citizenship in tunisia: cosmopolitan citizenship as an alternative

STATE, JUSTICE AND YOUTHDEVLET, ADALET VE GENÇLİK

2-4 May / Mayıs 2013Istanbul University Cenvention Centerİstanbul Üniversitesi Kongre Merkezi

INSTITUTE OF STRATEGIC THINKINGÇetin Emeç Bulvarı Aşağı Öveçler Mahallesi

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SDE Publications

2014

ISBN: 978-605-5386-15-3

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Prepared and Proof ReadM. Cahid Karakaya

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Contents

POLITICAL PARTIES ONLINE:BUILDING SOCIAL CAPITAL OR REPRODUCING POLARIZATION?Assist. Prof. Marwa Fikry Abdel SameiNesma Sharara .................................................................................................5

YOUTH AND SOCIALIZATION IN TURKEYProf. Sami Şener ............................................................................................ 25

IDENTITY DIFFERENTIATION: COMMUNICATING TURKEY’S NATION BRANDAssist. Prof. Bahar Senem Çevik .................................................................. 41

CITIZENSHIP IN TUNISIA: COSMOPOLITAN CITIZENSHIP AS AN ALTERNATIVEAssoc. Prof. Adem ÇaylakRes. Assist. Başak Akar Yüksel ...................................................................... 57

THE CRITERIA VALUES OF THE QUR’ANIC REFERENCES FOR ENJOYINGPUBLIC RIGHTSDr. Fikret Gedikli ............................................................................................ 77

A FINANCING TECHNIQUEIN SUPPORTING THE YOUNG ENTREPRENEURS: ANGEL INVESTORSErkan Perktaş ................................................................................................. 91

ALTERNATIVE TOURISM TYPES BETWEEN TURKEY ANDGCC COUNTRIES: TOWARDS A REGIONAL WIN-WIN STRATEGYAssist. Prof. Zafer Öter .................................................................................107

THE SECURITY POLICY UNDER MORSI’S RULERabha Seif Allam .........................................................................................123

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POLITICAL PARTIES ONLINE:BUILDING SOCIAL

CAPITAL OR REPRODUCING POLARIZATION?

Assist. Prof. Marwa Fikry Abdel SameiNesma Sharara

Political scientists have long considered the role of political parties as critical in the promotion of democratic culture and practice. As Huntington argued, political parties drive “the participation of new groups in politics.”1 In this way, political parties are considered as linking-institutions between the state and society through which political development and stability are achieved. At times of transition to democracy and state fragility, political parties help in rebuilding trust and reconnecting the relationships between citizens and the state by mediating the clash of interests. This last function is said to enhance social integration, participation and stability.2

Focusing on the Egyptian case after the January 25 revolution, we find that the number of political parties has mushroomed. What is interesting in this trend is that some of the most influential emergent political parties (ex. the Freedom and Justice, al-Nour, and al-Dostour parties) were, or are an extension of, social movements (the Muslim Brotherhood, the Salafi Call, and the supporters of

1 Huntington, Sameul P.1968. Political Order in Changing Societies. New Haven: Yale University Press, p. 401.

2 Scarrow, Howard A. 1967. “The Function of Political Parties: A Critique of the Literature and the Approach”. The Journal of Politics, vol. 29 (4), pp. 770-771.

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Dr. Mohamed El Baradei, respectively) and utilize the same tactics as social movements, particularly their use of social media.

This paper investigates the ways in which the new political parties use social media and their impact on the Egyptian state after the revolution and whether it remains fragile or makes the transition to a stable democracy. The main question is: Do political parties online work on producing social capital (in terms of trust/interactivity, engagement, awareness), or contributing to the polarity of the society? This paper offers an evaluation of the role played by political parties in the democratic transition in Egypt and the effectiveness of their employment of social media in accomplishing mobilization.

Given the Islamic-secular division that is increasingly plaguing Egypt’s transition, the paper is going to focus on the Facebook pages of both the Freedom and Justice party (FJP) and that of al-Dostour (Constitution) party. The first is representative of the Islamic side that won the majority of votes in the first parliamentary elections after the revolution and whose leader, Dr. Mohamed Morsi, was elected President of Egypt in June 2012. Many scholars also argue that the party in power bears a greater responsibility in forging dialogue, enhancing trust, and fostering a national identity that transcends divisions. As for al-Dostour party, it is the institutional manifestation of Dr. Mohamed El Baradei’s political views. El Baradei, the former Head of the International Atomic Energy Agency, played a significant role in inspiring many Egyptian youth that took part in the revolution. He was adept in communicating with his followers through social networks. The question is how far his party has gotten in communicating with other political and social groups?

Role of Political Parties at Times of Transition

Toppling an authoritarian regime does not automatically result in a democratic one. The successful transition depends on number of factors on top of which is the way people, political actors, and institutions interact in establishing the new system. Political parties play a pivotal role in this regard. They mediate, aggregate and articulate interests and opinions and, supposedly, provide policy alternative to governing3. They affect the dominant political culture and provide the basis on which different actors and segments of the society deal with each other. Political parties play a critical role in fostering a political culture that promotes discourse, dialogue and debate, on one hand. On the

3 Greg Power, Rebecca A. Shoot. “The Pivotal Role of Political Parties in Transition: An Introduction”. In: Greg Power, Rebecca A. Shoot (eds.) Political Parties in Democratic Transitions: a DIPD Reader. Denmark: Danish Institute for Parties and Democracy (DIPD), p. 10.

POLITICAL PARTIES ONLINE:BUILDING SOCIAL CAPITAL OR REPRODUCING POLARIZATION?Assist. Prof. Marwa Fikry Abdel Samei, Nesma Sharara

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other hand, they help in establishing political structures that are deemed to be legitimate, fair and provide an opportunity for all sectors of political opinion to be aired.4

Effective political parties, most importantly, promote citizens’ confidence and rebuild the relationship among people and political actors (social capital), and between people and power.5 These functions are particularly important at times of transition where expectations tend to be high and the ability of political institutions to fulfill these expectations is usually low.6 Political parties, in this way, not only contribute to establishing democracy but also determining the quality and durability of the new political system and the democratic culture that surrounds it. For political parties to fulfill these roles, they need to be: responsive to citizens, rooted in communities, capable of translating people’s demands into policies, able to lead and shape public opinion, and realistic by focusing on what is achievable.7 In countries where political power was never transferred via the ballot box, new political leaders and citizens alike must come to understand that political opponents are not mortal enemies, and that compromise and power sharing are not signs of weakness but are essential ingredients of the democratic process8.

Accordingly, the role of political parties goes beyond campaigning, contesting and winning elections. They should provide vehicles that can help the public to understand, navigate, and shape the process of transition. They should offer citizens the opportunity of involvement and influence and channels of producing elites and future leaders9.

Social media: How Political Parties Are Performing Online?

Social media have played an indisputable role prior to and after the Egyptian revolution. Internet-based social network activists successfully used their tools to interact, spread awareness, and mobilize. Egyptian activists have, thus,

4 Ibid., p.13.5 Greg Power. Conclusion on Parties in Transitional States: Changing the Relation between People

and Power in the Arab World”. In: Greg Power, Rebecca A. Shoot (eds.) Political Parties in Democratic Transitions: a DIPD Reader. Denmark: Danish Institute for Parties and Democracy (DIPD), p. 13.

6 Huntignton, op. cit.,, p. 4.7 Greg Power, op. cit., p.84 8 Political Parties and the Transition to Democracy: A Primer in Democratic Party-Building for Leaders,

Organizers and Activists. National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI), p.49 Ibid., pp. 2-4.

STATE, JUSTICE AND YOUTH

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created a digital public sphere characterized - before and during the revolution - by relationships, trust, and a set of norms, i.e. social capital.10

However, soon after the euphoria of al-Tahrir, when the majority of Egyptians were demonstrating a high degree of unity, a social split appeared. Accusations of betraying the blood of the martyrs and apostasy etc… began to be widely circulated. This tendency started with the 2011 March referendum11 and over time, the division and polarization of Egyptian society seemed to be irreconcilable.

The majority of Egyptian political parties evolved out of social or protest movements either developed before, during, or after the January 25 Revolution. The Freedom and Justice Party (FJP), for instance, emanates as the political arm of the famous social movement of the Muslim Brotherhood. Al-Dostour Party, on its part, is comprised by many of the passionate tech-savvy activists that were inspired by Dr. Mohammed al-Baradie and have participated in the revolution from the beginning. Both parties have their Facebook pages, websites and twitter accounts (in the case of the FJP). This keenness to be online reflects the importance of social media as conceptualized by political parties and actors in Egypt after the revolution. Using these forums (in organization, communication, fundraising and training), can effectively help political parties in fulfilling their expected roles.12

It is highly likely that transition from authoritarianism to democracy to witness a high degree of tensions between social and political forces that were previously suppressed. Authoritarian regimes marginalize any opposition and usually portray them as enemies of the state. Such strategy distorts and limits political discourse in a way that leaves significant imprints on the dominant political culture. Consequently, at time of transition, political actors usually lack

10 Amr Osman, Marwa Abdel Samei. 2012. “The Media and the Making of the 2011 Egyptian Revolution”. Global Media Journal (German Edition), vol. 2 (1). Available at: http://www.db-thueringen.de/servlets/DerivateServlet/Derivate-25453/GMJ3_Samei_final.pdf. (Retrieved: 10/9/2012).

11 After the revolution, the Supreme Council of Armed Forces (SCAF) suspended the 1971 constitution and appointed a committee of jurists to introduce some constitutional amendments to prepare the way to parliamentary and presidential elections. The pro-amendments camp saw this course to be the most suitable at that time and the quickest way to transfer power from the military to civilians. The anti-amendments camp called for the necessity to have a new constitution written before establishing the new institutions. For more details: Nathan Brown, Michele Dunne. “Egypt’s Draft Constitutional Amendments Answer Some Questions and Raise Others.” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Available at: http://egyptelections.carnegieendowment.org/2011/03/03/egypt%e2%80%99s-draft-constitutional-amendments-answer-some-questions-and-raise-others. (Retrieved: 20/12/2012).

12 Greg Power, Rebecca A. Shoot., op. cit., p.4


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the norms that guide them in engaging with one another. Therefore, it is very common to find the relations between political contenders characterized by suspicion, antagonism and occasionally violence.13

It is important, therefore, to evaluate what political parties are doing online, and how they are using the Internet- based social networks. Internet has become a source of information to many people and, at the same time, a significant tool for political parties in communicating with their constituencies14. Given the historical background against which the two parties under study have been established, it is important to link social movement theory to that of social media to investigate the common usage of new media by social movement, also to see how different parties interact with one another in the emerging political sphere and the effectiveness of their use of these tools.

Theoretical Framework and Methodology

Social media are increasingly changing the way politics and government operate. Generally, the use of social media in politics revolves around three basic aspects. First, they serve as a communication tool to spread and share information with the people. Second, social media work as a facilitator of engagement. Third, there is an increasing employment of social media as an election campaign tool (mobilizing tool).15

These aforementioned aspects are also directly related to social capital. According to Putnam, it is particularly the norms of trust, engagement and reciprocity that define social capital16 which, in turn, facilitate coordinated actions and improve the efficiency of society.17 Drawing on this characterization, four elements can be identified as key elements of social capital. First is the trustworthiness of the social environment (trust/interactivity). Second the availability of effective channels of information exchange (awareness). The third element is the quality/direction of communication (engagement). The

13 Ibid., p.13.14 Mathew Conway, Dan Dorner. 2004. “An Evaluation of New Zealand Political Parties Websites”.

Information Research, vol. 9 (4). Available at: http://informationr.net/ir/9-4/paper196.html. (Retrieved: 10/1/2013).

15 Catherine McGoveran. 2012. “Evaluating the Uses and Realizing the Benefits of Social Media Use in Politics”. Dalhousie Journal of Interdisciplinary Management, vol. 8. Available at: http://ojs.library.dal.ca/djim/article/view/2012vol8McGoveran/3136. (Retrieved: 13/2/2013).

16 Putnam defines social capital as “features of social organization, such as trust, norms, and networks, that can improve the efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated actions.” See: Robert Putnam, Robert Leonardi, Rafaella Nanetti. 1993. Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy. Princeton: Princeton University Press, p.167.

17 Ibid, p. 167-168.


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Final element is the capacity of information to flow across groups to provide a basis for action (mobilization).18

For the purpose of this study, which evaluates how political parties’ use of social media affects social capital, four categories will be investigated: awareness, interactivity (trust), engagement, and mobilization. Interactivity is very much related to the values of trust and community and solidarity building, one of the pillars of social capital. In this study, interactivity refers to the way each party conceptualizes its adversaries in terms of the image portrayed (i.e. negative or positive) and the characteristics used in describing them (i.e. dealing with them as political competitors or enemies to the state or to the revolution…etc). For the purpose of this study, we will also add the image of the media or those working in the media which supposedly play a critical role in democracies. Awareness refers to the distribution of information: the amount of information that the party’s Facebook page makes available to its followers. By publishing as much information as possible, organisations increase the chance that people read them and may become a more engaged public. Information is grouped in certain categories: news and activities, interviews, declarations, comments, and refuting rumours. These categories of information are, on its part, classified according to the institution or actors of interest: party, a certain political group, the Parliament, the Presidency, the Government, the economy, the General Persecutor, and other. As for engagement, there are four models in mediated communication: the monologue (one-way, sender controlled – information distribution), the feedback (the receiver is able to reply), the responsive dialogue (awareness of previous messages) and the mutual discourse (receiver and sender role become interchangeable)19. Based on these classification and the conception of engagement in social capital and social media literatures, our study codes engagement in the following way: recruitments, call for ideas and actions (for/from the party, and for the government), questions asked, documents provided (for example, the draft laws), articles and comments from other public figures. Finally is the indicator of mobilization which is a prerequisite for organizing actions and winning

18 William Maloney, Graham Smith, Gerry Stoker . 2000. “Social Capital and Urban Governance: Adding a More Contextualised Top-down Perspective”. Political Studies, vol. 48, pp. 802-820, James Coleman. 1988. “Social Capital in the Creation of Human Capital”. American Journal of Sociology , vol. 94, pp. S95-S120.

19 Gloria Fanenbruck. 2010. “The Role of New Media in Protest Organization: A Case Study of the “Wave” Climate Change Protest in London. “Unpublished Master Thesis”. Erasmus University Rotterdam, pp. 38- 45.


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support during elections. The raising of emotions,20 such as dissent (blame) and the creation of a feeling of solidarity21 facilitate the process of mobilisation and are, thus, important assets in the process. Blame and solidarity are thus turned into codes for Facebook. Since mobilization is about getting people to participate in whatever action/ event the party or the movement is calling for, direct call for action is included in the mobilization module as well as any visual medium used in this regard. Direct communication/ call for action/ solidarity/ blame/ any videos related, all make the module for mobilization. Here we focus on the campaign launched by the FJP slightly before the anniversary of the 25th of January revolution: “Together We Build Egypt”. As for al-Dostour party we focus on its call for demonstrations to accomplish the goals of the revolution at the same time frame.

We analysed the two Facebook pages on the period starting from January 18 (one week before the revolution anniversary) until February 2 (a week after and the anniversary of the The Battle of the Camel).22 It should be mentioned here that the official Facebook page of a-Dostour party was only launched on January 21st (this is the page that the party’s website refers to). Therefore, there is three days difference to those from the FJP.

FJP and al-Dostour on Facebook:

• FJP Facebook Page

The Facebook page of the Freedom and Justice Party is very well established. It is frequently updated in a manner that reflects some characteristics of news portals. The page displays the main information about the party in terms of the administrative headquarter, telephone numbers, e-mails and a hot line in a way that facilitates communication and correspondence with the party. It also provides links to the party’s website, its twitter account, and the newspaper website. However, information about the vision, program is not directly available on the FB page.

20 James M. Jasper.1998. “The Emotion of Protest: Affective and Reactive Emotions in and around Social Movement”. Sociological Forum, vol.13 (3), pp. 397-424. Available at: http://www.jamesmjasper.org/files/Emotions_of_Protest.pdf. Retrieved (24/2/2013).

21 Natalie Fenton. 2008. “Mediating Solidarity”. Global Media and Communication, vol. 4(1), pp. 37-57. Available at: http://eprints.gold.ac.uk/5974/2/solidarity.pdf. Retrieved (20/2/2013).

22 The Battle of the Camel took place on February 2nd 2011 where Mubarak’s loyalists on horses and camels attacked protestors encamping in Tahrir Square. It was the bloodiest day of the January 25 Revolution with 11 deaths and over 600 protestors injured. See: Yasmine Fathi. 2012. “Egypt’s ‘Battle of the Camel’: The Day the Tide Turned”. Ahramonline. Available at: http://english.ahram.org.eg/News/33470.aspx. (Retrieved: 10/2/2012).


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Following the page from January 18- February 2nd, we can pinpoint some observations.

With regard to awareness, it comes as the first interest of the page. The following diagram sheds light on the different weight assigned to each part in this category.

As the diagram shows, apart from the “other” category that includes reference to societal news, accidents, and external news, the big bulk of the awareness category goes to the news and activities of the government. There is a noticeable focus on the news and the activities of the Muslim Brotherhood- affiliated ministries. Special interest on the activities of the Minister of Supply- Bassim Uda- is detected. News and activities of the party rank second in this category, while those related to the economy rank at the very end.

The page was keen on reporting the declarations, interviews and comments of the party members, those of the Muslim Brotherhood, the presidential team, general persecutor and members of the Parliament in order to make sure that their opinions are communicated probably. This becomes the more evident when we see that a part of the awareness category deals with refuting rumours particularly those related to the government and the party.

As for interactivity, it occupies the second place in the page’s attention. The following diagram summarizes this category.


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As we can see, political opponents and opposition leaders are overwhelmingly presented in a negative way. Demonstrators were generally portrayed as thugs and gangs or rioters and anarchists. For example, when the offices of the FJP and the Muslim Brotherhood were attacked, the page reported that “the thugs of the Popular Trend (al-Tayyar al-Sha‘bi), the followers of the losing presidential candidate Hamdeen Sabahi attacked the headquarter of the FJP,”23 and that “the thugs of the Popular Trend surround the headquarters of the Muslim Brotherhood.”24 We can also notice that the video of the demonstrator that was stripped naked by the security forces was not uploaded on the FJP Facebook page. When clashes between the demonstrators and the police occurred, the party’s page was much more interested in reporting the number of police forces that had died or injured. There was also a verbal and visual stress on how the demonstrators were throwing fire bomb at the security forces.

Political opposition leaders, in particular those of the National Salvation Front, are portrayed as destructive, opportunists and violence triggers. There was a stress on showing the opposition as a bunch of hypocrites whose main intent is to overthrow an “elected” president. This latter idea was particularly emphasized, along with highlighting the invitation by some public figures, of the supposedly “civil” opposition, to the Army to interfere in the political life.

23 Freedom and Justice Party Facebook Page, https://www.facebook.com/#!/FJParty.Official?fref=ts ( 25/01/2013).

24 Ibid.,


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The message that the page wanted to send was clear: the opposition was contradictory and hypocrite. Media, on its part, were predominantly portrayed as biased, and to a lesser extent as remnants of the old regime. It was portrayed as a part of the opposition bloc not as an independent entity

The self-versus the other is portrayed in the good versus the bad dichotomy: one builds, while the other destroys. Lack of self-criticism is obvious especially when it comes to commenting on protestors. The possibility that some of the demonstrators may be sincere youth that got disappointed of the slow, or lack of, accomplishing of the goals of the revolution is not entertained at all even with disagreeing with the means they use. The message that was highly stressed is that the Muslim Brotherhood and FJP are “able to achieve the renaissance of Egypt”25, and that “Loving the country is by work (which they do) not by words26 (which the opposition does)”. The day of January 25 was branded as “a day for building”27, and we (The Muslim Brotherhood) “will keep working for the sake of the country”.28

We can also notice here that the closer the anniversary of the 25 January Revolution, the more the page was stressing the message that the revolution has ended (complete) and that accomplishing its goals is gradually underway. Two major accomplishments were stressed: ending the military rule and writing the constitution. This portrayal of the revolution was probably aiming at demobilizing the masses from responding to the calls for demonstrations raised by the opposition and activists to challenge the regime. However, attempts to use religious sentiments were not widely noticed except of one incident where attack on a mosque in Damietta and burning the Quran was reported.

It is interesting here to notice how the differently Ultras was portrayed before and after the verdict on the Port Said massacre. Before the verdict, Ultras were indirectly portrayed as rioters. This was shown in describing their gathering in front of the Stock Market as “siege”29 (hisar), an Arabic world that gives the impression of obstructing work and blocking in or out access to the place. After the verdict, news on the Ultras took a more neutral tone and their gathering was seen as “peaceful celebrations” that refuses to chant “Down to the regime”30.

25 Ibid., 22/1/2013 26 Ibid., 23/1/2013.27 Ibid., 23/1/2013. 28 Ibid., 23/1/2013. 29 Ibid., 23/1/2013.30 Ibid., 26/1/2013.


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The FJP Facebook page shows the least interest to engagement. The relative weights of each component of engagement are shown in the following diagram.

The FJP page posts lots of links to articles and comments by famous journalists, writers, academics or public figures. However, all of these links are for opinions that highly present the same view of the party and mainly criticize the opposition. Engagement is also achieved by posting documents as that of draft laws as a means to encourage debate and discussion among the different view-holders. One of the important things that the page employed with regard to engagement is asking questions and receiving answers from the page followers. It also approached its followers for new ideas either for improving the performance of the page and the party or for solutions or suggestions to the government with regard to a particular problem. As for the aspect of recruitment, it was lightly dealt with by the page as it did not exceed 1.59% of the page’s interest. This was reflected in posting the membership application and covering the events of the political education camps for the new members.

Al-Dostour

The first impression that one gets by visually comparing the FJP and al-Dostour Facebook pages is that the former is much more established than the latter. Al-Dostour page does not reflect the same capabilities expressed by the performance of the FJP page despite the supposedly large number of savvy-tech youth among party members. This is surprising given the fact that the


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party’s founder, Mohammed el-Bradei was able to communicate well with his youth followers via social networks before and after the revolution. Not only does al-Dostour page communicate less but also it is not frequently updated. For example, during the period under study, there were days where the page showed no activity. For example, on January 25 and 29 and the period from 1st – 4th of February, the page did not add any posting, comments, or links.

The Facebook page also does not provide information about the location, telephone numbers, e-mails or any other ways of communicating with the party. The only way to figure out this information is to go to the party’s webpage. Unlike the FJP page, al-Dostour Facebook page was interested in publishing the party’s mission and the description of its main vision.

Looking at the aspects of Awareness, Interactivity and Engagement of the al-Dostour party, we find the following. With regard to awareness, like FJP, al-Dostour Facebook page pays the most attention to the aspect of awareness. The biggest share goes to awareness about the party, followed by that related to the National Salvation Front. Declarations either from the party or the front rank second in the awareness scale. This gives an impression of a one-way communication especially when we find that the majority of the news about the party relates to the activities and declarations of party members especially those of the head of the party: Mohammad el-Bradei. It is also intriguing how news and declarations from the Presidency were ignored while those of al-Baradei were treated as if the whole nation was waiting for it. For example, the page used to announce that el-Baradei was going to talk to the people tomorrow, or in other cases after a while, which resembled the way the official page of the Presidency used to do when the President was going to talk to the people.

It is noticeable here that the very few examples where the general persecutor was mentioned in, he was branded as the “Ikhwan’s persecutor” in a way that questioned the integrity of the investigations that were conducted especially those related to the demonstrators (the revolutionaries or the masses as used by the page).

Al-Dostour page did not show any interest in the news, activities, or declarations of the state’s institutions (the government, the presidency or the parliament) in a way that gives the impression that this was intentionally done. The page seems to be stressing the message that the current regime has lost legitimacy and the true legitimacy was with the street (the demonstrators) that the party, and its allies in the National Salvation Front, claim to represent.


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With regard to interactivity, al-Dostour Facebook page predominantly portrays the regime and those behind it (the group of the Muslim Brotherhood) in a negative way. The page was stressing the message that the current regime was even worse than Mubarak’s. Describing the regime as fascist and tyrannical was frequently used. The regime was also described as collaborate with external parties in a way that suggests an unpatriotic attitude. Here, the idea of conspiracy with Qatar is explicitly expressed without giving tangible evidence on it.

There is a tendency to describe the people as the leaders whom the opposition follows. This characterization of the relationship between the people and the party differs from the traditional role of political parties in providing leadership. This also seems inconsistent with the mostly one-way communicative style of the page.


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With regard to the demonstrators, there was a stress that those that fall in the violent clashes were victims and martyrs. There was absolutely no attempt to distinguish between peaceful protestors and molotov cocktail throwers. Similar to the FJP page, al-Dostour Facebook page reflected no sign of self-criticism and there was no condemnation to the violence used on the part of some protestors. The President and the Minister of interiors, according to the page, carried the whole responsibility; an idea that the page seemed persistent in stressing.

When it comes to Engagement, calling for demonstrations occupied 60% of the total content of Facebook page. Posting documents and articles comes next in this category (20%), while posting questions or news related to the quest for recruitment are completely absent.

Although it is not unobserved in the party’s Facebook page that the preoccupying issue of the party founders is the constitution, the party’s page did not provide followers with different sources of information on why the constitution was important or what were the flaws in the constitution as seen by the party (except for one posting that explained the reasons to reject the constitution)31. It did not present, however, a clear and specified alternative vision of how the party read the constitution and what were the alternatives for the defective articles. The dominant idea that the page kept stressing was the necessity of annulling the constitution.

31 Al-Dostour Facebook Page. https://www.facebook.com/AldostourP. 24/1/2013.


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Effectiveness in Using Social Media

Here, we are going to focus on an important role of both parties and social media: mobilization. While the role of social media in mobilizing protests in Egypt before, during, and after the revolution is unquestionable, the effectiveness with which the emergent parties use this media in mobilizing for their agenda is understudied.

We have developed a module for mobilization to evaluate the effectiveness of the Facebook pages of both parties in getting the most of their social media tools. During the period under study, there was one major mobilizing event each page was interested in. These two events paralleled the second anniversary of the January 25 revolution. The FJP and the Muslim Brotherhood launched a campaign under the title “together we build Egypt.” It was clear that FJP was trying to give a celebrating appearance to the revolution anniversary. On its part, al-Dostour party was campaigning for demonstrating that day. It called for Egyptians to continue their revolution until its goals were categorically met.

To win people’s support, solidarity is crucial. It requires that people identify themselves with those that called for a certain action32. This can happen either by relating to a cause, an action, an issue or a group. Social movement theory also tells us how finding somebody to blame is important in generating dissent/ or mobilizing feelings that leads to action. The way by which one incites people to participate in a certain action also makes a difference. One of these ways is the language used. Using the imperative form, for instance, has a stronger effect than informing or reporting. Any supplementary materials like, for example, videos and posters, also have a mobilizing effect.33

Based on this, the module of evaluating effective mobilization we use consists of the following elements: solidarity, blame, calls for participation, and videos related to the campaign. By applying this module to the two campaigns, the findings are summarized in the following diagram:

32 Glora Fanenbruck, op.cit., p.41.33 Ibid., pp:26-28.


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Comparing the campaigns of the two parties reveals how FJP depended on the aspect of solidarity while al-Dostour focused on blaming (the president, the regime, the Muslim Brotherhood). FJP solidarity strategy was designed to get people’s support via a series of events and activities related to the main cause (the campaign of Together we Build Egypt “Ma‘an Nabni Masr”). For example, the MB group and the FJP organized joint as well as separate events. The former organized the campaign of “Mother Egypt… Here are your sons” [Masr ya Um, Wiladik Ahum] and jointly they organized “The Million March for Good” [Milyuniyat al-Kheir] that extended from 24-28th of January. All these activities were part of the bigger campaign which is “Together we Build Egypt” where everyone was invited to participate.

On its part, al-Dostour solidarity strategy was threefold. One is trying to bring people together under the call for accomplishing the goals of the revolution. Second is winning people’s support by stressing the cause for which martyrs sacrificed their lives and how “their souls would not be lost in vain”. Third is portraying the party- and its allies in the National Salvation Front (NSF)- as the parties that were showing solidarity with the people and not the vice versa. This last strategy was focusing portraying the demonstrators as “the Egyptian people”, the main actors, while the party and the NSF were only supporters.

As for blame, al-Dostour relied a lot on this aspect in its mobilizing strategy. Calling for demonstrating on the revolution anniversary were driven by “the accumulated mistakes of the Brotherhood regime, its inability and incompetence that led to the deteriorating economy and doubling the suffering


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of millions of our people…”34 It was also the “tyranny of the current fascist regime” that required demonstrating to “stressing the vitality and continuity of the revolution, blocking the Ikhwanization of the state, establishing the principle of citizenship…”.35 Regarding calling for demonstrations on January 31st (The Friday of Deliverance, Jom‘at al-Khalas), al-Dostour blamed the responsibility on the President, the Minister of Interior, and the FJP for the “deaths of martyrs,” and the “escalation of bloody violence.”36

Using blame in the FJP’s mobilizing strategy was more subtle. The party was stressing the message of “building” versus “destroying and sabotaging”. The page was highlighting the clashes between the demonstrators and police forces and the ruins and destruction resulted from them. At the same time, it was showing the efforts exerted by the FJP members to clean the street, implant trees and maintain schools. FJP was, thus, indirectly trying to win people’s support by blaming the other side for its unproductive actions.

We can notice how the FJP resorted more to supplementary materials particularly videos. The videos were stressing that celebrating the revolution was by a “developmental battle away from political tensions”37. Moreover, the invitation posters clearly mentioned the goals of their campaign (planting trees, cleaning street, taking care of the impoverished and those that are in need, free medical checks, and discounts at the pharmacies). Al-Dostour, however, only used this tool once and this was a poster in which the tweet of El-Baradei was written when he called for Egyptians to complete their revolution. The two parties also did not make the most of the call for participation. Each page directly asked its followers to participate in its campaign only once.

Conclusion:

Comparing the two Facebook pages of the FJP and al-Dostour political parties shows how there are varying degrees to which the parties as organizational structures are involved in and reaching out through social media applications. The FJP reflects the characteristics of both a party and a social movement. This is not surprising giving the organic relations between the party and the MB and the activities that they jointly organize. The party Facebook page was, to a large extent, fulfilling many of the roles of an influential party: awareness, interest articulation, mobilization, leadership, engagement and recruitment.

34 Al-Dostour Facebook Page, op. cit., 21/1/2013.35 Ibid.,36 Al-Dostour Facebook Page, op.cit., (28/1/2013).37 FJP Facebook page, op. cit., (20/1/2013).


