance

deliberative quality. These contributions may go beyond governments’ own capacities, for

example, to do effective outreach, and complement government’s obligation to ensure that

all interest groups are equally represented. If democracy is at risk (Macedo et al. 2005), this

is a promising avenue to pursue.

Acknowledgments I gratefully acknowledge the contribution of staff, affiliates, and colleagues of theSouthwest Network for Environmental and Economic Justice and the Powder River Basin Resource Councilfor their contribution to this research. They brought to interviews a deep knowledge of their respective socialchange efforts. This research was supported by the Research and Documentation component of Leadershipfor a Changing World (LCW), a program sponsored by the Ford Foundation; I recognize the contributions ofmy colleagues at the Research Center for Leadership in Action, and our co-researchers and partners in thisprogram who shaped my understanding of social change work. An earlier version of this article waspresented at the American Political Science Association conference, September 2013. My thanks to JohnDryzek, Stephen Elstub, Selen Ercan, Frank Fischer, and Ricardo Fabrino Mendonca for their comments andconversation.

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