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Although the FJP tries to communicate and engage with the people online, its awareness strategy tends to be indoctrinating rather than educating.

On its part, al- Dostour, the liberal party, not only did it not open a dialogue with the people, but it also was communicating less with them. The party Facebook page never asked for the people’s opinions on an issue or event. Al-Dostour, in this way, was missing important tools of social networks which could enhance the party’s communication with the public and avoid the distortion of its message. In fact, al-Dostour Facebook page resembles that of a social movement with its issue-oriented tendency. It does not reflect the characteristics or the roles of a political party. It is true that political parties used to function well before the introduction of the Internet and social networking, but these developments in the communication sphere have provided parties with new avenues to interact and communicate with its members or attracting new followers. Al-Dostour does not seem to be making the most of these new opportunities especially that it claims to represent a wide array of the youth of the revolution. Having a social media presence is something, while having an active social media presence is something else.38

For example, the dearth of information on party’s activities and news or explanation may affect its ability to have roots at the local level. As Thomas O’Neil argued:

the strength and stability of a national political party and the success of its candidates for elective office at every level are closely related to the number of active, enthusiastic party members and supporters at the local level. The local base of a political party, just like the roots of a tree, must be strong if the party is to grow and succeed. Party leaders may understand the importance of local party building, but in practice they do not all act accordingly, or contribute fully to the democratic process. The result is often a party that is uncompetitive and not able to assume control of government. To be effective as the local face and voice of the party, local organizers need dependable, regular sources of information from the party leadership.39

The founders and members of al-Dostour, in this way, seem to be moving from “connectedness to mobilization”,40 but not yet to effective organization. This

38 Catherine McGoveran, op.cit.,39 Quoted from: NDI, op. cit., p.440 Armando Salvatore. 2011. “Armando Salvatore On Egypt, Facebook and the Public Sphere”. Theory

Culture and Soceity. Available at: http://theoryculturesociety.blogspot.com/2011/03/armando-salvatore-on-egypt-facebook-and.html. (Retrieved: 25/12/2012).


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constitutes the main challenge for al-Dostour: how to make the transition from a protest or campaigning body into one that can respond to and deliver on the expectations of voters.41 Upon review of each of the two parties Facebook accounts, it also became clear that neither works on building confidence and social capital. Both pages, with different degrees, draw a negative image of their contender. This was even more obvious in al-Dostour’s page where demonizing the other was highly reiterated. Since the way in which parties engage determine the tone of political culture, we can justifiably say that the two parties online contribute to lack of confidence and, hence, reproduce the polarization climate in Egypt. As Marc Lynch noticed:

Internet has contributed to the dangerous polarization that now besets so much of the Arab region. The ideological differences, institutional uncertainty, seem to be reinforced by the tendency toward polarization and informational bubbles so commonly observed in online environments.42

Political parties in Egypt should be willing to actively engage with wide-ranging audiences whether supporters or contenders. Communication should not be limited to broadcasting information, but also responding to questions and asking for feedback where possible. After the revolution, political parties’ use of social media was not promoting a public sphere that accepts and respects different opinions; one that is based on dialogue and mutual respect. Instead, as Marc Lynch argued, “Islamists and their adversaries retreat to their respective camps, reinforcing each other’s prejudices.”43

41 Greg Power, Rebecca A. Shoot, op. cit., p.15.42 March Lynch. 2013. “Twitter Devolutions: How Social Media is Hurting the Arab Spring”. Foreign

Policy. Available at: http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/02/07/twitter_devolutions_arab_spring_social_media. (Retrieved: 20/2/2013).

43 Marc Lynch, op. cit.,


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YOUTH AND SOCIALIZATION

IN TURKEY

Prof. Sami ŞenerSakarya University Sociology Department

1. Dynamics of Socialization process

1.1. Youth’s need for socialization

Youth is the period after childhood when serious socialization starts. Therefore, such an important transition and formation process must not be spent haphazardly or idly and must be accompanied by personal and social values and experiences. Such a role is generally undertaken and administered by families. However, this great task to respond to multilateral expectations and needs necessitates the emergence of institutional and administrative dimension of the matter indispensable.

Social life is a complicated and multidimensional process that brings out multifaceted responsibilities and duties. Bringing this life cycle under control to a certain extent is possible with effectiveness of knowledge and culture about man and society. As regular and productive life necessitates multifaceted information, it should be acknowledged that religious, philosophical and moral answers that man will give to life as part of his philosophy of life are of utmost importance and necessary in terms of dynamism of life.

Socialization is the name of the process whereby children and young people grow up with education and training techniques within the scope of a life

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built on cultural values, traditions and beliefs of a society through family and education and counseling services. This process is not only enlightenment but also multilateral civilized relations including various behavioral patterns and taking place within mutual interaction.

Giddens maintains that our interaction with other people from birth to death will absolutely influence our personality, our values and way of behavior. At the same time, socialization process underlies developing our personal identity and freedom. Through socialization process, all of us develop a feeling of identity, free-thinking and ability to act (Giddens, 2000:43).

As family and school give some values and information to a person, information on negative examples and actions that appear in his surroundings and are part of this life should be given to the youth for them to draw a lesson. Otherwise, the youth that meet such negative effects and conditions are likely to fall into the trap of these actions, encounter problems and experience difficulty.

1.2. Moral and Psychological dimension of socialization

Socialization does not materialize by only comprehending social life and offering information on this world and living conditions or adaptation. It also necessitates the existence of the phenomena of faith and thinking that shape people’s inner world and their being presented prudently because philosophical and moral thinking underlie behavior and attitudes. Reasons that cause events and attitudes manifest themselves in this philosophical stance and enable man’s adopting attitudes and behavior consciously. Philosophical logic frame of life and the world of values that guide and steer this philosophy constitute moral and psychological dimension of socialization. Economic, political and legal frame of life can be shown as an application area community that is related to the thinking dimension of socialization, analyzes them in the light of values and brings out systems from them.

When socialization is mentioned, it is not sufficient to mention a “neutral concept” as a person’s integrating with social environment and making use of some possibilities offered to him by the social environment. First of all, social circle should have a certain understanding of civilization and ethic and positive socialization that adapts a life within this frame to man should be mentioned. Naturally, the existence of an active and noncoercive environment of young people’s own thoughts and behavior is among conditions to be taken note of.

A young person that is growing up adopts a culture of life to fulfill duties and responsibilities of social world that builds the future by taking intellectual and conceptual information knowledge of his own world. He has information frame on comprehending different social events. Youth accepts this world of

YOUTH AND SOCIALIZATION IN TURKEY • Prof. Sami Şener

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knowledge and thoughts as a reference for their own life systems and try in order to build their future analyses on these issues.

It is impossible to separate thought from art and culture or from knowledge. Therefore, the existence of serious intellectual background is necessary for an individual to perceive life in the socialization process and make new initiatives. Similarly, the youth expects to know the intellectual aspect of their lifestyle and wishes and had the rights to interpret the future by having confidence in this.

Cultural and social world of socialization strengthens more with a certain intellectual structure because thoughts have to constitute a whole with moral, social and psychological factors. Man’s social world becomes meaningful with a certain system of thought. The inside of a world bordered by intellectual systems is meaningful when filled with social and cultural values. The thought system of a society is the reason for the existence of that society and is related to a great extent to its life being meaningful. In fact, art, literature, history and politics try to enrich the basic logic of this world of thoughts. Intellectual targets constitute the general framework of all social and art-centered activities.

1.3. The role of civilization and historical background

The history of a society or mankind must be considered as a significant source of knowledge and lesson. Information given to us by history allows us to compare the past and present and events narrated by history enable us to think about noteworthy events that are cornerstones in determining our situation and even future. History is the general accumulation of human experience consisting of culture basins based on different historical experiences that are related in different ways to cultural basin and belongingness to civilization that shape the formation of the mental world of a historian (Davudoğlu, 1992:2).

It is impossible not to know that history takes on the task of a laboratory largely in sociology and presents significant clues in the assessment of events. This situation allows an important assessment method such as estimating the unknown by acting on information about what is known. In a sense, history, presents important information by offering humankind significance of understanding mistakes in the past and unnoticed dynamics.

Civilization is the philosophy of private life of events, institutions and lifestyles of one or more societies based on their values and cultural background. In a sense, civilization is the identity of a society or societies. A civilization offers vast knowledge about structure, thoughts and ethics of societies. According to Berger, any society is built by value judgment of its people. This value judgment is defined as the definition of truth. (Berger,1985:24) Naturally, there


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are conditions and factors that determine all civilizations. Every civilization has a special type of person and character peculiar to itself otherwise; we wouldn’t have had the opportunity to set differences and changes of civilizations.

Civilization launches a socialization proess peculiar to itself by exhibiting an understanding and thought as a life framework and a community of experiences and systems. People in deep-rooted civilizations carry the weight of a long life interpreted with thoughts and differ from others from this aspect. People’s manners and traditions can be understood by looking at their attitudes, behavior, approaches and even the way they speak. In other words, civilizations have a discipline peculiar to themselves just like a person’s moral qualities.

1.4. Showing the youth a role and a method

The youth have all intellectual and moral heritage of a society to which they belong. That is to say, they grow up in a certain culture and educational environment and mingle with traditions of the society in which they grow up. However, social values, traditions and philosophy of life must be a quality that is continuously examined and integrated with way of living. In other words, philosophy of life must be analyzed in a comparative way in the light of different incidents and must have the potential to re-interpret the philosophy of culture and every event and truth. If such an analysis is not made and adopted values lose the opportunity to explain life with new rules and understandings, it toughens in the course of time and might face losing its functional capacity. Therefore, civilization and culture renewing themselves with expectations and pursuits of the youth and addressing the needs of life facilitate the socialization role of the youth and pave the way for overcoming different problems in society.

At this point, the issue of researching and determining psychological and biological aspect of young people is faced. First of all, current culture and understanding must assess young people separately from other groups in society. This will allow a system that will have an approach suitable for young people’s psychology, understand his pursuits and expectations and meet these needs. Such an effort is first possible by understanding young people’s basic qualities and a youth policy that will meet needs and expectations to this end. This matter must be systematized with special sociological and psychological study and a field survey needs to conducted continuously on this matter.

It must be also mentioned that unfortunately such systematic studies are not made in Turkey and research conducted on the youth is insufficient or includes certain areas. Therefore, assessment of the current situation is incomplete


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without a field of study peculiar to the youth, center of activities, sufficient documents and events related to the center of attention. Studies to be made on the youth are not made comprehensively.

2. Dangers on the way to socialization

2.1. Shortcomings of youth policies

The youth issue in Turkey is in a quite narrow and uncertain area. There is no defined and realistic role and function of the youth in terms of the family and state. The youth alternate sometimes between childish and sometimes between mature attitudes and behavior.

On socialization of the youth, education, studies, and activities in the family display a characteristic far from sufficient information, accumulation and experience on the social and psychological existence of the youth issue.

The problem needs to be defined multidimensionally. Thus, efforts made by the youth to join and take part in society will be explained. Within this scope, unconstrained and democratic approaches must be dealt with and possibilities and difficulties of this segment of society must be assessed without any orientation and preconceived opinion on the youth.

The youth being the most important investment factor for society will be noticed by giving them a better position and an opportunity for a role. After this point, it will be seen that the youth have a special and irreplaceable value within social groups.

The youth issue in Turkey is in a quite narrow and uncertain area. There is no defined and realistic role and function of the youth in terms of the family and state. The youth alternate sometimes between childish and sometimes between mature attitudes and behavior.

In Turkey, socialization of the youth is within a quite uncertain dimension. The youth see a more different and modernist understanding of life than moral, religious and social knowledge they obtain from their parents. This situation influences social development of the youth to a considerable extent.

On the other hand, parents feel confused and disturbed as if their children whom they have brought up with an understanding of life based on customs and traditions and rules of life are part of another culture and receiving another education. This situation either results in a reaction against official institutions or attains the point of adopting existing official views and cultures by doubting their own knowledge and values.


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Families have even been forced to adopt an attitude like setting their children free in society as they are concerned over the fact that state institutions that shape their children will put pressure on them.

On the other hand, the state has not developed important programs or projects to bring up or orientate the youth. During one-party rule of the Republican People’s Party everyone was obliged to support CHP and other institutions were banned from carrying out any activities.

Although the state changed its perspective on pressure in the following periods, it has made the youth open to harm caused by sex, gambling and leisure industry that made serious financial gain by free market, western-type entertainment, social relations, lifestyle and emotional and moral abuse. Today, although the state does not have past imposing and de facto situations contrary to society, modernist approaches of the media and some Westernized circles make it difficult for the youth finding their identity outside the influence of the west.

This contradictory situation that concerns both groups result in serious disturbance and unbalanced attitude in socialization of the youth.

Western type lifestyle in particular, results in adoption of some ready-made patterns related to music and other human affairs. Therefore, the youth adopt some tendencies and understandings without knowing the reason and deeming necessary to research and socialize according to some simple and rootless models of behavior by acting like some people.

This situation brings the youth to a level at which self-confidence has not developed and original thoughts and discovery capacity have not been attained regarding taking part, contributing and lending impetus to society. Under these circumstances, a youth mass that has not completed socialization is faced. It must also be mentioned that youth brought up in this way cannot reach the adequate level of responsibility towards society and even themselves.

Socialization process during youth is directed at personality formation. A young person tries to understand who he is, why he lives and what his status in society is just like someone that has lost his memory. Adolescence is a period when a young person makes efforts to find a place and play a role in the society that he lives. He starts distancing himself from his parents while looking for his personality. A young person trying to be different from their parents has replaced a girl that wore her mother’s clothes to look like her and a boy that tried to look strong like his father in their childhood. (Durmuş,2003:46)


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The youth sometimes act childishly and sometimes face a situation in which they are overwhelmed under a heavy burden and commitments based on such a structure and examples.

On socialization of the youth, education, studies, and activities in the family display a characteristic far from sufficient information, accumulation and experience on the social and psychological existence of the youth issue.

An acculturation program with western values and philosophy of education on socialization of the youth, was launched through Hasan Ali Yücel’s initiatives in the 1940s. Many works, majority of them from western classics, were translated during this period to make western culture widespread. Some works were also translated from eastern classics. We know that social structures are built on knowledge, attitudes and traditions and human imagination attains new horizons and attitudes by assimilating and assessing these qualities. (Bennet,2007:4) Therefore, moving away from society and particularly the youth from social conditions results in serious social problems.

2.2. The role of street culture and ideologies in socialization

It is known that in the developmental age, the youth are curious about a life outside certain values and habits and want to leave their family circle and exert efforts to make initiatives for unknown reasons. These tendencies are related to the youth wanting to be free and achieve something by themselves. They also embark on an “adventure psychology “ as a result of some ruleless and free living philosophy that come from their surroundings and guide the youth. In fact this situation is the beginning of alienation in sociological sense.

When social position of the youth is taken up in terms of another factual truth taking development models in developed countries as an example and constitutes a problem in societies where it is put into practice, it is seen that these youths cannot cope with intellectual and emotional development phases and undergo a more painful process compared to Western youths because the youth in neighboring countries are at the same time experiencing cultural dissonance of the ebb and flow of modernism/ traditionalism. Therefore, this social and cultural schizophrenic situation caused by our life divided into three parts “from traditionalism to modernism and then to post modernism” (Atay, 2004a.87) results in popular mass culture being produced once again as a vicious circle as if under the effect of drugs and the youths displaying anomic and alienated behavior patterns during a period when they are looking for their identity. (Şahin, 2005;162)

Knowledge and examples before youths in terms of understanding themselves belong largely to outside thoughts and world. Therefore, when knowledge and


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understandings stemming from childhood contradict with these new thoughts they have either become depressed or adopted new ideas and worldviews unconsciously. (Tanpınar, 2006:56)

In this world where socialization takes place distressfully and with confusion, personality and mental health have started to wear down significantly and “anomie” which is a sociological problem of putting into practice other worlds in one’s inner world and thoughts was met. Can the youth of a society that see themselves in others’ world and accept to be part of it socialize properly? An intellectual act far from listening to and examining oneself only tries to make an assessment and develop oneself with others’ thoughts and lifestyles. This is not a healthy social development but “cultural quote”. (Turhan, 1969) Such social abandonment results in youths falling prey to ideological or interest groups and sometimes losing their lives. I would like to tell about an incident that I have experienced on this matter.

A Maoist group that saw loneliness and poverty of a naïve and poor Kurdish young man, that was a newcomer student to secondary school of a youth association, convinced him to join them by promising him some financial possibilities and giving him social status (group leader) that he could not attain. Objections made by his teacher that wanted to help him were not enough. The teacher saw this young man that stopped coming to the youth association for some time at the front row of a cortege in a resistance demonstration of a group in Bayezıt and felt sorry for his future. This naïve boy was given a gun and took part in armed attacks for the sake of a cause that he was made to believe and was shot dead after a few months. This incident indicates how ideological movements deceive and use young people, deceive them with empty and unrealistic ideologies and make them sacrifice their lives.

What would this young man lose if he assessed many matters with more accurate information and carried out his struggle on an intellectual and social plan at a later age? However, harmful organizations and exploiters do not allow youths to assess such a situation.

2.3. Anti-democratic and secular drifts in socialization

Socialization is development and maturity. Therefore, it is impossible for a generation that has not completely attained stability, intellectual and moral basis to enter into an easy and smooth socialization process. Therefore, it is very difficult to take up youth socialization in Turkey and the Islamic world within a natural line of social development. Another group that continue their reaction to state institutions that regard socialization as a function of modernization by not sending their children to school or being attached to


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religious and traditional habits blindly, make their young children experience dramatic examples of cultural diversity that sometimes commands them and sometimes clashes with them.

When we look at different activities on socialization of the youth in Turkey, we see that they have not developed them in terms of mental, intellectual, psychological and moral depth. The existence of the implementation that tries to shape and change mental and psychological world with Western life style, way of entertainment, works, films and plays of western culture is noticed. Westernist and modernist attitudes of Intellectuals that adore the West without any ethical or cultural values have resulted in serious estrangement and social alienation in cultural life and way of thinking in Turkey’s westernization.

Reasons for moral depression observed in Turkish intelligentsia indicate some social clues that need to be explained with historical development of our nation, social structure elements, worldview and philosophy of life. The administrative elite having been generally educated in international schools, not mingling with people, being conditioned to a mentality open to western norms and innovations instead of the system of national culture and values has resulted in the appointment of staff that are weak in solidarity and reflect a personality that fits to almost all patters. This socio-psychological depression mostly seen in the elitist staff resulted in youth depression that engulfed the eastern and western world in the 1968s. (Türkdoğan, 1987:48)

We see a youth that is brought up with recipes of western dishes while being taught how to cook, imitates western models in clothing and is taught western philosophy and doctrines as intellectual and ethical culture. This youth, tries to build its socialization on the cyber world by experiencing lack of harmony brought about by assimilation of another history, geography and philosophies as accumulation of knowledge. However, this does not materialize in one way or another. The problem needs to be defined multidimensionally. However, this offers a possibility to explain efforts made by the youth to take part in society. Within this scope, the youth must be addressed with easy and democratic approaches without any orientation and preconception and possibilities and difficulties of this segment of society must be assessed.

Socialization of the youth and socialization environment and relations need common culture and traditional values. Contradictory knowledge and imposition of values in curricula do not allow the formation of original and new ideas and systems in education. At university, the youth do not easily attain power and competence to live a more comfortable and unplanned life, develop themselves to get ready to problems of the real world and tip the scales in their favor instead of further strengthening their socialization.


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2.4. Social Identity of the Youth and Consumer Culture

A Society without a certain policy on the youth will result in the youth being left free and face risks and activate many factors. A young person will absolutely encounter many difficulties if he does not get ready for the future and maturity within a certain direction and culture. A few of these can be explained as follows: Taking something from home and showing off with them outside; and these factors can be money, clothing, cigarettes and cell phones. The young man’s friends can ask him to bring these from home and he can fulfill this as a duty.

When we go a step further, a certain ideological approach can go as far as involving a young man in some unethical and illegal acts like some objects like money, goods or even food being brought from his house and precious jewelry and things worth money being stolen from his house.

They told me an interesting incident on this matter. Someone transferred the title deeds of his flat into his married son’s name. This young man was a member of an ideological group. The ideological group forced him to sell his flat and to donate the money to the group. However, after some time, he had financial difficulties and was in dire straits. This is an important example to the young man’s reckless attitude without thinking about his own situation and future. Young people’s incompetency regarding knowledge and experience, not knowing people sufficiently make him do wrong things in assessing the environment and life and get into danger as a slave of his feelings.

Today, the PKK terrorist group that pushed people of Kurdish origin into a bloody conflict on the grounds that the Kurdish race was despised, suppressed and ostracized, intended to kill them for the sake of their ideologies and was engaged in drug, women and arms trafficking , brings illiterate, inexperienced and unemployed young masses that have financial difficulties into its fold. This organization canalizes young people that it gathers around it by saying Kurds’ rights with wrong information, functions as a moneyed murder and drug gang outside the Kurdish cause by acting as a sub-contractor of some countries and even functions like a sub-contractor for international interest gangs. Idealistic but unconscious youths are used for killing their co-religionists and relatives with whom they have lived together for a long time under the command of other countries or local bosses.

2.5. Youth and activity

Biological and physical structures of the youth make them have a tendency to lead a very active life. This situation leads them to short term activities and


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areas that produce a quick result without taking interest in difficult and long term studies. If the youth are not kept in an active position and made to work efficiently, knowing their structure, these masses can be involved in certain tendencies and actions without calculating the outcome and not expressing their opinions. Political and ideological actions in particular, make use of this quick and active aspect of the youth and seriously traumatize societies.

Youths not attaining social and psychological maturity while entering puberty, makes them oversensitive and short-tempered and pushes them into displaying sudden attitudes and behavior. Robert Coles says that in the history of mankind violence has been observed in the form of political violence, ethnic violence and class violence. Since the beginning of mankind violence has been observed in one of these forms in almost all societies. Violence has undergone a change with social development and reached the present day. Violence includes destructive and aggressive behavior that intentionally harms nature and man. According to Goswami, violence is synonymous with physical aggression. Violence is directed at wounding, harming or affecting individuals or society (Kocadas, 2004).

Experts state that in fact tendency to violence stems from different reasons like illiteracy, ignorance and bad examples. Particularly films, novels and games that push youths into violence in fact paralyze young brains that are jewels of society and turn them into robots that others can easily use.Violence appears before us in a wide range of areas from supranational and international relations that are macro-structures in social life to social collectivity and relations between institutions that are mezzo-structures in social life to face-to-face relations at the micro level in social life. It is as if in the past we had a more tranquil and peaceful life when we were less modern. As we progressed on the way modernization, we started living in a more vulgar and ruthless life full of more violence. (Çelebi, Towards a World Without Violence, 2009;1)

Another issue is youth trying to take their psychological world by weakening it to a non-human point without feelings and moral sensitivities with sex pictures and films. Television had a significant influence in shaping daily life in Turkey in the post 1980 period. Watching television appeared as a most widespread way of entertainment and habit in society during this period. Beyond time spent in front of television, it put its stamp on daily life by influencing everything from language and music to consumption and politics. (Kozanoğlu, 1996). It can be said that the most distinct characteristic of cultural life during this period was articulation of “visualization and entertainment” industry under the influence of television. (Oktay, 1996)


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As family and educational institutions where young masses with good personality grow up and take refuge are the most important targets of such commercial and ideological centers in all these matters, they go to any lengths to make families and education centers lose their function. At this point, there are circles that do not hesitate to make use of famous people like artists and sportsmen that have become a focus of interest in society. These qualities of the youth require their being educated by very special methods and under very special circumstances and are significant in terms of their active and sensitive constitutions not being canalized to a wrong direction with wrong methods.

Interest in entertainment and ostentation in city life in particular, are perhaps the weakest aspects to today’s youth. Particularly traps directed at areas of attraction like relationship between girls and boys have resulted in many youngsters falling into the trap of various commercial and ideological groups by losing their families, morality and social characteristics. Media, industrial organizations and big commercial companies that complement the city under the influence of modernization, make people part of mass culture.

There is a certain industry in mass culture and this industry is more indifferent to people’s likes, sensitivities and tendencies. It offers industrial culture without taking these into consideration. That is to say, popular culture has turned to mass culture with the emergence of industrial culture. People determine popular culture. Sectors determine mass culture. Therefore this is called industrial culture. (Şahin, 2005;167)

3. Effects of Wrong Socialization

3.1. The youth have to oppose rules

Intellectual and ideological movements do not want the existence of rules that guide social life due to different wrong views on the youth or negative socialization effects of foreign philosophy and steer the youth towards this. This attitude inspires people to live their lives without being subjected to certain values or certain authoritarian rule. This situation aims to make society open to inspiration within free understanding and culture and therefore open to guidance. In such a situation they are asked not only to be indifferent to social values and rules but also to be aware of basic social values, oppose these values and fulfill the duty of weakening established rules of society.

3.2. The youth acting irresponsibly

The fact that youth being free and whimsical in all kinds of jobs and studies without any restriction means that they will not take into consideration rules


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and traditions in society. This situation is not consistent with the purpose of socialization. Because the existence of social rules is only possible with the existence of rules society believes in and with which it regulates its life accordingly; while bringing a philosophy in which rules are not taken into consideration to the fore means social rules are ineffective. Thus, lessening effectiveness of values and traditions that support society by stirring up the youth results in social degeneration and make the youth an “instrument to be used” in any way.

3.3. The youth acting based on their knowledge and decisions

Although the youth have special knowledge and skills, their having social and cultural background is out of the question. Instead of producing something in society based on their knowledge, the youth must develop their knowledge, assimilate basic understanding and knowledge of society and assess their situation within this general framework. As the youth take notice of established traditions and experiences in society, there is unity and mixing between different segments of society and harmony of social structure. Therefore, socialization must take place in an environment of good will and mutual confidence. Those that put forward views and theses against this are trying to bring conflict and not socialization to the fore.

3.4. The Youth will be the founders of a new world

The idea of a new world or mark an era, generally includes deviation from social values and targets because the old and the new being poles apart is in fact an indication of disunity. Shaping of social development and social structure in particular is possible by mixing of the old and the new, disunity between social groups and understandings results in serious confusion on how socialization can take place.

Making efforts to carry out an important function in society only by the will of a group like the youth, results in belittling and lack of respect for other segments of society. Therefore, the youth being the only choosers on a significant matter will deal a blow to social development and sharing, as it will harm solidarity, which is the logic of socialization.

4. Basic steps for socialization of the youth

4.1. Acknowledgement of the existence of the youth

On acknowledgement of the youth, the first characteristic to acquire is children that have become adolescents to be conscious of their social position that will make them stand on their own feet. Children that were guided and


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asked to abide by certain rules in their childhood, must get used to taking responsibility starting from the age of 12 by getting used to the idea that they can do something on their own and develop themselves. At this stage, they will acquire the understanding that doing things on their own and learning about life instead of taking help from others or taking refuge in them is necessary in terms of getting to know and understanding life and how it can be lived.

Thanks to this knowledge, the youth will acquire guidance and self-confidence, consciousness and understanding that they are valuable and important and distance themselves from childhood habits and expectations. It will also make them sensitive to needs and expectations of social life that they live. Such a duty will start with the family, which is the first and basic institution of the youth. As the family is the first institution that best knows the youth and has the biggest share in their development, it sows the first seeds of acknowledgment of the existence of the youth and offers a philosophy of life in terms of character education and moral values.

As the way of education of the family is more directed at behavior and attitudes and the family is the first place where character and basic knowledge is acquired, this education takes place in a more permanent and rooted way. If the family neglects such a duty, it will be very difficult to acquire knowledge and habits on human personality and existence at a later age and education periods.

4.2. The youth acquisition of identity:

The youth acquisition of identity must follow a process that first starts with taking notice of and caring about them. Making them acquire an identity will start with making them accept the truth that there is a world and philosophy of life of their own. The identity of a society or group first appears with an established understanding of life and culture and its guiding practical life. The existence of an identity emerges when a worldview adopted and considered valuable has a determining role on all attitudes and behavior.

After such a stage, the youth reach a point of carrying out their own mission in life and making sacrifice because there is a system of rules that they think is valuable. These rules with consider the existence and efficiency of the system and its own existence equal and continue to act within the scope of that understanding of life. I have said previously that the youth acquire a basic identity with family education and experience. The youth acquiring an identity for life and their own future must attain a further stage with counseling and enlightenment in educational institutions.


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At this point, wide and different knowledge based on family education will shape and strengthen the formation of the youth’s identity. If family values and behavior are ostracized and the youth acquire an identity contrary to them, there will be confusion in their world of identity, lack of confidence in themselves and knowledge acquired as they will be torn between family and school and this will result in an identity crisis.

4.3. Bringing up the youth amid activities and duties:

The youth are a mass that just begin to work and are inexperienced. Therefore, they have listened to many matters either insufficiently or theoretically. Therefore, the youth getting to know themselves and life is possible only with different experiences and studies. Therefore, the youth must assume duties not only based on knowledge acquired in school but also with various events and activities and gain experience in all of them. This experience and studies must start at the age of maturity of the youth and they must not get used to easiness and comfort. Social means confronting many incidents in society. Therefore the youth must confront hundreds of pieces of information and experiences dynamically on how every incident takes place and work is carried out and what results are encountered.

Within this scope, they must be part of different social groups and have practical knowledge and experiences based on what dynamics they will act in society with social psychology. Types of people in particular have the chance to gain experience only amid social activities based on different examples of people’s approaches and characters. Experience is knowledge about life and includes knowledge, examples and problems obtained from relations with different people and groups. A lesson must be learned not only from good incidents but also from dismal ones. A sorrowful incident can make people gain more experience than a book they will read or speeches they will listen to.

4.4. Assigning social roles to the youth:

Giving social rules to the youth includes reassessing the youth and society and fulfilling duties and responsibilities of society. Giving or playing a role is related to a person or society’s willpower and horizon. Giving or playing a role is an important group of duties within the scope of taking certain responsibilities, putting forward new ideas on things to be changed and putting into practice.The person or group that has assumed a role has certain background and has attained a level where he can do some things on his own. He has self-confidence and can undertake some jobs.

This role can develop as sharing some jobs in adults and includes original and different solutions and understanding of working on some matters by bringing


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up special ideas and thoughts. In a few words, the youth must notice matters and areas that concern them before adults call them for duty and play a role to attain a level of consciousness at which they can undertake responsibilities and jobs by accepting themselves on duty.

Bibliography:

Atay, Tayfun (2004a). Religion Goes Out Of Life. İletişim Publications .İstanbul

Beehr, T. A., & Bennett, M. M. (2007). Examining retirement from a multi-level perspective. In K. S. Shultz & G. A. Adams (Eds.), Aging and work in the 21st century (pp. 277–302). New York, NY: Psychology Press.

Berger, Peter (1985) Modernization and Consciousness, Çev.Cevdet Cerit, Pınar Publications, İstanbul

Davudoğlu,Ahmet (1992/2, The Role of Civilizations in Understanding History, Divan İlmi Research Magazine, İstanbul

Durmuş, Adem (2003) I Am Preparing My Child For Youth and Life, Timaş Publications, İstanbul

Giddens, Antony (2000) How Does Globalization Change Our Life, Alfa Publications; İstanbul

Kocadas, Bekir, (2004), “Assessment on the Concepts of Violence and Terror”, http://www.egm.gov.tr/ education/magazine/back number/40/web/articles

Çelebi, Nilgün (2009)

Oktay, A. (1996). Cultural Transformation in Turkey in the 80s. Republican Period Turkey Encyclopedia. As the Century Ends. Volume: 13. İletişim Publications. İstanbul.

Tanpınar, Ahmet Hamdi (2009) , As I live, Dergah Publications, İstanbul

Turhan, Mümtaz ( 1969 ) Cultural Changes, Ministry of National Education 1001 Basic Works, Ankara

Türkdoğan, Orhan (1987) Social Violence and Turkey, Ministry of National Education Publications, Ankara

Şahin, M.Cem (2005)Social Identity of Youth in Turkey and Popular Consumer Culture, Gazi Faculty of Education Magazine, Volume 25, Number 2 (2005)


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IDENTITY DIFFERENTIATION: COMMUNICATING

TURKEY’SNATION BRAND

Assist. Prof. Bahar Senem ÇevikAnkara University

Nation brands are the distinct qualities of nations that are crafted through a meticulous analysis of their identity drawn from their history, culture, politics and values. A nation brand incorporating its assets, liabilities and potential projects intangible values geared toward audiences. These variables differentiate a nation from others. Hence, a nation’s differentiation can be interpreted as its competitive identity. Competitive nation brands help foster a nation’s soft power by communicating and cultivating the essence of that nation brand. Public diplomacy provides a set of tools to communicate nation brands. As such, public diplomacy is categorized as an international public relations strategy in numerous ways that is concurrently interpreted as strategic communications. Public diplomacy and soft power are fairly new concepts in Turkey articulated mainly in its foreign policy discourse. A consensus on a nation’s identity is a prerequisite in crafting an effective public diplomacy grand strategy scheme. Alas, Turkey has not been able to find a consensus to overcome its identity-based contradictions. In turn such a dilemma hampers its efforts in crafting its nation brand and public diplomacy strategies. This paper argues that Turkey’s unique identity together with its historical, cultural, religious, political and moral values are the pillars of Turkish soft power, which are by the same token variables of its public diplomacy strategies. Under the rubric of identity, the paper suggests that Turkey’s identity-based differentiation is a byproduct of its fluid identity- democratic, modern, secular yet Muslim identity-. The

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paper further argues that a healthy balance among these variables will bolster Turkey’s competitive edge and are integral in fostering its regional position in the long-term. This balance is contingent upon embracing a multi-cultural setting, resolving the paradox of past and present and setting aside the social polarization. Turkey’s competitive edge will be further discussed taking cue from public relations models and international public relations.

Public Diplomacy as an International Public Relations Tool

Public relations (PR) is “...the management function that identifies, establishes and maintains mutually beneficial relationships between an organization and the various publics on whom its success or failure depends” (Cutlip, Center and Broom, 1985, p. 4). Public relations “...aims to educate and inform in order to create knowledge and understanding...” (Jefkins, 1994, p .26). The public relations society of America (PRSA) defines public relations as “a strategic communication process that builds mutually beneficial relationships between organizations and publics” (PRSA, homepage, 2013). Furthermore, PR is about influencing the behavior of groups —facilitating an attitude change— of people in relation to each other through dialogue (White and Mazur, 1994).

According to Lesly (1991, p.11-12), PR strategies have eight phases that result in the influence of attitude change towards an organization. These phases are defined as: 1) analyzing the general climate of attitudes and the relation of the organization to its universe, 2) determining the attitude of any group toward the organization, 3) analyzing the state of opinion,4) anticipating potential problems, needs or opportunities, 5) formulating policy, 6) planning means of improving the attitudes of a group, 7) carrying out the planned activities and 8) finally feedback, evaluation and adjustment. As this categorization implies, listening to the audience, which can be identified as feedback, and formulating a policy accordingly are key elements in effective attitude change. Though, it has taken decades of intellectual thinking and practice for public relations to craft an effective set of methodology in attitude change.

Modern day public relations in political terms originated in the United States (U.S) by Thomas Jefferson in his nation building campaign where he set out to differentiate the colonies from Europe (Cutlip, 1995; Tucker and Hendrickson, 1990; Cutlip, Center and Broom, 1985). Likewise, PR was also institutionalized in the U.S transforming itself through decades from press agentry, publicity models to symmetrical communication models (Kitchen, 1997; Cutlip, Center and Broom, 1985). Grunig and Hunt (1984) categorizes the era between 1850 to 1900 as press agentry and publicity eras, 1900 to 1920’s as public information era, 1920’s and onwards as two-way asymmetrical public relations and finally

IDENTITY DIFFERENTIATION: COMMUNICATING TURKEY’S NATION BRAND • Assist. Prof. Bahar Senem Çevik

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the era following 1960’s and 70’s as two-way symmetrical model era. The two-way asymmetrical model, a one-way communication strategy, insinuates traditional public diplomacy (PD) techniques that predominantly play down the value of feedback. However, the two-way symmetrical model emphasizes feedback. Grunig’s symmetry lies in listening and hearing what the publics are saying. To this day, the two-way symmetrical model is acknowledged as the most ideal public relations model. This ideal model owes its excellence to the interaction between the sender and the receiver. As a matter of fact, the two-way symmetrical model can be described as a balanced exchange and reciprocity where concepts of “sender” and “receiver” rather imply previous models (Grunig and Grunig, 2006).

Another facet of PR on the transnational level is international public relations (IPR). In a global perspective IPR takes regional and cultural differences into account (Freitag & Stokes, 2009). PR is employed as a convenient tool to establish corporate reputation and image both domestically and internationally. In this respect, IPR is about building and maintaining prestige or reputation that creates a favorable image (Kitchen, 1997). Moreover, IPR deals with the image management process of governments in which PD holds a central role in achieving the desired outcome (Kunczik, 1996). IPR is constructed both as a multi-faceted and a diverse communication method in response to the probable misunderstanding emanating from the deployed messages. Diverse communication paves the way for strategies customized for each target audience/public based on their identity, values and priorities. Hence, IPR creates a favorable image through understanding, analyzing and applying strategies that are believed to be relevant in each of these communities (Curtin and Gaiter, 2007). IPR is a form of strategic communications. Correspondingly, Kunczik and Farwell (2012) categorize public diplomacy as a form of strategic communications. Considering the role of image management and nation branding in IPR and PD the following section will take a closer look at the conceptualization of PD and its convergences with PR.

In Nye’s (2004) conceptualization soft power is getting others to want the outcomes that you want through culture, politics and foreign policy. An emotional tie with the target public is necessary to achieve this end result. In Nye’s own words “a country may obtain the outcomes it wants in world politics because other countries-admiring its values, emulating its example, aspiring to its level of prosperity and openness- want to follow it just as in the case for Turkey. In this sense, it is also important to set the agenda and attract others in world politics, and not only to force them to change by threatening military force or economic sanctions” (2004, p.5). The author further argues that soft power is “getting others to buy in to your values” (p.5). In this


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respect, soft power is persuading audiences/publics through one’s own will. This conceptualization of soft power appears similar to the notion of PR, which also attempts to shape public opinion through persuasion (Cutlip, Center, Broom, 1985). Correspondingly, one of the key instruments of soft power is the complex communication initiatives coined as public diplomacy (Melissen, 2007, p.4). Public diplomacy is a concept that relies heavily on ‘emotions’, perceptions and persuasion. Marcus (2003) argues that emotion is attached to the salient features of experience and emotions, once formed, control our reactions, orientations, dispositions, and behavior toward these objects-to persons, events and circumstances whether favorably or unfavorably. Saydam (2005) also suggests that emotion is a major component in effective public relations. Similarly the traditional understanding of PD is winning the hearts and mind of publics to gain advantage in policy objectives having an emotional component related to soft power.

Public diplomacy is rather a new terminology in political science and international relations. However, it dates back to more popular concepts such as propaganda and PR (see Bardos, 2001; Cull, 2009a). Melissen (2007) states that PD is as old as diplomacy itself. Nevertheless scholars and practitioners have not been able to find a common definition and scope for the concept. PD can be defined as complex communication initiatives aimed at foreign publics and governments by other governments or non-governmental organizations in pursuit of policy goals (Leonard, 2002; Hocking, 2007, p. 41). One of the main tasks of public diplomacy is to persuade foreign publics and politicians in regards to the values, policies and actions of the state (Mor, 2006, p. 157). Listening, understanding, reciprocity and carefully evaluating the message feedback before strategizing a communication process with an end result in foreign policy objectives all are equally important (Leonard, 2002; Cull, 2009b). As a matter of fact public diplomacy is very similar to proactive public relations which on an organizational level. Likewise, Kitchen (1997) describes proactive PR as a strategy to “...enhance a company’s image ...by repairing its reputation, preventing marketing erosion and regaining lost sales” (p. 30).

Public diplomacy was first coined in the US during the Cold War by Edward Gullion and was later implemented as a strategy by the United States Information Agency (USIA) as a reactive method to change public opinion and disseminate opinion (Blinken, 2002, s. 104). Traditional PD is predominantly self-centered downplaying the much necessary listening function. Even after the devastating attacks on 9/11, the ineffectiveness of American PD by pursuing one-way communication inexorably failed to deliver a change in foreign audience perceptions.


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Despite the failure of American PD in delivering messages to key audiences, much thought has been given to revive the PD outlook. The new PD is a renovated concept derived from this pursuit. The new PD strategies require a broader range of skills relying on civil society (Snow, 2009, 2010; Cull, 2009a). Today, direct relations with publics instead of elites —a people-to-people interaction— are now more important than ever. Inevitably, under these circumstances non-state actors play a vital role in crafting the new PD. According to Zaharna (2005) PD today has a mission to build bridges with foreign publics with the inclusion of new stakeholders. Despite a distinction between old and new PD it is safe to say that states use a balanced combination of old and new PD because of the diverse effects of each method. Besides, public diplomacy is a long-term process that requires extensive research on public opinion (Blinken, 2002). Long-term objectives are best achieved through an interconnected PD structure that equally incorporates non- state actors and states.

Public diplomacy is occasionally used interchangeably with public relations, branding, country image marketing (see Pratkanis, 2009), strategic communications, perception management and even propaganda. Indeed, public diplomacy is intertwined with communications, political science, international relations, as well as psychology (Gilboa, 2008). PD is rather an intersecting point in all of these areas. According to Leonard the three dimensions of public diplomacy are daily communications, strategic communication and building long-term relationships (Leonard, 2002, pp.8-11). Public diplomacy can also be envisioned as a form of intellectual, political and social engagement (Henrikson, 2007, p.71). Hence, it can be concluded that public diplomacy changes the perceptions and attitudes of foreign publics through dialogue and two-way communication. This process is defined as acquiring influence through impression management (Mor, 2006, s.157). Similarly, another discipline of impression management is public relations.

L’Etang (1996) discusses the convergences between public relations and diplomacy arguing that techniques of political communication are fundamental to the diplomatic role. In essence, both depend on the management of public opinion. The author further argues that organizations actively seek to influence national and international political decisions in their favor and thus apply public diplomacy. Due to its nature and purpose public diplomacy can be analyzed from an international public relations perspective. Various public diplomacy models are adapted from public relations theories. In this respect, Van Dyke and Vercic (2003) state, “public relations and public diplomacy often operate together with other communication functions like psychological operations to support soft and hard power” (p.823). Public relations and public diplomacy both aim to build long-term relationships and create a positive image. Both are


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most effective in a symmetrical two-way communication model that is built on trust and credibility. Public relations have a sales and image building purpose, whereas public diplomacy has a foreign policy objective (Melissen, 2007). L’Etang also draws similarities between organizational public relations and governmental public relations —diplomacy— arguing that both communicate with their target audience in attempts persuade and counsel in attempts to build image. Similarly White and Mazur (1994) argue that a requirement in persuading governments is the utilization of public relations to build up effective links. Within the PR framework the two-way symmetrical model suggested by is best applicable to the new public diplomacy as suggested by Signitzer and Coombs (1992).

The previous discussion on IPR and PD is perhaps able to set the framework for the ways a nation builds its image, attraction and cultivates this image through international communication.

Reputation and Image Building

Nation branding expert Olins (2007) state that “nations have always tried to create and modulate their reputations in order to create domestic loyalties and coherence and promote their own power and influence in neighboring countries” (p. 170). By way of example, China’s culture, literature, cuisine are powerful assets in creating a positive image (D’Hooge, 2007, p.15). The 2008 Olympics in China facilitated this global positive image in attempts to rebrand China. As a result, China enjoyed more press coverage in efforts to boost its soft power whilst falling prey of international criticism on human rights issues. Nevertheless, the attempts to rebrand China via international organizations such as the EXPO and Olympics remain a key element in Chinese PD (Wang, 2013).

In tandem with country image, nation branding can be described as the design, plan and communication of the national brand and identity in managing/building reputation (see Anholt, 2007, p.4). Melissen (2007) states that “public diplomacy and nation branding are sisters under skin” but argues that branding has a high level of ambition, re-shapes and projects a country image. The author further argues that public diplomacy is rather about “promoting and maintaining smooth international relations” (Melissen, 2007, p.21) in comparison to branding. Nevertheless, nation-branding initiatives puts its energy into building a positive country image that will in effect reinforce its international relations. Perhaps, the concept of nation brand complements “product differentiation” —a concept derived from marketing— or in Anholt’s words competitive identity (Anholt, 2010, p.11). To create attractive power a


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nation must have specific qualities that differentiate itself from others in order to create attractive power. By way of example, niche actors’ peace talks are considered a key element in wielding soft power (Nye, 2004). In this sense, peace talks held by Norway constitute a certain differentiation where the nation brand is galvanized as a mediator and peace-builder in the global public consciousness (Henrikson, 2007, p.68). Hence, the Norwegian nation brand exhibits the niche trends in nation brands that have substantial end results in international relations. Likewise, South Africa is acclaimed for its historical reconciliation process and thus has gained considerable moral high ground. As demonstrated some of these nation brands acquire their attractiveness through a unique contribution to world civilization. In recently years, Turkey has been eager to follow suit as a potential mediator. Turkey’s major pillars of foreign policy, minimum conflict with neighbors and moral/humanitarian rhetoric encompasses its mediating efforts. Turkey’s ability to offer a niche contribution to world civilization is interrelated with its image, and in turn contingent upon various features of its identity. As a middle power, Turkey is still undecided on its nation brand. It would be fair to argue that this indecisiveness is connected to its struggles in self-identification, which will be elaborated in later sections of the article.

Creation of a nation brand converges with marketing strategies. As a matter of fact, Kotler and Zaltman (1971) suggest that social causes can also be marketed. Countries offer tangible assets such as brand names associated with the source country. These brands invariably generate added value to the nation brand. To illustrate, automobile brands such as Audi and Mercedes is associated with Germany while Apple Inc, Facebook, Twitter and Hollywood is associated with the US, Sony with Japan and Samsung with South Korea. As a result Germany mirrors an image based on technology, innovation while the US resonates lifestyle and freedoms, South Korea technological advancement (Olins, 2007; Anholt, 2007; Leonard, 2002). More importantly, these tangible assets propel a nation’s perceived hard power. Turkish Airlines (THY) is also considered as a soft power tool (Selçuk, 2013). However, THY carries all the responsibility in representing the country resulting from the scarcity of brand names associated with Turkey.

In line with Nye and Anholt’s formulation, a country’s policies and values are critical in its image. Therefore, values can be proclaimed as strategic assets. A country’s democratic principles, human rights records and ethics are all part and parcel of its values. To illustrate, Turkey’s value based political rhetoric in terms of morality regarding Somalia, Syria, Gaza and Myanmar are some of its attempts to re-design the nation brand based on moral motivations. In


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doing so, Turkey employs its NGOs and the volunteer capacity of these NGOs in actualizing its humanitarian stance. In this respect, another element in a nation’s image is its actual human resources capacity. Similarly, Snow (2006) argues the public and the qualities of the public are the best advertising campaigns (p.238). Within the nexus of image building and reputation, the identity of a country, the image that it portrays, its values represented by its public encompass the distinct “brand” of a nation. As Riordan (2004) argues country’s image embodies its cultural, political and economic values.

The image and identity of a nation altogether constitutes the reputation of the nation. Leonard (2002) states, “public diplomacy is based on the premise that the image and reputation of a country are public goods which can create either an enabling or a disabling environment for individual transactions” (p.9). While an image might be the pseudo-reality, reputation is rather about the perceived reality or what actually the nation stands for and represents. Concurrently, Turkey’s reputation lies in its budding democracy —albeit a thorny road—, sustainable politics, steady economy —yet still fragile—, sense of modernity, secularism and Islam —at times either one idealized—. On the other hand major problems related to Turkey’s domestic policies and its history —e.g. Kurdish, Alevi and Armenian questions, lack of pluralism, constraints on free speech and increasing self-censorship— have adverse effects on its reputation. Against the backdrop of these complications, the combination of Turkey’s identity elements provide a venue for Turkey to wield its soft power and find an operative ground of its public diplomacy initiatives. Still, under the rubric of human rights and freedoms, it is imperative that Turkey upgrades its current standing to compliment the other assets it presents. The following sections will delve into the concept of cultivation, the identity differentiation of Turkey and Turkey as a brand within this perspective.

Image Cultivation

Public diplomacy, a communication strategy, delivers effective results through cultivating foreign audiences. The main objectives of PD are to change public opinion and foreign attitudes. Hence, PD initiatives pursue methods of cultivation, whether consisting of cultivating a country image or behavior. In reality, PD is a process of cultivation and learning through communication.

It can be argued that desired behaviors and attitudes can be cultivated though sufficient exposure of the messages based on research in cultivation (Gerbner, 1970; Gerbner and Gross, 1976; Gerbner et.al, 1980). The consistency of messages and cultivation effect can be adapted to PD. Within this framework, cultivation is also actualized in cultural exchanges, social media, bilateral


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agreements, education, peace talks and other venues of public diplomacy. For example, the Fulbright Program and Confucius Institutes, workshops and track two initiatives are exemplary of such exchanges that facilitate cultivation.

Cultural cultivation is a process that is also evident in Turkey’s governmental and non-governmental PD initiatives. Yunus Emre Cultural Centers, Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency, Directorate of Religious Affairs are the most recognized government offices that oversee PD initiatives. A distinct venue of Turkey’s communicative cultivation is primarily evident in its global television programming. Turkish television drama series could be categorized as a key element in the recent success in Turkey’s non-governmental public/cultural diplomacy. Turkish TV series such as Öyle Bir Geçer Zaman Ki, Aşk-ı Memnu, Ezel, Yaprak Dökümü, Gümüş, Muhteşem Yüzyıl, Kurtlar Vadisi along with many more have become hits —specifically the Middle East and the Balkans— around the globe. Consequently, these audiences have been cultivated with the lavish Turkish lifestyle and sense of modern, yet Muslim Turkish identity.

Moreover, cultivation prevails itself in setting an example and offering intangible assets such as attractive personality, culture, political values, institutions and policies (Nye, 2004). In a similar perspective, the Edward Murrow Center for Public Diplomacy argues that public diplomacy “…deals with the influence of public attitudes…the cultivation by governments of public opinion in their countries” (Public Diplomacy Alumni Association, 2013). Accordingly, audiences can be cultivated given a country’s attractive power.

In behavioral terms soft power is attractive power (Nye, 2004). By the same token, identification —another behavioral term— plays an important role in defining the attractive power of a nation. It will prove useful to take a brief look at identification and attraction. Identification, as the primary variable in creating an attraction, does not necessarily materialize on all levels, but rather on specific aspects of the attractive power. Researches on the psychoanalytic literature indicate that identification is the original form of emotional tie with an object (person). Parents are the objects of identification at a primary level. The prerequisite of identification is idealization of the object. In later stages the object of idealization can be a political leader. The most common outcome of idealization is imitation and modeling. This is the process in which a child unconsciously adopts the characteristics of parents and duplicates parents’ behavior. Identification is a rather long-term process, requiring a shared emotional bond between the two. Therefore identification takes place when the object satisfies the psychological needs.


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One the other hand, secondary identification occurs when an individual identifies with leaders or others. The materialization of secondary identification necessitates a certain degree of envy or feeling that the two have common characteristics (see Mahler, Pine & Bergman, 1975/1985). Identification with another person/leader intensifies with cultural proximity, almost encapsulating a “like me” attitude. This means that an individual identifies with another person only after the initial feeling of attractive power.

Likewise, groups also identify with other groups once they relate. For instance, it is highly likely for a Middle Eastern country to relate to another Middle Eastern country rather then the U.S. or Europe because of cultural and historical reasons. In this case, perhaps such an attraction can be identified as cultural attractiveness. A nation’s identity, history, values, norms, culture and economy have direct effect on whether a nation bears the potential to be identified with. Similarly, Nye states that a country’s culture; political values and foreign policies are major dynamics in a country’s soft power (Nye, 2004). Within the framework of political values, wars crimes against humanity and human rights abuses have a large impact on the mental images of a country. (Snow, 2006, p.225; Melissen, 2007). To sum up, a country’s attractive power is interrelated to the degree of other nations’ identification with its values, images, politics and culture that is exerted. As a result, cultivation is contingent upon image and attraction. With that perspective at hand, the following section will assess Turkey’s brand advantage in the global scene from an identity angle.

Turkey’s Competitive Advantage: Identity

Turkey’s competitive advantage has several facets that include economy, culture, history, democratic traditions, identity, and ties with the West —connected to its European Union bid—. Kirişçi (2011) coins the composition of these elements as Turkey’s ‘demonstrative effect’. As the general framework of the paper focuses on identity this section will be develop a discussion on Turkey’s identity as its competitive advantage predominantly in its regional proximity.

Places and nations can be compared to consumer products in terms of their attractive power. All these elements encounter a certain degree of competition that requires capacity to differentiate in the face of competition. Evidently, the variety and diversity of possibilities necessitate a need to craft a niche identity. In a globalized world, dubbed as the global village, the concept of borders has become more fluid blurring the lines between nations that compete for power. Within this perspective, Leonard (2002) argues that organizations/governments need to differentiate themselves from others through their


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identity. As such, the Turkish identity stands as Turkey’s comparative advantage that can be benefited from in developing its grand PD strategy. Perhaps, a key variable in fostering change and mutual communication is through contributing a unique intangible value. In this respect, a thorough discussion on its nation brand can shed light on the notion of Turkey’s competitive identity and its viability as an asset.

Turkish identity has gone through a very distinctive process of modernization and nation building while it still remains deeply fragmented. The Ottoman modernization was finally realized during the Republican period, representing an era of secular nationalism and removal of political and public visibility of Islam in order to create a modern state with its institutions (Ahmad, 2008). The creation of the new Turkish identity was consolidated through a strict purification process of symbols in which connections to the former identity —e.g. language, dress code, music, old state, the religious authority— were eliminated. This was an inevitable consequence of nation building and means to create a new identity (Volkan, 1984).

Nonetheless, these were all major transitional processes that later led to societal fragmentation. One of the major consequences of top down modernization later came into light in terms of a conflict between secular and conservative movements (Altunışık and Tür, 2005), which still serves as a pretext in contemporary discussions. Inevitably, the top-down modernization has led to a dual yet split loyalty reverberating in the Westernism and traditionalism divide. Both groups have held on to symbols —linking objects—that represented their distinctive identity due to the inability to internalize their losses (Volkan 1990; Volkan and Zintl, 1993) such as conservative poet Necip Fazıl Kısakürek, secular leftist poet Nazım Hikmet, Adnan Menderes, İsmet İnönü, ‘tyrant’ Abdülhamit or ‘great sultan’ Abdülhamit. To this day, these linking political objects preoccupy public discussions while intrinsically signifying a major split in the Turkish collective identity. Discussion on Atatürk, is certainly not exempt from these debates. Indeed, there seems to be an irrational symbolic clash and polarization between all symbols of the Republic and the Ottoman Empire besides the obvious ideological clash between the two that is omnipresent. This confrontation results in an excessive romanticizing of either period. It would be fair to call this collective amnesia of glorification coupled with a strong sense of nostalgia. It can be argued that the identity discussions emerging from the fall of the Ottoman Empire still preside over the Turkish society and politics more or less on a symbolic level.

In terms of large-group identity it would not be an overstatement to describe Turkey as an adolescent. Turkey is trying to find what Erikson (1968) calls sense


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of inner identity. This process of self-definition and reconstruction can be illustrated in what Turkey has been going through. Turkey, a highly polarized nation perhaps more than ever before, is still in search for an identity that needs to settle on a middle ground.

On another note, Turkey’s ties with the West and its struggle with establishing a full-fledged democracy and liberties too go back to the Ottoman era. The intricate relationship between the past and present makes it quite impossible to separate one from the other. In sum, this debate is embedded in the Republican-Ottoman that broadly defines political identities in Turkey. The complex debate has also been reflected in the old Turkey vs. new Turkey debate that intrinsically represents a somewhat hyperbolic clash of constructed identities. Despite the fragmentation of identity poses a threat to the national stability and unity. From another angle it also creates an alternative in-between identity, one that is between the past and today, between traditionalism and modernity, between East and West. Hence, coupled with its stable economy Turkey’s fluid identity is perhaps a key attractive variable that has been utilized in its PD formulations in attempts to project an image.

Transformations in the political sphere and occasional references to the Ottoman history have paved the way for Turkey to initiate new modes of social, economical and even ideological dialogues with the Middle East. The AK Party has been facilitating an unprecedented process that could be called a historic reconciliation or rediscovery (Larrabee, 2007). Coupled with the regained trust of majority of the Arab streets and rediscovery of the Ottoman past, Turkey lived the zenith of its relations with the Middle East up until the Arab Spring. At that time, Turkey became the living proof that economic excellence, democracy, modernity and Islam can actually co-exist. It can be suggested that Turkey has already gone through her own ‘awakening’ or ‘spring’ to unearth a balance between different factions in the society and to politically represent Islamic movements. In a way Turkish democracy has been proving that political movements - secular or Islamic- could be represented in the political system.

Keyman and Öniş (2007) argue “in the post 9/11 world Turkey and its historical experience of modernity constitutes a significance case for the possibility of the co-existence of Islam and democracy” (p.8). As a matter of fact the ruling AK Party has been demonstrating that Islam and democracy or even to say so Islam, democracy and modernity can all coexist peacefully (Bishara, 2012). It must also be mentioned that this case is what makes Turkey an exception in the Middle East. This fact is perhaps far more valuable than it is imagined to be. Keyman and Öniş (2007) propose Turkey as an alternative modernity, which may well describe the quite exceptional identity of Turkey. It is the argument


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of this paper that in terms of attractive power, Turkey’s differentiation is in fact the multi-cultural, inclusive identity, fluid in structure and coupled with strong democratic institutions. All together, this can be described as the ‘Turkish experience’ which could possibly not have happened if Turkey did not go through the alternative modernity process and the current rejuvenation in politics. From this point of view, the current lack of consensus on the Turkish brand can also be settled through realization of its alternative modernity and a grand restoration.

Conclusion

Perhaps, a realistic assessment of the Turkish nation brand is unlikely to yield prolific results. Lack of brands associated with the country, lack of meaningful contribution in sciences, technology, arts, issues with higher education and intellectual thinking reveal a rather grim picture. On the other hand, Turkey’s still thriving economy at the time of this publication and historical legacy of its multi-faceted identity taking cues from its cultural depth serve as potential soft power elements. These soft power elements can facilitate in the crafting and sustaining of Turkey’s nation brand. The notion of new Turkey is most likely to thrive, once differences are accommodated into a more inclusive societal setting that allows for a genuine socio-cultural reconciliation. Hence, recognizing the dual past —with all its complexities, failures and achievements— from a realistic point of view; stressing on a more inclusive secular and democratic tradition while assessing all from a longitudinal perspective is likely to foster Turkey’s role as a niche actor in its region building on identity differentiation.

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CITIZENSHIP IN TUNISIA:COSMOPOLITAN CITIZENSHIP

AS AN ALTERNATIVE

Assoc. Prof. Adem ÇaylakYıldırım Beyazıt University

Res. Assist. Başak Akar YükselYıldırım Beyazıt University

Abstract

As one of the most Westernized country in the North Africa with a predominantly Mus-lim population and a secular state, Tunisia is a good example for French type (civic-territorial) and republican citizenship. However, a tension emerges with the nation-state building process which offers an exclusive unity in secularism and Islamism axis. After Jasmine Revolution, Islamic citizenship approach rises in political arena in the hands of the new government. Hopefully, these new conditions do not create a new tension but brings democratic inclusion in the context of Ibn-Khaldun apprehension. In this study, we discuss the tension between French approach and Islamic approach with its possible effects on the democratization process which is witnessed recently by conceptualizing cosmopolitanism. Finally, we infer whether Ibn-Khaldun’s apprehension of citizenship (ummah) may provide a voice for every lifestyle in the public sphere.

Keywords: Jasmine revolution, Tunisia, cosmopolitan citizenship, Ibn-Khaldun, ummah

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CITIZENSHIP, RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CITIZEN AND STATE

Citizenship and State in Western Perspective

In Europe citizenship emerged in modern times, parallel to the emergence of nation states. During the modern era, the state and the politics of citizenship coincided on the concept of nation after abandoning religious state. Therefore, the nation became the core concept in citizenship politics in Europe and also in North Africa after the European invasions.

Citizenship in European nation-states focuses on common units of a society. These common units are sometimes tribes, kinships, myths, history, territory or state. The type of citizenship grows in a territory where depends on the bulk given to which common unit. For instance, if the bulk is on the tribe, we call it ethnogeneological. However the bulk may be on the shared territory, creating a territorial approach of nation (Connor, 2004). These approach of nation, af-fect the type of the citizenship politics in a country. While the citizenship is the whole of the relationship between the individual and the state, it is congruent with liberal individuality. By the way of addition, the politics on the citizenship relies on the given political system. Where a state embraces a republic or de-mocracy, the citizenship applications differ inside its borders; just like German and French traditions of citizenship distinguishes from each other. Tribal ap-proach belongs to German tradition (gesselschaft) that anticipates differentia-tion whereas territorial approach belongs to French tradition (gemeinschaft) that anticipates uniformity (Brubaker, 1990).

In a nation state, citizenship relies on the membership of a nation. Ideally a nation state is egalitarian, holy, democratic and one and only as a recognized state. The supplies some opportunities, correspondingly, it expects from their citizens to fulfill their duties, especially if republican citizenship approach is dominant. Then state’s holiness or significance is related with the reputation of the selected citizens that are good at doing their responsibilities (Taylor, 1994) rather than asking for rights.

The republican citizenship approach has been translated by the years and the citizensip which relies on rights of the individuals and groups in public sphere, rather than duties, is more valid. Anyhow, what is important today is equal recognition of the groups rather than being an honoured citizen (Taylor, 1994). So the rights of the ethnic minorities and migrants to be recognized and participation, and self-administrative demands are proposed to the nation state (Kymlicka, 1998). The demands change according to the structure of the population and the political culture.

CITIZENSHIP IN TUNISIA: COSMOPOLITAN CITIZENSHIP AS AN ALTERNATIVEAssoc. Prof. Adem Çaylak, Res. Assist. Başak Akar Yüksel

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The criticism of liberal and republican citizenship gave birth to the communitarian and multicultural citizenship, however, the groups which were “the others” have sublimed their differences. These ideals created communities not touching each other. Therefore Young’s (Kymlicka, 1998) multicultural citizenship has failed. Cosmopolitan citizenship provides a global and ethical framework for the cultural differences to move towards public sphere from private sphere. Yet, we should’t consider cosmopolitan vision as an ethical whole without any sanctions. Since today’s international affairs system depends on the nations and the states which defines the facts from the republican perspective, it cannot be a solution or santional unit. Locally interpreted cosmopolitan visions including hospitality and respect may rise and these all have to intersect somehow. So that, an individual or a community become the owner of some rights and ethical principals recognized globally.

Citizenship and State in Islamic Perspective

Citizenship and identity politics is not a subject of pre-modern era. In Europe, citizenship concept emerges after the urbanization by industrialization. However, this doesn’t mean that there wasn’t a membership and participation system or identities. Yet, they were not problems before the state and in public sphere. So it was in Islamic world.

There are not clear statements about citizenship in the sources of the Islam but it is possible to make some inferences. Although citizenship is a concept belonging to modernity and congruent with nation state organizations this does not mean Islam tells nothing about citizenship, citizens or the state. There are some concepts which help us to understand the Islamic perspective towards the state and the citizenship, such as; umma, Muslim in Medina, mawali and dhimma...

Umma is a feeling of being connected with every Muslim in the world which provides a religious fraternity regardless of one’s nation, tribe, place or gender. Although apprehension and the use of the umma changes according to the eras, this essence never changes (Al-Turabi,2009). Also dar al-Islam (Islam Peace State) and Medina Constitution relies on this essence. Any Muslim that decides to reside in the Medina State, there are not any districts for him or her. Muslim is free to travel and works where he or she resides to earn money. Therefore any Muslim resides in Islamic State, he or she is a citizenship of the state as well as the Jews residing in the state. The alien is only the one that resides outside the dar-al Islam (Kamali, 2009). This means that the state’s point of view towards its citizens is not from tribal or religious perspective but from territorial perspective.


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Another issue regarding citizenship in Islamic perpective is the Muslim captives (mawali) and the non-Muslim protected people that are migrants or former slaves (dhimmis). Although the state counts both of the groups as citizen in the context of dwellers, the Arabs enjoy the full citizenship rights such as participating to the army, working, eligibility for judgeship... (Kamali, 2009). However these people meet more than a tolerance in Islamic State (Al-Turabi, 2009).

After the abolition of the Caliphate umma apprehension has changed. Umma and qawm is used as if they are the same concept with a nation. Even umma represents a brotherhood of every Muslim regardless of their nation. The conjuncture forced the former postcolonial Muslim states to form nation states. Yet, umma became unable to define modern citizenship in a nation state; then translated. Some muslims find a link between political liberalism and Islam; not only in the Islamic territory but also throughout the Christian territory by the Muslim migrants (March, 2005). Although process is the same with political liberalism and representative democracy, the elected is not only responsible to the public but also to Allah (Al-Turabi, 2009) because the only sovereign in Islamic State is Allah (Khatab and D. Bouma, 2010).

Another issue regarding Islamic perspective is Islamic State and law. Sharia is the basis of the legislation. Legislation is a right acknowledged by the society (Khatab and D. Bouma, 2010). The principles of an Islamic State are; justice and equality. These principles include merit and conseilling (sura) (Teymiye, 1999). Regarding these, from the eye of the state, citizens have some duties. These duties are obedience and assistance (Kamali, 2009) after biat44. Obedience is compulsory if the executive is lawful and legitimate. Otherwise, Islam recognizes the right of civil disobedience. And the assistance refers to the community rather than individual. Therefore it is congruent with the group rights which rejects being introvert but promotes establishment of relationships. However umma should be comprehended as a roof above the cultures reinforcing the neighborhood.

We cannot truly separate Islamic law and the state, though sharia loosely indicates how should be the legislation and execution. However, secularism is something experinced by the Islamic States through history. As not evolved same with the Western type of secularism, it needs to be redefined for the Islamic states. Secularim is the sum of tolerance and harmony (Khatab and D. Bouma, 2010) rather than strictly separation of state and the religion.

44 Ibn Khaldun mentions that the tradition of biat has changed in time. Although the caliph or the leader of the Islamic State do not need a swear, they began to collect biat from public by pressure. Yet, if biat includes love and pleasure, swear is not necessary (El-Katip, 2010).


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In modern times a tension between the approaches of Islamic values and the nation state emerged. When nation state leaving the religion outside the game, made nation a mythic base for the state. Therefore discriminated and marginalised some layers of the society, including some cultures and weak socioeconomic layers, particularly by embracing liberalism. Whereas for Islam, indeed being a human is adequate to be recognized by a state (Kamali, 2009). This tension became apparent in postcolonial North African countries such as Tunisia because just like every society they asked for freedom and share in the world market. Nation state limited the work and residence rights of the migrants or the aliens, even sometimes its own citizens. Secondly, since the nation state is an organizational structure, umma became a feeling rather than an administrative formation.

IDEAL UNIVERSAL CITIZENSHIP APPROACHES IN THE CONTEXT OF WESTERN AND ISLAMIC PERSPECTIVES

Cosmopolitan Citizenship

Cosmopolitan vision is not a recent concept found place in political phiosophy where we can find its roots in Kant’s writings. Although in Ancient Greek and the era of Roman Empire until scholastical philosophy, these were the places where differences lived together in peace and nobody finds this fact strange. Yet, scholars distinguish the limitations of being a citizen in those civilizations from the cosmopolitan vision developed in modern times and today.

The concept has been constituted by the help of Kant’s philosophy and Hegel’s and the other social scientists criticisms parallel to the Westphalian state order and modernism, also has risen with the principles defining human rights and crimes against humanity (Waldron, 2008). From many perspectives: “…cosmopolitanism signifies an attitude of enlightened morality that doesn’t place ‘love of country” ahead of ‘love of mankind’ (Martha Nussbaum) for some; for others cosmopolitanism signifies hybridity, fluidity and recognizing the fractured and internally riven character of humanselves and citizens whose complex aspirations cannot be circumscribed by national fantasies and primordial communities (Jeremy Waldron); for a third group of thinkers whose lineages are those of Critical Theory, cosmopolitanism is a normative philosophy for carrying the universalistic norms of discourse ethics beyond the confines of the nation state (Jürgen Habermas, David Helld, James Bohman)” (Benhabib, 2008a). For Benhabib (2008a), cosmopolitanism “…best be characterized as framing the morality of the law but in a global rather than a domestic context.”

Cosmopolitan conditions for Kant are, as sum; international law, cosmopolitan rights and authoritative international authority. The principal of


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cosmopolitanism is to bring an end to the war in Europe. Therefore politics need to be inclusive in a territory and both the people and the state should have hospitality besides many conditions such as having no debt of military costs and having no interfere to another state’s domestic politics as well as international affairs. “The law of world citizenship shall be limited to conditions of universal hospitality.” (Kant, (1975) 1923, p.443, in Benhabib, 2008a). A federation of nations provide cosmopolitan vision to scatter. In Kant’s vision, state should draw the lines of hospitality according to the situation of being under the colonization or invasion (Fine, 2007). Kant was criticised most because of his support republican state although he perceives the will of the citizens will prevent a war if it is asked. Also there is a problematic arena with the international platform posessing cosmopolitan vision and having a moral injunction on the states (Fine, 2007).

At this point a valid and also significant argument emerges. There should be a difference between the cosmopolitanization and institutional cosmopolitanization parallel to the ‘value free approach and normative cosmopolitanism (Beck, 2006). The problem with the universalist norms or international relationship is their having subjects of only states. However an individual is one that has some rights independent from any state. Therefore the actual sanctions on the states have no value from the perspective of cosmopolitanism. Infact, as Arendt and Jaspers (in Benhabib, 2008a) mention, these are also problems for cosmopolitanism to be applied to the divided people without an institutional enforcement, because every local community embraces norms as the way they find that applicable in the context of the will for living together45. It is unnecessary to expect good performances from universal institutions (Honig, 2008), cosmopolitanism is where local wills and self determination exists46.

“… Modern state system is caught between sovereignty and hospitality.” (for liberal democracies) “because they are based on the fragile but necessary negotiation of constitutional universalism and territorial sovereignty” (Benhabib, 2008a, p.31) in contradiction between republican and cosmopolitan approaches and democratic legitimacy. The dilemma which causes foreign co-citizenship and resident aliens, rises since “…territorial sovereignty and

45 Although Benhabib perceives this situation as a dilemma, and finds lack of universalism, Waldron perceives that as ordinary (Waldron, 2008).

46 “On Benhabib’s account…universality represents a principle; democratic self-determination an exigency.” (Honig, 2008, p.110). Besides, “she does not dwell on the role of social movements in these cases of ‘democratic iteration’ and absent that is hard to tell what’s democratic about them” (Honig, 2008, p. 117).


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the democratic voice have never matched completely.” (Benhabib, 2008a, p.35). That’s why democratic iterations (Benhabib, 2008a) are significant during cosmopolitanism included salvation process. Rather than perceiving cosmopolitanism normatively, by eliminating the defects of it, every territory may create a cosmopolitan way of solving problems on citizenship conceptualization according to both the newly changed conditions and the common will through jurisgenerative processes (Benhabib, 2008a).

Whilst cosmopolitanism and the cosmopolitan citizenship has covered in the context of foreign co-citizens and resident aliens, we can also put in these concepts the “others left from the grateful citizens” (Üstel, 2009) which makes origin, religion, lifestyle and even class47 (Benhabib, 2008b) in the public sphere important. Although many of the scholars are interested on asylum seekers, immigrants or the minorities, we should also take into account the minorities through lifestyles, yet in a territory people may have common origin or common religion but a disjunction can still be faced through different lifestyles. This differentiation is usually supported by the state rather than public itself since state sovereignty may perceive a political peril regarding an issue. That peril is sustained by the grateful citizens that own the laws and the state sovereignty (Waldron, 2008).

From a liberal perspective, Kymlicka (2008, p.129-130) states a number of injustices against those that are not seen as full members of the nation; “immigrants…, historic substate groups, neigboring nation states and antagonism…” and finds cosmopolitan citizenship “…sever the link between liberal democracy and nationhood and thereby entirely avoid the risks of (discriminative) liberal nationalism”, call it transcending liberal nationhood (Kymlicka, 2008, p.131). He argues that cosmopolitanism does not have any conflict with liberal nationhood but needs to find a compromise.

Citizenship From Islamic Perspective and Ibn Khaldun’s Asabiya and Umma

Ibn Khaldun is one of the first realists and founders of sociology (Ilm-ul Umran) that was born in Maghrib and contributed social sciences universally. Since he was the man of the territory, his ideas on state, citizenship (membership of a umma) may be beneficial for the future of Tunisia as well as other cultures. He tries to get knowledge by observing and trying to reach the realm. His aim of getting knowledge is still discussed as well as his method and ideas. What is obvious, anyone can see an effort of compromising Islam and the historical reality.

47 Especially valid for Europe she mentions.


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Ibn Khaldun’s perspective of society (umran) depends on the necessity of the community, based on the feeling of living together. There is an idea of the social contract rooted from the innate sociability of human (Al-Azmeh, 1981). This social contract is called Constitution of Medine, providing freedom of religion, expectation of consent as well as some listed freedoms and responsibilities (Hamidullah, 2007). He analyzes the membership of a society by Asabiya theory. Asabiya means solidarity, cohesion and aggregation. It integrates the individuals and generates the social change including a collective action. The object of asabiya is to establish new states (Hassan, 1998).

There are two types of societies: Badawah and Hazari. Badawi society is not only composed of nomads but also includes every type of society shapes before civilized life style (Avva, 2011; Hassan, 1998). Badawi society depends on kinship, solidarity, cooperation and collective property. Administrative organ treats democratically though it is not that difficult because of being small units. Foreigners can be accepted to the clans (which were the basic organizational unit in Maghrip among the Arab). Their ties of asabiya are pretty strong to affect the features of the badawi. When nomadic life style evolved to the more civilized society with its changing division of labour and form of production which depends on property, equality and solidarity dissappears and caused the elites emerge (Azmeh, 1981; Hassan, 1998).

There are two kinds of asabbiyya; first is kinship and the second is causal. Their common point is action; however for Ibn Khaldun, kinship asabbiyya shouldn’t become prominent, as Hz. Muhammed mentions “Learn your pedigree to the level of binding your brothers and relatives.” (Hassan, 1998, p.235). However when causal asabbiyya comes forefront, people act as if they are all relatives of each other. Therefore, clan system’s emotion of kinship asabiya while acting and causal asabiya’s membership system is ideal. Asabiya is necessary just like society itself since it is a productive power; without asabiya even religious events cannot emerge (Hassan, 1998)

Islamic state focuses on justice in administration; and asabiya provides the soul of Islamic administration. “…Kinship itself is not enough to explain the unity of nomadic groups or, indeed of any other ‘protosemitic’ or premodern group.” (Azmeh,1981, p. 183). Badawis are democratic and fair in administration with a selected leader that is mature to apply the God’s provisions and justice (Ibn Haldun,1989); but the civilized Hazari society looses these values. Even nomads choose their leader from their clans, this doesn’t mean that after getting together with their clans, the leader won’t change; parallel to the caliph elections. While asabiya makes necessary right to use force, in civilized societies which based on property, in further phases, governmental


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instrumentse right to use force (tagallüb) and pressure (kahr) (Hassan, 1998). For sure, Hz. Muhammed suggested centralization where the clans and their power were dispersed but still full of asabiya. He tried to make rise the causal asabiya. Islamic state is established on asabiya; however in Hazari society when the asabiya disappears, religion takes place of the asabiya. In fact, the operational feature of Islam and Islamic State comes from asabiya.

“In consanguineous societies having democratic tradition, pay attention to consensus and depends on a real general consent; however in property based societies political order is provided by the acceptance because of having no alternative choice marched forward in time” (Hassan, 1998, p.261). For Ritter (in Hassan, 1998, p. 244); “ ‘Muslim brother’ concept could hardly takes place of ‘clan brother’ in Islam. The power of blood unity is significant in Ancient city-states, however this matter of fact is more apparent in Arab.”

Minority issues are solved parallel to the classical Islamic administration. “Other groups not belonging to the genealogical group falling under the grand asabiya, such as Christian militias, or Kurdish and Circassian clans,” (Azmeh, 1981, p.186) and of course Jews and Berbers. Besides, Hz. Mohammed’s behaviour towards Jews and Christians in Medina is a model for Islamic political culture48. After a confirmation the process is accomplished as they are accepted as the members of the umran. The new members accept the new social order, whilst they do not touch the main group but have to accord with the grand asabiya’s public sphere (Azmeh, 1981). 49It is possible to observe this approach in Modern Tunisia whilst making pressure in the public sphere in order to support social order of the elites. Not only on the Western outfit expectations from the people but also the obligation for the foreign non-muslim partner to marry a Tunisian muslim woman to convert (The Embassy of US, 2013).

A SUGGESTION FOR TUNISIA AS A CASE

Modern Tunisia, Identity and Unity

Tunisia was residence for Jews, Christians, Turks, Southern Europeans and Berberis. Jews and Berberis were local minorities in Tunisia. However, Berberis became Muslims after the Arab invasion and within long years they embraced

48 In era of Hz. Mohammed, Jews were free to be educated in Jewish schools called “Beyt-el Midras”. Besides, a treaty was held between the Muslims and Necran Christians which provides property and life; moreover the Christian community was allowed to elect the patrician and the priests (Yılmaz, 1997, p.88).

49 This matter of fact may include voluntariness too, since “..the administrated clan may see the stronger clan’s culture high” (Ibn Haldun, 1989, p.374-375).


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Arabic culture and even language, though Arabs and Berberis are not different in races. After the independency, many Jews integrated to diaspora since they had suspicions about the new government’s minority politicies regarding religion (Perkins, 1986). In today’s Tunisia, 98% of the population is Muslim Arabs, 1% is European and Christian, 1% is Jewish or other. Arabic is both official and commerce language where French is commerce language (CIA The World Factbook, para. 3) and used in schools.

The political culture of the Tunisians finds its roots during the exploitation experience which began with the invasion of the France on Tunisia in 1881, French effect on economic and social life began to be felt. La Marsa Convention clarified the French protectorate on Tunisia, signed in 1883 (Perkins, 1986). Uncomfortable with the free travel of the Muslim Algerians and Tunisians without recognizing borders is one of the reason why France conquerred Tunisia rapidly. While trying to establish borders between Tunisia and the other Arab countries, French worked for the safe of their properties and their political acquisitions. Tunisians enjoy the right to go to the school as French do, and take the bilangual education, which forms future elites of Tunisia struggle for equality in eligibility for loyal and executive jobs. These elites founded Young Tunisians struggling with the Western values on their land and then Dustur Party referring their constitutional demands; conflicting with what they fight and demand indeed.

The initial sound responses to the protectorate were nationalist and modernist movements emerged against Western values besides supporting equality on pays. Only after several years Habib Bourguiba was that could reinforce the nationalist struggle against French Protectorate under Dustur Party. He was distinguished from other Dustur members by not being against West but supporting independence in his writings on the newspaper L’Action Tunisienne in 1932. He also supported Tunisian traditions, traditional dress and Arabo-Islamic values without deviating from secularism. When Bourguiba called for independence, Dustur has dissolved insight and this event gave birth to Neo-Dustur in 1934. Soon, they were arrested and sent to the internal exile. When he returned back from exile, released by French Government, work on independence struggle has accelerated by the support of Tunisian Trade Workers. Finally in 1956, society hugged the leader and Modern Tunisia was established. Bourguiba became the president of the young Tunisia Repulic and the new establishing constitution was inured in 1959 (UNPAN, 1991).

In independent Tunisia Republic, a nation state which is influenced by both French and German tradition of citizenship politics, is established. After the establishment, the elites of the struggle announced that everyone living in


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Tunisia are citizens of independent Tunisia, no matter what their ethnic or religious status. The people of the Tunisia from that moment on were not Arabic, Muslim, Jewish or French but Tunisian. Although Tunisians were conservative, Bourguiba, during his rule, wanted to see a social change in education, in the position of the women, in medical care in terms of industrialization. Also, in order not to demolish the bridges between the Tunisia and the West, the education kept bilingual with the bulk on French. He supported the traditional values during war, whereas the alliance between the ulama and the French caused discredit of the ulama in the public eye. This perception reinforced Bourguiba’s radical secular reforms. Also, ulama left its position to the state itself (Perkins, 1986).

In November 1987, the discontent resulted with a coup of Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, put forward the bad health conditions of Bourguiba. As soon as he became president, he declared that the Tunisians are ready for participation, pluralism and multiparty system (Angrist, 1999) Yet, transition from single party regime to a multiparty regime requires a distinction between the ruling party and the state apparatus (Hoffman, 1994; Lijphart, 1999); however, this couldn’t be possible even after the Pact and authoritarianism kept living in the territory.

People trying to withstand the deteriorating economy and political pressure have blown out in 2011 with huge demonstrations. Although the first protests were for high rate of unemployment soon directed at political objectives including citizenship politics as it always happen in such movements (Haggard and Kaufman, 1999). These situations strengthened the opposition and the marginalised groups. Tunisia was ruled by one party government and authoritarian leaders till the revolution. Until then, the administration turned into a personal authoritarian rule, including patronage, repression of political competition and dissent.

Citizenship in Tunisia

Tunisia established its unity by the definition of citizenship. 1959 Consttitution and the citizenship law mentions the principles and attitude towards identity issues. However, the constitution of 1959 (UNPAN, 1991), adopted Islam as the religion of the state, yet the state is not an Islamic State, and applying sound secularism. Although the religion of the state is Islam, citizenship rules are according to the nationality. Therefore, it is difficult to define Tunisia with territorial citizenship approach, solely.

If we cover Code de la Nationalité Tunisienne (Jurisite Tunisienne, 2009) which regulates Tunisians citizenship status, some articles can give us some clues about the Western influence on the law. First, this law percieves citizenship


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interrelated with nation. Although Tunisian identity is not defined by any religion or tribe, “Tunisian” itself is perceived as a whole uniform nation. This brings inclusiveness for the different prevailing cultures already exist in the country, not for the newborns or strangers.

Secondly, both the constitution of 1959 with amendments and the citizenship law, entails some preconditions, responsibilities and a legal procedure. This means there is a system of membership. What is distinguishing from other other countries is the power of the President to oppose the citizenship appliances by scanning some legal necessities. These necessities can be evaluated as the conditions for dispositioning from Tunisian citizenship, such as; rejecting military responsibilities, treason or to make false representation in legal papers during appliance (Jurisite Tunisienne, 2009).

Another important feature of the citizenship apprehension in Tunisia is about how the citizenship acquisition by birth is. In 1956 version of the code, a Tunisian was the one that has born from a Tunisian father no matter where. This has altered by adding “born from a Tunisian mother” in 2005 by the improvement of the women acquisitions (Jurisite Tunisienne, 2009). However this amendment does not change the mentality. Tribal citizenship approach of German romantism reveals by this article. Yet, dual citizenship is recognized and so this apprehension is broadened. For muslims, everything in the context of passing through the Tunisian citizenship seems easy. However, this is not completely true when a non-muslim man asks for Tunisian citizenship. If a non-muslim man wants to marry and ask for Tunisian citizenship, he should convert by the papers. Although there are many other political and immigration related problems cause this kind of regulation, it is impossible to ignore that the state perceives a non-muslim man from different culture and makes more difficult to become a Tunisian.

Tunisia is a secular state where is influenced much by French secularism. The law of citizenship is secular just like many other regulations but the constitution. Yet, the religion of the state is Islam, executives that considered the society as conservative, put this feature into the constitution. Sound secularism politics in Tunisia was not affected much by this article but the afraid of Islamic fundemantalism remained consistent in the executive elites of the state. Although the elites repressed the conservative opposition, it is impossible to understimate the political culture brought by Islamic values. Without an ulama, Tunisians follow Maliki historically and Hanafi by the influence of Ottomans. As the ulama was discreditted during the I. World War, state superseded the ulama after independence. The state’s Islam which supports uniformity and unity just like prevailing ideology, controls the social life. So there is a dilemma in the historical political culture and the French laicism.


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In present Tunisia, this code and its citizenship politics is more moderate because of the international conventions regarding citizenship and refugees. Recently the elected have efforts on preparing a new constitution and making amendments on citizenship regulations, especially by the women’s pressure.

Although clans are tried to be made prototypes by the liberal and republican citizenship type rooted in West, these efforts have failed to do that. But pushed the differences to the private sphere and this caused a tension. In Tunisia where the political culture was affected by nesep asabiya, then Islamic State experience and French colonization, there are some indicators Show Tunisia is on the way to the causal asabiya. Even if the clans culture is not alive in today’s political environment; groups having different lifestyles hava asabiya in itself with the conflicts contributing their asabiya. Of Tunisia, one of the most Westernized country through Northern Africa; there may be a sign for the living nesep asabiya in the context of creating a new “other”; such as, the attitude limiting the non-muslim men that wants to become a Tunisian citizen by marrying a Tunisian muslim women. In fact, even in Islamic State which was a sedentary society, any kinship and religion were accepted to the umma if there is a consent and the will of living together. So that an inclusiveness and the spreading the causal asabiya coincide with cosmopolitan citizenship vision.

Tension Between Western and Islamic Perspective of the Citizenship on the Territory

The Arabic and Muslim society which lived by the Islamic rules and the ulama as an umma did not know borders for Muslims. However there was fights between the Berberies the other cultural and religious groups untill they met the Ottomans. These fights steadied by the Ottoman beys for a while. As Tunisia became a trade center for Europe, especially for France, the land became more multicultural.

Territorial citizenship approach brought by French protectorate to Tunisia translated the citizenship apprehension throughout the country, beginning from the executives. The borders between Arab Muslim countries through the region were drawn. In this period Tunisians and the French people of the protectorate experienced the first constitution. The first citizens of the Tunisia were French living in that territory, because the executive wanted to protect the French investments and the properties.

The Muslims became local minorities (Kymlicka, 1998) of the land where they could only achieve bad jobs and excluded from executive possibilities by the monarch. So, an opposition movement raised to get the rights of equal pay, having a good job, going to the schools. When they succeeded, they provided


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elites of Tunisia grew up in the Western type schools of Tunisia. They raised with French école but fought against the Western values.

When they get organized first under Young Tunisians, then in Dustur Party they asked for equality mainly; at least equal pay and equal membership to the state, until the demand for independency after the leadership of Bourguiba. And the movement established a new nation state following the territorial citizenship apprehension, influenced much with the French Revolution. Public hugged the leader in order to see the light at the end of the protectorate tunnel. So Bourguiba that is afraid of loosing the acquisitions of the new independent nation state, found legitimacy for establishing a “one man” state. French protectorate prepared a base for the authoritarian regime adding the tradition of citizenship politics.

After the independency, people that live in Tunisia were all equal in the context of uniformity. Although individuals were not distinguished by their religions or tribes, some of the cultures were discriminated. Particularly the harsh secularism borrowed from France and Turkey, excluded the conservative people to get the high jobs, and conservative opposition from the political and executive system. The Tunisian uniformity was culture-blinded to those that did not wanted to integrate the system as the way they were expected.

The conservative opposition had a pick during the authoritarian regimes of Bourguiba and Ben Ali when the exclusion had a pick too. The unity and uniformity anticipated by the government did no work. Although there was no article rooted discrimination in the constitution (UNFT, 1991), that was the constitution of only the followers of the Bourguiba not hugged by the conservatives, socialists, Jews or Christians. The 1959 Constitution can be identified as blind. The state promoted liberalism and development economically, and said to be promoted political liberalism, the main defect of the nation state revealed.

Jasmine Revolution and the latest events in Tunisia can be evaluated as political liberal demands coming from the bottom irreversibly. At the same time, these demands can be perceived as requests for living equally together, participation, have a chance to affect the execution and voice out their differences.

The protests’ demands are to have freedom in public sphere. What is problematic with the republican citizenship, French laicism and the authoritarian executive in practice is the repression on the public sphere and political institutions. It is understandable if a group or individual asks to use its identity in politics. Its the choice of the group or individual to voice or not, its culture, religion or identity, politically (Modood, 2010). It is not possible to distinguish private


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sphere, public sphere and the politics completely (Vally and Worby, 2008). Although Islamic State is inadequate to explain modern concepts regarding citizenship politics, the Western separations between these institutions may led a tension which doesn’t occur in Western political life.

There is a nationalist and uniformist structure of citizenship politics under influence of German tradition in Tunisia. Indeed, the definition of Tunisian does not rely on tribe, however, one that was born in Tunisia can not get Tunisian citizenship. Yet, Islamic citizenship culture , experienced before the protectorate, relies on the residence regardless of the religion.

Cosmopolitan citizenship which means more than Kymlicka’s (1998) suggestion of multicultural citizenship can be a solution for the tension between Islamic political culture and the Western citizenship approach applied in Tunisia. Requests for equal recognition and living together of the groups, identities were repressed for a long time under authoritarian regimes. Recognising the defects of multicultural citizenship and adopting multiculturalism according the needs of the Tunisians can promote the translation process. The pure, individualist political liberalism and the procedural democracies became barriers before the participation and expression.

Tunisia has experienced sound French citizenship approach while the political culture depended on Islamic perspective. “As postcolonial immigrants exercise their option in recent years for French citizenship or legal residency, those that do not fit the profile of the proper citizen are subjected by formal and informal state agents to poliçe or administrative control and informal intimidation.” (Honig, 2008). This perception sustained after the independence that the grateful citizen of the newly established republic in Tunisia, constituted the elites close to the Western policies. Could cosmopolitan citizenship live congruent with Ibn Khaldun’s perspective of asabiya? After the revolution, Tunisians have to find a way to congregate a citizenship policy between people supporting peaceful and inclusive Islamic State and the secular state including any kind of expression, while it does not seem impossible with a common ground.

Benhabib (2008a) suggests federation and republican administration for that embraces cosmpolitan vision. However these bot hare not compulsory requirements. Indeed, people of Tunisia asks for more democracy and republican delegative democracies (Guillermo O’Donnell) which actualized by the republican state cannot satisfy these demands.

Although federal administration type seems congruent with cosmopolitan vision and cosmopolitan citizenship; Lijphart (1999) mentions that plural societies in language and ethnicities need federalism. However Tunisia is


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not a plural society that way. Moreover, in federative states, there is a strict distinction between the legislation, execution and jurisdication. But in Islamic political culture, the distinction between legislation and execution is not clear; which is close to the parliamentary system. Tunisia’s citizenship approach indicates that the main issue is the perception of “grateful citizen” and the discrimination to the different lifestyles applied by the state and the elites. The political culture rooted in asabiya and the expectation of the congruence from the weak or defeated part of the society, still alive.

CONCLUSION

There is a tension between the Western type of citizenship politics and Islamic apprehenship of citizenship. This tension reveals throughout the countries where experienced Islamic political culture for long years. One of these countries is Tunisia with an Islamic State and a colonial past. Tunisia, just like many countries had a principle of Westernization and industrialization without abandoning the traditions. However, French protectorate created a tension with French Revolutionary ideas and the conservative social life as well as changing political values in country.

The nation state is in contradiction with umma apprehension. One is inclusive for religious and exclusive for other nations whereas the other is inclusive for tribes. Although there were bloody contestations for power between the dynasties, the idea of umma continued.

The Islamic notion of citizenship relies on the principle of residence whereas Western citizenship depends on territory or tribe. These differences emerged after the French invasion. Also, Western liberal citizenship approaches are religious or color blinded. Islamic State accepts equality in social life, but only Muslims can benefit from high ranks such as Sharia courts. Therefore there is not a pure eqalitarian system in both. Though Islam focuses on justice and equality together for the relationship betwe different groups, Western liberalism focuses on equality of individuals. What is common in both approach is the duties and responsibilities prevailing to the rights.

Secularism distinguishes the religious sphere and the state in politics and sometimes state tries to control religion. But in the Islamic State, religion, state and public sphere cannot be separated (Avva, 2011). They are interactive. To compromise cosmopolitanism and asabiya just like West and Islam, a new definition of secularism should be covered in the context of tolerance and harmony.

In both Islamic and Western states citizens are representated politically with one difference. The responsibility of the elected people in Western type of


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representation is directed to the public whereas the nominated and then elected authority in Islamic State is responsible to Allah as well as the umma. However, Tunisia, where conservative Muslims live, has always witnessed ruling dynasties; including the Ottoman beys and two latest authoritarian leaders. Since society has not nominated someone, this structure continues unwillingly until the Jasmine Revolution in 2011.

To conclude, these citizenship approaches has transformed. The tension between Islamic and Western political cultures left their places first to the citizenship definition by individual rights then to the group rights and now cosmopolitan vision. The advantage of the Tunisian Muslim society lies in the harmony between the Islamic culture and the multiculturalism. Since both Islamic perspective and cosmopolitan vision bring “the love of mankind” forefront, without neglecting cohesion, the Arab Spring may be a good opportunity to establish a new citizenship polity in Tunisia. Therefore, an inclusive, congruent and respectful view of society is needed to respect any differentiation such as tribe, religion or life style with a certain political culture.

Which approach of cosmopolitan vision is suitable to Tunisia’s recent situation is not yet clear; but whatever version is embraced should be parallel to the political culture of the territory. Universal norms for global ethics constitute one branch of cosmopolitanism. As cosmopolitanism’s basic concept, i.e., hospitality, it is necessary to widen that to the different life-styles in public sphere. This vision includes both individual and group rights in a global framework. With a territorial sovereignty and territorial interpretation, a new citizenship form can be constituted. Cosmopolitan vision and cosmopolitan citizenship are not unique to the West but consider it a s general framework for local communities.

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THE CRITERIA VALUES OFTHE QUR’ANIC REFERENCES

FOR ENJOYINGPUBLIC RIGHTS

Dr. Fikret GedikliMuş Alparslan University Faculty of Theology

Abstract

This article will evaluate Quranic suggestions and outlines to benefit from public rights and opportunities, its principal criteria, such applications in different eras of Islamic His-tory depending on its background in connection with our modern day. It will discuss whether or not it is a problem to adopt the references of Quran in public institutions as a principal criterion as well as the contribution of taking the fairness into account in benefiting public rights.

Besides, the content of working in public organizations, the principal of career and merit standard, what is observed in this field will be explained with Quranic aspects. The arti-cle will evaluate what people expect from the justice in public administration, whether determining a criterion to accept the necessities of the required job means discrimina-tion or not with their examples. It will present whether certain formulations reminding discrimination especially in such an application is associated with the Quranic sugges-tions of attitudes, principals and practices and whether handling certain applications of modern-day with a pragmatic point of view means interpreting religious references arbitrarily.

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INTRODUCTION

In this study, we reviewed such matters as the features of a structure that would allow for a comprehensive social justice and practices, possibility and limits of implementation of such features or, in this context, of reinforcing and maintaining the existing one, behavioral recommendations and primary criteria provided by the Qur’an for individuals to enjoy their social rights; we examined certain examples of some implementations from various eras of the history of Islam related to this matter in accordance with the respective background, adapting them to the current conditions; and we emphasized Qur’anic references of the contribution of all members of the community or their respective duties and liabilities in the justly distribution of social rights, taking as criteria the justice and the safety, i.e., the equality and the merit; and possible consequences of the implementation of the principles prescribed by these references as solid criteria.

This statement explains the circumstances surrounding such terms as “justice”, “safety” and “competence” and the true causes (illat) and lateral meanings (manat) underlying these terms, and then an assessment is made relating to their projection on the modern world, giving various recommendations thereof. The recommendations provided are not ideal behaviors that are impossible to realize. Then, over-idealizing a concept is to put the largest obstacle for its possibility, or a solely scientific attempt; but merely a scientific presentation of the basic dynamics of the Qur’an and some positive practice recommendations from the history of Islam. This presentation necessarily expresses that certain timely attitudes and behavioral patterns may give rise to certain behaviors and attitudes. These behaviors and attitudes do emerge under influence of the infrastructure created by the respective community. In the course of historical development, certain inconsistencies and negativities required justice and safety principles to become the main dynamics. This obligation, in turn, made it manifest that it is essential for the community that is the subject of the justice and safety principle to benefit from all public services and social possibilities in an equal manner and in accordance with the justice and merit principle.

Consequently, the study is established around the fact that the basic justice and safety measures of the Qur’an do constitute the criteria for social duties, and it is emphasized within this scope that persistently maintaining of the justice and merit measures of the Qur’an and demand social and individual sense of justice and the relevant practice thereof in order to keep the concept of “merit” alive would not be an over-idealized, unrealizable practice rather it reminds to all that take it as a value that it is the sole ethical attitude to assume all the time towards our history and future.

THE CRITERIA VALUES OF THE QUR’ANIC REFERENCES FOR ENJOYING PUBLIC RIGHTS • Dr. Fikret Gedikli

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1. The Justice and Safety Principle of the Qur’an

Justice, the ethical virtue that allows for individual and social peace and harmony and a life consistent with the merit and equality principles, is a noun that means “being just in behavior and judgment, judging with justice, being equal, and establishing equality” (Ibn Manzur, 1119: 31/2838). Justice is used in the Qur’an to generally refer to order, equilibrium, equality and impartiality. “(They are) listeners of a lie, devourers of what is forbidden; therefore if they come to you, judge between them or turn aside from them, and if you turn aside from them, they shall not harm you in any way; and if you judge, judge between them with equity; surely Allah loves those that judge equitably.” (al –Maida ); “Allah does not forbid you respecting those that have not made war against you on account of (your) religion, and have not driven you forth from your homes, that you show themkindness and deal with them justly; surely Allah loves thedoers of justice. (al-Mumtahana, 60/8)

No doubt that Allah the Almighty glorifies respecting trust many times in the Qur’an and commands the mankind to be just in every respect (an-Nahl, 19/90); furthermore, He established justice as the pivotal concept and the basic practice within the scope of certain matters or circumstances, e.g. when judging among people (an-Nisa, 4/58); in the economic life (al-An’am, 6/152); ar-Rahman, 55/9); when giving testimony (al-Baqara, 2/282); reconciling two fighting or conflicting parties (al-Hujurat, 49/9); matters concerning the family law, as the essential justification in the settlement of any dispute relevant to the abovementioned is not to violate the “justice”; to restore an individual’s rights; (an-Nisa, 4/58); and to preserve the merit (an-Nisa, 4/3).

In our opinion, it would be useful to briefly explain reasons for the revelation of the “Surely Allah commands you to make over trusts to their owners and that when you judge between people you judge with justice; surely Allah admonishes you with what is excellent; surely Allah is Seeing, Hearing.” (an-Nisa, 4/58) as it is closely related to the concepts of “trust” and “justice” in particular. The well-known rumor was that on the day Mecca was conquered, when Muhammad arrived at the Kaaba, Uthman Ibn-Talha, the key holder of the Kaaba, locked the gates of the Kaaba and declined to hand over the keys to Muhammad. Then, Ali Ibn-Abi Talib took the keys by twisting his arm thus allowing Muhammad to perform a two-raqat prayer within the Kaaba. Thereafter, Uthman Ibn-Talhah stated, “If I had known he was Muhammad, I would have given it to him”. At that point, when the Prophet performed his prayer and got out of the Kaaba, his uncle Abbas Ibn Abd Al-Muttalib demanded the position of the key keeper to be assigned upon him to carry out along with his already well established Zamzam business Quite the opposite, Muhammad commanded the position


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of key bearer of the Kaaba to be restored to Uthman Ibn-Talha and Ali Ibn-Abi Talib to apologize to him for what he has done. Thereupon, Uthman Ibn-Talhah, about whom an Ayah was revealed, converted to Islam and the keys to the gates of the Kaaba was kept by him ever since. (Vahidi, 1998; 116/117; at-Tabari, VII/170) No doubt that the revelation of this Ayah in connection with such an incident does not necessarily obligate that the Ayah should be linked only to this incident. The point that must be considered here is the fact that the person, to whom Muhammad returned the Kaaba’s keys, was not a Muslim but converted to Islam following the returning of the keys. There is no doubt about that the restoration in question does offer a wide perspective as to how the essential criteria on “trust” should be.

The following matters may be considered to better understand the Qur’an’s approach to trust: The concept of trust has a relatively wide semantic aspect in the literature, covering religious, ethical and social concept and principles. Respecting trust is mentioned in the Qur’an among the essential features a believer should have. (al-Mu’minun, 23/8; al-Maarij, 70/32). Tabari stated that the “Ayah” (An-Nisa, 4/58) “dictates that the leaders in particular must maintain trust as well as justice. Commands them to respect trust, let their people benefit from the possibilities their country offers them equally, maintain justice and follow the law for their every decision”. (Jami al-Bayan, IV. 145-146) Razi the Mufassir interprets trust as “restoring a right to its rightful beneficiary; whereas he defines ruling with justice as “commanding restoration of a right to its rightful beneficiary”. (ar-Razi, 10:144) On the other hand, Darwaza explains that “it encourages people to judge among themselves with justice, without depending on their positions, without discriminating among themselves on the basis of relation-friendship, without being dependent unto anybody, and preserve and respect rights and trust” (Darwaza, 236). Mawdudi accounts for what this Ayah suggests, “Muslims were warned not to make the mistakes Israelites had done before them; in the course of their degeneration, their biggest mistake was assigning authority and rule to incapable rulers; then, they bestowed the religious and political authority, which, by nature, require responsibility, to such people that were unqualified, incapable, shortsighted, shallow in moral values and sense of justice. Yet, Almighty Allah commands His servants to treat each other justly, notwithstanding they are friendly or hostile.” (Mawdudi, E. A. 1996: I/300)

Bayraktar Bayraklı, one of the contemporary mufassirs, interprets the same Ayah as follows: When the term “competence”, which immediately follows the concept of trust, is considered it becomes possible to interpret this Ayah differently. For instance, the political power of the society is a trust. All public services are examples of trust. Therefore, it is possible to say that this


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Ayah imposes upon people a first in the political and administrative sense as well; then, bestowing public services upon competent persons has always allowed for a significant change in the communities which in turn paved the way for those communities to get rid of their tribal structure and become civilized. Yet, in the ancient tribal communities, duties were assigned in accordance with the nobility of the respective persons. In Mecca, anyone to be appointed to a public service had to be from the Quraysh Tribe. Assigning public services in accordance with the nobility was the indicator of the tribal structure of a community. By commanding assignment of trust to competent authorities, Almighty Allah abolished the criteria of nobility and replaced it with competence. With this command, Allah emphasized knowledge and competence and rendered use of them mandatory. The Prophet implemented this practice by appointing Zayd Ibn-Harithah as the chief commander during the Battle of Mu’tah. Being freed from slavery did not necessarily prevent Zayd from being respected as the chief commander. Historical period does not necessarily plays an important role in becoming a modern community, yet on what criteria the power is distributed does. If such measures or practices as favoritism towards relatives, partisanism, sectarianism, and denominationalism do play a role in assignment of public services, it indicates that the respective community has failed to abolish primitive practices. Today, it is well known that assigning political, administrative and economical services, which are basically trust, in accordance with knowledge and competence - career and merit - is among the features of being a modern community. Imposing upon such services any criteria other than knowledge and competence causes regression and prevents communities from developing. Since “bestowing trust to the competent” means appointing the ones that are competent and skilled for a service, we can be confident that those that seek for competence in assigning a duty and impose no other criteria thereof do worship Allah as, by doing so, they fulfil the command of Allah as well. Assigning public services, which are trust, to the incompetent is nothing but breach of Allah’s trust. (Bayraklı, 2001: 5/175-181)

According to the Qur’an, the sole criterion of justice is equity. While being just leads to the true path, it also leads to the justice. (al-Araf, 7/181) Merit is an objective concept and an established principle of law. Those who are pleased when the judgment on a merit is in their favor but disregard the respective judgment when it is against them are addressed as, “they are the Zalimoon (the unjust ones)” (an-Nur, 24/48-50). Therefore, motives that do not play a role in terms of ethical law such as yielding self-benefit, such emotional relations as kinship and hostility, difference in the social class of the parties, i.e. being noble or commoner, physical or psychological incompetency may not


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justify the breach or suppression of a merit and, in the final instance, deviating from the justice principle. (Çağrıcı, I/372)

Consequently, the final approach of the Qur’an on this matter is to take the measures required to unconditionally bestow upon all people what they merit in order to operate the mechanism of justice and safety and fulfil its purpose without deviating from it. What Allah commands here is the distribution of each and every ethical, social, economic, legal and political right to the extent of their merits. (Mawdudi, 1996: III/52). Islam studies justice in its widest sense without isolating it from its meaning and purposes and suggested plans and projects to maintain its main aspect that is intertwined with the daily life. This aspect is the maintenance of the social justice in line with the principles of “competence” and “equality”. (Halil, 1993: 28)

2. Historical and Contemporary Practices

The life and era of the Prophet Muhammad was the single most important period of the history of Islam and has always been a reference for the social, political, economic and private life of the Muslims. (Zorlu, 2002: Introduction) Towards the end of this era, in his deathbed as his single last will the Prophet instructed, “keep praying and performing Salat and protect and maintain justice and rights of your slaves, concubines and servants”. (Ibn-Sa’d, II/254) The Prophet said to Abu Dzar Al-Ghifari, that requested to be appointed to the tax collecting position, “This duty is trust and you are incompetent thereof; for those that fail to maintain, the trust becomes contempt and desolation in Qiyamah”. (Müslim, Imare: 16)

On the other hand, in his letter he sent to Abu Musa Al-Ashari, Caliph Omar focused on the following matters: “(...) justice means nothing unless appropriate provisions are implemented. Treat people equally in every aspect, do not let those that occupy higher positions and those that are wealthy assume that you will incline toward them for their positions or wealth, and do not let those poor and weak ones forsake on your justice... Muslims are all equal. Rewards given by people mean nothing compared to the worldly blessings of Allah and His rewards and mercy He will bestow upon you in the afterlife. May Allah keep you on the righteous path, may peace be upon you.” (Kasapoğlu, 1965: 10-11/175)

In the course of history, Muslim Arabs formed the ruling class during the Ummayid Era. Generally, those who are Muslims but not Arabs were not shown respect during the Umayyid Era. They could not rise to important and higher positions but intensely engaged and excelled in science and arts. Consequently, this made them estranged toward the ruling class and encouraged them to participate to rebellions against the government. In the Umayyid Era, slaves,


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whose conditions the Qur’an tried to make better, became the object of a profitable business. Being the lowest class in the social structure of the Umayyid Era, Non-Muslims managed to rise to higher positions in almost all periods except for the time of Omar Ibn-Abdulaziz. (Aksu, 2006: 80)

The Umayyads’ tendency to become mundane took its toll on the people as, while preserving their rule, they lived a luxurious and flamboyant life and financed it from the public funds. Indeed, the Umayyads exploited the state treasury as if it was their own property and embezzled the national revenues. Furthermore, a significant portion of the revenue sources were mostly illegal and from unjust taxes they imposed upon all the people of the Empire without discriminating among Muslims and Non-Muslims. In other words, a significant portion of their wealth consisted of illegal and unjust taxes they imposed upon their people. (Kara, 2006:169)

When today’s practices reviewed, it might be said to a certain extent that there are some deviations from the main course. The most prominent criterion of facilitating the mechanism of the justice and merit system while blocking all possible paths to discrimination in assigning public services is to ensure that assignment of public services are open to all without relying onto certain subjective criteria and to prevent people from being forbidden to reach this by imposing such discrimination. Otherwise, a bias, by which immediate appointment in public services in various ways other than that comply with the purposes of such services becomes essential yet investigation of the legitimacy paradigm of its nature is postponed to be reviewed in the future(!) - a future that may never come -, will eventually emerge. At this point, we must say that the tolerable behavioral pattern scala towards; or put in the most optimistic way, limits of such a practice, i.e. preservation of trust would become quite narrow.

While the assumption which dictates that “such practices may eventually give rise to such potential risks as incidents which are initiated with the argument, “senior officers do change with each government” and do not have any outlines, force individuals towards the risk of operating the notion of taking a seat in the public services in a manner that obligates them to make choices either way and do not come across the objection and reaction of the community” (Güran, 1980: 293-294) has yet to be verified, it is necessary to mention that possible fields of formation may emerge.

It is possible to mention about certain practices that would reduce the abovementioned general rules into highly specific examples; that would harm their characteristics that render them values. It should be remembered that


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any practice implemented in this way will always involve certain subjective opinions and criteria, constituting the potential of violation of rights. Any practice fulfilled with such a perspective would harm satisfaction, to say the least, and the call of the sense of justice would never stop disturbing people’s conscience.

Certain negative tendencies of the past and today’s practices have most surely nothing to do with the justice, which is the most effective merit and equality concept of everyone. Can it be called justice when creative force of man is suppressed and formed not according to his will but the targets imposed by others? (Halil, 1993: 26) It is clear that suspending the criteria function of justice and safety and referring to pseudo-criteria formed upon the reasonable subjective criteria of those that made them would not be called justice. Such excuses as “circumstances and conditions require so”, which are suggested as a consequence of confusing essential quality of the matters and their apparent similarities would not create reaction in the public opinion; it would never be accepted as it would create helpless and restless populations thus creating a separate fields of unlawfulness and irresponsibility.

Moreover, we must put firmly about such fields of irresponsibility that covering up faults and emphasizing virtues with the help of Qur’anic references would be total carelessness and recklessness; then, it is indeed true that spreading its principles relying onto correlation would be equal to spoiling its meaning. The accomplishment may have a solid and significant profile, however, legitimacy of anything that is built upon violation of personal rights and the justice cannot be claimed. It must be remembered that any accomplishment reached under guidance of a practical perspective that is assumed correct will create more critical problems than the problem itself. Otherwise, certain contemporary practices, motivated highly in joining now institutionalized practices, will integrate into the existing ones, and as Ahmet Hamdi Tanpınar once expressed, “This chalice, formed by centuries, remains the same, giving zest to everything in it with its own special taste” (Tanpınar, A.H. (2011: 54), will maintain its quality of being an ancient problem. The reason for the persistency of the problem is the omission of the necessity of preserving the essence of the principle of justice and safety while fulfilling a practice; then, the leading founding element of serving in the public field is the establishment and maintenance of a structure, in which subjective criteria are never considered a decisive factor, justice and merit are considered the sole reference criteria at all times thus increasing the coefficient of sustainability.

Another matter to emphasize is the fact that the procedures performed today in preparation of certain regulations and practices have nothing to do with


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the parties that carry out such regulations and practices, i.e. they are, by their nature, performed for others. While this is the case in the conceptual level, the risk that the one that prepares such regulations may potentially be generous on behalf of others will always remain. However, should the practice be exercised taking into account the possibility of implementing such practices may always be implemented upon those that prepare it, it can be assumed with certainty that generosity would not be a problem, let alone being penurious. For this reason, “Ayah” (An-Nisa, 4/135), it must be remembered that the motive to testify justly is based upon securing the rights of the party, for whom testimony is given, thus making violation of such rights impossible; then, Muslims are obligated “not only to administer justice but also to be guardians and witnesses of the justice in order to eliminate injustice and establish justice and equality” (Mawdudi, 1993: I/340).

As to the predicaments of offering such recommendations and assessments, on the other hand, asking those who carry out such recommendations and assessments the following question to investigate their position: Then, what is the field of legitimacy of those that offer such recommendations? While the rhetorical aspect of this question is seemingly strong, its content is weak and inconsistent; this question may be answered with the following analogy: When Moses demanded from the Pharaoh, that was cruel and merciless upon Israelites, to set them free along with him and the Pharaoh asked him “(Firon) said: Did we not bring you up as a child amongus, and you tarried among us for (many) years of your life?” (ash-Shuara, 26/18), the way Moses answered “And is it a favor of which you remind me that you haveenslaved the children of Israel?” (ash-Shuara, 26/22) We think that the answer Moses gave, “Had you not been so tyrant towards Israelites, I would have not been sent to your house to be raised as an Egyptian noble. Nothing but because of your tyranny did my mother put me in a basket and set me afloat in the River Nile. Otherwise, I would have been raised in my own family’s house which would be beautiful. Then, it is not appropriate for you to remind me that it is a blessing for me to be raised in your house” (Mawdudi, 1993: IV/18-19), draws attention upon the logic of the same question.

Islam obligates Muslims to refuse the principle, “the goal justifies the means” and to rely onto humane and ethical values to reach their goals. (Halil, 1993: 19) “Therefore, invite them (Oh my friend! to amalgamation). Proceed directly as you are guided and remain diligent. Do not follow their desires and indulgences and say: “To this then go on inviting, and go on steadfastly onthe right way as you are commanded, and do not follow theirlow desires, and say: I believe in what Allah has revealedof the Book, and I am commanded to do justice between you: Allah is our Lord and your Lord; we shall have our deeds andyou


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shall have your deeds; no plea need there be (now) between us and you: Allah will gather us together, and to Him is the return.” (ash-Shura, 42/15) “O you who believe! be maintainers of justice, bearers of witness of Allah’s sake, though it may be against your own selves or (your) parents or near relatives; if he be rich or poor, Allah is nearer to them both in compassion; therefore do not follow (your)low desires, lest you deviate; and if you swerve or turn aside, then surely Allah is aware of what you do.” (an-Nisa, 4/135)

Then, the counter-attitudes the Qur’an maintains with regard to the main problems in the ongoing relations between man, society and history are in harmony with justice in its widest sense; then, such attitudes leads man to where he should be, affirming the value of the freedom, without which humanity may not truly exist, by distributing it equally. (Halil, 1993: 28)

Final Review and Conclusion

When the Qur’an, authentic resources of the Sunnah and various examples which have ben practiced through the different periods of history are reviewed, it can be said that the necessary condition of being appointed to a public service is, in Qur’anic terms, trust and competence, or in modern terms, career and merit. Otherwise, we can barely say that these practice based on whatever reason comply with the principles and practices of the Qur’an, to say the least, even though such practices can be reasonably explained within their logical and conjectural structure.

What Qur’an tries to achieve is a system that excludes subjective criteria, would preclude subjective practices by governing bodies and individuals, in which everyone would feel safe and free; a system in which no criteria but justice and law would prevail. The possibility is that the most prominent feature of any system is the principle of justice being the basic criterion in terms of career and merit, provided that it is extracted from the technical details derived from the operational instruction of each system.

As the consequence of insisting on a practice that is deprived of such principles and criteria, the structure that is the base of such practices would be doomed to evolve toward losing its main founding elements. It is not unusual to see the footprints of such fates on our country; then, all these processes should be considered identical to each other. Organizing practices in favor of authoritarian solutions; offering a solution would eventually make it impossible for that solution to survive upon factors derived from the paradigm it feeds on. We can certainly speak about a direct proportion between them. When the practice operates on merit and competence, the existing paradigm gets stronger and proceeds with confidence; otherwise, it will temporarily survive


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with an equilibrium which is very fragile yet defined by the authority within its subjective dynamic but will eventually fail. This will pose structural and legal problems. In order to avoid a depressing circumstance in the future; being drawn into a more authoritarian axis or perceiving short-term solutions the situation offers rather than radical reforms from the sentence, “that which cannot be changed” and “changing” such practices approval which are accepted, and becoming a periodical example of “a fate (al-Qasas, 49/47) that emerges as a result of the own accomplishments” of the divine addressing, the “effort” is required. We do think that failing to reformulate the practice with the accompaniment of the suggested concepts and theories would give rise to groups that are immune to this effort, ethical weakness and practices without a principle.

We also think that it would be useful to state that: The suggestion does not include a structure that is distant from the conditions of the real world, does not offer rational solutions, practices of which are established upon the divine. It is related to the principles that the divine remains at the center. Today, no one would claim that the existence of a structure in which each and every government establishes its own rules and laws, and constitutes the sole criterion for its laws and rules would be appropriate. Therefore, it is not an idealized suggestion within its own structure with no possibility of implementation.

In Islam, social justice has a realistic ethical dimension compared to other political systems in maintaining its role and protecting it from all kinds of abuse, misconduct, deviation and misuse. This ethical aspect gets the strength and power that may pave the way for it to take place in all situations from the eternal sense of responsibility bestowed upon Muslims by Islam, ever alive religious awareness, and the sense of being under supervision of Almighty Allah in their every step, in every accomplishment they yield, small or large. This is a matter of ethicality. Principles that are conjectural, legitimacy of which are established by subjective criteria, that are imposed, incompliant with the nature of the mankind and deprived of faith and common sense shall not make it possible for the mankind to keep them alive; shall not be effective in evolving to a entity which constitutes harmony between thought and implementation, subject and object, purpose and instrument, a dynamic and believing entity. (Halil, 1993: 109) Moreover, it must be remembered that the lack of effectiveness will eradicate the principles supported by the depth of faith and common sense thus rendering problems into the essential issues and parallel to that, feed and reinforce certain cultures of resentment and aggression. Such practices may constitute the main reason for persisting insoluble problems today and into the future, let alone yielding certain advantages in favor of the practitioners.


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Such a set of practices, it is a plane on which a breach of the criterion of fairness will convict itself. In our opinion, the minimal effort made in order to establishing this or to reinforce the existing one will eventually become the essential principle and criterion of all those who contemplates not to adopt any method other than the belief that the criterion of justice and merit is inevitable for them. People do form a reference framework, a spread of behavior in accordance with their own beliefs and attitude. I also hold that it would be useful to reexamine the social and political references of the abovementioned practices. The most curious aspect of the matter is maybe the fact that, when their behavioral solutions are reviewed, it can be found that certain practices show a tendency towards the criterion of justice and merit.

In fact, the main reason behind this study is not the ostentatious sensitivity of the modern era as some suggest (Solomon, R.C. 2004: 358) but the reaction against the failure to establish a solid correlation between the apparent behavioral patterns of those who offer practice and their recorded behaviors; i.e. that their behaviors do not show an explanatory function. Surprisingly, the fact that the accomplished practice has no faults and accepting that everything is fulfilled within the criteria of justice do not necessarily reduce inconsistencies. It must be easy to see that the method which has been implemented for some reasonable motives restricts our capability to discover the ideal attitude. In order to eliminate this competence restricting method, three refined suggestions may be made: a structure in which the principles of justice, competence and merit can be implemented simultaneously. Time is always capable of discovering valid and sustainable principles that may constitute the basis of the practice. If not today, then tomorrow. We should blame ourselves for producing new versions of illusion rather than inclining towards manifest senses and deeds upon which we can rely to correct certain errors and unjustly practices or at least minimalize the effect of them. (Solomon, R.C. 2004: 359) In parallel with this, it is meaningful to ask why the justice, the legitimacy of which is established by the Qur’an and Sunnah and its implementation which was strictly stipulated by the prophets can only survive partially. It is not mercy but rather justice that will balance the increasing power.

Bibliography

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Güran, S. (1980). Memur Hukukunda Kayırma ve Liyakat Sistemleri. İstanbul: Fakülteler Matbaası.

Halil, İ. (1993). Sosyal Adalet.Daid Aykut (Çev.). İstanbul: Şule.

İbn.Sa’d, (ts.). et-Tabakâtu’l Kübrâ, Beyrut: Dâru Sâdır.

Karagöz. B. (2009). Toplumsal Adalet ve Totalitarizm. İstanbul: Divan.

Kara, Seyfullah, (2006). İslam Tarihinde İlk Zihniyet Sapması: Emevîler Döneminde Otoritenin Dünyevîleştirilmesi. İstem, Sayı:8,

Kasaboğlu, A. H.(1965). Hazret-i Ömer’in Adaletinden Örnekler, Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı. Cilt:4, Sayı: 10-11.

el-Kurtubî, E.Abdillah.(1998). el-Câmiu li Ahkami’l- Kur’an, Beyrut: Daru’l- Kutubi’l- İlmiyye.

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Mevdudi, E. A. (1996).Tefhimu’l- Kur’an, Heyet (Çev). İstanbul: İnsan.

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el-Vâhidî, A.b.A.(1316) Esbâbu Nuzûli’l- Kur’an. Beyrut: Dâru’l- Kutubi’l- İlmiyye.

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A FINANCING TECHNIQUEIN SUPPORTING THE YOUNG

ENTREPRENEURS:ANGEL INVESTORS

Erkan PerktaşAdıyaman University

Abstract

Globalized competition conditions and the current economic situation affect the es-tablishment of new businesses and the development of existing businesses. Young en-trepreneurs will especially need financing from outside while establishing business if their own resources are not enough to take action in. Young entrepreneurs can choose the one of suitable financing techniques such as bank loans, subsidies, micro-finance, venture capital, angel investors, leasing, factoring, forfeiting, etc. to meet the needs of funding emerges during the establishment as well as stage of development. One of these funding techniques, namely Angel Investors is a financial type that provides sup-port to especially young and dynamic entrepreneurs in the initial stage. Angel Investor is defined as the person who invests in the idea of a job that is just up the road, provides the capital for business growth and development. The Angel Investor provides entrepre-neurs with financial support, information support or both.

In this study, we provide the definition of angel investors and explain the nature of their support to young entrepreneurs. Also, we discuss the examples of Angel Investor in our country and around the world.

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1. Introduction

Is quite significant to supporting entrepreneurs and their business ideas to improve the current economic situation of countries and establish development. Financing support being the most important support for entrepreneurs is unquestionable truth. Most entrepreneurs face financial difficulties either during the establishment or maintaining of business because they do not own sufficient capital. The financing needs of newly-established enterprises are met from different sources. The significance of angel investors as one of these sources increases with each passing day particularly for young and dynamic entrepreneurs. The role of angel investors and their influence on the entrepreneurial process is quite important in the early stages when funds are needed (Karabayır etc., 2012, p.70).

Angel investors come to entrepreneurs’ rescue like an angel by offering councilling services both as equity capital and related entrepreneurial experiences. Besides, money is not the only thing to be received from angels. Business angels are successful people who contribute to entrepreneurs with their advice and feedback when needed. They also have valuable local networks that will be helpful for entrepreneurs. In addition, angel investors provide reliable support for entrepreneurs in matters related to providing a bureau for a lawyer, accountant, banker, supplier, staff and workplace (Uluyol, 2008, p.44).

2. Basic Concepts

2.1. Entrepreneurship and Entrepreneurs

When historical development of the word entrepreneurship is examined it is derived from the French word “entreprendre” and means “doing something”. The word was used in the Middle Ages for an active person doing business. In economic theory, it was first used in a work written by Richard Cantillon, a Frenchman, in the 1730s. According to Cantillon an entrepreneur can be defined as a person that organizes business in order to profit and undertakes its risks (Döm, 2008, p.1). The word began to be used in English literature in a study titled “ Principles of Political Economy” made by John Stuart Mill in the 19th century. In the 20th century, the term entrepreneurship was used in sociological, psychological, economic theory and economic anthropology. According to the entrepreneurship theory that appeared in the 20th century, an entrepreneur is a person making innovations by taking risks. In other words, he is a person that watches for entrepreneurial opportunities and materializes them by taking all kinds of risks when he finds them (Çetindamar, 2002, p.33).

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The notion of entrepreneurship can be developed by taking into consideration principles and concepts of management, administration and personal assessment (yurkseven, 2007, p.60). Entrepreneurship is an activity directed at taking responsibility for setting up, maintaining and expanding a profit-oriented business unit including producing or distributing goods and services of partnerships formed by an individual or individuals. An entrepreneur can be defined as a person that taking necessary initiatives to produce economic goods and services by bringing together production factors and finds economic sources needed for production and markets where production is evaluated (Ufuk and Özgen, 2000).

According to Drucker, an entrepreneur is a person that creates an order in an unclear and variable world and brings together and arranges sources that can result in welfare (Drucker, 1986, p.2). In other words, entrepreneurship can be defined as a process of creating different values to attain personal satisfaction and economic awards as a result of taking economic, physical and social risks by spending necessary time and making necessary efforts (Akpınar, 2009, p.14).

2.2. Characteristics of an entrepreneurial personality

Although there are no basic entrepreneurial personality characteristics, there should be characteristics distinguishing entrepreneurs from other people. These characteristics can be listed as follows: (Akpınar, 2009, p.151). (a) Taking risks, (b) independence, (c) tolerating uncertainty, (d) seeking success, (e) self-confidence, (f) being creative and innovative, and (g) making quick decisions

2.3. Significance of Entrepreneurship

2.3.1. Economic significance of Entrepreneurship

People need products and services to continue their lives. As nobody can produce products and services to meet all of his needs, businesses to do this should be established. At this point, the existence of entrepreneurs is quite important. The concept of entrepreneurship started to gain importance in the economic sense after transition from industrial society to information society. As the weight of human labor on production decreased in the information age, the weight of information-based labor started to increase. At this point, the importance of entrepreneurship appeared as the complementary of innovation, creativity and management activities. Besides, the service sector gaining importance in the information society as a result of significant changes in production, transportation and management and under the influence of globalization further increased the importance of entrepreneurship.


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Entrepreneurship is a very important element of economic development. Particularly, success of developing countries depends on an increase in the number of microentrepreneurs.

Entrepreneurs do not only contribute to economic development by creating employment or income. If we think about this influence more broadly, the significance of entrepreneurship will be seen in its influence to raise the level of welfare in society by carrying out investment and production activities with the aim of defining the needs of society and meeting them (Demirel and akbıyık,2009,p.25). This study will explain TÜSİAD (Turkish Industrialists and Businessmen’s Association) the contribution of entrepreneurship to economy in three ways. First, thanks to entrepreneurship production factors are combined with new methods and unused production factors become part of the economy. Existing input of used production factors are used differently and more production is obtained. At the same time, entrepreneurs lead creation and implementation of innovations and speed them up (TÜSİAD, 1987, p.38). We can show the significance of entrepreneurship in economic development at micro and macro levels as follows:

Micro Process Outcome

Pers

onal

Le

vel Skills, Sources Motivation,

DemandsSuccess, Development, Income, Satisfaction

Com

pany

Le

vel Skills, Sources Motivation,

DemandsEmployment, Inflow of new sourcesto the economy

Maco

Coun

try

Leve

l Skills, Sources Motivation,Demands

Increase in New Technology, products, services, supply and demand, Economic growth

Source: Semra Arıkan, “Entrepreneurship”, Siyasal Bookstore Ankara 2002, p. 42

2.3.2. Social significance of Entrepreneurship

We know that entrepreneurs put innovations that facilitate life at the disposal of mankind. These innovations can be in the form of products and services as well as new production, marketing, finance, etc. Regardless of its dimension, level or type, work carried out by entrepreneurs aims at peace and welfare of mankind. At this point, it can be said that entrepreneurship is a manifestation of social cooperation. This cooperation can, at the same time, be likened to a chain that unites society. Every entrepreneur produces products and services in


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his field that meet the needs of society, makes investments and expands areas of business. As a result of entrepreneurship function, people are satisfied, their income increases and therefore they enjoy life (Demirel and Akbıyık, p.27).

Entrepreneurship factor and therefore entrepreneurs and particularly young entrepreneurs that play such an important role in the development of economic and social life, must be absolutely supported financially. Entrepreneurs need different amounts of funds in different periods of businesses like beginning, growth, maturity and regression. The funds that are needed can be met from different sources of financing. These sources can be listed as follows: a) Personal Savings, b) Entrepreneur’s family and relatives, c) Commercial banks, d) Supplier’s credit, e) Angel investors, f) Venture capital, g) Leasing, h) Factoring, i) Forfaiting, j) Franchising, k) Barter, and l) Micro loans. In this study Angel Investors which is one of the abovementioned techniques will be examined in detail.

3. Angel Investors

3.1. Definition:

The term angel investor is defined differently in many different sources. Some of these definitions can be listed as follows: The concept of angel investor is generally a concept used in the sense of a person or groups that have finantial support for entrepreneurs that have an idea of a profitable business but have source problem (Uluyol, 2009, p.264). An angel Investor is also defined as a financing technique including partnership that private investors that have investment experience enter into with newly established businesses with their money and experiences (Küçük, 2007, p.263). Angel investors can also be defined as a type of private investor that invests in companies that have high risk and growth potential in the initial stages of their establishment (Akpınar, 2009, p.128).

When common aspects of these definitions in different sources are taken into consideration, we can infer that angel investor is a person or institution that gives life to companies in the establishment phase or companies in a difficult situation with financing. As angel investors themselves are generally successful entrepreneurs, they add value to companies they invest in by continuously providing consultancy on business.

Different notions used as to angel investors can be briefly explained as follows: (Uluyol, 2008, p.51)

Virgin Angel: People that support a project for the first time.


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Experienced Angel: People that have not made any angel investment in the past three years but have such previous experience.

Welfare Enhancing Angel: An experienced businessman that has supported and supports earlier and current projects as an angel investor.

Entrepreneur Angel: People that have spirit of entrepreneurship, a good financial position, operate in a few different sectors and play in the stock market.

Income-seeking Angel: It is a person that wants to create income or business by investing capital in a business.

Partner Angel: They are corporate bodies that make investment to support projects.

Business Angel (Angel Investor) Network (BAN): They are organizations set up to bring together business angels and entrepreneurs. BANs are impartial in these organizations and have the position of a marketplace where angel and entrepreneurs that will match each other can meet.

Serial Angel: They are people that have contributed to more than one investment in a year.

3.2. Characteristics of Angel Investors

1- Business angels can act independently or as a group and in this way, they can meet bigger financial needs.

2- Besides supporting a successful investment, business angels also follow investment opportunities that they can evaluate.

3- Besides being capital owners, they generally have personal experience in the area that they invest.

4- Expectations of those that choose to be business angels are not only to enable return of the money, create added value or play a role in the entrepreneurial process but also to meet angel investors that have expectations of spiritual satisfaction.

5- Business angels want to play an active role in the management of companies for which they provide financing.

6- A majority of business angels consist of company owner businessmen aged between 35 and 65.

7- Business angels generally provide support for investments that range between 25-250 thousand Euros in the EU and 10—500 thousand U.S. Dollars in the U.S.


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8- Business angels are most interested in health, medical services, software and biotechnology sectors

(www.tusiad.org.tr, 2009, p.10).

3.3.Support Activities of Angel Investors

Angel Investors prefer to support young entrepreneurs that are young, energetic, dynamic, and honest, look at life positively, produce new business ideas, and are open to participation and highly motivated. As, at the same time, Angel investors wish to enrich companies, they pay attention to the fact that the vision of jobholders that demand financial support tallies with their own vision.

Return rate of an investment should be high for Angel Investors to meet the demand for financial need that has these qualities.

Angel Investor Activities are listed as either providing financial support that makes up seed capital in the establishment of an enterprise, or providing information support at the establishment phase of the enterprise or afterwards or providing both financial and information support for the enterprise (www.myfikirler.com). Besides making investment in enterprises, Angel Investors also play a role in decision-making areas of these companies like management and marketing and contribute with their own experiences and knowledge.

3.4. Advantages and Disadvantages of Angel Investors

As in other financing techniques, Angel Investors have some advantages and disadvantages. These can be listed as follows (Küçük, 2007, p.265):

Advantages:

1- Angel investors prefer low level investments.

2- Angel investors generally invest in newly established businesses.

3- Angel investors can make investments in all sectors.

4- Angel investors are more flexible compared to risk investors in financial decisions.

5- Funds supplied by Angel investors do not result in increase in price.

6- Angel investors provide added value (a company invested in can turn to one that invests)

7- Angel investment market can extend over a large geographic area.

8- Money provided by angel investors creates a leverage effect (a business invested in become attractive for other suppliers of finance).


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9- Angel investors also provide loans other than their investments.

Disadvantages:

1- Angel investors avoid making sequential investments in the same company.

2- Angel investors want to have a say that might result in an entrepreneur making concessions on his control power.

3- Angel investors can turn to a monster acting on its own rather than assisting the company.

4- Angel investors do not have a name, fame and prestige in the country and abroad in terms of reliability.

Angel Investors in the World and in Turkey

Although 270 thousand investors in the U.S. have attained a turnover of $26 billion and 75 thousand investors from “Angel Investors” system (http://www.girisimcilikveyenilik.com) in the EU have attained a turnover of 4 billion Euros, it has recently begun to be used in Turkey with funding and financing new initiatives in this way is quite old. When we look at the past we see that Bell telephone company founded by A. Graham Bell in 1874; Henry Ford’s Ford factory and construction of Golden Gate Bridge were financed by angel investors’ funds. Today, angel investors’ funds have been used in the establishment phase of famous companies like Amazon, Yahoo, Hotmail, Google, Youtube and Apple (Kantar, 2008,p.113).

3.5.1. Angel Investors in the U.S.

We come across the most interesting data on angel investors in the U.S. In the U.S., 80% of new employment and 50% of innovations since 1980 were materialized by entrepreneurs supported by angel investors. Besides individual investments, “Angel investors” form groups of 10 and 60 people called Angel Investors Club and aim to approach business more professionally and share the risk with other members of the group. There were more than 250 active Angel Investors Clubs including 227.000 individual angel investors in the U.S. in 2005 (Uluyol, 2008, p.58).

Total angel investments amounted to $26 billion in the U.S. in 2006. The number of enterprises invested in was 51 thousand. According to research results published by New Hampshire University, there is an average 10% increase in angel investments compared to 2005. Most invested sectors are health, medical equipment, software and biotechnology. 201.400 new jobs


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were created in 2006 with these investments. This number only states jobs created at the stage when an investment was made. As businesses invested in grow bigger and their number increases, obviously there will be an increase in employment.

When taking it up only in terms of jobs created, the significance of putting such a financing model into practice is easily seen. Such mechanisms are important in decreasing unemployment and enabling sustainable growth (Kantar, 2008, p.114).

3.5.2. Angel Investors in Europe

The number of angel investors in European countries increases gradually. In parallel with this increase, a notable increase in the number of business angel networks BANs established is also observed. When looking at it in terms of investment amount, most angel investments in Europe in 2006 were made in Britain with 63.671.988 Euros. Britain was followed with France with 26.000.000 Euros, Switzerland

with 13.500.000 Euros, Sweden with 12.500.000 Euros, Italy with 11.800.000 Euros, Finland with 10.395.500 Euros, Belgium with 7.070.075 Euros, Germany with 6.598.000 Euros, Holland with 3.950.000 Euros, Spain with 2.285.000 Euros, Austria with 1.800.000 Euros and Ireland with 550.000 Euros. Angel investments worth a total of 149.473.857 Euros were made in EU countries.

3.5.3. Angel Investors in Turkey

Angel investors were introduced in Turkey by LabX set up in 2006, within the body of Helix Management Consultancy, Turkey’s oldest consulting firm. LabX acts like a bridge between entrepreneurs that have ideas but not capital and angel investors. Entrepreneurs that have ideas should first apply to LabX. LabX fixes the business idea and obtains financing from angel investors in different countries after feasibility work. LabX is at the same time a company partner and offers consultancy services for entrepreneurs. Turkey’s first angel investor network set up by LabX, currently has an angel investment power of 85 people. LabX Angel Investor Network offers investors possibility to have unique business ideas and show their presence in the international arena thanks to EBAN (European Business Angels Network) of which it is a member and local cooperation (www.lab-x.org).

LabX set up to incorporate high potential business ideas and develop ongoing projects, supplies capital for these ideas and projects thanks to angel investor network and incorporates them by drawing up business plans. LabX which


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is open to all entrepreneurs’ applications does not demand any fees from entrepreneurs for this service.

İstanbul-based Galata Business Angels is İstanbul’s first angel investor organization. Galata Business Angels is a group consisting of entrepreneurs, managers and angel investors that invest their time and money in high technology start up companies.

Members of Galata Business Angels have established companies like Airties, Yemeksepeti.com (online food ordering website), Mynet.com and Markafoni.com and were senior managers at companies like Apple,eBay, maxim, Turkcell and DBI.

Galata Business Angels operas as a non-profit association and undertakes the role of a platform enabling angel investors and ambitious entrepreneurs to exchange views on investment possibilities and startup (www.galatabusinessangels.com).

Business Angels Association Turkey, established under Baybars Altuntaş in 2011 when it started operating, has certain objectives to develop entrepreneurial activities in our country and: bring angel investors and entrepreneurs together. These objectives can be summarized as follows (www.melekyatirimcilardernegi.org):

1- To enable the development of partnership culture in business world in Turkey,

2- To support entrepreneurs that want to set up their own business and facilitate access to financing sources required,

3- To make the current eco system more effective for all individuals, institutions and organizations that support entrepreneurs in the country and abroad, facilitate their setting up a business and supply finance required,

4- To enable more all kinds of training possibility regarding entrepreneurship,

5- To introduce “Angel Investor” system in Turkey and establish legal infrastructure required,

6- To enable “Angel Investor” concept to be perceived as a professional career,

7- To develop “Inclination for Entrepreneurship Tests” in cooperation with universities and/or private schools,

8- To conduct local or countrywide research to bring to light entrepreneurship profile and/or development trend on yearly basis and draw up reports,


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9- To form legal infrastructure needed for Angel Investors and organize public opinion studies required,

10- To inform all kinds of private and official institutions like Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges of Turkey (TOBB), High Education board (YÖK), Small and Medium Sized Industry Development Organization(KOSGEB), Turkish Public Employment Agency (İŞKUR), Banking Regulation and Supervision Agency (BDDK), Capital Markets Board (SPK), Technoparks, the Banks Association of Turkey, Participation Banks association of Turkey, Ministry of Industry and Trade, Competition Authority, Entrepreneurship Clubs of Universities, Incubation centers, Foundations and Chambers of Commerce and Industry and non-governmental organizations about Angel Investors and engage in cooperation,

11- To act like an active bridge between matchmakers that bring together Entrepreneurs-Angel Investors-Angel Investment Groups-Venture capitalists-Entrepreneurs and Angel Investors,

12- To make or have studies done to bring entrepreneurs and angel investors together when necessary,

13- To train or have trained instructors/academicians/experts that will train entrepreneurs and Angel Investors,

14- To form necessary platform to transfer know-how from experienced Angel Investors to potential Angel ınvestors,

15- To increase the number of inventions in our country by contacting scientists,

16- To transfer necessary know-how by inviting successful Angel Investors to Turkey from abroad,

17- To prepare an environment where newly established enterprises can find sources more easily by forming Angel Investors financial market at a local and national level,

18- To prepare platforms where Angel Investors can share business experience among themselves,

19- To enable ideas and projects of entrepreneurs in the initial stage to attain the level to receive investments from Angel Investors by supporting them with methods like training, seminars, workshops and mentorship.

It would be useful to increase the number of similar associations and institutions to spread in Turkey “Angel Investors” system that has created a remarkable


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economy in the world. On the one hand, some studies on the function of the system are made in the Treasury Undersecretariat and on the other hand, mediators that bring together investors and those that have business ideas together are carrying out intense work to reach out to more entrepreneurs and investors.

4. Major contribution of Angel Investors Financing Model

If venture fund and the idea of entrepreneurship do not come together, they do not mean anything. The angel financing model results in enterprises by combining these two values. “Business angels leave those that have business ideas to move on by themselves in line with the essence of entrepreneurship after investments they support achieve success and find new projects by contacting those that have new business ideas.” With these characteristics, business angels on the one hand contribute to the development of entrepreneurship and on the other hand they have a social function too as they play an active role in materialization of projects that will socially produce added value.

4.2. Contribution to Employment

The contribution of angel investors to employment is perceptibly seen in data in the U.S.: in 2006, capital worth $26 billion was invested in 49.500 companies (entrepreneurs) with angel investments and job opportunities were created for 201.400 people. It is observed in EU research that 60% of angel investors have taken the title of “permanent” and “serial” investors by making investments more than once. Steps taken and to be taken in our country will resolve the current unemployment problem and therefore contribute to increasing employment and particularly youth employment. These data, point out that angel investment has gradually become a lifestyle and profession for high-level professionals.

4.3. Contribution to the Development of the Country’s Economy

A country’s economy develops when entrepreneurship develops with financing and consultancy support for good business ideas and turns into major investments.

Angel investors have a social function as they contribute to the development of entrepreneurship and play a significant role in materialization of projects that can produce added value socially. From this standpoint, angel financing method also offers an opportunity in terms of angel investors in their meeting social commitments.


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5. CONCLUSION AND SUGGESTIONS

As we have mentioned at first, İT is obvious that entrepreneurship is especially important to speed up the development of developing countries. Particularly in Turkey there is less experience in entrepreneurship and efforts and studies on training entrepreneurs and bringing financing sources together are limited, therefore enterprises that are established are unsuccessful after some time. Different studies on entrepreneurship and financing must be launched to prevent this situation.

Young and dynamic population, qualified workforce, developing consumer demands and attitudes indicate that Turkey is a country of opportunities. However, the lack of capital in entrepreneurship still constitutes to be a major problem for the existence and employment of young entrepreneurs in particular. When we look at statistics, we see that youth aged between 15 and 34 in Turkey make up about 35% of the population. When we consider education, 2011 data indicate that unemployment rate for the graduates of high school and vocational high school is about 21.8% and unemployment rate for university graduates is about 30% (Turkish statistical Institute, TÜİK News Bulletin). As we see in the figures, there are shortcomings regarding employment of young population in Turkey. Therefore, young and dynamic population should be trained in entrepreneurship to eliminate unemployment issue and enable them to join business life and supported with capital with various methods.

Universities and non-governmental organizations have important duties regarding training young and dynamic entrepreneurs. There must be entrepreneurship lectures in many industry-based departments at universities. Stages starting from establishment phase of an enterprise to development and maturity phase must be explained with examples in these lectures in practice and theory. Besides this, youth with business ideas must be supported in line with Young Entrepreneurs Support Program. Such studies must increase with regard to financing. Angel Investors as a method in resolving finance issues of entrepreneurs can be a significant gain for entrepreneurship and, therefore, for the country’s economy and the development of social life. We cannot look at Angel Investors only as a source of financing. They undertake the duty of a guide, suitable to their name Angel and broaden entrepreneurs’ horizons in many matters as advisors.

It is believed that the development of angel financing, organizing angel networks, informing potential entrepreneurs about such activities and encouraging them to cooperate with angel investors will be significantly


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beneficial (Uluyol, 2008, p.66). We can suggest increasing the number of Angel Investors in Turkey and the development of networks bringing together angel investors and entrepreneurs.

a) Communication between activities carried out by angel investors and government, media, finance and investment actors is to be increased.

b) An advantageous environment including elements like financial incentives, establishment of public-private partnership in the form of investment funds must be created for angel investors in Turkey. Besides, participation of individuals that have high values on a net basis must be encouraged in terms of financing companies in the initial stage before opportunities of exchange of assets of public institutions.

c) The network of development of professional business angels must be supported throughout Turkey.

d) Potential trade circles must be formed with training programs offered by Angel Investors organization (e.g., Business Angels Association).

e) Training programs for business angels and entrepreneurs must be supported to increase the quality and number of agreements made in the establishment phase thanks to Angel Investors.

f) Success stories of Angel Investors must be publicized in media outlets.

g) Investors must be encouraged to be angel investors by providing them financial arrangements required for instance different tax advantages, rather than transferring their sources to traditional and more reliable investments.

h) Institutions related to this matter, the Scientific and Technological Research Council of Turkey, TÜBİTAK, Universities, businessmen’s associations such as Turkish Industrialists and Businessmen’s Association, TÜSİAD, union of chambers and commodity exchanges, chambers of industry and non-governmental organizations like Small and Medium Size Industry Development Organization, KOSGEB that support entrepreneurship must engage in cooperation. Regional business angel networks must be set up as angel investors invest in their own areas.


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BIBLIOGRAPHY

Akpınar, S., (2009). Basic Information about Entrepreneurship. Kocaeli: Umuttepe.

Arıkan, S., (2002). Entrepreneurship. Ankara:Siyasal.

Çetindamar, D., (2002). Entrepreneurship in Turkey. İstanbul : TÜSİAD Lebib Yalkın.

Demirel, E.T., Akbıyık, N. (2009). The Concept of Entrepreneurship and its Emergence. Mehmet Tikici and Ali Aksoy (Ed.), Entrepreneurship and Small Scale Enterprises (s.5-62). Ankara:Nobel.

Döm, S., (2008). Entrepreneurship and Small Scale Enterprise Management. Ankara:Detay.

Druckeir, P. F. (1986). The Frontiers of Management: Where Tomorrow’s Decisions Are Being Shaped Today. Newyork:Harper &Row.

Hatun, U., Özlen, Ö., (2000). Sociocultural and Economic Profile of Women Entrepreneurs (Ankara Example). Ankara : Mavi Ofset.

Gözek, S., (2006). Qualities of candidates for entrepreneurship, Entrepreneurial Tendencies and Support for candidates for entrepreneurship.(Unpublished Post Graduate Thesis). Kahramanmaraş Sütçü İmam University/ Institute of Applied Sciences, Kahramanmaraş.

Kantar, E., (2008). Alternative Capital and Sources of Funds for Small and Medium Sized Enterprises .Kobis and Venture : Venture Fund and Angel Investor (An Application in Leather Industry). (Unpublished Post Graduate Thesis). Marmara University/ Banking and Insurance Institute, İstanbul.

Karabayır, M.E., Gülşen, A.Z., Çifci, S., Muzaffar, H., (2012). The Role of Entrepreneurial Focus in Angel Investors’ Investment Decisions: A Study on Angel Investors in Turkey, Ankara University SBF Magazine ,Volume 67, No. 2, 69-93

Küçük, O., (2007). Entrepreneurship and Small Scale Enterprise Management. İstanbul: Seçkin.

TÜSİAD, (1987) Problems and Solutions Related to Entrepreneurship in Turkey. No: T/87.10.103, İstanbul:TUSİAD.

Uluyol, O., (2008). Angel Financing as an Alternative Financing Model in Entrepreneurship. Sustainable Competition And Resource-Based View In Global Markets, 3(2).

Yurtseven, R., (2007). Entrepreneurship, Establishment and Management of a Small Scale Enterprise. Ankara:Detay.

http://www.tusiad.org.tr/entrepreneurship-financing

http:// www.myfikirler.com/melek-yatirimci-nedir-melek-yatirimcinin-ozellikleri-nelerdir.html (Access 19.09.2012).

http://www. melekyatirimcilardernegi.org (access 20.09.2012)

http://www.girisimcilikveyenilik.com/destekler/sirketler/item/59-tbaa-melek- yat%C4%B1r%C4%B1mc%C4%B1lar-derne%C4%9Fi-t%C3%BCrkiyede.html (Access 19.09.2012).

http://www.lab-x.org/yatirimci_formu/index.php?lng=tr (Access 20.09.2012).

http://www.galatabusinessangels.com/about us (Access 20.09.2012)


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ALTERNATIVE TOURISMTYPES BETWEEN TURKEY ANDGCC COUNTRIES: TOWARDS A

REGIONAL WIN-WIN STRATEGY

Assist. Prof. Zafer ÖterIzmir Katip Celebi University Faculty of Tourism

Abstract

Turkey has become one of the most visited destinations on the globe. As a key tourism industry player Turkey receives majority of her visitors from European countries, Rus-sia, and her immediate neighbors. However, Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries provide a sizeable potential for Turkish tourism. On the other hand, GCC countries at-tract visitors from Turkey at an increasing pace. Both Turkey and GCC countries can offer specialized tourism products to visitors. While Turkey can offer her strong health tour-ism potentials and natural heritage to the visitors coming from the GCC region, Turkish citizens can prefer Gulf countries for their shopping, adventure, and religious (i.e. Hajj and Umrah) visits.

This qualitative study aims to explore the potentials of alternative tourism types that complete and support each other between Turkey and GCC countries. This area creates a demand for a considerable amount of tourism. The characteristics of natural and cultural attractions offered in these countries complement one another rather than competing. The study aims to analyze current status of tourism movements in and around related countries. Furthermore, based on the demographic, economic, and socio-cultural con-ditions of related countries, potential areas of tourism development will be discussed.

Key Words: Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), Turkey, Tourism, Regional cooperation.

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Introduction

The world is changing constantly. Thanks to great technological advances witnessed especially in transportation, communication, and information technologies (IT) several examples of status quo are questioned. Geographic, cultural, social and other macro environmental perceptions of 20th century are shaken by the new era of information society. Day by day Internet penetration is increasing throughout the world. Large populations in Asian countries and Middle East-North Africa (MENA) are getting used to satellite communication, mobile phones, and eventually smart phones.

Technological advances provide physical rapprochement and reduces distances between places. Information technology closes political, intellectual and socio-cultural gaps between societies. At the intersection of transport and IT progresses that took place during the last 50 years tourism industry has seen a dramatic development. In 2011, travel and tourism industry generated 2 trillion USD in direct GDP. This amount is twice of the automotive industry and one third larger than that of chemicals industry. Few industries exist with larger GDP amounts globally than tourism such as finance, education, and communication. When indirect and induced impacts are taken into consideration the total GDP impact of travel and tourism reaches 6.3 trillion USD in 2011. Currently travel and tourism industry provides 9.1 % of global GDP which is very close to education and communication industries. In Middle East region travel and tourism industry contributes to GDP less than mining (oil) and financial services, but it is close to the levels of other key industries. The greatest contribution of travel and tourism industry can be better understood in terms of employment data. Few industries can offer employment opportunities to large young populations as tourism industry does. Currently, around 100 million people (8.7 % of globe) are directly employed by travel and tourism industry in the world. Tourism industry creates 2 times more employees than global communications industry, 4 times more than global mining industry, 5 times more than chemicals industry, and 6 times more than automotive manufacturing. Good news is that in the near future there seems no risk of slow-down for tourism industry. While global economy is expected to grow 3.6 % per annum during the decade of 2012-2022, travel and tourism industry is expected to grow 4.2 % annually at the same period. Employment expectations for tourism industry are to grow 1.9 % per annum, while global economic employment may grow only 1.2 % during the same period (World Travel and Tourism Council, 2012). Since tourism is a labor-intensive field countries with young populations can benefit from this industry for employment purposes.

Turkey has been one of the key players of global tourism industry. Despite her relatively late entrance to global tourism arena after mid-1980s, Turkey

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proved to be a competitive destination. During early period of Turkish tourism development visitor profile was predominantly European (especially from Germany, United Kingdom, Holland, Austria etc.) however this outlook has gradually turned to a more diverse structure. After the collapse of Soviet Union more Russian and Asian visitors started to visit Turkey. Additionally, during the decade of 2000-2010 an increasing influx from neighbor countries has been recorded. Latest development regarding the profile of Turkey’s visitors is related with Arab countries and GCC region. More Arab visitors visit Turkey than before. GCC countries play an increasing role in Turkey’s tourism industry not only as visitors but also as investors.

This study aims to discover alternative tourism types that can be flourished between GCC countries and Turkey. Developing bilateral economic and sociocultural relations in a sustainable and well-balanced method should be a strategic goal for Turkey and GCC countries. When both parties can receive some benefits from the relationship following the win-win strategy a longer period of relationship can be planned.

1- Current Positions of Turkey and Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) Countries in Global Tourism Industry

Turkey’s interest in tourism industry dates back to late Ottoman periods. During Republican Era Turkish tourism staggered long time until the economic liberalization policies of 1980s. In 1966 Turkey was a typical rural country that earned only 12 million USD from international tourism. In 1970 Turkey’s tourism revenues (51.6 million USD) first time surpassed her tourism expenditures (47.7 million USD). In 1975 Turkey’s tourism revenues quadrupled and attained 200 million USD. In 1983, Turkish tourism revenues overpassed 400 million USD. After 1983, Turkish tourism started to develop very rapidly thank to the Law of Tourism Incentives (No. 2634) put into practice in 1982. In 1984, Turkish tourism revenues doubled in one year. In 1985 Turkey earned around 1.5 billion USD from tourism, and Turkey joined to the club of destinations earning over 1 billion USD from tourism industry. In 1988, Turkey’s revenues raised up to 2.3 billion USD. In 2001, only after 16 years of her first billion USD from tourism Turkey overpassed another psychologically important level and reached 10 billion USD in tourism revenues. Compared with figures of 1970, Turkey multiplied her tourism revenues by 200 times in only 30 year period (within one generation). The period between 1983 and 2001 is accepted as the introductory phase of Turkey to the international tourism scene. After 2001 the second phase of Turkish tourism development starts. This second phase can be called as maturity phase during which Turkey started to diversify her tourism markets and visitor profile. At this second phase Turkey started to receive visitors from Russia, immediate


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neighbors, and Arab countries to balance her visitor profile which had been over-dependent on OECD and European Union countries. Between 2001 and 2010 Turkey doubled once more her tourism revenues and reached 20 billion USD per year. Turkey’s tourism revenues helped her economically during downturns. Especially after 1983 during the first boom phase; the proportion of tourism revenues varied between 15 to 34 % in total export revenues. Therefore; tourism has become one of the greatest contributors to the currency deficit in Turkey and helped to the balance of payments since then. Since 2001 tourism revenues constitute roughly around 20 % of Turkish export revenues. On the contrary, Turkish tourism expenditures abroad (outgoing) vary between 2 to 4 billion USD and her outgoing expenditures constitute around 1.5 to 3 % of Turkish import expenses (TÜRSAB, 2013). As a result, tourism industry has a crucial importance for Turkish economy and contributes positively to Turkish foreign trade balance.

1.1. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia:

Between 2006 and 2011 number of total inbound visitors to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, fluctuated from 11 to17 millions. Among these visitors around 2 million are qualified as same-day visitors. These same-day visitors are also known as excursionists and their contribution to tourism industry in economic terms is limited since they do not buy accommodation and spend very limited time in the country. Therefore, approximately around 10 million visitors come to the Kingdom and realize overnight stays (nuitee) per year. These visitors stay at average 13-14 days in the country and spend around 25-30 billion SAR during their visits. A typical visitor spends around 150-200 SAR per night during their stay. Origins of visitors in Saudi Arabia are 60 % from Middle East countries according to figures of 2011 (MAS, 2012). Middle Eastern visitors are followed by South Asians (22 %), and Africans (8 %). Americas, Asians and Europeans constitute in total only about 10 % of visitors in Saudi Arabia. Top 5 tourist source countries of Saudi Arabia are Kuwait, Egypt, India, United Arab Emirates, and Qatar (MAS & SCTA, 2012).

Faith (religious), and visiting friends & relatives (VFR) are the two pioneering motivations for travels to Saudi Arabia. 30 % of tourists visit Saudi Arabia for religious reasons (Umrah and Hajj), and 21 % of them visit for family reasons. While visitors from abroad stay average two weeks in the country Saudi citizens stay at average 20 nights during their visits. Tourists coming to Saudi Arabia use 99 % air and land transport while maritime and rail transport modes are neglected. 67 % of tourists arrive via airlines and 32 % of them arrive with land transport (car, bus). During their visits inbound tourists (non-resident visitor coming from abroad) prefer shopping activities at the top (65 %), followed


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by religious activities (40 %), environmental activities ((21%), and recreational activities (18 %). In monetary terms the expenditures of the inbound tourists are shared by shopping expenses (33 %), accommodation (29%), transport (15 %), and food & beverage (13 %) (MAS & SCTA, 2012).

At the same time Saudi citizens tend to travel more to other countries. Approximately more than 5 million travels are realized per year to abroad destination by Saudis. In proportion to the population of the country the number of Saudis travelling abroad seems quite high. In every 4 years the number of Saudi visitors to other countries surpasses the population of the country. Comparing this figure with Turkey would give a better idea about respective travel propensities. 2010 the number of Turkish citizens travelling abroad hardly reached 11 million (TURSAB, 2012). While Turkish citizens travelling abroad reach the total population figure of the country in 7 years, Saudi citizens reach the total population figure in 4 years. Therefore, comparatively more travels are realized by Saudis then Turkish in terms of the population and number of travels. The share of outbound travels per year in Saudi population is 25 %. In Turkey this percentage is 14 %. Germans create 93 million travels to other countries in a year, while British travels abroad reach up to 57 million. Annually; 31 million French citizens, 24 million Russians, and 23 million Hollanders travel abroad (Bloomberght.com, 2012). Thinking the share of travels in their populations; Germans and Hollanders are the most travelling nations in the world. As a comparison Holland and Saudi Arabia have populations close to each other. While Saudi Arabia has 20 millions of citizens as of July 2011 (Indexmundi, 2012), Holland has nearly 17 million citizens (Indexmundi, 2012). While Holland produces 23 million travels abroad (more than its actual population), Saudi Arabia produces 5 million travels to abroad out of 20 million citizens.

Looking at the monthly dispersion of travels it is noteworthy that Saudis travel in July more than any other month of the year. Saudis visit mostly neighboring countries and Middle East (62 %) and South Asian countries (20%), and to a lesser extent East Asian & Pacific countries (7%). In order of their visiting frequency most popular foreign destinations for Saudis are Bahrain, Egypt, UAE, and Kuwait. Saudis travelling abroad prefer to go by plane (56%) and car (44%). Typically a Saudi tourist stays around 2 weeks at their destinations. Saudi travelers prefer mostly furnished apartment units (54%) outside their country. Only 20% of Saudi tourists stay at hotels in other countries (MAS & SCTA, 2012).

Saudi citizens are highly mobile since 93% of them visit other parts of their country as overnight visitors. Makkah Al Mukarramah is the most popular


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destination for Saudi domestic tourists. More than 40% of Saudi travelers visit Makkah, followed by Madinah (23%), Eastern Province (11%), Asir Province (9%), and Riyadh Province (6.8 %). Around 95 % of Saudi travels in their own country are realized by land transport. Land transport is dependent on private car ownership to a large extent. During their travels in home country Saudi citizens prefer to stay at private houses (37 %), followed by hotels (32 %), and furnished apartment units (18 %) (MAS & SCTA, 2012). Their accommodation preferences underline a certain characteristic; a greater interest in privacy enabling large accommodation units instead of small size hotel rooms where privacy is limited relatively.

Currently one of the most critical problems of the tourism industry in Saudi Arabia is the lack of qualified personnel with necessary skills. The concept of tourism education is recently established in Saudi Arabia and the number of colleges and universities offering diplomas and degrees are less than a handful in Saudi Arabia. Therefore, a great potential exists to be fulfilled by educational units to prepare the future human resources of this growing industry. The growth of tourism industry is inevitable with its sub-sectors (aviation, transport, food and beverage, hospitality, travel services management, tourist guiding, events and meetings industry etc.) in all Saudi Arabia in the forthcoming years. The number of increasing investments in transports, travel, and hospitality enable us to hold positive regards for the future of the industry (Arabnews, 25.04.2012). The number of international travellers is expected to overpass one billion this year. This is a historic moment for tourism industry and Saudi Arabian tourism industry will be welcoming an increasingly diverse and mobile visitor profile of which the interests will not be limited to holy destinations such as Makkah and Madinah.

Saudi Arabia is a valuable country in terms of its location allowing quick access to African continent, increasing young population, and relatively high level of personal income. There are new opportunities offered to foreign investors some of which Turkey can develop mutual benefits (World Turkish Business Council, 2009). In 2012, Saudi Arabia’s tourism industry was one of the fastest growing in the world mostly based on Haj and Umrah pilgrims. This strong growth was demonstrated by 14 % increase (the fifth fastest growing tourism in the world).

1.2. The Sultanate of Oman, the Kingdom of Bahrain, United Arab Emirates,

Qatar, Kuwait:

GCC region became more accessible by its growing team of airlines. There are direct routes to several European and Mediterranean tourist markets. GCC


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tourism firms are present at global tourism events such as MITT (Moscow International Tourism Business Summit), EMITT (East Mediterranean Tourism and Travel Exhibition-Istanbul). GCC countries try to attract visitors from long distances such as Sao Paolo via direct flight to Abu Dhabi International Airport to be operated by Etihad Airways after June 2013. In recent years several international hotel brands invested in the region to open their luxury properties. Big hotel groups try to circulate GCC nationals around their other properties in the world, and attract visitors from the world to the region. For instance, for Kempsinski Hotels Kuwait is a key market, because income level of Kuwaiti tourists are very high and they can spend considerable amount of money during their visits around the world. This hotel accepts GCC nationals at its properties in Istanbul (Ciragan Palace Kempinski), in Munich (Hotel Vier Jaherszeiten), or in Abu Dhabi (Emirates Palace). After its first hotel opened in 1998 in Middle East, Kempinski Hotels opened nine more luxuries hotels around GCC countries including Qatar, UAE, and Bahrain. They will open new hotels in Riyadh, Jeddah, Al Khobar (Saudi Arabia) and Oman in the next two years. Countries other than Saudi Arabia try to attract visitors by creating business hubs, entertainment, and sports venues for tourists. Typical examples of these man made attractions are islands in Dubai (UAE) and Manama (Bahrain), luxury resorts, international sports events, concerts, film festivals, and art exhibitions (Nihal, 2013). (Concerts given by global stars such as Julio Iglesias, sponsorship of Barcelona by Qatar Foundation, Museum Project with Louvre of Paris…)

2. Natural and Cultural Tourism Supplies in Turkey for GCC Citizens

Turkey’s natural resources may be very attractive for GCC citizens because of her geographical location with mild climate. Turkey’s natural resources that can be of particular interest to GCC tourists are as follows:

Climate: Turkey offers a variety of climatic conditions at one time and sometimes at very close distances. For this reason climate is a very important factor of Turkey’s attractiveness in global tourism industry. Turkey’s geomorphological characteristics allow the seasonal variations. For instance, at the same week a tourist can ski at Eastern Turkey and swim at Mediterranean shores in April. During very hot periods of summer GCC nationals can benefit cool and green plateaus of Northern and Eastern Turkey. At northwest already some cities like Yalova, Bursa are well-known by GCC markets. At northeast Trabzon creates an attraction for Arab visitors because it has an international airport. In short while we can expect Ordu and Giresun provinces to be next destinations of GCC visitors, because the construction of Ordu-Giresun International Airport has started. East Anatolia Region may also offer some mountain resorts for GCC visitors but much investment is needed at this region since investments were delayed as a result of security problem created by PKK terror organization.


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Flora: Turkey’s flora is very rich and GCC visitors can discover nature deeply in Turkey. Botanic tours are organized for some groups already in Turkey.

Fauna: Bird watch, hunting, fishing are some possible animal related tourism activities realized in Turkey.

Rivers, Lakes, Seas and other aquatic resources: Rivers are rare in Gulf region and for this reason GCC visitors will find much to see as regards to aquatic resources in Turkey. There are famous waterfalls like Manavgat in Antalya, Muradiye in Van. There are lakes of different sizes such as Egirdir in Isparta, Lake Van, Salty Lake near Konya, and artificial lakes of dams. On several lakes there are water sport activities. Rivers in Turkey can offer rafting sports, trekking opportunities, swimming trips, canoeing. Turkey is already known for beaches and coastal resorts, where boat trips can be taken such as Blue Voyage. Another possibility is the yachting and cruise ports of Turkey.

Mountains: Turkey is a hilly, mountainous land where several mountain activities can be organized. Trekking routes are already established in many mountains. Popular mountains such as Ararat (Agri) – being the highest in Turkey with 5.165 m. altitude, Cilo, Taurus offer spectacular panorama and also some myths and narratives (ie. Noah’s Ark). Several mountains are ideal for climbing and cave discoveries.

Turkey’s rich cultural heritage is also an important asset. Turkey can attract both GCC nationals and expatriate families living in this region to her cultural heritage. Some of cultural heritage elements are related with Islamic civilization, and some others belong to different civilizations such as Romans, Byzantines, and Ottomans etc.

3. Natural and Cultural Tourism Supply in GCC Countries for Turkish Citizens

Natural tourism supply in GCC for Turkish citizens can be developed on climatic differences and deserts. For Turkish visitors mild climate and sea in GCC region during winter period (End of November-End of April) is very attractive. If some official and religious holidays (Ramadan Feast etc.) match with this period Turkish people would spend their holidays in GCC region. Desert experience is quite different for Turkish visitors and they can be interested in several desert-based activities packaged as tourism products.

Cultural supply in GCC countries may be developed from the traditions of the GCC people. New forms of cultural events such as art festivals, concerts, handcrafts fairs, cinema and film based events, MICE industry products can be of interest for Turkish visitors. Gastronomy and local vernacular products, old


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production techniques of some materials (leather, wool, perfume…) can attract tourists from Turkey.

4. Tourism Demand between Turkey and GCC Countries

Turkey is close to GCC countries by geographical location and distance, but also by cultural and sociological aspects. Turkey tries to diversify its visitor profile and upgrade the profile of these diversified visitors. From this perspective, GCC countries can support Turkey’s diversification and upgrade policy. Visits from GCC countries to Turkey soared in recent years. For instance, in 2012 visits from Qatar increased 600 %, 331 % from Kuwait, 370 % from UAE (Nihal, 2013).

In order to increase tourist flows between GCC countries and Turkey we need to take precautions in the following domains:

- Transportation: tourism can become reality with the access of visitors to the destinations. Therefore transport is vital for the future of tourism between Turkey and GCC. Air, road, and rail transport may play crucial role in transport solutions.

- Security: Security and safety precautions should be implemented carefully at destinations, hospitality properties, and transport vehicles.

- Visa facilitations: Turkish visitors generally prefer visits to the countries which do not as visa. Heavy visa procedures are generally disappointing for Turkish visitors and they may decline visiting a country just because of visa even if they have enough resources and time.

- Tourism superstructure: Visitors from GCC region is different than other tourist groups in Turkey. Privacy and family life is important for visitors from GCC countries.

- Manpower training and quality service: In Turkey tourism education is designed for tourist profiles to come from Europe and for this reason there are few employees that can speak Arabic currently. There is a need to increase Arabic courses within tourism education programs.

- Sound legal basis: During visits and stays in GCC region and Turkey there can be disputes or legal cases. Tourists and tourism firms should be well informed before the trips. Turkish tourism law should be translated to Arabic and given to GCC firms. Also for visitors there should be leaflets explaining their rights and responsibilities clearly when they are in Turkey. For this purpose Ministries of Tourism and Justice can cooperate.


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5. A Literature Research on Tourism Development and Regional Cooperation Possibilities between Turkey and GCC Countries

5.1. Demographic perspective

After 1967 Turkish labor force started to work temporarily in MENA countries including GCC member states. Since that date demographic mobility continues between Turkey and GCC. The characteristics of this demographic relationship is depicted as; geographic proximity, guaranteed jobs as employment is provided by large international firms, some jobs provide long term stay while others do not, Turkish workers easily adapt to these countries since there is a cultural common background based on religion (easier adaptation than Asian workers), relatively low level of vocational education among MENA countries, 99 % of workers moving to these countries are male which create some family problems after a certain period (Özözen Kahraman, 2012).

As a general fact, MENA populations are young. GCC populations are much younger than Turkish population which creates bilateral partnership opportunities. Young GCC populations need education and employment which can be realized by extensive educational investments and academic staff exchange between Turkey and GCC countries. On the other hand, Turkey has a relatively young population which is elder than GCC averages. High level of education among Turkish people creates opportunities for GCC. Especially, Turkish expatriates that received international education and work experience now are turning back to MENA region from North America and European countries. In Qatar, where approximately 20.000 Turkish people live, Turkish female expatriates fulfill very important professional positions. Some of them occupy key positions at international projects related with hotel and other construction. Another group of Turkish expatriates work in academic institutions. Interestingly, most of intellectual workers (white collars) have international experience (Sabah, 2011).

In all GCC countries urban population is at high levels. For instance in Saudi Arabia 82 %, in Bahrain 89 %, in Kuwait 98 %, in Oman 72 %, in UAE 78 %, and in Qatar 96 % of population is urban. In Turkey urban population constitutes 70 %. Therefore, in comparison with GCC countries Turkey’s urbanization process is still low. Compared with GCC countries Turkey is less urbanized but Turkey is a large country with a high population too. Total populations in GCC region are; Bahrain 1.2 million, Kuwait 3.1 million, Oman 3.3 million, Qatar 1.7 million, Saudi Arabia 28.4 million, UAE 8.3 million. In total GCC population raises up to 45.9 million people (The Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf, 2013). Turkey’s population is currently over 75 million people. The


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demographic profiles of Turkey and GCC countries have particularities that complement each other. Except Saudi Arabia GCC countries have low levels of populations which are mostly urbanized. In GCC countries population is young and increase at average faster than Turkey. Citizens of GCC countries generally enjoy good education and health services. Turkey can offer several educational opportunities to the young students at GCC especially during summer periods. Turkish and GCC State universities can develop new forms of partnership. GCC citizens living in urban zones of the Gulf can enjoy rural attractions of Turkey.

5.2. Economic perspective

In Bahrain, economy is not as strong as other GCC members. In 2005, 15% of Bahrainis were unemployed, but despite this unemployment problem Bahrain labor force is composed of foreign immigrant up to 60 %. Oil reserves of Bahrain is less than other GCC members and this fact leads country to develop a diverse economy (ship repairing, manufacturing, light engineering, aluminum smelters…). PPP (Purchasing power parity) in Bahrain is 29.723 USD (Stalker, 2010).

Kuwait has developed rapidly after the discovery of oil in 1946. This country offers good education and healthcare to the population. With one of the highest level of literacy in GCC region Kuwait still need expatriates for its economy. In 2006, Kuwaitis made only 35% of the population, and only 17 % of the labor force was formed by Kuwaitis. Purchasing power parity in Kuwait is quite high, reaching 47.812 USD. Kuwait still has important oil reserves (10 % of world oil) which now are combined with large reserves of gas. Kuwaiti economy is dependent on oil (52 % of GDP, 95 % of export earnings, 75 % of government income) (Stalker, 2010).

Oman economy started to develop after 1970s thanks to the oil reserves. Human development since 1970 is a spectacular success. For instance, between 1970 and 2008 life expectancy increased from 40 to 76 years. Over the same period great advances were recorded for infant mortality (fell from 126 deaths per 1000 births to 10 deaths per 1000). Oil constitutes only 25 % of Omani GDP (Stalker, 2010).

After the discovery of oil in 1939 Qatar has developed rapidly. In the coming years Qatar is expected to become one of the richest nations on Earth. Qatari Purchasing Power Parity is one of the highest in the world reaching up to 74.882 USD. Qatari economy is shifting from oil based production to gas extraction that could improve the country for the coming centuries. Qatar’s Al-Jazeera TV station is one of the powerful information sources of the region (Stalker, 2010).


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In UAE only 17 % of the population is citizen. The rest of the population is composed of immigrant workers. Nearly all UAE citizens work in government jobs. In UAE tourism and agriculture are also important industries. After 1958, oil production helped country’s economic boom. UAE also invests seriously on international bonds and equity markets. In total the foreign assets of the UAE is around 600 billion USD. Government backed Dubai World Company invested heavily in real estate and tourism industries and these efforts paid well off with soaring tourist arrival reaching 5 million visitors per year (Stalker, 2010).

GCC citizens spend 27 billion USD abroad during their travels. On the other hand GCC countries will invest around 18 billion USD for tourism projects by 2015. Tourism is accepted as one of the pillars of economic diversification in GCC members (Emirates 24/7, 2013).

Despite high rates of development in economy unemployment continues to be a concern for Middle East countries including GCC region. Unemployment rate was 12.6% in 2003 through Middle East, and then decreased to 10.3% in 2007. After that time with the effect of global economic crisis that started in 2008 unemployment rate is slowed down over 10%. Social unrest and the price of the oil are critical inputs for these economies. Another risk is the economic crisis that threatens oil consumption at developed countries (ILO, 2012).

5.3. Socio-cultural perspective

GCC population and Turkish society has a historical relationship. Nowadays, Turkish presence in global politics and Turkish cultural actors has impacts on developing new ties with the region. For instance, Turkish soap operas are popular among GCC people. Many Turkish professionals started to work in service industries in GCC countries. Turkish firms and GCC firms are chasing for new joint collaborations in the region. Socio-culturally societies of Turkey and GCC have common points. Their lifestyles, values, beliefs, political positions, even languages have similarity. These similarities can help easy adoption of tourism destinations reciprocally.

5.4. Natural/Environmental Perspective

Turkey and GCC countries are on the northern hemisphere but Turkey has different morphological and climatic conditions. Because natural characteristics are different fauna and flora are also different in these regions. Oman and some parts of Saudi Arabia offer some similar environmental characteristics with Turkey.


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Conclusion

According to UNWTO, a half of the global tourist arrivals are motivated by pleasure (holiday, recreation, leisure). The other half of the world travel is dispersed among several motivations. However, one can distinguish the persistence of some historical travel motivations such as health, religious, business, and VFR (visiting friends and relatives). Around seven percent of global tourism arrivals do not belong to the categories above. Therefore, these are small niche markets that offer high level of diversity in products and markets. Between Turkey and GCC following tourism types and related products can be developed:

- VFR tourism: Families having Turkish origins reside in GCC countries and vice versa is valid for Turkey. Therefore, thousands of mixed families exist in this region. Some of these families have their historical records back to the Ottoman period. After the collapse of Ottoman Empire several families in Arabian Peninsula with Turkish kinship were left in the region. It is possible to see remnants of these relationships in Hedjaz area close to Mecca and Medina. These families still conserve their links with their relatives on both sides. Existence of Arab originated families in Turkey is visible especially in southern Turkey where borders with Arab neighbors are shared. However from GCC countries there seem to be a limited number of families residing in Turkey. One should add modern expatriate movements and second home ownership phenomenon to the historical family ties to see the bigger picture. MENA countries and especially GCC countries have been the second expatriate movement address for Turkish labor force. Turkish labor immigration to Europe slowed after 1974 and new destination for unemployed Turkish labor was MENA countries. Between 1962 and 1972 the number of Turkish immigrants heading to Europe reached 641.959. At the same period 8.933 Turkish workers went to MENA countries to find jobs. In 1983, only 464 Turkish citizens went to Europe to find jobs, while 52 thousand workers preferred to immigrate to MENA countries (Gül, 1992). The labor mobility of modern times also creates an opportunity for VFR tourism. Employees of Turkish firms operating in GCC countries transfer a lot of Turkish workers during their contract periods. New investments and franchising contracts increase the number of expatriates on both sides. A final phenomenon is the interest of GCC citizens to the real estate markets in Turkey. This interest creates second home ownership among GCC nationals especially in Istanbul, Bursa, Yalova and other areas of Northern Turkey.

- Health tourism: GCC countries support health investments generously. They support treatment and medical tourism for their citizens. A recent phenomenon


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is the rise of Istanbul as a health tourism destination for GCC citizens. They prefer Istanbul for its high quality health service mixed with qualified medical staff and well-equipped modern facilities. In addition to this, health service prices are relatively lower than European and American hospitals. When cultural proximity and short flight distances are included Turkey becomes an ideal destination for thermal, geriatric, disabled, and medical tourism seekers in GCC. Hair transplant, dentistry, aesthetic surgeries and other kind of health services provided by Turkish firms are gaining popularity among GCC citizens.

- Religious tourism: Both Turkey and GCC countries offer religious events and heritage to the visitors. Saudi Arabia has a pivotal role in religious tourism in particular for Muslim visitors. Countries other than Saudi Arabia do not offer much for religious tourism, however they can offer great cultural heritage to the visitors. Religion is part of the cultural tourism. Cultural tourism is based on several heritage elements and events based not only in religion. Therefore, countries like Oman, Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait, and UAE can offer modern religious monuments and constructions nearby their rich cultural heritage (nomadic origins, desert lifestyle, folklore, handcrafts…). For Turkish citizens Saudi Arabia is the number one destination for religious visits. Every year demand for Umrah and Hajj visits is increasing. If visas are canceled with GCC countries many Turkish families can visit these countries by their own vehicles and by other means. The most important factor to ease travel influx from Turkey to GCC countries seems to be visa exemption.

- Business/professional tourism: The Gulf Region has long been a select MICE (meetings, incentives, conventions, and exhibitions) destination. Especially, UAE has invested heavily on business tourism and shopping outlets. Increasing professional links between Turkey and GCC triggers new investments by tourism firms. Arabian travel fairs are watched closely by Turkish companies and the number of GCC originated firms participating to fairs and other business activities in Turkey is on the rise. One can expect greater amounts of business partnerships between Turkish companies and GCC companies especially with the political support and help of bilateral organizations such as associations of businessmen and traders.

- Holiday/Leisure/Recreation (HLR) tourism: Turkey is typically known as a holiday destination. Especially for visitors from Northern Europe and Russia Turkey has been the ideal holiday country in the last 25 years. However, Turkey tries to change this image of 3S (Sun-Sea-Sand) based holiday tourism pattern with a richer texture of tourism types. Health, culture, business, ski are some of the much underlined themes for this transition. Despite the need of transition from a heavily coastal holiday destination to a diversified and


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balanced (distribution of tourism all year and at every corner of the country) destination Turkey will keep her competitive edge as a holiday destination thanks to her geographical and natural characteristics. For GCC citizens Turkey offers mild climate and abundant greenery at Black Sea and Marmara regions. In near future, Eastern Anatolia plateaus with similar offers can also attract GCC visitors. Nearby, green belt destinations at higher and mostly northern parts of the country Turkey offers ideal exclusive destinations for luxury tourism. This luxury segment in GCC countries started to discover Istanbul and Bodrum as their new destinations. In order to attract this elite segment to Turkey, destinations like Istanbul, Bodrum, Cesme/Alacati, Gocek/Fethiye, and Trabzon should plan the development. This group requires special services such as; easy access to international airports with frequent flying options; respect to their privacy, high level of security and high quality service, yacht anchorage options and easy access via maritime vehicles, quality infrastructure (telecommunications, satellite, electricity, financial services, local transport). For Turkish holiday makers Arabian Peninsula and GCC countries represent a rich imaginary. Adventure and culture based tourism products can attract Turkish holiday makers to the region. Shopping proved to be another significant motivation for Turkish visitors to go to GCC area, in particular to Dubai.

- Special Interest Tourism Types: Gastro-tourism, luxury tourism, sports tourism, hunting, caravanning.

Risk factors to avoid are social unrest, political tensions, economic crisis, and fluctuations in oil price, epidemic diseases, and long visa procedures.

References

Arabnews Daily Newspaper, 2012. ‘New transport system aims to generate major savings’, Wednesday, April 25.

Emirates 24/7 (Online News Channel), 2013. “Dubai is key tourism destination: GCC Chambers”, February 27. http://www.emirates247.com/business/dubai-is-key-tourism-destination-gcc-chambers-2013-02-27-1.496669 , Accessed: 22.04.2013.

Gül, Abdullah. 1992. “Ortadoğu ülkelerinde Türk işgücü ve bu ülkelerin işgücü açığı” (Turkish Labor force in Middle East countries and labor shortage of these countries), Sosyal Siyaset Konferansları Dergisi (Journal of Social Policy Conferences), No. 37-38, pp. 103-109. http://www.journals.istanbul.edu.tr/tr/index.php/sosyalsiyaset/article/view/12274/11519

Accessed: 25.04.201

http://www.bloomberght.com/kultur-sanat/haber/1110031-seyahatte-dunya-rekoru-

onlarin

Accessed 18.04.2012.


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ILO (International Labor Organization), 2012. Global Employment Trends 2012, Geneva: ILO.

INDEXMUNDI, http://www.indexmundi.com/saudi_arabia/demographics_profile.html, Accessed 18.04.2012.

MAS & SCTA. 2012. Quarterly Tourism Monitor: July-September 2011, Riyadh, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.

Nihal, Mariam. 2013. GCC tourism continues to thrive, Saudi Gazette, www.saudigazette.com.sa , Accessed: 26.04.2013.

Özözen Kahraman, Selver. 2012. Theoretical and spatial assesments of labor migrations from Turkey to MENA countries, International Journal of Human Sciences, Vol: 9, Issue: 2, pp. 1158-1178.

Sabah (Daily Turkish Newspaper), 2011. Katar’a damga vuran Türk kadınları (Turkish women earmarking Qatar), http://www.sabah.com.tr/fotohaber/ekonomi/katara-damga-vuran-turk-kadinlari/31576 , Accessed: 22.04.2013.

Stalker, Peter. 2010. A Guide to Countries of the World, 3rd Edition, New York: Oxford University Press.

The Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf, http://www.gcc-sg.org/eng/indexc64c.html?action=GCC, Accessed: 20.04.2013.

TURSAB, 2012. Yurtiçi Seyahat Pazarı (Turkish domestic tourism market) (http://www.tursab.org.tr/tr/istatistikler/yurtici-seyahat-pazari/yurt-disina-cikis-sayilari-1991-_909.html , Accessed 18.04.2012.

TURSAB (Association of Turkish Travel Agencies), 2013. İstatistikler (Statistics), http://tursab.org.tr/tr/istatistikler , Accessed: 25.04.2013.

World Travel and Tourism Council (WTTC), 2012. The Comparative Economic Impact of Travel and Tourism, http://www.wttc.org/site_media/uploads/downloads/The_Comparative_Economic_Impact_of_Travel__Tourism.pdf , Accessed: 25.04.2013.

World Turkish Business Council, 2009. Türkler Buluşuyor (Turkish Businessmen are Meeting), Foreign Economic Relations Board of Turkey (DEİK), http://www.dtik.org.tr/DC/Files/FB/5eb715123cd048ca937602384a4c63b6.pdf , Accessed: 23.04.2013.


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THE SECURITYPOLICY UNDERMORSI’S RULE

Rabha Seif Allam

Introduction

One of the major reasons for the Egyptian revolution to spark and expand in January 2011 was the police brutality. Human rights and dignity were at the core of the protestors’ demands and were an important motivation for citizens to engage in massive rallies before and after Mubarak’s ousting. The ministry of Interior was involved in manipulating elections, intimidating Mubarak’s political opponents, violently attacking workers in strikes, managing media and academia. Therefore, Egypt was literally ruled through security services. During the revolution events, Egyptians showed their anger against the police brutality through burning police stations and vehicles and chasing the remains of the Central Security Forces in Cairo’s and other governorates’ streets. A deep rift damaged the relationship between the Egyptians and their police forces, the latter were a source of threat instead of being a protection’s source. This crisis of trust was deepened latter, when the police restrained from working right after Mubarak’s ousting and caused a deliberate security chaos. The revolution was widely misperceived by the police officers, since they were the direct target of the rage of the demonstrators during the revolution.

This paper will tackle the topic of the security sector reform from two perspectives; the first one is to determine the major aspects of the security

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policy that should be altered and to introduce vital suggestions to enable enhancing the police’s professional performance alongside respecting laws, human and civil rights. In the second part, the paper will evaluate the efforts done by Morsi’s government to implement his electoral promises regarding police reform, as well as improving the security condition in Egypt. In this regard, the study will inquire the constants and the variables of the security policy, the major lobbying actors influencing the formulation of this policy and the prospects of change in the light of the current political situation.

I- The Necessity of Security Sector Reform

In autocracies Police is usually the regime’s tool to chase political opponents and spread the fear to intimidate any potential opposition. On the contrary, in democracies police is the tool of citizens’ protection and law enforcement under a civilian oversight of freely elected representatives. Therefore, any potential democracy consolidation in Egypt must definitely pass through the police reform. Accordingly, most of the crises that made the Egyptians to protest in massive rallies during Morsi’s mandate were primarily protesting the Police’s brutality or the unlawful detention of activists and ordinary people.

However, the process of Police reform is very difficult as it tackles several things at once. It should target the Police Culture/Doctrine, the Police Structures/tools and the Police personnel at the same time. It is also a very delicate process as it should balance two difficult tasks: ensure the respect of law and human rights, and enhance the professional capacity of policemen.

a- Culture/Doctrine Change:

The concept of the police culture gained importance in the last two decades as concept describing a big obstacle in the way of police reform. And by culture we mean not only the police’s declared doctrine that includes vision, mission and goals. It is rather the “layer of informal occupational norms and values operating under the apparently rigid hierarchical structure of police organizations”50. Hence, the police culture is the vehicle which transmits or mis-transmits the implementation of the police doctrine. Therefore, transforming the police doctrine through official documents or doctrinal papers respecting human rights, the rule of law and professional norms, is not enough. Those upper policies imposed by the ruling authorities are not enough to guarantee that the police would respect those norms. On the contrary, the police’s doctrine should be internalized by police officers themselves and fitting in their culture as tasks, duties, honorable stories and deep convictions. Such a process could

50 Janet Chan, “Changing Police Culture”, in BRIT.J. CR1MIN0L, VOL.36 NO. 1 WINTER 1996, ONLINE

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not be imposed by an outsider, it should emanate from inside the institution. However this fact contradicts another rule, the civilian oversight over the police as a guarantee for a sustainable democracy. Officers usually have a sense of solidarity and refute outsiders’ involvement especially civilians. But if we were to introduce a deep shift in the police doctrine from the “State security” to the “human security” and human rights, civilian (lawyers, rightists and judges) must be involved. Additionally, if those who draw the police doctrine and detailed action plans remained the same, we should not expect any different outcome at all. Therefore, the small circle of decision making in the police administration should accept the insertion of civilian actors that share the responsibility and duty of drawing new policies and strategies for professional and lawful police practices. In Poland, such an insertion was crucial and interestingly smooth in the transitional period at the late eighties. The minister of interior was first an ex-officer with civilian collaborates that were drawing new polices then passing them to middle ranked officers in charge of internalizing those policies into action plans and common concepts to the rest of the police body51. Therefore, the reformulation of the police doctrine should be the basis of any prospect change in police performance. And this process should involve both civilians and police officers to guarantee that the new doctrine would meet the human rights requirements and would be culturally assimilated by the officers that are in charge of its implementation.

b- Structures and Tools Change

A new policy should be introduced côte à côte with suitable structures and tools to guarantee its perfect implementation. Trying to introduce a new policy without changing old structure and tools is a risky choice that will not only cause the failure of the new policy but will keep the old one intact. Therefore, one of the first steps in transforming police performance is to restructure its components and tools to fit the requirements of the new doctrine and culture. Omitting some departments, adding others, transferring officers from non security to security tasks only, injecting civilian employees to perform non security tasks, introducing new techniques of investigation abiding by the law52, bringing new weaponry system adequate with the job design and reducing or increasing the personnel of some departments according to the

51 Christopher Paun, Democratization and Police Reform, Freie Universität Berlin, Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin and Universität Potsdam, Joint Master›s Degree Program in International Relations, October 2007, pp. 38-44

52 Some initiatives suggested to provide police patrolling groups with laptops linked to the police database to check if a suspect is really wanted before driving him to police stations, Arab Reform Initiative, Egypt: Police, People and a missing trust”, February, 2011, http://www.arab-reform.net/ar/%D9%85%D8%B5%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B4%D8%B1%D8%B7%D8%A9-%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B4%D8%B9%D8%A8-%D8%AB%D9%82


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assigned tasks, all are examples of new structures and tools that should be introduced. Some eastern European countries in the period of transition have dissolved the political investigation devices and dismantled the paramilitary police forces in small groups for patrolling in neighborhoods53. In Egypt’s case, Non-security tasks should be separated from the function of the Ministry of Interior (MIO) such as passport administration, civil records, civil defense and pilgrimage organization54.

Accordingly, there is a big debate in Egypt today about the Central Security Forces CSF which are fulfilling their military service through the police forces. Some would argue that this entity should be kept as it is since it is fulfilling semi- military tasks especially in Sinai instead of the Army Forces which are not allowed to be deployed in borderland area according to the peace agreement with Israel. However, the criticism of these forces targets their tasks in Cairo and other governorates rather than Sinai. The well equipped CSF are deployed in Tahrir square to intimidate peaceful demonstrators not in Sinai to face smugglers or terrorist groups. The main problem of these forces that they are not trained to deal with different situations; they are only trained to attack protestors, and in many cases they are not even applying a gradual escalation policy to disperse the masses. Therefore, before considering canceling or restructuring these forces, we should also consider providing them with suitable skills and capacities to deal with peaceful protesters.

c- Personnel’s Capacity Building/ Enhancement:

Capacity building and capacity enhancement are crucial factors in transforming police performance. Previously, police investigators used to torture and put pressure on suspects to make them confess arbitrarily in order to resolve cases. New techniques of criminal investigations respecting human rights and ongoing laws should be introduced. Meanwhile, police personnel should be trained on these new techniques and equipped with new skills of problem solving, conflict prevention, negotiations, trust building and direct communications with the community it is serving.

The Indonesian experience of police reform has proven that introducing general reformist policies was not enough to alter the police performance. After formulating a new doctrine and restructuring the MOI, micro-level training courses were necessary to enhance the individual performance of police officers in different provinces. This training process, organized on the

53 Jan Rommel, “My experience in the Ministry of Interior”, in Transition process: the Czech experience, People in Need Foundation, p.129, http://www.clovekvtisni.cz/index2en.php?id=629

54 Omar Ashour, “From Bad Cop to Good Cop: The Challenge of Security Sector Reform in Egypt”, Brookings Doha Center- Stanford Project on Arab Transitions, Paper Series #3, November 2012, p.2


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provincial level, was gathering side by side head of police stations and low level ranking police officers. This process enabled the policemen to internalize the general slogans of the new policy and to practice them through tangible methods and techniques55. Those training courses also included hearing sessions for some stakeholders from provincial community in order to involve them in the formulation of the police strategies in their neighborhoods. But the most important about the Indonesian experience was engaging the Police apparatus into direct partnership with strategic and security research and training centers which produced surveys to assess police performance, citizens’ degree of satisfaction and the local needs in terms of the security service. Afterward, these centers designed the training courses in order to cover the needed skills, ethics and techniques that the police personnel lack on provincial basis.

This approach also recalls the Community Oriented Policing experience that was introduced in Kosovo late 2000s. The main logic of this approach was to transform the police from being the regime’s tool of repression to a trusted entity that provides the security service equally to all citizens. In this regard, the police should engage with the local community to assess their needs and go into mutual activity with them to provide crime prevention/reduction and promotion of public order and individual safety56. Besides being an effective approach to fulfill the police tasks, the Community Oriented Policing is also a guarantee that resists the relapse of the police function to be a mere repression tool in hands of the new regime. Thus, being directly connected to the local community grants the police personnel immunity against the politicization of their functions.

Such an approach if introduced in Egypt could be very fruitful and build upon the experience of “the popular committees” that defended the neighborhoods from thugs’ attacks during the revolution’s events. However, introducing this technique before ensuring police neutrality in political conflicts could have opposite dysfunctional results.

II- Police Reform Initiatives in Egypt

a- Civil Society Initiatives:

Right after ousting Mubarak, a big debate on the police’s role in Egypt was widely initiated. Several NGOs, law professors, ex-officers and strategic

55 Arifah Rahmawati and Najib Azca ,”Police Reform from Below: Examples from Indonesia’s Transition to Democracy”, Center for Security and Peace Studies and Gadjah Mada University, Democracy Conflict and Human Security, pp 53-67

56 “Reforms in Kosovo Police”, by Forum for Security, Pristina, December 2011, pp. 8-9


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experts have discussed and published papers about the reform that should take place. These discussions were analyzing the reasons of the police failure and suggesting alternative policies of reform. One of the most prominent initiatives in this regard was the “National Initiative to rebuild the Police Force” NIRPF that was gathering human rights activists, law professors, current and ex-officers. The NIRPE initiative produced several documents to demand short-term and long-term reforms to be introduced. The main core of this initiative was to bring the perpetrators of the unlawful killing to justice, to replace the officers violating human rights with skilled investigators, to permit NGOs to monitor police stations and prisons at any time without notice and to reform the police academy curricula57. Nevertheless, this initiative was never granted an obligatory mandate, it was merely an optional suggestion that the MOI could consider or ignore when deciding about the reform, if any.

b- Police Officers’ Unofficial Initiatives

After the police failure during the revolution and the severe criticism of the officers’ performance, some young policemen were motivated to create unofficial syndical association to defend their profession and rebuild the trust of the society. Different attempts of associations were introduced such as “Officers but honest” and the “General Syndicate of the Police Officers” (GSPO). For instance, OBH have contributed in the drafting the amended police law issued by the parliament in May 2012. Beside this reformist contribution, OBH were constantly targeting what they consider the main corrupted figures resisting reform inside the MOI. They have also widely discussed the bad conditions in which the officers are fulfilling their job and demanded to increase their salaries and enhance their capacities to provide the country with a better security service. For playing the role of the whistleblower inside the MOI, key officers of the OBH were subject to threats, intimidation and even internal investigations for alleged corruption58. Despite including thousands of officers, only key figures were fired or suspended, a fact that pushed the initiative to fade with time. The same goes for the officers that tried to found the General Syndicate; as young reformists their aim was reviving the slogan of “Police is at the service of the People” and rebuild the credibility of police officers despite the continued abuse practices. For demanding the improvement of their conditions and defending their rights, the GSPO was accused by the MOI of pursuing the narrow interest of some undisciplined officers59.

57 Omar Ashour, op. cit., pp.8-958 “the MOI fires a member of OBH”, in al-Badil, 23-8-201159 Heba Hesham, “Police officers protest the MOI for own syndicate”, in Daily News Egypt, 28-3-2012,

http://www.dailynewsegypt.com/2012/03/28/police-officers-protest-at-moi-for-own-syndicate/


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The desire of Police officers to organize in syndicates was widely controversial; some argued that their semi-military job would be affected by the disobedience that officers may practice if their syndicate decided to strike or at least diverged with the MOI in certain issues. Whereas, others thought that part of the police reform process is to emphasize the civil nature of the police as a public service, hence, its personnel should acquire all the related rights including the right of organize in unions and syndicates.

Beyond discussing the legality of founding a syndicate for police officers, the officers’ initiatives and demands of reform were not taken into consideration by any official authority, especially the MOI which was busy tracking the “undisciplined” officers that are giving public statements on the MOI conditions. However, the trade union of Police officers that was formed during the transitional period in Poland played a big role in suggesting reforms and internalizing the new doctrine. Therefore, such a syndical experience, if well received by the authorities, could play a role in catalyzing the police reform in Egypt.

c- The Officially introduced Initiatives

After the dissolution of the State Security Investigation SSI and its replacement with the National Security Apparatus, the police reform initiatives launched by the MOI were almost halted. Some would say that this decision was already a big reform, while others considered it a cosmetic change60. Afterward, The MOI has launched several media campaigns to rebuild a positive image about the Egyptian police. Commercials were produced and police officers were encouraged to appear on TV shows to speak to the public about the change that they are adopting. Nevertheless, no substantial new policies, techniques or tools were really put forward. The change that was really introduced consisted of two points: first was adopting a wide transfers and promotions decision that expelled many of El-Adly’s 61 close associates out of service and promoted middle ranking officers to key post in the MOI. And the second was a collectively shared feeling amongst officers especially in the central security forces that did not want to be pushed again to clash with the people over political issues. Yet, the first point was merely an internal promotion decision that substituted old leaders with young ones, without making the old leaders accountable for any of their mistakes or guaranteeing that the new ones will not commit the same mistakes. This decision targeted 505 major-generals, 82

60 Omar Ashaour, op. cit. p. 10 61 Habib El-Adly, the last Minister of interior that served in Mubarak›s regime from 1997 to 2011


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brigadier generals and 82 colonels.62 A similar move was introduced in Poland, but it was well organized to guarantee that the new leaders are respecting the new police doctrine and abiding by the laws. Moreover, it was not an isolated decision; it was rather a part of a comprehensive plan that consisted of reformulation of a new police doctrine, a tight monitoring system of police performance and a wide campaign of capacity building and training course abroad.

On the other hand, the second point is mainly cognitive, personal and non-guaranteed for long term. Under the SCAF rule, some police officials refused to disperse by force peaceful demonstrations in front of Maspero building in October 2011 and in front of the cabinet headquarter in December 2011. Therefore, army forces were mobilized to do the job instead. However, police forces were involved in brutality in other incidents, especially in Mohamed Mahmoud Street in November 2011 and were accused of wide passivity and neglect that led to the massacre of Ahly Ultras members in PortSaid stadium in February 2012. Thus, we cannot relay for long on such un-institutional personal initiatives to reform such a complicated institution as the MOI. It was obvious that the needed reform is not well received by the MOI officials; they could accept replacing a minister with another as long as they are all former officers. However, civilians are not welcomed in the high level administration inside the MOI, and new policies cannot be introduced through the same old mindsets.

On the other side, the parliament managed to issue an amendment for the police law just a month before its dissolution in summer 2012. The amendment consisted mainly of raising the police officers salaries and guaranteeing some of the officers’ rights63. The amended law raised lot of frustrations, since it was not projecting a comprehensive process for police reform, rather it has responded to some minor demands64.

III- Morsi’s Security Policy

a- Appeasing Fears and Increasing Salaries

In his first few inaugural speeches, President Morsi was keen to praise the police officers and appreciate their neutral performance during the presidential elections. The main point he emphasized on in many occasions was to appease the police officers’ fears about their future and immunity. His speeches were loaded with tolerance and reconciliation for the long history of police brutality,

62 Omar Ashour, op. cit., p.1063 Al—Masry AL-Youm, 30-5-201264 Omar Ashour, op. cit., p.11


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but at the same time he was constantly stressing on rendering “the martyrs’ rights” without clarifying how he could compromise these two dimensions. Furthermore, Morsi appointed a minister of Interior that was bad received by most of human rights and political activists for his previous responsibility for Mohamed Mahmoud street clashes in 2011. Those clashes that resulted in more than 11 victims were left unpunished and related police officials were not even made accountable based on administrative neglect. After popular pressures, only one officer, who was called by the media “sniper of the eyes”, was brought to justice and his case is still ongoing till today.

On the other hand, a new set of salaries was introduced to all policemen based on a big increase to enhance their living conditions. The Security share in the budget of 2012-2013 is kept the same, but differently divided to permit this salaries’ increase. Accordingly, the salary of the lowest rank of police officers (just graduated) will start by 2218 LE after being around 650 LE before65.

Such an improvement could be valued if it was accompanied with a clear plan of reforms to enhance Police professionalism, skills and performance. The raise in salaries could have been conditioned with the degree of assimilation of the new police doctrine, norms and ethics respecting human rights and liberties. However, raising salaries without introducing any reforms would positively reinforce the police abuses and keep them immune rather than make them accountable.

b- Applying Old Methods

According to El-Nahda project, Morsi promised: the respect of Human Rights, Law enforcement, solving crimes, enhancing Police skills, reforming the Police Academy curricula and restructuring the Internal management of MOI. Nevertheless, those vague slogans were not translated into tangible policy options with specified action plans or defined timeframe. By appointing Ahmed Gamal El-Din, a minister that was serving as head of the General Security Sector when Mohamed Mahmoud clashes took place, Morsi was giving chance to the figures resisting change to gain space in the MOI.

The police forces’ reaction to peaceful demonstrations was kept almost the same. During the commemoration of the Mohamed Mahmoud clashes in 2012, the police forces applied the same propaganda alleging that the demonstrators are intending to break in the MOI headquarter. Tears gas was massively fired and armed groups with civilian uniforms were given the chance to attack the protestors with no minor intervention from police forces. Later the minister of

65 Al-shorouk newspaper, 21-6-2012


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Interior accused a “third party” of poisoning the relation between the police and the protestors66. Hence, the police forces were not motivated to apply new peaceful methods to negotiate or to peacefully deal with riots. Furthermore, no substantial investigations were held to identify the so called “third party” that was accused of attacking both sides: police forces and protestors. Like the first clashes in Mohamed Mahmoud in 2011, the prosecutors were present on the scene, collected some evidences and no results were announced.

On the other hand, peaceful protestors sitting-in in front of the Presidential Palace in December 2012 were severely attacked for at least 10 hours with a clear passivity from the security forces. Human Rights Watch criticized the police’s neutrality when witnessing the unlawful detention of around 49 demonstrators and their torture by Islamist militants on the 5th and 6th of December 2012. Those clashes resulted in the killing of 10 and the injury of 749, with no prospect for punishment for the perpetrators67. Rather than applying peaceful methods for controlling riots, police stayed neutral while political factions were holding a street war in the surrounding area of the Presidential Palace and in different governorates.

Therefore, the Police forces are whether taking part in clashes by directly targeting the peaceful demonstrators or staying neutral leaving the ground for a “mini civil war” to prosper. This fact reflects a real failure of adopting a new doctrine based on political neutrality, law enforcement and respect of human rights. Rather than arresting protestors involved in violence, police forces are whether involved in counter-violence or playing negative passivity. On the contrary, others evaluated this passive attitude as an attempt from the minister of Interior to pull out from politics; hence, it was shortly replaced by a new minister that showed willingness to resume political repression for the sake of the new regime68. When comparing Mohamed Ibrahim, the new minister of Interior to the former Ahmed Gamal El-Din, it seems that both are resisting reforms, but the new one seems more flexible in deploying Police Forces in political disputes.

On the other hand, the MOI spent the equivalent of £1.7m on 140,000 US-sourced teargas in late January 2013 in the mid of an economic crisis and a new

66 Al-Masry Al-Youm, 21-11-201267 Al-Masry AL-Youm, 12-12-201268 Mohamed Adam, “Brothers and Soldiers: a weakened security Apparatus is implicated in political

play”, in Egypt Independent, 6-2-2013, http://www.egyptindependent.com/news/brothers-and-soldiers-weakened-security-apparatus-implicated-political-play


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wave of protests against police brutality69. Rather than introducing reforms to build the professional capacities of a democratic policing apparatus, the MOI focused its expenditure on importing new weapons and uniforms for its CSF. But interestingly, those weapons were not effective in imposing law and order in different governorates when protests were resumed in the second anniversary of the revolution.

c- Policy Outcome: Mistrust and Disorder

Since the security policy is kept the same without any substantial change, the outcome is also the same, despite the State’s denial. During the first 100 days of Morsi’s mandate, the security condition in the streets has improved, the security patrols are present in the neighborhoods, and the police officers are no longer abstaining from working. In his speech on the 6th of October, Morsi rated the success of the security plan in the first 100 days by 70%. The success he perceived was increasing the policemen salaries by 300%, capturing of 500 criminal gangs, capturing of 320 dangerous criminals, solving 300 cases and recapturing of 6500 stolen cars70.

Nevertheless, police methods were kept the same, and any recorded success was not the result of the reforms introduced but the result of the self confidence the policemen gained after being praised by the president and protected from any potential prosecution for human rights abuses.

Al-Nadeem Center for the rehabilitation of torture victims reported over 247 cases of police brutality incidents during the first 100 days of Morsi’s mandate. Amongst those abuses were 34 cases of unlawful killings and 88 cases of torture practiced against detained in police stations and prisons71. Later on, Mohamed Mahmoud clashes this year resulted in one killing and 152 injuries72, while the Presidential Palace clashes in late 2012 resulted in 10 killings and 749 injuries73.

Furthermore, the MOI celebrated the second anniversary of the revolution by tremendous amount of human rights abuses. In PortSaid, after issuing the verdict sentencing 21 of the suspects of PortSaid stadium massacres with

69 Patrick Kingsly, “Egypt spent £1.7m on teargas amid economic crisis”, in the Guardian, 22-2-2013, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/feb/22/egypt-17million-teargas-economic-crisis

70 Statistics based on the President›s Speech on 6th of October 2012 in Cairo stadium 71 “Egyptian police torture 88, kill 34 under President Morsi: Rights report”, AhramOnline, 15-10-

2012. http://english.ahram.org.eg/News/55595.aspx72 Al-Masry AL-Youm, 22-11-201273 Al-Masry AL-Youm, 12-12-2012


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death penalty, wide riots exploded in the city. The wide riots resulted in 45 killed amongst were two policemen and 884 injured by gunfire74. While the MOI accused thugs of attempting to break in the prison to liberate the sentenced prisoners, the residents of the city claimed that the police forces were randomly shooting ordinary people and attacking the funerals with teargas. The MOI was entirely incapable of facing the situation in Portsaid, hence, the curfew was imposed and the army forces replaced police forces in imposing order. In that sense, the MOI went back to square one, where it could not manage the situation, the policemen were fleeing and abandoning their stations, and the army is replacing them.

Despite that failure, the MOI continued its human rights abuses in many occasions; 21 Egyptian rights group reported that the police brutality has regained the old rates of Mubarak’s era. Since late January 2013, around 70 protesters were tortured under detention, beside hundreds detained without trial and several male protesters were raped in custody75. On the other hand, Morsi’s allies argued that the president could not be blamed for these incidents since the reform of the institutions in Egypt, including the MOI might take more than a decade. But the real problem is that the reform has not started yet to predict its results after a decade.

“The president has not said a single word about torture; the prime minister went to the headquarters of Central Security Forces after recent clashes in Port Said to promise them he would give them more weapons; the government has brushed aside all initiatives to reform the police; the minister of justice denied torture existed under President Morsi, and has often said the police cannot be reformed except from within and based on initiatives by its leadership”76. However, the only reform that the MOI understands is more salary raises, more weapons and less accountability. In mid- February, police officers in Bani-suwaf, in Upper Egypt, revenged the death of one of their colleagues by bringing the detained suspect to the officer’s funeral to be severely beaten by the policemen77. Such an unprofessional attitude was not even subject to internal investigation within the MOI, the officers were rather excused and even protected against any judicial complaints.

74 Alwafd, 25-2-201375 Patrick Kingsley, op. cit.76 Khaled Fahmy, “Egypt: What doesn’t Morsi understand about police reform?”, Al-

Ahram Weekly, 1-3-2013, http://english.ahram.org.eg/News/65849.aspx?fb_action_ids=10152636344535217&fb_action_types=og.recommends&fb_source=aggregation&fb_aggregation_id=288381481237582

77 Amr El-Shobaki, “And If the MOI Collapses?” in Arabic, in AlMasry AlYoum, 17-2-2013, http://www.almasryalyoum.com/node/1479901


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In this sense the Egyptian blood is still wasted because of the postponement of needed reforms in the security sector. Moreover, there is no serious intention to make the responsible for those incidents accountable. There were lots of suggestions to initiate a comprehensive system of accountability and monitoring over the police performance that ranges from appointing a Human Rights Ombudsman to the activation of the role of the National Council of Human Rights, but all were ignored by Morsi.

On the other hand, the police control over Sinai was increasingly violated. Criminal gangs and radical Islamist militants were obviously challenging the State’s sovereignty. The security policy in Sinai is still unbalanced; policemen are under-armed and under-equipped when compared to the gangs they are supposed to chase and police checkpoints and stations are becoming easy targets for armed groups. Several protests were reported amongst policemen in Sinai to refute the failed policies of the MOI, but the result was only changing the head of the security unit in Areesh not altering the policy78.

Conclusion

When accessing to power, Morsi thought that he would gain the alliance of the Ministry of Interior (MIO) if he granted its officers full forgiveness and immunity against their previous abuses. He ignored the different initiatives of security sector reform, considering that reconciling with the police apparatus could motivate its officers to reform and ally with the new ruler. Nevertheless, there is no prospect for the MOI to introduce a voluntary reform plan; such a plan should be imposed by the President and should involve civilian actors, judges, human activists, experts and young reformist officers. He has all the authority to do so whether through introducing legislations imposing reform or involving a judicial oversight over police practices or establishing a new institution such the Ombudsman.

Postponing reforms does neither appease the tension nor weaken the resistance; it is rather doubling the problem and embarrassing the President and eroding his credibility. The experience of South Africa is very relevant in that regard, the transition was concluded in 1991, new security policy was discussed in 1992, cosmetic reforms were introduced two years later, but the absence of accountability procedures was the main reason for the failed reform. Consecutive governments were reluctant in introducing substantial reform, old police figures stayed in office and a private security sector was established to

78 Al-Masry Al-Youm, 4-11-2012


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compensate the public police failure79. Afterwards, the lobby of the private security business has frequently impeded police reform to guarantee its own viability. The crime rate in South Africa is amongst the highest worldwide and it is the first worldwide on the scale of gun violence80. On the contrary, the police transformation in Poland and Czech Republic were much more successful, one reason for that was the introduction of reforms in early period right after the transition and the involvement of human rights, judges and young reformist officers in the design of reforms. Another reason for that success was the involvement of international actors in catalyzing, financing and supporting such reforms. Germany, the UK and the US were amongst the international partners that helped training, equipping and supporting the new polish police, a condition that Egypt lacks and should consider accepting if introduced by its international allies. Finally, I suggest that Egypt’s precarious political condition does not afford a further postponement of the security reform. Otherwise, the essential human rights are at the stack and the credibility of the first freely elected civilian President is really endangered.

REFERENCES

BOOKS AND STUDIES

ASHOUR, OMAR, "FROM BAD COP TO GOOD COP: THE CHALLENGE OF SECURITY SECTOR REFORM IN EGYPT", BROOKINGS DOHA CENTER- STANFORD PROJECT ON ARAB TRANSITIONS, PAPER SERIES #3, NOVEMBER 2012, ONLINE

CHAN, JANET, "CHANGING POLICE CULTURE", IN BRIT.J. CR1MIN0L, VOL.36 NO. 1 WINTER 1996, ONLINE

PAUN, CHRISTOPHER, DEMOCRATIZATION AND POLICE REFORM, FREIE UNIVERSITÄT BERLIN, HUMBOLDT-UNIVERSITÄT ZU BERLIN AND UNIVERSITÄT POTSDAM, JOINT MASTER'S DEGREE PROGRAM IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, OCTOBER 2007, ONLINE

RAHMAWATI, ARIFAH AND AZCA NAJIB, "POLICE REFORM FROM BELOW: EXAMPLES FROM INDONESIA’S TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY", CENTER FOR SECURITY AND PEACE STUDIES AND GADJAH MADA UNIVERSITY, DEMOCRACY CONFLICT AND HUMAN SECURITY, ONLINE

ROMMEL, JAN, "MY EXPERIENCE IN THE MINISTRY OF INTERIOR", IN TRANSITION PROCESS: THE CZECH EXPERIENCE, PEOPLE IN NEED FOUNDATION, HTTP://WWW.CLOVEKVTISNI.CZ/INDEX2EN.PHP?ID=629

79 Democratic Oversight of Police Forces, Mechanisms for Accountability and Community Policing, National Democratic Institute, 2008, p.47

80 International Crime Statistics, South Africa, http://www.nationmaster.com/country/sf-south-africa/cri-crime


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REPORTS:

ARAB REFORM INITIATIVE, EGYPT: POLICE, PEOPLE AND A MISSING TRUST", FEBRUARY, 2011

DEMOCRATIC OVERSIGHT OF POLICE FORCES, MECHANISMS FOR ACCOUNTABILITY AND COMMUNITY POLICING, NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTE, 2008, ONLINE

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ARTICLES:

ADAM, MOHAMED, "BROTHERS AND SOLDIERS: A WEAKENED SECURITY APPARATUS IS IMPLICATED IN POLITICAL PLAY", IN EGYPT INDEPENDENT, 6-2-2013, HTTP://WWW.EGYPTINDEPENDENT.COM/NEWS/BROTHERS-AND-SOLDIERS-WEAKENED-SECURITY-APPARATUS-IMPLICATED-POLITICAL-PLAY

EL-SHOBAKI, AMR, "AND IF THE MOI COLLAPSES?" IN ARABIC, IN ALMASRY ALYOUM, 17-2-2013, HTTP://WWW.ALMASRYALYOUM.COM/NODE/1479901

FAHMY, KHALED, "EGYPT: WHAT DOESN'T MORSI UNDERSTAND ABOUT POLICE REFORM?", AL-AHRAM WEEKLY, 1-3-2013, HTTP://ENGLISH.AHRAM.ORG.EG/NEWS/65849.ASPX?FB_ACTION_IDS=10152636344535217&FB_ACTION_TYPES=OG.RECOMMENDS&FB_SOURCE=AGGREGATION&FB_AGGREGATION_ID=288381481237582

HESHAM, HEBA, “POLICE OFFICERS PROTEST THE MOI FOR OWN SYNDICATE”, IN DAILY NEWS EGYPT, 28-3-2012, HTTP://WWW.DAILYNEWSEGYPT.COM/2012/03/28/POLICE-OFFICERS-PROTEST-AT-MOI-FOR-OWN-SYNDICATE/

KINGSLEY, PATRICK, "EGYPT SPENT £1.7M ON TEARGAS AMID ECONOMIC CRISIS", IN THE GUARDIAN, 22-2-2013, HTTP://WWW.GUARDIAN.CO.UK/WORLD/2013/FEB/22/EGYPT-17MILLION-TEARGAS-ECONOMIC-CRISIS

NEWSPAPERS AND WEBSITES:

INTERNATIONAL CRIME STATISTICS, SOUTH AFRICA, HTTP://WWW.NATIONMASTER.COM/COUNTRY/SF-SOUTH-AFRICA/CRI-CRIME

EGYPT INDEPENDENT

AL-AHRAM WEEKLY

DAILY NEWS EGYPT

THE GUARDIAN

AL-SHOROUK

AL-MASRY AL-YOUM

AL-WAFD

AL-BADIL

AHRAMONLINE


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